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ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR, A

Rational Account of the Grounds

OF

NATURAL and REVEAL'D

RELIGION.

THE EIGHTH EDITION.

To which is now added

Part of another BOOK *upon the ſame Subject,*

Written *A. D.* MDCXCVII.

Publiſh'd from the AUTHOR's Own

MANUSCRIPT.

The Second Volume.

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, D. D.

Late Lord Biſhop of *Worceſter.*

LONDON,
Printed by *J. Heptinſtall*, for HENRY and GEORGE MORTLOCK,
at the *Phœnix* in St. *Paul*'s Church-yard, MDCCIX.

G.R. III

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR A

Rational Account of the Grounds

OF THE

CHRISTIAN FAITH,

AS TO THE

TRUTH

AND

Divine Authority

OF THE

SCRIPTURES,

And the Matters therein contain'd.

By **EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, M. A.**

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2 Pet. 1. 26. *For we have not followed cunningly deviſed Fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but were eye-witneſſes of his Majeſty.*

Neque religio ulla ſine ſapientia ſuſcipienda eſt, nec ulla ſine religione probanda ſapientia. Lactant. de falſ. relig. cap. 1.

LONDON,
Printed for HENRY and GEORGE MORTLOCK, at the Sign of the
Phœnix in St. *Paul*'s Church-yard, MDCCIX.

G.R III
BRITISH MUSEUM

To his moſt Honour'd FRIEND

And PATRON

Sr. ROGER BOURGOINE,

Knight and Baronet.

SIR,

IT was the early felicity of *Moſes*, when expoſ'd in an Ark of *Nilotic papyre*, to be adopted into the ſavour of ſo great a Perſonage as the Daughter of *Pharaoh*: Such another Ark is this Vindication of the Writings of that Divine and Excellent Perſon expoſ'd to the World in; and the greateſt ambition of the Author of it is, to have it receiv'd into your Patronage and Protection. But altho' the Contexture and Frame of this Treatiſe be far below the excellency and worth of the ſubject (as you know the Ark in which *Moſes* was put, *was of bulruſhes daubed with ſlime and pitch,*) yet when You pleaſe to caſt your eye on the matter contain'd in it, you will not think it beneath your Favour, and unworthy your Protection. For if Truth be the greateſt preſent which God could beſtow, or Man receive (according to that of *Plutarch*, Ὡς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπῳ λαβεῖν μεῖζον, ἢ χαρίσασθαι Θεῷ σεμνότερον ἀληθείας) then *Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.* certainly thoſe Truths deſerve our moſt ready acceptance, which are in themſelves of greaetſt importance, and have the greateſt evidence that they come from God. And altho' I have had the happineſs of ſo near relation to You, as to know how little You need ſuch diſcourſes which tend to ſettle the Foundations of Religion, which you have rais'd ſo happy a Superſtructure upon; yet withal I conſider what particular kindneſs the Souls of all good Men bear to ſuch deſigns, whoſe end is to aſſert and vindicate the Truth and Excellency of Religion. For thoſe who are enrich'd themſelves with the ineſtimable Treaſure of true Goodneſs and Piety are far from that envious temper to think nothing valuable but what they are the ſole poſſeſſors of; but ſuch are the moſt ſatisfy'd themſelves, when they ſee others not only admire but enjoy what they have the higheſt eſtimation of. Were all who make a ſhew of Religion in the World really ſuch as they pretend to be, Diſcourſes of this nature would be no more ſeaſonable, than the commendations of a great Beauty to one who is already a paſſionate admirer of it; but on the contrary we ſee how common it is for Men firſt to throw Dirt in the face of Religion, and then perſuade themſelves it is its natural Complexion; they repreſent it to themſelves in a ſhape leaſt pleaſing to them, and then bring that as a Plea why they give it no better entertainment.

It may juſtly ſeem ſtrange, that true Religion, which contains nothing in it but what is truly Noble and Generous, moſt rational and pleaſing to the Spirits of all good Men, ſhould yet ſuffer ſo much in its eſteem in the World, thro' thoſe ſtrange and uncouth vizards it is repreſented under. Some accounting the life and practice of it, as it ſpeaks ſubduing our Wills to the Will of God (which is the ſubſtance of all Religion) a thing too low and mean for their Rank and Condition in the World; while others pretend a quarrel againſt the Principles of it, as unſatisfactory to Humane Reaſon. Thus Religion ſuffers with the Author of it between two Thieves; and it is hard to define which is more injurious to it, that which queſtions the Principles, or that which deſpiſeth the Practice of it. And nothing certainly will more incline Men to believe that we live in an Age of Prodigies, than that there ſhould be any ſuch in the Chriſtian World, who ſhould account it a piece of Gentility to deſpiſe Religion, and a piece of Reaſon to be *Atheiſts*. For if there be any ſuch thing in the World as a true height and magnanimity of Spirit, if there be any ſolid Reaſon and depth of Judgment, they are not only conſiſtent with, but only attainable by a true generous Spirit of Religion. But if we look at that which the looſe and profane World is apt to account the greateſt Gallantry, we ſhall find it made up of ſuch pitiful ingredients, which any skilful and rational Mind will be aſham'd to plead for, much leſs to mention them in competition with true Goodneſs and unfeign'd Piety. For how eaſy is it to obſerve ſuch who would be accounted the moſt high and gallant Spirits, to quarry on ſuch mean preys, which only tend to ſatisfy their brutiſh appetites, or fleſh Revenge with the Blood of ſuch who have ſtood in the way of that airy title, *Honour!* Or elſe they are ſo little apprehenſive of the inward worth and excellency of Human Nature, that they ſeem to envy the gallantry of Peacocks, and ſtrive to outvy them in the gayety of their Plumes; ſuch who are, as *Seneca* ſaith, *ad ſimilitudinem parietum extrinſecus culti*, who imitate the Walls of their Houſes in the fairneſs of the outſides, but matter not what rubbiſh there lies within. The utmoſt of their ambition is to attain *enervatam felicitatem qua permadeſcunt animi*, ſuch a felicity as evigorates the Soul by too long ſteeping, it being the nature of all terreſtrial pleaſures, that they do Ἐκτήκειν ϗ ἀνυγραίνειν τὸ φρονοῦν; by degrees *conſume Reaſon*, by *effeminating* and *ſoftening* the *Intellectuals*. Muſt we appeal then to the judgment of *Sardanapalus* concerning the nature of Felicity, or inquire of *Apicius* what Temperance is? or deſire that *Sybarite* to define Magnanimity, who fainted to ſee a Man at hard labour?

Or doth now the conqueſt of Paſſions, forgiving Injuries, doing good, Self-denial, Humility, Patience under croſſes, which are the real expreſſions of Piety, ſpeak nothing more noble and generous than a luxurious, malicious, proud, and impatient Spirit? Is there nothing more becoming and agreeable to the Soul of Man, in exemplary Piety, and a Holy well-ordered Converſation, than the lightneſs and vanity (not to ſay rudeneſs and debaucheries) of thoſe whom the World accounts the greateſt Gallants? Is there nothing more graceful and pleaſing in the ſweetneſs, candor, and ingenuity of a truly Chriſtian temper and diſpoſition, than in the revengeful, implacable Spirit of ſuch whoſe Honour lives and is fed by the Blood of their Enemies? Is it not more truly honourable and glorious to ſerve that GOD who commands the World, than to be a ſlave to thoſe paſſions and luſts which put Men upon continual hard ſervice, and torment them for it when they have done it? Were there nothing elſe to commend Religion to the Minds of Men, beſides that tranquility and calmneſs of Spirit, that ſerene and peaceable temper which follow a good Conſcience where-ever it dwells, it were enough to make Men welcome that Gueſt which brings ſuch good entertainment with it. Whereas the amazements, horrors, and anxieties of Mind, which at one time or other haunt ſuch who proſtitute their Conſciences to a violation of the Laws of GOD, and the Rules of rectify'd Reaſon, may be enough to perſuade any rational Perſon, that Impiety is the greateſt folly, and Irreligion madneſs.

It cannot be then but matter of great pity to conſider that any Perſons, whoſe Birth and education hath rais'd them above the common People of the World, ſhould be ſo far their own enemies, as to obſerve the Faſhion more than the Rules of Religion, and to ſtudy Complements more than Themſelves, and read Romances more than the ſacred Scriptures, *which alone are able to make them wiſe unto ſalvation.*

But, SIR, I need not mention theſe things to You, unleſs it be to let you ſee the excellency of your choice, in preferring true Vertue and Piety above the Ceremony and Grandeur of the World. Go on, SIR, to value and meaſure true Religion, not by the uncertain meaſures of the World, but by the infallible dictates of GOD himſelf in his ſacred Oracles. Were it not for theſe, what certain foundation could there be for our Faith to ſtand on? and who durſt venture his Soul, as to its future condition, upon any Authority leſs than the infallible veracity of GOD himſelf? What certain directions for practice ſhould we have, what Rule to judge of Opinions by, had not God out of his infinite Goodneſs provided and preſerved this authentic Inſtrument of his Will to the World? What a ſtrange Religion would Chriſtianity ſeem, ſhould we frame the Model of it from any other thing than the Word of GOD? Without all controverſy the diſeſteem of the Scriptures upon any pretence whatſoever, is the decay of Religion, and thro' many windings and turnings leads Men at laſt into the very depth of Atheiſm. Whereas the frequent and ſerious converſing with the Mind of GOD in his Word is incomparably uſeful, not only for keeping up in us a true notion of Religion (which is eaſily miſtaken, when Men look upon the face of it in any other glaſs than that of the Scriptures) but likewiſe for maintaining a powerful ſenſe of Religion in the Soul of Men, and a due valuation of it, whatever its eſteem or entertainment be in the World. For tho' the true genuine Spirit of Chriſtianity (which is known by the purity and peaceableneſs of it) ſhould grow never ſo much out of credit with the World, yet none who heartily believe the Scripture to be the Word of God, and that the Matters reveal'd therein are infallibly true, will ever have the leſs eſtimation of it. It muſt be confeſs'd that the credit of Religion hath much ſuffer'd in the Age we live in thro' the vain pretences of many to it, who have only acted a part in it, for the ſake of ſome private intereſts of their own. And it is the uſual *Logic* of *Atheiſts*, *Crimine ab uno diſce omnes*; if there be any hypocrites, all who make ſhew of Religion are ſuch; on which account *the Hypocriſy of one Age makes way for the Atheiſm of the next.* But how unreaſonable and unjuſt that Imputation is, there needs not much to diſcover, unleſs it be an argument there are no true Men in the World, becauſe there are ſo many Apes which imitate them; or that there are no Jewels, becauſe there are ſo many counterfeits. And bleſſed be God, our Age is not barren of inſtances of real goodneſs and unaffected Piety; there being ſome ſuch generous Spirits as dare love Religion without the dowry of Intereſt, and manifeſt their affection to it in the plain dreſs of the Scriptures, without the paint and ſet-offs, which are added to it by the ſeveral contending parties of the Chriſtian World. Were there more ſuch noble Spirits of Religion in our Age, *Atheiſm* would want one of the greateſt pleas which it now makes againſt the truth of Religion; for nothing enlarges more the Gulf of *Atheiſm*, than that Μέγα χάσμα, *wide paſſage* which lies between the Faith and Lives of Men pretending to be Chriſtians. I muſt needs ſay there is nothing ſeems more ſtrange and unaccountable to me, than that the practice of the unqueſtionable duties of *Chriſtianity* ſhou'd be put out of countenance, or ſlighted by any who own, profeſs, and contend for the Principles of it. Can the profeſſion of that be honourable, whoſe practice is not? *If the Principles be true, why are they not practis'd? If they be not true, why are they profeſs'd?*

You ſee, Sir, to what an unexpected length my deſire to vindicate the Honour as well as Truth of Religion, hath drawn out this preſent Addreſs. But I may ſooner hope for your pardon in it, than if I had ſpent ſo much paper after the uſual manner of Dedications, in repreſenting You to Your ſelf, or the World. Sir, I know You have too much of that I have been commending, to delight in Your own deſerv'd Praiſes, much leſs in Flatteries, which ſo benign a ſubject might eaſily make one's pen run over in. And therein I might not much have digreſs'd from my deſign, ſince I know few more exemplary for that rare mixture of true Piety, and the higheſt Civility together, in whom that ineſtimable Jewel of Religion is plac'd in a moſt ſweet, affable, and obliging temper. But altho' none will be more ready on any occaſion with all gratitude to acknowledge the great obligations You have laid upon me; yet I am ſo far ſenſible of the common vanity of *Epiſtles Dedicatory*, that I cannot ſo heartily comply with them in any thing, as in my hearty prayers to the Almighty for your good and welfare, and in ſubſcribing my ſelf,

SIR,

Your moſt humble

June 5.
1662.

and affectionate Servant,

ED. STILLINGFLEET.

THE

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

IT is neither to ſatisfy the importunity of Friends, nor to prevent falſe Copies (which and ſuch like excuſes I know are expected in uſual Prefaces) that I have adventured abroad this following Treatiſe: but it is out of a juſt reſentment of the affronts and indignities which have been caſt on Religion, by ſuch who account it a matter of judgment to disbelieve the Scriptures, and a piece of wit to diſpute themſelves out of the poſſibility of being happy in another World: When yet the more acute and ſubtile their arguments are, the greater their ſtrength is againſt themſelves; it being impoſſible there ſhould be ſo much wit and ſubtilty in the Souls of Men, were they not of a more excellent Nature than they imagin them to be. And how contradictious is it for ſuch Perſons to be ambitious of being cry'd up for Wit and Reaſon, whoſe deſign is to degrade the rational Soul ſo far below her ſelf, as to make her become like the Beaſts that periſh! If now the weight and conſequence of the ſubject, and the two great ſeaſonableneſs of it (if the common fame of the large ſpread of Atheiſm *among us be true) be not ſufficient Apology for the publiſhing this Book. I am reſolv'd rather to undergo thy cenſure than be beholding to any other. The intendment therefore of this Preface is only to give a brief account of the ſcope, deſign, and method of the following Books, altho' the view of the Contents of the Chapters might ſufficiently acquaint thee with it. How for I have been either from tranſcribing, or a deſign to excuſs out of the hands of their admirers, the ſeveral Writings on the behalf of Religion in general, or Chriſtianity in particular (eſpecially* Mornay, Grotius, Amyraldus, *&c.) may eaſily appear by comparing what is contain'd in their Books and this together. Had I not thought ſomething might be ſaid, if not not more fully and rationally, yet more ſuitably to the preſent temper of this Age, than what is already written by them, thou hadſt been troubled with this Preface, much leſs with the whole Book. But as the Tempers and Genius's of Ages and Times alter, ſo do the arms and weapons which* Atheiſts *imploy againſt Religion:*

the moſt popular pretences of the Atheiſts *of our Age, have been the irreconcilableneſs of the account of Times in Scripture, with that of the learned and ancient Heathen Nations; the inconſiſtency of the belief of the Scriptures with the Principles of Reaſon; and the account which may be given of the Origin of things from Principles of Philoſophy without the Scriptures: Theſe three therefore I have particularly ſet my ſelf againſt, and directed againſt each of them a ſeveral Book. In the firſt I have manifeſted that there is no ground of credibility in the account of ancient times given by any Heathen Nations different from the Scriptures, which I have with ſo much care and diligence inquir'd into, that from thence we may hope to hear no more of Men before* Adam *to ſalve the Authority of the Scriptures by, which yet was intended only as a deſign to undermine them; but I have not thought the frivolous pretences of the Author of that* Hypotheſis *worth particular mentioning, ſuppoſing it ſufficient to give a clear account of things without particular citation of Authors, where it was not of great concernment for underſtanding the thing it ſelf. In the ſecond Book I have undertaken to give a rational account of the grounds, why we are to believe thoſe ſeveral Perſons, who in ſeveral Ages were imploy'd to reveal the Mind of* GOD *to the World; and with greater particularity than hath yet been us'd, I have inſiſted on the Perſons of* Moſes, *and the Prophets, our Saviour and his Apoſtles, and in every of them manifeſted the rational evidences on which they were to be believ'd, not only by the Men of their own Age, but by thoſe of ſucceeding Generations. In the third Book I have inſiſted on the matters themſelves which are either ſuppos'd by, or reveal'd in the Scriptures; and have therein not only manifeſted the certainty of the foundations of all Religion, which lie in the being of* GOD *and Immortality of the Soul, but the undoubted truth of thoſe particular accounts concerning the Origin of the Univerſe, of Evil, and of Nations, which were moſt liable to the* Atheiſts *exceptions, and have therein conſider'd all the pretences of Philoſophy Ancient or Modern, which have ſeem'd to contradict any of them; to which* (mantiſſæ loco) *I have added the Evidence of Scripture-Hiſtory in the remainders of it in Heathen Mythology, and concluded all with a Diſcourſe of the excellency of the Scriptures. Thus having given a brief view of the Deſign and Method of the whole, I ſubmit it to every free and unprejudic'd judgment. All the favour then I ſhall requeſt of thee is, to read ſeriouſly, and judge impartially; and then I doubt not but thou wilt ſee as much reaſon for Religion as I do.*

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ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

BOOK I.

53:1.H.

CHAP. I.

The Obſcurity and Defect of Ancient Hiſtory.

I. II. III. IV. *The knowledge of* Truth *proved to be the moſt natural perfection of the Rational Soul*; V. *Yet* Error *often miſtaken for Truth: the Accounts of it.* VI. *Want of Diligence in its ſearch*; VII. VIII. *The Mixture of Truth and Falſhood: Thence comes either rejecting Truth for the Error's ſake, or embracing the Error for the Truth's ſake*; IX. *The firſt inſtanced in Heathen Philoſophers,* XIII. *The ſecond in Vulgar Heathen.* X. XI. XII. *Of* Philoſophical Atheiſm, *and the grounds of it.* XIV. *The Hiſtory of* Antiquity *very obſcure.* XV. *The Queſtion ſtated, where the true Hiſtory of Ancient Times is to be found? in Heathen Hiſtories, or only in Scripture?* XVI. *The want of Credibility in* Heathen Hiſtories *aſſerted and proved by the general Defect for want of timely Records among Heathen Nations; the reaſon of it ſhewed from the firſt Plantations of the World.* XVII. *The manner of them diſcovered. The Original of* Civil Government. XVIII. *Of* Hieroglyphics. XIX. *The uſe of* Letters *among the* Greeks *no elder than* Cadmus; XX. *His Time enquired into: no elder than* Joſhua: XXI. *The Learning brought into* Greece *by him.*

I. ENQUIRIES after Truth have that peculiar commendation above all other Deſigns, that they come on purpoſe to gratify the moſt noble Faculty of our Souls, and do moſt immediately tend to advance the higheſt perfection of our Rational Beings. For all our moſt laudable endeavours after Knowledge now, are only the gathering up of ſome ſcattered Fragments of what was once an entire Fabric, and the recovery of ſome precious Jewels which were loſt out of ſight, and ſunk in the ſhipwrack of Humane Nature. That ſaying of *Plato*, *That all Knowledge is Remembrance, and all Ignorance Forgetfulneſs*, is a certain undoubted truth; if by Forgetfulneſs be meant the Loſs, and by Remembrance the Recovery of thoſe notions and conceptions of things which the Mind of Man once had in its pure and primitive State, wherein the Underſtanding was the trueſt Microcoſm, in which all the Beings of the inferior World were faithfully repreſented according to their true, native, and genuine Perfections. GOD created the Soul of Man not only capable of finding out the Truth of

things,

things, but furniſhed him with a ſufficient κριτήριον, or Touchſtone to diſcover Truth from Falſhood, by a Light ſet up in his Underſtanding, which if he had attended to, he might have ſecured himſelf from all Impoſtures and Deceits. As all other Beings were created in the full poſſeſſion of the agreeable Perfections of their ſeveral Natures, ſo was Man too; elſe God would have never cloſed the Work of Creation with thoſe words, *And God ſaw all that he had made, and behold it was very good*, that is, endued with all thoſe Perfections which were ſuitable to their ſeveral Beings. Which Man had been moſt defective in, if his Underſtanding had not been endow'd with a large ſtock of Intellectual Knowledge, which is the moſt natural and genuine Perfection belonging to his Rational Being. For Reaſon being the moſt raiſed Faculty of Humane Nature, if that had been defective in its diſcoveries of Truth, which is its proper object, it would have argued the greateſt maim and imperfection in the Being it ſelf. For if it belongs to the perfection of the Senſitive Faculties to diſcern what is pleaſant from what is hurtful, it muſt needs be the perfection of the Rational to find out the difference of Truth from Falſhood. Not as tho' the Soul could then have had, any more than now, an actual notion of all the Beings in the World co-exiſting at the ſame time, but that it would have been free from all deceit in its Conceptions of things, which were not cauſed through inadvertency. Gen.1.31.

II. Which will appear from the ſeveral aſpects Man's Knowledge hath, which are either upwards towards his Maker, or abroad on his Fellow-Creatures. If we conſider that Contemplation of the Soul which fixes it ſelf on that infinite Being which was the cauſe of it, and is properly θεωρία; it will be found neceſſary for the Soul to be created in a clear and diſtinct knowledge of him, becauſe of Man's immediate obligation to obedience unto him. Which muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe the Knowledge of Him, whoſe Will muſt be his Rule: for if Man were not fully convinced in the firſt moment after his Creation of the Being of Him, whom he was to obey, his firſt work and duty would not have been Actual Obedience, but a Search whether there was any ſupreme, infinite, and eternal Being or no; and whereon his Duty to him was founded, and what might be ſufficient declaration of his Will and Laws, according to which he muſt regulate his obedience. The taking off all which doubts and ſcruples from the Soul of Man, muſt ſuppoſe him fully ſatisfied upon the firſt free uſe of Reaſon, that there was an Infinite Power and Being which produced him, and on that account had a right to command him in whatſoever he pleaſed, and that thoſe commands of his were declared to him in ſo certain a way, that he could not be deceived in the judging of them. The clear knowledge of God will further appear moſt neceſſary to Man in his firſt Creation, if we conſider that God created him for this end and purpoſe, To enjoy converſe, and an humble familiarity with Himſelf; he had then ἔμφυλον πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν κοινωνίαν, in the language of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Converſe with God was as natural to him as his Being was.* For Man, as he came firſt out of God's Hands, was the Reflection of God himſelf on a dark Cloud, the Iris of the Deity; the ſimilitude was the ſame, but the ſubſtance different: Thence he is ſaid to be created after the Image of God. His knowledge then had been more intellectual than diſcurſive; not ſo much imploying his Faculties in the operoſe deductions of Reaſon (the pleaſant toyl of the Rational Faculties ſince the Fall) but had immediately

Clemens *Protrept.* *p.* 63.

Gen.1.26.

diately imploy'd them about the ſublimeſt objects; not about Quiddities and Formalities, but about Him who was the fountain of his Being, and the center of his Happineſs. There was not then ſo vaſt a difference between the Angelical and Humane Life: the Angels and Men both fed on the ſame dainties; all the difference was, They were in the ὑπερῷον, the upper room in Heaven, and Man in the ſummer parlor in Paradiſe.

III. If we take a view of Man's knowledge as it reſpects his Fellow-Creatures, we ſhall find theſe were ſo fully known to him on his firſt Creation, that he needed not to go to School to the wide World to gather up his conceptions of them. For the right exerciſe of that Dominion which he was inſtated in over the Inferior World, doth imply a particular knowledge of the Nature, Being and Properties of thoſe things which he was to make uſe of, without which he could not have improved them for their peculiar ends. And from this knowledge did proceed the giving the Creatures thoſe proper and peculiar Names which were expreſſive of their ſeveral Natures. For as *Plato* tells us, ȣ πάντα δημιȣργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶ), ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τ ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ: *The Impoſition of Names on things belongs not to every one, but only to him that hath a full proſpect into their ſeveral Natures.* For it is moſt agreeable to Reaſon, that Names ſhould carry in them a ſuitableneſs to the things they expreſs; for Words being for no other end but to expreſs our Conceptions of things, and our Conceptions being but εἰκόνες ϗ ὁμοιώματα πραγμάτων, as the ſame Philoſopher ſpeaks, *The Reſemblances and Repreſentations of the things*, it muſt need follow, that where there was a true knowledge, the Conceptions muſt agree with the Things; and Words being to expreſs our Conceptions, none are ſo fit to do it, as thoſe which are expreſſive of the ſeveral Natures of the things they are uſed to repreſent. For otherwiſe all the uſe of Words is to be a meer Vocabulary to the Underſtanding, and an Index to Memory, and of no further uſe in the purſuit of knowledge, than to let us know what Words men are agreed to call things by. But ſomething further ſeems to be intended in their firſt Impoſition, whence the *Jews* call it הבדלת המינים as *Mercer* tells us, *a Separation and Diſtinction of the ſeveral kind of Things:* and *Kircher* thus Paraphraſes the Words of *Moſes*; *and whatſoever* Adam *called every living creature, that was the Name thereof: i. e.* ſaith he, *Fuerunt illis vera & germana Nomina & rerum Naturis propriè accommodata.* But however this be, we have this further evidence of that Height of knowledge which muſt be ſuppoſed in the firſt Man, that as he was the Firſt in his Kind, ſo he was to be the Standard and Meaſure of all that followed, and therefore could not want any thing of the due perfections of Humane Nature. And as the *Shekel* of the Sanctuary was, if not double to others, (as Men ordinarily miſtake) yet of a full and exact weight, becauſe it was to be the Standard for all other weights (which was the cauſe of its being kept in the Temple) ſo if the Firſt Man had not double the proportion and meaſure of knowledge which his Poſterity hath, if it was not running over in regard of Abundance, yet it muſt be preſſed down and ſhaken together in regard of weight; elſe he would be a very unfit Standard for us to judge by, concerning the due and ſuitable Perfections of Humane Nature.

Plato in Cratylo.

Mercerus in Gen. 2. 19.

Kircher Oedip. Ægypt. Tom. 2. Claſſ. 2. cap. 1.

IV. But we need not have run ſo far back as the Firſt Man, to evince the knowledge of Truth to be the moſt natural Perfection of the Soul of

Man; for even among the preſent ruines of Humane Nature, we may find ſome ſuch noble and generous Spirits, that diſcern ſo much beauty in the face of Truth, that to ſuch as ſhould enquire what they find ſo attractive in it, their anſwer would be the ſame with *Ariſtotle*'s in a like caſe, it was τυφλȣ̃ ἐρώτημα, *the Queſtion of thoſe who never ſaw it.* For ſo pleaſing is the enquiry, and ſo ſatisfactory the finding of Truth after the ſearch, that the reliſh of it doth far exceed the greateſt Epicuriſm of *Apicius*, or the moſt coſtly entertainments of *Cleopatra*; there being no Guſt ſo exquiſite as that of the Mind, nor any Jewels to be compared with Truth. Nor do any perſons certainly better deſerve the name of Men, than ſuch who allow their Reaſon a full employment, and think not the Erectneſs of Man's Stature a ſufficient diſtinction of him from Brutes. Of which thoſe may be accounted only a higher ſpecies, who can patiently ſuffer the impriſonment of their Intellectuals in a dungeon of Ignorance, and know themſelves to be Men only by thoſe characters, by which *Alexander* knew himſelf not to be a God, by their proneneſs to Intemperance and Sleep. So ſtrange a *Metempſychoſis* may there be without any change of Bodies; and *Euphorbus* his Soul might become a Brute without ever removing its lodging into the Body of an Aſs. So much will the Soul degenerate from it ſelf, if not improved; and in a kind of ſullenneſs ſcarce appear to be what it is, becauſe it is not improved to what it may be.

V. But, you'll ſay, if this knowledge of Truth be ſo great, ſo natural, ſo valuable a Perfection of Humane Nature, whence comes ſo much of the World to be over-run with Ignorance and Barbariſm? whence come ſo many pretenders to Knowledge, to court a Cloud inſtead of *Juno?* to pretend a love to Truth, and yet to fall down and worſhip Error? If there were ſo great a ſympathy between the Soul and Truth, there would be an impatient deſire after it, and a moſt ready embracing and cloſing with it. We ſee the Magnet doth not draw the Iron with greater force, than it ſeems to run with impatience into its cloſeſt embraces. If there had been formerly ſo intimate an acquaintance between the Soul and Truth, as *Socrates* fanſied of Friends in the other World, there would be an harmonious cloſure upon the firſt appearance, and no divorce to be after made between them.

True, but then we muſt conſider there is an intermediate ſtate between the former acquaintance, and the renewal of it, wherein all thoſe remaining Characters of mutual knowledge are ſunk ſo deep, and lie ſo hid, that there needs a new fire to be kindled to bring forth thoſe latent Figures, and make them again appear legible. And when once thoſe tokens are produced of the former Friendſhip, there are not more impatient longings, nor more cloſe embraces between the touched Needle and the Magnet, than there are between the Underſtanding and diſcovered Truth. But then withall, we are to conſider that they are but few whoſe Souls are awakened out of that Lethargy they are fallen into in this degenerate condition: the moſt are ſo pleaſed with their Sleep, that they are loth to diſturb their reſt; and ſet a higher price upon a lazy Ignorance, than upon a reſtleſs Knowledge. And even of thoſe, whoſe Souls are as it were between ſleeping and waking, what by reaſon of the remaining confuſion of the ſpecies in their Brains, what by the preſent dimneſs of their Sight, and the hovering uncertain Light they are to judge by, there are few that can put a difference between a meer Phantaſm and a real Truth. Of which theſe rational accounts may be given, *viz.* Why ſo few pretenders to Knowledge do light on Truth.

VI. (1.) Firſt, *Want of an impartial diligence in the ſearch of it.* Truth now muſt be ſought, and that with care and diligence, before we find it; Jewels do not uſe to lie upon the ſurface of the Earth: High-ways are ſeldom paved with Gold; what is moſt worth our finding, calls for the greateſt ſearch. If one that walks the Streets ſhould find ſome ineſtimable Jewel, or one that travels the Road meet with a bag of Gold, it would be but a ſilly deſign of any to walk the Street, or travel the Road, in hopes to meet with ſuch a purchaſe to make them rich. If ſome have happily light on ſome valuable Truths, when they minded nothing leſs than them, muſt this render a Diligence uſeleſs in inquiries after ſuch? No: Truth, tho' ſhe be ſo fair and pleaſing as to draw our affections, is yet ſo modeſt as to admit of being courted; and, it may be, deny the firſt ſuit, to highten our importunity. And certainly nothing hath oftner forbid the Banns between the Underſtanding and Truth inquired after, than Partiality and Preoccupation of Judgment, which makes Men enquire more diligently after the Dowry than the Beauty of Truth; its correſpondency to their Intereſts, than its evidence to their Underſtandings. An uſeful Error hath often kept the keys of the Mind for free admiſſion, when important Truths, but contrary to mens Preconceptions or Intereſt, have been forbidden entrance. Prejudice is the wrong byaſs of the Soul, that effectually keeps it from coming near the mark of Truth; nay, ſets it at the greateſt diſtance from it. There are few in the World that look after Truth with their own Eyes, moſt make uſe of Spectacles of others making, which makes them ſo ſeldom behold proper lineaments in the face of Truth; which the ſeveral tinctures from Education, Authority, Cuſtom and Prediſpoſition do exceedingly hinder men from diſcerning.

VII. (2.) Another Reaſon why there are ſo few who find Truth, when ſo many pretend to ſeek it, is, *That near reſemblance which Error often bears to Truth.* It hath been well obſerv'd, that Error ſeldom walks abroad the World in her own raiments; ſhe always borrows ſomething of Truth, to make her more acceptable to the World. It hath been always the ſubtilty of grand Deceivers to graft their greateſt Errors on ſome material Truths, to make them paſs more undiſcernible to all ſuch who look more at the Root on which they ſtand, than on the Fruits which they bring forth. It will hereafter appear how moſt of the groſſeſt of the Heathen Errors have, as *Plutarch* ſaith of the *Ægyptian* Fables, ἀμυδρὰς τινας ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, *ſome faint and obſcure reſemblances of Truth*; nay more than ſo, as moſt pernicious weeds are bred in the fatteſt ſoils, their moſt deſtructive Principles have been founded on ſome neceſſary and important Truths. Thus Idolatry doth ſuppoſe the Belief of the exiſtence of a Deity; and Superſtition the Immortality of the Souls of Men. The Devil could never have built his Chapels, but on the ſame ground whereon God's Temples ſtood; which makes me far leſs wonder than many do, at the meeting with many expreſſions concerning theſe Two grand Truths in the Writings of ancient Heathens; knowing how willing the Devil might be to have ſuch Principles ſtill owned in the World, which by his depraving of them, might be the nouriſhers of Idolatry and Superſtition. For the general knowledge of a Divine Nature, ſuppoſing men ignorant of the true God, did only lay a foundation to erect his idolatrous Temples upon; and the Belief of the Soul's ſurviving the Body after death, without knowledge of the true way of attaining Happineſs, did make men more eager of embracing thoſe Rites and Ceremonies, which came with a pretence of ſhewing the way to a bleſſed Immortality.

VIII. Which may be a moſt probable reaſon, why Philoſophy and Idolatry did increaſe ſo much together as they did; for tho' right Reaſon fully improved, would have overthrown all thoſe curſed and idolatrous practices among the Heathens; yet Reaſon only diſcerning ſome general Notions without their particular application and improvement, did only diſpoſe the moſt ordinary ſort of people to a more ready entertainment of the moſt groſs Idolatry. For hereby they diſcern the neceſſity of ſome kind of Worſhip, but could not find out the right way of it; and therefore they greedily followed that which was commended to them, by ſuch who did withall agree with them in the common Sentiments of Humane Nature: Nay, and thoſe Perſons themſelves who were the great maintainers of the ſublimer Notions concerning God and the Soul of Man, were either the great Inſtruments of advancing that horrid Superſtition among them, as *Orpheus* and *Apollonius*, or very forward complyers with it, as many of the Philoſophers were. Altho' withall it cannot be denied to have been a wonderful diſcovery of Divine Providence, by theſe general Notions to keep waking the inward Senſes of Mens Souls, that thereby it might appear when Divine Revelation ſhould be manifeſted to them, that it brought nothing contrary to the common Principles of Humane Nature, but did only rectifie the depravations of it, and clearly ſhew men that way which they had long been ignorantly ſeeking after. Which was the excellent advantage the Apoſtle made of the Inſcription on the Altar at *Athens* to the unknown
17. 23. God; *Whom*, ſaith he, *ye ignorantly ſerve, him I declare unto you.* And which was the happy uſe the Primitive learned Chriſtians made of all thoſe Paſſages concerning the Divine Nature, and the Immortality of the Souls of Men, which they found in the Heathen Writers, thereby to evidence to the World that the main *Poſtulata* or Suppoſitions of Chriſtian Religion were granted by their own moſt admired men: and that Chriſtianity did not raſe out, but only build upon thoſe common Foundations, which were entertained by all who had any Name for Reaſon.

IX. Tho' this, I ſay, were the happy effect of this building Errors on common Truths to all that had the advantage of Divine Revelation to diſcern the one from the other; yet as to others who were deſtitute of
(1.) it, they were liable to this twofold great inconvenience by it. Firſt, *for the ſake of the apparent rottenneſs of the Superſtructures, to queſtion the ſoundneſs of the Foundations on which they ſtood.* And this I doubt not was the caſe of many conſiderative Heathens, who obſerving what monſtrous and unreaſonable way of Worſhip obtaining among the Heathen, and not being able by the ſtrength of their own Reaſon, thro' the want of Divine Revelation, to deduce any certain inſtituted Worſhip, they were ſhrewdly tempted to renounce thoſe Principles, when they could not but abhor the Concluſions drawn from them; for there is nothing more uſual than for men who exceedingly deteſt ſome abſurd Conſequence they ſee may be drawn from a Principle ſuppoſed, to reject the Principle it ſelf for the ſake of that Conſequence; which it may be doth not neceſſarily follow from it, but thro' the ſhortneſs of their own Reaſon doth appear to them to do ſo. Thus when the intelligent

Heathen did apparently ſee that from the Principles of the Being of God, and the Immortality of Souls, did flow all thoſe natural and inhumane Sacrifices, all thoſe abſurd and ridiculous Rites, all thoſe execrable and profane Myſteries; out of a loathing the immoralities and impieties which attended theſe, they were brought to queſtion the very truth and certainty of thoſe Principles which were capable of being thus abuſed. 3:1:5:: 63:1.9.

4. X. And therefore I am very prone to ſuſpect the Apology uſually made for *Protagoras*, *Diagoras*, and ſuch others of them who were accounted Atheiſts, to be more favourable than true, *viz.* That they only rejected thoſe Heathen Deities, and not the Belief of the Divine Nature. I ſhould think this account of their reputed Atheiſm rational, were it any ways evident that they did build their Belief of a Divine Nature, upon any other grounds than ſuch as were common to them with thoſe whoſe worſhip they ſo much derided. And therefore when the Heathens accuſed the Chriſtians of Atheiſm, I have full and clear evidence that no more could be meant thereby than the rejection of their way of Worſhip; becauſe I have ſufficient aſſurance from them that they did believe in a Divine Nature, and an inſtituted Religion moſt ſuitable to the moſt common received Notions of God, which they owned in oppoſition to all Heathen Worſhip. Which I find not in the leaſt pretended to by any of the forementioned perſons, nor any thing of any different way of Religion aſſerted, but only a deſtruction of that in uſe among them.

XI. And altho' the caſe of *Anaxagoras Clazomenius*, and the reſt of the *Ionic* Philoſophers, might ſeem very different from *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, and thoſe beforementioned, becauſe altho' they denied the Gods in vulgar repute to be ſuch as they were thought to be (as *Anaxagoras* call'd the Sun μύδρον διάπυρον, *a mere globe of fire*, for which he was condemned at *Athens* to baniſhment, and fined five *Talents*; yet the Learned *Voſſius* puts in this Plea in his behalf, That he was one that aſſerted the Creation of the World to flow from an eternal Mind:) altho' therefore, I ſay, the caſe of the *Ionic* Philoſophers may ſeem far different from the others, becauſe of their aſſerting the Production of the World (which from *Thales Mileſius* was conveyed by *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* to *Anaxagoras*) yet to one that throughly conſiders what they underſtood by their Eternal Mind, they may be ſooner cleared from the imputation of Atheiſm, than Irreligion. which two certainly ought in this caſe to be diſtinguiſhed; for it is very poſſible for men, meeting with ſuch inſuperable difficulties about the caſual concourſe of Atoms for the production of the World, or the eternal exiſtence of Matter, to aſſert ſome Eternal Mind, as the firſt Cauſe of theſe things, which yet they may imbrace only as an Hypotheſis in Philoſophy to ſolve the Phænomena of Nature with, but yet not to make this Eternal Mind the object of adoration. And ſo their aſſerting a Deity was only on the ſame account as the Tragedians uſed to bring in their Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, when their Fables were brought to ſuch an iſſue, and perplexed with ſo many difficulties, that they ſaw no way to clear them again, but to make ſome God come down upon the Stage to ſolve the difficulties they were ingaged in; or, as *Seneca* ſaith of many great Families, when they had run up their Genealogies ſo high that they could go no further, they then fetch'd their Pedigree from the Gods: So when theſe Philoſophers ſaw ſuch incongruities in aſſerting an infinite and eternal Series of Matter,

Voſſ. *de Idololat.* c. 1.

ter, they might by this be brought to acknowledge ſome active Principle which produced the World, tho' they were far enough from giving any religious worſhip to that Eternal Mind.

XII. Thus even *Epicurus* and his Followers would not ſtick to aſſert the Being of a God, ſo they might but circumſcribe him within the Heavens, and let him have nothing to do with things that were done on Earth. And how uncertain the moſt dogmatical of them all were, as to their opinions concerning the Being and Nature of their Gods, doth fully appear from the large Diſcourſes of *Tully* upon that ſubject: where is fully manifeſted their variety of opinions and mutual repugnancies, their ſelf-contradictions and inconſtancy in their own Aſſertions; which hath made me ſomewhat inclinable to think that the reaſon why many of them did to the world own a Deity, was, that they might not be Martyrs for Atheiſm: Which *Tully* likewiſe ſeems to acknowledge, when ſpeaking of the puniſhment of *Protagoras* for that Speech of his; *De diis neque ut ſint, neque ut non ſint, habeo dicere: Ex quo,* ſays he, *equidem exiſtimo tardiores ad hanc ſententiam profitendam multos eſſe factos, quippe cum pœnam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuiſſet.* So that for all the verbal aſſerting of a Deity among them, we have no certain evidence of their firm belief of it, and much leſs of any worſhip and ſervice they owed unto it. And tho', it may be, they could not totally excuſs the Notions of a Deity out of their minds, partly thro' that Natural Senſe which is engraven on the Souls of Men; partly, as being unable to ſolve the difficulties of Nature without a Deity; yet the obſerving the notorious vanities of Heathen Worſhip, might make them look upon it as a mere Philoſophical ſpeculation, and not any thing that had an influence upon the government of mens lives: For, as in Nature, the obſerving the great mixture of Falſhood and Truth, made the *Academicks* deny any certain κριτήριον, or *Rule of judging Truth*; and the *Scepticks* take away all certain Aſſent: ſo the ſame conſequence was unavoidable here, upon the ſame principle. And that made even *Plato* himſelf ſo ambiguous and uncertain in his Diſcourſes of a DEITY; ſometimes making him an Eternal Mind, ſometimes aſſerting the whole World, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, Souls and all, to be Gods, and even thoſe that were worſhip'd among the Heathens, as *Tully* tells us out of his *Timæus* and *De Legibus*; which, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* there ſpeaks, *Et per ſe ſunt falſa & ſibi invicem repugnantia.* This is the firſt inconvenience following the mixture of truth and falſhood, *For the ſake of the falſhood to queſtion the truth it ſelf it was joyned with.*

Cicero *de Nat. Deor. l.* 1. *c.* 63.

XIII. (2.) The other is as great which follows, when truth and falſhood are mixed, *For the ſake of the Truth to embrace the Falſhood.* Which is a Miſtake as common as the other, becauſe men are apt to think, that things ſo vaſtly different as Truth and Falſhood could never blend or be incorporate together; therefore when they are certain they have ſome truth, they conclude no falſhood to be joyned with it. And this I ſuppoſe to have been the caſe of the more credulous and vulgar Heathen, as the other was of the Philoſophers; for they, finding Mankind to agree in this, not only that there is a GOD, but that he muſt be worſhip'd, did without ſcruple make uſe of the way of worſhip among them, as knowing there muſt be ſome, and they were ignorant of any elſe. And from hence they grew as confident believers of all thoſe Fables and Traditions on which their Idolatry was founded, as of thoſe firſt Principles and Notions from which the neceſſity of Divine Worſhip did ariſe.

And being thus habituated to the belief of theſe things; when Truth it ſelf was divulged among them, they ſuſpected it to be only a corruption of ſome of their Fables. This *Celſus* the *Epicurean* on all occaſions in his Books againſt the *Chriſtians* did fly to. Thus he ſaith the building of the Tower of *Babel*, and the confuſion of Tongues, was taken from the Fable of the *Aloïdæ* in *Homer*'s *Odyſſeis*; the ſtory of the Floud, from *Deucalion*; Paradiſe, from *Alcinoüs* his Gardens; the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, from the Story of *Phaëton*. (Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. p. 174, 179.) Which *Origen* well refutes, from the far greater antiquity of thoſe relations among the *Jews*, than any among the *Greeks*: and therefore the corruption of the tradition was in them, and not in the *Jews*. Which muſt be our only way for finding out which was the original, and which the corruption; by demonſtrating the undoubted antiquity of one beyond the other, whereby we muſt do as *Archimedes* did by the Crown of *Hiero*, find out the exact proportions of Truth and Falſhood which lay in thoſe Heathen Fables.

J. K. A.

XIV. And this now leads to the third Account, Why Truth is ſo hardly diſcerned from Error, even by thoſe who ſearch after it, which is *The great obſcurity of the Hiſtory of Ancient Times*, which ſhould decide the Controverſie. For there being an univerſal agreement in ſome common principles, and a frequent reſemblance in particular traditions, we muſt of neceſſity, for the clearing the truth from its corruption, have recourſe to ancient Hiſtory, to ſee if thereby we can find out where the Original tradition was beſt preſerved, by what means it came to be corrupted, and whereby we may diſtinguiſh thoſe corruptions from the Truths to which they are annexed. Which is the deſign and ſubject of our future diſcourſe, *viz.* ‘To demonſtrate that there was a certain ‘original and general tradition preſerved in the World concerning the ‘eldeſt Ages of the World; that this tradition was gradually corrupted ‘among the Heathens; that notwithſtanding this corruption there were ‘ſufficient remainders of it to evidence its true original; that the full account of this tradition is alone preſerved in thoſe Books we call *Scriptures*: That where any other Hiſtory ſeems to croſs the report contained in them, we have ſufficient ground to queſtion their credibility; and that there is ſufficient evidence to clear the undoubted certainty of that Hiſtory which is contained in the Sacred Records of ‘Scripture. Wherein we ſhall obſerve the ſame method, which *Thales* took in taking the hight of the Pyramids, by meaſuring the length of their ſhadow; ſo ſhall we the hight and antiquity of Truth from the extent of the fabulous Corruptions of it. Which will be a work of ſo much the greater difficulty, becauſe the truth we purſue after takes cover in ſo great antiquity, and we muſt be forced to follow its moſt flying footſteps thro' the dark and ſhady paths of ancient Hiſtory. For tho' Hiſtory be frequently called the Light of Truth, and the Herald of Times, yet that Light is ſo faint and dim, eſpecially in Heathen Nations, as not to ſerve to diſcover the face of Truth from her counterfeit, Error; and that Herald ſo little skill'd, as not to be able to tell us which is of the elder Houſe. The reaſon is; tho' Truth be always of greater Antiquity, yet Error may have the more wrinkled face, by which it often impoſeth on ſuch who gueſs antiquity by deformity, and think nothing ſo old as that which can give the leaſt account of its own age. This is evidently the caſe of thoſe who make the pretence of ancient Hiſtory a plea for Infidelity, and think no argument more plauſible to impugn the certainty of Divine Revelation, than the ſeeming repugnancy of ſome pretended Hiſtories with the account of ancient time reported in the *Bible*. Which being a pretext ſo unworthy, and deſigned for ſo ill an end, and ſo frequently made uſe of, by ſuch who account Infidelity a piece of antiquity as well as of reaſon, it may be worth our while to ſhew, That the Scriptures are no more liable to be baffled with Reaſon, than to be confuted by Antiquity.

XV. In order therefore to the removing of this ſtumbling-block in our way, I ſhall firſt evince, *That there is no certain credibility in any of thoſe ancient hiſtories which ſeem to contradict the Scriptures*, nor any ground of reaſon why we ſhould aſſent to them, when they differ from the *Bible:* and then prove, That all thoſe undoubted characters of a moſt certain and authentick hiſtory are legible in thoſe records contained in Scripture. Whereby we ſhall not only ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of infidelity, but the rational evidence which our faith doth ſtand on as to theſe things. I ſhall demonſtrate the firſt of theſe, *viz.* That there is no ground of aſſent to any ancient hiſtories which give account of things different from the Scriptures, from theſe arguments; The apparent defect, weakneſs and inſufficiency of them as to the giving an account of elder times; The monſtrous confuſion, ambiguity and uncertainty of them in the account which they give; The evident partiality of them to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. I begin with the firſt of theſe, the defect and inſufficiency of them to give ſuch an account of elder times as may amount to certain credibility: which if cleared, will of it ſelf be ſufficient to manifeſt the incompetency of thoſe records, as to the laying any foundation for a firm aſſent to be given to them. Now this defect and inſufficiency of thoſe hiſtories is either more general, which lies in common to them all; or ſuch as may be obſerved in a particular conſideration of the hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations, which have pretended higheſt to antiquity.

XVI. The general defect is, *The want of timely records to preſerve their hiſtories in*. For it is moſt evident, that the trueſt hiſtory in the world is liable to various corruptions thro' length of time, if there be no certain way of preſerving it entire. And that, thro' the frailty of memory in thoſe who had integrity to preſerve it; through the gradual increaſe of barbariſm and ignorance, where there are no ways of inſtruction; and thro' the ſubtilty of ſuch, whoſe intereſt it may be to corrupt and alter that tradition. If we find ſuch infinite variety and difference in men's accounts, as to the hiſtories of their own times, when they have all poſſible means to be acquainted with the truth of them; what account can we imagin can be given, where there was no way of preſerving to poſterity the moſt authentick relation of former Ages? Eſpecially, it being moſt evident, that where any certain way of preſerving tradition is wanting, a People muſt ſoon degenerate into the greateſt ſtupidity and barbariſm: becauſe all will be taken up in minding their own petty concerns, and no encouragement at all given to ſuch publick ſpirits, who would mind the credit of the whole Nation. For what was there for ſuch to employ themſelves upon, or ſpend their time in, when they had no other kind of learning among them, but ſome general traditions conveyed from father to ſon, which might be learned by ſuch who followed nothing but domeſtick employments? So that the Sons of *Noah*, after their ſeveral diſperſions and plantations of ſeveral Countries, did gradually degenerate into ignorance and barbariſm: For, upon their firſt ſetling in any Country, they found it employment ſufficient to cultivate

tivate the Land, and make habitations to live in, and to provide themſelves of neceſſaries for their mutual comfort and ſubſiſtence. Beſides this, they were often put to removes from one place to another, where they could not conveniently reſide; which *Thucydides* ſpeaks much of as to the ancient ſtate of *Greece*: and it was a great while before they came to imbody themſelves together in Towns and Cities, and from thence to ſpread into Provinces, and to ſettle bounds and extents of their Territories. The firſt Age after the plantation of a Country being thus ſpent, the next ſaw it neceſſary to fall cloſe to the work of husbandry, not only to get ſomething out of the earth for their ſubſiſtence; but when by their diligence they had ſo far improved the Ground, that they had not only enough for themſelves, but to ſpare to others, they then found out a way for commerce one with another by exchange. This way of traffick made them begin to raiſe their hopes higher, of enriching themſelves; which when ſome of them had done, they bring the poorer under their power, and reign as Lords over them; theſe rich, with their dependents, ſtrive to outvye each other; whence came wars and mutual contentions, till they who got the better over their adverſaries, took ſtill greater authority into their hands: thence at firſt every City almoſt, and adjacent Territory, had a King over it; which by conflicting with each other, at laſt brought ſeveral Cities and Territories under the power of one particular perſon, who thereby came to reign as ſole Monarch over all within his Dominions. A.

XVII. B. 2. B. For altho' there be ſome reaſon to think, that the Leaders of ſeveral Colonies had at firſt ſuperiority over all that went with them; yet there being evidence in few Nations of any continued ſucceſſion of Monarchs from the poſterity of *Noah*, and ſo great evidence of ſo many petty Royalties almoſt in every City (as we read of ſuch multitudes of Kings in the ſmall Territory of *Canaan*, when *Joſhua* conquered it,) this makes it at leaſt probable to me, that after the death of the firſt Leader, by reaſon of their poverty and diſperſedneſs of habitations, they did not incorporate generally into any Civil government under one head, but did riſe by degrees in the manner before ſet down; but yet ſo, that in the petty diviſions ſome prerogative might be given to him who derived his pedigree the neareſt from the firſt Founder of that plantation; which in all probability is the meaning of *Thucydides*, who tells us, when the riches of *Greece* began to increaſe, and their Power improved, Tyrannies were erected in moſt Cities, πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, *for before that time Kingdoms with honors limited were hereditary*; for ſo the Scholiaſt explains it, πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων παραλαμβανόμεναι κατὰ διαδοχὴν γένους. This then being the ſtate and caſe of moſt Nations in the firſt ages after their plantation, there was no likelihood at all of any great improvement in knowledge among them; nay ſo far from it, that for the firſt ages, wherein they conflicted with poverty and neceſſity, there was a neceſſary decay among them, of what knowledge had been conveyed to them: becauſe their neceſſities kept them in continual employment; and after they conquered Them, they began to conquer each other: ſo that till ſuch time as they were ſettled in peace under eſtabliſhed Common-wealths, there was no leiſure nor opportunity for any Arts or Sciences to flouriſh, without which all certain Hiſtories of their own former ſtate muſt vaniſh and dwindle into ſome fabulous ſtories. And ſo we find they did in moſt Nations; which thence are able to give no other account of themſelves, but

Thucyd. *l.* 1. *p.* 10. *Ed. Port.*

but that they ſprung out of the earth where they lived; from which opinion the *Athenians* uſed to wear of old their golden Graſhoppers, as *Thucydides* relates. What account can we then expect of ancient times from ſuch Nations which were ſo defective in preſerving their own Originals? 44:19.

XVIII. Now this defectiveneſs of giving teſtimony of ancient times by theſe Nations, will further appear by theſe two conſiderations: *Firſt*, What ways there are for communicating knowledge to poſterity. *Secondly*, How long it was ere theſe Nations came to be Maſters of any way of certain communicating their conceptions to their Succeſſors. Three general ways there are whereby knowledge may be propagated from one to another; by repreſentative Symbols, by Speech, and by Letters. The firſt of theſe was moſt common in thoſe elder times, for which purpoſe *Clemens Alexandrinus* produceth the teſtimony of an ancient Grammarian *Dionyſius Thrax* in his Expoſition of the ſymbol of the Wheels: ἐσήμαινον γοῦν οὐ διὰ λέξεως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ συμβόλων ἔνιοι τὰς πράξεις: *That ſome perſons made a repreſentation of their actions to others, not only by ſpeech, but by ſymbols too.* Which any one who is any ways converſant in the Learning of thoſe ancient times, will find to have been the chief way of propagating it (ſuch as it was) from one to another: as is evident in the Hieroglyphicks of the *Ægyptians*, and the cuſtom of Symbols from thence derived among the *Grecian* Philoſophers, eſpecially the *Pythagoreans*. It was the ſolemn cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to wrap up all the little knowledge they had, under ſuch myſtical repreſentations, which were unavoidably clog'd with two inconveniences very unſuitable to the propagation of knowledge, which were Obſcurity and Ambiguity. For it not only coſt them a great deal of time to gather up ſuch Symbolical things which might repreſent their conceptions; but when they had pitched upon them, they were liable to a great variety of Interpretations, as is evident in all thoſe remainders of them, preſerved by the induſtry of ſome ancient Writers. As in their χωμασιαὶ, or *golden Images of their Gods*, they had ingraved two Dogs, an Hawk and an Ibis. By the Dogs ſome underſtood the two Hemiſpheres, others the two Tropicks; by the Hawk ſome underſtood the Sun, others the Æquinoctial; by the Ibis, ſome the Moon, others the Zodiack, as is evident in *Clemens*, who reports it. This way then is a moſt unfit way to convey any ancient tradition; by being both obſcure, ambiguous, and unable to expreſs ſo much as to give any certain light to future ages of the paſſages of the precedent.

Clem. Alexan. Strom. l. 5.

XIX. The other ways of conveying knowledge, are either by Speech, or by Letters. The firſt muſt be by ſome vocal Cabala, delivered down from father to ſon: but Words being of ſo periſhing a nature, and man's Memory ſo weak and frail in retaining them, it is neceſſary for a certain communication of knowledge, that ſome way ſhould be found out more laſting than Words, more firm than Memory, more faithful than Tradition: which could not otherwiſe be imagined, than that the Author of his own conceptions ſhould himſelf leave them to the view of all poſterity; in order to which, ſome way muſt be contrived whereby mens Voices might be ſeen, and mens Fingers ſpeak. But how to expreſs all kind of ſounds, with the ſeveral draughts of a pen, and to confine them within the compaſs of twenty-four letters, is deſervedly called by *Galileo*, *admirandarum omnium inventionum humanarum ſignaculum*, *the choiceſt of all humane inventions.* And had we no other evidence of the great obſcurity of ancient hiſtory, the great difference as to the firſt inventor of letters, would be a ſufficient demonſtration of it. For almoſt every Nation hath had a ſeveral Author of them: The *Jews* derive them from *Adam* or *Moſes*; the *Ægyptians* attribute their invention to *Thoyt* or *Mercury*; the *Grecians* to *Cadmus*; the *Phœnicians* to *Taautus*; the *Latins* to *Saturn*; others to the *Æthiopians*: and leſt the *Pygmies* ſhould be without their enemies, ſome think they were found out *à gruum volatu*, from the manner of the flying of Cranes. Thus it hath happened with moſt Nations; what was firſt among themſelves, they thought to be the firſt in the world.

XX. But by whomſoever they were firſt invented, we are certain they were but lately in uſe in that Nation, which hath moſt vainly arrogated the moſt to it ſelf in point of Antiquity, and yet had the leaſt reaſon, I mean, the *Grecians*. Thence the *Ægyptian* Prieſt *Patenit* truly told *Solon*, *the Greeks were always children*, becauſe they had nothing of the antiquities of former ages. If we may believe *Joſephus*, they had no Writings earlier than *Homer*; but herein he is conceived to have ſerved his cauſe too much, becauſe of the Inſcription of *Amphitryo* at *Thebes* in the Temple of *Apollo Iſmenius* in the *Ionic* letters and two others of the ſame age to be ſeen in *Herodotus*; and becauſe of the Writings of *Lycus*, *Orpheus*, *Muſæus*, *Oroebantius Troezenius*, *Thaletas*, *Meleſander*, and others. This we are certain of, the *Grecians* had not the uſe of letters among them 'till the time of *Cadmus* the *Phœnician*'s coming into *Greece*, whither he came to plant a Colony of *Phœnicians*, whence aroſe the ſtory of his purſuit of *Europa*, as *Conon* in *Photius* tells us.

Procl. in Tim. Plat.
Joſeph. c. App. lib. 1.
Herodot. lib. 5.
V. Bochar. Geograph. Sacr. p. 2. l. 2. c. 20.
Conon apud Phot. Bibl. l. 37.

And it is very probable, which learned men have long ſince obſerved, that the name *Cadmus* comes from the *Hebrew* קדם *Kedem*, and may relate as an appellative either to his Dignity, as *Junius* in his *Academia* conjectures, or more probably to his Country, the Eaſt, which is frequently call'd *Kedem* in Scripture. Some have conjectured further, that his proper name was עוג *Og*; upon what reaſon I know not, unleſs from hence, that thence by a duplication of the word came the *Greek* Ὤγυγος, who ſeems to have been no other than *Cadmus*, as will appear by comparing their ſtories together. Only one was the name his memory was preſerved by at *Athens*, where the *Cadmeans* inhabited, as appears by the *Gephyræi*, who *Herodotus* tells us were *Phœnicians* that came with *Cadmus*; and others fanſie the *Academia* there was originally called *Cadmea*; and the name *Cadmus* was preſerved chiefly among the *Bœotians* in memory of the Country whence he came: it being likely to be impos'd by them upon his firſt landing in the Country; as many learned perſons conceive, the name of an *Hebrew* was given to *Abraham* by the *Canaanites*, upon his paſſing over the river *Euphrates*. On this account then it ſtands to reaſon, that the name which was given him as a ſtranger, ſhould be longeſt preſerved in the place where it was firſt impoſed. Or if we take קדם in the other ſenſe, as it imports Antiquity; ſo there is ſtill a higher probability of the affinity of the names of *Cadmus* and *Ogyges*; for it is certain, that the *Greeks* had no higher name for a matter of antiquity, than to call it Ὠγύγιον, as the Scholiaſt on *Heſiod*, *Heſychius*, *Suidas*, *Euſtathius* on *Dionyſius*, and many others obſerve. And which yet advanceth the probability higher, *Luctatius* or *Lactantius* the Scholiaſt on *Statius*, tells us, the other *Greeks* had this from the *Thebanes*; for, ſaith he, *Thebani res antiquas Ogygias nominabant*. But that which puts it almoſt beyond meer probability, is, that

Hiſt. l. 5.
Lactantius in Statii Theb. l. 1.

Varro, *Feſtus*, *Pauſanias*, *Apollonius*, *Æſchylus*, and others make *Ogyges* the Founder of the *Bœotian Thebes*, which were thence called *Ogygiæ*; and *Strabo* and *Stephanus* further ſay, that the whole Country of *Bœotia* was called *Ogygia:* now all that mention the Story of *Cadmus*, attribute to him the founding of the *Bœotian Thebes*. And withall it is obſervable, that in the *Vatican* Appendix of the *Greek Proverbs*, we read *Cadmus* called *Ogyges*; Ὠγύγια κακὰ, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχληρῶν, ἐπεὶ συνέβη Κάδμον τὸν Ὠγύγην διὰ τὰς θυγατέρας κακοῖς περιπεσεῖν. *Meurſius* indeed would have it corrected, Κάδμον τὸν Ὠγύγου, as it is read in *Suidas*; but by the favour of ſo learned a man, it ſeems more probable that *Suidas* ſhould be corrected by that; he bringing no other evidence of any ſuch perſon as *Cadmus* a Son of *Ogyges*, but only that reading in *Suidas*; whereas we have diſcovered many probable grounds to make them both the ſame. That which I would now infer from hence is, the utter impoſſibility of the *Greeks* giving us any certain account of ancient times, when a thing ſo modern in compariſon as *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is thought by them a matter of ſo great antiquity, that when they would deſcribe a thing very ancient, they deſcribed it by the name of *Ogyges*, who was the ſame with *Cadmus*. Now *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is generally, by Hiſtorians, placed about the time of *Joſhua*, whence ſome (I will not ſay how happily) have conjectured, that *Cadmus* and his company were ſome of the *Canaanites* who fled from *Joſhua*, as others are ſuppoſed to have done into *Africa*, if *Procopius* his Pillar hath ſtrength enough to bear ſuch a conjecture. But there is too great a confuſion about the time of *Cadmus* his arrival in *Greece*, to affirm any thing with any great certainty about it.

Vatic. App. Cent. 4. Prov. 52. Meurſius de Regno Att. Lib. 8. c. 5.

Yet thoſe who diſagree from that former Computation, place it yet lower. *Voſſius* makes *Agenor Cadmus*'s Father contemporary with the latter end of *Moſes*, or the beginning of *Joſhua*; and ſo *Cadmus* his time muſt fall ſomewhat after. *Jac. Capellus* placeth *Cadmus* in the third year of *Othoniel*. The Author of the *Greek* Chronicle, in the *Marmora Arundeliana*, makes his coming to *Greece* to be in the time of *Helen* the ſon of *Deucalion*; which *Capellus* fixeth on the 73. of *Moſes*, *A. M.* 2995. But Mr. *Selden* conceives it ſomewhat lower: and ſo it muſt be, if we follow *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who places it in the time of *Lynceus* King of the *Argives*, which he ſaith was ἐνδεκάτῃ ὕστερον Μωσέως γενεᾷ, *in the eleventh Generation after Moſes*, which will fall about the time of *Samuel:* But tho' it ſhould be ſo late, it would be no wonder it ſhould be reckoned a matter of ſo great antiquity among the *Grecians*; for the eldeſt Records they have of any King at *Athens*, began at the time of *Moſes*, whoſe contemporary *Cecrops* is generally thought to be; for at *Cecrops* his time it is the Marble Chronicle begins. Now that the *Grecians* did receive their Letters from the *Phœnicians* by *Cadmus*, is commonly acknowledged by the moſt learned of the *Greeks* themſelves, as appears by the Ingenuous confeſſion of *Herodotus*, *Philoſtratus*, *Critias* in *Athenæus*, *Zenodotus* in *Laertius*, *Timon Phliaſius* in *Sextus Empiricus*, and many others: ſo that it were to no purpoſe to offer to prove that, which they who arrogate ſo much to themſelves, do ſo freely acknowledge. Which yet hath been done to very good purpoſe by *Joſeph Scaliger* and *Bochartus*, and many others from the form of the Letters, the order of the name of them. It ſeems probable that at firſt they might uſe the form of the *Phœnician* Letters, in which *Herodotus* tells us the three old Inſcriptions were extant; and *Diodorus* tells us, that the

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.

Strom. 1.

Scalig. Not. in Euſeb. Chron. n. 1617. Bochart Geogr. p. 3. l. 1. cap. 20.

braſs pot which *Cadmus* offered to *Minerva Lindia*, had an inſcription on it in the *Phœnician* Letters: but afterwards the form of the Letters came by degrees to be changed, when for their greater expedition in writing they left the old way of writing towards the left hand, for the natural and expedite way of writing towards the right, by which they exchanged the ſites of the ſtrokes in ſeveral Letters, as it is obſerved by the fore-cited Learned Authors.

Not that the old *Ionic* Letters were nearer the *Phœnician*, and diſtinct from the modern, as *Joſ. Scaliger* in his learned Diſcourſe on the original of the *Greek* Letters, conceives; for the *Ionic* Letters were nothing elſe but the full Alphabet of twenty-four, with the additions of *Palamedes*, and *Simonides Ceus*; as *Pliny* tells us, that all the *Greeks* conſented in the uſe of the *Ionic* Letters: but the old *Attic* Letters came nearer the *Phœnician*, becauſe the *Athenians*, long after the Alphabet was increaſed to xxiv, continued ſtill in the uſe of the old 16, which were brought in by *Cadmus*; which muſt needs much alter the way of writing: for in the old Letters they writ THEOΣ for Θεὸς, which made *Pliny*, with a great deal of learning and truth, ſay, that the old *Greek* Letters were the ſame with the *Roman*. Thence the *Greeks* called their ancient Letters Ἀττικὰ γράμματα, as appears by * *Harpocration* and *Heſychius*; not that they were ſo much diſtinct from others, but becauſe they did not admit of the addition of the other eight Letters.

Scalig. ibid.

Plin. Hiſt. 7. cap. 57.

* *V. Mauſſacum in Harpocr. Salmaſ. in Conſecr. Templ. p. 30.*

XXI. We ſee then the very Letters of the *Greeks* were no elder than *Cadmus*; and for any conſiderable Learning among them, it was not near ſo old. Some aſſert indeed that Hiſtory began from the time of *Cadmus*; but it is by a miſtake of Him for a younger *Cadmus*, which was *Cadmus Mileſius*, whom *Pliny* makes to be the firſt Writer in Proſe; but That he after attributes to *Pherecydes Syrius*, and Hiſtory to *Cadmus Mileſius*: and therefore I think it far more probable, that it was ſome writing of this latter *Cadmus*, which was tranſcribed and epitomized by *Bion Proconeſius*, altho' *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſeems to attribute it to the elder. We ſee how unable then the *Grecians* were to give an account of elder times, that were guilty of ſo much infancy and nonage, as to begin to learn their Letters almoſt in the noon-tide of the World, and yet long after this to the time of the firſt *Olympiad* all their relations are accounted fabulous. A fair account then we are like to have from them of the firſt Antiquities of the World, who could not ſpeak plain truth, 'till the World was above three thouſand years old; for ſo was it when the *Olympiads* began.

Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. 5. c. 29. l. 7. c. 57.

Clem. Strom. l. 6.

So true is the obſervation of *Juſtin Martyr*, οὐδὲν Ἕλλησι πρὸ τῶν Ὀλυμπιάδων ἀκριβὲς ἱστόρηται; *the Greeks had no exact hiſtory of themſelves before the Olympiads*; but of that more afterwards.

This is now the firſt Defect which doth infringe the credibility of theſe Hiſtories, which is *the want of timely and early Records* to digeſt their own Hiſtory in.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory.

I. *The particular defect in the Hiſtory of the moſt learned Heathen Nations.* II. *Firſt the* Phœnicians. *Of* Sanchoniathon, *his Antiquity and Fidelity.* III. *Of* Jerom baal, Baal-Berith. IV. *The Antiquity of* Tyre. Scaliger *vindicated againſt* Bochartus. V. Abibalus. VI. *The vanity of the* Phœnician *Theology.* VII. *The imitation of it by the* Gnoſtics. VIII. *Of the Ægyptian Hiſtory.* IX. *The Antiquity and Authority of* Hermes Triſmegiſtus. X. *Of his Inſcriptions on Pillars, tranſcribed by* Manetho. XI. *His Fabulouſneſs thence diſcovered.* Terra Seriadica. XII. *Of* Seth's *Pillars in* Joſephus, *and an account whence they were taken.*

220:1.B

I. HAving already ſhewed a general defect in the ancient Heathen Hiſtories, as to an account of ancient times; we now come to a cloſer, and more particular conſideration of the Hiſtories of thoſe ſeveral Nations which have born the greateſt name in the world for Learning and Antiquity. There are four Nations chiefly which have pretended the moſt to antiquity in the learned World, and whoſe Hiſtorians have been thought to deliver any thing contrary to Holy Writ in their account of ancient times, whom on that account we are obliged more particularly to conſider; and thoſe are the *Phœnicians*, *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and *Græcians*; we ſhall therefore ſee what evidence of credibility there can be in any of theſe, as to the matter of antiquity of their Records, or their Hiſtories taken from them. And the credibility of an Hiſtorian depending much upon the certainty and authority of the Records he makes uſe of, we ſhall both conſider of what value and antiquity the pretended Records are, and particularly look into the age of the ſeveral Hiſtorians. As to the *Græcians*, we have ſeen already an utter impoſſibility of having ancient Records among them, becauſe they wanted the means of preſerving them, having ſo lately borrowed their Letters from other Nations. Unleſs as to their account of times they had been as careful, as the old *Romans* were, to number their years by the ſeveral *clavi* or *nails*, which they fixed on the Temple-doors: which yet they were not in a capacity to do; not growing up in an entire body, as the *Roman* Empire did; but lying ſo much ſcattered and divided into ſo many petty Republicks, that they minded very little of concernment to the whole Nation. The other three Nations have deſervedly a name of far greater antiquity than any the *Græcians* could ever pretend to; who yet were unmeaſurably guilty of an impotent affection of Antiquity; and arrogating to themſelves, as growing on their own ground, what was with a great deal of pains and induſtry gathered but as the gleanings from the fuller harveſt of thoſe Nations they reſorted to. Which is not only true as to the greateſt part of their learning, but as to the account likewiſe they give of ancient times; the chief and moſt ancient Hiſtories among them being only a corruption of the Hiſtory of the elder Nations, eſpecially *Phœ-*

nicia and *Ægypt*: for of theſe two *Philo Byblius* the tranſlator of the ancient *Phœnician* Hiſtorian *Sanchoniathon*, ſaith, *they were* παλαιότατοι τῶν Βαρβάρων, παρ' ὧν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ παρείλαβον ἄνθρωποι, *the moſt ancient of all the Barbarians, from whom the others derived their Theology*; which he there particularly inſtanceth in.

Philo Bybl. apud Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 8. p. 23. Ed. R. St.

II. We begin therefore with the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, whoſe moſt ancient and famous Hiſtorian is *Sanchoniathon*, ſo much admired and made uſe of by the ſhrewdeſt antagoniſt ever Chriſtianity met with, the Philoſopher *Porphyrius*. But therein was ſeen the wonderful Providence of God, that out of this *Eater* came forth *Meat*, and out of the *Lion*, *Honey*; that the moſt conſiderable teſtimonies by him produced againſt our Religion, were of the greateſt ſtrength to refute his own. For he being of too great Learning to be ſatisfied with the vain pretences of the *Grecians*, he made it his buſineſs to ſearch after the moſt ancient Records, to find out ſomewhat in them to confront with the antiquity of the Scriptures; but upon his ſearch could find none of greater veneration than the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, nor any Author contending for age with this *Sanchoniathon*. Yet when he had made the moſt of his Teſtimony, he was fain to yield him younger than *Moſes*, tho' he ſuppoſeth him elder than the *Trojan* Wars. And yet herein was he guilty of a moſt groſs ἀντιςιχία, not much exceeding the *Græcians* in his skill in Chronology, when he makes *Semiramis* coexiſtent with the Siege of *Troy*: as is evident in his teſtimony produced at large by *Euſebius* out of his firſt *Book againſt the Chriſtians*; nay, he goes to prove the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s Hiſtory by the agreement of it with that of *Moſes* concerning the *Jews*, both as to their Names and Places, ἱστορεῖ γὰρ τὰ περὶ Ἰουδαίων ἀληθέστατα, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τόποις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν αὐτῶν τὰ συμφωνότατα; whereby he doth evidently aſſert the greater Truth and Antiquity of *Moſes* his Hiſtory, when he proves the truth of *Sanchoniathon*'s from conſonancy with that.

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 10. c. 8. p. 285.

III. Two things more *Porphyry* inſiſts on to manifeſt his credibility; the one I ſuppoſe relates to what he reports concerning the *Jews*, the other concerning the *Phœnicians* themſelves. For the firſt, that he made uſe of the Records of *Jerom-baal* the Prieſt of the God *Ieuo*, or rather *Iao*; for the other, that he uſed all the Records of the ſeveral Cities, and the ſacred Inſcriptions in the Temples. Who that *Jerom-baal* was, is much diſcuſſed among Learned men, the finding out of which hath been thought to be the moſt certain way to determine the age of *Sanchoniathon*. The learned *Bochartus* conceives him to be *Gideon*, who in Scriptures is called *Jerub-baal*, which is of the ſame ſenſe in the *Phœnician* Language, only after their cuſtom changing one *b* into *m*, as in *Ambubajæ*, *Sambuca*, &c. But admitting the conjecture of this learned perſon concerning *Jerub-baal*, yet I ſee no neceſſity of making *Sanchoniathon* and him contemporary; for I no where find any thing mentioned in *Porphyry* implying that, but only that he made uſe of the Records of *Jerub-baal*, which he might very probably do at a conſiderable diſtance of time from him; whether by thoſe ὑπομνήματα, we mean the Annals written by him, or the Records concerning his actions: either of which might have given *Sanchoniathon* conſiderable light in the hiſtory either of the *Iſraelites* or *Phœnicians*. And it is ſo much the more probable, becauſe preſently after the death of *Gideon*, the *Iſraelites* worſhipped *Baal-berith*; by which moſt probably is meant the Idol of *Berith* or *Berytus*, the place where *Sanchoniathon* lived; by which means the

Bochart. Geogr. Sac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.

Judg. 8. 33.

Berytians might come eaſily acquainted with all the remarkable paſſages of *Jerub-baal*.

IV. But I cannot conceive how *Sanchoniathon* could be contemporary with *Gideon*, (which, if he were, he falls 182 years ſhort of *Moſes*,) eſpecially becauſe the building of *Tyre*, which that Author mentions as an ancient thing (as hath been obſerved by *Scaliger*) is by our beſt Chronologers placed about the time of *Gideon*, and about 65 years before the deſtruction of *Troy*. I know *Bochartus*, to avoid this argument, hath brought ſome evidence of ſeveral places called *Tyrus* in *Phœnicia*, from *Scylax* his *Periplus*; but none that there was any more than one *Tyrus* of any great repute for antiquity. Now this *Tyrus Joſephus* makes but 240 years elder than *Solomon*'s Temple, and *Juſtin* but one year elder than the deſtruction of *Troy*. Neither can any account be given why *Sidon* ſhould be ſo much celebrated by ancient Poets, as *Strabo* tells us, when *Tyre* is not ſo much as mentioned by *Homer*; if the famous *Tyre* were of ſo great antiquity and repute as is pretended. It cannot be denied but that there is mention in Scripture of a *Tyre* elder than this we ſpeak of, *Joſhua* 19. 29. which ſome think to be that which was called *Palætyrus*, which *Strabo* makes to be 20 furlongs diſtant from the great *Tyre*; but *Pliny* includes *Palætyrus* within the circumference of *Tyre*, and ſo makes the whole circuit of the City to be 19 miles. It is not to me ſo certain to what place the name *Palætyrus* refers, whether to any *Tyrus* before the firſt building of the great *Tyre*, or to the ruins of the great *Tyre* after its deſtruction by *Nebuchadnezzar*, compared with the new *Tyre*, which was built more inward to the Sea, and was after beſieged by *Alexander* the Great. It may ſeem probable that *Palætyrus* may relate to the ruins of the great *Tyre*, in that it was after included in its circuit, and chiefly becauſe of the prediction in *Ezekiel* 26. 4. *Thou ſhalt be built no more*; for the *Tyre* erected after, was built not on the Continent, but almoſt in the Sea. If ſo, then *Palætyrus* or the *old* famous *Tyrus* might ſtand upon a rock upon the brink of the Continent: and ſo the great argument of *Bochartus* is eaſily anſwered, which is, *that after it is mentioned in* Sanchoniathon*'s Hiſtory, that* Hypſouranius *dwelt in* Tyre, *upon the falling out between him and his brother* Uſous, Uſous *firſt adventured* εἰς θάλασσαν ἐμβῆναι, *to go to Sea*, which ſaith he, *evidently manifeſts that the* Tyre *mentioned by* Sanchoniathon *was not the famous Inſular* Tyrus, *but ſome other* Tyre. This argument, I ſay, is now eaſily anſwered, if the famous *Tyre* before its deſtruction by *Nebuchadnezzar* did ſtand upon the Continent; for then it might be the old famous *Tyre* ſtill, notwithſtanding what *Sanchoniathon* ſpeaks of the firſt venturing to Sea after *Tyre* was built. So then I conceive theſe ſeveral ages agreeable to the ſame *Tyre*; the firſt was when it was a high ſtrong Rock on the Sea-ſide without many Inhabitants; ſo I ſuppoſe it was when mentioned by *Joſhua*, as a bound of the tribe of *Aſher*. The ſecond age was, when it was built a great City by the *Sidonians* upon the former place, and grew very populous and famous, which laſted 'till *Nebuchadnezzar*'s time; after this, tho' it were never built upon the Continent again, yet a little farther into the Sea, a new and goodly City was erected, which was *New Tyre*, and the remains on the Continent ſide *Palætyrus*. Thus far then we have made good *Scaliger*'s opinion againſt *Bochartus*, that the famous *Sanchoniathon* is not ſo old as he is pretended to be.

Scalig. Not. in Frag. Græc. p. 40.

Joſph. Ant. l. 8.

Strabo l. 16.

Plin. Hiſt. Nat. l. 5. c. 19.

V. Which will be further manifeſt, if that *Abibalus*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* is ſuppoſed to dedicate his Hiſtory, were the father to *Hiram*, contemporary with *Solomon*, as *Joſ. Scaliger* ſuppoſeth, who was 154 years after the deſtruction of *Troy*. In the *Tyrian* Dynaſties produced by *Scaliger* out of the *Phœnician* Annals, this *Abibalus* is the firſt who occurs, and is contemporary with *David*: *Sanchoniathon* then is of no great antiquity, if this were the time he lived in. But *Bochartus* well obſerves, that it is not ſpoken of *Abibalus* King of *Tyre*, but of *Abibalus* King of *Berytus*, whom we may allow to be ſomewhat nearer the time of *Moſes* than the other *Abibalus*, as the *Phœnician* Annals make it appear, as *Porphyry* tells us; but yet we find his antiquity is not ſo great as to be able to conteſt with *Moſes*, as *Porphyry* himſelf confeſſeth; altho' we may freely acknowledge him to be far elder than any of the *Greek* Hiſtorians; which is all *Voſſius* contends for, and ſufficiently proves: but we are far from yielding him contemporary with *Semiramis*, as *Porphyry* would have him, and yet makes him junior to *Moſes*, and to live about the time of the *Trojan* war, which is to reconcile the diſtance of near 800 years: ſuch miſerable confuſion was there in the beſt learned Heathens in their computation of ancient times.

Scal. Not. in Euſeb. Chr. p. 12. *Scal. Can. Iſag. l.* 2.

Voſſ. de Hiſt. Græc. l. 1. *c.* 1.

VI. Having thus cleared the Antiquity of *Sanchoniathon* and the *Phœnician* Hiſtory, we are next to conſider the Fidelity of it. This *Sanchoniathon* is highly commended for, both by *Porphyry*, and his Tranſlator into *Greek Philo Byblius*, who lived in *Adrian*'s time; and *Theodoret* thinks his name in the *Phœnician* language ſignifies φιλαλήθης, which *Bochartus* endeavours to fetch from thence, and conceives the name to be given him when he ſet himſelf to write his Hiſtory; and he wiſheth, and ſo do we, that he had been then *vir ſui nominis*, and made it appear by his writing that he had been a *Lover of Truth*. *Philo* ſaith he was ἀνὴρ πολυμαθὴς ϗ πολυπράγμων, *a very learned and inquiſitive man*; but either he was not ſo diligent to enquire after, or not ſo happy to light on any certain Records; or if he did, he was not over-much a Lover of truth, in delivering them to the world. How faithful he was in tranſcribing his Hiſtory from his Records, we cannot be ſufficient judges of, unleſs we had thoſe Books of *Taautus*, and the ſacred Inſcriptions, and the Records of Cities which he pretends to take his Hiſtory from, to compare them together. But by what remains of his Hiſtory, which is only the firſt Book concerning the *Phœnician* Theology, extant in *Euſebius*, we have little reaſon to believe his Hiſtory of the World and eldeſt times, without further proof than he gives of it, there being ſo much obſcurity and confuſion in it, when he makes a *Chaos* to be the firſt beginning of all things, and the Gods to come after; makes Αὐτόχθων γήϊνος to be the ſon of *Chryſor* or *Vulcan*, and again the ſame γήϊνος, *the man born of earth*, to be ſeveral generations after Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος, who were the firſt mortal men; and yet from the two brethren Τεχνίτης and Αὐτόχθων came two Gods, whereof one was called Ἀγρὸς, and the other Ἀγρότης, and this latter was worſhipped with as much veneration as any of their Gods.

VII. Yet from theſe things, as fooliſh and ridiculous as they are, it is very probable the *Gnoſtics* and the ſeveral ſubdiviſions of them might take the riſe of their ſeveral *Æones* and συζυγίαι: for here we find Αἰὼν and Πρωτόγονος made two of the number of the Gods; but the reſt of the names they, according to their ſeveral ſects, took a liberty of altering according to their ſeveral fancies. This is far more probable to me, than that either *Heſiod*'s Θεογονία ſhould be the ground of them; or the opinion of a late *German* Divine, who conceives that *Philo Byblius* did in imitation of the *Gnoſtics*, form his holy ſtory of the *Phœnicians* Theology. For altho' I am far from believing what *Kircher* ſomewhere tells us, that he had once got a ſight of *Sanchoniathon*'s Original Hiſtory (it being not the firſt thing that learned men hath been deceived in) yet I ſee no ground of ſo much peeviſhneſs, as becauſe this Hiſtory pretends ſo much antiquity, we ſhould therefore preſently condemn it as a figment of the Tranſlator of it. For had it been ſo, the Antagoniſts of *Porphyry*, *Methodius*, *Apollinarius*, but eſpecially *Euſebius*, ſo well verſed in antiquities, would have found out ſo great a cheat. Altho' I muſt confeſs they were oft-times deceived with *Piæ Fraudes*; but then it was when they made for the Chriſtians, and not againſt them, as this did. But beſides a fabulous confuſion of things together, we have ſome things delivered concerning their Gods, which are both contrary to all natural notions of a Deity, and thoſe very common principles of Humanity, which all acknowledge. As when Κρόνος or *Saturn*, ſuſpecting his ſon *Sadidus*, deſtroyed him with his own hands, and warred againſt his father *Uranus*, and after deſtroyed him likewiſe, and buried his brother *Atlas* alive in the earth; which being taken, as *Philo Byblius* contends they ought to be, in the literal ſenſe, are ſuch incongruities to all notions of a divine nature, that it is the greateſt wonder there ſhould be any that ſhould believe there was any God, and believe theſe were Gods together.

Joh. Urſinus Exerc. 3. ſect. 1.

But altho' there be ſo many groſs Fables and Inconſiſtencies in this *Phœnician* Theology, that are ſo far from meriting belief in themſelves, that it were a ſufficient forfeiture of reaſon to ſay they were credible; yet when we have a greater light in our hands of divine revelation, we may in this dungeon find out many excellent remainders of the ancient tradition, tho' miſerably corrupted; as, concerning the Creation, the Original of Idolatry, the Invention of Arts, the Foundation of Cities, the Story of *Abraham*, of which in their due place. That which of all ſeems the cleareſt in this Theology, is the open owning the original of Idolatry to have been from the conſecration of ſome eminent perſons after their death, who had found out ſome uſeful things for the world while they were living: which the ſubtiler *Greeks* would not admit of, *viz.* that the perſons they worſhip'd were once Men; which made them turn all into Allegories and Myſtical Senſes to blind that Idolatry they were guilty of the better among the ignorant: which makes *Philo Byblius* ſo very angry with the *Neoteric Græcians*, as he calls them, ὡς ἂν βεβιασμένως καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῶς τοὺς περὶ θεῶν μύθους ἐπ' ἀλληγορίας καὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις τε καὶ θεωρίας ἀνάγουσι: *That with a great deal of force and ſtraining they turned all the ſtories of the Gods into Allegories and Phyſical Diſcourſes.* Which is all the ingenuity that I know is to be found in this *Phœnician* Theology, that therein we find a free acknowledgment of the beginning of the Heathen Idolatry: and therefore *Sanchoniathon* was as far from advancing *Porphyry*'s Religion, as he was in the leaſt from overthrowing the credibility of Chriſtianity.

Philo Bybl. ap. Euſeb. Præp. l. 1. c. 6. p. 23.

VIII. The next we come to then, are the *Ægyptians*; a people ſo unreaſonably given to Fables, that the wiſeſt action they did, was to *conceal* their Religion; and the beſt offices their Gods had, was to *hold their fingers in their mouths*, to command ſilence to all that came to worſhip them. But we deſign not here any ſet diſcourſe concerning the vanity of the *Ægyptian* Theology, which yet was ſo monſtrouſly ridiculous, that even thoſe who were over-run with the height of Idolatry themſelves, did make it the object of their ſcorn and laughter. And certainly had we no other demonſtration of the greatneſs of Man's apoſtaſy and degeneracy, the *Ægyptian* Theology would be an irrefragable evidence of it: for who could but imagine a ſtrange lowneſs of ſpirit in thoſe, who could fall down and worſhip the baſeſt and moſt contemptible of creatures? Their Temples were the beſt Hieroglyphics of themſelves, fair and goodly ſtructures without, but within ſome deformed creatures enſhrined for veneration. But tho' the *Ægyptians* had loſt their credit ſo much as to matter of Religion; yet it may be ſuppoſed, that they who were ſo famed for wiſdom and antiquity, ſhould be able to give a full and exact account of themſelves thro' the ages of the world. And this they are ſo far from being defective in, that if you will believe them, they will give you an account of themſelves many thouſands of years before ever the world was made, but the peculiar vanity of their Chronology will be handled afterwards: That we now enquire into, is, what certain Records they had of their own antiquity, which might call for aſſent from any unprejudiced mind; whether there be any thing really anſwering that loud and unparallell'd cry of antiquity among the *Ægyptians*, whereby they will make all other Nations in compariſon of them, to be but of yeſterday, and to know nothing. We queſtion not now their pretence to wiſdom and learning, but are the more in hopes to meet with ſome certain way of ſatisfaction concerning ancient times, where learning is ſuppoſed to have flouriſhed ſo much, even when *Greece* it ſelf was accounted barbarous.

IX. The great baſis of all the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory depends on the credit of their ancient *Hermes*, whom out of their veneration they called *Triſmegiſtus*; for to him they aſcribe the firſt invention of their Learning, and all excellent Arts; from him they derive their Hiſtory; their famous hiſtorian *Manetho* profeſſing to tranſcribe his Dynaſties from the Pillars of *Hermes*. We ſhall therefore firſt ſee of what credit and antiquity *Hermes* himſelf was, and of what account particularly thoſe Pillars were which uphold all the Fabric of *Manetho* his Dynaſties. For *Hermes* himſelf the ſtory concerning him is ſo various and uncertain, that ſome have from thence queſtioned whether ever there were ſuch a perſon or no, becauſe of the ſtrangely different account that is given of him. *Cotta* in *Tully*, in order to the eſtabliſhing his Academical doctrine of with-holding Aſſent, mentions no fewer than five *Mercuries*, of which, two he makes *Ægyptian*, one of them the *Hermes* we now ſpeak of, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, and was the Author both of their Laws and Letters. The *Ægyptians*, as appears by *Diodorus*, make him to be a ſacred Scribe to *Oſiris*, and to have inſtructed *Iſis*; and when *Oſiris* went upon any warlike expedition, he committed the management of affairs to him for his great wiſdom. The *Phœnicians* preſerve his memory among them too: for *Philo Byblius* ſaith, That *Sanchoniathon* deſcribed his Theology from the Books of *Taautus*, whom the *Ægyptians* call *Thoyth*, who was the firſt inventor of Letters, and was a Counſellor to *Saturn*, whoſe advice he much relied on. What now muſt we pitch upon in ſo great uncertainties? How come the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* Theology to come both from the ſame perſon, which are conceived ſo much to differ from each other? If we make the ſtories of *Oſiris* and *Iſis* to be fabulous, and merely allegorical, as *Plutarch* doth, then *Mercury* himſelf muſt become an

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Allegory, and the Father of Letters muſt be an Hieroglyphic. If we admit the *Ægyptian* narrations to be real, and ſeek to reduce them to truth, and thereby make *Oſiris* to be *Mitſraim* the ſon of *Cham*, who firſt ruled in *Ægypt*: All that we can then affirm of *Hermes* is, That he might be ſome uſeful perſon, who had a great influence both upon the King and State, and did firſt ſettle the Nation in a politick way of government, whoſe memory on that account the *Ægyptians* might preſerve with the greateſt veneration; and when they were once fallen into that idolatry of conſecrating the memories of the firſt contributors to the good of mankind, they thought they had the greateſt reaſon to adore his memory, and ſo by degrees attributed the invention of all uſeful things to him. For ſo it is apparent they did, when *Jamblichus* tells us, The *Ægyptians* attributed all their Books to *Mercury*, as the Father of them: becauſe he was reputed the father of wit and learning, they made all the off-ſprings of their brains to bear their father's name. And this hath been the great reaſon the world hath been ſo long time impoſed upon with varieties of Books going under the name of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*. For he was not the firſt of his kind, who in the early days of the Chriſtian World obtruded upon the World that *Cento* or confuſed mixture of the *Chriſtian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* Doctrines, which is extant ſtill under the name of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*; whoſe vanity and falſhood hath been ſufficiently detected by learned men. There were long before his time extant ſeveral *Mercurial* Books, as they were called, which none of the wiſer Heathens did ever look on as any other than fables and impoſtures, as appears by *Porphyry*'s letter to *Anebo* the *Ægyptian* Prieſt, and *Jamblichus* his anſwer to it in his Book of the *Ægyptian* Myſteries.

Jamblic. de Myſt. l. 1.

X. We have then no certainty at all, notwithſtanding the great fame of *Hermes*, of any certain records of ancient times, unleſs they be contained in thoſe ſacred Inſcriptions from whence *Manetho* took his Hiſtory. It muſt be acknowledged that the moſt ancient way of preſerving any monuments of learning in thoſe elder times, was by theſe Inſcriptions on Pillars, eſpecially among the *Ægyptians*, as is evident from the ſeveral teſtimonies of *Galen*, *Proclus*, *Jamblichus*, and the Author of the Book called *Sapientia ſecundum Ægyptios*, adjoyned to *Ariſtotle*; who all concur in this, that whatever laudable invention they had among them it was inſcribed on ſome Pillars, and thoſe preſerved in their Temples, which were inſtead of Libraries to them. *Manetho* therefore to make his ſtory the more probable, pretends to take all his relations from theſe ſacred Inſcriptions; and as *Euſebius* tells us, tranſlated the whole *Ægyptian* Hiſtory into *Greek*, beginning from their Gods, and continuing his Hiſtory down near the time of *Darius Codomannus*, whom *Alexander* conquered: for in *Euſebius* his *Chronica* mention is made of *Manetho* his Hiſtory, ending the xvith year of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, which, ſaith *Voſſius*, was in the ſecond year of the 107th *Olympiad*. This *Manetho Sebennyta* was High Prieſt of *Heliopolis* in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, at whoſe requeſt he writ his Hiſtory, which he digeſted into three Tomes, the firſt containing the 11 Dynaſties of the Gods and Heroes; the ſecond, 8 Dynaſties; the third 12; all containing, according to his fabulous computation, the ſum of 53535 years. Theſe Dynaſties are yet preſerved, being firſt epitomized by *Julius Africanus*, from him tranſcribed by *Euſebius* in his *Chronica*, from *Euſebius* by *Georgius Syncellus*, out of whom they are produced by *Joſ. Scaliger*, and may be ſeen both in his *Euſebius*, and his *Canones Iſagogici*.

Gal. l.1.c. Jul. c.1. Procl. in Tim. p.31. Jamb. de Myſt. c.2. ſect. 1. Sap. Sec. Ægypt. c.1. ſ. 1.

Voſſius de Hiſt. Græc. l. 1. c. 14.

Now *Manetho*, as appears by *Euſebius*, voucheth this as the main XI. teſtimony of his credibility, that he took his Hiſtory, ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ γῇ κειμένων τηλῶν, ἱερᾷ διαλέκτῳ καὶ ἱερογραφικοῖς γράμμασι κεχαρακτηρισμένων ὑπὸ Θωὺθ τοῦ πρώτου Ἑρμοῦ, καὶ ἑρμηνευθεισῶν μετὰ τὸν Κατακλυσμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν γράμμασιν ἱερογλυφικοῖς, καὶ ἀποτεθεισῶν ἐν βίβλοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγαθοδαίμονος τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ, πατρὸς δὲ τοῦ Τὰτ, ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγυπτίων; *from ſome Pillars in the Land of* Seriad, *in which they were inſcribed in the Sacred Dialect by the firſt* Mercury Thoyth, *and after the floud were tranſlated out of the Sacred Dialect into the Greek Tongue in Hieroglyphic Characters, and are laid up in Books among the Reveſtries of the Ægyptian Temples, by* Agathodæmon, *the ſecond* Mercury, *the Father of* Tat. Certainly this fabulous Author could not in fewer words have more manifeſted his own impoſtures, nor blaſted his own credit more than he hath done in theſe; which it is a wonder ſo many learned Men have taken ſo little notice of, which have found ſo frequent occaſion to ſpeak of *Manetho* and his Dynaſties. This I ſhall make appear by ſome great Improbabilities, and other plain Impoſſibilities which are couched in them. The improbabilities are, *firſt*, ſuch Pillars, being in ſuch a place as *Seriad*, and that place no (1.) more ſpoken of either by himſelf or by any other *Ægyptians*, nor any uſe made of theſe Inſcriptions by any other but himſelf. As to this *terra Seriadica* where it ſhould be, the very learned and inquiſitive *Joſeph Scaliger* plainly gives out, and ingenuouſly profeſſeth his ignorance. *Scalig. Not. in gr. Euſeb. p.* 408. For in his Notes on the Fragments of *Manetho* in *Euſebius*, when he comes to that ἐν γῇ τῇ Σηριαδικῇ, he only ſaith, *Quæ nobis ignota quærant ſtudioſi.* But *Iſaac Voſſius*, in his late Diſcourſes *De ætate mundi*, *Iſ. Voſſ. de æt. mund. c.* 10. cries Εὕρηκα, and confidently perſuades himſelf that it is the ſame with *Seirah*, mentioned *Judges* 3. 16. Indeed were there nothing elſe to be conſidered but affinity of names, it might well be the ſame: but that פסילים, which we render the *ſtone-quarries*, ſhould ſignifie the Pillars of *Mercury*, is ſomewhat hard to conceive. The *Seventy* render it, as himſelf obſerves, τὰ γλυπτὰ, by which they underſtand *graven Images:* So the word is uſed 2 *Chron.* 33. 19. *Deut.* 7. 5. *Iſai.* 10. 19. The vulgar *Latin* renders it, *ad locum Idolorum*; which were the certain interpretation, if *Chytræus* his conjecture were true, that *Eglon* had lately ſet up Idols there; but if it be meant of Pillars, I cannot but approve of *Junius* his interpretation, which I conceive bids faireſt to be the genuine ſenſe of the place, *viz.* that theſe Stones here were the Twelve ſtones pitched by *Joſhua* in *Gilgal* after the *Iſraelites* paſſed over *Jordan*; Joſh. 4. 19, 20, 21. and theſe Stones are ſaid to be by *Gilgal*, *Judges* 3. 19. So that notwithſtanding this handſome conjecture, we are as far to ſeek for the Pillars of *Mercury* as ever we were, and may be ſo to the world's end. *Secondly*, the ſtanding of theſe Pillars during the Floud, which muſt (2.) be ſuppoſed certainly to have ſome ſingular virtue in them to reſiſt ſuch a torrent of Waters, which overthrew the ſtrongeſt built Houſes, and moſt compacted Cities. The plain Impoſſibilities are, *firſt*, that *Manetho* (1.) ſhould tranſcribe his Dynaſties from the beginning of the Hiſtory of *Ægypt*, to almoſt the time of *Alexander*, out of the ſacred Inſcriptions of *Thoyth*, who lived in the beginning of the very firſt Dynaſty according to his own computation. Sure this *Thoyth*, was an excellent Prophet, to write an Hiſtory for above 50000 years to come, as *Manetho* reckons it. *Secondly*, it is as well ſtill, that this Hiſtory after the Floud ſhould (2.) be tanſlated into Hieroglyphic Characters. What kind of Tranſlation is that? we had thought Hieroglyphics had been repreſentations of Things, and not of Sounds and Letters, or Words: How could this Hiſtory have at firſt been written in any tongue, when it was in Hieroglyphics? Do Hieroglyphics ſpeak in ſeveral Languages, and are they capable of changing their Tongues? (3.) But *thirdly*, it is as good ſtill, that the ſecond *Mercury* or *Agathodæmon* did tranſlate this Hiſtory ſo ſoon after the Floud into *Greek*: Was the *Greek* Tongue ſo much in requeſt ſo ſoon after the Floud, that the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory, for the ſake of the *Greeks* muſt be tranſlated into their Language? Nay, is it not evident *Herod. l.* 2. *Diod. l.* 1. *c.* 67. from *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*, that the *Grecians* were not permitted ſo much as any commerce with the *Ægyptians*, till the time of *Pſammetichus*, which fell out in the 26th Dynaſty of *Manetho*, and about a Century after the beginning of the *Olympiads*. We ſee then how credible an Author *Manetho* is, and what truth there is like to be in the account of ancient times given by the *Ægyptian* Hiſtorians, when the chief of them ſo lamentably and ominouſly ſtumbles in his very entrance into it.

And yet as fabulous as this account is, which *Manetho* gives of his taking his Hiſtory from theſe Pillars before the Floud, I cannot but think that *Joſephus*, an Author otherwiſe of good credit, took his famous ſtory of *Seth*'s Pillars, concerning Aſtronomical obſervations before the Floud, from this ſtory of *Manetho*; and therefore I cannot but look upon them with as jealous an eye as on the other, altho' I know how fond the world hath been upon that moſt ancient monument, as is pretended, of learning in the world. *Du Bartas* hath writ a whole Poem on theſe Pillars, and the truth is, they are fitter ſubjects for Poets than any elſe, as will appear on theſe conſiderations. *Firſt*, how ſtrangely improbable is it, that the poſterity of *Seth*, who, as is pretended, did foreknow a deſtruction of the world to be by a Floud, ſhould buſie themſelves to write Aſtronomical obſervations on Pillars, for the benefit of thoſe who ſhould live after it? Could they think their Pillars ſhould have ſome peculiar exemption above ſtronger ſtructures, from the violence of the rough and furious waters? If they believed the Floud abſolutely univerſal, for whom did they intend their obſervations? if not, to what end did they make them, when the perſons ſurviving might communicate their inventions to them? But, *Secondly*, if either one or both theſe Pillars remained, whence comes it to paſs that neither the *Chaldæans*, nor any of the eldeſt pretenders to Aſtronomy, ſhould neither mention them, nor make any uſe of them? Nay, *Thirdly*, whence came the ſtudy of Aſtronomy to be ſo lamentably defective in thoſe ancient times, if they had ſuch certain obſervations of the heavenly bodies gathered by ſo much experience of the perſons who lived before the Floud? *Fourthly*, How comes *Joſephus* himſelf to neglect this remarkable teſtimony of the Scripture-hiſtory in his Books againſt *Appion*, if he had thought it were ſuch as might be relyed on? *Fifthly*, How comes *Joſephus* ſo careleſly not to ſet down the place in *Syria* where theſe Pillars ſtood, that inquiſitive Perſons might have ſatisfy'd themſelves with the Sight of the Pillar at leaſt, and what kind of characters thoſe obſervations were preſerved in? But now, if we compare this of *Joſephus* with *Manetho* his ſtory, we ſhall find them ſo exactly reſemble each other, that we may judge all thoſe Pillars to have been taken out of the ſame Quarry. Two things make it yet more probable: *Firſt*, The name of the place wherein they ſtood, which *Euſtathius* in *Hexaemeron* takes out of *Joſephus*, and calls Σιριάδ, the very ſame place with that in *Manetho.* The other is the common uſe of the name of *Seth* among the *Ægyptians*, as not only appears by *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, but by this very place of *Manetho*; where it follows, ἐν βίβλῳ Σώθεως a book of his bearing the Title, which *Vettius Valens Antiochenus* tells us is not called Σῶθις but Σῆθ. Now therefore *Joſephus*, who frequently uſeth the teſtimony of Heathen Writers, and frequently of this *Manetho*, endeavoured to bring this fabulous relation of *Manetho* as near the truth as he could; therefore inſtead of *Thoyth* he puts *Seth*, and inſtead of the fabulous hiſtory of *Ægypt*, the inventions of the Patriarchs, and *Syria* inſtead of *Seriadica*, a Country too large to find theſe pillars in.

Vettius Val. apud Scal. not. Gr. p. 438.

CHAP. III.

220. l. C

Of the *Chaldæan* Hiſtory.

I. *The conteſt of Antiquity among Heathen Nations, and the ways of deciding it.* II. *Of the* Chaldæan *Aſtrology, and the foundation of Judicial Aſtrology.* III. *Of the* Zabii, *their Founder, who they were; no other than the old* Chaldees. IV. *Of* Beroſus *and his Hiſtory.* V. *An account of the fabulous Dynaſties of* Beroſus *and* Manetho; VI. *From the Tranſlation of the Scripture-hiſtory into Greek in the time of* Ptolemee. VII. *Of that Tranſlation and the time of it.* VIII. *Of* Demetrius Phalereus. Scaliger's *arguments anſwered.* IX. Manetho *writ after the Septuagint, proved againſt* Kircher; *his arguments anſwered. Of Rabbinical and Arabic Authors, and their little credit in matter of Hiſtory.* X. *The time of* Beroſus *enquired into; his Writing contemporary with* Philadelphus.

I. THE next whom our Enquiry leads us to, are the *Chaldæans*, a Nation of great and undoubted Antiquity, being in probability the firſt formed into a National Government after the Floud, and therefore the more capable of having theſe Arts and Sciences flouriſh among them, which might preſerve the memory of eldeſt times to the view of poſterity. And yet even among theſe who enjoyed all the advantages of eaſe, quiet, and a flouriſhing Empire, we find no undoubted or credible Records preſerved, but the ſame vanity as among the *Ægyptians*, in arrogating Antiquity to themſelves beyond all proportion of reaſon or ſatisfaction from their own Hiſtory, to fill up that vaſt meaſure of time with: which makes it moſt probable, what *Diodorus* obſerves of them, *That in things pertaining to their Arts, they made uſe of Lunar years of* 30 *days*; ſo they had need, when *Tully* tells us that they boaſted of obſervations of the Stars for 470000 years. It had been impoſſible for them to have been ſo extravagant in their accounts of themſelves, had they but preſerved the Hiſtory of their Nation in any certain Records. For want of which, the Tradition of the eldeſt times varying in the ſeveral families after their diſperſion, and being gradually corrupted by the

Diodor. Biblioth. l. 1.

Cicero de Divin. l. 1.

policy of their Leaders, and thoſe corruptions readily embraced by the predominancy of ſelf-love in the ſeveral Nations, thence aroſe thoſe vain and eager conteſts between the *Chaldæans*, *Scythians*, *Ægyptians*, and *Æthiopians*, concerning the antiquity of their ſeveral Nations: which may be ſeen in *Diodorus*, and others: by which it moſt evidently appears that they had no certain hiſtory of their own Nations, for none of them inſiſt upon any Records, but only upon ſeveral probabilities from the nature of their Country, and the Climates they lived under. Neither need *Pſammetichus* have been put to that ridiculous way of deciding the controverſy by his two Infants bred up without any converſe with Men, concluding the language they ſpake would manifeſt the great antiquity of the Nation it belonged to: Whereas it is more than probable they had ſpoken none at all, had they not learned the inarticulate voice of the Goats they had more converſe with than Men. The making uſe of ſuch ways to decide this controverſy doth not only argue the great weakneſs of thoſe times as to natural knowledge; but the abſolute defect and inſufficiency of them, as to the giving any certain account of the ſtate of ancient times.

II. Of which the *Chaldæans* had advantages above all other Heathen Nations, not only living in a ſetled Country, but in or near that very place where the grand Anceſtours of the world had their chief abode and reſidence. Whereby we ſee how unfaithful a thing Tradition is, and how ſoon it is corrupted or fails, where it hath no ſure records to bottom its ſelf upon. But indeed it is the leſs wonder that there ſhould be a confuſion of Hiſtories, where there had been before of Tongues; and that ſuch whoſe deſign and memory God had blaſted before, ſhould afterwards forget their own original. But as if the *Chaldæans* had retained ſomething ſtill of their old aſpiring mind to reach up to Heaven; the only thing they were eminent for, and which they were careful in preſerving of, was Some Aſtronomical obſervations, which *Tully* tells us *they had a great conveniency for, by reaſon of the plain and even ſituation of their Country*; whereby they might have a larger proſpect of the heavenly bodies, than thoſe who lived in mountainous Countries could have. And yet even for this (which they were ſo famous for, that the name *Chaldæans* paſſed for *Aſtrologers* in the *Roman* Empire) we have no great reaſon to admire their excellency in it, conſidering how ſoon their skill in Aſtronomy dwindled into that which by a great *Catachreſis* is called *Judicial* Aſtrology. The original of which is moſt evident among Them, as all other Heathen Nations, to have been from the Divinity which they attributed to the Stars; in which yet they were far more rational than thoſe who now admire that Art: For, granting their Hypotheſis, that the Stars were Gods, it was but reaſonable they ſhould determine contingent effects; but it is far from being ſo with Them who take away the foundation of all thoſe celeſtial Houſes, and yet attribute the ſame effects to them, which they did, who believed a Divinity in them. The *Chaldæans*, as *Diodorus* relates, ſet 30 Stars under the Planets; theſe they called Βουλαίους Θεούς; Others they had as Princes over theſe, which they called τῶν Θεῶν Κυρίους; the former were as the privy Counſellours, and theſe the Princes over them, by whom in their courſes they ſuppoſed the courſe of the Year to be regulated. See then what a near affinity there was between Aſtrology and Divinity of the Stars, which makes *Ptolemee* call them *Atheiſts* who condemned Aſtrology, becauſe thereby they deſtroyed the main of their Religion, which was the

Diodor. l. 2. Biblioth.

Ptolem. Tetrab. l. 1.

the worſhipping the Stars for Gods. But it ſeems by *Strabo*, that one of the Sects of the *Chaldæans* did ſo hold to Aſtronomy ſtill, that they wholly rejected *Genethlialogy*: which cauſed a great diviſion among the *Orchoëni* and *Borſippeni*, two Sects among them, ſo called from the places of their habitations.

Strabo Geograph. l. 16.

III. And if we reckon the *Zabii* among the *Chaldæans*, as *Maimonides* ſeems to do, we have a further evidence of the Planetary Deities ſo much in requeſt among the *Chaldæans*; for the deſcription he gives of them is to this purpoſe, *That they had no other Gods but the Stars to whom they made Statues and Images, to the Sun Golden, to the Moon Silver, and ſo to the reſt of the Planets of the Metals dedicated to them. Thoſe Images derived an influence from the Stars to which they were erected, which had thence a faculty of foretelling future things*; which is an exact deſcription of the Στοιχεῖα or *Taliſmans* ſo much in requeſt among the Heathens; ſuch as the *Palladium* of *Troy* is ſuppoſed by learned men to have been. Theſe *Taliſmans* are by the *Jews* called *David*'s *bucklers*, and are much of the ſame nature with the ancient *Teraphim*, both being accurately made according to the poſitions of the Heavens; only the one were to foretel future things, the other for the driving away ſome calamity. Concerning theſe *Zabii*, *Maimonides* tells us, *That the underſtanding their Rites would give a great deal of light to ſeveral paſſages of Scripture which now lie in obſcurity*: but little is ſuppoſed to be yet further known of them than what *Scaliger* hath ſaid, That they were the more Eaſtern *Chaldæans*; which he fetcheth from the ſignification of the word. Several of their Books are extant, ſaith *Scaliger*, among the *Arabians*, but none of them are yet diſcovered to the *European* world. *Salmaſius* thinks, theſe *Zabii* were the *Chaldæans* inhabiting *Meſopotamia*, to which is very conſonant what *Maimonides* ſaith, that *Abraham had his education among them. Saïd Batricides*, cited by Mr. *Selden*, *attributes the original of their Religion to the time of* Nahor, *and to* Zaradchath *the Perſian as the Author of it*; who is conceived to be the ſame with *Zoroaſter*, who in all probability is the ſame with the *Zertooſt* of the *Perſees*, a Sect of the ancient *Perſians* living now among the *Banyans* in the *Indies*. Theſe give a more full and exact account concerning the original, birth, education, and enthuſiaſms or revelations of their *Zertooſt*, than any we meet with in any *Greek* Hiſtorians; three books they tell us of, which *Zertooſt* received by Revelation, or rather one book conſiſting of three ſeveral tracts, whereof the firſt was concerning Judicial Aſtrology, which they call *Aſtoodeger*; the ſecond concerning *Phyſic*, or the knowledge of Natural things; the third was called *Zertooſt*, from the bringer of it, containing their Religious rites; the firſt was committed to the *Jeſopps* or *Magi*, the ſecond to *Phyſicians*, the third to the *Darooes* or Churchmen, wherein are contained the ſeveral precepts of their Law; we have likewiſe the rites and cuſtoms of theſe *Perſees* in their worſhip of Fire, with many other particular rites of theirs, publiſhed ſome time ſince by one Mr. *Lord*, who was a long time reſident among them at *Surat*; by which we may not only underſtand much of the Religion of the ancient *Perſians*, but, if I miſtake not, ſomewhat of the *Zabii* too. My reaſons are, becauſe the ancient *Zaradcha* or *Zoroaſter* is by *Saïd Batricides* made the Author of the *Zabii*, as we have ſeen already, who was undoubtedly the founder of the *Perſian* worſhip, or rather a promoter of it among the *Perſians*; for *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us, that he was inſtructed in the rites of the *Chaldæans*, which he added to the *Perſian* rites. Beſides

Maimon. More Nevo. p. 3. *c.* 29.

v. Scaliger Ep. ad Caſaubon. & *Ep. Gallic. Selden de Diis Syris, l.* 1. *c.* 2. *Salmaſ. de An. Clim. p.* 578.

Selden de jure nat. & *gent. l.* 2. *c* 7.

Am. Marc. Hiſt. l. 23.

their agreement in the chief point of Idolatry, the worſhip of the Sun, and conſequently the Πυραιθεῖα or Symbol of the Sun, the eternal Fire, is evident; which, as far as we can learn, was the great and moſt early Idolatry of the Eaſtern Countries. And further we find GOD in *Leviticus* 26. 30. threatning to deſtroy their חמנים *their Images of the Sun*, ſome render it; but moſt probably by that word is meant the Πυραιθεῖα, *the Hearths* where they kept their perpetual Fire, for thoſe are חמנים from חמה, which is uſed both for the *Sun* and *Fire*. Now hence it appears that this Idolatry was in uſe among the Nations about *Palæſtine*; elſe there had been no need of ſo ſevere a threatning againſt it: and therefore moſt probably the rites of the *Zabii* (which muſt help us to explain the reaſons of ſome particular poſitive precepts in the *Levitical* Law relating to Idolatry) are the ſame with the rites of the *Chaldæans* and *Perſians*, who all agreed in this worſhip of the Sun and Fire; which may be yet more probable from what *Maimonides* ſaith of them, *Gens Zabia erat gens quæ implevit totum orbem*; it could not be then any obſcure Nation, but ſuch as had the largeſt ſpread in the Eaſtern Countries, which could be no other than the ancient *Chaldæans*, from whom the *Perſians* derived their worſhip. It may not ſeem altogether improbable that *Balaam* the famous Southſayer was one of theſe *Zabii*, eſpecially if according to *Salmaſius* his judgment, they inhabited *Meſopotamia*; for *Balaam*'s Country ſeems to be there; for it is ſaid, *Num.* 22. 5. *that he dwelt in Pethor by the river*, i. e. ſaith the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt, *in Peor of Syria by Euphrates*, which in Scripture is called *the river*, Eſa. 8. 7. But from this great obſcurity as to the hiſtory of ſo ancient and ſo large a people as theſe *Zabii* are ſuppoſed to be, we have a further evidence to our purpoſe of the defectiveneſs and inſufficiency of the Eaſtern Hiſtories as to the giving any full account of themſelves and their own original.

V. Voſſ. Idol. l. 2. c. 9.

IV. We are told indeed by ſome, that *Nabonaſſar* did burn and deſtroy all the ancient Records of the *Chaldæans* which they had diligently preſerved among them before, on purpoſe to raiſe the greater reputation to himſelf, and blot out the memory of his uſurpation, by burning the Records of all their own ancient Kings. Which is a conceit I ſuppoſe hath no other ground than that the famous *Æra* ſo much celebrated by Aſtronomers and others, did bear the name of *Nabonaſſar*. Which (if we ſhould be ſo greedy of all empty conjectures, which tend to our purpoſe, as to take them for truths) would be a very ſtrong evidence of the falſhood and vanity of the *Chaldæans* in their great pretences to Antiquity. But as the caſe ſtands in reference to their Hiſtory, we find more evidence from Scripture to aſſert their juſt antiquity, than ever they are able to produce out of any undoubted Records of their own. Which yet hath been endeavoured by an Author both of ſome credit and antiquity, the true *Beroſus*, not the counterfeit of *Annius*, whoſe vizard we ſhall have occaſion to pull off afterwards. This *Beroſus* was, as *Joſephus* and *Tatianus* aſſure us, *a Prieſt of* Belus, *and a* Babylonian *born, but afterwards flouriſhed in the Iſle of* Cos, *and was the firſt who brought the* Chaldæan *Aſtrology in requeſt among the* Greeks; in honour to whoſe name and memory, the *Athenians* (who were never backward in applauding thoſe who brought them the greateſt News, eſpecially if ſuitable to their former Superſtition) erected a Statue for him with a gilded tongue. A good Emblem of his Hiſtory, which made a fair and ſpecious ſhew, but was not that within, which it pretended to be: eſpecially where he pretends

Joſeph. c. App. l. 1. Tatian. c. Græcos.

to give an account of the moſt ancient times, and reckons up his two Dynaſties before the time of *Belus :* but of them afterwards. It cannot be denied but ſome Fragments of his hiſtory, which have been preſerved from ruin by the care and induſtry of *Joſephus*, *Tatianus*, *Euſebius* and others, have been very uſeful, not only for proving the truth of the hiſtory of Scripture to the Heathens; but alſo for illuſtrating ſome paſſages concerning the *Babylonian* Empire: as making *Nabopolaſſar* the Father of *Nebuchadonoſor*, of which *Scaliger* hath fully ſpoken in his Notes upon thoſe Fragments. *Scaliger Append. ad l. de Emend. Temp.*

9. 1. 6.

V. Far be it from me to derogate any thing even from prophane Hiſtories, where they do not interfere with the Sacred Hiſtory of Scripture; and it is certainly the beſt improvement of theſe to make them *draw water to the Sanctuary*, and to ſerve as ſmaller Stars to conduct us in our way, when we cannot enjoy the benefit of that greater Light of Sacred Hiſtory. But that which I impeach theſe prophane hiſtories of, is only an inſufficiency as to that account of ancient times: wherein they are ſo far from giving light to ſacred Records, that the deſign of ſetting of them up ſeems to be for caſting a cloud upon them. Which may ſeem ſomewhat the more probable in that thoſe monſtrous accounts of the *Ægyptian* and *Chaldæan* Dynaſties did never publickly appear in the world in the *Greek* Tongue 'till the time that our ſacred Records were tranſlated into *Greek* at *Alexandria*. For 'till that time when this authentic hiſtory of the world was drawn forth from its privacy and retirement into the public notice of the world about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, [being as it were lockt up before among the *Iſraelites* at *Judæa*] theſe vain pretenders to antiquity thought not themſelves ſo much concerned to ſtand up for the credit of their own Nations. For 'till that time the credulous world, not being acquainted with any certain report of the creation and propagation of the world, was apt to ſwallow any thing that was given forth by thoſe who were had in ſo great eſteem as the *Chaldæan* and the *Ægyptian* Prieſts were. Becauſe it was ſuppoſed that thoſe perſons, who were freed from other avocations, had more leiſure to inquire into theſe things; and becauſe of their myſterious hiding what they had from the vulgar, they were preſumed to have a great deal more than they had. But now when the *Sun of Righteouſneſs* was approaching this Horizon of the world, and in order to that the Sacred Hiſtories like a Day-ſtar was to give the world notice of it, by which the former ſhadows and miſts began to fly away, it concerned all thoſe whoſe intereſt lay in the former ignorance of mankind, as much as they could, to raiſe all their *Ignes Fatui*, and whatever might tend to obſcure that approaching Light, by invalidating the credit of that which came to beſpeak its acceptance.

VI. It is very obſervable, what gradations and ſteps there were in the world to the appearance of that Grand light, which came down from Heaven to direct us in our way thither; how the world not long before was awakened into a greater inquiſitiveneſs than ever before, how knowledge grew into repute, and what methods divine providence uſed to give the inquiſitive world a taſte of truth at preſent to ſtay their ſtomachs, and prepare them for that further diſcovery of it afterwards. In order to this that Nation of the *Jews* which was an incloſed garden before, was now thrown open, and many of the plants removed and ſet in foreign Countries, not only in *Babylon* (where even after their return were left three famous Schools of Learning, *Sora*, *Pombeditha*, and *Neharda*) but in *Ægypt* too, where multitudes of them by *Alexander*'s favour were ſettled at *Alexandria*, where they had opportunity to ſeaſon thoſe two great Fountains, whence the current of knowledge ran into the reſt of the world. And now it was not in *Jewry only that God was known*, but *He whoſe name was great in Iſrael* did make way for the knowledge of himſelf among all the Nations of the earth. And that All-wiſe GOD who directed the *Magi* by a ſtar to Chriſt, making uſe of their former skill in Aſtronomy to take notice of that Star which came now on a peculiar errand to them to lead them to their Saviour (the great GOD condeſcending ſo far to mankind, as to take advantage of particular inclinations, and to accommodate himſelf to them; for which purpoſe it is very obſervable that he appeared in another way to the Wiſe-men, than to the poor Shepherds) the ſame GOD made uſe of the curioſity and inquiſitiveneſs after knowledge, which was in *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* (which he is ſo much applauded for by *Athenæus* and others) to bring to light the moſt advantageous knowledge, which the world ever had before the coming of Chriſt in the fleſh. And that great Library of his erecting at *Alexandria* did never deſerve that title 'till it had lodged thoſe ſacred Records, and then it did far better than the old one of *Oſymanduas*, of which Hiſtorians tells us this was the Inſcription' Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς, *The ſhop of the Soul's Phyſic.*

V. Caſaub. ad Athenæum, l. 5. c. 9.

VII. But this being a matter of ſo much concernment in order to our better underſtanding the original of the vaſt accounts of time among the *Chaldæans* and *Ægyptians*, and a ſubject not yet touched by any, we ſhall a little farther improve the probability of it, by taking a more particular account of the time when the Scriptures were firſt tranſlated, and the occaſion might thereby be given to theſe *Ægyptians* and *Chaldæans* to produce their fabulous account into the view of the world. Whether the Scriptures had been ever before tranſlated into the *Greek* language, (tho' it be aſſerted by ſome ancient Writers of the Church,) is very queſtionable, chiefly upon this account, that a ſufficient reaſon cannot be aſſigned of undertaking a new tranſlation at *Alexandria* if there had been any extant before. Eſpecially if all thoſe circumſtances of that tranſlation be true, which are commonly received and delivered down to us, with almoſt an unanimous conſent of the perſons who had greater advantages of knowing the certainty of ſuch things, than we can have at this great diſtance of time. And therefore certainly every petty conjecture of ſome modern, tho' learned men, ought not to bear ſway againſt ſo unanimous a tradition in a matter of fact, which cannot be capable of being proved, but by the teſtimony of former ages. And it is ſomewhat ſtrange that the ſingle teſtimony of one *Hermippus* in *Diogenes Laertius* (whoſe age and authority is ſomewhat doubtful) concerning only one Particular referring to *Demetrius Phalereus*, ſhould be thought of force enough among perſons of judgment as well as learning, to infringe the credibility of the whole ſtory delivered with ſo much conſent, not only by *Chriſtian*, but *Jewiſh* Writers; the teſtimony of one of which (every whit as conſiderable as *Hermippus*) viz. *Ariſtobulus Judæus* a *Peripatetical* Philoſopher, in an epiſtle to *Ptolemee Philometor*, doth plainly aſſert that which was ſo much queſtioned concerning *Demetrius Phalereus.*

Diog. Laer. Vit. Demetrii.

Apud Euſ. præp. Ev. l. 13.

VIII. But whatever the truth of all the particular circumſtances be, which I here enquire not after, nor the authority of that *Ariſtæus* from whom the ſtory is received, nor whether this Tranſlation was made by *Jews* ſent out of *Judæa*, or by *Jews* reſiding at *Alexandria*; it ſufficeth for our purpoſe that this Tranſlation was made before either the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties of *Beroſus*, or the *Ægyptian* of *Manetho*, were publiſhed to the world. In order to which it is neceſſary to ſhew in what time this Tranſlation was effected; and herein that chanel of Tradition, which conveys the truth of the thing in one certain courſe, runs not with ſo even a ſtream concerning the exact time of it; all indeed agree that it was about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, but in what years of his reign, is very dubious. *Joſeph Scaliger* who hath troubled the waters ſo much concerning the particular circumſtances of this Tranſlation, yet fully agrees that it was done in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; only he contends with *Africanus* that it ſhould be done in the 132^{d} *Olympiad*, which is in the 33^{d} year of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; but *Euſebius* and *Jerom* place it in the very beginning of his reign, which I think is far more probable, and that in the time when *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* reigned with his Father *Ptolemæus Lagi*: for ſo it is moſt certain he did for two years before his fathers death. By which means the great difficulty of *Scaliger* concerning *Demetrius Phalereus* is quite taken off; for *Hermippus* ſpeaks nothing of *Demetrius* his being out of favour with *Philadelphus* during his father's life, but that upon his father's death, he was baniſhed by him, and died in his baniſhment, ſo that *Demetrius* might have the overſight of the Library at *Alexandria*, and be the main inſtrument of promoting this Tranſlation, and yet thoſe things be after true which *Hermippus* ſpeaks, viz. when *Ptolemæus Lagi* or *Soter* was now dead. For it ſtands not to reaſon that during his father's life *Philadelphus* ſhould diſcover his diſpleaſure againſt *Demetrius*, it being conceived upon the advice given to his father for preferring the ſons of *Arſinoe* to the Crown before the ſon of *Berenice*. Moſt likely therefore it is that this Tranſlation might be begun by the means of *Demetrius Phalereus* in the time of *Philadelphus* his reigning with his father; but, it may be, not finiſhed till after the death of *Soter*, when *Philadelphus* reigned alone. And by this now we can perfectly reconcile that difference which is among the Fathers concerning the time when this Tranſlation was made. For *Irenæus* attributes it to the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*; *Clemens Alexandrinus* queſtions whether in the time of *Lagi* or *Philadelphus*; the reſt of the Chorus carry it for *Philadelphus*; but the words of *Anatolius* in *Euſebius* caſt it fully for both; for there ſpeaking of *Ariſtobulus*, he ſaith, *He was one of the Seventy who interpreted the Scriptures to* Ptolemæus Philadelphus *and his father, and dedicated his Commentaries upon the Law to both thoſe Kings*. *Hæc ſane omnem ſcrupulum eximunt*, ſaith * *Voſſius* upon producing this teſtimony, *this puts it out of all doubt*; and to the ſame purpoſe ſpeaks the learned *Jeſuit Petavius* in his Notes on *Epiphanius*.

Scaliger Animad. ad Num. Euſ. 1734.

V. Scaliger ib. Theocr. Schol. ad: Idyl. 17. *Juſt. l.* 16. *Euſ. Chro. Gr.*

Euſeb. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 7. *c.* 26.

* *Voſſius de Hiſt. Græc. lib.* 1. *c.* 12. *Petav. ad Epiph. pag.* 380.

IX. Having thus far cleared the time when the tranſlation of the Scriptures into Greek was made, we ſhall find our conjecture much ſtrengthened, by comparing this with the age of the forementioned Hiſtorians, *Manetho* and *Beroſus*. *Manetho* we have already made appear to have lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, and that, ſaith *Voſſius*, after the death of *Soter*. It is evident from what remains of him in *Euſebius* his *Chronica*, that he not only flouriſhed in the time of *Philadelphus*, but writ his hiſtory at the ſpecial command of *Philadelphus*, as manifeſtly appears by the remaining Epiſtle of *Manetho* to him, ſtill extant in *Euſebius*. This command of *Philadelphus* might very probably be occaſioned upon the view of that account, which the holy Scriptures, being then tran-

Euſ. Chro. Gr. p. 6.

ſlated into *Greek*, did give of the World, and the propagation of Mankind; upon which, we cannot imagine but ſo inquiſitive a perſon as *Philadelphus* would be very earneſt to have his curioſity ſatisfyed, as to what the *Ægyptian* Prieſts (who had boaſted ſo much of antiquity) could produce to confront with the Scriptures. Whereupon the task was undertaken by this *Manetho*, High-Prieſt of *Heliopolis*, whereby thoſe things which the *Ægyptian* Prieſts had to that time kept ſecret in their Cloiſters, were now divulged and expoſed to the judgment of the learned world; but what ſatisfaction they were able to give inquiſitive minds, as to the main Ζητούμενον, or *matter enquired after*, may partly appear by what hath been ſaid of *Manetho* already, and by what ſhall be ſpoken of his Dynaſties afterwards.

But all this will not perſuade *Kircher*; for, whatever *Scaliger*, nay, what *Manetho* himſelf ſaith to the contrary, He with the confidence and learning of a *Jeſuite* affirms, that this *Manetho* is elder than *Alexander* the Great. For theſe are his words, *Frequens apud priſcos hiſtoricos Dynaſtiarum Ægyptiacarum fit mentio, quarum tamen alium Authorem non habemus niſi Manethonem Sebennytam, Sacerdotem Ægyptium, quem ante tempora Alexandri, quicquid dicat Scaliger, in Ægypto floruiſſe comperio.* Certainly ſome more than ordinary evidence may be expected after ſo confident an affirmation; but whatever that perſon be in other undertakings, he is as unhappy a perſon in Philology, as any that have pretended ſo much acquaintance with it. One would think, he that had been twenty years, as he tells us himſelf, courting the *Ægyptian* Myſteries for compaſſing his *Oedipus*, ſhould have found ſome better arguments to prove an aſſertion of this nature, than meerly the teſtimony of *Joſephus*, the *Hebrew* book *Juchaſin*, and ſome *Arabic* Writers, not one of all which do mention the thing they are brought for, *viz. that* Manetho *was elder than* Alexander. All the buſineſs is, they quote him as an ancient Writer; but what then? The Author of the book *Juchaſin* was *Abraham Zachuth*, a *Jew* of *Salamanca*, who writ in the year of our Lord 1505. and this book was firſt printed at *Conſtantinople* 1556. Might not this man then well mention *Manetho* as an ancient Writer, if he flouriſhed above 1600 years before him, in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*? And what if ſome *Arabic* Writers mention him? Are they of ſo great antiquity and credit themſelves, that it is an evidence *Manetho* lived in *Alexander*'s time to be praiſed by them? It would be well, if *Kircher*, and other learned men, who think the world is grown to ſo great ſtupidity, as to believe every thing to be a jewel which is far fetched, would firſt aſſert and vindicate the antiquity and fidelity of their *Arabic* Authors, ſuch as *Geladinus*, *Abenephi*, and many others, before they expect we ſhould part with our more authentic Records of Hiſtory for thoſe fabulous relations which they are ſo full fraught withal. Were it here any part of my preſent buſineſs, it were an eaſy matter ſo to lay open the ignorance, falſity, and fabulouſneſs of thoſe *Arabians* whom that author relies ſo much upon, that he could not be freed from a deſign to impoſe upon the world, who makes uſe of their teſtimony in matter of ancient times without a *Caveat*. I know none fit to believe theſe *Arabick* Writers as to theſe things, but thoſe who have faith enough to concoct the *Rabbins* in matter of Hiſtory; of whom *Origen* ſaith, Πάντα μὲν τῶν Ἰουδαίων τῶν νῦν μῦθοι καὶ λῆροι. who are, as *Grotius* truly ſaith, *peſſimi hiſtoriæ Magiſtri; nam ex quo patria expulſi ſunt, omnis apud illos hiſtoria craſſis erroribus & fabulis eſt inquinata,*

Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. *Syn. c.* 9.

Origen. C. Celſ. l. 2.
Grotius Annot. in Matth. 24. 24.

quibus & proinde nihil credendum eſt, niſi aliunde teſtes acceſſerint. And *Iſ. Caſaubon* paſſeth this ſharp, but due cenſure upon them, *Rabbinis, ubi de lingua Hebraica agitur & vocis alicujus proprietate, vel aliquo Talmudico inſtituto merito à Chriſtianis tribui non parum; ubi vero à verbis venitur ad res, aut ad hiſtoriam, vel rerum antiquarum veteris populi explicationem, niſi falli & decipi volumus, nihil admodum eſſe illis fidei habendum. Sexcentis argumentis hoc facile probarem, ſi id nunc agerem.* And in reference to their Ancient Rites as well as Hiſtory *Joſeph Scaliger* hath given this verdict of them, *Manifeſta eſt Judæorum inſcitia, qui cum uſu veterum rituum etiam eorum cognitionem amiſerunt, ut multa quæ ad eorum ſacra & hiſtoriam pertinent, longe melius nos teneamus quam ipſi.* The ſame which theſe very learned perſons ſay of *Rabbinical*, may with as much truth be ſaid of theſe *Arabic* Writers, in matters of ancient hiſtory, which I have here inſerted, to ſhew the reaſon why I have thought the teſtimony of either of theſe two ſorts of perſons ſo inconſiderable in the matter of our future diſcourſe; which being hiſtorical, and that of the greateſt antiquity, little relief is to be expected from either of them in order thereto. But to return to *Kircher*. It is freely granted, that *Joſephus*, an Author of credit, and age ſufficient to give his opinion in this caſe, doth very frequently cite *Manetho* in his *Ægyptian* Hiſtory; particularly in his learned books againſt *Appion*; but where he doth give the leaſt intimation of *Manetho* being elder than *Alexander*, I am yet to ſeek. But *Kircher* will not yet leave the matter ſo, but undertakes to give an account of the miſtake; which is, That there were two *Manetho's* beſides, and both *Ægyptians*, mentioned by *Suidas*; one a *Mendeſian*, who writ of the Preparation of the *Ægyptian* Κῦφι, a kind of Perfume uſed by the *Ægyptian* Prieſts. The other a *Dioſpolitan*, who writ ſome Phyſiological and Aſtronomical Treatiſes, whoſe works he hears are preſerved in the Duke of *Florence* his Library; and this was he (ſaith he) who lived in the times of *Auguſtus*, whom many by the equivocation of the name have confounded with the ancient Writer of the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties. Is it poſſible ſo learned a *Jeſuite* ſhould diſcover ſo little judgment in ſo few words? For, *firſt*, who ever aſſerted the writer of the Dynaſties to have lived in the time of *Auguſtus*? Yet, *ſecondly*, if that *Manetho*, whom *Suidas* there ſpeaks of, lived in *Auguſtus* his time according to *Kircher*, then it muſt neceſſarily follow, that the Compiler of the Dynaſties did: for it is evident to any one that looks into *Suidas*, that he there ſpeaks of the ſame *Manetho*, for theſe are his words: Μανεθῶς ἐκ Διοσπόλεως τ Αἰγύπτȣ, ἢ Σεβεννύτης, φυσιολογικὰ, &c. Can any thing be more plain than that he here ſpeaks of *Manetho Sebennyta*, who was the Author of the Dynaſties, tho' he might write other things beſides, of which *Suidas* there ſpeaks? But *Kircher* very wiſely, in tranſlating *Suidas* his words, leaves out Σεβεννύτης, which decides the controverſy, and makes it clear, that he ſpeaks of the ſame *Manetho* of whom we have been diſcourſing. Thus it ſtill appears that this *Manetho* is no elder than the time of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, which was the thing to be proved.

Caſaub. Exercit. ad Baron. 16. S. 8.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 6.

X. Now for *Beroſus*, altho' the *Chaldæans* had occaſion enough given them before this time to produce their Antiquities by the *Jews* converſe with them in *Babylon*; yet we find this Author the firſt who durſt adventure them abroad, ſuch as they were, in *Greek*. Now that this *Beroſus* publiſhed his Hiſtory after the time mentioned, I thus prove. *Tatianus Aſſyrius* tells us that he writ the *Chaldaic* Hiſtory in three Books, and dedicated them to *Antiochus*, τῷ μετὰ Σέλευκον τρίτῳ, as it is read in the fragment of *Tatianus*, preſerved in *Euſebius*; but it muſt be acknowledged *Euſeb. præp. Evang. l. 10. p. 289. ed. R. Steph.* that in the *Paris* edition of *Tatianus*, as well as the *Baſil*, it is thus read, καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον γεγονὼς, Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν τρίτῳ, here it relates to the *third* from *Alexander*, in the other, to the *third* from *Seleucus*; Now if we reckon the *third* ſo as to take in the perſon from whom we reckon for the *firſt*, according to the reading in *Euſebius*, it falls to be *Antiochus* called Θεὸς; according to the other reading it falls to be *Antiochus Soter*; *V. Scal. de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 392.* for *Seleucus* ſucceded *Alexander* in the Kingdom of *Syria*; *Antiochus Soter*, *Seleucus*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς, *Antiochus Soter*. But according to either of theſe readings, our purpoſe is ſufficiently proved. For *Antiochus Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the *ſixth* year of *Ptol. Philadelphus* in *Ægypt*; *Antiochus* Θεὸς ſucceded him in the 22d year of *Philadelphus*; now the ſooneſt that the hiſtory of *Beroſus* could come forth, muſt be in the reign of *Antiochus Soter*, which according to our accounts is ſome competent time after the tranſlation of the Scripture into *Greek*. But if it were not till the time of *Antiochus* Θεὸς, we cannot but imagine that the report of the account of ancient times in the Scriptures was ſufficiently divulged before the publiſhing of this hiſtory of *Beroſus*; and, it may be, *Beroſus* might ſomewhat ſooner than others underſtand all tranſactions at *Alexandria*, becauſe the place of his chief reſidence was where *Ptolemee Philadelphus* was born, which was in the Iſle of *Cos*. But *Voſſius* *Voſſius de Hiſt. Græc. li. 1. c. 13. Plin. hiſt. nat. l. 7. c. 57.* goes another way to work, to prove the time of *Beroſus*, which is this. He quotes it out of *Pliny* that *Beroſus* recorded the hiſtory 480 years, which, ſaith he, muſt be reckoned from the *Æra* of *Nabonaſſar*. Now this began in the ſecond year of the 8th *Olympiad*, from which time if we reckon 480 years, it falls upon the latter end of *Antiochus Soter*; and ſo his Hiſtory could not come out before the 22d of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, or very little before. Thus we have made it evident, That theſe two great Hiſtorians are younger even than the tranſlation of the Bible into *Greek*, by which it appears probable that they were provoked to publiſh their fabulous Dynaſties to the world. And ſo much to ſhew the inſufficiency of the *Chaldæan* Hiſtory, as to the account of ancient times: *Strab. l. 11.* Which we ſhall conclude with the cenſure of *Strabo*, a grave and judicious Author, concerning the antiquities of the *Perſians*, *Medes*, and *Syrians*; ***which***, ſaith he, ***have not obtained any great credit in the world***, διὰ τὴν τῶν συγγραφέων ἁπλότητα καὶ φιλομυθίαν, *because of the ſimplicity and fabulouſneſs of their Hiſtorians*. From hence we ſee then that there is no great credibility in thoſe Hiſtories, which are impeached of falſhood by the moſt grave and judicious of Heathen Writers.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The defect of the *Grecian* Hiſtory.

I. *That manifeſted by three evident arguments of it.* (1) *The fabulouſneſs of the Poetical age of* Greece. *The Antiquity of Poetry.* II. *Of* Orpheus *and the ancient Poets. Whence the Poetical Fables borrowed.* III. *The advancement of Poetry and Idolatry together in* Greece. IV. *The different cenſures of* Strabo *and* Eratoſthenes *concerning the Poetical age of* Greece; *and the reaſons of them.* V. (2.) *The eldeſt Hiſtorians of* Greece *are of ſuſpected credit. Of* Damaſtes, Ariſteus, *and others*; VI. *of moſt of their eldeſt Hiſtorians we have nothing left but their Names, of others only the Subjects they treated of, and ſome Fragments.* VII. *The higheſt Antiquity of the* Greeks *not much older than* Cyrus *or* Cambyſes. VIII. (3.) *Thoſe that are extant either confeſs their ignorance of eldeſt times, or plainly diſcover it. Of the firſt ſort are* Thucydides *and* Plutarch. IX. *Several evidences of the* Grecians *ignorance of the true original of Nations.* X. *Of* Herodotus *and his miſtakes.* XI. *The* Greeks *ignorance in Geography diſcovered, and thence their inſufficiency as to an account of ancient Hiſtory.*

DEſcend we now to the Hiſtory of *Greece*; to ſee whether the Metropolis of Arts and Learning can afford us any account of ancient times, that they may be able to make us in the leaſt queſtion the account given of them in ſacred Scriptures. We have already manifeſted the defect of *Greece* as to letters and ancient Records, but yet it may be pretended that her Hiſtorians, by the excellency of their wits and ſearching abroad into other Nations, might find a more certain account of ancient times, than other Nations could obtain. There is no body, who is any thing acquainted with the *Grecian* humour, but will ſay they were beholding to their Wits for moſt of their Hiſtories; they being ſome of the earlieſt Writers of Romances in the world, if all fabulous narrations may bear that name. But laying aſide at preſent all their Poetic *Mythology*, as it concerns their Gods, (which we may have occaſion to enquire into afterwards) we now examine only their credibility, where they pretend to be moſt hiſtorical. Yet how far they are from meriting belief even in theſe things, will appear to any that ſhall conſider; *firſt*, That their moſt ancient Writers were Poetical and apparently fabulous; *ſecondly*, That their eldeſt Hiſtorians are of ſuſpected credit even amongſt themſelves; *thirdly*, That their beſt Hiſtorians either diſcover or confeſs abundance of ignorance as to the hiſtory of ancient times. *Firſt*, That their firſt Writers were poetical, and apparently fabulous. *Strabo* undertakes to prove that Proſe is only an imitation of Poetry, and ſo Poetry muſt needs be firſt written. *For*, ſaith he, *at firſt Poetry only was in requeſt; afterwards in imitation of that,* Cadmus, Pherecydes, *and* Hecatæus *writ their hiſtories, obſerving all other laws of Poetry, but only the meaſures of it; but by degrees Writers began to take greater liberty, and ſo* I. Strabo l. 1.

brought it down from that lofty ſtrain it was then in, to the form now in uſe: as the Comical ſtrain is nothing elſe but a depreſſing the ſublimer ſtyle of Tragedy. This he proves, becauſe ᾄδειν did anciently ſignify the ſame with φράζειν; for Poems were only λόγοι μεμελισμένοι, Leſſons fit to be ſung among them: thence, ſaith he, is the original of the Ῥαψῳδίαι, &c. for theſe were thoſe Poems which were ſung ἐπὶ ῥάβδῳ, when they held *Plutarch. Sympoſ.* a branch of Laurel in their hands, as *Plutarch* tells us they were wont to ſing *Homer*'s *Ilias*; others were ſung to the Harp, as *Heſiod*'s Ἔργα: beſides, ſaith *Strabo*, that Proſe is called ὁ πεζὸς λόγος, argues that it is only a bringing down of the higher ſtrain in uſe before. But however this were in general; as to the *Grecians*, it is evident that Poetry was firſt in uſe among them; for in their elder times when they firſt began to creep out of Barbariſm, all the Philoſophy and Inſtruction they had *Plutarch. de Pyth. Orac. p. 403.* was from their Poets, and all couched in Verſe; which *Plutarch* not only confirms, but particularly inſtanceth in *Orpheus*, *Heſiod*, *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes*, *Empedocles*, and *Thales*; and hence *Horace de arte Poëtica* ſays of the ancient Poets before *Homer*,

——fuit hæc ſapientia quondam
Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra prophanis:
Concubitu prohibere vago: dare jura maritis:
Oppida moliri: leges incidere ligno.
Sic honor & nomen divinis vatibus atque
Carminibus venit.

Heinſ. Diſſ. in Heſ. cap. 6. From hence, as *Heinſius* obſerves, the Poets were anciently called Διδάσκαλοι; and the ancient ſpeeches of the Philoſophers containing matters of Morality, were called Ἄσματα καὶ Ἀδόμενα, of which many are mentioned in their Lives by *Diogenes Laertius*; in the ſame ſenſe were *Carmina* anciently uſed among the *Latines* for Precepts of Morality, as in that collection of them, which goes under the name of *Cato*, (which ſome think *Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. c. 14.* to be an ancient piece, but with a falſe inſcription, but *Boxhornius* thinks it to be of ſome Chriſtians doing in the decay of the *Roman* Empire,) *Si Deus eſt animus, nobis ut Carmina dicunt. Carmina*, ſaith *Heinſius*, i. e. *dicta Philoſophorum; cauſa eſt, quia dicta illa brevia, quibus ſententias ſuas de Deo deque reliquis includebant,* ἀδόμενα *dicebant*, i. e. *Carmina.*

II. When Poetry came firſt into requeſt among the *Grecians*, is ſomewhat uncertain; but this is plain and evident, that the intention of it was not meerly for inſtruction, but, as *Strabo* expreſſeth it, δημαγωγεῖν καὶ *Strabo l. 1. p. 13.* στρατηγεῖν τὰ πλήθη, *the more gently to draw the people on to idolatry.* For as he ſaith, *it is impoſſible to perſwade women and the promiſcuous multitude* ‘ *to religion by meer dry reaſon or philoſophy,* ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας, ‘ τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιίας καὶ τερατείας; *but for this*, ſaith he, *there is need* ‘ *of ſuperſtition, and this cannot be advanced without ſome fables and wonders.* ‘ For, ſaith he, *the Thunderbolts, Shields, Tridents, Serpents, Spears at-* ‘ *tributed to the Gods are meer fables, and ſo is all the ancient Theology; but* ‘ *the Governours of the Commonwealth made uſe of theſe things the better to* ‘ *awe the ſilly multitude, and to bring them into better order.* I cannot tell how far this might be their end, ſince theſe things were not brought in ſo much by the ſeveral Magiſtrates, as by the endeavour of particular Men, who thought to raiſe up their own eſteem among the vulgar by ſuch things, and were imployed by the great Deceiver of the world as his grand inſtruments to advance Idolatry in it. For which we are to conſider, that altho' there were groſs Ignorance; and conſequently Superſtition enough in *Greece* before the Poetic age of it; yet their ſuperſtitious and idolatrous worſhip was not ſo licked and brought into form, as about the time of *Orpheus*, from whom the Poetic age commenceth: who was as great an inſtrument of ſetting up Idolatry, as *Apollonius* was afterwards of reſtoring it, being both perſons of the higheſt eſteem and veneration among the heathen. Much about the ſame time did thoſe live in the world who were the firſt great promoters of Superſtition and Poetry, as *Melampus*, *Muſæus*, *Arion Methymnæus*, *Amphion* of *Thebes*, and *Eumolpus Thrax*, none of whom were very diſtant from the time of *Orpheus*. Of whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* thus ſpeaks, Προσχήματι μουσικῆς λυμηνάμενοι τὸν βίον ἐντέχνῳ τινὶ γοητείᾳ—τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα χειραγωγοῦσι πρῶτοι. *Theſe under a pretence of Muſick and Poetry corrupting the lives of men, did by a kind of artificial Magic firſt draw them on to the practice of Idolatry.* For the novelty and pleaſingneſs of Muſic and Poetry did preſently inſinuate it ſelf into the minds of men, and thereby drew them to a venerable eſteem both of the Perſons and practices of thoſe who were the Authors of them. So *Conon* in *Photius* tells us that *Orpheus* was exceedingly acceptable to the people for his skill in Muſic, which the *Thracians* and *Macedonians* were much delighted with: From which aroſe the fable of his drawing trees and wild beaſts after him, becauſe his Muſic had ſo great an influence upon the civilizing that people, who were almoſt grown rude thro' Ignorance and Barbariſm: and *Horace explains it*,

Clem. Al. Protreptic. p. 3.

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 186. ſect 45.

Horat. Ep. ad Piſon.

Sylveſtres homines ſacer interpreſque Deorum
Cædibus & victu fœdo deterruit Orpheus,
Dictus ab hoc lenire Tigres rabidoſque Leones.

This *Orpheus* by *Mythologiſts* is uſually called the ſon of *Calliope*, but may with better reaſon be called the Father of the whole Chorus of Muſes, than the Son of one of them; ſince *Pindar* calls him Πατέρα ἀοιδᾶν, and *John Tzetzes* tells us he was called the ſon of *Calliope*, ὡς καλλιλογίας ποιητικῆς εὑρετὴς καὶ ὕμνων τῶν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς, *as the inventor of poetical elegancy, and the ſacred Hymns which were made to the Gods:* (which the old *Romans* called *Aſſamenta*) and *Juſtin Martyr* calls him τὸν πολυθεότητος πρῶτον διδάσκαλον, *the firſt teacher of Polytheiſm and Idolatry.*

Schol. in Heſiod. p. 1.

Parænеſ. 1.

III. For this *Orpheus* having been in *Ægypt*, as *Pauſanias*, *Diodorus*, and *Artapanus* in *Euſebius* all confeſs, he brought from thence moſt of the Magical rites and ſuperſtitious cuſtoms in uſe there, and ſet them up among the *Grecians*; ſo *Diodorus* acknowledgeth in the ſame place; and it is likewiſe evident by what *Ariſtophanes* ſaith in his Βάτραχοι,

Pauſ. Eliac. 2.

Diod. Bibl. lib. 1.

Euſ. Præp. l. 10.

Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε, φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι.

Ariſtoph. Ran. Act 4. ſc. 2.

Orpheus *firſt inſtructed them in the ſacred myſteries, and to abſtain from ſlaughter*, which is to be underſtood of the Βουθυσίαι, *the killing of beaſts in ſacrifice*, which probably was in uſe among them before, as a remainder of ancient tradition, till *Orpheus* brought his *Ægyptian* doctrine into requeſt among them. The myſteries of *Oſiris*, ſaith *Diodorus*, were tranſplanted into *Greece* under the name of *Dionyſius* or *Bacchus*, and *Iſis* under *Ceres* or *Magna Mater*, and the puniſhment and pleaſures after this life from the rites of Sepulture among them; *Charon*'s wafting of Souls, from the lake *Acheruſia* in *Ægypt*, over which they were wont to ſend the dead bodies. *Pauſanias* tells us, that the *Spartans* derived the worſhip of *Ceres Chthonia* from *Orpheus*, and the *Æginetæ* the worſhip of *Hecate*. Beſides which he inſtituted new rites and myſteries of his own, in which the initiated were called 'Ορφεοτελεσταὶ: and required a moſt ſolemn oath from all of them never to divulge them, which was after obſerved in all thoſe prophane myſteries which in imitation of theſe were ſet up among the *Greeks*. *Strabo* thinks the myſteries of *Orpheus* were in imitation of the old *Cotyttian* and *Bendidian* myſteries among the *Thracians*; but *Herodotus* with more probability parallels them and the *Dionyſian* with the *Ægyptian*, from which we have already ſeen that *Orpheus* derived His; who is conceived by *Georgius Cedrenus* and *Timotheus* in *Euſebius*, to have lived about the time of *Gideon* the Judge of *Iſrael*; but there is too great confuſion concerning his age, to define any thing certainly about it. Which ariſeth moſt from the ſeveral perſons going under this name, of which, beſides this, were in all probability two more; the one an Heroic Poet, called by *Suidas*, *Ciconæus*, or *Arcas*, who lived two ages before *Homer*, and he that goes under the name of *Orpheus*, whoſe Hymns are ſtill extant, but are truly aſcribed to *Onomacritus* the *Athenian*, by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tatianus Aſſyrius*, *Suidas*, and others; who flouriſhed in the times of the *Piſiſtratidæ* at *Athens*. We are like then to have little relief for finding out of truth in the Poetic age of *Greece*, when the main deſign of the Learning then uſed was only to inſinuate the belief of Fables into the people, and by that to awe them into Idolatry.

Pauſ. Lac. p. 95. Corinth. p. 72. Vide Cæl. Rhod. Ant. Lect. l. 15. p. 9.

Stab. l. 10. Herod. Euterp. p. 134. Ed. H. St.

Suid. in 'Ορφ.

IV. If we come lower down to the ſucceding Poets, we may find Fables increaſing ſtill in the times of *Homer*, *Heſiod*, and the reſt, which made *Eratoſthenes*, a perſon of great judgment and learning (whence he was called *alter Plato*, and Πένταθλος, and τὸ Βῆτα, becauſe he carried, if not the *firſt*, yet the *ſecond* place in all kind of Literature) condemn the ancient Poetry as γραώδη μυθολογίαν, *a company of old Wives tales*, which were invented for nothing but to pleaſe ſilly people, and had no real learning or truth at all in them: For this, tho, he be ſharply cenſured by *Strabo*, in his firſt book, who undertakes to vindicate the Geography of *Homer* from the exceptions of *Eratoſthenes*; yet himſelf cannot but confeſs that there is a very great mixture of old fables in all their Poets, *which is*, ſaith he, *partly to delight the people, and partly to awe them. For the minds of men being always deſirous of novelties, ſuch things do hugely pleaſe the natural humours of weak people; eſpecially if there be ſomething in them that is* θαυμαστὸν καὶ τερατῶδες, *very ſtrange and wonderful, it increaſeth the delight in hearing it*; ἥπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν φίλτρον, *which draws them on to a deſire of hearing more of it. And by this means*, ſaith he, *are children firſt brought on to learning, and all ignorant perſons are kept in awe; nay, and the more learned themſelves* (partly for want of reaſon and judgment, and partly from the remainder of thoſe impreſſions which theſe things made upon them when they were children) *cannot ſhake off that former credulity which they had as to theſe things.* By which diſcourſe of *Strabo*, tho' intended wholly by him in vindication of poetic Fables, it is plain and evident what great diſſervice hath been done to Truth by them, by reaſon they had no other Records to preſerve their ancient Hiſtory but theſe fabulous Writers. And therefore ſuppoſing a mixture of truth and falſhood together, which *Strabo* contends for; yet what way ſhould be taken to diſtinguiſh the true from the falſe, when they had no other certain Records? And beſides, he himſelf acknowlegeth how hard a matter it is even for wiſe men to excuſs thoſe fabulous narrations out of their minds, which were inſinuated unto them by all the advantages which prejudice, cuſtom and educacion could work upon them. Granting then there may be ſome truth at the bottom of their fabulous narrations;

> Ὡς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνὴρ, Homer. Odyſſ. 3.

which may be gilded over with ſome pleaſant tales, as himſelf compares it; yet how ſhall thoſe come to know that it is only gilded, that never ſaw any pure metal, and did always believe that it was what it ſeemed to be? Had there been any Κριτήριον, or Touch-ſtone to have differenced between the one and the other, there might have been ſome way for a ſeparation of them; but there being none ſuch, we muſt conclude, that the fabulous narrations of Poets inſtead of making truth more pleaſant by their fictions, have ſo adulterated it, that we cannot find any credibility at all in their narrations of elder times, where the truth of the ſtory hath had no other way of conveyance but thro' their fictions.

V. But tho' Poets may be allowed their liberty for repreſenting things to the greateſt advantage to the palates of their Readers, yet we may juſtly expect, when men profeſs to be Hiſtorical, they ſhould deliver us nothing but what upon ſtricteſt examination may prove undoubted truth. Yet even this were the *Greeks* far from; for *Strabo* himſelf confeſſeth of (Strab. l. 1.) their eldeſt Hiſtorians, Καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι δὲ ἱστορικοὶ καὶ φυσικοὶ μυθογράφοι, *their firſt Hiſtorians both of perſons and things were fabulous. Diodorus* particularly inſtanceth in their eldeſt Hiſtorians, as *Cadmus Mileſius*, *Hecatæus*, and *Hellanicus*, and condemns them for fabulouſneſs. *Strabo* condemns *Damaſtes Sigeenſis* for vanity and falſhood, and wonders at *Eratoſthenes* for making uſe of him; yet this man is of great antiquity among them, and his teſtimony uſed by Authors of good credit, as *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis*, *Plutarch*, and others. (V. Caſaub. in Stra. l. 1. Voſſ. de hiſt. Græc. l. 4. c. 5.) Nay, *Pliny* profeſſeth to follow him, and ſo he doth *Ariſteas Proconneſius* in his *Arimaſpia*, which may render the credit of his Hiſtory very ſuſpicious; with whom it was a ſufficient ground of credibility to any ſtory, That he found it in ſome *Greek* Authors. *Strabo* reckons *Damaſtes* with *Euhemerus Meſſenius* and *Antiphanes Bergæus*; which latter was ſo noted a lyar, that from him, as *Stephanus* tells us, Βεργαΐζειν was uſed as a proverb for *to ſpeak never a word of truth*. (Stephan. in Βέργη.) *Ariſteas Proconneſius* lived in the time of *Cyrus*, and writ a Hiſtory of the *Arimaſpi*, in three Books, who ſeems to have been the Sir *John Mandevil* of *Greece*, from his ſtories of the *Arimaſpi* with one eye in their foreheads, and their continual fighting the *Gryphens* for gold; yet the ſtory was taken upon truſt by *Herodotus*, *Pliny*, and many others; tho' the experience of all who have viſited thoſe northern Climates do ſufficiently refute theſe follies. *Strabo* ſaith of this *Ariſteas*, (Strab. l. 13.) that he was ἀνὴρ γόης εἴ τις ἄλλος, *one inferior to none for juggling*, which cenſure was probably occaſioned by the common ſtory of him, that he could let his ſoul out of his body when he pleaſed and bring it again; yet this Juggler did *Celſus* pitch on to confront with our bleſſed *Saviour*, as *Hierocles* did on *Apollonius*: ſo much have thoſe been to ſeek for Reaſon, who have ſought to oppoſe the doctrine of Faith.

VI. But further, what credit can we give to thoſe Hiſtorians who have ſtriven to confute each other, and lay open one anothers falſhood to the world. Where was there ever any ſuch diſſonancy in the ſacred Hiſtory of

Scripture? doth the Writer of one book diſcover the weakneſs of another? do not all the parts ſo exactly agree, that the moſt probable ſuſpicion could ever fall into the heart of an Infidel, is, that they were all written by the ſame perſon, which yet the ſeries of times manifeſts to have been impoſſible? But now, if we look into the ancient *Greek* Hiſtorians, we need no other teſtimony than themſelves to take away their credibility. The Genealogies of *Heſiod* are corrected by *Acuſilaus*, *Acuſilaus* is condemned by *Hellanicus*, *Hellanicus* accuſed of falſhood by *Ephorus*, *Ephorus* by *Timæus*, *Timæus* by ſuch who followed him, as *Joſephus* fully ſhews. Where muſt we then fix our belief? upon all in common? that is the ready way to believe contradictions: for they condemn one another of falſhood. Muſt we believe one, and reject the reſt? but what evidence doth that one give why he ſhould be credited more than the reſt? And their eldeſt Hiſtorians are acknowledged to be moſt fabulous: [which is a moſt irrefragable argument againſt the *Grecian* hiſtory:] For our only recourſe for deciding the controverſy among the younger Hiſtorians, muſt be to the elder: and there we are further to ſeek than ever; for the firſt ages are confeſſed to be Poetical, and to have no certainty of truth in them. So that it is impoſſible to find out any undoubted certainty of ancient times among the *Greek* Hiſtorians; which will be yet more evident when we add this, That there are very few extant of thoſe Hiſtorians, who did carry the greateſt name for Antiquity.

Joſeph. c. Appion. l. 1.

VII. The higheſt Antiquity of the *Greek* Hiſtorians doth not much exceed the time of *Cyrus* and *Cambyſes*, as *Voſſius* hath fully demonſtrated in his learned Book, *De Hiſtoricis Græcis*, and therefore I ſhall ſpare particular enquiries into their ſeveral ages. Only theſe two things will further clear the inſufficiency of the *Greek* Hiſtory, as to an account of ancient times: *Firſt*, That of many of theſe old Hiſtorians we have nothing left but their mere names, without any certainty of what they treated. Such are *Siſyphus Cous*, *Corinnus*, *Eugeon Samius*, *Deïochus Proconneſius*, *Eudemus Parius*, *Democles Phigaleus*, *Ameleſagoras Chalcedonius*, *Xenomedes Chius*, and ſeveral others whoſe names are recorded by ſeveral Writers, and liſted by *Voſſius* among the Hiſtorians; but no evidence what ſubject of hiſtory was handled by them. *Secondly*, That of thoſe whoſe not only memories are preſerved, but ſome evidence of what they writ, we have nothing extant till the time of the *Perſian* war. For all that was writ before, is now conſumed by time, and ſwallowed up in that vaſt and all-devouring Gulph; in which yet their heads ſtill appear above the waters, to tell us what once they informed the world of. It cannot be denied, but if many of thoſe ancient Hiſtories were yet remaining, we might probably have ſome greater light into ſome matters of fact in the elder times of *Greece*, which now we are wholly to ſeek for, unleſs we think to quench our thirſt in the muddy waters of ſome fabulous Poets. For what is now become of the antiquities of *Ionia* and the city *Miletus* written by *Cadmus Mileſius*, ſuppoſed to be the firſt Writer of Hiſtory? where lie the *Genealogies* of *Acuſilaus Argivus?* where is now extant the *Hiſtory of the Gods* written by *Pherecydes Syrius*, *Pythagoras* his Maſter? or the *Chronica* of *Archilochus* who flouriſhed about the 20th *Olympiad?* or thoſe of *Theagenes Rheginus?* Where may we hope to meet with *Pherecydes Lerius* his *Attic Antiquities*, or his *Catalogue of Cities and Nations?* or *Hecatæus* his *Deſcription* of *Aſia*, and ſome ſuppoſe of *Libya* and *Europe* too? or the *Originals of Nations and*

Founders of Cities written by *Hellanicus*? How may we come by the *Perſic*, *Greek* and *Ægyptian* Hiſtory of *Charon Lampſacenus*; the *Lydian* Hiſtory of *Xanthus Lydius*; the *Samian* Antiquities of *Simmias Rhodius*; the *Corinthian* Hiſtory of *Emelus Corinthius*; *Panyaſis* his Antiquities of *Greece*; the *Scythian* Hiſtory of *Anacharſis*; the *Phrygian* of *Diagoras*; the *Chaldaïc* and *Perſian* of *Democritus*; the *Sicilian* and *Italian* of *Hippys Rheginus*; the *Telchiniac* Hiſtory of *Teleclides*? All theſe are now buried with many more in the rubbiſh of time, and we have nothing but meer skeletons of them left, to tell us, that once ſuch perſons were, and thought themſelves concerned to give the world ſome account of their being in it. Whereby may be likewiſe ſeen the remarkable providence of God, concerning the Sacred Hiſtory, which tho' of far greater antiquity than any of theſe, hath ſurvived them all, and is ſtill preſerved with us with as much purity and incorruption as a Book paſſing thro' ſo many hands was capable of. But of that in its due place.

VIII. But yet if the *Greek* Hiſtorians that are yet extant, were of more undoubted credit than thoſe that are loſt, we might eaſily bear with our loſing ſome old Stories, if we gained ſome authentick Hiſtory by it accompliſhed in all its parts: but even this we are far from in the *Greek* Hiſtory; for the Hiſtorians themſelves do either confeſs their own ignorance of ancient times, or do moſt palpably diſcover it, which was the *third* and laſt conſideration touching the credibility of the *Grecian* Hiſtory. That moſt grave and accurate Hiſtorian *Thucydides* than whom ſcarce ever any *Grecian* diſcovered more an impartial love to the truth in what he writ, doth not only confeſs, but largely prove the impoſſibility of an exact account to be given of the times preceding the *Peloponneſian* War, in the entrance into his Hiſtory: *For*, ſaith he, *the matter preceding that time cannot now through the length of time be accurately diſcovered or found out by us.* All that he could find in the ancient ſtate of *Greece* was a deal of confuſion, unquiet ſtations, frequent removals, continual piracies, and no ſettled form of Commonwealth. What certain account can be then expected of thoſe times, when a moſt judicious Writer, even of *Athens* its ſelf, acknowledgeth ſuch a *Chaos* in their ancient Hiſtory? And *Plutarch*, a later Author indeed, but ſcarce behind any of them, if we believe *Taurus* in *A. Gellius*, for learning and prudence, dares not, we ſee, venture any further back than the time of *Theſeus*; for before that time, as he compares it, as Geographers in their Maps, when they have gone as far as they can, fill up the empty ſpace with ſome unpaſſable Mountains, or frozen Seas, or devouring Sands; ſo thoſe who give an account of elder time, are fain to inſert τερατώδη καὶ τραγικὰ, ſome wonderful and tragical Stories, which (as he ſaith) have neither any truth nor certainty in them. Thus we ſee thoſe who were beſt able to judge of the *Greek* Antiquities, can find no ſure footing to ſtand on in them; and what baſis can we find for our Faith, where they could find ſo little for their Knowledge? And thoſe who have been more daring and venturous than theſe perſons mentioned, what a labyrinth have they run themſelves into? how many confuſions and contradictions have they involved themſelves in? Sometimes writing the paſſages of other Countries for thoſe of *Greece*, and at other times ſo confounding times, perſons and places, that one might think they had only a deſign upon the underſtandings of their Readers, to make them play at Blind-mans-buff in ſearching for the Kings of *Greece*.

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IX. But as they are ſo confuſed in their own Hiſtory, ſo they are as ignorant and fabulous when they dare venture over their own threſholds and look abroad into other Countries; we certainly owe a great part of the lamentable ignorance of the true original of moſt Nations to the pitiful account the *Greek* Authors have given of them; which have had the fortune to be entertained in the world with ſo much eſteem and veneration, that it hath been thought learning enough to be acquainted with the account which they give of Nations. Which I doubt not hath been the great reaſon ſo many fabulous relations, not only of Nations but Perſons and ſeveral Animals never exiſting, have met with ſo much entertainment from the leſs inquiſitive world. The *Greek* Writers, it is evident, took up things upon truſt as much as any people in the world did, being a very weak and inconſiderable Nation at firſt: and afterwards the knowledge they had was generally borrowed from other Nations, which the wiſe men only ſuited to the temper of the *Greeks*, and ſo made it more fabulous than it was before. As it was certainly the great defect of the Natural Philoſophy of the *Greeks*, (as it hath been ever ſince in the world) that they were ſo ready to form Theories upon ſome Principles or Hypotheſes, which they only received by tradition from others, without fetching their knowledge from the experiments of Nature; and to theſe they ſuited all the phænomena of nature; and what was not ſuitable was rejected as monſtrous and anomalous; ſo it was in their Hiſtory, wherein they had ſome fabulous Hypotheſes they took for granted without enquiring into the truth and certainty of them, and to theſe they ſuit whatever light they gained in after-times of the ſtate of foreign Nations, which hath made Truth and Antiquity wreſtle ſo much with the corruption which eat into them thro' the pride and ignorance of the *Greeks*. Hence they have always ſuited the Hiſtory of other Nations with the account they give of their own; and where nothing could ſerve out of their own Hiſtory to give an account of the Original of other Nations, they (who were never backward at fictions) have made a Founder of them ſuitable to their own language. The truth is, there is nothing in the world uſeful or beneficial to mankind, but they have made ſhift to find the Author of it among themſelves. If we enquire after the original of Agriculture, we are told of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*; if of Paſturage, we are told of an *Arcadian Pan*; if of Wine, we preſently hear of a *Liber Pater:* if of Iron inſtruments, then who but *Vulcan?* if of Muſic, none like to *Apollo*. If we preſs them then with the Hiſtory of other Nations, they are as well provided here: if we enquire an account of *Europe*, *Aſia*, or *Libya*; for the firſt we are told a fine ſtory of *Cadmus*'s Siſter; for the *ſecond* of *Prometheus*'s Mother of that name, and for the *third* of a Daughter of *Epaphus*. If we are yet ſo curious as to know the original or particular Countries; then *Italy* muſt find its name from a Calf of *Hercules*, becauſe Ἴταλος in *Greek* will ſignifie ſome ſuch thing; *Sardinia* and *Africa* muſt be from *Sardos* and *Afer* two ſons of *Hercules*; but yet if theſe will not ſerve, *Hercules* ſhall not want for children to people the world; for we hear of *Scythes*, *Galatas*, *Lydus*, ſome other ſons of his, that gave names to *Scythia*, *Lydia*, and *Galatia*; with the ſame probability that *Media* had its name from *Medea*, and *Spain* and *Luſitania* from *Pan* and *Luſus*, two companions of *Bacchus*. If *Perſia* want a founder, they have one *Perſeus* an *Argive* ready for it; if *Syria*, *Babylonia*, and *Arabia* want reaſons of their names, the prodigal *Greeks* will give *Apollo* three ſons, *Sy-*

rus, *Babylon* and *Arabs*, rather than they ſhall be heretical *Acephaliſts*. This vanity of theirs was univerſal, not confined to any place or age, but as any Nation or People came into their knowledge, their Gods were not ſo decrepit, but they might father one ſon more upon them, rather than any Nation ſhould be *filia Populi*, and want a father. Only the grave *Athenians* thought ſcorn to have any Father aſſigned them; their only ambition was to be accounted *Aborigines & genuini Terræ*, to be the eldeſt ſons of their *teeming mother the Earth*, and to have been born by the ſame equivocal generation that Mice and Frogs are, from the impregnated ſlime of the earth. Are we not like to have a wonderful account of ancient times from thoſe who could arrogate to themſelves ſo much knowledge from ſuch ſlender and thin accounts of the Originals of people which they gave, and would have the world entertain with the greateſt veneration upon their naked words? Have we not indeed great reaſon to hearken to thoſe who did ſo frequently diſcover their affection to Fables, and manifeſt their ignorance when ever they venture upon the hiſtory of other Nations?

X. The truth is, *Herodotus* himſelf (whom *Tully* calls the *Father of Hiſtory*, which title he deſerves at leaſt in regard of antiquity, being the eldeſt of the extant *Greek* Hiſtorians) hath ſtood in need of his Compurgators, who yet have not been able to acquit him of fabulouſneſs, but have ſought to make good his credit by recrimination, or by making it appear that *Herodotus* did not fully believe the ſtories he tells, but took them upon truſt himſelf, and ſo delivers them to the world. Some impute it to the ingenuity of *Herodotus*, that he calls his Books of Hiſtory by the name of the *Muſes*, on purpoſe to tell his Readers they muſt not look for meer Hiſtory in him, but a mixture of ſuch relations, which tho' not true, might yet pleaſe and entertain his Readers. Tho' others think they were not ſo inſcribed by himſelf, but the names were given to them by the *Greeks* from the admiration his Hiſtory had among them. However this were, this we are certain, that *Herodotus* was not firſt ſuſpected of falſhood in theſe latter Ages of the world, but even among the *Greeks* themſelves there have been found ſome that would undertake to make good that charge againſt him. For ſo *Suidas* tells us of one *Ælius Harpocration*, who writ a Book on purpoſe to diſcover the falſhood of *Herodotus*, Περὶ τοῦ κατεψεῦσθαι τὴν Ἡροδότου ἱστορίαν. *Plutarch* his Books are well known *Of the ſpight or malignity* of *Herodotus*, but the occaſion of that is ſufficiently known likewiſe, becauſe *Herodotus* had given no very favourable character of *Plutarch*'s Country. *Strabo* likewiſe ſeems to accuſe *Herodotus* much of nugacity and mixing pro- *Strabo l.* digious fables with his Hiſtory; but, I confeſs, obſerving the grounds *17.* on which *Plutarch* inſiſts againſt *Herodotus*, I am very prone to think that the ground of the great pique in ſome of the *Greek* Writers againſt *Herodotus*, was, that he told too many tales out of School, and had diſcovered too much of the Infancy of *Greece*, and how much the *Grecians* borrowed of the *Ægyptian* ſuperſtitions: which *Plutarch* expreſly *Plutarch.* ſpeaks of, that *Herodotus* was too much led aſide, ταῖς Αἰγυπτίων ἀλαζο- *de Herod. Mal. p.* νείαις καὶ μυθολογίαις τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ ἁγνότατα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν ἀνατρέπων. *857.* Altho' therefore *Herodotus* may not be much to blame in the things which the *Grecians* moſt charge him with, yet thoſe who favour him moſt cannot excuſe his palpable miſtakes in ſome things, and ignorance *Joſeph. c.* in others. *Joſephus* thinks he was deceived by the *Ægyptian* Prieſts in *App. l. 1.* things relating to the ſtate of their affairs, of which *Joſ. Scaliger* gives *Scal. Can. Iſagog. l. 3.*

many accounts; *Either*, ſaith he, *the perſons who gave him his intelligence were ignorant themſelves*; *or elſe, like true* Ægyptians, *they were cunning enough and impoſed upon* Herodotus *being a ſtranger and unacquainted with their artifices*; *or elſe he did not underſtand his Interpreter, or was deceived by him*; or laſtly, Herodotus *might have ſo much of a* Grecian *in, as to adulterate the true Hiſtory with ſome fables of his own*; wherefore he rather adheres to *Manetho* than *Herodotus* as to the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory: who yet elſewhere (I will not ſay with what conſtancy to himſelf) vouchſafes him this high *Elogium*, that he is, *Scrinium originum Græcarum & Barbararum, auctor à doctis nunquam deponendus*.

Idem ad num. Euſ. 1572.

XI. It cannot be denied but a great deal of very uſeful Hiſtory may be fetched out of him; yet who can excuſe his ignorance, when he not only denies there is an Ocean compaſſing the Land, but condemns the Geographers for aſſerting it? Unleſs this might be any plea for his ignorance in Geography, that he had ſo many great names beſides him guilty of the ſame: Witneſs *Ariſtotle*'s ſuſpicion that the *Indies* ſhould be joyned to *Europe* about the *Streights*, where they feigned *Hercules* his Pillars to be. And the *Theræans* ignorance where any ſuch place as *Libya* was, when the Oracle bid them plant a Colony there. Would it not have been worth one's while to have heard the great noiſe the Sun uſed to make every night when he douſed his head in the Ocean, as none of the moſt ignorant *Greeks* imagined? And to have ſeen the Sun about *Hercules* his Pillars to be a hundred times bigger than he appeared to them, as they commonly fanſied. Was not *Alexander*, think we, well tutored in his Coſmography by his Maſter *Ariſtotle*, when he writ word to his Mother, he had found out the head of *Nilus* in the *Eaſt Indies*? as *Arrian* relates the ſtory. No wonder then his Souldiers ſhould miſtake the mountain *Paropamiſus* in the *Indies* for *Caucaſus* near *Colchis*, when even their learned men thought *Colchis* the utmoſt boundary of the world on that ſide, as *Hercules* his Pillars on this. What a lamentable account then were they able to give of the moſt ancient times, who were ſo ignorant of the ſtate of the world in their own time, when Learning was in its height in *Greece*, and frequent diſcoveries daily made of the world, by the wars which were made abroad? *Eratoſthenes* confeſſeth the *Grecians* were ignorant of a great part of *Aſia* and the Northern parts of *Europe* before *Alexander*'s expedition; and *Strabo* confeſſeth as much of the Weſtern parts of *Europe* till the *Roman* expeditions thither. *Palus Mæotis* and *Colchis*, ſaith he, were not fully known till the time of *Mithridates*, nor *Hyrcania*, *Bactriana*, and *Scythia*, till the *Parthian* wars. *Eratoſthenes* mentions ſome who thought the *Arabian* Sea to be only a Lake. And it further argues their ignorance in Geography, that the later Geographers always correct the errors of the elder, as *Ptolemee* doth *Marinus*, *Eratoſthenes* thoſe before him, *Hipparchus Eratoſthenes*, and *Strabo* not only both them, but *Eudoxus*, *Ephorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Polybius*, *Poſidonius*, and almoſt all that had writ before him. I inſiſt on theſe things, not that I would deſtroy the credibility of any Humane Hiſtory, where the Authors are guilty of any miſtakes (for that were to take away the credit of all Humane Hiſtory) but to ſhew how inſufficient thoſe Hiſtorians are to give us a certain account of the original of Nations, who were ſo unacquainted with the ſtate of thoſe Nations which they pretend to give an account of. For where there is wanting Divine Revelation (which was not pretended by any *Greek* Hiſtorians; and if it had, had been eaſily refuted) there

Herod. l. 2. *c.* 5.

Arrian. Hiſt. Alex. l. 6.

Strabo l. 1.

there muſt be ſuppoſed a full and exact knowledge of all things pertaining to that which they pretend to give an account of; and if they diſcover apparent defect and inſufficiency (which hath been largely manifeſted as to them, in the precedent diſcourſe) we have ground to deny the credibility of thoſe Hiſtories upon the account of ſuch defect and inſufficiency. So much then will abundantly ſuffice for the making good the firſt argument againſt the credibility of Profane Hiſtories, as to the account which they give of Ancient times, different from the Word of GOD.

E.

CHAP. V.

The general uncertainty of Heathen Chronology.

I. *The want of credibility in Heathen Hiſtory further proved from the uncertainty and confuſion in their accounts of Ancient times. That diſcovered by the uncertain form of their Years.* II. *An enquiry into the different forms of the Ægyptian Years; the firſt of thirty Days,* III. *The ſecond of four Months; of both Inſtances given in the Ægyptian hiſtory.* IV. *Of the Chaldæan accounts, and the firſt Dynaſties mentioned by* Beroſus, *how they may be reduced to probability.* V. *Of the Ægyptian Dynaſties of* Manetho. *Reaſons of accounting them fabulous, becauſe not atteſted by any credible authority, and rejected by the beſt Hiſtorians.* VI. *The opinion of* Scaliger *and* Voſſius, *concerning their being contemporary, propounded,* VII. *and rejected with reaſons againſt it.* VIII. *Of the ancient diviſion of Ægypt into* Nomi *or Provinces, and the number of them, againſt* Voſſius *and* Kircher.

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THe next thing to manifeſt how little there is of credibility in the account of ancient times, reported by the Hiſtories of Heathen Nations, is, the uncertainty, confuſion and ambiguity in the account they give of thoſe times. If we ſuppoſe them not defective as to their records, if yet we find the account given ſo perplexed, ambiguous and confuſed, that we can find no certainty of the meaning of it, we have very little reaſon to entertain it with any certain aſſent unto it. Now this will be made evident by theſe things. 1. The uncertainty of their Chronology, whereon their whole account depends. 2. The multitude of Impoſtures taken from ancient Hiſtories. 3. The uncertain meaning of thoſe Characters wherein their ancient hiſtories were preſerved. I begin with the great uncertainty of the heathen Chronology. which will be manifeſted by two things: *Firſt*, the uncertain form of their years: *Secondly*, the want of certainty of their ἀπαντήματα, or certain fixed *Epocha's* from which to derive their account of ancient times. *Firſt*, the uncertain form of their years; this of it ſelf is ſufficient to deſtroy the credibility of their accounts of antiquity, if it be manifeſted that they had different forms of years in uſe among them; and it be uncertain to which to refer their accounts they give; for if I.

years be ſometimes lunar, ſometimes ſolar, and ſometimes but of thirty days, ſometimes of four months, ſometimes of three hundred and ſixty days, ſometimes three hundred and ſixty five, ſometimes four times three hundred ſixty five in their *tetraëteris*, ſometimes eight times in their *octaëteris*, ſometimes more, what certainty can we poſſibly have which of them to fix their accounts to? Eſpecially when they only give them in general, and never tell us which of them they mean, which may make them ſhrewdly ſuſpicious, that their intent is only to impoſe on our underſtandings, and not to deal fairly and truly with us. We ſhall therefore ſo much explain the different form of their years, as thereby to ſhew what uncertainties we are left to by them: Where we meddle not with their Tropical and Aſtronomical years, but chiefly thoſe which were in civil uſe among the ſeveral Nations we ſpeak to. A year is nothing elſe but a Syſtem of days, and is therefore capable of as great variety, as days are in being joyned together; but uſually there were ſome other leſſer Syſtems of days than thoſe which are called years, out of which the other doth reſult. Such is the ἑπταήμερον, or the week, Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 1. which, as *Joſeph Scaliger* ſaith, was *res omnibus Orientis populis ab ultima uſque antiquitate uſitata, a thing in continual uſe among the Eaſtern Nations*, tho' it be but of late reception into the parts of *Europe*, and no elder than Chriſtianity among them. Among the *Romans* was uſed an ὀκταήμερον, which was for the ſake of *Nundinæ*; returning every ninth day. The *Mexicans*, as *Scaliger* tells us, reckon all by a τρισκαιδεκαήμερον, *a Syſtem of thirteen days.* Next to theſe were their Months; which were either Lunar or Solar. The Lunar were either from the Moon's return to the ſame point of the Zodiac again, called περίοδος σελήνης, which was leſs than twenty eight days; but this was of no uſe in civil computations; or elſe from one conjunction of the Moon with the Sun to another, which was called σύνοδος σελήνης; or elſe from the firſt phaſis of the Moon, the ſecond day after its *coïtus*, called φάσις and ἀπόκρουσις σελήνης; ſome, as the *Grecians*, reckoned their Lunar Months from the *coïtus*, as *Scaliger* proves out of *Vitruvius*; others from the *phaſis*, as ſome Eaſtern Nations did; as the *Jews* began their obſervation of the New Moons from the firſt *phaſis* or appearance of her after the *coïtus*. The Solar Months were either natural, ſuch as were defined by the Sun's paſſage from one ſign of the *Zodiac* to another; or civil, whereby the Months were equally divided into 30 days apiece, as in the *Grecian* and *Ægyptian* year.

II. Having thus far ſeen of what the year conſiſts, we now proceed to ſhew that the ancient Nations did not obſerve one conſtant form of year among them, but had ſeveral in uſe, to which their accounts may be referred. And becauſe the *Ægyptians* are ſuppoſed to have been beſt Macrob. Saturn. l. 1. c. 12. skilled as to the form of the year, according to that of *Macrobius*, *Anni certus modus apud ſolos ſemper Ægyptios fuit:* We ſhall particularly demonſtrate the variety of years in uſe among them: By which we ſhall ſee what great uncertainty there is in their accounts of their Dynaſties. For firſt it is evident that the time of 30 days was among the ancient *Ægyptians* accounted a year, for which we have the teſtimony of *Plutarch* in *Numa.* Αἰγυπτίοις δὲ μηνιαῖος ἦν ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς, εἶτα τετράμηνος; *The Ægyptians had at firſt a year conſiſting of one month, and after of four:* So Lactant. de Origin. l. 2. c. 12. *Varro* in *Lactantius* gives an account of the great Age of ſome men in ancient times, who are ſuppoſed to have lived 1000 years; *Ait enim apud Ægyptios pro annis menſes haberi, ut non Solis per 12 ſigna circuitus* *faciat annum, ſed Luna quæ orbem illum ſigniferum* 30 *dierum ſpacio illuſtrat.* It is then evident that this year of thirty days was in uſe among the *Ægyptians*; the only ſcruple is whether it was uſed in their ſacred accounts or no; and that it was, we have a pregnant teſtimony in *Plutarch* in the forecited place; ſpeaking of the *Ægyptians* great pretence to antiquity, he gives this account of it; πλῆθος ἀμήχανον ἐτῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς γενεαλογίαις καταφέρουσιν, ἅτε δὴ τοὺς μῆνας εἰς ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν τιθέμενοι. *They reckon an infinite number of years in their accounts, becauſe they reckon their months inſtead of years.*

According to this computation, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the vaſt accounts of the *Ægyptian* antiquity to ſome proportion, and to reconcile their exorbitant Dynaſties with ſobriety and truth, eſpecially as to the account given of them by *Diodorus Siculus*; for ſo *Diodorus* gives in their accounts, that the Gods and Hero's reigned in *Ægypt* for the ſpace of near 18000 years, and the laſt of them was *Orus* the ſon of *Iſis:* From the reign of Men in *Ægypt* he reckons about 9500 years to the time (if we admit of *Jacob Capellus* his correction of πεντακοσίων for πεντακισχιλίων in *Diodorus*) of his entrance into *Ægypt*, which was in the 180 *Olympiad.* Now as the aforeſaid learned Author obſerves, *Diodorus* came into *Ægypt*, *A. M.* 3940. *V. C.* 694. the mortal Men then had reigned in *Ægypt* 9500 years, which taking it for theſe Lunar years of 30 days, makes of *Julian* years 780. the Hero's and Gods 18000 months, that is of *Julian* years 1478; from theſe two ſumms together are gathered 2258 years, which being deducted from the year of the world 3940, falls in the year of the world 1682 about which time *Miſraim*, who was the great hiſtorical *Oſiris* of *Ægypt* (ſo called by a light variation of his former name) might be well ſuppoſed to be born; for that was in the year of *Noah* 630; and ſo *Orus* might be born, who was the ſon of *Oſiris*, about the year of the world 1778. Between whoſe time and *Alexander* the great his Conqueſt of *Ægypt*, the *Ægyptians*, as the ſame *Diodorus* tells us, reckon little leſs than 23000 years: Now according to this computation of 30 days for a year, we may reconcile this to truth too; for from 1778 to 3667 of the world, which falls upon the 417 year of *Nabonaſſar*, there is an interval of 1889 years, which makes of theſe Lunar years of 30 days, ſaith *Capellus*, 22996 and 15 days, which comes very near, if not altogether up to the *Ægyptian* Computation: So when the *Ægyptians*, according to *Diodorus*, makes no leſs than 10000 years diſtance between their *Hercules* and *Hercules Bœotius*, the ſon of *Alcmena*, it muſt be underſtood of theſe Lunar years; for granting what the *Ægyptians* ſay, that *Hercules Bœotius* lived but one generation before the *Trojan* war, and ſo his time to fall out about 2783; reckoning now backward from thence, and deducting from that year of the world 10000 months of 30 days, or *Julian* years 831, and 130 days, the time of the *Ægyptian Hercules* will fall about the year of the world, 1962, about which time we may well ſuppoſe him to live or die. And according to this computation we are to underſtand what the *Ægyptians* told *Herodotus*, that from their firſt King or Prieſt of *Vulcan*, till the time of *Sethos* (in whoſe time *Sennacherib* attempted the conqueſt of *Ægypt*) there had been paſſed 341 *Generations*, and as many Kings and High-Prieſts, and 11340 years, reckoning three Generations to make up a Century. But now, if we underſtand this prodigious computation according to this form of years, we may ſuſpect the *Ægyptians* of an intention to deceive

Diodor. lib. 1.

Hiſt. ſacr. & Exot. A. M. 1682.

Herodotus and the credulous *Greeks*, but yet not impeach them of direct falſhood, it being thus reconcilable to truth. For according to this account 100 years makes 3000 days, and a Generation 1000; ſo many days the Kings or Prieſts of *Vulcan* may be allowed to reign; ſo 340 Generations of 1000 days apiece, make up 340000 days, to which, if we add the 200 days which *Sethos* had now reigned upon *Sennacherib*'s invaſion, we have 340200 days, which makes up of theſe years of 30 days apiece 11340, which is the number aſſign'd by *Herodotus*. *Jacobus Capellus* thinks the *Epocha* from whence theſe years are to be reckoned, is from *A. M.* 2350, when *Mephres* began to reign in *Ægypt*, from whence if we number theſe 340200 days, or 11340 monthly years, which makes up of *Julian* years 931, and 152 days, the number falls *A. M.* 3282; about which time in probability *Sennacherib* invaded *Ægypt*. Thus we ſee by making uſe of thoſe Lunar years, that it is poſſible to reconcile ſome of the *Ægyptian* extravagant accounts to ſome probability and conſiſtency with truth; but however we owe very little thanks to the *Ægyptians* for it, who deliver theſe things in groſs, without telling us which years they mean, and thereby evidence their intent to deceive all who have ſo little wit as to be deceived by them.

Capell. Hiſt. ſacr. & Exot. p. 198.

III. The next kind and form of the *Ægyptian* year, was that which conſiſted of four equal Months, amounting to 120 days; the uſe of this kind of year among them is atteſted by *Plutarch* in the fore-cited place, and by *Diodorus*, who gives an account of this kind of year among the *Ægyptians*. *Solinus* ſeems to mention this as the only year in requeſt among the *Ægyptians*: and ſo S. *Auguſtin*, *Perhibentur* Ægyptii *quondam tam breves annos habuiſſe ut quaternis menſibus finirentur.* This renders then the *Ægyptian* accounts yet more uncertain, and only leaves us to gueſs with the greateſt probability of reaſon, what form of year was meant by them in their computations. So when *Diodorus* ſpeaks ſo much in favour of the old *Ægyptian* Kings and Laws, and produceth this from the *Ægyptian* Prieſts, as the beſt evidence of the excellent temper of their Government, that they had Kings of their own Nation for the ſpace of 4700 years, till the time of *Cambyſes* his inroad into *Ægypt*, which was in the third year of the 63 *Olympiad*. Now beſides the apparent contradiction of theſe accounts to the other already explained, if we take them in groſs, as the *Ægyptians* give them, it is evident this can be no otherwiſe true, than by taking theſe accounts in that form of years now mentioned by us. For theſe 4700 years, taking them for 120 days apiece, make up of *Julian* years 1544, which being deducted from the year of the World 3475, which was the time when *Cambyſes* invaded *Ægypt*, the remainder is *A. M.* 1931, about which time we may fix the death of *Orus*, from whom their proper Kings commenced. And of theſe years, *Voſſius* tells us, we are to underſtand what they report of the long lives of their ancient Kings, when they attribute to each of them the ſpace of 300 years: as when they attribute 1000, and more to their eldeſt Kings, we are to underſtand them of ſimple Lunar years of 30 days, by which theſe *Gigantic* meaſures of the term of their lives, may without the help of *Procruſtes* be cut ſhort according to the proportion of Men's ordinary age in thoſe eldeſt times. So when *Diodorus* reckons from the death of *Proteus* to his own time *A. M.* 3940, 3400 years, it muſt be underſtood of theſe years of four equal months; for ſo thoſe 3400 years make up of *Julian* years 1117, which being deduced from 3940 the remainder is 2823, a-

Diod. l. 1.

Solin. Polyhiſt. c. 3. *Auguſt. de Civ. Dei, l.* 12. *c.* 10.

Diod. l. 1.

Voſſius de Idolat. l. 1. *c.* 28.

bout which year of the world *Proteus* may be ſuppoſed to live, which was about the time of the *Judges* in *Iſrael.*

IV. Neither was this only the *Ægyptians* way, but in probability the ancient *Chaldæans* obſerved the ſame, which may be a ground likewiſe of thoſe unmeaſurable accounts among them in their firſt Dynaſties, as is evident in the Fragments of *Abydenus* and *Apollodorus* out of *Beroſus*, where the times of their firſt Kings are reckoned not by years, but Σάροι, Νῆροι, and Σῶσσοι, now according to them every Σάρος contained 3600 years, Νῆρος 600, Σῶσσος 60. Now who can imagine that *Alorus* and the ten Kings from him to *Xiſuthrus* ſhould reign 120 *Sari* as their computation is, which reckoning for every *Saros* 3600 years, makes up 432000 years? A very fair ſum for the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties before the time of *Xiſuthrus*, by whom in probability *Noah* was by them underſtood. There have been only two ways thought on of dealing with theſe computations; either rejecting them as wholly fabulous, and founded on no evidence or records of Hiſtory, as we have ſeen already; only they might retain (being ſo near the place of the ſettlement of *Noah* and his poſterity after the floud) the memory not only of the floud (of which it is evident they had ſeveral remainders preſerved in their Traditions) but likewiſe of the ages of men preceding the floud, wherein they were right, reckoning from *Alorus* the firſt to *Xiſuthrus*, i. e. from *Adam* to *Noah*, ten Generations; but as to the names of thoſe ten perſons, and the times they lived in, being wholly ignorant thro' the unfaithfulneſs of tradition, they took their liberty not only of coyning names, but of ſetting what age to them they pleaſed themſelves. And to this purpoſe *Scaliger* obſerves that ſome of their firſt Kings are reckoned before the floud, which ſaith he, is denied by *Georgius Syncellus* without any ſhew of reaſon. Thus far then we may admit of the *Chaldæan* Dynaſties as to ſome part of the Tradition, but rejecting their names and computations as fabulous. The other way of explaining theſe Dynaſties, is by the ſeveral ways of computation among them: For the learned Monks, *Panodorus* and *Anianus*, underſtand thoſe vaſt ſums, not of years, but days, and ſo make a *Saros* to contain 120 months of 30 days apiece, which, ſaith *Scaliger*, make ten *Chaldee* years, and a *Nirus* 20 equal months, and a *Soſos* two: according to which computation the 100 *Sari* make but 1200 years. But this computation of theirs is rejected by *Georgius Syncellus*, becauſe he ſuppoſeth *Euſebius* ſo well verſed in theſe things, that he would never have ſet them down for years, if the *Chaldæans* had not underſtood them ſo, and therefore he would not trouble himſelf in reducing Fables to true Hiſtory, as he expreſſeth it, whoſe words are at large produced by *Scaliger* in the fore-cited place. And it will appear more neceſſary to reject thoſe *Chaldæan* Computations, if we take the ſums of their years in the ſenſe which *Salmaſius* gives of them in the Preface to his Book, *De annis Climactericis* (from whom *Pyrerius* the Author of the *Præadamites* hath borrowed moſt of his Arguments as to theſe things.) According to him then, every Σάρος contained no leſs than 6000 years, as the *Toman* among the *Perſians* contained 10000: but becauſe that learned man hath only given us his *reperi Scriptum*, without any certain foundation for ſo large an account of thoſe ſums, we ſhall take them in as favourable a ſenſe as we can. In order to which a very learned man of our own hath found a third interpretation of the Σάρος in the *Chaldee* accounts, from a correction of *Suidas* by the MS. in the *Vatican* Li-

Scal. Not. in Gr. Euſeb. p. 406.

D. Pearſon on the Creed, p. 115. I. edit. brary, according to which he thus reads the words, Οἱ γὰρ ρκ σάρα ποιοῦσιν ἐνιαυτοὺς βσκβ΄ κατὰ τὴν Χαλδαίων ψῆφον, εἴπερ ὁ σάρος ποιεῖ μῆνας Σεληνιακῶν σκβ΄, οἳ γίνονται ιη ἐνιαυτοὶ ϗ μῆνες ἕξ: *And ſo the ſenſe,* ſaith he, *is clear;* Σάρος *according to the* Chaldee *account comprehends* 222 *months, which come to eighteen years and ſix months; therefore* 120 Σάρα *make* 2220 *years, and therefore* (he adds) *for* βσκβ΄, *I read, leaving out the laſt* β, βσκ΄. Now according to this ſenſe of 120 *Sari* to comprehend the ſumm of 2220 years, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the fragment of *Beroſus* concerning the ten Kings before the floud reigning 120 *Sari*, to ſome degree of probability: as to which I ſhall only ſuppoſe theſe two things. *Firſt*, that the ancient *Chaldæans* had preſerved among them ſome Tradition of the number of the chief perſons before the flood; for we find them exactly agreeing with the Scriptures as to the number, tho' differing as to the names of them, which may be ſeen in the *Euſeb. p. 5.* Fragments of *Africanus*, preſerved in *Euſebius* his *Greek Chronica. Secondly*, that *Beroſus* from whom *Apollodorus* and *Alexander Polyhiſtor* deliver theſe computations, might, as to the account of the times of thoſe perſons, follow the tranſlation of the *Septuagint*. For I have already made it evident that *Beroſus* did not publiſh his Hiſtory till after the *Septuagint* was abroad; now according to the computation of the *Septuagint* of the ages before the floud, theſe 120 *Sari* of the ten Kings will not much diſagree from it. For theſe make 2220 years of theſe ten perſons, and the *Septuagint* in all make 2242; ſo that if inſtead of βσκβ΄ in *Suidas*, we only read it βσμβ΄, we have the exact computation of the *Septuagint* in theſe 120 *Sari*; but of this let the learned judge.

V. We now come to the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties of *Manetho*, as to which I doubt we muſt be fain to take the ſame courſe that *Euſebius* did with the *Chaldæan*, μὴ συμβιβάζειν τὸ ψεῦδος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, *not to trouble our ſelves overmuch in ſeeking to reconcile fables to truth.* Great pains is taken by ſome very learned men to reduce the diſorderly Dynaſties of *Manetho* to ſome probable account; but I muſt confeſs upon an impartial Examination of them, that I think they have ſtriven, if not to make an *Æthiopian* white, yet an *Ægyptian* to ſpeak truth concerning his own Country, which are almoſt of an equal impoſſibility. *Joſeph Scaliger* who firſt in this latter age of the world produced them into the light out of *Georgius Syncellus*, hath a more favourable opinion of them, than of the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus* and others, but upon what account I cannot imagine. Is it becauſe four Dynaſties, according to his own computation, exceed the Creation of the world according to the true account? for which he is fain to make uſe of his *Tempus prolepticum* and *Julian* period, which reacheth 764 years beyond the age of the world, and was invented by him from the multiplication of the great *Cycle* into the *Indiction*, i. e. of 532 into 15. Or is it becauſe forſooth *Manetho* hath digeſted all into better order, and reckoned up the ſeveral Dynaſties which lay confuſed in other Authors? but this only ſhews him a more cunning impoſtor who ſaw the former accounts given by others would not ſerve the turn, and therefore pretends to more exactneſs and diligence, that he might more eaſily deceive his Readers. But ſetting aſide thoſe things which have been ſaid already concerning *Manetho*, I have theſe things which make me reject his Dynaſties as fabulous: *Firſt*, the vaſt difference between *Manetho* his accounts and all others who have written the *Ægyptian* Hiſtory, in the order and names of Dynaſties. Where do we ever read of the ſeveral Dynaſties of the

Thinites, *Memphites*, *Soïtes*, *Dioſpolitans* and many others, but in himſelf? It is very ſtrange that neither *Herodotus*, nor *Eratoſthenes*, nor *Diodorus*, who have all written a ſucceſſion of the *Ægyptian* Kings, ſhould neither by their own induſtry, nor by all the intereſt they had in *Ægypt*, get any knowledge of theſe methodically digeſted Dynaſties. Beſides, had there been any hiſtorical certainty in theſe Dynaſties of *Manetho*, whence comes it to paſs that they ſhould be ſo ſilently paſſed over by thoſe who were *Ægyptian* Prieſts themſelves, and undertook to write the Hiſtory of *Ægypt*? Such were *Chæremon*, who was an Ἱερογραμματεὺς, *a ſacred Scribe*, and *Ptolemæus Mendeſius* who was an *Ægytian* Prieſt, as *Euſebius* tells us, and comprehended the Hiſtory of *Ægypt* in three Books. Now had this Hiſtory been ſo authentical as is pretended, whence come ſo many and great contradictions between them? inſomuch that **Joſephus* ſaith, *If that which they report were true it were impoſſible they ſhould ſo much differ*; *but they labour in the invention of lyes, and write neither agreeably to the truth, nor to one another.* So that it is next to a miracle almoſt to ſee how prodigiouſly fond of theſe Dynaſties *Kircher* is, and what pains he hath taken to no purpoſe about them; *ſcio multos eſſe*, ſaith he, *qui hujuſmodi Dynaſtias meras nugas & commenta putant*; very true; but why is not he of the ſame mind too? he confeſſeth himſelf to have been ſo once; but ſince he hath converſed more with the Oriental Traditions, he hath found them not to be ſo fabulous as many make them. It ſeems then the *Baſis* of the *Ægyptian* Dynaſties as well before the floud as after, muſt lie in this Oriental Tradition; a thing, which ſome, to ſhew their great skill in thoſe Eaſtern Languages, are grown very fond of. But as far as I can yet ſee, they ſail to *Ophir*, not for *Gold*, but *Peacocks*; and the next Legend the world hath ſhould be called *Legenda Orientalis*. For can any thing be more irrational, abſurd and fabulous, than thoſe *Arabic* Traditions which that Author ſcrapes as much for, as *Æſop*'s Cock did on the dunghil? but there is no jewel to be found among them; Unleſs we ſhould take thoſe fifteen hard names of men for ſuch which by the *Arabic* Writers are ſaid to have ſucceeded each other in *Ægypt* before the floud, *viz. Nacraus*, *Nathras*, *Meſram*, *Henoah*, *Arjak*, *Haſilim*, *Huſal*, *Tatraſan*, *Sarkak*, *Schaluk*, *Surith*, (who they ſay built the Pyramids) *Hugith*, *Manaus*, *Aphrus*, *Malinus*, *Abn Ama Pharaun*, in whoſe time they ſay the floud came. But ſhould we be ſo little befriended by reaſon as to grant all this, what advantage will this be to *Manetho*, who ſpeaks not of Kings, but whole Dynaſties? ſo that it ſtill appears theſe Dynaſties are fabulous, not being atteſted by any credible witneſſes. *Secondly*, All thoſe who profeſs to follow *Manetho*, differ ſtrangely from one another, as *Joſephus*, *Africanus*, *Euſebius*, *George the Syncellus* of the Patriarch *Taraſius*: and *Scaliger*, who hath taken ſo much pains in digeſting of them, yet he is condemned by others ſince; and *Iſaac Voſſius* gives a particular caution to his Reader, *In his Dynaſtiis compingendis nequaquam eſſe ſequendum ordinem & calculum* Scaligeri. What ſhould be the reaſon of this diverſity, but that they thought them not ſo authentic, but they might cut off, alter and tranſpoſe, as they ſaw occaſion? which is moſt plain and evident in *Euſebius*, who makes no difficulty of cutting off one whole Dynaſty, and dividing another into two, only to reconcile the diſtance between *Thuoris* the Ægyptian King, and *Teutamus*, the Aſſyrian Emperor, and the deſtruction of *Troy*; and therefore leaves out four Aſſyrian Kings, and a whole

* *Joſeph. c. App. l.* 1.

Kircher. Oed. Ægyp. To. 1. *Synt.* 1. *c.* 9.

Iſ. Voſſius de ætate Mundi, cap. 10.

whole Dynaſty of the Ægyptians, to make a *ſynchroniſm* between thoſe three.

VI. But yet there hath been ſomething very fairly offered to the world, to clear the truth, if not *Manetho*, in order to his Dynaſties, *viz.* that the ſubtile *Ægyptian*, to inhance the antiquity of his own Country, did take implicite years for ſolid, and place thoſe in a ſucceſſion which were contemporary one with another; This indeed is a very compendious way to advance a great ſum of years with a very little charge: Wherein he hath done, ſaith *Capellus*, as if a *Spaniard* in the *Indies* ſhould glory of the antiquity of the Dynaſties of *Spain*, and ſhould attribute to the Earls of *Barcelona* 337 years, to the Kings of *Arragon* 498, to the Kings of *Portugal* 418, to the Kings of *Leon* 545, of *Caſtile* 800 years, and yet all theſe Dynaſties riſe from the year of our Lord 717, when the *Saracens* firſt entred *Spain*. There are very few Nations, but will go near to vie antiquity with the *Ægyptians*, if they may thus be allowed to reckon ſucceſſively all thoſe petty Royalties which anciently were in moſt Nations; as might be particularly inſtanced in moſt great Empires, that they gradually riſe from the ſubduing and incorporating of thoſe petty Royalties into which the ſeveral Nations were cantonized before. And there ſeems to be very ſtrong ground of ſuſpicion that ſome ſuch thing was deſigned by *Manetho*, from the 32d Dynaſty which is of the *Dioſpolitan Thebans*; for this Dynaſty is ſaid to begin from the tenth year of the 15th Dynaſty of the *Phœnician* Paſtors in the time of *Saites*: now, which is moſt obſervable, he that begins this Dynaſty, is of the very ſame name with him who begins the very firſt Dynaſty of *Manetho*, who is *Menes*, and ſo likewiſe his Son *Athothis* is the ſame in both: Which hath made many think, becauſe *Menes* is reckoned firſt, not only in both theſe, but in *Diodorus*, *Eratoſthenes* and others, that this *Menes* was he who firſt began the Kingdom of *Ægypt*, after whoſe time it was divided into ſeveral Dynaſties. Which makes *Scaliger* ſay, *Illa vetuſtiſſima regna fuerunt inſtar latrociniorum; ubi vis, non lex aut ſucceſſio aut ſuffragia populi reges in ſolio regni collocabant.* This opinion of the co-exiſtence of theſe Dynaſties is much embraced by *Voſſius* both Father and Son, and by the Father made uſe of to juſtifie *Scaliger* from calumniators, who made as tho' *Scaliger* did in effect overthrow the authority of the Scriptures by mentioning with ſome applauſe the Dynaſties of *Manetho*.

Capell. Hiſt. ſacr. & exot. A. M. 3308.

Scalig. can. Iſag. l. 3.

Ger. Voſſ. Idol. l. 1. *c.* 28. *Iſ. Voſſ. de æt. mund. c.* 10.

VII. But to this opinion, how plauſible ſoever it ſeems, I offer theſe exceptions. *Firſt*, As to that *Menes* who is ſuppoſed to be the firſt Founder of the Ægyptian Kingdom, after whoſe death it is ſuppoſed that *Ægypt* was divided into all theſe Dynaſties; I demand who this *Menes* was; was he the ſame with him whom the Scripture calls *Miſraim*, who was the firſt Planter of *Ægypt?* this is not probable, for in all probability His name muſt be ſought among the Gods, and not the Mortals that reigned. If we ſuppoſe him to be any other after him, it will be hard giving an account how he came to have the whole power of *Ægypt* in his hands, and ſoon after him it ſhould be divided. For Kingdoms are oft-times made up of thoſe petty Royalties before; but it will be very hard finding inſtances of one perſon's enjoying the whole power, and ſo many Dynaſties to ariſe after his deceaſe, and to continue coexiſtent in peace and full power ſo long as theſe ſeveral Dynaſties are ſuppoſed to do. Beſides, is it not very ſtrange, that no Hiſtorian ſhould mention ſuch a former diſtribution of ſeveral Principalities ſo anciently in *Ægypt?* But that which to me utterly overthrows the coexiſtence of theſe Dynaſties in *Ægypt*, is, by comparing with them what we find in Scripture of greateſt antiquity concerning the Kingdom of *Ægypt*; which I cannot but wonder that none of thoſe learned men ſhould take notice of. When the Ægyptian Kingdom was firſt founded, 'tis not here a place to enquire; but it is evident that, in *Abraham*'s time, there was a *Pharaoh* King of *Ægypt* (whom Archbiſhop *Uſher* thinks to have been *Apophis*) not *Abimelech* the firſt King of *Ægypt*, as *Conſtantinus Manaſſes* reports in his Annals (by a ridiculous miſtake of the King of *Gerar* for the King of *Ægypt*.) This *Pharaoh* was then certainly King of all the Land of *Ægypt*, which ſtill in Scripture is called *the Land of Miſraim* from the firſt Planter of it: and this was of very great antiquity; and therefore *Funccius* (tho' improbably) thinks this *Pharaoh* to have been *Oſiris*, and *Rivet* thinks *Miſraim* might have been alive till that time; here then we find no Dynaſties coexiſting, but one Kingdom under one King. If we deſcend ſomewhat lower, to the times of *Jacob* and *Joſeph*, the evidence is ſo undoubted of *Ægypt*'s being an entire Kingdom under one King, that he may have juſt cauſe to ſuſpect the eyes either of his body or his mind that diſtruſts it. For what more evident, than that *Pharoah* who preferred *Joſeph*, was *King of all the land of* Ægypt? *Were not the ſeven years of famine over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 55. *Was not* Joſeph *ſet by* Pharaoh *over all the land of* Ægypt? *Gen.* 41. 41, 43, 45. *And did not* Joſeph *go over all the land of* Ægypt *to gather Corn?* Gen. 41. 46. *Nay did he not buy all the land of* Ægypt *for* Pharaoh? *Gen.* 47. 20. Can there poſſibly be given any fuller evidences of an entire Kingdom, than theſe are, that *Ægypt* was ſuch then? Afterwards we read of one King after another in *Ægypt* for the ſpace of nigh two hundred years, during the children of *Iſrael*'s ſlavery in *Ægypt*; and was not he, think we, King over all *Ægypt*, in whoſe time the children of *Iſrael* went out thence? And in all the following Hiſtory of Scripture, is there not mention made of *Ægypt* ſtill as an entire Kingdom, and of one King over it? Where then is there any place for theſe contemporary Dynaſties in *Ægypt?* No where that I know of, but in the Fancies of ſome learned men.

Gen. 12.

VIII. Indeed there is one place that ſeems to give ſome countenance to this opinion; but it is in far later times than the firſt Dynaſties of *Manetho* are ſuppos'd to be in, which is in *Iſai.* 19. 2. Where God ſaith, *He would ſet the* Ægyptians *againſt the* Ægyptians, *and they ſhall fight every one againſt his brother, city againſt city, and kingdom againſt kingdom.* Where it ſeems that there were ſeveral Kingdoms then exiſtent among the *Ægyptians*; but the *Septuagint* very well renders it νομὸς ἐπὶ νομόν. Now νομὸς among the *Ægyptians*, as *Epiphanius* and others tell us, notes τῆς ἑκάστης πόλεως περιοικίδα ἤτοι περίχωρον, *the precincts of every great City*, ſuch as our Counties are, and therefore *Pliny* renders νομοὶ by *præfecturæ*; theſe were the ſeveral Provinces of *Ægypt*, of which there were thirty ſix in *Ægypt*, ten in *Thebais*, ten in *Delta*, the other ſixteen in the midland parts; ſo that by kingdom againſt kingdom, no more is meant than one Province being ſet againſt another. *Iſaac Voſſius* thinks the number of the ancient *Nomi* was twelve, and that over every of theſe was a peculiar King; and that this number may be gathered from the Dynaſties of *Manetho*, ſetting aſide the Dynaſties of the *Perſians*, *Æthiopians*, and *Phœnicians*: *viz.* the *Thinites*, *Memphites*, *Elephantines*, *Heracleopolitans*, *Dioſpolitan Thebans*, the leſſer *Dioſpolitans*, *Xoites*, *Tanites*,

nites, *Bubaſtites*, *Saïtes*, *Mendeſians*, and *Sebennytes:* and ſo that *Ægypt* was anciently a *Dodecharchy*, as *England* in the *Saxons* time was a *Heptarchy*. But as it already appears, there could be anciently no ſuch *Dodecharchy* in *Ægypt*; ſo it is likewiſe evident that this diſtribution of *Ægypt* into *Nomi* is a later thing, and by moſt Writers is attributed to *Seſooſis* or *Seſoſtris*, whom *Joſephus* ſuppoſed to be *Seſack* King of *Ægypt*, contemporary with *Rehoboam*. Indeed if we believe *Gelaldinus* the *Arabic* Hiſtorian cited by *Kircher*, the moſt ancient diſtribution of *Ægypt* was into four parts. *Miſraim* held one part to himſelf, and gave his Son *Copt* another, *Eſmun* a third, and *Atrib* a fourth part; which diviſion the ſame Author affirms to have continued till the time of *Joſeph*, who made a new diſtribution of the whole Land: After him *Seſoſtris* divided the whole into thirty ſeveral *Nomi*; ſo *Kircher* will needs have it, that of the three ſeveral parts of *Ægypt*, each might have for ſome myſtical ſignification its ten *Nomi*, of which every one had its diſtinct and peculiar God it worſhipp'd, and a particular Palace in the Labyrinth, and a peculiar *Sanhedrin* or Court of Juſtice belonging to it. But it evidently appears by that vain-glorious *Oedipus*, that it is a far eaſier matter to make new Myſteries, than to interpret old ones, which as it might be eaſily diſcovered is the main foundation whereon that ſtructure ſtands, ſo we have ſome evidence of it in our firſt entrance into it, in this part of the *Chorography* of *Ægypt*. For from whence had he this exact diviſion of *Ægypt* into thirty *Nomi*, ten of which belonged to the upper *Ægypt*, or *Thebais*, ten to *Delta*, or the lower *Ægypt*, and the ten remaining to the midland Country? Hath he this from *Ptolemee*, whoſe Scheme of the ſeveral *Nomi* he publiſheth? No, *Ptolemee* and *Pliny*, by his own confeſſion, afterwards add many others to theſe, as *Omphile*, *Phanturites*, *Tanites*, *Phatnites*, *Neut*, *Heptanomos*, &c. Hath he it from *Strabo*, whoſe authority he cites for it? No ſuch matter. For *Strabo* ſaith expreſly, that *Thebais* had ten *Nomi*, *Delta* ten, and the midland ſixteen; only ſome are of opinion, ſaith he, that there were as many *Nomi* as Palaces in the Labyrinth, which were toward thirty; but yet the number is uncertain ſtill. We ſee by this, how ominous it is for an *Oedipus* to ſtumble at the threſhold, and how eaſie a matter it is to interpret Myſteries, if we may have the making of them. We ſee then no evidence at all for theſe contemporary Dynaſties of *Manetho*; which yet if we ſhould grant, would be a further argument of the uncertainty of heathen *Chronology*, when among them implicit years are given out to the world for ſolid; ſo that which way ſoever *Manetho* his Dynaſties be taken, they will prove the thing in hand, whether we ſuppoſe them at leaſt moſt part fabulous, or ſhould grant he had taken thoſe in ſucceſſion to each other, which were coexiſtent with one another.

Vid. Boch. Geogr. p. 1. *l.* 4. *c.* 4. *Kircher Oedip. Ægypt. To.* 1. *Syntag.* 1. *c.* 4.

Idem Synt. 1. *c.* 2. *p.* 7.

Strab. l. 17.

CHAP. VI.

The uncertain Epocha's of Heathen Chronology.

I. *An account of the defect of Chronology in the eldeſt times. Of the Solar Year among the* Ægyptians, *the original of the Epacts, the antiquity of Intercalation among them. Of the ſeveral Canicular Years; the difference between* Scaliger *and* Petavius *conſidered. The certain Epocha's of the Ægyptian Hiſtory no elder than* Nabonaſſar. II. *Of the* Grecian *accounts. The fabulouſneſs of the Heroical age of* Greece. III. *Of the ancient* Grecian *Kingdoms. The beginning of the* Olympiads. IV. *The uncertain Origins of the Weſtern Nations. Of the* Latin *Dynaſties. The different* Palilia *of* Rome. *The uncertain reckoning* Ab Urbe condita. V. *Of impoſtures as to ancient Hiſtories. Of* Annius, VI. Inghiramius, *and others.* VII. *Of the characters uſed by Heathen Prieſts.* VIII. *No ſacred characters among the* Jews. IX. *The partiality and inconſiſtency of heathen Hiſtories with each other. From all which the want of credibility in them as to an account of ancient times is clearly demonſtrated.*

I. THe next thing to evidence the uncertainty of the heathen *Chronology*, is the want of certain *Parapegmata*, or ſome fixed periods of time, according to which the account of times muſt be made. For if there be no certain *Epocha's* by which to reckon the ſucceſſion of ages, the diſtance of intervals, and all intervening accidents, we muſt of neceſſity fluctuate in continual uncertainties, and have no ſure foundation to bottom any account of ancient times upon. The great reaſon of this defect, is, the little care which thoſe who lived in the eldeſt times had to preſerve the memory of any ancient tradition among themſelves, or to convey it to poſterity in ſuch a way as might be leaſt liable to impoſture. Of all kinds of Learning, *Chronology* was the moſt rude in eldeſt times; and yet that is well called by *Scaliger*, *The life and ſoul of Hiſtory*, without which *Hiſtory* is but a confuſed lump, a mere *Mola*, an indigeſted piece of fleſh, without life or form. The ancient accounts of the world were merely from year to year, and that with abundance of obſcurity, uncertainty and variety: ſometimes going by the courſe of the Moon; and therein they were as mutable as the Moon her ſelf, how to conform the year regularly to her motion: and it was yet greater difficulty to regulate it by the courſe of the Sun, and to make the accounts of the Sun and Moon meet. There was ſo much perplexity and confuſion about the ordering of a ſingle year, and ſo long in moſt Nations before they could bring it into any order, that we are not to expect any fixed periods by which to find out the ſucceſſion of ages among them. Among the *Ægyptians* who are ſuppoſed moſt skilful in the account of the year, it was a long time before they found out any certain courſe of it. It is agreed by moſt, that when the Ægyptian Prieſts had found out the form of the year by the courſe of the Sun which is attributed by *Diodorus* to the *Heliopolitan* Prieſts) yet the year in common uſe was only of 360 days, which in any great period of years muſt needs cauſe a monſtrous confuſion, by reaſon that their Months muſt of neceſſity by degrees change their place, ſo that in the great Canicular year of 730 *Thoyth*, which was the beginning of the Summer *Solſtice* in the entrance into that period, would be removed into the midſt of Winter, from whence aroſe that Ægyptian fable in *Herodotus*, that in the time of their eldeſt Kings, the Sun had twice changed his riſing and ſetting; which was only cauſed by the variation of their Months, and not by any alteration in the courſe of the Sun. Which defect the Ægyptian Prieſts at laſt obſerving, ſaw a neceſſity of adding five days to the end of the year w^ch^ thence were called ἐπαγόμεναι, which implies they were not anciently in uſe among them, being afterwards added to make up the courſe of the year. Which the *Ægyptians* give an account of, as *Plutarch* tells us under this fable: *Mercury being once at dice with the Moon, he got from her a 72*^d^ *part of the year, which he after added to the* 360 *days which were anciently the days of the year, which they called* ἐπαγομένας, *and therein celebrated the Feſtivals of their Gods.* Thence the names of the ſeveral ἐπαγόμεναι were taken from the Gods; the firſt was called Ὄσιρις, it being celebrated in honor of him; the ſecond Ἀρουήρις, by which *Scaliger* underſtands *Anubis*, but *Voſſius* more probably the ſenior *Orus*; the third to *Typho*; the fourth to *Iſis*; the fifth to *Nephtha* the wife of *Typho*, and ſiſter to *Iſis*. This courſe of the year *Scaliger* thinks that the *Ægyptians* repreſented by the Serpent called Νειοὶ, being deſcribed in a round circle biting ſome part of his tail in his mouth; whereby, ſaith he, they would have it underſtood that the form of the year was not perfect without that adjection of five days to the end of the year: For to this day, ſaith he, the *Coptites* and ancient *Ægyptians* call the end of the year Νειοί. It ſeems that afterwards they underſtood likewiſe the neceſſity of intercalation of a day every fourth year, for the ſake of the redundant quadrant each year above 365 days; which courſe of four years they called Canicular year, becauſe they obſerved its defect in that time one whole day from the riſing of the Dog-ſtar: and beſides that they called it Ἡλιακὸν ἔτος, and Ἔτος θεοῦ, *& luſtrum Sothiacum*, from Σῶθις the Dog-ſtar: but *Cenſorinus* denies any uſe of intercalation among the *Ægyptians* in their civil year, altho' their Sacred and Hieroglyphical years might admit of it. And upon this ground, I ſuppoſe the controverſy between thoſe two learned perſons, *Scaliger* and *Petavius*, concerning the antiquity of Intercalation among the *Ægyptians* may be reconciled. For on the one ſide it is apparent, that the ordinary or civil year did want intercalation, by this teſtimony of *Cenſorinus*; *Eorum annus civilis ſolos habet dies* 365 *ſine ullo incercalari; itaque quadriennium apud eos uno circiter die minus eſt quam naturale quadriennium*; and thence, ſaith he, it comes to paſs, that in 1461 years, which was the great *Heliacal* year, it returns to the ſame beginning; for then the Dog-ſtar ariſeth again upon the firſt day of the month *Thoyth*, as it did at the beginning of this great Canicular year; and that this kind of civil year did continue among them in the time of *Cenſorinus* (which was of the *Dionyſian* account 238) appears by this, that he ſaith in the year wherein he wrote his book the *New-moon* of *Thoyth* was before the ſeventh day of the Calends of *July*, whereas a hundred years before, it was before the 12 of the Calends of *Auguſt*; whence it is evident, that the *Julian* year, whatever ſome learned men pretendt o the contrary, was not in

ordinary

Diodor. l. 1. *c.* 50.

Herod. Euterp. Vide Scaliger. de Emend. Temp. l. 3. *p.* 195.

Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride.

Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1. *c.* 28.

Cenſorin. de die Nat. c. 18.

V. Petav. de doctr. Temp. l. 3. *c.* 2.

ordinary uſe among the *Ægyptians* in that time; and that *Soſigenes* when he corrected the *Roman* Account, and brought in the form of the *Julian* year, did not take his pattern from the Ægyptian year, but from the *Grecians* of *Alexandria*, who did make uſe of the Quadrant added to the 365 years, which the *Ægyptians* did not, as appears further by the Golden circle in the monumnet of *Oſimanduas* (which *Diodorus* ſpeaks of out of *Hecatæus Mileſius*) which was of 365 cubits compaſs, and divided into ſo many ſegments for every day with the obſervations of the riſing and ſetting of the ſeveral Stars, and the effects portended by them. And the reaſon why this year continued in civil uſe among the *Ægyptians*, is well aſſigned by *Geminus*, that the *Ægyptians* according to a ſuperſtitious obſervation they had, would needs have their Feſtivals run through every day in the year. But now on the other ſide, it is as evident that by continual obſervation the wiſeſt of the Ægyptian Prieſts did diſcern the neceſſity of intercalation, and that there wanted ſix hours in every year to make it compleat, which every four years would make the intercalation of a day neceſſary; ſo much by *Diodorus* is affirmed of the *Theban* Prieſts, who were the beſt Aſtronomers; and by *Strabo* both of the *Theban* and *Heliopolitan*; and ſo likewiſe *Horapollo*, whoſe work was to interpret the more abſtruſe learning of the Ægyptian Prieſts: *When* (ſaith he) *the* Ægyptians *would expreſs a year, they name a Quadrant, becauſe from one riſing of the ſtar* Sothis *to another the fourth part of a day is added, ſo that the year conſiſts of 365 days*; (and a quadrant muſt be added, becauſe of the antecedents and conſequents) therefore every fourth year they reckon a ſupernumerary day. How unjuſtly *Petavius* hath charged *Scaliger* with falſhood in reference to this teſtimony of *Horapollo*, meerly becauſe the citation did not appear in that Chapter mentioned by *Scaliger* in the Book which *Petavius* uſed, hath been already obſerved by learned men. Whereupon *Voſſius* condemns *Petavius* of ſtrange incogitancy, becauſe in three Editions mentioned by him, *Scaliger*'s citation was right: but *Conringius* hath ſince pleaded in behalf of *Petavius*, that he might make uſe of the Edition of *Cauſinus* diſtinct from the other three; whereby we ſee how ſmall a matter will beget a feud between learned men, eſpecially where prejudice hath lodged before; as is too evident in *Petavius* his rough dealings on all occaſious, with that very deſerving perſon *Joſeph Scaliger*. But to return, from hence by degrees the *Ægyptians* proceded to make greater periods of years (as *Eudoxus* carried his *Octaeteris* into *Greece* from the Canicular year of the *Ægyptians*) they framed from this a great Canicular year, which had as many years as the *Julian* hath days; and laſtly, the greateſt Canicular year, which comprehended four of the greater, and conſiſted of a period of 1461 years. But thus we ſee, that the great periods of years among them riſe gradually, as they grow more skilful in the underſtanding the nature of the year; and that they had anciently no certain periods to govern themſelves by in their computation of ancient times. Nay the *Ægyptians* have not, as appears, any certain *Epocha* to go by, elder than the Ægyptian years of *Nabonaſſar*, and afterwards from the death of *Alexander*, and *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, and *Auguſtus* his Victory at *Actium*.

Kircher Oed. Ægyp. To.3. Claſſ. 7. c. 2.

Diod. l. 1. c. 49.

Geminus de ſphæra cap. 6.

Diodor. l. 1. c. 50.

Strab. l. 17.

Horapollo. Hieroglyp. l. 1. c. 5.

Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1. c. 28.

Conring. de Hermet. Med. c. 12.

II. If from the *Ægyptians* we remove our diſcourſe unto the *Grecians*, we are ſtill plunged into greater uncertainties, it being acknowledged by themſelves that they had no certain ſucceſſion of time before the *Olympiads*. To which purpoſe the teſtimony of *Varro* in *Cenſorinus* is generally taken notice of, diſtributing time into three parts, reckoning two of them to be unknown and fabulous, and the hiſtorical part of time to begin with the firſt *Olympiad*. Indeed *Scaliger* and ſome others are loath to reject all that ſecond part of time as fabulous, which was in the interval between *Deucalion*'s flood and the *Olympiads*; and therefore they had rather call it Heroical, tho' much corrupted with fables, and to think that it was hiſtorical as to perſons, but fabulous as to the actions of thoſe perſons. But granting this; yet we are wholly to ſeek for any certain account of the ſucceſſion of time and perſons for want of ſome certain *Epocha*'s, which like the Pole Star ſhould guide us in our paſſage thro' that vaſt Ocean of the *Grecian* Hiſtory. It muſt be confeſſed that ſome of the learned Heathens have taken a great deal of pains this way to find out ſome certain Periods to fix on in the time before the *Olympiads*; as *Philochorus*, *Apollodorus*, and *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis*, and others, who out of their skill in Aſtronomy ſought to bring down ſome certain intervals between the deſtruction of *Troy*, and the firſt *Olympic* games of *Pelops*, reſtored by *Hercules* and *Atreus*. But granting that their *Epocha*'s were fixed and certain, that the deſtruction of *Troy* was upon the 23 of *Thargelion*, the 11th month of the *Attic* account, and that the *Olympic* game fell out anſwerably to the ninth of our *July*, and theſe things were evidently proved from Aſtronomical obſervations; yet how vaſt an account of time is loſt quite beyond the ſiege of *Troy*? And beſides that, as to all other accidents in the Intervals between theſe two *Epocha*'s which could not be proved by Celeſtial obſervations concurrent with them, they were left at a very great uncertainty ſtill; only they might gueſs whether they approached nearer to one *Epocha* than the other by the ſeries of Families and their Generations (three of which made a Century of years) whereby they might come to ſome conjectures, but could not arrive at any certainty at all.

Scalig. not in Can. Iſagoge. l. 3.

III. But that which is moſt to our purpoſe is, that all the Hiſtory of the original of *Greece*, the foundations of their ſeveral Kingdoms, the ſucceſſion of their firſt Kings, and all that comes under the name of the Hiſtory of their ancient times, is clearly given over by their own moſt skilful Chronologers, as matters out of the reach of any clear evidence. Thence comes ſuch great differences concerning the antiquity of their ancient Kingdoms; the *Argolic* Kingdom by *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſ.* is ſuppoſed to be the eldeſt, and the *Attic* younger than it by 40 Generations, which according to their computation comes to 1000 years, which is impoſſible; and yet the *Arcadians*, who gave themſelves out to be elder than the Moon, are ſuppoſed to be younger by him than the Graſhoppers of *Athens* by nine Generations; and the *Phthiotica*, under *Deucalion*, younger than *Arcadica* by 42 Generations, which *Scaliger* might well ſay were impoſſible and inconſiſtent. The *Sicyonian* Kingdom is by moſt ſuppoſed to be of greateſt antiquity among the *Grecians*, from which *Varro* began his Hiſtory, as S. *Auſtin* tells us; and yet as to this, *Pauſanias* only reckons the names of ſome Kings there, without any ſucceſſion of time among them; and yet as to thoſe names *Africanus* (and *Euſebius* from him) diſſent from *Pauſanias*; and which is moſt obſervable, *Homer* reckons *Adraſtus*, who is the 23d in the account of *Africanus*, to be the firſt that reigned in *Sicyon*, whoſe time was after the inſtitution of the *Olympic* Game by *Pelops*: of him thus *Homer*,

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 16. c. 2.

Καὶ Σικυῶν ὅθ᾽ ἄρ᾽ Ἄδρηστος πρῶτ᾽ ἐμβασίλευεν.

Homer. Iliad. 2.

whereby he expreſſeth *Adraſtus* to be the firſt King of *Sicyon*; and not as *Scaliger* would interpret it, that *Adraſtus* was firſt King of the *Sicyonians*, before he was of the *Argives*; for in the time of *Adraſtus* at *Sicyon*, either *Atreus*, or *Thyeſtes* was King of the *Argives*: for in the ſecond year of *Phæſtus* and *Adraſtus* his ſuppoſed predeceſſor in *Sicyon*, *Atreus* reſtored the *Olympic* Game of *Pelops*, in the 41 year of their reign, and they reigned at *Argi* 65 years: Now that *Phæſtus* at *Sicyon* is ſuppoſed to reign but eight years; and therefore the reign of *Adraſtus* at *Sicyon* falls in with that of *Atreus* and *Thyeſtes* at *Argi* or *Mycenæ*. Thus we ſee now, how uncertain the account of times was before the beginning of the *Olympiads* among the *Grecians*, which is fully acknowledged by *Diodorus*, and the very reaſon given which we here inſiſt on, Διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράπηγμα παρειληφθῆναι περὶ τούτων πιστευόμενον, *That there was no certainty in the ancient* Grecian *hiſtory, becauſe they had no certain term* (which he calls *parapegma*, as others *Epocha*; and *Cenſorinus*, *Titulus*) *from whence to deduce their accounts.* But now from the time of the *Olympiads* (i. e. from the firſt of them after their reſtoration by *Iphitus*, wherein the names of the Conquerors were ingraven in braſs Tablets for the purpoſe) the ſucceſſion of time is moſt certain and hiſtorical among the *Grecians*; by which account we have from thence a certain way of commenſurating the ſacred and prophane Hiſtory. All the difficulty is in what year of ſacred Hiſtory the *Olympiads* began, which *Scaliger* thus finds out. *Cenſorinus* writes (in the year of *Chriſt* 238 which was of the *Julian* period 4951.) that, that year was from the firſt *Olympiad* of *Iphitus* 1014, the firſt *Olympiad* was of the *Julian* period 3938. which was according to our learned Primate *A. M.* 3228, and the 35 of *Uzziah* King of *Judah*, or the 34, as *Capellus* thinks: So that from henceforward we have a clear account of times, which we have demonſtrated to have been ſo uncertain before.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5.

IV. If we come to the *Greeks* further into theſe *European* parts, we ſhall find as much darkneſs and obſcurity as to ancient times, if not more, than in thoſe already diſcours'd of. For the truth is, the account of times before the *Romans* in *Italy*, *Germany*, old *Gallia* or *Britain*, are ſcarce fit to be diſcourſed of under any head than that of impoſture. Not that I think thoſe Nations had lain in a perpetual ſleep, till the *Romans* waked them into ſome kind of civility but that they had no certain way of conveying down the tranſactions of their own and former times to the view of poſterity. On which account we may juſtly reject all thoſe pretended ſucceſſions of Kings here in *Britain* from *Gomer* and *Brute* as fabulous. And it will be the leſs wonder it ſhou'd be ſo in thoſe then accounted barbarous Nations, when even among thoſe who were the Planters of knowledge and civility among others, the account of their ancient times is ſo dark, confuſed and uncertain. As it would ſufficiently appear to any that would take the pains to examine the ſucceſſion of the two firſt Dynaſties among the *Latines*; the firſt before *Æneas* his coming into *Italy*; and the ſecond of the *Æneadæ* after. And certainly it will be ſufficient ground to queſtion the account of times before; if in the third Dynaſty, when the ſucceſſion ſeems ſo clear, and ſo certain an *Epocha* as the building of *Rome*, to deduce their accounts from their Chronology be uncertain, which I ſhall briefly ſpeak to. For altho' *Porcius Cato* have in *Dionyſius* the honour of finding out the firſt *Palilia* of the City of *Rome* (which was the Feaſt obſerved to the honour of the Goddeſs *Pales* in the time of which, the foundations of

Rome were laid) yet there appears no great certainty in his undertaking; for therein he was after contradicted by the learned *Roman*, *Varro*. *Dionyſius* tells us that *Cato* found by the *Cenſors* Tables the exact time from the expulſion of the Kings, to the time of the City's being taken by the *Gauls*; from which time to his own, he could not miſs of it from the *Faſti Conſulares*; ſo that it cannot be denied but that *Cato* might have a certain account of times from the *Regifugium* to the time he writ his *Origines*. But what certainty *Cato* could have from the firſt *Palilia* of the City to the expulſion of *Tarquin*, we cannot underſtand. For the ſucceſſion of Kings muſt needs be very uncertain, unleſs it be demonſtrated from ſome public monuments, or certain records, or ſome public actions certainly known to have fallen out preciſely in ſuch a year of their ſeveral Reigns. Now none of theſe do occurr in the *Roman* Hiſtory, in all that interval from the *Palilia* to the *Regifugium*; ſo that not only the whole interval, but the time of every particular King's Reign, are very uncertain. And therefore *Varro* being deſtitute of any demonſtration of that time, had recourſe to *L. Tarrutius Firmanus*, to ſee if by his skill in Aſtronomy he could certainly find out the firſt *Palilia* of *Rome*: His anſwer was, that he found that the City was built in the time of an Eclipſe of the Sun, which was in the third year of the ſixth *Olympiad*; according to which account *Varro* proceeded, and thence aroſe the difference between the *Palilia Catoniana* and *Varroniana*; the latter falling out in the 23d of *Iphitus*, the other in the 24th. But if we believe *Joſeph Scaliger*, there could not be an Eclipſe of the Sun, at the time affirmed by *Tarrutius*: But yet granting an Eclipſe of the Sun then, what certainty can we have of the ſucceſſion of the ſeveral Kings afterwards without which there can be no certain computation *ab Urbe condita?* If then the *Romans*, who had ſo great advantage of knowing times, and were withal ſo inquiſitive concerning the building of their city (which was a thing of no very remote diſtance) could attain to no abſolute certainty about it, what certainty can we expect as to an account of far ancienter times, either from them or others, when they had no Cenſors Tables, nor *Faſti Conſulares* to be guided by? And thus much may ſerve to ſhew the great uncertainty of heathen Chronology, as to the giving an account of ancient times.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 5. p. 358.

V. And yet were it only an uncertainty as to Chronology, we might better bear with it; for the miſtake meerly in computation of times were not ſo dangerous (any further than the credibility of the Hiſtory depends on the computation, as in point of antiquity) if we were but certain that the perſons and actions related of them were ſuch as they are reportedto be. But that which adds much to the confuſion and uncertainty of heathen Hiſtory, is, the frequency of impoſtures, which are more hard to be diſcovered, in that there are no authentic Hiſtories of thoſe times extant, which hath both given occaſion to variety of impoſtures, and much hindred their diſcovery. For the curioſity of men leading them back into a ſearch after ancient times, it makes them exceeding credulous in embracing whatever pretends to give them any conduct thro' thoſe dark and obſcure paths of ancient Hiſtory. And the world hath never been wanting of ſuch as would be ready to abuſe the ſimple credulity of well-meaning, but leſs wary men; but thoſe ages have been moſt *feracious* in the production of ſuch perſons, which have pretended to more learning than they had. The pretence of Learning made ſuch perſons appear, and the want of it made them not be diſcovered. Thus it was not only of old among the *Chaldæan* and *Ægyptian* Prieſts, and the *Grecian* Poets, and Hiſtorians, of whom we have ſpoken already; but even among thoſe who might have learned more truth from the Religion they profeſſed, than to think it ſtood in need of their lyes. For there can be no greater diſparagement offered to truth, than to defend it with any thing but it ſelf, nothing laying truth ſo open to ſuſpicion, as when falſhood comes to be his advocate. And a falſe teſtimony diſcovered, doth more prejudice to a good cauſe, than it could any ways advantage it, were it not diſcovered. And therefore their labours have been as ſerviceable to the world who have diſcovered Impoſtures, as thoſe who have directly maintained truth againſt its open oppoſers; thoſe being ſo much more dangerous, in that they appear in the diſguiſe of truth, and therefore are with more difficulty diſcovered. Such a one was that *Ignis fatuus* that appeared in a kind of twilight in the *Chriſtian* world between the former darkneſs of Barbariſm, and the approaching light of knowledge: I mean *Annius Viterbienſis*, who like *Hannibal* in paſſing the *Alps*, not finding a way ready to his mind, ſets himſelf to burning the woods and firing the rocks, and diſſolving them with vinegar to make a paſſage thro' them: So *Annius* being beſet in thoſe ſnowy and gray-headed *Alps* of ancient Hiſtory, and finding no way clear for him according to his fancy, he labours to burn down all certain Records, to eat thro' the credit of undoubted Authors, to make a more free paſſage for his own Hiſtory, which he deduceth ſuitably to Scripture from the concurrent teſtimony of the eldeſt Hiſtorians. To which purpoſe, a new *Beroſus*, *Manetho*, *Philo*, *Metaſthenes* (as he miſtook for *Megaſthenes*) and *Xenophon* muſt put on a grave diſguiſe, and walk abroad the world with a mantle of Antiquity about their ſhoulders, altho' they wear nothing elſe but airy Phantaſms, covered over with the *Cowl* of the Monk of *Viterbo*. For being himſelf ſomewhat more verſed in the Hiſtory of thoſe elder times than generally perſons were in the age he lived in, he made that unhappy uſe of his skill, to play the Mountebank with his Learning; and to abuſe the credulity of thoſe who have better ſtomachs than palates, and ſooner ſwallow down the compoſitions that are given them, than find out the ingredients of them. Thus *Annius* puts a good face on his New-old Authors, bids them be bold and confident, and they would fare the better. And the truth is, they tell their ſtory ſo punctually in all circumſtances, in thoſe things which had no certain conveyance to poſterity, that that were ſufficient ground to any intelligent perſon to queſtion their authority. But leſt his Authors ſhould at any time want an Interpreter to make out their full meaning, he ſets himſelf a large Commentary upon them, and certainly he was the fitteſt perſon in the world to do it; for, *cujus eſt condere, ejus eſt interpretari*; none ſo fit to explain *Annius*, as *Annius* himſelf. The whole ſtory of this impoſture, how he made the Inſcriptions himſelf, and hid them under ground, how they were digged thence and brought to *Annius*; how *Annius* cauſed them to be ſent to the Magiſtrates, and after publiſhed them in the equipage they are in, is at large related by that learned Biſhop * *Antonius Auguſtinus*, from *Latinus Latinius*.

VI. From a like quarry to this, came out thoſe other famous Inſcriptions, walking under the ſpecious title of *Antiquitatum Etruſcarum fragmenta*, wherein, beſides many palpable incongruities to the cuſtoms of thoſe eldeſt times diſcovered partly by *Leo Allatius* in his Diſcourſe concerning them, there are ſo many particular ſtories and circumſtances related concerning *Noah*'s being in *Italy*, and other things ſo far beyond probability of Reaſon, that it is a wonder there are yet any perſons pretending to Learning, who ſhould build their diſcourſes upon ſuch rotten and ſandy foundations as theſe Inſcriptions are. But tho' *Ixion* might, *Jupiter* would never have been deceived with a *Cloud* inſtead of *Juno*; ſo, tho' perſons unacquainted with the lineaments of Truth, may be eaſily impoſed on with appearances inſtead of her: yet ſuch perſons who have ſagacity enough to diſcern the air of her countenance from the paint of forgeries, will never ſuffer themſelves to be over-reached by ſuch vain pretenders. But theſe Impoſtors are like the Aſtrologers at *Rome*, ever baniſhed, and yet ever there; and ſo theſe are ever exploded by all lovers of truth, yet always find ſome to applaud and entertain them. Altho' it be more difficult to do ſo now in the preſent light of Knowledge, and all advantages for Learning, than it was in thoſe elder times, when the heathen Prieſts pretended to the Monopoly of Learning among themſelves, and made it one of their great deſigns to keep all others in dependance on themſelves, thereby to keep up their veneration the better among the people. And therefore all the Records they had of Learning or Hiſtory, were carefully lockt up, and preſerved among the Prieſts; and leaſt at any time others might get a view of them, they were ſure to preſerve them in a peculiar Character diſtinct from that in civil and common uſe. By which means the heathen Prieſts had all imaginable opportunities and conveniences for deceiving the ſilly people, and thereby keeping them in an obſequious ignorance, which is never the Mother of any true Devotion, but of the greateſt Superſtition.

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* *Anton. Auguſt. Dialog.* 11.

VII. It is well known of the *Ægyptian* Prieſts, that the ſacred Characters of their Temples were ſeldom made known to any but ſuch as were of their own number and family, (the Prieſthood being there hereditary) *Diod. l.* 3. or ſuch others as by long converſe had inſinuated themſelves into their ſociety, as ſome of the *Greek* Philoſophers and Hiſtorians had done. And yet we have ſome reaſon to think they were not over-free and communicative to ſome of them, by the ſlender account they give of ſeveral things, which are ſuppoſed to be well known among the *Ægyptians*. That the *Phœnician* Prieſts had their peculiar and ſacred Characters too, is evident from the words of *Philo Byblius* concerning *Sanchoniathon*, if we take *Bochartus* his Expoſition of them: He tells us that his Hiſtory *Euſeb. præpar. Evang. l.* 1. *c.* 10. was compared, τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδύτων εὑρεθεῖσιν, ἀποκρύφοις Ἀμμουνέων γράμμασιν ἃ οὐκ ἦν πᾶσι γνώριμα, *with the Inſcriptions in the Temples written in the Ammunean letters, which are known to few: Literæ Ammuneorum* (ſaith *Bochart. Geogr. ſac. p.* 2. *l.* 2. *c.* 17. *Bochartus*) *ſunt literæ Templorum, literæ in ſacris exceptæ.* For חמה is the Sun, thence חמן the *Temple of the Sun*, whom the *Phœnicians* worſhip'd as their principal Deity, under the name of *Beel-ſamen*, *the Lord of Heaven*. The ſame Author tells us out of *Diogenes Laertius*, of a Book of *Democritus*, περὶ τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἱερῶν γραμμάτων. by which it is evident that the *Babylonian* Prieſts had their ſacred Characters too: And of a Teſtimony of *Theodoret* of all the *Grecian* Temples, *Quæſt. in Gen.* 1. Ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς νάοις ἴδιοι τινὲς ἦσαν χαρακτῆρες γραμμάτων, οὓς ἱερατικοὺς προσηγόρευον, *That they had ſome peculiar Characters which were called ſacred.* But that learned Author thinks there is no neceſſity of underſtanding it peculiarly of the *Grecians*, becauſe the *Greek* Fathers called all Heathens by the name of *Greeks*: but if ſo, the teſtimony is the larger, and amounts to an univerſal teſtimony of the heathen Temples.

VIII. Neither was this only peculiar to them, if we believe ſome perſons of greater Learning than Judgment, who attribute this diſtinction of ſacred and vulgar Characters to the *Jews* as well as others, but without any probability of reaſon. For theſe learned men being ſtrongly poſſeſſed with the opinion of the modern *Jews* concerning the antiquity of the preſent *Hebrew* Characters, and finding themſelves preſſed not only with the teſtimony of ſome ancient *Rabbins*, but with the ſtronger evidence of the ancient *ſhekels* about *Solomon*'s time, inſcribed with the *Samaritan* letters, have at laſt found this Evaſion, that the *Samaritan* letters were in vulgar uſe; but the preſent Characters were then ſacred and not made common till after the time of the Captivity. But this ſeems to be a meer ſhift, found out by ſome modern *Jews*, and greedily embraced by their followers, becauſe thereby they are in hopes to evade the ſtrength of the contrary arguments, which otherwiſe they can find no probable ſolution of. And a meer ſhift it will appear to be, to any one that conſiders on how little ground of reaſon it ſtands: For none of thoſe reaſons which held for ſuch a diſtinction of Characters among the Heathens, can have any place among the *Jews*. For it was never any part of God's deſign to have the Law kept from the peoples view. Truth is never ſo fearful of being ſeen abroad; it is only falſhood that walks under diſguiſes, and muſt have its hiding-places to retreat to: Nay, God expreſly commanded it as a duty of all the *Jews*, to ſearch and ſtudy his Law, which they could not do, if it were locked up from them in an unknown Character. Did not God himſelf promulge it among the people of *Iſrael* by the miniſtry of *Moſes*? Did he not command it to be *as frontlets between their eyes*, and *ſigns upon their hands*: not that *Phylacteries* ſhould be made of the Law to wear, as the *Phariſees* interpreted it, and others from them have miſtaken; but that they ſhould have the Law in continual remembrance, as if it were always between their eyes, and engraven upon their hands. Again, if we ſuppoſe the Law to be among the people, but in the vulgar character, I would fain know, what ſanctity, majeſty, and authority there was in that character more than in the words and matter? and if there were, how comes the vulgar uſe of it to be no where forbidden? and how durſt *Ezra*, as is ſuppoſed, after the Captivity, prophane ſo ſacred a thing by expoſing it to common uſe? But granting them yet further, that it was lawful, but not uſeful, to make uſe of that ſacred Character; I demand then how comes that diſuſe to continue ſo punctually till the time of *Ezra*, and that it ſhould never be divulged before? when there was ſo great reaſon to make it common, ſince the ſquare letters are leſs operoſe, more expedite and facile, than the *Samaritan*, which is, when time ſerves, uſed as a plea for their great antiquity. But yielding yet more, that the ſacred Character was only uſed for the authentic copy of the Law, which was to decide all differences of other copies (which ſome run to as their laſt ſhift) I appeal to any man's reaſon, whether this be not the moſt improbable of all? For how could ſuch a copy be the judge of all others, which could not be read or underſtood by thoſe who appealed to it? Or was the knowledge and reading of this Character peculiar to the High-Prieſt, and conveyed down as a *Cabala* from one to another? but how many incongruities would follow hence, in caſe one High-Prieſt ſhould die before his Son was capable of underſtanding the Letters, and ſo that ſacred Treaſure muſt needs be loſt;

Exod. 13. 16.
Deut. 6. 8.

loſt; or had they it all by inſpiration, and underſtood the ſacred Character by *Urim* and *Thummim*? Thus every way, this opinion among the *Jews* is preſſed with inconveniences, but it was moſt ſuitable to the heathen Prieſts to maintain a *Meum* and *Tuum* between their own Character and the vulgar. For hereby they prohibited all prying into their myſteries by any, but thoſe who had the ſame intereſt with themſelves, and therefore were unlikely to diſcover any thing that might leſſen their reputation. Whereas, had there been nothing but truth in their Records, or that truth had been for their intereſt, what need had there been of ſo great reſervedneſs and privacy? but when the diſcovery of truth would undeceive the world, it was their intereſt to lock it up, and to give out ſuch things to the vulgar, which might advance themſelves and pleaſe them; which artifices of theirs give no ſmall ground to queſtion the credibility of their Hiſtories.

IX. Eſpecially if we add what we promiſed in the laſt place, to ſhew the want of credibility in the report of ancient times among them, which was not only defectiveneſs, and uncertainty, but apparent partiality to themſelves, and inconſiſtency with each other. How evident is it in all theſe Nations we have ſpoken to, how much they ſtrive to inhance the reputation of their own Nation, and to that end blend the Hiſtory of other Nations with their own, to make theirs ſeem the greater? How much do the *Ægyptians* tell us of the excellency of their ancient Laws and Government? and yet how evident is it, from their own Hiſtories, that no ſuch Laws were obſerved by their Kings as they ſpeak of? Can we think that ſuch Kings as *Chemmis* and the reſt of them, who built thoſe vaſt ſtructures of the Pyramids, and employed Myriads of men for ſo many years for the doing of them, would be content to be ſo dieted by their Laws, as *Hecatæus* and *Diodorus* tell us they were to be? Nay it ſeems to be very ſuſpicious, that the great enterprizes of their famous *Seſooſis* are meerly fabulous; and ſome think, an attributing to themſelves, what was done by the *Aſſyrian* Emperor in his time. By which we may gueſs, what to think of the great conqueſts of *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, and their ſubduing almoſt the whole world to them. And it is moſt evident how partial the *Ægyptians* are in diſſembling their greateſt loſſes; as is clear in the ſtory of the conqueſt of *Pharaoh Necho* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, Jer. 46. 12. of which there is not the leaſt mention in *Herodotus* or *Diodorus*. But on the contrary, *Herodotus* tells us this *Necos*, as he calls him, conquered the *Syrians* at *Magdalos*, and the ſtory of *Vaphres* and *Amaſis* in him ſeems to be only a diſguiſe of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s conqueſt; only leſt men ſhould think them conquered by a Foreigner, they make *Amaſis* to be an *Ægyptian Plebeian*. Again, what a vaſt number of Cities doth *Diodorus* tell us of, that were in *Ægypt* in their eldeſt times? no leſs than 18000, when yet himſelf confeſſeth in the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*, there were reckoned but ſomewhat above 3000 Cities, and then *Ægypt* was the moſt populous that ever it had been. How probable doth this ſound, that in thoſe eldeſt times ſuch vaſt multitudes of Cities ſhould be erected? But the truth is, it is not unſuitable to their opinion of the production of the firſt men; which were cauſed, they ſay, by the heat of the Sun, and the mud of *Nilus*; and it is certain then they might be the moſt populous Nation in the world: for there could be no defect as to either efficient or material cauſe, there being mud enough to produce Myriads, and the Sun hot enough to impregnate it. The partiality of other Nations hath been already diſcourſed of in our paſſage; and

Herodot. lib. 2.

Diodor. l. 1.

and ſo likewiſe hath their mutual repugnancy to, and inconſiſtency with, each other: Which yet might be more fully manifeſted from the contradictions in reference to the Ægyptian Hiſtory between *Manetho, Herodotus, Diodorus, Dicæarchus, Eratoſthenes*, and all who have ſpoken of it: as to the *Aſſyrian* Empire between *Herodotus, Diodorus*, and *Julius Africanus*: as to the *Perſian* Empire between *Herodotus* and *Cteſias*, and thoſe in no inconſiderable things, as is evident in *Photius* his *Excerpta* out of him. Among the *Grecians* we have already diſcover'd it as to their Hiſtory and Geography; and if we ſhould enter into their *Theology*, and the Hiſtory of that, we ſhould find their other differences inconſiderable, if compared with theſe. Of which we may partly make a conjecture by the incredible ſpite that is born by the graveſt *Greek* Authors, as *Strabo, Plutarch*, and others, towards *Euhemerus Siculus*, for offering to deliver the hiſtory of *Jupiter*, which he ſaith, he tranſcribed from the *Golden Pillar in the Temple of* Jupiter Triphyllius *in* Panchotis.

But I ſuppoſe enough hath been diſcovered already, to prove that there is no credibility in any of thoſe Heathen Hiſtories, which pretend to give an account of ancient times; there being in all of them ſo much defect and inſufficiency, ſo great uncertainty and confuſion, ſo much partiality and inconſiſtency with each other. It remains now that I proceed to demonſtrate the credibility of that account of ancient times, which is reported in the Sacred Scriptures, which will be the ſecond part of our Task.

A-Fr.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

BOOK II. 32.25

CHAP. I.

The certainty of the Writings of *Moſes.*

In order to the proving the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, ſeveral Hypotheſes laid down. I. *The firſt concerns the reaſonableneſs of preſerving the ancient Hiſtory of the World in ſome certain Records, from the importance of the things,* II. *and the inconveniencies of meer Tradition or conſtant Revelation.* III. *The ſecond concerns the certainty that the Records under* Moſes *his name, were undoubtedly his. The certainty of a matter of fact enquired into in general, and proved as to particular,* IV. *by univerſal conſent,* V. *and ſettling a Common-wealth upon his Laws.* VI, VII. *The impoſſibility of an Impoſtor as to the Writings of* Moſes *demonſtrated. The pleas to the contrary largely anſwered.*

I. HAVING ſufficiently demonſtrated the want of credibility in the account of the ancient times, given by thoſe Nations who have made the greateſt pretence to Learning and Antiquity in the World, we now proceed to evince the credibility and certainty of that account which is given us in Sacred Scriptures: In order to which I ſhall premiſe theſe following Hypotheſes.

Hypoth. 1. *Firſt, It ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that an account of things ſo concerning and remarkable, ſhou'd not be always left to the uncertainty of an Oral Tradition; but ſhou'd be timely entred into certain Records, to be preſerv'd to the memory of poſterity.* For it being of concernment to the World, in order to the Eſtabliſhment of Belief, as to future things, to be ſettled in the Belief, that all things paſt were manag'd by Divine Providence; there muſt be certain Records of former Ages, or elſe the mind of Man will be perpetually hovering in the greateſt uncertainties: Eſpecially where there is ſuch a mutual dependance and concatenation of one thing with another, as there is in all the Scripture-hiſtory. For take away but any one of the main Foundations of the *Moſaical* Hiſtory, all the Superſtructure will be exceedingly weakned, if it doth not fall quite to the ground. For Man's obligation to Obedience unto GOD, doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe his Original to be from him; his hearkning to any propoſals of favour from GOD, doth ſuppoſe his Apoſtaſie and Fall; GOD's deſigning to ſhew mercy and favour to fallen Man, doth ſuppoſe that there muſt be ſome way whereby the Great Creator muſt reveal himſelf as to the Conditions on which fallen Man may expect a recovery; the revealing of theſe Conditions in ſuch a way whereon a ſuſpicious (becauſe guilty) Creature may firmly rely, doth ſuppoſe ſo certain a recording of them, as may be leaſt liable to any ſuſpicion of impoſture or deceit. For altho' nothing elſe be in it ſelf neceſſary from God to Man, in order to his Salvation, but the bare revealing in a certain way the Terms on which he muſt expect it; yet conſidering the unbounded Nature of Divine Goodneſs, reſpecting not only the good of ſome particular Perſons, but of the whole Society of Mankind, it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon that ſuch a Revelation ſhou'd be ſo propounded, as might be with equal certainty convey'd to the community of Mankind. Which cou'd not with any ſuch evidence of credibility be done by private and particular Revelations (which give ſatisfaction only to the inward Senſes of the partakers of them) as by a public recording of the matters of Divine Revelation by ſuch a Perſon who is enabled to give the World all reaſonable ſatisfaction, that what he did was not of any private deſign of his own head; but that he was deputed to it by no leſs than Divine Authority. And therefore it ſtands to the higheſt reaſon, that where Divine Revelation is neceſſary for the certain requiring of Aſſent, the matter to be believ'd ſhou'd have a certain uniform conveyance to Mens minds, rather than that perpetually new Revelations ſhou'd be requir'd for the making known of thoſe things; which being once recorded, are not liable to ſo many impoſtures, as the other way might have been under pretended Revelations. For then Men are not put to a continual Trial of every Perſon pretending Divine Revelation, as to the evidences which he brings of Divine Authority, but the great matters of concernment being already recorded and atteſted by all rational evidence as to the truth of the things, their minds therein reſt ſatisfy'd without being under a continual heſitancy, leſt the Revelation of one ſhou'd contradict another.

II. For ſuppoſing that God had left the matters of Divine Revelation unrecorded at all, but left them to be diſcover'd in every Age by a Spirit of Prophecy, by ſuch a multitude as might be ſufficient to inform the World of the truth of the things; we cannot but conceive that an innumerable company of croaking *Enthuſiaſts* wou'd be continually pretending Commiſſions from Heaven, by which the minds of Men wou'd be left in continual diſtraction, becauſe they wou'd have no certain infallible Rules given them, whereby to difference the good and evil Spirit from each other. But now ſuppoſing God to inſpire ſome particular Perſons, not only to reveal, but to record Divine Truths, then whatever evidences can be brought atteſting a Divine Revelation in them, will likewiſe prove the undoubted certainty and infallibility of thoſe Writings, it being impoſſible that Perſons employ'd by a God of truth, ſhou'd make it their deſign to impoſe upon the World; which gives us a rational account, why the wiſe God did not ſuffer the Hiſtory of the World to lie ſtill unrecorded, but made choice of ſuch a Perſon to record it, who gave abundant evidence to the World that he acted no private deſign, but was peculiarly employ'd by God himſelf for the doing of it, as will appear afterwards. Beſides, we find by our former Diſcourſe, how liable the moſt certain Tradition is to be corrupted in progreſs of time, where there are no ſtanding Records, tho' it were at firſt deliver'd by Perſons of undoubted credit. For we have no reaſon to doubt, but that the Tradition of the old World, the Flood and the conſequences of it, with the nature and worſhip of the true God, were at firſt ſpread over the greateſt part of the World in its firſt Plantations; yet we ſee how ſoon for want of certain conveyance, all the ancient Tradition was corrupted and abus'd into the greateſt Idolatry. Which might be leſs wonder'd at, had it been only in thoſe parts which were furtheſt remote from the ſeat of thoſe grand Tranſactions; but thus we find it was even among thoſe Families who had the neareſt reſidence to the place of them, and among thoſe Perſons who were not far of in a lineal deſcent from the Perſons mainly concern'd in them; as is moſt evident in the Family out of which *Abraham* came (who Joſh.24.2. was himſelf the tenth from *Noah*) yet of them it is ſaid, *That they ſerved other Gods*. How unlikely then was it, that this Tradition ſhou'd be afterwards preſerv'd entire, when the People God had peculiarly choſen to himſelf, were ſo mixed among the *Ægyptians*, and ſo prone to the Idolatries of the Nations round about them, and that even after God had given them a written Law atteſted with the greateſt Miracles? What wou'd they have done then, had they never been brought forth out of *Ægypt* by ſuch Signs and Wonders, and had no certain Records left to preſerve the memory of former Ages? Thus we ſee how much it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that ſo memorable things ſhou'd be digeſted into Sacred Records.

Hypoth. 2. Secondly, *We have as great certainty that* Moſes *was the Author of the Records going under his name, as we can have of any matter of fact done at ſo great a diſtance of time from us.* We are to conſider that there are two very diſtinct queſtions to be thought of, concerning a Divine Revelation, to any Perſon at a conſiderable diſtance of time from us; and thoſe are what evidences can be given that the matters recorded are of a true Divine Revelation; and what evidence we have of the truth of the matter of fact, that ſuch things were recorded by ſuch Perſons. They who do not carefully diſtinguiſh between theſe two Queſtions, will ſoon run themſelves into an inextricable Labyrinth, when they either ſeek to underſtand themſelves, or explain to others the grounds on which they believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. The firſt ſtep in order to which, muſt be the proving the undoubted certainty of the matter of fact, or the truth of the Hiſtory, that ſuch Perſons were really exiſtent, and did either do or record the things we ſpeak of: After this ſucceeds the other, to prove not only the real exiſtence of the things, but that the Perſons who recorded the things were aſſiſted by an Infallible Spirit; then there can be no reaſon at all to doubt, but thoſe Records are the Word of God. The firſt of theſe, is, that which at preſent we enquire after, the certainty of the matter of fact, that the Records under the name of *Moſes* were undoubtedly his. And here it will be moſt unreaſonable for any to ſeek for further evidence and demonſtration of it, than the matter to be prov'd is capable of. But if they ſhou'd, I ſuppoſe we have ſufficient reaſon to demonſtrate the folly of ſuch a demand, and that on theſe accouuts.

1. Whoever yet undertook to bring matters of fact into Mathematical demonſtrations, or thought he had ground to queſtion the certainty of any thing that was not prov'd in a Mathematical way to him? who wou'd ever undertake that *Archimedes* was kill'd at *Syracuſe*, by any of the Demonſtrations he was then about? or that *Euclide* was the undoubted Author of the *Geometry* under his name? or do Men queſtion theſe things for want of ſuch Demonſtrations? Yet this is all we at preſent deſire, only the ſame liberty here which is us'd in any thing of a like nature.

2. I demand of the Perſon who denies this Moral certainty to be ſuffi-

cient for an aſſent, whether he doth queſtion every thing in the World, which he was not preſent at the doing of himſelf? If he be peremptorily reſolv'd to believe nothing but what he ſees, he is fit for nothing but a Voyage to *Anticyræ*, or to be ſoundly purg'd with *Hellebore*, to free him from thoſe cloudy humours that make him ſuſpect the whole World to be an impoſture. But we cannot ſuppoſe any Man ſo deſtitute of Reaſon, as to queſtion the truth of every matter of fact which he doth not ſee himſelf; if he doth then firmly believe any thing, there muſt be ſuppos'd ſufficient grounds to induce him to ſuch a belief. And then what ground can there be to queſtion the certainty of ſuch things, which have as great evidence as any of thoſe things have, which he moſt firmly believes? and this is all we deſire from him.

3. Do we not ſee that the moſt concerning and weighty actions of Mens lives, are built on no other foundation than this Moral certainty? yet Men do not in the leaſt queſtion the truth of the thing they rely upon: As is moſt evident in all Titles to Eſtates deriv'd from Anceſtors, either by Donation or Purchaſe: In all Trading, which go's upon the Moral certainty, that there are ſuch places as the *Indies*, or *France* or *Spain*, &c. In all Journeyings, that there is ſuch a place, as that I am going to, and this is the way thither; for theſe we have but this Moral certainty; for the contrary to both theſe are poſſible, and the affirmatives are indemonſtrable. In eating and drinking there is a poſſibility of being poiſoned by every bit of meat, or drop of drink; do we therefore continually doubt, whether we ſhall be ſo or no? Chiefly this is ſeen in all natural affection and piety in Children towards Parents, which undoubtedly ſuppoſe the truth of that, which it was impoſſible they cou'd be witneſſes of themſelves, their coming out of their Mothers wombs. And doth any one think this ſufficient ground to queſtion his Mother, becauſe the contrary is impoſſible to be demonſtrated to him? In ſhort then, either we muſt deſtroy all Hiſtorical Faith out of the World, and believe nothing (tho' never ſo much atteſted) but what we ſee our ſelves, or elſe we muſt acknowledge, that a Moral certainty is a ſufficient foundation for an undoubted aſſent, not ſuch a one *cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum*, but ſuch a one *cui non ſubeſt dubium*, *i. e.* an *Aſſent undoubted*, tho' not infallible. By which we ſee what little reaſon the *Atheiſt* on one ſide can have to queſtion the truth of the Scriptures, as to the Hiſtory of it; and what little ground the *Papiſts* on the other ſide have to make a pretence of the neceſſity of Infallibility, as to the propoſal of ſuch things where Moral certainty is ſufficient, that is, to the matter of fact.

IV. Which I now come to prove, as to the ſubject in hand; *viz.* That the Writings of *Moſes* are undoubtedly his. Which I prove by a twofold Argument: 1. *An univerſal conſent of Perſons, who were beſt able to know the truth of the things in queſtion.* 2. *The ſettling of a Commonwealth upon the Laws delivered by* Moſes. 1. The univerſal conſent of Perſons moſt capable of judging in the caſe in hand. I know nothing the moſt ſcupulous and inquiſitive mind can poſſibly deſire in order to ſatisfaction, concerning any matter of fact, beyond an Univerſal Conſent of ſuch Perſons who have a greater capacity of knowing the truth of it than we can have: And thoſe are all ſuch Perſons who have liv'd neareſt thoſe times when the things were done, and have beſt underſtood the Affairs of the times, when the things were pretended to be done. Can we poſſibly conceive that among the People of the *Jews*, who were ſo exceedingly

ceedingly prone to tranſgreſs the Law of *Moſes*, and to fall into Idolatry, but if there had been any the leaſt ſuſpicion of any falſity or impoſture in the Writings of *Moſes*, the ring-leaders of their revolts wou'd have ſufficiently promulged it among them, as the moſt plauſible plea to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God? Can we think that a Nation and Religion ſo maligned as the *Jewiſh* were, cou'd have eſcaped diſcovery, if there had been any deceit in it, when ſo many lay in wait continually to expoſe them to all contumelies imaginable? Nay, among themſelves in their frequent Apoſtaſies, and occaſions given for ſuch a pretence, how comes this to be never heard of, nor in the leaſt queſtioned, whether the Law was undoubtedly of *Moſes* his writing or no? What an excellent plea wou'd this have been for *Jeroboam*'s Calves in *Dan* and *Bethel*: for the *Samaritans* Temple on Mount *Gerizim*, cou'd any the leaſt ſuſpicion have been rais'd among them, concerning the authenticneſs of the fundamental Records of the *Jewiſh* Commonwealth? And which is moſt obſervable, the *Jews* who were a people ſtrangely ſuſpicious and incredulous, while they were fed and cloathed by Miracles, yet cou'd never find ground to queſtion this. Nay, and *Moſes* himſelf, we plainly ſee, was hugely envied by many of the *Iſraelites* even in the Wilderneſs, as is evident in the conſpiracy of *Corah* and his complices, and that on this very ground, That he took too much upon him; how unlikely then is it, that amidſt ſo many enemies he ſhou'd dare to venture any thing into public Records, which was not moſt undoubtedly true; or undertake to preſcribe a Law to oblige the People to poſterity? Or that after his own Age any thing ſhou'd come out under his name, which wou'd not be preſently detected by the Emulators of his glory? What then, is the thing it ſelf incredible? ſurely not, that *Moſes* ſhou'd write the Records we ſpeak of. Were not they able to underſtand the truth of it? What? not thoſe who were in the ſame Age, and convey'd it down by a certain Tradition to poſterity? Or did not the *Iſraelites* all conſtantly believe it? What? not they, who wou'd ſooner part with their Lives and Fortunes, than admit any variation or alteration as to their Law?

V. Well, but if we ſhou'd ſuppoſe the whole *Jewiſh* Nation partial to themſelves, and that out of honor to the memory of ſo great a Perſon as *Moſes*, they ſhou'd attribute their ancient Laws and Records to him: Which is all that Infidelity it ſelf can imagine in this caſe; yet this cannot be with any ſhadow of Reaſon pretended. For,

1. Who were thoſe Perſons, who did give out this Law to the *Jews* under *Moſes* his name? Certainly they, who undertake to contradict that which is receiv'd by common conſent, muſt bring ſtronger and clearer Evidence, than that on which that conſent is grounded; or elſe their Exceptions deſerve to be rejected with the higheſt indignation. What Proof can be then brought, that not only the *Jewiſh* Nation, but the whole Chriſtian World hath been ſo lamentably befool'd to believe thoſe things with an undoubted aſſent, which are only the contrivances of ſome cunning Men?

2. At what time could theſe things be contriv'd? Either while the memory of *Moſes* and his actions were remaining, or afterwards. Firſt, How cou'd it poſſibly be, when his memory was remaining? for then all things were ſo freſh in their memories, that it was impoſſible a thing of this univerſal nature cou'd be forged of him. If after, then I demand, whether the People had obſerv'd the Law of *Moſes* before or no? if

not, then they muſt certainly know it at the time of its promulgation to be counterfeit; for had it been from *Moſes*, it wou'd have been obſerv'd before their times; if it was obſerv'd before then either continually down from the time of *Moſes*, or not? If continually down, then it was of *Moſes* his doing, if we ſuppoſe him to have had that Authority among the People, which the Objection ſuppoſeth; if not, then ſtill the nearer *Moſes* his time, the more difficult ſuch a counterfeiting cou'd be; becauſe the Conſtitutions which *Moſes* had left among them, wou'd have remain'd in their memories, whereby they wou'd eaſily reject all pretences and counterfeits.

3. How can we conceive the Nation of the *Jews* wou'd have ever embraced ſuch a Law, had it not been of *Moſes* his enacting among them in that ſtate of time when he did? For then the People were in fitteſt capacity to receive a Law, being grown a great People, and therefore neceſſary to have Laws; newly delivered from bondage, and therefore wanting Laws of their own; and entring into a ſettled ſtate of Commonwealth, which was the moſt proper ſeaſon of giving Laws.

VI. Theſe conſiderations make it ſo clear, that it is almoſt impoſſible to conceive the Nation of the *Jews* cou'd have their Laws given to them but at the time of their being in the Wilderneſs, before they were ſettled in *Canaan*. For ſuppoſe we at preſent, to gratify ſo far the Objection, that theſe Laws were brought forth long after the conſtitution of the Government and the National ſettlement, under *Moſes* his name; how improbable, nay how impoſſible is it to alter the fundamental Laws of a Nation after long ſettlement? what confuſion of intereſts doth this bring? what diſturbance among all ſorts of People, who muſt be diſſeis'd of their rights and brought to ſuch ſtrange unwonted cuſtoms, ſo ſeemingly againſt their intereſts, as many of the Conſtitutions among the *Jews* were? For can we imagine, that a People always devoted to their own intereſt, wou'd after it had been quietly ſettled in their Land, by Conſtitutions after the cuſtoms of other Nations, preſently under a pretence of a copy of Laws found (that were pretended to be given by one in former Ages of great eſteem, call'd *Moſes*) throw open all their former incloſures, and part with their former Laws, for theſe of which they have no evidence, but the words of thoſe that told it them? We have a clear Inſtance for this among the *Romans*; altho' there were great evidence given of the undoubted certainty, that the Books found in *Numa*'s grave by *Petilius* were his, yet becauſe they were adjudg'd by the Senate to be againſt the preſent Laws, they were without further enquiry adjudg'd to be burnt. Was not here the greateſt likelihood that might be, that theſe ſhou'd have taken place among the *Romans*, for the great veneration for wiſdom which *Numa* was in among them, and the great evidence that theſe were certain remainders of his, wherein he gave a true account of the ſuperſtitions in uſe among them? yet leſt the ſtate ſhou'd be unſettled by it, they were prohibited ſo much as a public view, when the *Prætor* had ſworn they were againſt the eſtabliſhed Laws. Can we then conceive the *Jewiſh* Nation wou'd have embraced ſo burdenſome and ceremonious a Law as *Moſes*'s was, had it been brought among them in ſuch a way as the Books of *Numa*, tho' with all imaginable evidence, that it was undoubtedly his, eſpecially when they were engag'd to the obſervation of ſome Laws or Cuſtoms already, by which their Commonwealth had been eſtabliſh'd? And withal theſe Laws of *Moſes* ſeeming ſo much againſt the intereſt and good husbandry of a Nation, as all the neighbour

Nations thought, who for that accuſed them to be an idle and ſlothful People, as they judged by their reſting wholly one Day in ſeven, the great and many ſolemn Faſts they had, the repairing of all the Males to *Jeruſalem* thrice a Year; the Sabbatical Years, Years of *Jubilee*, &c. Theſe things were apparently againſt the intereſt of ſuch a Nation, whoſe great ſubſiſtence was upon paſturage and agriculture. So that it is evident theſe Laws reſpected not the outward intereſt of the Nation, and ſo cou'd not be the contrivance of any Politicians among them, but did immediately aim at the honor of the God whom they ſerv'd, for whom they were to part even with their civil intereſts: The doing of which by a People generally taken notice of for a particular love of their own concernments, is an impregnable argument theſe Laws cou'd not take place among them, had they not been given by *Moſes* at the time of their unſettlement, and that their future ſettlement did depend upon their preſent obſervation of them; which is an evidence too that they cou'd be of no leſs than Divine original: Which was more than I was to prove at preſent.

VII. Were not theſe Writings undoubtedly *Moſes*'s; whence ſhou'd the neighbour Nations about the *Jews*, notwithſtanding the hatred of the *Jewiſh* Religion, retain ſo venerable an opinion of the wiſdom of *Moſes*? The *Ægyptians* accounted him one of their *Prieſts* (which notes the eſteem they had of his learning) as appears by the teſtimonies produced out of *Chæremon* and *Manetho* by *Joſephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaks of him with great reſpect among the famous Legiſlators, and ſo doth *Strabo*, who ſpeaks in commendation of the Religion eſtabliſh'd by him. The teſtimony of *Longinus* is ſufficiently known, that *Moſes was no man of any vulgar wit* (οὐχ ὁ τυχὼν ἀνὴρ.) *Chalcidius* calls him *ſapientiſſimus Moſes* (altho' I muſt not diſſemble that *Chalcidius* hath been, I think, undeſervedly reckoned among heathen Writers, tho' he comments on *Plato*'s *Timæus*, it being moſt probable that he was a Chriſtian *Platoniſt*, which might more probably make *Vaninus* call him *circumforaneum blateronem*) but tho' we exempt *Chalcidius* out of the number of thoſe Heathens, who have born teſtimony to the wiſdom of *Moſes*, yet there are number enough beſides him produced by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Cyril*, and others, whoſe evidence is clear and full to make us undoubtedly believe, that there cou'd never have been ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition concerning the Writings and Laws of *Moſes*, had they not been certainly his, and convey'd down in a continual ſucceſſion from his time to our preſent age. Which will be yet more clear, if we conſider in the ſecond place, That the National Conſtitution and ſettlement of the *Jews*, did depend on the truth of the Laws and Writing of *Moſes*. Can we have more undoubted evidence, that there were ſuch Perſons as *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and *Numa*, and that the Laws bearing their names were theirs, than the Hiſtory of the ſeveral Commonwealths of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Rome*, who were governed by thoſe Laws? When Writings are not of general concernment, that may be more eaſily counterfeited; but when they concern the Right, Privileges, and Government of a Nation, there will be enough whoſe intereſt will lead them to prevent impoſtures. It is no eaſy matter to forge a *Magna Charta*, and to invent Laws; Men's caution and prudence is never ſo quick-ſighted as in matters which concern their Eſtates and Freeholds. The general intereſt of Men lies contrary to ſuch impoſtures, and therefore they will prevent their obtaining among them. Now the Laws of *Moſes* are incorporated into the very

Joſeph. c. App. l. 1.
Diod. l. 1.
Strab. Geograph. 16.

Longin. de ſublim.

V. Voſſ. de Idol. l. 2. c. 45.

V. Grot. de Ver. Relig. Chr. l. 2.

very Republic of the *Jews*, and their Subſiſtence and Government depends upon them, their Religion and Laws are ſo interwoven one with the other, that one cannot be broken off from the other. Their Right to their temporal poſſeſſions in the land of *Canaan* depends on their owning the Sovereignty of GOD who gave them to them; and on the truth of the Hiſtory recorded by *Moſes* concerning the Promiſes made to the Patriarchs. So that on that account it was impoſſible thoſe Laws ſhou'd be counterfeit on which the welfare of a Nation depended, and according to which they were governed ever ſince they were a Nation. So that I ſhall now take it to be ſufficiently proved, that the Writings under the name of *Moſes* were undoubtedly his; for none, who acknowledge the Laws to have been his, can have the face to deny the Hiſtory, there being ſo neceſſary a connexion between them; and the Book of *Geneſis* being nothing elſe but a general and very neceſſary introduction to that which follows. I deny not but the Hiſtory of *Moſes* might, according to the Tradition of the *Jews*, and the Belief of others, be reviſed by *Ezra*, or the Men of the great Synagogue after the *Jew*'s return from Captivity, as appears by the names of Places, and other paſſages not ſuitable to the time of *Moſes*; but I utterly deny that the *Pentateuch* was not of *Moſes* his penning, or that it was only a Collection out of the Diaries and Annals of the Nation: For throughout the Scripture the very hiſtorical paſſages are attributed to *Moſes*, and in all probability the *Samaritan Pentateuch* bears date before the Captivity; by which it ſtill appears that thoſe Books are truly the Books of *Moſes*.

32:2: U

CHAP. II.

Moſes his certain knowledge of what he writ.

I. *The third Hypotheſis concerns the certainty of the matter of* Moſes *his Hiſtory, that gradually proved: Firſt,* Moſes *his knowledge cleared, by his education, and experience, and certain information.* II. *His education in the wiſdom of* Ægypt; *what that was.* III. *The old* Ægyptian *learning enquired into;* IV. *the conveniences for it.* V. *Of the* Ægyptian *Prieſts,* Moſes *reckoned among them for his knowledge.* VI. *The Mathematical, Natural, Divine, and Moral learning of* Ægypt. VII. *Their Political wiſdom moſt conſiderable.* VIII. *The advantage of* Moſes *above the Greek Philoſophers, as to wiſdom and reaſon.* Moſes *himſelf an eye-witneſs of moſt of his hiſtory:* IX. *The certain uninterrupted tradition of the other part among the* Jews, *manifeſted by rational evidence.*

Having thus far cleared our way, we come to the third *Hypotheſis*, which is, *There are as manifeſt proofs of the undoubted truth and certainty of the Hiſtory recorded by* Moſes, *as any can be given concerning any thing which we yield the firmeſt aſſent unto.* Here it muſt be conſidered, that we proceed in a way of rational evidence to prove the truth of the thing in hand, as to which, if in the judgment of impartial Perſons the I. Hypoth. 3.

arguments produced be ſtrong enough to convince an unbyaſſed mind: It is not material, whether every wrangling *Atheiſt* will ſit down contented with them. For uſually perſons of that inclination, rather than judgment, are more reſolved againſt light than inquiſitive after it, and rather ſeek to ſtop the chinks at which any light might come in, than open the Windows for the free and cheerful entertainment of it. It will certainly be ſufficient to make it appear, that no Man can deny the truth of that part of Scripture which we are now ſpeaking of, without offering manifeſt violence to his own faculties, and making it appear to the World, that he is one wholly forſaken of his own Reaſon: which will be ſatisfactorily done, if we can clear theſe things: *Firſt*, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be ignorant of the things he undertook to write of, and ſo be deceived himſelf. *Secondly*, That it was utterly impoſſible he ſhou'd have any deſign in deceiving others in reporting it. *Thirdly*, That it is certain from all rational evidence, that he hath not deceiv'd the World, but that his Hiſtory is undoubtedly true. *Firſt*, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceiv'd himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he writ of. Two things are requiſitive to prevent a Man's being deceiv'd himſelf. *Firſt*, That he be a perſon of more than ordinary judgment, Wiſdom, and Knowledge. *Secondly*, That he have ſufficient information concerning the things he undertakes to write of. If either of theſe two be wanting, it is poſſible for a Man of integrity to be deceiv'd; for an honeſt Heart hath not always an *Urim* and *Thummim* upon it; nor is Fidelity always furniſh'd with the acuteſt intellectuals. The ſimplicity of the Dove is as liable to be deceiv'd its ſelf, as the ſubtilty of the Serpent is to deceive others; but where the wiſdom of the Serpent is, to prevent being deceiv'd, and the Dove's innocency in not deceiving others, there are all the qualifications can be deſir'd in any one who undertakes only to tell the truth. *Firſt* then, that *Moſes* was a Perſon of a great Underſtanding, and ſufficiently qualify'd to put a difference between Truth and Falſhood, will appear, *Firſt*, from the ingenuity of his Education, *Secondly*, from the ripeneſs of his Judgment, and greatneſs of his Experience when he penned theſe things.

Firſt, We begin with his education. And here we require at preſent no further aſſent to be given to what is reported concerning *Moſes* in Scripture, than what we give to *Plutarch*'s Lives, or any other relations concerning the actions of Perſons who lived in former Ages. Two things then we find recorded in Scripture concerning *Moſes* his Education; Heb. 11. 25. Act. 7. 22. *That he was brought up in the Court of* Ægypt, and *that he was skilled in all the learning of the* Ægyptians; and theſe Two will abundantly prove the ingenuity of his Education, *viz.* That he was a Perſon both converſant in civil Affairs, and acquainted with the abſtruſer parts of all the *Ægyptian* Wiſdom.

II. And I confeſs there is nothing to me which doth advance ſo much the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning, as that the Spirit of GOD in Scripture ſhou'd take ſo much Notice of it, as to ſet forth a Perſon (otherwiſe renowned for greater accompliſhments) by his skill in this. For if it be below the wiſdom of any ordinary Perſon, to ſet forth a Perſon by that which in its ſelf is no matter of commendation; how much leſs can we imagine it of that infinite wiſdom which inſpired *Stephen* in that Apology which he makes for himſelf againſt the *Libertines*, who charged him with contempt of *Moſes* and the Law? And therefore certainly this was ſome very obſervable thing, which was brought in as a ſingular commendation of *Moſes*, by that perſon whoſe deſign was to make it appear how high an eſteem he had of him. And hence it appears that Learning is not only in its ſelf a great accompliſhment of human nature, but that it ought to be looked upon with veneration, even in thoſe who have excellencies of a higher nature to commend them. If a Pearl retains its excellency when it lies upon a dunghil, it can certainly loſe nothing of its luſtre by being ſet in a Crown of gold; if Learning be commendable in an *Ægyptian*, it is no leſs in *Moſes*, where it is enamell'd with more noble perfections, than of it ſelf it can reach unto. All the queſtion is, Whether the ancient Learning of the *Ægyptians* was ſuch as might be ſuppos'd to improve the reaſon and Underſtanding of Men to ſuch an height, as thereby to make them more capable of putting a difference between Truth and Falſhood? Whether it were ſuch an overflowing *Nilus* as wou'd enrich the Underſtandings of all thoſe who were in a capacity to receive its Streams? The truth is, there want not grounds of ſuſpicion, that the old *Ægyptian* Learning was not of that elevation which the preſent diſtance of our Age makes us apt to think it was. And a learned Man hath in a ſet Diſcourſe endeavoured to ſhew the great defects that there were in it: Neither can it, I think, be deny'd, but according to the reports we have now concerning it, ſome parts of their Learning were frivolous, others obſcure, a great deal Magical, and the reſt ſhort of that improvement, which the acceſſion of the parts and induſtry of after Ages gave unto it. But yet it is again as evident, that ſome parts of Learning were invented by the *Ægyptians*, others much improved, and that the *Greeks* did at firſt ſet up with the ſtock they borrow'd out of *Ægypt*, and that Learning chiefly flouriſh'd there, when there was (I had almoſt ſaid) an *Ægyptian* darkneſs of Ignorance overſpreading the face of *Greece* as well as other Nations.

Conring. de Hermet. Medic. c. 10, 11, 12.

III. Which will appear by theſe conſiderations, The great antiquity of their repute for Learning, the great advantages they had for promoting it, and the parts of Learning moſt in uſe among them. This tho' it may ſeem a digreſſion here, will yet tend to promote our deſign, by ſhewing thereby how qualify'd and accompliſh'd *Moſes* was to deliver to the World an Hiſtory of ancient times. If we believe *Macrobius*, there was no people in the World cou'd vye for Learning with the *Ægyptians*, who makes *Ægypt* in one place, *the Mother of all Arts*, and in another, the *Ægyptians*, *omnium Philoſophiæ diſciplinarum parentes*, *The fathers of all the Philoſophic Sciences*; he derives elſewhere the original of all *Aſtronomy* from them, *quos conſtat primos omnium cœlum metiri, & ſcrutari auſos*: tho' it be more probable that the Nativity even of Aſtronomy it ſelf was firſt calculated by the *Chaldæans*, from whom it was convey'd to the *Ægyptians*. He likewiſe appropriates all divine knowledge to them, where he ſaith they were *Soli rerum divinarum conſcii*, and after calls *Ægypt divinarum omnium diſciplinarum compotem*. It is ſufficiently notorious what great repute the *Ægyptian* Learning hath been in, with ſome in our latter times, in that our Chymiſts look upon it as the greateſt honour to their profeſſion, that they think they can claim kindred of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, and derive the pedigree of their Chymiſtry from the old *Ægyptian Hermes*. But that vain pretence is ſufficiently refuted by the fore-mentioned learned Man *Conringius*, in his Tract on this ſubject, *de Hermetica Medicina*. *Franciſcus Patricius* profeſſeth himſelf ſo great an admirer of the old *Ægyptian* Learning, that he thought it wou'd be no bad exchange, if the *Peripatetic* Philoſo-

Macrob. Saturn. l. 1. *cap.* 15. *in Somn. Scip. lib.* 1. *c.* 19.

Ibid. c. 21.

Id. Saturn. l. 1. *c.* 14. *l.* 7. *c.* 13.

phy were extruded, and the old *Ægyptian* received inſtead of it. But the World is now grown wiſer, than to receive his *Hermes Triſmegiſtus* for the Author of the old *Ægyptian* Philoſophy, the credit of his Author being for ever blaſted, and the doctrine contained in the Books under his name, manifeſted to be a mere *Cento*, a confus'd mixture of the *Chriſtian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* doctrine together. So that we cou'd hardly maintain the juſtneſs of the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning from any thing now extant of it; but yet we ſee no reaſon to queſtion it, eſpecially ſince it is ſo honourably ſpoken of in Sacred Writ, and ſeems in it to have been made the ſtandard and meaſure of humane Wiſdom. For which we have this obſervable teſtimony, that when the Wiſdom of *Solomon* is ſpoken of with the greateſt advantage and commendation, it is ſet forth with this character, *that it exceeded the wiſdom of all the children of the Eaſt Country, and all the wiſdom of* Ægypt. *1 King. 4. 29. 30, 31.* Whence it is moſt natural and eaſy to argue, That certainly their learning muſt be accounted the greateſt at that time in the World; or elſe it cou'd not have been inferred, that *Solomon* was wiſer than all men, becauſe his wiſdom excelled theirs, unleſs we ſuppoſe their wiſdom to have been the greateſt in that Age of the World, when the wiſdom of *the Græcians* (altho' in that time *Homer* is ſuppoſed to flouriſh) was not thought worthy the taking notice of. We ſee from hence then, as from an irrefragable teſtimony, that the wiſdom of the *Ægyptians* anciently was no trivial *Pedantry*, nor mere ſuperſtitious and Magical Rites, but that there was ſomething in it ſolid and ſubſtantial, or it had not been worth triumphing over by the wiſdom of *Solomon*: It being true of that, what *Lipſius* ſaith of the *Roman* Empire, *Quicquid dignum vinci videbatur, vicit; cætera non tam non potuit quam contempſit*; it was an argument of ſome great worth, that it was overtopp'd and conquer'd by it. *Lipſius de Magnitud. Rom. l. 1 c. 3.*

IV. Thus we ſee how juſt the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning is from teſtimony, and we ſhall find as great reaſon for it, when we conſider the great advantages the *Ægyptians* had for promoting of Learning among them. Two ways Men come to knowledge, either by Tradition from others, or by Obſervation of their own; what the *Ægyptians* had the firſt way, will be ſpoken to afterwards; we now conſider the latter of theſe. All Knowledge ariſing from Obſervation, muſt be either of thoſe Sciences which immediately conduce to the benefit of Men's lives, or ſuch whoſe end is to improve Men's rational faculties in the knowledge of things. The former neceſſity will put men upon the finding out, the latter require *ſeceſſum & otia*, freedom from other imployments, a mind addicted to them, and induſtry in the ſtudy of them, and a care to preſerve their inventions in them. *Vid. Ariſt. Metaph. 1. l. c. 1.* The ſtudy of *Geometry* among the *Ægyptians*, ow'd its original to Neceſſity; for the river *Nile* being ſwell'd with the ſhowers falling in *Ethiopia*, and thence annually overflowing the Country of *Ægypt*, and by its violence overturning all the marks they had to diſtinguiſh their Lands, made it neceſſarry for them upon every abatement of the floud to ſurvey their Lands, to find out every one his own by the quantity of the ground upon the ſurvey. The neceſſity of which put them upon a more diligent enquiry into that ſtudy, that thereby they might attain to ſome exactneſs in that, which was to be of ſuch neceſſary, conſtant and perpetual uſe. Thence we find the invention of Geometry particularly attributed by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo* and others, to the *Ægyptians*. *Herodot. lib. 2. Diodor. l. 1 Strabl 17. Cæl. Rhod. l. 18. c. 34.* This skill of theirs they after improved into a greater benefit, *viz.* the conveying the water of *Nile* into thoſe places where it had not overflown to ſo great a height, as to give them hopes of an enſuing plenty; which they did by the artificial cutting of ſeveral Channels for that end, wherein, ſaith *Strabo*, the *Ægyptians Art and Induſtry out-went Nature it ſelf.* By this likewiſe they obſerv'd the height of the overflowing of the river, whereby they knew what Harveſt to expect the following year; which they did by a Well near *Memphis* (from the uſe of it called Νειλομέτριον) upon the walls of which were the marks of ſeveral cubits, which they obſerve and publiſh it to all, that they might provide themſelves accordingly. We ſee what grounds there are, even from profit and advantage, to make us believe that the *Ægyptians* were skill'd in Geometry, and the knowledge relating thereto.

V. And for the promoting of all other knowledge, whoſe end is Contemplation, the very conſtitution of their Commonwealth did much conduce thereto: For thereby it was provided that there ſhou'd always be a ſufficient number of perſons freed from all other Employments, who might devote themſelves to a ſedulous enquiry into the natures of things. Such were the Ægyptian Prieſts, who by the peculiar nature of the Ægyptian ſuperſtitions, were freed from that burdenſome ſervice of ſacrificing beaſts, which the Prieſts of other Nations were continually employ'd about, and ſo they enjoy'd not only an eaſie but a very honourable employment; for they were the perſons of the greateſt honour, eſteem, and authority among the *Ægyptians*, of which rank, as far as I can find, all were accounted, who were not Souldiers, Husbandmen, or Artificers. For *Strabo* mentions no Nobility at all in *Ægypt* *Strab. l. 17.* diſtinct from the Prieſts; for he divides the whole Commonwealth into Souldiers, Husbandmen and Prieſts. And telling us that the other two were employ'd about matters of War, and the King's revenues in Peace, he adds, οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἤσκουν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ὁμιληταί τε τῶν βασιλέων ἦσαν, *The Prieſts minded the ſtudy of Philoſophy and Aſtronomy, and converſ'd moſt with their Kings:* And after, ſpeaking of their Kings being ſtudy'd in their Arts, as well as others of the Prieſts, he adds, μεθ' ὧν ἦν αὐτοῖς πλείων ὁ βίος, *with whom they ſpent moſt of their lives.* Agreeable to this, *Plutarch* tells us, that the Kings themſelves were often Prieſts; *Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.* and adds out of *Hecatæus*, that the Kings us'd to drink Wine by meaſure, ἱερεῖς ὄντες, *becauſe they were Prieſts*; for as he ſaith, the Kings of *Ægypt* were choſen, either out of the rank of Prieſts or Souldiers, τοῦ μὲν δι' ἀνδρείαν, τοῦ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν γένους ἀξίωμα καὶ τιμὴν ἔχοντος· *thoſe two orders being of the greateſt honour, the one for valour, and the other for wiſdom*; and if the King were choſen out of the Souldiers, he was preſently entred among the Prieſts, to learn their Myſtical Sciences. *Diodorus* ſeems to *Diod. l. 1.* reckon ſome great perſons after the Prieſts, and diſtinct from the Souldiery; but if he means by theſe any other than ſome of the other two profeſſions, I muſt ſay, as *Caſaubon* doth in another caſe of *Diodorus*, *Caſaub. Not. in Strab. l. 17.* *Sane* Strabonis *auctoritas multis Siculis apud me prævalet.* Diodorus *his teſtimony not to be weighed with* Strabo'*s*. From whence we may underſtand the reaſon why that *Potipherah*, whoſe Daughter *Joſeph* married, is called כהן, which ſome render the Prieſt, others the *Prince of On*; *Gen. 41. 45.* but theſe two we ſee are very conſiſtent, their Prieſts being their great Princes; and *Heliopolis*, or *On*, of which *Potipherah* was Prince or Prieſt, being the chief Seat and Univerſity of the Prieſts of *Ægypt*. Now it is evident from *Clemens Alexandrinus*, that the *Ægyptians* did not communicate their Myſteries promiſcuouſly to all, but only to ſuch as were *Clem. Alex. Strom l. 5.* in ſucceſſion to the Crown, or elſe to thoſe of the Prieſts and their Children,

dren, who were moſt apt and fit for them, both by their diet, inſtruction, and family. For this was unalterably obſerved among them, that there was a continued ſucceſſion of a profeſſion in their ſeveral families, both of Prieſts, Souldiers, and Husbandmen, whereby they kept their ſeveral orders without any mixture or confuſion, which is confeſs'd
Herodot. l. 1. Diod. l. 1. c. 71.
both by *Herodotus* and *Diodorus:* So that by this Conſtitution Learning was among them confin'd to the Prieſts, which highly advanceth the probability of that Tradition, preſerv'd among the *Ægyptians* concerning *Moſes* (which likewiſe ſtrongly proves our preſent deſign) *viz. Manetho*'s Records, as *Joſephus* tells us,
Joſeph. l. 1. C. App.
that *Moſes* was one of the Prieſts at *Heliopolis*, and that his name among them was *Oſarſiphus*, who changing his name, was called *Moſes*; and in the time of *Amenophis* conducted the leprous people out of *Ægypt* (ſo the *Ægyptians* out of their hatred of the *Iſraelites* call them.) And *Chæremon* another Ægyptian Prieſt in the ſame Author, calls *Moſes* a Scribe, and *Joſeph* (by whom probably he means *Joſhua*) a ſacred Scribe, and ſaith, that the Ægyptian name of *Moſes* was *Tiſithen*, and of *Joſeph*, *Poteſeph*. Now this tradition did in all probability ariſe from the repute of *Moſes* his learning and wiſdom; which being among them proper to their Prieſts, they thence aſcrib'd that name to him, altho' probably he might come to the knowledge of all their Myſteries, from the relation he had to *Pharaoh*'s Daughter.

VI. We come now to conſider the parts of the Ægyptian Learning, in
Philo Jud. de vita Moſis.
which the Scripture tells us *Moſes* was ſkill'd: This by *Philo Judæus* is branched into *Arithmetic*, *Geometry*, *Muſic*, and *Hieroglyphical Philoſophy:*
Sixt. Senen. l. 2. p. 39.
But *Sixtus Senenſis* more comprehenſively from *Diodorus*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, divides it into four parts, *Mathematical*, *Natural*, *Divine* and *Moral*. Their skill in the Mathematical parts of Learning hath been partly ſhew'd already, and might be more largely from that skill in them, which the *Grecians* gain'd from the *Ægyptians*, as both
Jambl. de vitæ Pyth. l. 1. 29. Porphyr. de vit. Pyth. p. 182.
Jamblichus and *Porphyry* ſpeak of *Pythagoras*, that he gain'd his skill in Geometry chiefly from the *Ægyptians:* for theſe as *Porphyry* ſaith, of a long time had been very ſtudious of Geometry, as the *Phœnicians* of Arithmetic, and the *Chaldæans* of Aſtronomy. But *Jamblichus* (and I think deſervedly) takes notice of the τὸ δυσπροσόδευτον, the *difficult acceſs*
Strab. l. 17.
of the Ægyptian Prieſts, eſpecially as to acquaintance with their Myſteries; and ſo *Strabo* calls them, μυστικοὺς ϗ δυσμεταδότους, ſuch who concealed their learning under many Symbols, and were not eaſily drawn to unfold it. And yet we might think the two and twenty years time which *Pythagoras* is thought to have ſpent among them, had been enough to have inſinuated himſelf into their utmoſt acquaintance, and to have drawn from them the knowledge of their greateſt Myſteries; but yet we have no great reaſon to think he did, if we believe the ſtory in *Diogenes Laertius* of his ſacrificing an *Hecatomb* for the finding out that Demonſtration, which is now contain'd in the 47 propoſition of the firſt of *Euclide*. Yet this did not abate the *Græcians* eſteem of the *Ægyptians* Mathematical Learning; for in *Plato*'s time, *Eudoxus Cnidius* went into *Ægypt* on purpoſe to acquire it; and *Democritus* his boaſt,
Clem. Al. Strom. l. 1. Euſ. Præp. l. 10. c. 2.
that none of the *Arſepedonaptæ* in *Ægypt* (ſo their Prieſts were call'd, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Euſebius* tell us, who relate the ſtory) exceded him in the Mathematics, proves, at leaſt inferred, that they were
Diodor. l. 1. c. 49, 50. Strab. l. 17. Herodot. l. 2.
then in greateſt eſteem for them. Their great skill in Aſtronomy is atteſted by *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Herodotus*, and others, and by their finding out the courſe of the year by the motion of the Sun, which was the

invention of the *Heliopolitan* Prieſts. How much they valued Geography, appears from *Clemens* his deſcription of the Ἱερογραμματεὺς, or *ſacred Scribe*, in the ſolemn proceſſion; for he was requir'd to be skilful in Hieroglyphics, Coſmography, Geography, the motions of the Planets, the Chorography of *Ægypt*, and deſcription of the *Nile*. *Clemens Strom. l. 6. p. 631. ed. Par.* *Euſtathius* in his Notes on *Dionyſius*, attributes the invention of Geographical Tables to *Seſoſtris*, who cauſed the Lands he had conquered to be deſcribed in Tables, and ſo communicated to the *Ægyptians*, and from them to others. Their skill in Natural Philoſophy cou'd not be very great, becauſe of their Magic and Superſtition, whereby they were hindred from all experiments in thoſe Natural things, which they attributed a Divinity to; but they ſeem to have been more exact and curious in Natural Hiſtory; for any prodigies, or any thing that was anomalous in Nature, they did, ſaith *Strabo*, φιλοπραγμονέστερον ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα, *with a great deal of curioſity inſert in their ſacred Records*; and *Herodotus* adds, *that more things of that nature are obſerved by them than by any other Nation*; which, ſaith he, they not only diligently preſerve, but frequently compare together, and from a ſimilitude of prodigies gather a ſimilitude of events. But that which gained the *Ægyptians* the greateſt repute abroad, ſeems to have been their early skill in *Phyſic*, which is ſo much ſpoken of by *Homer*, *Plato*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, that it were impertinent troubling a Reader's patience with the proof of that which is ſo generally confeſs'd. A great evidence of the antiquity of this ſtudy among them is (if *Manetho* may be ſo far credited) that *Athotis*, the ſecond King of the firſt Dynaſty of the *Thinites*, was a Phyſician himſelf, and writ ſome Books of *Anatomy*; and the ſecond King of the third Dynaſty of the *Memphites*, was, for his skill in *Phyſic*, honoured among them by the name of *Æſculapius*. *Pliny* affirms it to have been the cuſtom of their Kings to cauſe dead bodies to be diſſected, to find out the nature of Diſeaſes; and elſewhere tells us, that the original of *Phyſic* among them was from the relation of thoſe who by any remedy were cured of any Diſeaſe, which for a memorial to poſterity were recorded in their Temples. *Plin. Nat. hiſt. l. 19. c. 5. l. 29. c. 1.* Their Hieroglyphical and Myſtical Learning hath made the greateſt noiſe in the world and the leaſt of Subſtance in it; which whoever will not be convinced of without peruſal of *Kircher*'s *Oedipus Ægyptiacus*, will at laſt find it fully done to his hand by the ſucceſleſs endeavours of that otherwiſe learned Man. I cannot think any rational Man cou'd think that ſtudy worth his pains, which at the higheſt can amount but to a conjecture; and when it is come to that with a great deal of pains, it is nothing but ſome ordinary and trivial obſervation. As in that famous Hieroglyphic of *Dioſpolis*, ſo much ſpoken of by the Ancients, where was a Child to expreſs coming into the World, an old Man for going out of it, an Hawk for God, an *Hippopotamus* for Hatred, and a Crocodile for Impudence; and all to expreſs this venerable *Apophthegm*, *O ye that come into the World, and that go out of it, God hates impudence.* And therefore certainly this kind of Learning deſerves the higheſt form among the *difficiles Nugæ*; and all theſe Hieroglyphics put together, will make but one good one, and ſhou'd be for *Labour loſt*.

VII. There is yet one part of Learning more among them, which the *Ægyptians* are eſteemed for, which is the Political and Civil part of it, which may better be called Wiſdom, than moſt of the foregoing; two things ſpeak much the wiſdom of a Nation, good Laws, and a prudent management of them: their Laws are highly commended by *Strabo* and *Diodorus*; and it is none of the leaſt commendations of them, that *Solon* and *Lycurgus* borrowed ſo many of their Conſtitutions from them; and for the prudent management of their Government, as the continuance of their State ſo long in peace and quietneſs, is an invincible demonſtration of it; ſo the report given of them in Scripture adds a further teſtimony to it; for therein the King of *Ægypt* is called the Son of Iſa. 19.11, 12. the Wiſe, as well as the Son of ancient Kings; and his Counſellors are called *wiſe Counſellors of* Pharaoh, and the *wiſe Men*; whereby a more than ordinary prudence and policy muſt be underſtood. Can we now imagine ſuch a perſon as *Moſes* was, bred up in all the ingenuous Literature of *Ægypt*, converſant among their wiſeſt perſons in *Pharaoh*'s Court, having thereby all advantages to improve himſelf, and to underſtand the utmoſt of all that they know, ſhou'd not be able to paſs a judgment between a mere pretence and Impoſture, and real and important Truths? Can we think that one who had intereſt in ſo great a Court, all advantages of raiſing himſelf therein, ſhou'd willingly forſake all the pleaſures and delights at preſent, all his hopes and advantages, for the future, were he not fully perſuaded of the certain and undoubted truth of all thoſe things which are recorded in his Books? Is it poſſible a Man of ordinary wiſdom ſhou'd venture himſelf upon ſo hazardous, unlikely and dangerous employment, as that was *Moſes* undertook, which could have no probability of ſucceſs, but only upon the belief that God who appeared unto him, was greater than all the Gods of *Ægypt*, and cou'd carry on his Deſign by his power, maugre all the oppoſition which the Princes of the world cou'd make againſt it? And what poſſible ground can we have to think that ſuch a perſon, who did verily believe the truth of what God reveal'd unto him, ſhou'd dare to write any otherwiſe than as it was revealed unto him? If there had been any thing repugnant to common Reaſon in the Hiſtory of the Creation, the Fall of Man, the univerſal Deluge, the propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*, the Hiſtory of the *Patriarchs*, had not *Moſes* rational faculties as well as we? nay, had he them not far better improved than any of ours are? and was not he then able to judge what was ſuitable to Reaſon, and what not? and can we think he wou'd then deliver any thing inconſiſtent with Reaſon or undoubted Tradition then, when the Ægyptian Prieſts might ſo readily and plainly have triumphed over him, by diſcovering the falſhood of what he wrote? Thus we ſee that *Moſes* was as highly qualify'd as any of the acuteſt heathen Philoſophers cou'd be, for diſcerning Truth from Falſhood; nay, in all probability he far excelled the moſt renowned of the *Græcian* Philoſophers in that very kind of Learning wherewith they made ſo great noiſe in the World, which was originally Ægyptian, as is evident in the whole ſeries of the *Græcian* Philoſophers, who went Age after Age to *Ægypt*, to get ſome ſcraps of that Learning there, which *Moſes* cou'd not have but full meals of, becauſe of his high place, great intereſt, and power in *Ægypt*. And muſt thoſe hungry Philoſophers then become the only Maſters of our Reaſon, and their Dictates be receiv'd as the ſenſe and voice of Nature, which they either receiv'd from uncertain Tradition, or elſe deliver'd in oppoſition to it, that they might be more taken notice of in the World? Muſt an αὐτὸς ἔφα be confronted with, *Thus ſaith the Lord?* and a few pitiful Symbols vye authority with Divine Commands? and *Ex nihilo nihil fit* be ſooner believ'd than, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth?* What irrefragable evidence of Reaſon is that ſo confident a preſumption built upon, when it can ſignifie nothing without this *Hypotheſis*, That there is nothing but Matter in the World? and let this firſt be prov'd, and we will never ſtick to grant the other. I may confidently ſay, the great gullery of the world hath been, taking philoſophical Dictates for the ſtandard of Reaſon, and unprov'd *Hypotheſes* for certain Foundations for our diſcourſe to rely upon. And the ſeeking to reconcile the Myſteries of our Faith to theſe, hath been that which hath almoſt deſtroy'd it, and turn'd our Religion into a mere philoſophical Speculation. But of this elſewhere. We ſee then that inſiſting merely on the accompliſhment and rational perfections of the perſons who ſpeak, we have more reaſon to yield credit to *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, than to any Philoſophers in their Speculations.

VIII. And that which in the next place ſpeaks *Moſes* to be a perſon of wiſdom, and judgment, and ability to find out truth, was his Age and Experience when he deliver'd theſe things to the World. He vented no crude and indigeſted conceptions, no ſudden and temerarious fancies, the uſual iſſues of teeming and juvenile Wits; he liv'd long enough to have experience to try, and judgment to diſtinguiſh a mere outſide and varniſh, from what was ſolid and ſubſtantial. We cannot then have the leaſt ground of ſuſpicion, that *Moſes* was any ways unfit to diſcern Truth from Falſhood, and therefore was capable of judging the one from the other.

But tho' perſons be never ſo highly accompliſh'd for parts, learning, and experience, yet if they want due information of the certainty of the things they deliver, they may be ſtill deceiv'd themſelves; and if they preſerve it for poſterity, be guilty of deceiving others. Let us now therefore ſee whether *Moſes* had not as great advantages for underſtanding the truth of his Hiſtory, as he had judgment to diſcern it. And concerning all thoſe things contained in the four laſt Books of his, to his own death, it was impoſſible any ſhou'd have greater than himſelf, writing nothing but what he was *pars magna* himſelf of, what he ſaw and heard, and did; and can any teſtimony be deſired greater than his whoſe actions they were, or who was preſent at the doing of them; and that not in any private way, but in the moſt public capacity? For altho' private perſons may be preſent at great actions, yet they may be guilty of miſ-repreſenting them, for want of underſtanding all circumſtances precedent, and ſubſequent, or for want of underſtanding the deſigns of the chief inſtruments of action: but when the perſon himſelf, who was the chief in all, ſhall undertake to write an exact Hiſtory of it, what evidence can be deſired more certain than that is, that there cou'd be no defect as to information concerning what was done? The only ſcruple then that can be made, muſt be concerning the paſſages of former times which *Moſes* relates. And here I doubt not but to make it appear, that inſiſting only on all that can be deſired in a bare Hiſtorian (ſetting aſide Divine Revelation) he had as true and certain information of the Hiſtory of thoſe former Ages, as any one can have of things at that diſtance from themſelves; and that is, by a certain uninterrupted tradition of them, which will appear more clear and evident in that Nation of which *Moſes* was, than in any other Nation in the World: and that on theſe two accounts: Firſt, *The undoubted lineal deſcent from Father*

ther to Son in the Jewiſh Nation. Secondly, *Their intereſt lying ſo much in the preſerving this Tradition entire.*

IX. Firſt, *That there was a certain unmixed lineal deſcent from Father to Son in the Jewiſh Nation:* the great cauſe of moſt of the confuſion in the Tradition of other Nations, was the frequent mixing of ſeveral Families one with another; now that God might as it were on purpoſe ſatisfie the World of the *Iſraelites* Capacity to preſerve the Tradition entire, he prohibited their mixture by Marriages with the People of other Nations and Families. So that in *Moſes* his time it was a very eaſie matter to run up their lineal deſcent as far as the Flood, nay, up to *Adam*; for *Adam* converſed ſometimes with *Lamech*, *Noah*'s Father; for *Lamech* was born *A.M.* 874. *Adam* died 930. ſo that 56 years, according to that computation, were *Adam* and *Lamech* contemporary. Can we then think *Noah* ignorant of the ancient Tradition of the World, when his Father was ſo long *coævous* with *Adam*; and *Mathuſelah* his Grand-father, who was born *A.M.* 687. died not till *A.M.* 1656. according to our moſt learned *Primate* of *Armagh*, *i.e.* was 600 years contemporary with *Noah*. *Sem* his Son was probably living in ſome part of *Jacob*'s time, or *Iſaac*'s at leaſt; and how eaſily and uninterruptedly might the general Tradition of the ancient Hiſtory be continued thence to the time of *Moſes*, when the number of Families agreeing in this Tradition was increaſed, and withal incorporated by a common ligament of Religion? I demand then, where can we ſuppoſe any ignorance or cutting off this general Tradition in ſo continued a ſucceſſion as here was? Can we imagine that the Grand-children of *Jacob* cou'd be ignorant of their own pedigree, and whence they came into *Ægypt*? can we think a thing ſo late and ſo remarkable as the account of their coming thither, ſhou'd be forgotten, which was attended with ſo many memorable circumſtances, eſpecially the ſelling and advancement of *Joſeph*, whoſe memory it was impoſſible ſhou'd be obliterated in ſo ſhort a time? Cou'd *Jacob* be ignorant of the Country whence his Grandfather *Abraham* came? eſpecially when he liv'd ſo long in it himſelf, and married in that branch of the Family that was remaining there, when he had ſerved his Uncle *Laban*? Cou'd *Abraham*, when he was contemporary with *Sem*, be ignorant of the truth of the Floud, when *Sem*, from whom he derived himſelf, was one of the perſons who eſcaped it in the Ark? Cou'd *Sem* be ignorant of the actions before the Floud, when *Adam*, the firſt Man, lived ſo near the time of *Noah*? and, cou'd *Noah* then be ignorant of the Creation and the fall of Man? Thus we ſee it almoſt impoſſible, that any age among them then cou'd be ignorant of the paſſages of the precedent, which they were ſo few Generations removed from, that they cou'd with eaſe derive themſelves from the Firſt Man. What then can we ſay? that any of theſe had a deſign of deceiving their Poſterity, and ſo corrupted the Tradition? beſides, that it cou'd be hardly poſſible at that time, when there were ſo many remaining teſtimonies of former times; what end can we imagin that any Parents ſhou'd have in thus deceiving their Children, or what advantage ſhou'd come to them by ſuch a deceit? Nay, I ſhall now manifeſt in the ſecond place, That the whole intereſt of their Children lay in preſerving this Tradition certain and entire. For their hopes of poſſeſſing *Canaan* and title to it, depended upon the promiſe made unto *Abraham* 400 years before; which wou'd not only keep awake their ſenſe of the Divine Providence, but wou'd make them careful during their Bondage to preſerve their Genealogies, becauſe all the Right they cou'd plead to their poſſeſſions in *Canaan*, was from their being of *Abraham*'s Seed. And beſides this, on purpoſe to be a memorial to them of paſſages between God and *Abraham*, they had in their fleſh a badge of Circumciſion, which wou'd ſerve to call to mind thoſe tranſactions which had been between God and their Fore-fathers. Theſe things then do fully demonſtrate, that inſiſting only on Rational Evidence, the *Iſraelites* were the moſt certain conſervators of the ancient Hiſtory of the World; and can we think, that *Moſes* who was the Ruler among them, ſhou'd not fully underſtand thoſe things which every *Iſraelite* cou'd ſcarce be ignorant of, and might correct the miſtakes of *Moſes* in his Hiſtory, if he had been guilty of any ſuch? Theſe things I ſuppoſe have made the firſt Propoſition evident, That it was morally impoſſible *Moſes* ſhou'd be deceived himſelf, or be ignorant of the things which he reports to others, both becauſe he had abilities ſufficient to diſcover Truth from Falſhood, and ſufficient information of the paſſages of former times.

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CHAP. III.

32:2:W.

Moſes his fidelity proved.

I. Moſes *conſidered as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law giver; his fidelity in both proved; clear evidences that he had no intent to deceive in his Hiſtory, freedom from private intereſt, impartiality in his relations, plainneſs and perſpicuity of ſtile.* II. *As a Law-giver he came armed with Divine Authority, which being the main thing, is fixed on to be fully proved from his actions and writings.* III. *The power of Miracles the great evidence of Divine Revelation. Two grand Queſtions propounded. In what caſes Miracles may be expected, and how known to be true. No neceſſity of a conſtant power of Miracles in a Church:* IV. *Two caſes alone wherein they may be expected. When any thing comes as a Law from God, and when a Divine Law is to be repealed. The neceſſity of Miracles in thoſe caſes as an evidence of Divine Revelation aſſerted.* V. VI. VII. *Objections anſwered. No uſe of Miracles when the Doctrine is ſettled and owned by Miracles by the firſt Revelation. No need of Miracles in reformation of a Church.*

THE ſecond Propoſition contains the proof of *Moſes* his fidelity, That he was as far from having any intent to deceive others, as he was from being deceived himſelf. Two ways *Moſes* muſt be conſidered, as an Hiſtorian, and as a Law-giver; the only inducement for him to deceive as an Hiſtorian, muſt be ſome particular intereſt which muſt draw him aſide from an impartial delivery of the truth; as a Law-giver, he might deceive, if he pretended Divine Revelation for thoſe Laws which were only the iſſues of his own Brain, that they might be re- I.

ceived with a greater veneration among the People, as *Numa Pompilius* and others did. Now if we prove that *Moſes* had no intereſt to deceive in his Hiſtory, and had all rational evidence of Divine Revelation in his Laws, we ſhall abundantly evince the undoubted fidelity of *Moſes* in every thing recorded by him. We begin then with his fidelity as an Hiſtorian; and it being contrary to the common intereſt of the World to deceive and be deceived, we have no reaſon to entertain any ſuſpicions of the veracity of any perſon where we cannot diſcern ſome peculiar intereſt that might have a ſtronger byaſs upon him than the common intereſt of the World. For it is otherwiſe in Morals than in Naturals; for in Naturals, we ſee that every thing will leave its proper intereſt to preſerve the common intereſt of Nature; but in Morals, there is nothing more common than deſerting the common intereſt of Mankind, to ſet up a peculiar intereſt againſt it: It being the trueſt deſcription of a Politician, that he is one who makes himſelf the centre, and the whole World his circumference; that he regards not how much the whole World is abuſed, if any advantage doth accrue to himſelf by it. Where we ſee it then the deſign of any perſon to advance himſelf or his poſterity, or to ſet up the credit of the Nation whoſe Hiſtory he writes, we may have juſt cauſe to ſuſpect his partiality, becauſe we then find a ſufficient inducement for ſuch a one to leave the common road of Truth, and to fall into the paths of deceit. But we have not the leaſt ground to ſuſpect any ſuch partiality in the Hiſtory of *Moſes*; for nothing is more clear than that he was free from the ambitious deſign of advancing himſelf and his poſterity, who notwithſtanding the great honour he enjoy'd himſelf, was content to leave his poſterity in the meaneſt ſort of attendance upon the Tabernacle. And as little have we ground to think he intended to flatter that Nation, which he ſo lively deſcribes, that one wou'd think he had rather a deſign to ſet forth the frowardneſs, unbelief, unthankfulneſs, and diſobedience of a Nation towards a gracious God, than any ways inhance their reputation in the world, or to ingratiate himſelf with them by writing this Hiſtory of them. Nay, and he ſets forth ſo exactly the leſſer failings and groſſer enormities of all the Anceſtors of this Nation, whoſe acts he records, that any impartial Reader will ſoon acquit him of a deſign of flattery, when after he hath recorded thoſe faults, he ſeeks not to extenuate them, or bring any excuſe or pretence to palliate them. So that any obſerving Reader may eaſily take notice, that he was carried on by a higher deſign than the common people of Hiſtorians are; and that his drift and ſcope was to exalt the goodneſs and favour of God, towards a rebellious and obſtinate people. Of which there can be no greater nor more lively demonſtration, than the Hiſtory of all the tranſactions of the *Jewiſh* Nation, from their coming forth of *Ægypt*, to
Deut. 7. 7, 8. their utter ruin and deſolation. And *Moſes* tells them as from God
himſelf, *it was neither for their number, nor their goodneſs, that God ſet his love upon them, but he loved them, becauſe he loved them*, *i. e.* no other account was to be given of his gracious dealing with them, but the freeneſs of his own bounty, and the exuberancy of his goodneſs towards them. Nay, have we not cauſe to admire the ingenuity as well as veracity of this excellent perſonage, who not only lays ſo notorious
Gen. 34. 25. a blot upon the ſtock of his own Family *Levi*, recorded ſo punctually
the inhumanity and cruelty of him, and *Simeon* in their dealings with the
Gen 49. 5, 6, 7. *Sechemites*; but likewiſe inſerts that curſe which was left upon their memory

memory for it, by their own Father at his deceaſe! And that he might not leave the leaſt ſuſpicion of partiality behind him, he hath not done as the Statuary did, (who engraved his own name ſo artificially in the Statue of *Jupiter*, that one ſhou'd continue as long as the other,) but what the other intended for the praiſe of his skill, *Moſes* hath done for his ingenuity, that he hath ſo interwoven the Hiſtory of his own failings and diſobedience with thoſe of the Nation, that his ſpots are like to continue as long as the whole web of his Hiſtory is like to do. Had it been the leaſt part of his deſign to have his memory preſerved with a ſuperſtitious veneration among the *Jews*, how eaſy had it been for him to have left out any thing that might in the leaſt intrench upon his reputation? but we find him very ſecure and careleſs in that particular; nay, on the other ſide, very ſtudious and induſtrious in depreſſing the honour and deſarts of Men, and advancing the power and goodneſs of GOD. And all this he doth, not in an affected ſtrain of *Rhetoric*, whoſe proper work is *impetrare fidem mendacio*, and as *Tully* ſomewhere confeſſeth, *To make things ſeem otherwiſe than they are*; but that innate ſimplicity and plainneſs, and yet withal with that *Imperatoria brevitas*, that Majeſty and Authority, that it is thereby evident he thought not to court acceptance, but to demand belief: Nor had any ſuch pitiful deſign of pleaſing his Readers with ſome affected phraſes, but thought that Truth it ſelf had preſence enough with it, to command the ſubmiſſion of our Underſtandings to it.

II. Eſpecially when all theſe were delivered by ſuch a one who came ſufficiently armed with all motives of credibility and inducements to aſſent, by that evidence which he gave, that he was no pretender to Divine Revelation, but was really imploy'd as a peculiar inſtrument of State under the GOD and Ruler of the whole World. Which if it be made clear, then all our further doubts muſt preſently ceaſe, and all impertinent diſputes be ſilenced, when the Supreme Majeſty appears impowering any perſon to dictate to the World the Laws they muſt be governed by. For if any thing be repugnant to our Rational Faculties, that is, that GOD ſhou'd dictate any thing but what is moſt certainly true, or that the Governour of the World ſhou'd preſcribe any Laws, but ſuch as were moſt juſt and reaſonable. If we ſuppoſe a GOD, we cannot queſtion veracity to be one of his chiefeſt Attributes, and that it is impoſſible the GOD of truth ſhou'd imploy any, to reveal any thing as from him, but what was undoubtedly true. So that it were an argument of the moſt groſs and unreaſonable incredulity, to diſtruſt the certainty of any thing which comes to us with ſufficient evidence of Divine, Revelation, becauſe thereby we ſhew our diſtruſt of the veracity of GOD himſelf. All that we can deſire then, is only reaſonable ſatisfaction concerning the evidence of Divine Revelation in the perſon whoſe words we are to credit, and this our gracious GOD hath been ſo far from denying Men, that he hath given all Rational Evidence of the truth of it. For it implying no incongruity at all, to any notions of GOD or our ſelves, that GOD ſhou'd, when it pleaſes him, ſingle out ſome inſtrument to manifeſt his will to the World; our enquiry then leads us to thoſe things which may be proper Notes and Characters of ſuch a perſon who is employ'd on ſo high an Embaſſy. And thoſe are chiefly theſe two, If his actions be ſuch as cou'd not flow from the power of mere Natural Cauſes; and, If the things he reveals be ſuch as cou'd not proceed from any created Underſtanding. *Firſt* then, for his Actions, theſe ſtriking moſt upon our outward Senſes, when they are any thing extraordinary, do tranſmit along with the impreſſions of them to the Underſtanding, an high opinion of the perſon that doth them: whereas the mere height of knowledge, or profoundneſs of things diſcovered, can have no ſuch preſent power and influence upon any, but ſuch as are of more raiſed and inquiſitive minds. And the World is generally more apt to ſuſpect its ſelf deceived with Words, than it can be with Actions; and hence Miracles, or the doing of things above the reach of Nature, hath been always embraced as the greateſt teſtimony of Divine Authority and Revelation. For which there is this evident Reaſon, That the courſe of Nature being ſettled by Divine Power, and every thing acting there by the force of that Power it receiv'd at firſt, it ſeems impoſſible that any thing ſhou'd really alter the ſeries of things, without the ſame power which at firſt produced them. This then we take for granted, That where-ever ſuch a Power appears, there is a certain evidence of a Divine Preſence going along with ſuch a Perſon who enjoys it. And this is that which is moſt evident in the actions of *Moſes*, both as to the Miracles he wrought both in *Ægypt* and the Wilderneſs, and his miraculous deliverance of the *Iſraelites* out of *Ægypt*, this latter being as much above the reach of any merely Civil Power, as the other above Natural.

We therefore come to the Rational Evidence of that Divine Authority whereby *Moſes* acted, which may be gathered from that Divine Power which appeared in his Actions, which being a matter of ſo great weight and importance (it being one of the main Baſes whereon the Evidence of Divine Revelation, as to us, doth ſtand) and withal of ſo great difficulty and obſcurity, (cauſed thro' the preferring ſome Parties in Religion above the common intereſt of it) it will require more care and diligence to ſearch what influence the Power of Miracles hath upon the proving the Divine Commiſſion of thoſe who do them. Whether they are ſuch undoubted Credentials, that where-ever they are produced, we are preſently to receive the Perſons who bring them, as Extraordinary Embaſſadors from heaven, employ'd on ſome peculiar Meſſage to the Sons of Men? For the full ſtating of this Important Queſtion, two things muſt be cleared: *Firſt*, in what caſes Miracles may be expected as Credentials to confirm an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven? *Secondly*, What Rational Evidences do attend thoſe Miracles, to aſſure us they are ſuch as they pretend to be? 3: 2: 6.

III. *Firſt*, For the cauſes wherein theſe Miracles are to be expected as inducements to, or confirmations of our Faith, concerning the Divine imployment of any perſons in the World. And here I lay down this as a certain Foundation, That a power of Miracles is not conſtantly and perpetually neceſſary in all thoſe who manage the affairs of Heaven here on Earth, or that act in the name of God in the World. When the Doctrine of Faith is once ſettled in Sacred Records, and the Divine Revelation of that Doctrine ſufficiently atteſted, by a Power of Miracles in the Revealers of it, What imaginable neceſſity or pretext can there be contrived for a power of Miracles, eſpecially among ſuch as already own the Divine Revelation of the Scriptures? To make then a power of working Miracles to be conſtantly reſident in the Church of God, as one of the neceſſary Notes and Characters of it, is to put God upon that neceſſity which common Nature is freed from, *viz.* of multiplying things without ſufficient cauſe to be given for them; and to leave Men's

Faith at a ſtand, when God hath given ſufficient teſtimony for it to rely upon. It is a thing too common and eaſy to be obſerved, that ſome perſons out of their eagerneſs to uphold the intereſt of their own party, have been fain to eſtabliſh it upon ſuch grounds, which when they are ſufficiently ſearched to the bottom, do apparently undermine the common and ſure Foundations whereon the Belief of our common Chriſtianity doth mainly ſtand. It were eaſy to make a large Diſcourſe on this Subject, whereby we may rip open the wounds that Chriſtianity hath receiv'd, thro' the contentions of the ſeveral parties of it; but this imputation cannot with ſo much reaſon be faſtn'd on any party, as that which is nailed to a pretended Infallible Chair; for which we need no other inſtance, than this before us. For while the leaders of that party make a Power of Miracles to be a neceſſary Note of the true Church, they unavoidably run Men upon this dangerous precipice, not to believe any thing as a matter of Faith, where they find not ſufficient Miracles to convince them that is the true Church which propounds it to them. Which neceſſarily follows from their acknowledg'd principles; for it being impoſſible, according to them, to believe any thing with a Divine Faith, but what is propounded by the Church as an infallible Guide; and it being impoſſible to know which is this infallible Guide, but by the Notes and Characters of it, and one of thoſe Notes, being a Power of Miracles, I cannot find out my Guide but by this Power; and this Power muſt be preſent in the Church, for nothing of former Ages concerning Faith, as the Miracles of *Chriſt*, his Reſurrection, &c. is to be believ'd, but on the Church's account) and therefore where Men do not find ſufficient conviction from preſent Miracles, to believe the Church to be an infallible Guide, they muſt throw off all Faith concerning the Goſpel; for as good never a whit, as never the better. And therefore it is no wonder *Atheiſm* ſhou'd be ſo thriving a plant in *Italy*; nay under, if not within the walls of *Rome* it ſelf, where inquiſitive Perſons do daily ſee the jugglings and impoſtures of Prieſts in their pretended Miracles, and from thence are brought to look upon Religion its ſelf as a mere impoſture, and to think no *Pope* ſo infallible, as he that ſaid, *Quantum nobis profuit hæc de Chriſto fabula?* Such horrid conſequences do Men drive others, if not bring themſelves, to, when they employ their parts and induſtry rather to uphold a corrupt intereſt, than to promote the Belief of the acknowledg'd principles of Chriſtian Faith. But as long as we aſſert no neceſſity of ſuch a power of Miracles to be the Note of any true Church, nor any ſuch neceſſity of an infallible Guide, but that the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles, were ſufficient evidences of a Divine Spirit in them; and that the Scriptures were recorded by them to be an infallible Rule of Faith; here we have more clear reaſon as to the primary motives and grounds of Faith, and withal the infallible veracity of God in the Scriptures, as the laſt reſolution of Faith. And while we aſſert ſuch an infallible Rule of Faith, delivered to us by ſuch an unanimous conſent from the firſt delivery of it, and then ſo fully atteſted by ſuch uncontroulable Miracles, we cannot in the leaſt underſtand to what end a power of Miracles ſhou'd now ſerve in the Church, eſpecially among thoſe who all believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. Indeed before the great harveſt of Converts in the primitive times were brought in, both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, and the Church fully ſettled in receiving the Canon of the Scriptures univerſally, we find God did continue this power among them; but after the Books of the New Teſtament were generally embraced as the Rule of Faith among Chriſtians, we find them ſo far from pretending to any ſuch Power, that they reject the pretenders to it, ſuch as the *Donatiſts* were, and plead upon the ſame accounts, as we do now againſt the neceſſity of it. We ſee then no reaſon in the world for Miracles to be continued where the Doctrine of Faith is ſettled, as being confirmed by Miracles in the firſt Preachers of it.

IV. There are only theſe two caſes then, wherein Miracles may juſtly and with reaſon be expected. *Firſt*, When any perſon comes as by an extraordinary commiſſion from God to the World, either to deliver ſome peculiar meſſage, or to do ſome more than ordinary ſervice. *Secondly*, When ſomething that hath been before eſtabliſh'd by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and ſome other way of worſhip eſtabliſh'd inſtead of it. *Firſt*, When any comes upon an extraordinary meſſage to the World, in the name of, and by commiſſion from God, then it is but reaſon to require ſome more than ordinary evidence of ſuch Authority. Becauſe of the main importance of the duty of giving credit to ſuch a perſon, and the great ſin of being guilty of rejecting that Divine Authority which appears in him. And in this caſe we cannot think that God wou'd require it as a Duty to believe, where he doth not give ſufficient arguments for Faith, nor that he will puniſh perſons for ſuch a fault, which an invincible ignorance was the cauſe of. Indeed God doth not uſe to neceſſitate Faith, as to the act of it, but he doth ſo clearly propound the object of it, with all arguments inducing to it, as may ſufficiently juſtify a Believer's choice in point of reaſon and prudence, and may leave all Unbelievers without excuſe. I cannot ſee what account a Man can give to himſelf of his Faith, much leſs what Apology he can make to others for it, unleſs he be ſufficiently convinced in point of the higheſt reaſon, that it was his duty to believe; and in order to that conviction, there muſt be ſome clear evidence given, That what is ſpoken hath the impreſs of Divine authority upon it. Now what convictions there can be to any ſober mind concerning Divine Authority in any perſon without ſuch a Power of Miracles going along with him, when he is to deliver ſome new Doctrine to the World to be believ'd, I confeſs I cannot underſtand. For altho' I doubt not but where-ever God doth reveal any thing to any perſon immediately, he gives demonſtrable evidence to the inward ſenſes of the Soul, that it comes from himſelf; yet this inward ſenſe can be no ground to another perſon to believe his Doctrine Divine, becauſe no Man can be a competent judge of the actings of the Divine Spirit from ſtrong impreſſions of fancy by the force and energy of them. Object. If it be ſaid, *That we are bound to believe thoſe, who ſay they are fully ſatisfy'd of their Divine Commiſſion.* Anſw. I anſwer *Firſt*, This will expoſe us to all deluſions imaginable; for if we are bound to believe them becauſe they ſay ſo, we are bound to believe all which ſay ſo; and none are more confident pretenders to this than the greateſt deceivers, as the experience of our Age will ſufficiently witneſs. *Secondly*, Men muſt neceſſarily be bound to believe contradictions; for nothing is more ordinary, than for ſuch confident pretenders to a Divine Spirit, to contradict one another, and it may be, the ſame perſon in a little time contradict himſelf: and muſt we ſtill be bound to believe all they ſay? If ſo, no Philoſophers wou'd be ſo much in requeſt, as thoſe *Ariſtotle* diſputes againſt in his *Metaphyſics*, who thought a thing might be, and not be, at the ſame time. *Thirdly*, The ground of Faith at laſt will be but a mere humane teſtimony, as far as the perſon who is to believe is capable of judging of it. For the Queſtion, being, Whether the perſon I am to believe hath Divine Authority for what he ſaith, What ground can I have to believe that he hath ſo? Muſt I take his bare affirmation for it? If ſo, then a mere humane teſtimony muſt be the ground of Divine Faith, and that which is laſt reſolved into: If it be ſaid, *That I am to believe the Divine Authority by which he ſpeaks, when he ſpeaks in the name of God:* I anſwer, The Queſtion will again return, how I ſhall know he ſpeaks this from Divine Authority? and ſo there muſt be a progreſs *in infinitum,* or founding Divine Faith on a mere humane teſtimony, If I am to believe Divine Revelation merely on the account of the perſon's affirmation who pretends to it. For in this caſe it holds good, *Non apparentis & non exiſtentis eadem eſt ratio*; if he be divinely inſpired, and there be no ground inducing me to believe that he is ſo, I ſhall be excuſed, if I believe him not, if my wilfulneſs and lazineſs be not the cauſe of my unbelief.

V. If it be ſaid, *That God will ſatisfy the minds of good Men concerning the truth of Divine Revelation.* I grant it to be wonderful true; but all the Queſtion is *de modo,* how God will ſatisfy them? whether merely by Inſpiration of his own Spirit in them, aſſuring them that it is God that ſpeaks in ſuch perſons; or by giving them Rational Evidence, convincing them of ſufficient grounds to believe it. If we aſſert the former way, we run into theſe inconveniences: *Firſt,* We make as immediate a Revelation in all thoſe who believe, as in thoſe who are to reveal Divine Truths to us; for there is a new Revelation of an object immediately to the mind; *viz. That ſuch a perſon is inſpired of God*; and is not after the common way of the Spirit's illumination in Believers, which is by enlightning the faculty, without the propoſition of any new object, as it is in the work of Grace: So that according to this opinion, there muſt be immediate Inſpiration as to that act of Faith, whereby we believe any one to have been divinely inſpired, and conſequently to that whereby we believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. *Secondly,* Doth not this make the faireſt plea for Men's unbelief? For, I demand, Is it the duty of thoſe who want that immediate Illumination to believe or no? If it be not their duty, Unbelief can be no ſin to them; if it be a duty, it muſt be made known to be a duty; and how can that be made known to them to be a duty, when they want the only and neceſſary means of Instruction in order to it? Will God condemn them for that, which it was impoſſible they ſhou'd have, unleſs God gave it them? And how can they be left inexcuſable, who want ſo much as rational inducements to Faith? for of theſe I now ſpeak, and not of efficacious perſuaſions of the Mind, when there are rational arguments for Faith propounded. But, *Laſtly,* I ſuppoſe the caſe will be clear'd, when we take notice what courſe God hath always taken to give all rational ſatisfaction to the minds of Men, concerning the perſons whom he hath imploy'd in either of the forementton'd caſes. *Firſt,* for thoſe who have been imploy'd upon ſome ſpecial meſſage and ſervice for God, he hath ſent them forth ſufficiently provided with manifeſtations of the Divine Power whereby they acted; as is moſt clear and evident in the preſent caſe of *Moſes, Exodus* 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. where *Moſes* puts the caſe to God which we are now debating of. Suppoſing, ſaith he, that I ſhou'd go to the *Iſraelites* and tell them, God had appeared to me, and ſent me to deliver them, and they ſhou'd ſay, God had not appear'd unto me;

how ſhou'd I ſatisfy them? God doth not reject this objection of *Moſes* as ſavouring of unbelief, but preſently ſhews him how he ſhou'd ſatisfy them, by cauſing a Miracle before his face, *turning his rod into a ſerpent*; and God gives this as the reaſon of it, *verſ.* 5. *That they may believe that the Lord God of their Fathers, the God of* Abraham, *the God of* Iſaac, *and the God of* Jacob, *hath appeared unto thee.* It ſeems God himſelf thought this wou'd be the moſt pregnant evidence of God's appearing to him, if he wrought Miracles before their faces. Nay, leſt they ſhou'd think one ſingle Miracle was not ſufficient, God in the immediate following verſes adjoyns two more, which he ſhou'd do in order to their ſatisfaction; and further, *verſ.* 21. God gave him a charge to do all thoſe wonders before *Pharaoh*, which he had put into his hand: and accordingly we find *Pharaoh* preſently demanding a Miracle of *Moſes*, *Exodus* 7. 9. which accordingly *Moſes* did in his preſence, tho' he might ſuppoſe *Pharaoh*'s demand not to proceed from deſire of ſatisfaction, but from ſome hopes that for want of it, he might have rendred his credit ſuſpected among the *Iſraelites*.

VI. Indeed after God had delivered his people, and had ſettled them in a way of ſerving him according to the Laws delivered by *Moſes*, which he had confirm'd by unqueſtionable Miracles among them, we find a caution laid in by *Moſes* himſelf againſt thoſe which ſhou'd pretend ſigns and wonders to draw them off from the Religion eſtabliſh'd by the Law of *Moſes*. Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. And ſo likewiſe under the Goſpel, after that was eſtabliſhed by the unparallell'd Miracles of our Saviour and the Apoſtles, we find frequent cautions againſt being deceiv'd by thoſe who came with pretences of doing great Miracles. But this is ſo far from infringing the credibility of ſuch a Teſtimony which is confirm'd by Miracles, that it yields a ſtrong confirmation to the truth of what I now aſſert. For the Doctrine is ſuppos'd to be already eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, according to which we are to judge of the ſpirits of ſuch pretenders. Now it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that when a Religion is once eſtabliſh'd by uncontrouled Miracles, we ſhou'd not hearken to every whiffling Conjurer that will pretend to do great feats, to draw us off from the truth eſtabliſh'd. In which caſe, the ſureſt way to diſcover the Impoſture is, to compare his pretended Miracles with thoſe true and real ones which were done by *Moſes* and *Chriſt*; and the ground of it is, becauſe every perſon is no competent judge of the truth of a Miracle; for the Devil, by his power and ſubtilty, may eaſily deceive all ſuch as will be led by the noſe by him in expectation of ſome wonders to be done by him. And therefore as long as we have no ground to queſtion the certainty of thoſe Miracles which were wrought by *Chriſt* or *Moſes*, I am bound to adhere to the Doctrine eſtabliſh'd by thoſe Miracles, and to make them my rule of judging all perſons who ſhall pretend to work Miracles: Becauſe, 1. I do not know how far God may give Men over to be deceiv'd by lying wonders, who will not receive the truth in the love of it; *i. e.* thoſe that think not the *Chriſtian Religion* ſufficiently confirm'd by the Miracles wrought at the promulgation of it. God in juſtice may permit the Devil to go further than otherwiſe he cou'd, and leave ſuch perſons to their own credulity, to believe every impoſture and illuſion of their ſenſes for true Miracles. 2. That Doctrine which was confirm'd by undoubted Miracles, hath aſſur'd us of the coming of Lying Wonders, whereby many ſhou'd be deceiv'd. Now this part of the Doctrine of the Goſpel is as certainly true as any of the reſt for it was confirm'd by the ſame Miracles that the other was; and beſides that, the very coming of ſuch Miracles is an evidence of the truth of it, it falling out ſo exactly according to what was fore-told ſo many hundred years ſince. Now if this Doctrine be true, then am I certain the intent of theſe Miracles is to deceive, and that thoſe are deceiv'd who hearken to them; and what reaſon then have I to believe them? 3. To what end do theſe Miracles ſerve? Are they to confirm the truths contain'd in Scripture? But what need they any confirmation now, when we are aſſur'd by the Miracles wrought by *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles*, that the Doctrine by them preach'd came from God? and ſo hath been receiv'd upon the credit of thoſe Miracles ever ſince. Were theſe truths ſufficiently prov'd to be from God before or no? If not, then all former Ages have believ'd without ſufficient ground for Faith; if they were, then what ground can there be to confirm us in them now? Certainly God, who never doth any thing but for very great purpoſes, will never alter the courſe of Nature, merely for ſatisfaction of Men's vain curioſities.

But it may be it will be ſaid, It was ſomething not fully reveal'd in Scripture which is thus confirm'd by Miracles: but where hath the Scripture told us, that any thing not fully reveal'd therein, ſhou'd be afterwards confirm'd? Was the Scripture an infallible rule of Faith, while this was wanting in it? Did *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles diſcharge their places, when they left ſomething unreveal'd to us? Was this a Duty before theſe Miracles or no? if it was, what need Miracles to confirm it? if not, *Chriſt* hath not told us all neceſſary conditions of Salvation. For whatever is required as a Duty, is ſuch, as the neglect of it runs Men upon damnation. *Laſtly*, Men's Faith will be left at continual uncertainties; for we know not according to this principle, when we have all that is neceſſary to be believ'd, or do all that is neceſſary to be practis'd in order to Salvation. For if God may ſtill make new Articles of Faith, or conſtitute new duties by freſh Miracles, I muſt go and enquire what Miracles are wrought in every place, to ſee I miſs nothing that may be neceſſary for me, in order to my happineſs in another World. VII.

If Men pretend to deliver any Doctrine contrary to the Scripture; then it is not only neceſſary that they confirm it by Miracles, but they muſt manifeſt the falſity of thoſe Miracles on which that Doctrine is believ'd, or elſe they muſt uſe another Miracle to prove that God will ſet his Seal to confirm both parts of a contradiction to be true. Which being the hardeſt task of all, had need be prov'd by very ſufficient and undoubted Miracles, ſuch as may be able to make us believe thoſe are Miracles, and are not, at the ſame time, and ſo the ſtrength of the Argument is utterly deſtroy'd by the *medium* produc'd to prove it by.

By this Diſcourſe theſe Two things are clear; *Firſt*, That no pretences of Miracles are to be hearkn'd to, when the Doctrine we are to believe is already eſtabliſh'd by them if thoſe miracles tend in the leaſt to the derogation of the truth of what was eſtabliſh'd by thoſe former Miracles. *Secondly*, That when the full Doctrine we are to believe is eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, there is no neceſſity at all of new Miracles, for confirmation of any of the truths therein deliver'd. And therefore it is a moſt unreaſonable thing to demand Miracles of thoſe to prove the truth of the Doctrine they deliver, who do firſt ſolemnly profeſs to deliver nothing but what was confirm'd by Miracles in the firſt delivery of it, and is contain'd in the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtament; and *ſecondly* do not pretend to any immediate Commiſſion from Heaven, but do nothing but what in their Conſciences they think every true Chriſtian is bound to do; much more all Magiſtrates and Miniſters, who believe the truth of what they profeſs, which is in their places to reform all Errors and Abuſes which are crept into the Doctrine or Practice of *Chriſtianity*, thro' the Corruption of Men or Times. And therefore it is a moſt unjuſt and unreaſonable demand of the *Papiſts*, when they require Miracles from our Firſt Reformers, to prove the truth of their Doctrine with. Had they pretended to have come with an immediate Commiſſion from Heaven to have added to the Doctrine of the Goſpel, there had been ſome plea for ſuch a demand; but it was quite otherwiſe with them: Their only deſign was, *to whip the buyers and ſellers out of the Temple*, to purge the Church from its abuſes: And altho' that by *Jerome* was thought to be one of our Saviour's greateſt Miracles, yet this by us is conceiv'd to be no other than the duty of all Magiſtrates, Miniſters, and private Chriſtians; theſe by their Prayers, Miniſters by their Doctrine, and Magiſtrates by their juſt Authority.

C. N.

171.2:E.

CHAP. IV.

The fidelity of the Prophets ſucceeding *Moſes*.

I. *An order of Prophets to ſucceed* Moſes, *by God's own appointment in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The Schools of the Prophets.* III. *The original and inſtitution of them.* IV. *The Cities of the Levites. The occaſion of their firſt inſtitution.* V. *The places of the Schools of the Prophets, and the tendency of the inſtitution there to a prophetical office.* VI. *Of the Muſic us'd in the Schools of the Prophets.* VII. *The Roman Aſſamenta, and the Greek Hymns in their ſolemn worſhip.* VIII. *The two ſorts of Prophets among the* Jews, *Leiger and extraordinary. Ordinary Prophets taken out of the Schools, prov'd by* Amos *and* Saul.

I. But altho' now under the Goſpel (the Revelation of God's Will being compleated by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles) we have no reaſon either to expect new Revelations, or new Miracles for confirming the Old; yet under the Law, God training up his People by degrees till the coming of *Chriſt*, there was a neceſſity of a new ſupply of Divine Meſſengers (call'd *Prophets*) to prepare the People, and make way for the coming of *Chriſt*. As to whom theſe two things are conſiderable.

Firſt, Thoſe Prophets whoſe work was to inform the People of their duties, or to reprove them for their ſins, or to prepare them for the coming of the *Meſſias* (which were their chief tasks) had no need to confirm the truth of their doctrine or commiſſion from Heaven by the working of Miracles among them. And that on theſe two accounts.

Firſt, Becauſe God did not conſummate the Revelation of his Mind and Will to the *Jews* by the Miniſtry of *Moſes*, but appointed a ſucceſſion of Prophets to be among them, to make known his Mind unto them. Now, in this caſe, when the prophetical office was eſtabliſh'd among them, what neceſſity was there that every one that came to them upon an Errand from God, ſhou'd prove his Teſtimony to be true by Miracles, when in the diſcharge of his Office he deliver'd nothing diſſonant from the Law of *Moſes?* It is one argument God intended a ſucceſſion of Prophets, when he laid down ſuch Rules in his Law for the judging of them, whether they were truly inſpir'd or no, *Deut.* 18. 21, 22. And in that ſame place God doth promiſe a ſucceſſion of Prophets, *Deut.* 18. 15, 18. *A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up unto thee like unto me; to him ſhall ye hearken.* Which words, tho' in their full and compleat ſenſe they do relate to *Chriſt* (who is the great Prophet of the Church) yet who ever attends to the full ſcope of the words, will eaſily perceive that the immediate ſenſe of them doth relate to an order of Prophets, which ſhou'd ſucceed *Moſes* among the *Jews*; between whom and *Moſes* there wou'd be a great ſimilitude as to their Birth, Calling, and Doctrine, tho' not a juſt equality, which is excluded, *Deut.* 34. 10, 11. and the chief reaſon why it is ſaid there that the other Prophets fell ſo much ſhort of *Moſes* is, in regard of the Signs and Wonders which he wrought, as is there largely expreſs'd. Nor may it ſeem ſtrange, that by a Prophet ſhou'd be underſtood an order or ſucceſſion of Prophets when it is acknowledg'd by moſt *Proteſtants*, that by ὁ Ἀντίχριστος, *the Antichriſt*, is underſtood a Rank and Succeſſion of ſeveral Perſons in the ſame name and function: And that it is to be underſtood in thoſe words concerning a ſucceſſion of Prophets, will appear by the occaſion of their being brought in; for ver. 14. God prohibits them to hearken after the manner of their Neighbour-nations, to Obſervers of times and Diviners, and then brings in the following words, *ver.* 15. as to the reaſon of that Prohibition, that *God would raiſe up a Prophet among themſelves like unto* Moſes, *and to him ſhould they hearken.* Now let any rational Man judge whether it were ſo probable an Argument to keep them from hearkening to Diviners of other Nations, that there ſhou'd be a Prophet ariſe 2000 years after like unto *Moſes*, as that he wou'd raiſe up a continued ſucceſſion of Prophets among themſelves, to whom they ſhou'd hearken. Thus *Origen* in his excellent Book againſt *Celſus*, ſhews the neceſſity of the Prophetical Office among the *Jews* from hence; *For*, ſaith he, *it being written in their Law that the Gentiles hearkened unto Oracles and Divinations; but God would not ſuffer it to be ſo among them, it preſently follows, A Prophet will the Lord God raiſe up in the midſt of thee,* &c. *Therefore*, ſaith he, *when the Nations round about them had their Oracles, and ſeveral ways of Divination, all which were ſtrictly prohibited among the* Jews, *if the* Jews *had no way of foreknowing things to come, it had been almoſt impoſſible, conſidering the great curioſity of humane nature, to have kept them from deſpiſing the Law of* Moſes, *or apoſtatizing to the heathen Oracles, or ſetting up ſomething like them among themſelves.* Which Interpretation of his ſeems to have a great deal of Reaſon, not only from the Coherence of the words here, but from the *Analogy* of many other Precepts of the Law of *Moſes*, which it is moſt certain have a reſpect to the cuſtoms of the Idolatrous Nations round about them. Another reaſon why it is moſt probable, that by this is underſtood a ſucceſſion of Prophets, is the charge which follows againſt falſe Prophets, and the Rules to diſcover them, *ver.* 20, 21, 22. which had not been ſo pertinent and coherent, if the oppoſition did not lie between the order of true Prophets among the *Jews*, and the falſe Prophets, which ſhou'd riſe up in the midſt of them. And

V. Arabic. verſ. & *Calv. in loc. P. Fagium, Pet. Mart. Loc. Com. Claſſ.* 1. *cap.* 3. *Sect.* 12.

Origin. con. Celſum, lib. 1. Deut. 18. 14.

And that which yet further juſtifies this Interpretation, is, that there is no other place in the whole *Pentateuch* which doth expreſly ſpeak of a ſucceſſion of Prophets, if this be not underſtood of it; and is it any ways probable a matter of ſo great moment and conſequence ſhou'd be wholly pretermitted? Eſpecially when we find it ſo exactly perform'd in the ſucceeding Ages of the Jewiſh Commonwealth; their immediate Ruler like Dictators at *Rome*, after *Moſes*'s death, being moſt rais'd up by immediate incitation and impulſe from God, and many of them inſpir'd with a Spirit of Prophecy. How ſhou'd the *Jews* have expected theſe, or obey'd them when they appear'd, had not God foretold it to them, and provided them for it by the Law of *Moſes*. 171.2 Th.

II. Neither did theſe Prophets ariſe ſingly among them, like blazing Stars, one in an Age, to portend future Events, but whole Conſtellations of them ſometimes united together; yea, ſo many ſmaller Prophets were ſometimes united together, as made a perfect *Galaxy*, when they were entred into Societies, and became Schools of the Prophets; for ſuch we frequently read of in Scripture. The Original and Inſtitution of which may caſt a further light into our preſent deſign, and ſhew us the little reaſon the *Jews* cou'd have to expect Miracles from them to confirm their Doctrine, who were brought up in the knowledge of their Law, and were call'd out of their ſeveral Societies into the prophetical office by the immediate incitation of God himſelf. Which being ſo commonly known among them, there needed no ſuch extraordinary proofs to manifeſt the Divine Authority by which they were employ'd. Two things then we ſhall endeavour to clear: *Firſt*, The Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets; and *Secondly*, That it was the ordinary courſe for the Prophets by employments to be taken forth of theſe Societies wherein they were educated. *Firſt*, for the Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets. The firſt Seminaries, or places of Inſtitution among the *Jews*, were the Cities of the *Levites*, which were diſperſed up and down in the ſeveral Tribes of *Iſrael*; God thereby turning that into a Bleſſing, which was pronounc'd as a curſe upon *Levi* by his Father *Jacob*, viz. *that he ſhould be divided in* Jacob, *and ſcattered in* Iſrael. But tho' the fulfilling of that Prophecy might be the primary ground of that ſcattering, yet it is evident that God aim'd at ſome further good in it, both in reference to the *Levites* and the *Iſraelites*. *Lyra* undertakes to aſſign four reaſons of this Diſtribution of the Cities of the *Levites* among the Tribes. (1) Becauſe if they had liv'd but in one Tribe, the Worſhip of God wou'd have ſeem'd to have been confin'd to that Tribe. (2.) Becauſe they wou'd have been a burden to that Tribe they had their habitations in. (3.) From the equity of being maintain'd by all who ſerv'd for all. (4.) Becauſe it was their office to teach the People, and therefore it was neceſſary they ſhou'd live among them. Theſe Reaſons are moſt of them oppos'd by *Abulenſis*, but defended by others. The laſt is that which moſt inſiſt on, it being the peculiar office of the *Levites* to teach the People; ſo 2 *Chron.* 35. 4. *And ſaid unto the Levites, qui erudiebant omnem Iſraelem*, as *Vatablus* renders it, *who taught all Iſrael*; and *Maſius* inſiſts on that as the great reaſon of their diſperſion, to be ready to teach the Law among the *Iſraelites*. But yet all thoſe who are agreed that Teaching the Law was the Duty of the *Levites*, are not yet agreed of the manner of that Teaching; for there being two parts of their Law, the one Ceremonial and Judicial, and the other Moral and Spiritual,

Gen 49.7.

Joſh. 21.

Abulenſis in Joſh. 21. c. 7 & 8. *V. Sherlog. Antiq. Hebraic. l.* 2. c. 3 ſ. 4. *Maſius in Joſh.* c. 14.

Spiritual, the Queſtion is, Whether of theſe two did belong to, or was perform'd by the *Prieſts* and *Levites*. There are many who underſtand all that Office of Teaching, which belong'd to the *Prieſts* and *Levites* to be merely concerning the Ceremonial Law, *i. e.* deciding all Caſes and Controverſies which ſhou'd ariſe concerning their Ceremonial Worſhip, which in *Levit.* 10. 10. is call'd *putting a difference between holy and unholy, and between clean and unclean.* But it ſeems ſomewhat ſtrange that God ſhou'd take ſo great care about the Shell and Outſide of his Worſhip, and none at all for the Moral and Spiritual part of it, eſpecially when he had ſet apart a whole Tribe merely for his own ſervice, and freed them from all other employments, that they might have a greater liberty to attend upon the things relating to his ſervice; eſpecially when it is mention'd as the Duty of the *Prieſts* and *Levites*, *to teach all the ſtatutes which the Lord had ſpoken to them by the hand of* Moſes, and that *they ſhall teach* Jacob *thy ſtatutes, and* Iſrael *thy law.* Lev. 10. 10. Deut. 33. 10. Which notwithſtanding what *Abarbinel* and others ſay, muſt certainly comprehend as well the Moral as the Ceremonial part of *Moſes* his Law. And the *Prieſts lips are ſaid to preſerve knowledge: and God ſaith they ſhould ſeek the law at his mouth; for he is the meſſenger of the Lord of Hoſts.* Mal. 2. 7. Do theſe things import no more than mere deciding the caſes of the Ceremonial Law? But whatever God's intention in the inſtitution of the *Levites* was, we find not much in Scripture of what they did for the promoting the Moral and Spiritual part of Divine Worſhip; but it is no news to hear that Societies inſtituted for good and pious ends, ſhou'd degenerate from the firſt intention of the Founders of them; and thus it is probable it was with the *Levites*, who finding the moſt of their benefit and advantage to come in by the Ceremonial Caſes, might grow more negligent of the Moral part of Divine Service, which brought no ſecular emolument to them.

III. And thence we read not of theſe Schools of the Prophets, which were Societies in order to Spiritual Inſtruction, till about the time of *Samuel*; and many think him to have been the firſt Author of them. For it is evident, that about his time the Prieſthood was grown to a great degeneracy, and Men thereby eſtranged from the Worſhip of God, ſo that there ſeem'd almoſt a neceſſity then of reſtoring ſome Societies, who might have a ſpecial eye to the Spiritual part of God's Worſhip and Service. The occaſion of the Inſtitution of them, ſeems to have been 1 Sam. 3. 1. from the reſort which the People had to the high places for ſacrificing, during the captivity or uncertain abode of the *Ark of God*, after the deſolation of *Shiloh*: now the People reſorting to theſe places to perform their Solemnities, it was ſo ordered, that a company of Prophets ſhou'd be there preſent to *bleſs the Sacrifices*, and inſtruct the People. Two of 1 Sam. 9. 12, 13. theſe places with the Societies in them we find mention'd in the time of *Samuel*. The *firſt* mention'd 1 *Sam.* 10. 5, 10. which cannot be *Ramah*, altho' the *Syriac* and *Arabic* Verſions ſo render it. For *Samuel* had his own reſidence in *Ramah* whither *Saul* went to him, 1 *Sam.* 9. 18, 19. but in this Chapter we find *Samuel* ſending *Saul* on a journey from him beyond *Bethel*, and the plain of *Tabor*, and there tells him he ſhou'd meet with the *company of the Prophets upon the hill of God*, ver. 5. Some think it was called the *Hill of God*, becauſe of its height, as *the Cedars of God*, and *the Mountains of God for the higheſt*; ſo *Tirinus* underſtands it, but *Menochius* far more probably, *quia in ea erat cœtus & veluti ſchola prophetarum.* The *Chaldee* Paraphraſt renders it, *ad* 1 Sam. 7. 1.

collem in quo arca Domini. R. *Solomon* makes the Hill to be *Kirjah-jearim*, and therefore call'd *the hill of God*; becauſe the *Ark* was there in the *houſe of* Abinadab *in the hill.* But *Lyra* thinks he hath prov'd, that before this time the *Ark* was remov'd from *Kirjah-jearim* to *Mizpah*; but *Abulenſis* more probably conceives it was never remov'd thither, and thinks this hill of God to be no other than *Gibeah* of *Benjamin*, where *Saul* inhabited; and thence the wonder was the greater, to ſee him propheſie among thoſe who had known his former life and education. The other place is *Naioth* in *Ramah*, where was a *high place*, whither the People came to ſacrifice; this *Ramah* ſeems to have been the place of *Samuel*'s nativity, call'd *Ramathaim Sophim*, which the *Syriac* verſion renders *collis ſpecularum* (ſome who wou'd be ready to improve every thing for their purpoſe, wou'd think it was ſo call d in alluſion to the imployment of the young Students there. So *Heinſius* conceives שרה צפים to be underſtood, *Numb.* 23. 14. the place of *Watchmen*, from which word ſaith he, without doubt, the *Greeks* deriv'd their σοφοὶ, who were wont in ſuch high places to obſerve the courſe and motions of the Heavens; But to paſs by ſuch frivolous conjectures.) It ſeems a great deal more probable, that this *Ramah* which the *Septuagint* by a light mutation of the initial letters, calls ἀρμαθαὶμ, was the ſame with *Arimathea*, the Town of *Joſeph* mention'd in the Goſpel. But the place where the School of the Prophets was, ſeems to have been, with greateſt conveniency, for a place of Education, at ſome diſtance from the Town. *Vatablus* conceives it was built in the fields of *Ramah*, and the word *Naioth*, ſaith *Pet. Martyr*, properly ſignifies *paſtures*, and ſome *remote places quæ fere ſunt ſtudiis aptiſſima.* The *Chaldee* Paraphraſt renders *Naioth* by כית אולבנא, *a College or School of prophetical Education:* Over this College *Samuel* himſelf was Preſident, as moſt underſtand that place, 1 *Sam.* 19. 20. *And when they ſaw the company of Prophets propheſying, and* Samuel *ſtanding as appointed over them*; *Jonathan* renders it, *Et Samuelem ſtantem docentem ſuper eos.* To which we may well apply the words of *Philo*, ſpeaking of the *Jewiſh* manner of Inſtruction, τοῦ μὲν ἡγεμόνος ὑφηγουμένου καὶ διδάσκοντος, τῶν δ' ἐπιδιδόντων εἰς καλοκαγαθίαν καὶ βελτιουμένων τά τε ἤθη καὶ τὸν βίον· *The Preſident going before and teaching, the reſt increaſing in goodneſs, and improving in life and manners.*

Vid. Jun. in loc.

1 Sam. 19. 18, 20.

1 Sam. 1. 1.

Heinſ. Exercit. Sacræ l. 1. c. 2.

Phil. Jud. de. v. Moſ. l. 3.

IV. Neither can we think ſo good and uſeful an Inſtitution ſhou'd preſently degenerate, or be turned into another Chanel; and therefore ſome conceive that the moſt noted Prophets to the time of *David* were the Preſidents of theſe Colleges; ſuch as beſides *Samuel* were *Helcana*, *Gad*, *Nathan*, *Heman*, and *Jeduthun*; and that they ſelected out the choiceſt and moſt hopeful of the young *Levites*, and here educated them, together with the *Nazarites* which came out of other Tribes. And it ſeems very probable, that in all the moſt noted high places whither they went to ſacrifice, there were ſuch Schools erected after the firſt Inſtitution of them. Thence we read of ſuch multitudes of the Prophets together, in the time of *Ahab*, 1 *Kings* 18. 4. for when *Jezabel* cut off the Prophets of the Lord, *Obadiah took an hundred, and hid them in caves*; and certainly their number was very great, when an hundred might be ſav'd without miſſing. The chief places where they reſided, ſeem to have been *Bethel*, 2 *Kings* 2. 3. and *Jericho*, which was a large College; for therein we read of *fifty ſons of the Prophets ſtanding together out of their number*, 2 Kings 2. 5, 7, 15. and *Gilgal*, which had been *a place of Religion* from the firſt entrance into *Canaan*; there we find *the ſons of the Prophets ſitting before Eliſha*, 2 Kings 4. 38. It ſeems moſt probable that the purity of God's Worſhip among the ten Tribes after the defection in the time of *Jeroboam* was preſerv'd by the Prophets in their *ſeveral Schools and places of habitation*; which hath ſufficient foundation in that place, 2 *Kings* 4. 23. where the *Shunamite*'s husband asks her, *Wherefore ſhe would go to the man of God that day, ſeeing it was neither new-moon nor Sabbath.* Whereby it is both evident, that the Prophets did undertake the office of inſtructing the People on their ſolemn Feſtivals, and that it was their cuſtom to reſort to them for that end. Thus we ſee what care God took for the inſtruction of his People, in a time of ſo general an Apoſtaſie as that of the ten Tribes was, when the Church of God cou'd not be known by that conſtant Viſibility and outward Glory, which ſome ſpeak ſo much of, but was then clouded in obſcurity, and ſhrouded it ſelf under the Mantles of ſome Prophets which God continued among them, and that not by any lineal ſucceſſion neither, tho' the *Jews* wou'd fain make the gift of Prophecy to be a kind of *Cabbala* too, and convey'd in a conſtant ſucceſſion from one Prophet to another. Neither were theſe Schools of the Prophets only in *Iſrael*, but in *Judah* likewiſe was God known, and his Name was great among theſe Schools there. In *Jeruſalem* it ſelf there was a College where *Huldah* the Propheteſs liv'd, 2 *Kings* 22. 14. ſome render *Miſhna in ſecunda urbis parte*; for *Jeruſalem* was divided into the Upper and Nether part of the City. *Abulenſis* and *Lyra* will have it refer to the three Walls of the City in which the three chief parts of it were compriz'd; in the *firſt*, the Temple and the King's Palace; in the *ſecond*, the Nobles and the Prophets Houſes; and in the *third*, the common People. *Joſephus* ſeems to favour the diviſion of the City into three parts; but *Pineda* thinks the *ſecond* part of the City was moſt inhabited by Artificers, and that the Prophets, and the Wiſe Men, and ſuch as frequented the Temple moſt, dwelt in the City of *David* within the firſt Wall; and therefore he conjectures that the College was upon Mount *Sion*, (and ſo properly call'd *Sion* College) and he explains that *Houſe*, which *Wiſdom is ſaid to have built, and hewn out her ſeven pillars*, Prov. 9. 1. by this College, which he ſuppoſeth was built by *Solomon* in Mount *Sion*, and thence *ver.* 3. *ſhe is ſaid to cry upon the higheſt places of the City.* Thus much may ſerve concerning the Original and Inſtitution of theſe Schools of the Prophets.

V. Manaſſ. Ben Iſrael. Concil. in Exod. 9. 35.

Joſeph. de bell. Jud. l. 6. *c.* 6. *Pineda de reb. Solom. l.* 3. *c.* 28.

V. I now come to the *Second* thing promis'd concerning the Schools of the Prophets, which is, *That it was God's ordinary Method to call thoſe perſons out of theſe Schools, whom he did employ in the diſcharge of the Prophetical Office.* Two things will be neceſſary for the clearing of this: *Firſt*, What Tendency their Education in thoſe Schools had towards the fitting them for their Prophetical Office. *Secondly*, What Evidence the Scripture gives us that God called the Prophets out from theſe Colleges. The *firſt* of theſe is very requiſite to be clear'd, becauſe the Prophetical Office depending upon immediate Inſpiration, it is hard to conceive what influence any antecedent and preparatory diſpoſitions can have upon receiving the Prophetical Spirit. It is commonly known how much the generality of *Jewiſh* Writers do inſiſt on the neceſſity of theſe qualifications antecedent to a Spirit of Prophecy. 1. An excellent Natural Temper. 2. Good Accompliſhments both of Wit and Fortunes. 3. Separation from the World. 4. Congruity of place which they make proper to *Judæa*.) 5. Opportunity of time. 6. And Divine Inſpiration. Theſe are ſo largely diſcours'd of by many Learned Men from *Jewiſh* Writers, that it will be both tedious and impertinent to recite much of their Opinions concerning them: who, ſince they have loſt the gift of Prophecy, ſeem to have loſt too that Wiſdom and Natural Underſtanding, which they make one of the moſt neceſſary qualifications of a Prophet. It is not eaſy to imagine what ſubſerviency Riches cou'd have to a prophetical Spirit, unleſs the *Jews* be of *Simon Magus* his Opinion, that theſe gifts of the Holy Ghoſt may be purchas'd with Money; and if ſo, they think themſelves in as likely a way to bid fair for a Prophetical Spirit, as any People in the World. Or is it that they think it impoſſible any without them ſhou'd have that free, cheerful and generous Spirit, which they make ſo neceſſary to a Prophetic Spirit, that it is an Axiome of great Authority with them, *Spiritus ſanctus non reſidet ſuper hominem mœſtum*: and they think *Eliſha* his fit of paſſion did excuſs his Prophetic Spirit from him, which he was fain to retrieve again with a fit of Muſic. There are only two ſorts of thoſe antecedent diſpoſitions which ſeem to bear any affinity with the Prophetic Spirit: And thoſe are ſuch as tended to the improvement of their Natural Faculties, and ſuch as tended to their advancement in piety, and conſequently to the ſubduing all irregular motions in their Souls: Not that either of theſe did concur by way of efficiency to the production of a Spirit of Prophecy (which is an opinion *Maimonides* ſeems very favourable to) but that GOD might make choice particularly of ſuch perſons, to remove all prejudices againſt them in thoſe they were ſent unto. For nothing cou'd poſſibly diſſatisfy them more concerning Divine Inſpiration, than if the perſon who pretended to it were of very weak and ſhallow intellectuals, or known to be of an irregular converſation. In order therefore to the fuller ſatisfaction of Men concerning theſe two qualifications, this Inſtitution of them in the Schools of the Prophets was of great ſubſerviency, becauſe therein their only Employment was to improve in knowledge, and eſpecially in true piety. This latter being the moſt neceſſary diſpoſition, ſince the Apoſtle hath told us that the Prophets were *Holy men, who ſpake as they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt.* And in order to this, the greateſt part we can find of the exerciſes of thoſe who were educated in theſe Schools of the Prophets, were Inſtructions in the Law, and the ſolemn celebration of the praiſes of GOD: Which appears in Scripture to have been their chief employment as Prophets, and by which they are ſaid to propheſie: So at *Gibeah* at the Oratory there, *we find a company of Prophets coming down from the high place with a Pſaltery, a Tabret and Pipe, and a Harp before them, and propheſying.*

V. G. Vor. in Maim. fundam. leg. c. 7. *Sect.* 1. Mr. *Smith* of Prophecy, c. 8.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. *c.* 36.

2 Pet. 1. 21.

1 Sam. 10. 5.

VI. It may ſeem ſomewhat ſtrange to conſider what relation theſe Muſical Inſtruments had to the propheſying here mention'd. Are Muſical Notes like ſome Seeds Naturaliſts ſpeak of, which will help to excite a prophetic Spirit? Or do they tend to elevate the Spirits of Men and ſo put them into a greater capacity of *Enthuſiaſm*? Or is it becauſe Muſic is ſo excellent for allaying the tumults of inward paſſions; and ſo fitting the Soul for the better entertainment of the Divine Spirit? Or was all this propheſying here ſpoken of nothing elſe but Vocal and Inſtrumental Muſic? So ſome indeed underſtand it, that it was only the praiſing GOD with Spiritual Songs and Melody; wherein one as the *Præcentor* began a Hymn, which the reſt took from him and carry'd on. I confeſs it carries the faireſt probability with it, that this propheſying with Muſical Inſtruments was at their places and times of ſacrifice, an adjunct, if not a part of the ſolemn ſervice of God: which was manag'd chiefly by the Choire of the Sons of the Prophets which were reſident there, and were train'd up in all exerciſes of piety and devotion. But yet I cannot ſee any reaſon to think that all this propheſying was merely ſinging of Hymns, and playing upon their Muſical Inſtruments to them, as ſome imagine, becauſe there ſeems to be implied ſome immediate impulſes of a prophetic Spirit, by what *Samuel* ſaid to *Saul*, that when he came among the Prophets, *the Spirit of the Lord would come upon him, and he ſhould propheſy with them, and he ſhould become another man.* 1 Sam. 10. 6. What ſtrange impulſe and wonderful transformation was this merely for *Saul* to joyn with the Prophets in their praiſes of God? And this needed not ſo much admiration as follow'd there upon this action of *Saul's*, that it ſhou'd become a Proverb, *Is* Saul *alſo among the Prophets?* 1 Sam. 10. 12. Certainly *Saul* was a very great hater of all ſpiritual Muſic before, if it became a Proverb merely for his being preſent at, or joyning with this company in ſinging their Hymns. Therefore others think that thoſe who are ſaid particularly to propheſy at theſe Muſic meetings, were ſome perſons as chief among the reſt, who having their ſpirits elevated by the Muſic, did compoſe Hymns upon the place by a Divine Energy inwardly moving their Minds. So that there were properly Divine Raptures in ſome of them, which tranſported them beyond the ordinary power of Fancy or Imagination, in dictating ſuch Hymns as might be ſuitable for the deſign of celebrating the honour of God.

VII. Neither may it ſeem ſtrange that ſuch an *Enthuſiaſtic* Spirit ſhou'd ſeize on them only at ſuch ſolemn times, ſince we read in the New Teſtament of a like exerciſe of ſuch gifts in the Church of *Corinth*, 1 *Cor.* 14. 26. where we ſee in *coming together every one had a Pſalm, a Doctrine, a Tongue, a Revelation,* &c. Whereby it appears that they were inſpir'd upon the place; *etiam extemporales Hymni ſæpe ab afflatu erant*, as *Grotius* there obſerves; as we ſee it in frequent inſtances in Scripture, of *Simeon* and *Anna*, *Moſes* and *Miriam*, *Deborah* and *Iſaiah*; and in the Chriſtian Church after that Land-flood of Inſpired Gifts was much abated in the Church, they kept up a cuſtom much like to theſe *extemporal* Hymns, as appears evidently by *Tertullian*, *poſt aquam manualem & luminaut quiſque de Scripturis ſanctis vel de proprio ingenio poteſt, provocatur in medium Deo canere:* Tertull. Apol. c. 39. After they had ended their Love-Feaſts, they begun their Hymns, which were either taken from the Scriptures, or of their own compoſition. Which *Pliny* takes notice of as a great part of the Chriſtian worſhip, that they did *ſecum invicem carmen Chriſto quaſi Deo dicere, they joyned in ſinging hymns to Chriſt as God.* Plin. Ep. l. 10. Ep. 97. Nay, we find ſomething very parallel to this preſerv'd among the ruins of the Heathen worſhip; ſuch were the *Aſſamenta* among the old *Romans*, which were peculiarly ſung to the honour of ſome particular God; thence the *Aſſamenta Janualia, Junonia, Minervia,* which were *privata poemata & carmina in ſingulos eos Deos conſcripta*, as the learned *Joſeph Scaliger* obſerves. Scal. conj. in Varr. p. 121. So likewiſe the *Greeks* had their ſolemn Hymns to their Gods, ſome to the propitious Gods, which they call'd κλητοὺς ὕμνους, and the *Latins* properly *Indigitamenta*, and *Carmen calatorium*; others they had to their *Vejoves*, or *Lævalumina*, which they call'd ὕμνους ἀποτροπαίους the *Latins*, *Carmen Averruncale*; but beſides theſe, they had ſome peculiar to the ſeveral Deities, as ὁ οὔπιγγος to *Diana*, Παιὰν to *Apollo*, Ἴουλος

Proclus ap. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 239.

to *Ceres*, *Dithyrambus* to *Bacchus*, *Adonidia* to *Adonis*, as *Proclus* tells us in his *Chreſtomathia*. And it is withal evident, that the Heathens thought ſome of their Prieſts inſpired while they were performing theſe ſolemn Devotions to the Gods (which probably was by *Satan*, as many other things in Heathen worſhip, taken up in imitation of theſe inſpired Hymns, and Muſic us'd by the Sons of the Prophets) but their Hymns were ſo compos'd, as to be fit rather to tranſport Men beyond the power of their reaſon, than to compoſe and ſweeten it, which was ſuitable to the fanatic *Enthuſiaſm*, which was ſo common among them. So *Proclus* tells us that the *Io-Bacche* was βεβαπτισμένος πολλῷ φρυάγματι, *full of noiſe and din*; and the *Dithyrambus* was κεκινημένος καὶ πολὺ τὸ ἐνθουσιῶδες, μετὰ χορείας ἐμφαίνων, *a kind of extatic Morice-dance*, and their Prieſts were apprehended by them to be under a real *Enthuſiaſm*, at theſe ſolemnities. So the *Corybantes* are deſcrib'd rather like mad Men than mere *Enthuſiaſts* by *Strabo*; they were ἐνθουσιαστικοί τινες καὶ βακχικοί, as he deſcribes them, *dancing about with their cymbals and drums, and arms and pipes*, (as tho' a *Bedlam* had been broke looſe among them) yet this was in high eſteem among them; for, as *Strabo* after ſaith, ὅ τε ἐνθουσιασμὸς ἐπίπνευσίν τινα θείαν ἔχειν δοκεῖ, καὶ τῷ μαντικῷ γένει πλησιάζειν, *this Enthuſiaſm ſeemed to have a Divine touch with it, and to come very near to a prophetic ſpirit.*

Strabo l. 10.

But tho' the propheſying with Muſic among the Sons of the Prophets, might be by ſome *Extemporary* Hymns immediately dictated by the *Precentor* of the Chorus; yet we are not to imagine any ſuch frantic actions among them as were among the *Curetes* and *Corybantes*, it being always the Devil's temper to over-do, when he ſtrives to imitate, and inſtead of ſolemn and ſet devotions, to carry Men beyond all ſenſe and reaſon. The Spirit of God did never dictate any *Io-Bacche's* or *Dithyrambs* to tranſport and amuſe the ſpirits of Men; but thoſe ſweet Airs which both compoſe and elevate the ſpirits of all that heard them. For in probability the ſpirits of all theſe Prophets were as Lutes tun'd to the ſame height, that when the Spirit of God did ſtrike upon one of them, the reſt preſently anſwer'd to it, and ſo made up an entire Conſort among them. So *Menochius* thinks the Spirit of God not only moved the ſpirit of him who was the *Præcentor*, but the reſt likewiſe who joyn'd with him; and they are ſaid to prophecy, ſaith *Torniellus*, *forte quod non quaſcunque ſed Propheticas duntaxat cantiones præcinerent*; but from hence we clearly ſee what the great Employment was in theſe Schools of the Prophets, which, as the ſame Author expreſſeth it was *ſtatis horis de rebus divinis diſſerere, & divinis laudibus vacare*; and thereby we underſtand what reference this Inſtitution had in order to the prophetical Office, becauſe the Spirit of God did much appear among them, and all their Exerciſes tended to piety, and ſo did remove all prejudices from their perſons, when God did ſend them abroad afterwards.

Tornielli Annal. ad An. Mun. 2945. Sect. 14.

VIII. And ſo it is evident he frequently did, not to ſay always, for that were to put too great a reſtraint upon the boundleſs Spirit of God: For ſometimes, as will appear afterwards, God ſent the Prophets upon extraordinary meſſages, and then furniſh'd them with ſufficient Evidence of their Divine Commiſſion, without being beholding to the Teſtimonials of the Schools of the Prophets. But beſides theſe, God had a kind of Leiger-Prophets among his People; ſuch were the moſt of thoſe whom we read of in Scripture, which were no Pen-men of the ſacred Scripture;

ſuch in *David*'s time we may conceive *Gad* and *Nathan*, and afterwards we read of many other Prophets and Seers among them, to whom the People made their reſort: Now theſe in probability were ſuch as had been train'd up in the prophetic Schools, wherein the Spirit of God did appear, but in a more fixed and ſettled way than in the extraordinary Prophets, whom God did call out on ſome more ſignal occaſions, ſuch as *Iſaiah* and *Jeremiah* were. We have a clear foundation for ſuch a diſtinction of Prophets in thoſe words of *Amos* to *Amaziah*, Amos 7. 14. 15. *I was no Prophet, neither was I a Prophets ſon; but I was a herdſman, and a gatherer of ſycamore fruits: And the Lord took me as I followed the flock; and the Lord ſaid unto me, Go propheſy to my people* Iſrael. Some underſtand the firſt words, *I was no Prophet*, that he was not born a Prophet, as *Jeremiah* was, not deſign'd and ſet apart to it from his Mother's womb; but I rather think by his not being a Prophet, he means he was none of thoſe reſident Prophets in the Colleges or Schools of them, not any of thoſe who had led a prophetic life, and withdrawn themſelves from converſe with the world; nor *was I* (ſaith he) *the ſon of a Prophet*, *i. e.* not brought up in Diſcipleſhip under thoſe Prophets, and thereby train'd up in order to the prophetic function. *Non didici inter diſcipulos Prophetarum*, as *Pellican* renders it; *nec inſtitutione qua filii Prophetarum quaſi ad donum Prophetiæ à parentibus præparabantur*, ſaith *Eſtius*. *Non à puero educatus in Scholis Propheticis*; ſo *Calvin* and moſt other modern Interpreters underſtand it, as well as *Abarbinel* and the Jewiſh Writers. Whereby it is evident that God's ordinary way for the Prophets, was to take ſuch as had been train'd up and educated in order to that end, altho' God did not tie up himſelf to this method, but ſometimes call'd one from the Court, as he did *Iſaiah*; ſometimes one from the herds, as here he did *Amos*, and bid them *go propheſy to the houſe of* Iſrael. There was then a kind of ſtanding College of Prophets among the *Iſraelites*, who ſhined as fixed Stars in the firmament; and there were others who had a moſt planetary motion, and withal a more lively and reſplendent Illumination from the fountain of prophetic Light. And further it ſeems that the Spirit of Prophecy did not ordinarily ſeize on any, but ſuch whoſe Inſtitution was in order to that end, by the great admiration which was caus'd among the People at *Saul*'s ſo ſudden propheſying, that it became a Proverb, *Is* Saul *alſo among the Prophets?* which had not given the leaſt foundation for an Adage for a ſtrange and unwonted thing, unleſs the moſt common appearances of the Spirit of Prophecy had been among thoſe who were trained up in order to it. Thus I ſuppoſe we have fully cleared the firſt reaſon why there was no neceſſity for the ordinary Prophets, whoſe chief office was inſtruction of the People, to prove their commiſſion by Miracles, becauſe God had promis'd a ſucceſſion of Prophets by *Moſes*, and theſe were brought up ordinarily to that end among them; ſo that all prejudices were ſufficiently remov'd from their perſons without any ſuch extraordinary power as that of Miracles.

1 Sam. 10. 12, 19, 24.

CHAP. V.

The tryal of the Prophetical Doctrine.

171:2A

I. *Rules of trying Prophets eſtabliſhed in the Law of* Moſes. II. *The puniſhment of pretenders. The ſeveral ſorts of falſe Prophets. The caſe of the Prophet at* Bethel *diſcuſſed.* III. *The tryal of falſe Prophets belonging to the great* Sanhedrin. IV. *The particular rules whereby the doctrine of Prophets was judged. The proper notion of a Prophet, not foretelling future contingencies, but having immediate divine Revelation.* V. *Several Principles laid down for clearing the doctrine of the Prophets.* 1. *That immediate dictates of natural light are not to be the meaſure of divine Revelation. Several grounds for divine Revelation from natural light.* VI. 2. *Whatever is directly repugnant to the dictates of nature, cannot be of divine Revelation.* VII. 3. *No divine Revelation doth contradict a divine poſitive Law without ſufficient evidence of God's intention to repeal that Law.* VIII. 4. *Divine Revelation in the Prophets, was not to be meaſured by the words of the Law, but by the intention and reaſon of it. The prophetical office a kind of chancery to the Law of* Moſes.

I. THe ſecond Reaſon why thoſe Prophets whoſe main office was inſtruction of the People, or merely foretelling future events, needed not to confirm their Doctrine by Miracles, is, becauſe they had certain rules of tryal by their Law whereby to diſcern the falſe Prophets from the true. So that if they were deceiv'd by them, it was their own oſcitancy and inadvertency which was the cauſe of it. GOD in that *Law* which was confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly divine, had eſtabliſh'd a Court of tryal for prophetic Spirits, and given ſuch certain Rules of procedure in it, that no Men needed to be deceiv'd, unleſs they wou'd themſelves. And there was a greater neceſſity of ſuch a certain way of tryal among them, becauſe it could not otherwiſe be expected but in a Nation where a prophetic Spirit was ſo common, there wou'd be very many pretenders to it, who might much endanger the Faith of the People, unleſs there were ſome certain way to find them out. And the more effectually to deter Men either from counterfeiting a prophetic Spirit, or from hearkning to ſuch as did, GOD appointed a ſevere puniſhment for every ſuch pretender, *viz.* upon legal conviction, that he be puniſhed with death. Deut. 18. 20. *But the Prophet which ſhall preſume to ſpeak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to ſpeak, or that ſhall ſpeak in the name of other Gods, ſhall ſurely die*, The *Jews* generally underſtand this of ſtrangling, as they do always in the Law, when the particular manner of death is not expreſſed. And therein a falſe Prophet and a Seducer were diſtinguiſhed each from other, that a mere Seducer was to be ſtoned to death under ſufficient teſtimony, *Deut.* 13. 6, 10. But the falſe Prophet is there ſaid in general only to be put to death,

V. Maimon. de Id l. c. 5. *ſ.* 1. *& ib Voſſiu r.*

death, *Deut.* 13. 1, 5. The main difference between the Seducer and falſe prophet was, that the Seducer ſought by cunning perſuaſions and plauſible arguments, to draw them off from the worſhip of the true God; but the falſe Prophet always pretended divine revelation for what he perſuaded them to, whether he gave out that he had that Revelation from the true God, or from Idols and falſe Gods. So that the mere pretence to divine Revelation was that which God wou'd have puniſhed with ſo great ſeverity.

II. The *Jews* tell us of three ſorts of Prophets who were to be puniſhed with death by Men, and three other ſorts who were reſerved to divine puniſhment: Of the firſt rank were theſe; 1. He that propheſied that which he had not heard, and for this they inſtance in *Zedekiah* the ſon of *Chenaanah*, who made him horns of iron, and ſaid, *Thus ſaith the Lord*, this was the Lying Prophet. 2. He that ſpeaks that which was revealed not unto him, but to another, and for this they inſtance in *Hananiah* the ſon of *Azur*, (but how truly I ſhall not determine) this was the Plagiary Prophet. 3. He that propheſied in the name of an Idol, as the Prophets of *Baal* did, this was the Idol Prophet. Theſe three, when once fully convicted, were to be put to death. The other rank of thoſe which were left to God's hand conſiſted of theſe; 1. He that ſtifles and ſmothers his own prophecy, as *Jonas* did, by which it may ſeem that when the Divine Spirit did overſhadow the Underſtanding of the Prophets, yet it offered no violence to their Faculties, but left them to the free determination of their own Wills in the execution of their Office; but this muſt be underſtood of a lower degree of Prophecy for at ſome times their Prophecies were *as fire in their bones*, that they were never at any reſt till they had diſcharged their Office. But withal by the example of *Jonas*, we ſee, that tho' the Spirit of Prophecy, like the Fire, on the Altar, cou'd only be kindled from Heaven, yet it might be deſtroyed when it was not maintained with ſomething to feed upon; or when it met not with ſuitable entertainment from the Spirits of thoſe it fell upon, it might retreat back again to Heaven, or at leaſt lie hid in the embers, till a new blaſt from the Spirit of God doth ἀναζωπυρεῖν, *retrieve* it into its former *heat* and *activity*. Thus it was with *Jonas*. 2. The other was, He that deſpiſed the words of a true Prophet; of ſuch God, ſaith, *Deut.* 18. 19. *And it ſhall come to paſs, that whoſoever will not hearken to my words which ye ſhall ſpeak in my name, I will require it of him.* Which *Maimonides* explains by מיתה בידי שמים, *death by the hands of God*, which he thus diſtinguiſheth from the *Cereth*, that he makes the death *per manus cœli*, to be leſs than the *Cereth*, becauſe this latter continued in the Soul after death, but the other was expiated by death; but generally they interpret it of a ſudden death, which falls upon the perſon. 3. The laſt is, He who hearkens not to the words of his own Prophecy; of which we have a moſt remarkable inſtance in Scripture concerning the Prophet whom God ſent to *Bethel* (whom *Tertullian* calls *Sameas*, the *Jews*, *Hedua*) whom God deſtroy'd in an unuſual manner for not obſerving the command which God had given him, *not to eat bread nor drink water at* Bethel, *nor turn again by the way he came*. Neither was it any excuſe to this Prophet, that the old Prophet at *Bethel told him that an Angel ſpake unto him by the word of the Lord that he ſhould turn back*. For, 1. Thoſe whom God reveals his will unto, he gives them full aſſurance of it, in that they have a clear and diſtinct perception of God upon their own Minds; and ſo they have no doubt,

V. Except. Gem. Sanhedr. c. 10. *ſ.* 3.

1 King. 22. 11.

Jer. 28. 11.

Jer. 20. 9.

Maim. de fundam. legis, c. 9. *ſ.* 4. *V. Abarbinel de Cereth. apud Buxtorf. de ſponſ. & divort. p.* 182.

1 King 13. 9.

Ver. 18.

doubt, but it is the Word of the Lord which comes unto them; but this Prophet cou'd have no ſuch certainty of the Divine Revelation which was made to another, eſpecially when it came immediately to contradict that which was ſo ſpecially enjoyn'd him. 2. Where God commands a Prophet to do any thing in the purſuit of his Meſſage, there he can have no ground to queſtion whether God ſhou'd countermand it or no by another Prophet; becauſe that was in effect to thwart the whole deſign of his Meſſage. So it was in this action of the Prophet; for God intended his not eating and drinking in *Bethel* to teſtify how much he loathed and abominated that place ſince its being polluted with Idolatry. 3. He might have juſt cauſe to queſtion the integrity of the old Prophet, both becauſe of his living in *Bethel*, and not openly, according to his office, reproving their Idolatry, and that God ſhou'd ſend him out of *Judæa* upon that very errand, which wou'd not have ſeem'd ſo probable, if there had been true Prophets reſident upon the place. 4. The thing he deſired him to do, was not an act of that weight and importance, on which God us'd to ſend his Word to any Prophets, much leſs by one Prophet to contradict what he had ſaid by another;
Tertullian. de jejuniis, cap. 16. and therefore *Tertullian* ſaith of him, *pænam deſerti jejunii luit*, God puniſh'd him for breaking his faſt at *Bethel*; and therefore that Meſſage of this Prophet ſeem'd to gratify more Man's carnal appetite, than uſually the actions of Prophets did, which were moſt times matters of hardſhip and uneaſineſs to the fleſh. 5. However all theſe were, yet he yielded too ſoon, eſpecially having ſo much reaſon on his ſide as he had; being well aſſured that God had commanded him, he had reaſon to ſee ſome clear Evidence of a countermand, before he altered his mind: if he had ſeen any thing upon tryal which might have ſtaggered his faith, he ought to have made his immediate recourſe to God by Prayer for the ſettlement of his mind, and removal of this great temptation. But ſo eaſily to hearken to the words of a lying Prophet, which contradicted his own Meſſage, argued either great Unbelief as to his own Commiſſion, or too great Eaſineſs and Inadvertency in being drawn aſide by the old Prophet. And therefore God made that old Prophet himſelf in the midſt of his entertainment, as with a *Hand-writing againſt the wall*, to tell him *he was weighed in the balance*, and *found too light*; and therefore his Life ſhou'd be taken from him. Thus we ſee how dangerous a thing it was either to counterfeit a Spirit of Prophecy, or to hearken to thoſe who did.

III. It is the generally received opinion among the Jewiſh Doctors, that the cognizance and tryal of falſe Prophets did peculiarly belong to the great *Sanhedrin*. And that this was one end of its Inſtitution. So
Maimon. de Idolol at. c. 5. *ſ.* 11. *Maimonides* after he has largely diſcourſed of the puniſhment of a Seducer, and ſpeaking of that of a falſe Prophet, he lays this down as a ſtanding Rule among them, ואיודנין נביא חשקר אלא בנד של עא *No falſe Prophet was to be judged but in the Court of Seventy one*; which was the number of the great *Sanhedrin*. And there is ſomething looks very like this
Jer. 26. 8. in the proceedings of the People of *Iſrael* againſt the Prophet *Jeremiah*;
Ver. 10. for the People, the Prieſts and the Prophets, they laid hold on him;
V. Grot. in loc. & Seld. de Syn. l. 2. *c.* 15. *ſ.* 4. *& l.* 3. *c.* 6. *ſ.* 4. and immediately after we read that the Princes of *Judah* (by whom *Grotius* underſtands the *Senators* of the great *Sanhedrin*) *they came up from the King's houſe to the houſe of the Lord, and ſat down in the entry of the new gate of the Lord's houſe*; which probably was the place where
Jer. 26. 16. Jer. 3. 6. the great *Sanhedrin* ſat) where after a particular Examination of *Jeremi-*

ah, they acquit him as a *perſon not worthy to die* upon a counterfeiting Prophecy, but declare *that he ſpake unto them in the name of the Lord.* And in this ſenſe *Grotius* likewiſe underſtands what is ſaid of *Zedekiah* concerning *Jeremiah* to the Princes of *Judah* afterwards, *Behold he is in your hand; for the King is not he that can do ought againſt you*; *i. e.* ſaith *Grotius*, *In manibus Synedrii cujus eſt judicare de Propheta vero aut falſo.* And to this many make thoſe words of our Saviour refer, *That it is impoſſible a Prophet ſhould periſh out of* Jeruſalem, becauſe the ſeat of the great *Sanhedrin* was in *Jeruſalem*; and ſo elſewhere our Saviour ſaith, Luk. 13. 33. *O Jeruſalem*, *Jeruſalem*, *thou that killeſt the Prophets, and ſtoneſt them which are ſent unto thee*: becauſe there it was the true Prophets were de- Matth. 23. 70. ſtroy'd as tho' they had been falſe ones, and God's own Meſſengers puniſhed with the death of Seducers, which was Lapidation. And on this very account many are of opinion that our Saviour was condemned by the *Sanhedrin* at *Jeruſalem*; which is ſuppoſed to have been aſſembled in the houſe of *Caiaphas* the High-Prieſt, when *Chriſt* was carried thither for Examination; which ſome think to have been at his Lodgings in the Temple, others at his Palace in the City. For we read that the Chief Matth. 26. 59. Prieſts, and the Elders, and all the Council were met together at the High-Prieſts Palace in order to our Saviour's Tryal. The next Morning they were met early together again in order to the further ſcanning of this buſineſs; but they ſeem not to examine *Chriſt* concerning a true Spirit of Prophecy, but concerning his being the *Meſſias*, and calling himſelf *the Son of God*; and ſo they would ſeem rather to proceed upon the Matth. 26. 63. Law againſt Blaſphemy, than that againſt falſe Prophets.

IV. But that which was the greateſt ſecurity of the People againſt the Impoſture of falſe Prophets, was the certain Rules of judging them which were laid down in the Law of *Moſes*: which may be comprehended under theſe two Heads, ſuch as concern their Doctrine, or ſuch as concern their Predictions, *Firſt*, ſuch as concerned the Prophets Doctrine, which ſhou'd eſpecially be looked after, becauſe the main office of a Prophet was to be *interpres & internuncius divinæ voluntatis*, to be *a revealer of God's Will to Men*. For the primary Notion of a Prophet doth not lie in foretelling future events, but in declaring and interpreting to the world the Mind of God, which he receives by immediate Revelation from himſelf. So that the receiving what he makes known by immediate Revelation, is that which formally conſtitutes a Prophet; but it is wholly extrinſecal and accidental what time his Prophecy reſpects, whether paſt, preſent, or to come; but becauſe future contingencies are the furtheſt out of the reach of humane underſtanding, therefore the predictions of ſuch have been chiefly looked on as the chief Note and Character of a Prophet, as being apprehended to be the ſtrongeſt evidence of Divine Revelation. And hence it is in Scripture that Pſal. 105. 15. the Patriarchs as *Abraham* and others are called Prophets, not becauſe Gen. 20. 7. of any prediction utter'd by them, but becauſe of the frequency of immediate Divine Revelations among them. And hence likewiſe thoſe in the New Teſtament who expounded the Scriptures by immediate Inſpiration, are called Prophets; and this was the Ἀποκάλυψις ſpoken of by 1 Cor. 14. 26. the Apoſtle, the Expoſition of the hidden Myſteries of the Old Teſtament by an immediate Inſpiration. And there is no word in the *Hebrew* for a Prophet, which may not equally reſpect all differences of time, but every one doth import immediate Inſpiration; for נביא properly is one *qui revelat abſcondita*; ראה a *Seer* chiefly reſpects the clear repreſen-

Vide Alſte-dii Trifol. proph. p. 53 tation of the intellectual ſpecies by the *lumen propheticum* to the underſtanding, and חזה carries an equal indifferency to all circumſtances of time.

V. This being then the chief notion of a Prophet, whatever he declared as the Mind and Will of God, muſt be ſearched and examined, to ſee what conſonancy it hath thereto. For the queſtion which *Moſes* ſuppoſeth; Deut. 18. 21. is founded upon clear and evident reaſon, *And if thou ſhalt ſay in thine heart, How ſhall we know the Word which the Lord hath ſpoken?* For it being plain that there may be falſe Prophets as well as true, we had need of ſome certain rules to judge of what is delivered for Divine Revelation. For the clearing of which important Queſtion, I lay down theſe principles.

1. *The immediate dictates of natural light are no ſufficient ſtandard to judge of Divine Revelation by.* I mean not in reference to conſonancy or repugnancy to natural light, but in reference to the extent and latitude of Divine Revelation, *i. e.* that natural light doth not contain in it whatever may be known of God or of his Will; and that upon theſe reaſons: 1. It implies no repugnancy to any dictate of nature, that God ſhou'd reveal any thing more of his Mind and Will, than is contained in the light of nature. 2. Nature reacheth, as to matters concerning Religion, no further than the obligation to Duty, but leaves the particular determination of the manner of obedience to divine poſitive Laws, as is clear in reference to the time, place, and particular duties of worſhip. 3. Nature owning an univerſal obligation to the Will of God in whatever he ſhall command, doth ſuppoſe a power in God to command what he pleaſeth. 4. Nature is ſenſible of its own decays; and the imperfection of its own light, and therefore ſeems rather to require further illumination than to put any bar againſt it. 5. Man's happineſs being a free gift of God's, it ſtands to the higheſt reaſon that he ſhou'd have the preſcribing of the conditions which are in order to it; now theſe conditions being the reſults, not of God's nature, but of his arbitrarious Will, it is impoſſible that natural light cou'd ever reach to the full diſcovery of them, 6. It hath been the general ſenſe of all Nations in the World, that God may reveal more of his Will than Nature can reach unto; which ſenſe diſcovers it ſelf in two things. 1. Praying to their ſeveral Gods for direction. 2. Hearkening after pretended Oracles, which the Devil cou'd never have had that advantage of deceiving the World by, had it not been for this general ſenſe of Mankind, that there wanted ſome particular Revelation from God to make Men happy. So then this may be aſſumed as a principle, That God may reveal more of his Mind and Will to Mankind, than he hath done by the dictates of mere natural light and reaſon.

2. *Whatever ſpeaks a direct repugnancy to any of the fundamental dictates of nature cannot be of Divine Revelation.* For thoſe being founded, not upon any poſitive or arbitrary Will, but upon thoſe inward impreſſions which are derived from the Divine Nature its ſelf, it cannot in reaſon be ſuppoſed that God ſhou'd commiſſion any to enervate his own Fundamental Law; and ſo by one Will to contradict another. *Placitum Regis* muſt never ſtand againſt the *Placita Coronæ*: Thoſe things which depend upon Fundamental and Eſtabliſhed Laws, hold good againſt any poſitive ſentence or declaration of a Prince's Will; Becauſe he is ſuppoſed to have bound up himſelf by the eſtabliſhed Laws; and therefore any thing elſe which comes from him, contrary to them, is ſuppo-

ſed not to be the Will of the Prince, but of the perſons perſuading him to it. But this now cannot be ſuppoſed in God, that he ſhou'd be any ways drawn to caſſate the Obligation of what is imprinted upon the Souls of Men as his own Law. But yet we muſt diſtinguiſh between nulling the general Obligation, and altering the particular nature of any thing which depends upon that general Law; the *firſt* in any caſe is impoſſible, that any Divine Revelation ſhou'd make it not to be Man's Duty to obey his Maker, or not to be a ſin to commit Murder, to lye, or to ſteal from another; but there may come a particular Revelation from God to alter the reſpects and nature of ſuch things as do immediately depend upon his own dominion; as the lives of perſons and the properties of things are; and thus God did reveal to *Abraham* that he ſhou'd go and Sacrifice his Son, which had been no murder, when done upon God's immediate command, and a ſacrifice to himſelf, and therefore wou'd have been acceptable as a teſtimony of entire obedience (which God did accept without the act) and ſo the *Iſraelites* taking the *Ægyptians* Jewels, and diſpoſſeſſing the *Canaanites*, did depend upon God's immediate diſpoſal of theſe things to them, which otherwiſe had been a ſin in them, and no doubt was ſo to any that were unſatisfy'd whether God had immediately commanded it or no. Or from hence to infer any general rule, is no doubt a breach of Divine Commands, and contrary to his Nature and Will.

VII. 3. *Where God hath eſtabliſhed a poſitive Law, preſcribing a form and manner wherein he will be worſhipped, it is ſufficient evidence of a falſe Prophet, to go about to null the obligation of that Law; unleſs there be as great evidences given, that God did intend the eſtabliſhing a new Law by that Perſon, as he did at firſt the inſtitution of the old by the hand of* Moſes. This latter clauſe is inſerted, to ſhew that the ſucceeding of the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, into the place of the Law of *Moſes*, doth not bear any repugnancy to the *Hypotheſis* laid down, there being greater evidences of God's intending the aboliſhing the Ceremonial Law by the Goſpel of *Chriſt*, than there were of the eſtabliſhment of it by *Moſes*. But of thoſe afterwards. I now only ſpeak of ſuch as upon the mere pretence of Divine Revelation, ſhou'd deſtroy any precept of an eſtabliſhed poſitive Law; and this as far as we can find, was the great Rule the *Jews* went by; if any thing were ſpoken by any Prophet, contrary to the Law of *Moſes*, or tending to the alteration of the worſhip of God eſtabliſhed thereby, he was accounted a falſe Prophet. The modern *Jews* to juſtify themſelves in their own Belief, as to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*, extend this further than the Law doth; for they inlarge it to all the precepts of the Ceremonial Law; whereas God in the Law ſeems to limit it to the Moral Law, and chiefly inſiſts on the three firſt precepts of the *Decalogue*; and therefore condemns ſuch a *one* as *ſpake in the name of the Lord, when he had not commanded them*, Deut. 18. 20. and ſuch *endeavoured to bring in idolatry*, Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. where tho' the falſe Prophet ſhou'd offer to do ſigns and wonders before them, yet if his intention were to draw them to worſhip falſe Gods, they were not to hearken unto him. And therefore *Maimonides*, where he largely diſputes about the truth of Prophecies, lays this down as a certain Rule: *Si Propheta ſurrexerit, atque magna miracula aut prodigia fecerit, & adlaboraverit falſitatis convincere prophetiam* Moſis *M. N. iſtum non audimus, quia certò novimus prodigium præſtigiis aut incantionibus productum eſſe*, as *Vorſtius* renders him. *If a Prophet do never ſo great Miracles, and ſeeks to convince* Moſes *of*

Maimon. de fund. leg. c.8. ſ.7

of falſhood, we are not to hearken to him; for we know that they are not done by the power of God, *but by the illuſion of the Devil.* And elſewhere he tells us, that if any pretends to prophecy בשם עבויים *in the name of Idols, they muſt not ſo much as diſpute with him, nor anſwer him, nor deſire any Signs or Miracles from him; and if of himſelf he ſhews any, we are not to regard or mind them; for,* ſaith he, *whoever doth but doubt in his mind concerning them he breaks that Command, And thou ſhalt not hearken to the words of that prophet.* So that the Doctrine once eſtableſhed, ought to be our moſt certain Rule, according to which we muſt judge of all pretenders to Miracles; if their deſign be to draw Men off from God's Word, we are not to hearken to what they either ſay or do.

Idem de Idololat. leg. c. 5. ſ. 9.

Deut. 13. 3.

VIII. 4. *The Doctrine of thoſe Prophets who ſeek not to introduce Idolatry, muſt not be meaſured by a ſtrict conformity to the words of* Moſes *his Law, but to the main reaſon and intention of it.* The great reaſon of this is, becauſe God did not intend the *Jews* ſhou'd always reſt in the *Pædagogy* of the Ceremonial Law, but ſent them Prophets to train them up by degrees, and to fit them for a ſtate of better perfection; and therefore it wou'd be very unreaſonable to judge whether they were true Prophets or no, exactly by that which they came gradually to wean them from; which were all one, as to try one whether he were grown a Man or no, by the Swadling clouts he wore when he was a Child. God tempered the Ceremonial Law much according to the condition and capacity of the perſons it was preſcribed to, and therefore the Sanctions of it did immediately reſpect their temporary concerns; but we are not to think the end of that diſpenſation was to be merely a Covenant for the Land of Promiſe; but as the Cherubims in the Temple did always look towards the Mercy-ſeat, ſo did this whole *œconomy* look towards the coming of the *Meſſias.* But it was with the generality of the *Jews,* as it is with ignorant people who looking up to the Heavens, cannot fanſie the Stars to be any bigger than they ſeem to them; but *Aſtronomers* by the help of their *Optic-tubes* and *Teleſcopes,* do eaſily diſcern the juſt magnitude of them; ſo the *Jews* ordinarily thought there was no more in theſe Types and Shadows, than was viſibly repreſented to them; but ſuch as had the help of the Divine Spirit (the beſt *Teleſcope* to diſcern the *Day-ſtar* from on high with) cou'd eaſily look thro' thoſe Proſpectives, into the moſt glorious Myſteries of the Goſpel of *Jeſus Chriſt.* Theſe Types being like triangular Priſmes, that muſt be ſet in a due light and poſture, before they can repreſent that great variety of Spiritual Myſteries which was contained in them. Now the great office of the Prophet was to adminiſter this Light to the people, and to direct them in thoſe excellent pieces of Perſpective, wherein by the help of a Prophetic-glaſs, they might ſee the Son of God fully repreſented to their view. Beſides this, the prophetical office was a kind of Chancery to the Moſaic Law, wherein the Prophets did interpret the *Pandects* of the Law *ex æquo & bono,* and frequently ſhewed in what caſes God did diſpenſe with the outward letter of it, to exalt the more the inward ſenſe and reaſon of it. Hence the Prophets ſeem many times to ſpeak contemptibly of the outward preſcribed Ceremonies, when their intent is not to condemn the obſervation of them, but to tell the people there were greater things which God looked at, than the outward obſervation of ſome Ceremonial precepts, and that God would never accept of that by way of commutation for real and internal goodneſs. Hence the Prophets [*] by their own practice, did frequently ſhew that the Law of *Moſes* did not

[*] Pſal. 50. 8. 51. 16. Iſa. 1. 11. 13. 66. 3. Jer. 7. 21, 22, 23.

ſo indiſpenſibly oblige Men, but that God wou'd accept of thoſe actions which were performed without the regularity required by the Law of *Moſes*; and thus he did of ſacrificing upon high places, not only before the building of the Temple, but ſometimes after, as he accepted of the ſacrifice of *Elijah* on Mount *Carmel*, even when high places were forbidden. 1 Kings 18. 38. Which the *Jews* are become ſo ſenſible of, that they grant that a true Prophet may ſometimes command ſomething to be done in violation of the Law of *Moſes*, ſo he doth not draw people to Idolatry, nor deſtroy the obligation of Moſes his Law. But this they reſtrain to לפי שעה ſomething done in caſe of neceſſity, and that it ſhou'd not paſs into a precedent or a perpetual Law; and therefore their rule is לפי שעה שימעו לו בכל. *The prophet was to be hearkened to in every thing he commanded in a caſe of neceſſity.* By this it is clear that the Prophets were not to be try'd by the Letter of the Law of *Moſes*, but by the end and the reaſon of it. Thus much I ſuppoſe will make it clear what Rules A. the people had to try the Prophets Doctrine by, without Miracles.

Vid. Jarchi Deut. 18. 21. *Et Vorſt. ad Maim. de fund. c. 9. ſ.* 5, 6, 7.

CHAP.

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CHAP. VI.

The Tryal of Prophetical Predictions and Miracles.

I. *The great difficulty of trying the truth of prophetical Predictions from* Jer. 18. 7, 8, &c. *Some general* Hypotheſes *promiſed for the clearing of it.* II. *The firſt concerns the grounds why Predictions are accounted an evidence of Divine Revelation. Three Conſectaries drawn thence.* III. *The ſecond, the manner of* GOD's *Revelation of his Will to the Minds of the Prophets. Of the ſeveral degrees of Prophecy.* IV. *The third is, that* GOD *did not always reveal the internal purpoſes of his Will unto the true Prophets.* V. *The grand Queſtion propounded, How it may be known when Predictions expreſs* GOD's *decrees, and when only the ſeries of cauſes. For the firſt ſeveral rules laid down.* 1. *When the Prediction is confirm'd by a preſent Miracle.* 2. *When the things foretold exceed the probability of ſecond cauſes.* VI. 3. *When confirm'd by* GOD's *oath.* VII. 4. *When the Bleſſings foretold are purely ſpiritual.* VIII. *Three rules for interpreting the Prophecies which reſpect the ſtate of things under the Goſpel.* IX. 5. *When all circumſtances are fortold.* 6. *When many Prophets in ſeveral ages agree in the ſame predictions.* X. *Predictions do not expreſs* GOD's *unalterable purpoſes, when they only contain comminations of judgments, or are predictions of temporal Bleſſings.* XI. *The caſe of the* Ninevites, Hezekiah, *and others, opened.* XII, XIII. *Of repentance in* GOD, *what it implies.* XIV. *The Jewiſh objections about predictions of temporal Bleſſings anſwered.* XV. *In what caſes Miracles were expected from the Prophets: when they were to confirm the truth of their Religion. Inſtanced in the Prophet at* Bethel, Elijah, Eliſha *and* Moſes *himſelf;* XVI. *whoſe divine authority that it was proved by Miracles, is demonſtrated againſt the modern* Jews, *and their pretences anſwered.*

I. THE next thing which the Rules of Tryal concerned, was the predictions of the Prophets. Concerning which God himſelf hath laid down this general Rule, *Deut.* 18. 22. *When a Prophet ſpeaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to paſs, that is the thing which the Lord hath not ſpoken, but the Prophet hath ſpoken it preſumptuouſly; thou ſhalt not be afraid of him. Grotius* underſtands this place of the Prophet's telling the people he would do ſome Miracles to confirm his Doctrine; but, if thoſe Miracles were not done as he ſaid, it was an evident demonſtration of a falſe Prophet. It is certain it was ſo; for then his own mouth told him he was a lying Prophet; but theſe words ſeem to refer rather to ſomething future than preſent, and are therefore generally underſtood concerning the truth of predictions; which was a matter of very difficult tryal, in regard of the goodneſs or the juſtice of God, ſo frequently interpoſing between the prediction and the event. That place which makes it ſo difficult to diſcern the truth of a prediction by the event, is *Jer.* 18. 7, 8, 9, 10. *At what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to deſtroy it; If that Nation againſt whom I have pronounced, turn from evil, I will repent of the evil I had thought to do unto them; And at what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my ſight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I ſaid I would benefit them.* By which place it ſeems clear, that even after the predictions of Prophets, God reserved a liberty to himſelf, either to repent of the evil or the good that was foretold concerning any people; how then can the fidelity of a Prophet be diſcovered by the event when God may alter the event, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet? This being a caſe very intricate and obſcure, will call for the more diligence in the unfolding of it: In order to which, we ſhall firſt premiſe ſome general *Hypotheſes* and then come to the particular reſolution of it. The general *Hypotheſes* will be concerning the way and method of God's revealing future contingencies to the Prophets, without which it will be impoſſible to reſolve the particular emergent caſes concerning predictions.

II.

1. *Hypoth.*

The prediction of future events is no further an argument of a prophetic Spirit, than as the foreknowledge of thoſe things is ſuppoſed to be out of the reach of any created underſtanding; and therefore God challengeth this to himſelf in Scripture as a peculiar prerogative of his own, to declare the things that are to come, and thereby manifeſts the Idols of the *Gentiles* to be no Gods, *becauſe they could not ſhew to their worſhippers the things to come*, Iſa. 44. 6, 7. From this *Hypotheſis* theſe three Conſectaries follow:

1. That the events that are foretold, muſt be ſuch as do exceed the reach of any created Intellect; for otherwiſe it cou'd be no evidence of a Spirit of true Prophecy; ſo that the foretelling of ſuch events as depend upon the ſeries of Natural Cauſes, or ſuch as tho' they are out of the reach of Human Underſtanding, yet are not of the Diabolical, or ſuch things as fall out caſually true, but by no certain grounds of prediction, can none of them be any argument of a Spirit of Prophecy.

2. That where there were any other evidences, that the Prophet ſpake by Divine Revelation; there was no reaſon to wait the fulfilling of every particular prophecy before he was believed as a Prophet. If ſo, then many of God's chiefeſt Prophets cou'd not have been believed in their own Generations becauſe their Prophecies did reach ſo far beyond them, as *Iſaiah*'s concerning *Cyrus*, the Prophet at *Bethel* concerning *Joſias*: and all the prophecies concerning the Captivity and Deliverance from it, muſt not have been believed till fulfilled, that is, not believed at all: for when prophecies are accompliſhed they are no longer the objects of Faith, but of ſenſe. Where then God gives other evidences of Divine Inſpiration, the credit of the Prophet is not ſuſpended upon the minute accompliſhment of every event foretold by him. Now it is evident there may be particular Divine Revelation of other things beſides future contingencies, ſo that if a reaſon may be given, why events once foretold may not come to paſs, there can be no reaſon why the credit of any prophecy ſhou'd be invalidated on that account; becauſe every event is not exactly correſpondent to the prediction. It is moſt certain that

what ever comes under Divine Knowledge, may be divinely revealed for the manifeſtation which is cauſed by any light, may extend it ſelf to all things to which that light is extended: but that light which the Prophet ſaw by was a Divine Light, and therefore might equally extend it ſelf to all kind of objects; but becauſe future contingencies are the moſt remote from humane knowledge, therefore the foretelling of theſe hath been accounted the great evidence of a true Prophet; but yet there may be a knowledge of other things in a lower degree than future contingencies, which may immediately depend upon Divine Revelation; and theſe are,

1. Such things which cannot be known by any particular Man, but yet are certainly known by other Men; as the preſent knowledge of things done by perſons at a remote diſtance from them: thus *Eliſha* knew what *Gehazi* did, when he followed *Naaman*; and thus the knowledge of the thought of another's heart depends upon immediate Divine Revelation, whereas every one may certainly know the thought of his own heart; and therefore to ſome thoſe things may be matters of ſenſe or evident demonſtration, which to another may be a matter of immediate Revelation. 2 King. 5. 26. 1 Cor. 14. 25.

2. Such things as relate not to future contingencies, but are matters of Faith exceeding the reach of human apprehenſion; ſuch things as may be known when revealed, but cou'd never have been found out without immediate Revelation; ſuch all the Myſteries of our Religion are, the Myſtery of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Hypoſtatical Union*, the Death of the Son of God for the pardon of the ſins of Mankind. Now the immediate Revelation of either of theſe two ſorts of objects ſpeaks as much a truly Prophetical Spirit, as the prediction of future contingencies. So that this muſt not be looked on as the juſt and adequate rule to meaſure a Spirit of prophecy by; becauſe the ground of judging a prophetical Spirit by that, is common with other things without that, ſeeing other object are out of the reach of humane Underſtanding as well as future events, and therefore the diſcovery of them muſt immediately flow from Divine Revelation.

3. The Revelation of future events to the Underſtanding of a Prophet, is never the leſs immediate, altho' the event may not be correſpondent to the prediction. So that if it be manifeſted that God immeately reveal ſuch future contingencies to a Prophet, he wou'd be neverthe leſs a true Prophet whether thoſe predictions took effect or no. For a true Prophet is known by the truth of Divine Revelation to the perſon of the Prophet, and not by the ſucceſs of the thing, which, as is laid down in the *Hypotheſis*, is no further an evidence of a true Prophet, than as it is an argument *à poſteriori* to prove Divine Revelation by. If then the alteration of events after predictions be reconcilable with the truth and faithfulneſs of God, there is no queſtion but it is with the truth of a prophetical Spirit, the formality of which lies in immediate Revelation.

III. 2. *Hypoth.* *The Prophets cou'd not declare any thing more to the people than was immediately revealed unto themſelves.* What was preſently revealed, ſo much they knew, and no more, becauſe the Spirit of prophecy came upon them *per modum impreſſionis tranſeuntis*, as the Schools ſpeak, and not *per modum habitus*; the *lumen propheticum* was in them, not as *lumen in corpore lucido*, but as *lumen in aëre*; and therefore the Light of Revelation in their Spirits depended upon the immediate irradiations of the Divine Spirit. The Prophets had not always a power to propheſie when they wou'd themſelves; and it is ſaid, when they propheſy'd, that the *Word of the Lord came unto them.* And therefore the Schools determine, that a Prophet upon immediate Revelation did not know *omnia prophetabilia* (as they ſpeak in their barbarous language) *all things* which *God might reveal*; the reaſon whereof *Aquinas* thus gives; *The ground*, 2.2.q.171. art.2.—4. ſaith he, *of the connexion of divers objects together is ſome common tie or principle, which joyns them together; as charity or prudence is in moral vertues; and the right underſtanding of the principles of a ſcience, is the ground why all things belonging to that ſcience are underſtood; but now in Divine Revelation; that which connects the objects of Divine Revelation is God himſelf; now becauſe he cannot be fully apprehended by any humane intellect, therefore the underſtanding of a Prophet cannot comprehend all matters capable of being revealed, but only ſuch as pleaſeth God himſelf freely to communicate to the Prophet's underſtanding by immediate Revelation.* This is further evident by all thoſe different degrees of illumination and prophecy, which the *Jews* and other Writers ſpeak ſo much of, *viz.* of Dreams and Viſions, the inſpirations of the Holy Spirit, the *Gradus Moſaicus*, the External Voice, &c. Now in every one of theſe degrees the Prophet cou'd go no further than his preſent Revelation extended; and therefore *Aquinas* determines, That the Underſtandings of the Prophets were *inſtrumenta deficientia reſpectu principalis agentis, i. e.* that in prophetical illumination the Mind of the Prophet was ſo moved by the Spirit of God, 2.2.q173.3. art. 3. as an inſtrument in the hand of an Artificer, which bears no proportion with the skill of the work-man: And therefore the Mind of a Prophet is moved ſometimes only to apprehend the thing repreſented (which they call *Inſtinctus Divinus*, of which they ſay a Prophet may have no certainty whether it comes from God or no) ſometimes it is moved ſo far as to know certainly that this Revelation is from God (this they call *Lumen Propheticum*;) ſometimes a Prophet may be moved to ſpeak thoſe things which he fully underſtands; ſo it was with moſt of the true Prophets; but ſometimes Men may be moved to ſpeak that which they underſtand not, as is plain in *Caiaphas*, and probable in *Balaam.* Sometimes a thing was repreſented to the Fancy of one, without any poſſibility of underſtanding the meaning of thoſe imaginary ſpecies, as in *Pharaoh*'s and *Nebuchadnezzar*'s Dreams; and to another may be given the true judgment of thoſe motions of Fancy without the repreſentation of the things, to them, as in *Joſeph* and *Daniel.* Now in theſe and many other different impreſſions of this prophetical Spirit, the Prophets, to whom the things were revealed, cou'd go no further than the degree of the Revelation made to them did extend.

IV. 3. *Hypoth.* *God did not always reveal to the Prophets the internal counſels and decrees of his own Will, but often only the method and ſeries of his providence in the adminiſtration of things in the world.* Which is the ground of that threefold diſtinction of prophecy in the Schools, into *Prophetia prædeſtinationis*, *Prophetia præſcientiæ*, and *Prophetia comminationis*; which is taken from the ordinary Gloſs upon *Matth.* 1. where they are thus explain'd; *The Prophecy of Predeſtination* is, when the event depends wholly upon God's Will, without any reſpect to ours, as the prophecy of the *Incarnation of Chriſt*; and the *Prophecy of Preſcience* is of ſuch things as depend upon the liberty of Man's Will; and the *Prophecy of Commination* only denotes God's denunciations of heavy judgments againſt a people. But *Aquinas* doth better reduce the two former to one, and the ground of the difference is to be fetched from the different ways whereby God knows things in the world; which is either as they are in their cauſes, and ſo they note the order and ſeries of things in the world, with the mutual reſpects and dependences they have upon one another, and this refers to God's adminiſtration of things in the world; or elſe God looks upon them as they are in themſelves, or according to his own poſitive determinations of them; and now in this ſenſe they are unalterable; but in the other they are not; but God may alter thoſe reſpects of things when he pleaſeth. Now tho' theſe different manners of knowledge can never be conceiv'd ſeparate from one another in the Divine Uuderſtanding, yet in the Revelation made to the Mind of a Prophet, they may be disjoyn'd from each other, becauſe God doth not always reveal things in the higheſt degree to the Prophets; for no free Agent doth always act as far as he can. And therefore prophetical Revelation is ſometimes a repreſentation of God's internal Decrees, and then they always take effect; and ſometimes only the order of Cauſes and Effects, and they may admit of an alteration, and the prophecy nevertheleſs be true, becauſe then it referr'd only to the ſeries of Cauſes in the world, according to which the Events wou'd follow, if God himſelf did not interpoſe. Theſe things being thus premis'd, we come to particular Reſolutions, which muſt ariſe from the Evidences that may be given when prophetical predictions did expreſs God's internal purpoſe and decree, and when only the order of the Cauſes in the world; for in theſe latter it is apparent that events might not anſwer predictions, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet: which is a matter of greater difficulty, *viz.* to find out the exact differences of theſe two, till the event hath made it apparent which came from God's unalterable purpoſe, and which not. But tho' it be a ſubject little ſpoken to either by *Jewiſh* or *Chriſtian* Writers, yet we are in hopes there may be ſome ſuch clear Notes of diſtinction diſcovered between them, even *à priori*, which may ſufficiently clear God's faithfulneſs, and the Prophet's truth, tho' the event be not always correſpondent to the words of a prediction.

V. I begin then with the evidences that may be given when predictions do flow from internal purpoſe and decree.

1. *Every prediction confirm'd by a preſent Miracle, doth not expreſs merely the order of cauſes, but the determinations of God's will,* becauſe there can be no ſufficient reaſon given why the order of cauſes in Nature ſhou'd be altered to expreſs the dependances of things on each other; for herein a Miracle wou'd rather tend to weaken than ſtrengthen Faith, becauſe the end of the Miracle wou'd be to confirm their Faith as to events following upon their cauſes; but now the *medium* us'd for that end ſeems to prove the contrary, *viz.* That God can alter the ſeries of cauſes when he pleaſes himſelf, by working Miracles, and therein going contrary to the courſe of Nature; and therefore a Miracle ſeems to be a very incongruous argument in this, becauſe it ſelf is an evidence that may be, which it comes to prove ſhall not be. But when Prophets come to declare the internal purpoſes of the Will of God concerning future contingencies, no argument can be more ſuitable to demonſtrate the truth of what is ſpoken, than the working of a preſent Miracle, for this demonſtrates to the ſenſes of Men, that however unlikely the event may be to them which is foretold, yet with God all things are poſſible and that it is very unlikely God wou'd ſend ſuch a Meſſenger to declare a falſhood, whom he entruſted with ſo great a power as that of working Miracles. Thus it was in that remarkable prophecy concerning *Jo-*

ſias by the Man of God at *Bethel*, 260 years before his Birth, which tho' it were to come to paſs ſo long after, God confirm'd it by a Sign, which was *the renting of the Altar, and the pouring out of the aſhes upon it, and the withering of* Jeroboam'*s hand.* 1 King.13. 3. We cannot therefore in reaſon think that God wou'd ſet ſo clear a Seal to any Deed which he did intend himſelf to cancel afterwards.

2. *Predictions expreſs God's inward purpoſe, when the things foretold do exceed all probabilities of ſecond cauſes*; in which cauſe tho' thoſe words of *Tertullian* ſeem very harſh, *credo quia impoſſibile*; yet taking that Impoſſibility as relating to ſecond cauſes, and the ground of Faith to be ſome divine prediction, we ſee what reaſon there may be for them: For the more unlikely the thing is to be effected by ſecond cauſes, the greater evidence it is, that the Prophets in foretelling it did not reſpect the mere order of things in the world, but the unalterable counſels of the will of God, which therefore wou'd certainly have their timely accompliſhments. When therefore any Prophets did foretel things above the reach of Natural cauſes, and thoſe things did not come to paſs, it was a certain evidence of a falſe Prophet, as the contrary was of a true one; for none cou'd know ſo long before-hand ſuch things as were above all humane power, but ſuch to whom God himſelf, who alone was able to effect them, did reveal and communicate the knowledge of them. And hence we ſee in Scripture thoſe predictions which have ſeemed the greateſt improbabilities with them, have had the moſt punctual accompliſhments, as the *Iſraelites* returning out of *Ægypt* at the end of 430 years; Gal. 3. 17. their deliverance by *Cyrus* after the Captivity in *Babylon*, which ſeemed ſo improbable a thing, that when God ſpeaks of it, he uſhers it in Iſa.44 25, 26, 28. with this preface, *That he fruſtrateth the tokens of the lyers, and maketh the diviners mad, but confirmeth the word of his ſervant, and performeth the counſel of his meſſengers that ſaith to Jeruſalem, Thou ſhalt be inhabited,* &c. The more unlikely then the thing was to come to paſs, the greater evidence there was in ſo clear a prophecy of it ſo long before (above 100 years) and ſo exact a fulfilling of it afterwards preciſely at the expiring of the LXX years from the firſt Captivity.

VI. 3. *Predictions concerning future events, which are confirmed by an oath from God himſelf, do expreſs the immutable determinations of God's will.* For which we have the greateſt aſſurance we can deſire from that remarkable expreſſion of the Apoſtle to the *Hebrews*, Heb. 6. 17, 18. *Wherein God willing more abundantly to ſhew to the heirs of promiſe the immutability of his counſel, confirmed it by an oath, that by two immutable things in which it was impoſſible for God to lye, we might have a ſtrong conſolation,* &c. Wherein the Apoſtle obviates and removes all doubts and miſpriſions, leſt God after the declaring of his Will ſhou'd alter the event foretold in it, and that he doth both by ſhewing that God had made an abſolute promiſe, and withal to prevent all doubts, leſt ſome tacite condition might hinder performance, he tell us that God had annexed his oath to it, which two things were the moſt undoubted evidences of the immutability of God's counſel. The word Ψεύδεσθαι here us'd, doth in Scripture often note the fruſtrating of Mens hopes and expectations; ſo it is us'd *Heb.* 3. 17. Ψεύσεται ἔργον ἐλαίας, we render it the *labour of the Olive ſhall fail.* So Hoſ. 9. 2. καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἐψεύσατο αὐτούς, *and the new Wine ſhall fail in her.* Thus the meaning here is, that by two immutable things in which it is impoſſible God ſhou'd fruſtrate the expectations of Men, or alter the events of things after he had declared them. For God's oath is an evident demonſtration of the immutability of his Will in all predictions to which this is annexed, and doth fully exclude that which the Scripture calls repenting in God, that is, doing otherwiſe than the words did ſeem to expreſs, becauſe of ſome tacite conditions underſtood in them. So we find *Pſal.* 89. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. *If they break my ſtatutes, and keep not my commandments, then will I viſit their tranſgreſſion with the rod, and their iniquity with ſtripes; nevertheleſs my loving kindneſs will I not utterly take from him, nor ſuffer my faithfulneſs to fail; my covenant will I not break; nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips. Once have I ſworn by my holineſs, that I will not lye unto* David. *His ſeed ſhall endure for ever, and his throne as the Sun before me.* Wherein we ſee what way God takes to aſſure us of the immutability of his Covenant with his people, by the oath which he adjoyns to his promiſes; whereby God doth moſt fully expreſs the unalterable determinations of his own Will, in that he ſwears by his own Holineſs that he wou'd not lye unto *David*, i. e. that he wou'd faithfully perform what he had promiſ'd to him. And therefore *Tertullian* well ſaith, *Beati ſumus quorum cauſa Deus jurat, ſed miſeri & deteſtabiles ſi ne juranti quidem credimus.* It is happy for us believing Creatures, that God ſtoops ſo low as to confirm his Covenant with an oath; but it will be ſad and miſerable for ſuch as dare not venture their Faith upon it, when God hath annex'd his oath unto it. It is thought by Expoſitors, that there is a peculiar emphaſis in thoſe words, אחת נשבעתי *Once have I ſworn*, thereby noting the irrevocable nature of God's oath, that there is no need of repetition of it as among Men, becauſe when once God ſwears by himſelf it is the higheſt demonſtration that no conditions whatever ſhall alter his declared purpoſe. Concil. Tolet. 8. c. 2. And therefore the Council of *Toledo* well explains the different nature of God's Oath, and his repentance in Scripture; *Jurare namque Dei eſt à ſe ordinata nullatenus convellere; pœnitere vero eadem ordinata cum voluerit immutare*; God is ſaid to ſwear when he binds himſelf abſolutely to performance: and to repent, when things fall out contrary to the declaration of God's Will concerning them; for ſo it muſt be underſtood to be only *mutatio ſententiæ*, and not *conſilii*, that the alteration may be only in the things, and not in the eternal purpoſe of God. But ſince it is evident in Scripture, that many predictions do imply ſome tacite conditions, and many declarations of God's Will do not expreſs his internal purpoſes, it ſeem'd neceſſary in thoſe things which God did declare to be the irrevocable purpoſes of his Will, there ſhou'd be ſome peculiar mark and character ſet upon them for the confirmation of his people's Faith, and this we find to be the annexing an oath to his promiſes. Thus it is in that grand Inſtrument of peace between God and his people, the covenant of Grace, wherein God was pleas'd ſo far to ſtrengthen the Faith of his people in it, that he ratifies the articles of peace therein contain'd, but eſpecially the Act of Grace, on his own part with an oath, thereby to aſſure them it was never his purpoſe to repeal it, nor to fail of performance in it. For we are not to think that an oath lays any greater obligation upon God for performance, than the mere declaration of his Will; it being a part of immutable juſtice, and conſequently neceſſarily imply'd in the Divine nature, to perform promiſes when once made; but God's Oath reſpects us, and not himſelf, *viz.* that it might be a teſtimony unto us that God's Will thereby declar'd is his eternal and unchangeable Will, and ſo the mercies thereby Iſa. 55. 3. promiſ'd are ſure mercies; ſuch as are ἀμεταμέλητα, *without any repentance on God's part.*

4. *Pre-*

VII. 4. *Predictions made by the Prophets concerning Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, do expreſs God's internal purpoſe, and therefore muſt have their certain accompliſhment in the time prefix'd by the Prophets.* The grand reaſon of this propoſition, is, that the beſtowing of Bleſſings merely ſpiritual, doth immediately flow from the Grace and Favour of God, and depends not upon conditions on our part, as procuring cauſes of them, and therefore there can be no account given why God ſhou'd ſuſpend the performance of ſuch promiſes, which wou'd not more ſtrongly have held why he ſhou'd not have made any ſuch promiſes at all. And therefore when we ſee that notwithſtanding the higheſt demerits, God made ſuch free promiſes, we can have no reaſon to think that any other demerits interpoſing between the promiſes and performance, ſhou'd hinder the accompliſhment of them: unleſs it be inſerted in the promiſes themſelves, which is contrary to the nature of free promiſes: Upon this ground all the promiſes relating to the Goſpel ſtate, and to the Covenant of Grace therein contain'd, muſt have their due accompliſhment in the time and manner prefix'd by the Prophets: and therefore the *Jews* are miſerably blind when they ſuppoſe the reaſon why the promiſe of the *Meſſias* is yet deferr'd after ſo long expectation of him, is, the ſins of their people; for this ſeems to ſuppoſe that God's promiſe of the *Meſſias* did depend upon their own righteouſneſs and worthineſs above all other people, which if it doth they are like to be the moſt miſerable and deſperate people the world hath: and beſides, if God's intuition of ſin makes him defer the coming of the *Meſſias*, his foreſight of ſin wou'd have hinder'd him from ever promiſing a *Meſſias* to come: but this was ſo far from being a hindrance of God's promiſe that the main end of the coming of the *Meſſias* was *to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to make an end of ſin, and to bring in everlaſting righteouſneſs.* Dan. 9. 24. And we ſee where-ever the Prophets inſiſt on the Covenant of Grace, the promiſe contain'd in it is *the blotting out of tranſgreſſions*, and *remembring ſins no more*, and that merely on the account of God's free Love and for his own Name's ſake: This can be no reaſon then why predictions concerning ſpiritual Bleſſings ſhou'd have their exact accompliſhment, becauſe there can be no bar againſt free Love, and the beſtowing of ſuch Mercies which do ſuppoſe the greateſt unworthineſs of them, as Goſpel Bleſſings do.

VIII. The great difficulty lies in explaining the prophetical phraſes concerning the Goſpel ſtate, which ſeem to intimate a greater advancement and flouriſhing of peace and holineſs therein, than hath as yet been ſeen in the Chriſtian World; which gives the *Jews* the greater occaſion to imagine that the ſtate ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, is not yet eſtabliſhed in the World. But all the difficulty herein ariſeth from the want of conſideration of the Idiotiſms of the prophetical language, eſpecially where it reſpects the ſtate of things under the Goſpel, concerning which, we may obſerve theſe following Rules.

1. *The Prophets under the Old Teſtament, when they ſpeak of things to come to paſs in the New, do ſet them forth by the repreſentation of ſuch things as were then in uſe among themſelves*; thus the ſpiritual Worſhip of the Goſpel is propheſy'd of, under the notion of the legal Worſhip among the *Jews*; the converſion of *Ægypt* to the Goſpel, is foretold *Iſaiah* 19. 19, 21. by the ſetting up an Altar, and *offering ſacrifice to the Lord*: and the *Converſion of the Gentiles* in general, by the *offering up of incenſe*, Mal. 1. 11. and the ſervice of God under the Goſpel, is ſet forth by

going up to Jeruſalem, *and keeping the feaſt of Tabernacles there*, Zach. 14. 16. and the *plentiful effuſion of the Spirit of God in the miraculous gifts*, which attended the preaching of the Goſpel, is ſet forth by the Prophet, *Joel* 2. 28. by *propheſying, and dreaming dreams, and ſeeing viſions*; not that theſe things ſhou'd really be under Goſpel times; but that the Prophets meaning might be the better underſtood by thoſe he ſpake unto, he ſets forth the great meaſure of gifts and Goſpel light under thoſe things which were accounted as the higheſt attainments among themſelves. So the great meaſure and degree of holineſs which was to be under Goſpel times, is ſet forth by the Prophet *Zachary*, Zach. 14. 20. by the placing of the Motto which was among the *Jews* only upon the *High-Prieſt's forehead*, that this ſhou'd be ſo common under the Goſpel, that even *the bells of the horſes ſhould bear it*, *i. e.* thoſe things which ſeem moſt remote from a ſpiritual uſe, ſhou'd be devoted to it, as the Bells were, which were commonly hang'd upon their war-horſes in thoſe mountainous Countries; and in the latter part of that verſe, the height and progreſs of Goſpel holineſs is deſcrib'd under that phraſe, *That the pots in the Lords houſe ſhould be as bowls before the Altar*, *i. e.* ſhou'd be advanc'd from a lower and more ignoble ſervice, to a higher and more ſpiritual degree of holineſs. Now the *Jews* when they obſerve theſe and many other prophetical paſſages relating to the time of the *Meſſias* to run in the old ſtrain of the Law, they preſently conclude that the *Meſſias* muſt not innovate any thing concerning their way or worſhip, but only be ſome great Prince to give them temporal deliverances, and ſo expound all theſe Texts in a literal ſenſe, which were only expreſs'd in ſuch a ſtrain, the better to help the capacities of thoſe they ſpake them to.

2. *Things abſolutely foretold to come to paſs in Goſpel times in a general manner, are to be underſtood comparatively in reference to what was before.* For when the meaſure of their grace or knowledge was ſo far above what was then among the *Jews*, that there was ſcarce any proportion between them, the Prophets made uſe of ſuch expreſſions to ſet it forth by, which might raiſe up the dull apprehenſion of the *Jews* to conceive the juſt meaſure and fulneſs of it. Thus when the Prophets foretel the grand increaſe of ſpiritual knowledge in Goſpel times, they do it in this phraſe, *They ſhall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, ſaying, Know the Lord, for all ſhall know me from the leaſt to the greateſt*, Jer. 31. 33. Where it was far from the Prophets meaning to exclude all uſe of teaching under the Goſpel, (which is contrary to the end of all the Ordinances of the Goſpel; but becauſe teaching doth commonly ſuppoſe great ignorance, he ſets forth the abundance of knowledge which ſhou'd be then, by the excluſion of that which doth imply it. So when it is ſaid that *they ſhall be all taught of God*, the meaning is not, that every one that lives in the Goſpel ſtate, ſhou'd be thus effectually taught by the Spirit of God; but that the number of ſuch under the Goſpel, ſhou'd ſo far exceed thoſe under the Law, that they cou'd hardly apprehend the diſproportion between them, unleſs it had been ſet forth in ſo large an expreſſion. Which leads me to the next Rule.

3. *Things foretold as univerſally or indefinitely to come to paſs under the Goſpel, are to be underſtood as to the duty of all, but as the event only of God's choſen people.* Thus when there is ſo great peace propheſy'd to be in Goſpel times, that then *men ſhould beat their ſwords into plow-ſhares, and ſpears* Iſa. 2. 4. 11. 6, 7.

ſpears into pruning-hooks; *that the Wolf ſhould lie down with the Lamb, and Leopard with the Kid*; *that Nation ſhould not lift up ſword againſt Nation, nor learn war any more*; with many others to the ſame purpoſe; all theſe ſpeeches are to be underſtood of what the nature and deſign of the Goſpel tends to, and what is the duty of all that profeſs it, and what wou'd effectually be in the Chriſtian world, did all that profeſs the Chriſtian Doctrine, heartily obey the Dictates of it; and ſo far as the Goſpel doth prevail upon any, it ſo far cicurates their wild and unruly natures, that of furious Wolves they become innocent Lambs, and of raging Lions, tender Kids; ſo far from hurting and injuring others, that they dare not entertain any thoughts of ill-will or revenge towards their greateſt enemies. And thus we may ſee, that notwithſtanding the ſeeming repugnancies of the prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the ſtate of the New, with the events which have been obſerv'd in it, yet that all thoſe predictions which concern'd the beſtowing of the ſpiritual Bleſſings which concern'd the Goſpel ſtate, have had their punctual accompliſhment in the ſenſe they were intended.

4. *Predictions concerning future events where not only the thing its ſelf is foretold, but the ſeveral circumſtances of perſons, time, and place enumerated, are to have their due accompliſhment, and conſequently expreſs God's inward purpoſes.* For thoſe promiſes or comminations which are capable of alteration by ſome tacit conditions imply'd in them, do moſt commonly run in general terms; or elſe are ſpoken by way of immediate addreſs to the perſons concern'd in order to the ſtirring them up the more to the duty God aims at by thoſe comminations; as when *Jonas* limited the *Ninevites* deſtruction to forty days. But when prophecies are recorded, not by way of commination but mere prediction, and particular circumſtances ſet down, it ſtands to reaſon that ſuch prophecies muſt have their certain accompliſhment; and that *firſt*, becauſe God by ſetting down the circumſtances would give them greater evidences that the predictions came from himſelf; as when the Prophet at *Bethel* not only foretold the deſtruction of the Altar there, but particularly named the Man that ſhou'd do it: viz. *Joſias*. So when God by *Iſaiah* call'd *Cyrus* by name, it was doubtleſs a great confirmation to them, that the deliverance of the *Jews* ſhould be by that perſon. *Secondly*, becauſe the circumſtances are intended for Land-marks to know the certainty of the accompliſhment of the prophecy. For when they find the circumſtances fall out exactly according to the prediction, they have no ground to queſtion the accompliſhment of the prophecy. And hence it was that in the grand prophecy of the coming of the *Meſſias* all particular circumſtances were ſo long before foretold. The firſt dawning of his day being to *Adam* after his fall, when the nature he ſhou'd be born of was foretold, *viz.* not Angelical but Human, of the Seed of the Woman. To *Abraham* it was further revealed of what Nation of Mankind, *viz.* from his Poſterity; to *Jacob* at what time, when the *Scepter ſhould be departed from* Judah; and from what Tribe, *viz.* his own; to *Iſaiah* of what perſon in that Family, a Virgin; to *Micah* in what place, *viz. Bethlehem*; and to *Daniel* at what preciſe time, toward the expiring of his ſeventy weeks; which according to the moſt probable computation of them did commence from the ſeventh year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and ſo the 490 years expired near upon our Saviour's paſſion. Now certainly the particular enumeration of all theſe circumſtances ſpoken of ſo long before, and falling out ſo exactly, cou'd not but give the greateſt conviction IX.

ction and evidence, that our bleſſed Saviour was that perſon ſo much ſpoken of by the Prophets, in whom all theſe ſeveral lines did meet as in their center.

5. Laſtly, *Predictions then expreſs divine purpoſes when many Prophets in ſeveral ages concur in the ſame predictions*; becauſe it is hardly ſeen but all thoſe tacit conditions which are ſuppos'd in general promiſes or comminations may be alter'd in different ages; but when the conditions alter, and the predictions continue the ſame, it is a ſtronger evidence it is ſome immutable counſel of God which is expreſs'd in thoſe predictions. And in this caſe one prediction confirms the foregoing, as the *Jews* ſay of Prophets; *One Prophet that hath the teſtimony of another Prophet, is ſuppos'd to be true*; but it muſt be with this ſuppoſition, that the other Prophet was before approv'd to be a true Prophet. Now both theſe meet in the prophecies concerning our Saviour; for to him bear all the Prophets witneſs; and in their ſeveral ages they had ſeveral things reveal'd to them concerning him; and the uniformity and perfect harmony of all theſe ſeveral prophecies by perſons at ſo great diſtance from each other, and being of ſeveral intereſts and imployments, and in ſeveral places, yet all giving light to each other, and exactly meeting at laſt in the accompliſhment, do give us yet a further and clearer evidence, that all thoſe ſeveral beams came from the ſame Sun, when all thoſe ſcattered Rays were at laſt gathered into one Body again at the appearance of the Sun of Righteouſneſs in the World.

X. Thus have we now cleared when predictions are expreſſive of God's internal purpoſes; by obſervation of which Rules we may eaſily reſolve the other part of the difficulty, when they only expreſs the ſeries and dependencies of things which wou'd have their iſſue and accompliſhment, if God by his immediate hand of Providence did not cut off the entail of effects upon their natural cauſes. Now as to theſe prophecies which concern things conſidered in themſelves, and not preciſely as they are in the counſel of God, we are to obſerve theſe Rules.

1. *Comminations of judgments to come do not in themſelves ſpeak the abſolute futurity of the event, but do only declare what the perſons to whom they are made are to expect, and what ſhall certainly come to paſs, unleſs God by his mercy interpoſe between the threatning and the event.* So that comminations do ſpeak only the *debitum pœnæ*, and the neceſſary obligation to puniſhment; but therein God doth not bind up himſelf as he doth in abſolute promiſes; the reaſon is becauſe comminations confer no right to any, which abſolute promiſes do; and therefore God is not bound to neceſſary performance of what he threatens. Indeed the guilt, or obligation to puniſhment is neceſſary, where the offence hath been committed to which the threatning was annexed; but the execution of that puniſhment doth ſtill depend upon God's arbitrarious Will, and therefore he may ſuſpend or remove it upon ſerious addreſſes made to himſelf in order to it. For ſince God was pleas'd not to take the preſent forfeiture of the firſt grand tranſgreſſion, but made ſuch a relaxation of that penal Law, that conditions of pardon were admittable, notwithſtanding ſentence paſs'd upon the malefactors, there is ſtrong ground of preſumption in Humane Nature that God's forbearance of Mankind notwithſtanding ſin, doth ſuppoſe his readineſs to pardon offenders upon their repentance, and therefore that all particular threatnings of judgments to come, do ſuppoſe incorrigibleneſs in thoſe they are pronounc'd againſt: Upon which the foundation of hope is built, that if timely repentance

pentance do intervene, God will remove thoſe judgments which are threatned againſt them.

XI. And this was certainly the caſe of the *Ninevites* upon *Jonas* his preaching among them. For when the threatning was ſo peremptory, *Yet* Jonah 3.4. *forty days and* Nineve *ſhall be deſtroyed*, all the hope they cou'd have of pardon muſt be from the general perſwaſions of Men's Souls of God's readineſs to remove judgments upon repentance. For otherwiſe there had been no place for any thing but deſpair, and not the leaſt encouragement to ſupplicate the Mercy of God, which we ſee they did in a moſt ſolemn manner after they were convinc'd theſe comminations came from God himſelf by the mouth of his Prophet. Some think that *Jonas* together with the threatning of judgment did intermix exhortations to repentance; but we can find no probability at all for that on theſe two accounts: Firſt, *Jonas* then wou'd not have been ſo unwilling to have undertaken this meſſage; for as far as we can ſee, the harſhneſs of it was the main reaſon he thought to have avoided it by flying to *Tarſhiſh*. Secondly, *Jonas* wou'd have had no pretence at all for his anger and diſpleaſure at God's pardoning *Nineve*; which is moſt probably conceiv'd to have been, becauſe the *Ninevites* might now ſuſpect him to be no true Prophet, becauſe the event anſwer'd not his prediction. Now there had been no reaſon at all for this, if he had mix'd promiſes together with his threatnings; for then nothing wou'd have fall'n out contrary to his own predictions. And therefore it ſeems evident that the meſſage *Jonas* was ſent with, was only the commination of their ſpeedy ruin, which God did on purpoſe to awaken them the ſooner, and with greater earneſtneſs to repentance, when the judgment was denounc'd in ſo peremptory a manner; altho' it ſeems *Jonas* had before ſuch apprehenſions of the *merciful nature of God*, and his readineſs Jonah 4.2. to pardon, that he might ſuppoſe God's intention by this ſevere denunciation of judgment, might be only to take occaſion upon their repentance, to ſhew his goodneſs and bounty to them. But this was no part of his inſtructions, which he durſt not go beyond in his preaching, whatever his private opinion might be; for the Prophets were to utter no more in their preaching or particular meſſages than was in their commiſſion, and were not to mix their own words with the Word of the Lord.

XII. And by this we may further underſtand the denunciation of death to *Hezekiah* by the Prophet *Iſaiah*, *Set thy houſe in order, for thou ſhalt die* Iſa. 38. 1. *and not live.* I queſtion not but the Prophet reveal'd to *Hezekiah* as much as God had reveal'd to him (for to ſay as *Molinæus* doth, that the *Molin. Vates*, *l.* 1. *c.* 26. Prophet ſpake theſe words of his own head, before he fully underſtood God's mind, is very harſh and incongruous) but God might at firſt diſcover to *Iſaiah* not his internal purpoſe, but what the nature of the diſeaſe wou'd bring him to (unleſs his own immediate hand of Providence interpos'd) which meſſage he wou'd have *Iſaiah* carry to *Hezekiah* for the tryal of his Faith, and exciting him to the more lively acts of Grace, and for a further demonſtration of God's goodneſs to him in prolonging his Life beyond humane probability and the courſe of Second Cauſes. Now what repugnancy is there to the truth and faithfulneſs of God, that God ſhou'd conceal from his Prophets in their Meſſages the internal purpoſes of his Will, and in order to the doing good to Men ſhou'd only reveal what wou'd certainly have come to paſs unleſs himſelf had otherwiſe determin'd it. And thus the repentance which is attributed to God in reference to theſe denunciations of judgments, is far from importing any real mutation in the internal purpoſes of God (a rock ſome have ſplit themſelves upon) but it only ſignifies the outward changing of the Scene towards Men, and acting otherwiſe than the words of the Prophets did ſeem to import; and all the alteration is in the outward diſcovery of his Will, which is certainly far from being any colluſion in God: Unleſs we muſt ſuppoſe God ſo bound up, that he hath no liberty of uſing his own methods for bringing Men to repentance, or for tryal of his People's graces, but muſt in every inſtance of his Word declare nothing but his own internal purpoſes, which is contrary to the general method of God's dealing with the World, which is, to govern Men by his own Laws, and thereby to awaken them to duty, and deter from ſin by his annex'd threatnings, without revealing any thing of his internal purpoſes concerning the ſtate and condition of any particular perſons at all; which threatnings of his, tho' pronounced with the greateſt ſeverity, do not ſpeak God's inward reſolutions as to any particular perſon, but what all muſt expect if they continue impenitent and incorrigible. For the only conditions imply'd in theſe threatnings being repentance, it neceſſarily follows, that where that is wanting, theſe Hypothetical comminations are abſolute predictions of what ſhall certainly come to paſs on all thoſe who are deſtitute of the condition ſuppos'd in them.

XIII. So that where any comminations are pronounced by any in a prophetical way concerning any perſon or people, and no alteration happen at all in them, but they continue impenitent and incorrigible, there the not coming of them to paſs may be a token of a falſe Prophet. For in this caſe the only tacite condition imply'd in theſe threatning prophecies is ſuppos'd to be wanting, and ſo the comminations muſt be underſtood as abſolute predictions: Now in thoſe comminations in Scripture, which are abſolutely expreſs'd, but conditionally underſtood, we find ſomething interpoſing, which we may rationally ſuppoſe was the very
Gen. 20.8. condition underſtood. As *Abimelech's* reſtoring of *Sarah* was the ground why the ſentence of death after it was denounced, was not executed up-
1 King. 21. 19. on him: So *Ahab's* Humiliation, *Hezekiah* his earneſt Prayer, the *Ninevites* Repentance, all interpos'd between ſentence and execution, whereby we may be fully ſatisfy'd of the reaſon why theſe denunciations did not take effect: But where the perſons continue the ſame after threatnings that they were before, there is no reaſon why the ſentence ſhou'd be ſuſpended, unleſs we ſhou'd ſuppoſe it to be a mere effect of the patience and long-ſuffering of God, leading Men to repentance and amendment of life: Which is the ground the *Jews* give, why the not fulfilling of denunciations of judgment was never accounted ſufficient to prove
Maim. de fund. leg. c. 10 ſ. 6. a Man a falſe Prophet; to which purpoſe theſe words of *Maimonides* are obſervable in his *Jeſude Thorah*, where he treats particularly on the ſubject of Prophecies: *If a Prophet foretell ſad things, as the death of any one, or famine, or war, or the like; if theſe things come not to paſs, he ſhall not be accounted a falſe Prophet; neither let them ſay, Behold he hath foretold, and it comes not to paſs; for our bleſſed God is ſlow to anger, and rich in mercy, and repenteth of the evil; and it may be that they repent, and God may ſpare them, as he did the Ninevites, or defer the puniſhment, as he did* Hezekiah's. Thus we ſee that prophetical comminations do not expreſs God's internal purpoſes, and therefore the event may not come to paſs, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet.

2. *Pre-*

XIV. 2. *Predictions concerning temporal bleſſings, do not always abſolutely ſpeak the certainty of the event, but what God is ready to do, if they to whom they are made continue faithful to him:* For which we have ſufficient ground from that place of *Jeremiah* 18. 9, 10. *At what inſtant I ſhall ſpeak concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my ſight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I ſaid I would benefit them.* So *Iſaiah* 1. 19, 20. *If ye be willing and obedient, ye ſhall eat the good of the land; but if ye refuſe and rebel, ye ſhall be devoured with the ſword; for the mouth of the Lord hath ſpoken it.* Whereby we ſee it evident, that all promiſes of Temporal Bleſſings are not to be taken abſolutely, but with the condition of obedience. But this the *Jews* can by no means digeſt, whoſe Rule is, that all prophecies of good things to come muſt neceſſarily come to paſs, or he was no true Prophet who ſpake them: For, ſaith *Maimonides, Whatever good thing* Ibid. ſ.7,8. *God hath promiſed, altho' it be promiſed under a condition, he never revokes it; and we never find that God repented him of any good thing promis'd, but in the deſtruction of the firſt Temple, when God had promis'd to the righteous, they ſhou'd not die with the wicked; but he repented him of his words.* But it is very plain to any one that conſiders the *Jewiſh* Interpretations of Scripture that in them they have always an eye to themſelves, and will be ſure not to underſtand thoſe Scripture which ſeem to thwart their own intereſt, as is moſt apparent in the preſent caſe; for the grand reaſon why the *Jews* inſiſt ſo much on the punctual accompliſhment of all Promiſes of good to be the ſign of a true Prophet is, to uphold their own intereſt in thoſe Temporal Bleſſings which are propheſy'd of concerning them in the Old Teſtament; altho' one wou'd think the want of correſpondency in the event in reference to themſelves, might make them a little more tender of the honour of thoſe Prophecies which they acknowledge to be divine; and have appear'd to be ſo in nothing more than the full accompliſhment of all thoſe threatnings which are denounced againſt them for their diſobedience, even by the mouth of *Moſes* himſelf, *Deut.* 28. from the 15th to the end. Can any thing be more plain and evident, than that the enjoyment of all the privileges conferr'd upon them, did depend upon the condition of their continuing faithful to God's Covenant? The only place of Scripture produced by them with any plauſibility, is that *Jer.* 28. 9. *The Prophet which propheſieth of peace, when the word of the Prophet ſhall come to paſs, then ſhall the Prophet be known that the Lord hath truly ſent him.* For reconciling of which place with thoſe already mention'd, we are to underſtand that here was a particular conteſt between two Prophets, *Hananiah* and *Jeremiah*; *Jeremiah* he foretold evil to come, tho' unwillingly, *ver.* 6. *Hananiah* he propheſyed peace. Now *Jeremiah*, according to God's peculiar directions and inſpiration, appeals to the event to determine whoſe prophecy was the trueſt: Now, ſaith *Jeremiah*, if the prophecy of *Hananiah* concerning peace be fulfill'd, then he is the true Prophet, and I the falſe. And in this caſe when two Prophets propheſy contrary things, it ſtands to reaſon that God will not reveal any thing by the mouth of his own Prophet which ſhall not infallibly come to paſs, that thereby the truth of his own Prophet may be fully manifeſted. Beſides *Jeremiah* refers not merely to the event foretold, but gives a ſudden ſpecimen of his own truth in another prophecy concerning the death of *Hananiah*, which was punctually accompliſh'd the ſame year, *ver.* 17. And which is moſt conſiderable to our purpoſe, both theſe Prophets conſidered the ſame people under the ſame circumſtances, and with the ſame conditions; and ſo *Jeremiah*, becauſe of their incorrigibleneſs, foretells deſolation certainly to come; notwithſtanding this, *Hananiah* foretells peace and ſafety, which was contrary directly to God's method of proceeding, and ſo the falſity of his prophecy wou'd infallibly be diſcovered by the event. So that notwithſtanding this Inſtance, it appears evident, that predictions of temporal Bleſſings do ſuppoſe conditions, and ſo have not always the event fulfilled, when the people do not perform their condition of obedience. And thus we have now laid down the Rules whereby the truth of prophecies was to be judg'd; by which it appears what little need the conſtant Prophets had to appeal to Miracles to manifeſt the certainty of Divine Revelation in them. So we have finiſhed our firſt Propoſition concerning the manner of trying Divine Revelation in the Prophets God ſent among his people. 3:29

XV. 2. *Prop.* We now come to the ſecond general Propoſition concerning the Prophets. *Thoſe Prophets whom God did imploy upon ſome extraordinary meſſage for confirming the truth of the Religion eſtabliſhed by him, had a power of Miracles conferred upon them in order to that end.* So that we muſt diſtinguiſh the ordinary imployment of Prophets, which was either Inſtruction or Prediction of future events among God's own people, from their peculiar meſſages when they were ſent to give evidence to the truth of that way of Religion which was then ſettled by God's own appointment. Now the Prophets generally did ſuppoſe the truth of their Religion as owned by thoſe they were ſent to, and therefore it had been very needleſs imploying a power of Miracles among them to convince them of that which they believed already. For we never read among all the revolts of the people of the *Jews*, that they were lapſed ſo far as totally to reject the Law of *Moſes*, (which had been to alter the conſtitution of their Common-wealth) altho' they did enormouſly offend againſt the precepts of it, and that in thoſe things wherein the honour of God was mainly concerned, as is moſt plain in their frequent and groſs Idolatry: Which we are not ſo to underſtand as tho' they wholly caſt off the worſhip of the true God, but they ſuperinduced (as the *Samaritans* did) the worſhip of Heathen Idols with that of the God of *Iſrael*. But when the revolt grew ſo great and dangerous that it was ready to ſwallow up the true worſhip of God unleſs ſome apparent evidence were given of the falſity of thoſe Heathen mixtures, and further confirmation of the truth of the eſtabliſhed Religion, it pleaſed God ſometimes to ſend his Prophets on this peculiar meſſage to the main inſtruments of this revolt, as is moſt conſpicuous in that dangerous deſign of *Jeroboam*, when he out of a politic end ſet up his two Calves in oppoſition to the Temple at *Jeruſalem*; and therein it was the more dangerous in that in all probability he deſigned not the alteration of the worſhip it ſelf, but the eſtabliſhment of it in *Dan* and *Bethel*. (1 King. 12. 27.) For his intereſt lay not in drawing of the people from the worſhip of God, but from his worſhip at *Jeruſalem*, which was contrary to his deſign of cantonizing the Kingdom, and taking the greateſt ſhare to himſelf. Now that God might confirm his peoples Faith in this dangerous juncture of time, he ſends a Prophet to *Bethel*, who by the working of preſent Miracles there, (1 King. 13. 2.) *viz. the renting the Altar and withering of* Jeroboam*'s hand*, did manifeſt to them that theſe Altars were diſpleaſing to God, and that the true place of worſhip was at *Jeruſalem*. (1 King. 18. 38.) So in that famous *Fire-Ordeal* for trying the truth of Religion between God and *Baal* upon Mount

Carmel by *Elijah*, God was pleas'd in a miraculous way to give the moſt pregnant teſtimony to the truth of his own worſhip by cauſing a *fire* to come down from Heaven and *conſume the ſacrifice*, by which the Prieſts of *Baal* were confounded, and the people confirmed in the Belief of the only true God: for preſently upon the ſight of this Miracle the people fall on their faces and ſay, *The Lord he is God, The Lord he is God.* 1 King. 18. 39. Whereby we plainly ſee what clear evidence is given to the truth of that Religion, which is atteſted with a power of Miracles. Thus the Widow of *Sarepta* which was in the Country of *Zidon*, was brought to believe *Elijah* to be a true Prophet by his raiſing up her Son to Life. And the Woman ſaid to *Elijah*, *Now by this I know that thou art a Man of God, and that the word of the Lord by thy mouth is truth.* 1 King. 17. 24. So we ſee how *Naaman* was convinc'd of the true God by his miraculous cure in *Jordan* by the appointment of *Eliſha*, *Behold now I know that there is no God in all the earth, but in* Iſrael; 2 King. 5. 15. by which inſtances it is demonſtrable that either the Faith of all theſe perſons was built upon weak and inſufficient grounds, or that a power of Miracles is an evident confirmation of the truth of that Religion which is eſtabliſh'd by them. For this we ſee was the great end for which God did imploy any of his Prophets to work Miracles, *viz.* to be as an evident demonſtration of the truth of what was revealed by him. So that this power of Miracles is not meerly a motive of credibility, or a probable inducement to remove prejudice from the perſon, as many of our Divines ſpeak, but it doth contain an evident demonſtration to Common Senſe of the truth of that Religion which is confirm'd by them.

XVI. And thus we aſſert it to have been in the caſe of *Moſes*, the truth of whoſe meſſage was atteſted both among the *Ægyptians*, and the *Iſraelites* by that power of Miracles which he had. But herein we have the great Patrons of *Moſes* our greateſt enemies, *viz.* the preſent *Jews*; who by reaſon of their enmity to the Doctrine of CHRIST, which was atteſted by unparallell'd Miracles, are grown very ſhy of the Argument drawn from thence: Inſomuch that their great Dr. *Maimonides* lays down this for a confident Maxim, משה רבנו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות: *Maim. de fund. leg. c. 8. ſ. 1.* *The Iſraelites did not believe in* Moſes *our Maſter for the ſake of the Miracles which he wrought.* Did they not? the more ſhame for them: and if they did, the more ſhame for this great *Rabbi* thus to belye them. But the reaſon he gives for it is, *Becauſe there may remain ſome ſuſpicion in ones mind, that all Miracles may be wrought by a power of Magic* or *Incantation:* Say ye ſo? what, when *Moſes* confounded all the Magicians in *Ægypt*, and made themſelves who were the moſt cunning in theſe things confeſs it was the finger of God, and at laſt give out as not able to ſtand before *Moſes?* might one ſtill ſuſpect all this to be done by a Magical power? *Credat Judæus Appella, non ego.* This is much like what another of their Doctors ſays, whom they call the Divine Philoſopher, *Joſ. Albo. l. 1. c. 18.* that *Eliſha* his raiſing the Child to Life, and curing *Naaman*'s Leproſy, and *Daniel*'s eſcaping the Lions, and *Jonas* out of the Whale's Belly, might all come to paſs by the influence of the Stars, or by *Pythoniſm*. Very probable! but it is moſt true which G. *Vortius* there obſerves of the *Jews*, *Nihil non nugaciſſimi mortalium fingunt ne cogantur agnoſcere virtute ac digito quaſi ipſius Dei Jeſum noſtrum effeciſſe miracula ſua.* All their deſign in this is, only to leſſen the Miracles of our Bleſſed Saviour, and to derogate all they can from the Belief of them. Hence they tell us, that nothing is ſo eaſy to be done as Miracles; the mere recital of the *Tetragammaton* will work wonders, and that by this *Jeremiah* and our Saviour did all their Miracles: It is well yet that he did no more than one of their own Prophets had done before him; but where I wonder do we read that ever the pronouncing of four Letters raiſed one from the dead, who had lain four days in the grave? or by what power did *Chriſt* raiſe himſelf from the dead; (which was the greateſt Miracle of all) cou'd his dead Body pronounce the *Tetragrammaton* to awaken its ſelf with? But *Maimonides* further tells us, that the Miracles which *Moſes* wrought among the *Iſraelites* were merely for neceſſity, and not to prove the truth of his Divine Commiſſion, for which he inſtanceth in dividing the Red ſea, the raining of Manna, and the deſtruction of *Corah* and his complices. But ſetting aſide that theſe two latter were the immediate hand of God, and not Miracles done by *Moſes*; yet it is evident that the intent of them was to manifeſt a Divine Preſence among them: and in the tryal of *Corah Moſes* appeals to God's immediate Providence to manifeſt whether God had immediately imploy'd him or no. For it is evident by the Text, that the main charge Numb. 16. 13. they laid againſt *Moſes*, was ambition and uſurpation; *Is it a ſmall thing, ſay they, that thou haſt brought us up out of a Land that floweth with milk and honey, to kill us in the wilderneſs, except thou make thy ſelf altogether a prince over us?* Whereby it is evident they thought that *Moſes* acted out of a private deſign, and aimed at his own honour and authority; which was an imputation of the higheſt nature that cou'd be alledged againſt him. Now ſee how *Moſes* proceeds to clear himſelf, (which is ſufficient to ſtop the mouths of theſe incredulous *Jews*) for he lays the greateſt evidence of his Divine Commiſſion upon a preſent Miracle. And V. 28, 29. *Moſes* ſaid, *Hereby ſhall ye know that the Lord hath ſent me to do all theſe works; for I have not done them of mine own mind; If theſe men die the common death of all men, then the Lord hath not ſent me*, &c. Can any thing be more plain than that the only intent of this Miracle was to make it appear, that *Moſes* took not his office upon him, but was immediately ſent and imploy'd by God in what he did. But that which will put an end to this controverſy, is God's giving *Moſes* a power to work Miracles for that very end, that the *Iſraelites* ſhou'd believe him, *Exodus* 8. 8, 9. And can we think they wou'd have ever left *Ægypt* as they did, and followed *Moſes* into the wilderneſs, unleſs they had been fully convinced he was a deliverer ſent from God? It is true (that which the *Jews* ſpeak ſo much of) the *ſtatio in monte Sina* was a great confirmation both to their own Faith and to *Moſes* his, according to what God had told him, *Exod.* 3. 12. but yet it follows not hence they had no firm bottom for their Faith to ſtand on before (for then they might have been drowned in the Red ſea as well as the *Egyptians*) but God's knowing their incredulity and readineſs to diſobey his Law, did at the promulgation of it teſtify to their eyes and ears his own preſence in the Exod. 19. 9. midſt of them. And this certainly was one of the greateſt Miracles of all: and therefore to oppoſe this to the evidence that is produced by Miracles is only to oppoſe a power of working Miracles to a power of doing them. So vain and empty then, ſo falſe and fallacious, yea ſo directly contrary to Holy Scripture is that *Axiome* of the *Jews*, *Prophetiæ veritas non confirmatur miraculis:* for Miracles are ſufficient evidences of Divine Revelation in any whom God imploys, to all but ſuch as are reſolved not to believe them; and as one well ſaith, *Pertinaciæ nullum remedium poſuit Deus; God never works Miracles to convince obſtinate Atheiſts*

theiſts and wilful Infidels. This now is the firſt caſe wherein Miracles are to be expected, which is, when God imploys any upon an extraordinary meſſage, to be as credentials to confirm their Divine Commiſſion.

A.D

CHAP. VII.

32: 2. X. The eternity of the Law of *Moſes* diſcuſſed.

I. *The ſecond caſe wherein Miracles may be expected, when a Divine poſitive Law is to be repealed, and another way of worſhip eſtabliſhed inſtead of it. The poſſibility in general of a repeal of a Divine Law aſſerted; the particular caſe of the Law of* Moſes *diſputed againſt the* Jews: II. *the matter of that Law proved not to be immutably obligatory; becauſe the ceremonial precepts were required not for themſelves, but for ſome further end; that proved from* Maimonides *his confeſſion:* III. *the precepts of the Ceremonial Law frequently diſpenſed with while the Law was in force. Of the Paſſover of* Hezekiah, *and ſeveral other inſtances.* IV. *It is not inconſiſtent with the wiſdom of* God *to repeal ſuch an eſtabliſhed Law.* Abravanel's *arguments anſwered.* V. *Of the perfection of the Law of* Moſes, *compared with the Goſpel.* VI. *Whether* God *hath ever declared he wou'd never repeal the Law of* Moſes. VII. *Of adding to the precepts.* VIII. *Of the expreſſions ſeeming to imply the perpetuity of the Law of* Moſes. *Reaſons aſſigned why thoſe expreſſions are uſed, tho' perpetuity be not implyed.* IX. *The Law of* Moſes *not built upon immutable reaſon, becauſe many particular precepts were founded upon particular occaſions, as the cuſtoms of the* Zabii; X. *many ceremonial precepts thence deduced out of* Maimonides; XI. *and becauſe ſuch a ſtate of things was foretold with which the obſervation of the Ceremonial Law wou'd be inconſiſtent.* XII. *That largely diſcovered from the prophecies of the Old Teſtament.*

I. I Now come to the ſecond caſe wherein Miracles may be juſtly expected, which is, *When ſomething which hath been before eſtabliſhed by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and ſome other way of Worſhip to be ſet up inſtead of it.* Two things are very neceſſary to be ſpoken to for the clearing of this Propoſition: Firſt, *Whether a Law once eſtabliſhed by God himſelf be capable of a repeal*; Secondly, *What neceſſity there is of Miracles to manifeſt God's intention of repealing a former Law.* Theſe two contain the main foundation of the Diſpute between the *Jews* and Us, *viz. Whether the Law of* Moſes *was ever to be laid aſide, and whether the Miracles of our Bleſſed Saviour were ſufficient evidences of God's intention by him to repeal the former Law eſtabliſhed by* Moſes? I begin with the *firſt*, Whether a Divine Law in general or the Law of *Moſes* in particular may be abrogated or repealed, after God himſelf had made it evident that the promulgation of it was from himſelf. This muſt be confeſſed the ſtrongeſt and moſt plauſible plea the preſent *Jews* have for their Infidelity, and therefore the eternity of the Law of *Moſes* is made by them one of the fundamental Articles of their preſent Creed, and is pleaded for with the greateſt ſubtility by their great R. *Abravanel*, who ſpends his whole 13th Chapter *de capite fidei* upon it, but with what ſucceſs, will be ſeen in our clearing of it. There are but three things can be ſuppoſed as the grounds why a Law once promulged by God himſelf, ſhou'd not be capable of Repeal; and thoſe are either firſt, *Becauſe the things themſelves commanded in that Law are of ſuch nature, that they are not capable of being diſpenſed with:* Or ſecondly, *that it is not conſiſtent with the wiſdom of God to repeal a Law once eſtabliſhed:* Or thirdly, *that the reaſon of the Law continuing always the ſame, it would argue mutability in God to revoke that Law, and eſtabliſh another inſtead of it:* If we can therefore demonſtrate, *That the matter of the Law of* Moſes *is of a poſitive and mutable nature, that is ſuitable to the wiſdom of God to alter it,* and *that ſufficient account in reaſon may be given for the alteration of it;* Then there can be no imaginable neceſſity that a Law once having God for its Author, muſt therefore derive from him an eternal and immutable obligation.

II. Firſt then as to the matter of the Law; and here it muſt be ſuppos'd, that in the matter of Controverſy between us and the *Jews*, the queſtion is not of any of thoſe things which are therefore commanded, becauſe they are intrinſecally good, as the precepts of the Natural or Moral Law; but of thoſe things which are therefore only good, becauſe God commands them, *i. e.* things merely poſitive, whoſe worth and value ariſeth not from the intrinſic weight of the things, but from the external impreſs of Divine Authority upon them. Now it is no queſtion on either hand whether God may require theſe things or no; nor whether theſe things will be acceptable unto God, ſo long as he requires them; but whether, when once required, the obligation to them can never ceaſe. Such kind of things among the *Jews* we ſuppoſe all the Rites and Ceremonies of the Law to be; *viz.* Circumciſion, Diſtinction of Meats and Days, Cuſtoms of ſacrificing, and ſuch like, and whatever other Laws reſpected them as a diſtinct and peculiar Common-wealth. All theſe we ſay are ſuch as do not carry an immutable obligation along with them; and that on theſe accounts.

1. Firſt, *Becauſe theſe things are not primarily required for themſelves, but in order to ſome further end.* Things that are required upon their own account, carry an indiſpenſable obligation in them to their performance; but where things are commanded not for themſelves, but the Legiſlator doth expreſs ſome particular grounds of requiring them, there the end and intention of the Legiſlator is the meaſure of their obligation. To which purpoſe *Maimonides* excellently ſpeaks, when he ſays, *That the particular manner of worſhip among the* Jews, *as ſacrifices and oblations, were ſecundum intentionem ſecundam Dei, God's ſecondary intention and deſign; but prayer, invocation, and the like, were nearer God's primary intention:* Now, ſaith he, *for the firſt, they are no further acceptable to God, than as all the circumſtances of time, place, and perſons are obſerved, which are preſcribed by God himſelf; but the latter are acceptable in any perſon, time, or place. And for this cauſe,* ſaith he, *it is that we find the Prophets often reproving men for their too great ſedulity in bringing oblations, and inculcating*

Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 32.

inculcating this to them, that God did not intend theſe as the principal inſtances of his worſhip, and that God did not need any of theſe things. So 1 *Sam.* 15. 22. *Behold to obey is better than ſacrifice, and to hearken, than the fat of rams:* Iſa. 1. 11. *To what purpoſe is the multitude of your ſacrifices unto me? ſaith the Lord.* And eſpecially *Jerem.* 7. 22, 23. *For I ſpake not to your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Ægypt, concerning burnt-offerings; but this thing I commanded them, ſaying, Obey my voice and I will be your God, and ye ſhall be my people.* Of which words *Maimonides* ſaith, *Scrupulum moverunt omnibus, quos mihi videre aut audire contigit*; For ſay they, How can it be that God did not command them concerning Sacrifices, when a great part of the Law is about them: But *Maimonides* well reſolves the doubt thus, *That God's primary Intention, and that which he chiefly looked at, was obedience; but God's Intention in ſacrifices and oblations, was only to teach them the chief thing, which was obedience.* This then is of the number of thoſe things which are ſpoken abſolutely, but to be underſtood comparatively; as, *I will have mercy and not ſacrifice. My doctrine is not mine, but his that ſent me. It is not you that ſpeak, but the Holy Ghoſt,* &c. So that we ſee all the goodneſs which is in theſe things, is convey'd into them by that which is morally good, which is obedience; and God did never regard the performance of thoſe Laws any further than as it was an expreſſion of obedience, and it was conjoyn'd with thoſe other moral duties which were moſt agreeable to the Divine Nature. And in this ſenſe many underſtood that difficult place, *Ezek.* 20. 25. *And I gave them* חקים לא טובים *ſtatutes that were not good,* i. e. ſay they, *comparatively with theſe things which were ſimply and in themſelves good*; to which purpoſe they give this Rule: *Aliquid negatur ineſſe alicui, quod alterius comparatione exiſtimatur exiguum.* But I rather think that which the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt ſuggeſts, and others explain further, to be the meaning of that place, *viz.* that by the Precepts that were not good, is meant the cruel and tyrannical impoſitions of thoſe enemies God for their ſins did deliver them over to, which were far from being acceptable to them, which is frequently the ſenſe of Good in Scripture. Thus we ſee one reaſon why the Ceremonial Precepts do not in themſelves imply an immutable obligation, becauſe they are not commanded for themſelves, but in order to a further end.

III. 2. *Becauſe God hath frequently diſpenſed with the Ceremonial Precepts when they were in greateſt force, if the end of them could be attained without them.* Thus the Precept of Circumciſion ſlept during the *Iſraelites* travels in the Wilderneſs. Thus *David* ate of the *Shew-bread*, which is expreſly forbidden in the Law; the *Jews* think to evade this by diſtinguiſhing between the Bread of Confeſſion in the *Euchariſtical* Offering, mentioned *Leviticus* 7. 13. and the proper *Shew-bread*: Now they ſay *David* ate only of the Firſt, and not of the Second; but this is *Gloſſa Aurelianenſis*, which overthrows the Text; for it is expreſly ſaid, that the ground why the Prieſt gave him Holy Bread, was becauſe there was none there but לחם הפנים, *the ſhew-bread*, 1 *Sam.* 21. 6. A like violation of the Law without reproof, is commonly ſuppoſed by the *Jews* to have been in the ſiege of *Jericho*, *viz.* in the caſe of the *Sabbath*. But it is more plain in that *Anomalous Paſſover* obſerved by *Hezekiah*, which many of the *Jews* themſelves acknowledge was not obſerved as the *Second Paſſover*, provided by the Law to be celebrated on the 14 day of the *ſecond month by thoſe who were debarred of* the

Exod. 29. 33.

Numb. 9. 11.

the firſt for their legal uncleanneſs; but they ſuppoſe it to have been intended for the *Legal Paſſover*; only becauſe the fourteenth of *Niſan* 2 Chron. 29. 17. was paſſed before the Sanctification of the *Temple was finiſhed*, leſt they ſhou'd celebrate none at all that year, they tell us that *Hezekiah* with the conſent of the Rulers, did make an Interculation that year of a whole Month, and ſo *Niſan* was reckon'd for the ſecond *Adar*, and *Jiar* for *Vid.Selden de Anno civili Jud. cap.* 9. *Niſan*, from whence they ſay that *Hezekiah* did intercalate *Niſan* in *Niſan*, that is, added another *Niſan* to the firſt. But where do we read any ſuch thing permitted in the Law as the celebrating the Firſt *Paſſover* the 14th of the ſecond Month? But granting that it was obſerved as a ſecond *Paſſover*, becauſe of the want of Legal Sanctification both in Prieſts and People; yet we find great irregularities in the obſervation 2 Chron. 30. 18. of it; for it is expreſly ſaid, *That a multitude of the people had not cleanſed themſelves, yet they did eat the Paſſover otherwiſe than it was written.* Ver. 20. And yet it is ſaid upon *Hezekiah's prayer, that the Lord hearkned to* Hezekiah, , *and healed every one.* So that we ſee God himſelf did diſpenſe with the ſtrict Ceremonial Precepts of the Law, where Men did look after the main and ſubſtantial parts of the worſhip God required from them. Nay God himſelf hath expreſly declared his own Will to diſpenſe with the Ritual and Ceremonial Law, where it comes to ſtand in competition with ſuch things as have an eternal Goodneſs in them, Hoſ. 6. 6. when he ſaith, *He deſired mercy and not ſacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings.* Thus we plainly ſee that the Ceremonial Law, however poſitive it was, did yield as to its obligation, when any thing that was Moral, ſtood in competition with it. And ſo the *Jews* themſelves ſuppoſe an open violation of the Judicial Law to have 2 Sam. 21. 9, 10. been in the hanging up of *Saul*'s Sons, a long time together, directly contrary to *Deut.* 21. 23. which they conceive to have been from the 16 of *Niſan* to the 17 of *Marcheſvan*, which is as much as from our *March* to *September*, whereas the Law ſaith expreſly that the *body of one that is hanged ſhall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou ſhalt in any wiſe bury him that day.* One of the *Jewiſh Rabbies*, as G. *Vorſtius* tells us, is ſo troubled at this, *That he wiſheth that place in* Samuel *expunged out of* *Vorſt. Not. in Abrav. c.* 13. *Scripture, that the Name of God might be ſanctified.* But whether this were done על פי הביביר, *by the command of the Oracle or no*, or whether only by a general Permiſſion, we ſee it was *acceptable unto God*; for upon that the *Gibeonites famine* was *removed, and God was intreated for the land.* Thus we have now proved that there is no immutable and indiſpenſable obligation which ariſeth from the things themſelves.

IV. Secondly, It is no way inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God to repeal ſuch a Law when once eſtabliſhed. The main argument of that *Abravanel Roſh. Amanana, c.* 13. learned R. *Abravanel*, whereby he wou'd eſtabliſh the eternity of the Law of *Moſes*, is fetched from hence, *That this Law was the reſult of the Wiſdom of God, who knows the ſuitableneſs of things he appoints to the ends he appoints them for; as God hath appointed bread to be the food of Man's body: Now we are not to enquire why God hath appointed bread and no other thing to be the food of Man; no more*, ſaith he, *are we to enquire why God hath appointed this Law rather than another for the food of our Souls; but we are to reſt contented with the counſels of God, tho' we underſtand not the reaſon of them.* This is the ſubſtance of that Argument, which he more largely deduceth. To which we anſwer, that his Argument holds good for Obedience to all God's poſitive Precepts of what kind or nature ſoever they be, ſo long as we know their Obligation to continue; but all the queſtion is, whether every poſitive Precept muſt always continue to oblige. And thus far his ſimilitude will hold good, that whatever God doth command, we are to look upon it to be as neceſſary to our Souls, as bread to our Bodies; but hence it follows not that our Souls muſt be always held to the ſame poſitive Precepts, any more than our Bodies to the ſame kind of food. Nay, as in our Bodies we find ſome kind of food always neceſſary, but the kind of it to alter according to age, health, and conſtitutions; ſo we ſay ſome kind of Divine Revelation is always neceſſary; but God is graciouſly pleaſed to temper it according to the age and growth of his People; ſo he fed them as with Milk in their Non-age, with a Ritual and Ceremonial Law, and trained them up by degrees under the Nurſery of the Prophets, till the Church was grown to age, and then God fed it with the ſtrong Meat, which is contained in God's Revelation of his Will by the Goſpel of his Son. And therein was abundantly ſeen God's πολυποίκιλος σοφία, his *variegated Wiſdom*, that he made choice of ſuch excellent and proportionable ways to his People's capacity to prepare them gradually for that full and compleat Revelation, which was reſerved for the time of the appearance of the true *Meſſias* in the World. For can any thing be more plain than the gradual progreſs of divine Revelation from the beginning of the World? That fair reſemblance and portraicture of God himſelf, and his Will upon his Word (if I may ſo expreſs it) had its Ground-work laid upon Man's firſt Apoſtacy in the Promiſe made *Gen.* 3. 15. whereon ſome further lines were drawn in the times of the Patriarchs, but it had its σκιαγραφία, it was ſhadowed out the moſt in the Typical and Ceremonial Law, but was never filled up to the life, nor had its perfect ζωογραφία, 'till the Son of God himſelf appeared unto the World. If then it be inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God to add any thing to the Law of *Moſes*, why not to the Revelation made to *Adam* or the Patriarchs? or eſpecially to the ſeven Precepts of *Noah*, which they ſuppoſe to have been given to all Mankind after the Flood? If it were not repugnant to the Wiſdom of God to ſuperadd Rituals and Ceremonials to Morals and Naturals, why ſhall it be to take down the ſcaffolds of Ceremonies, when God's Spiritual Temple the Church of God is come to its full height? Is there not more reaſon that Rituals ſhou'd give place to Subſtantials, than that ſuch ſhou'd be ſuper-induced to Morals?

V. There are only two things can be pleaded by the *Jews* why it ſhould be more repugnant to the Wiſdom of God to add to the Law of *Moſes*, than to any former Revelation, which are the greater perfection they ſuppoſe to be in this Revelation above others, and that God in the promulgation of it did expreſs that he would never alter it. But both theſe are manifeſtly defective and inſufficient, in order to the end for which they are produced. For *firſt*, what evidence is there that the Law of *Moſes* contained ſo great perfection in it, as that it was not capable of having any additions made to it by God himſelf? We ſpeak not now of the perfection of the Moral Law, which it is granted contained in it the foundation of all poſitive Precepts; for this we never contend for the abrogation of, but the Ritual Law is that we meddle with; and is it poſſible any Men ſhou'd be ſo little befriended by Reaſon as to think this to be the utmoſt pitch of what God cou'd reveal to the World, as to the way of his own Worſhip? Let any indifferent rational perſon take the Precepts of the Goſpel, and lay them in the balance with thoſe of the Ceremonial Law, and if he makes any ſcruple of deciding on which

Pſal. 19. 10.

which ſide the over-weight lies, we may have cauſe to ſuſpect him forſaken of that little Reaſon which gave him the name of Man. Let but the fifth of *Matthew* be laid againſt the whole book of *Leviticus*, and then ſee whether contains the more excellent Precepts and more ſuitable to the Divine Nature? I ſpeak not this to diſparage any thing which had once God for the Author of it, but to let us ſee how far God was from the neceſſity of Natural Agents to act to the height of his ſtrength in that diſcovery of his Will. God is wiſe as well as righteous in all his ways; as he can command nothing but what is juſt; ſo he will command nothing but what is good, nay excellent in its kind. But tho' all the Stars be in the ſame Firmament, *yet one Star differs from another in glory*; though they may be all Pearls, yet ſome may be more *Orient* than others are; every place of Holy Scripture may have its Crown, but ſome may have their *Aureolæ*, a greater excellency, a fuller and larger capacity than the other hath; every parcel of Divine Revelation may have ſome perfection in its kind, yet there may be ſome *monſtra perfectionis* in *Scaliger*'s expreſſion that may far out-vye the Glory and Excellency of the reſt. Can we think the miſts and umbrages of the Law could ever caſt ſo glorious a Light as the Sun of Righteouſneſs himſelf in his Meridian Elevation? As well may we think a dark ſhady paſſage more magnificent and glorious than the moſt princely Palace, a Picture drawn in charcoal more exquiſite and curious than the lines of *Apelles*, ſome imperfect rudiments more exact and accurate than the moſt elaborate work, as go about to compare the Law of *Moſes* with the Goſpel of *Jeſus Chriſt* in point of excellency and perfection. Let the *Jews* then boaſt never ſo much of their *gradus Moſaicus*, and how much it exceeds the degree of Revelation in other Prophets, we know if his light be compar'd with what the Goſpel communicates, *Moſes* himſelf ſaw but as in a glaſs darkly, and not in *ſpeculo lucido*, as the *Jews* are wont to ſpeak. We honour *Moſes* much, but we have learnt to honour him at whoſe Transfiguration he was preſent, more; neither can that be thought any diſparagement to him, who accounted *the reproach of Chriſt greater riches than the treaſures of Ægypt.*

VI. *But it may be, tho' the Law in its ſelf be not ſo abſolutely perfect, yet God may have declared he will never alter it, and then it is not conſiſtent with Divine Wiſdom to repeal it.* Very true: God will never alter what he hath ſaid he will not; but where is it that he hath thus bound up himſelf? Is it in that noted place to this purpoſe, *Thou ſhalt not add thereto nor diminiſh from it?* So indeed *Maimonides* argues; but therein more like a *Jew* than himſelf; and yet one of his own Nation therein far more ingenuous than he, gives a moſt ſufficient anſwer to it, which is *R. Joſ. Albo*, whoſe words are thus produced by *Vorſtius* and others; *The Scripture only admoniſheth us, that we ſhould not add to nor diminiſh from God's commands according to our own wills; but what hinders,* ſaith he, *but God himſelf may according to his own Wiſdom add or diminiſh what pleaſeth?* But are they in good earneſt when they ſay God bound up himſelf by this Speech? whence came then all the Prophetical Revelations among the *Jews?* did theſe add nothing to the Law of *Moſes*, which was as much the Will of God when revealed by them, as any thing was revealed by *Moſes* himſelf? or will they ſay that all thoſe things were contained for the ſubſtance in the Law of *Moſes*, as to what concerned practice? Very true; but not in the Ceremonial, but the Moral Law; and ſo we ſhall not ſtick to grant that the whole duty of Man may be reduced

Deut. 12. 32.
Maimon. de de fund. leg. c. 9. ſ. 1.
Ikkarim l. 3. c. 14.

duced to that. But if adding to the Precepts be the doing of God's Commands in another way than he hath preſcribed, and diminiſhing from them be merely not to do what God hath commanded, as ſome conceive, then theſe words are ſtill more remote from the ſenſe affixed on them by the incredulous *Jews*. For why may not God himſelf add to his own Laws, or alter the form of them, altho we are always bound directly to follow God's declared will? May not God enlarge his own Will, and bring his Scholars from Rudiments of their non-age to the higher knowledge of thoſe who are full grown? or muſt the World of neceſſity do that which the old *Roman* ſo much abhorred, *ſeneſcere in elementis, wax gray in learning this A, B, C?* or was the Ceremonial Law like the *China* Characters, that the World might ſpend its Age in conning of them? But it appears that there was no other meaning in that ſtrict prohibition, than that Men ſhou'd not of their own heads offer to find out new ways of worſhip as *Jeroboam* did, but that God's Revelation of his own Will in all its different degrees was to be the adequate Rule of the way and parts of his own worſhip. And I wou'd fain know of the *Jews* whether their own ſevere and ſtrict Prohibitions of things not at all forbidden in the Law of God, and that on a religious account, as סייג לתורה *a boundary to the Law*, come not nearer the adding to God's Law, than God's own further declaration of his Will doth? All the diſpute then muſt be, not whether God may add to his own Law, but whether the Goſpel be a prohibited addition to the Law of *Moſes*; that is whether it be only the invention of Men, or it be the expreſs declaration of the Will of God? As to which controverſy, he is no true Chriſtian who dare not readily joyn iſſue with them, and undertake to prove by all the Arguments by which they believe the Law of *Moſes* to have been of Divine Revelation, that the Goſpel of *Chriſt* is a clear Manifeſtation of the Will of God. But of that afterwards.

VII. From hence it is evident that God hath not by this place tied up himſelf from any further Manifeſtation of his Mind beyond the Law of *Moſes*; but it may be they may put a greater confidence in thoſe expreſſions which ſeem neceſſarily to imply a perpetual and unalterable obligation in the Law of *Moſes*: For, ſaith the late learned *Rabbi Manaſſeh Ben Iſrael*, *If by ſuch expreſſions as thoſe are uſed in Scripture which ſeem to import the perpetuity of the Law of* Moſes, *ſomewhat elſe ſhould be meant than they ſeem to expreſs; what did* Moſes *and the Prophets in uſing them but lay a ſtumbling-block in the ways of Men, whereas they might have ſpoken clearly, and told us there ſhould a time come when the Ceremonial Law ſhould oblige no longer?* This being a charge of ſo high a nature, muſt not be diſmiſt without a particular enquiry into the expreſſions which are the ground and reaſon of it. The places moſt inſiſted on by the *Jews* are *Deut*. 29. 29. *Things which are revealed belong to us and to our Children* עד עולם *for ever*. So *Levit*. 23. 14. the precept of offering the firſt fruits is there called חקת עולם *a ſtatute for ever*; and that of the *Paſſover*, *Exod*. 12. 17. where the ſame expreſſion is uſed. From hence they infer that no alteration can happen as to the Ceremonial Law, ſince God himſelf hath declared that it ſhall continue for ever. To this common argument of the *Jews*, it is in general reply'd, That the word in which the main force of the argument lies, doth not carry with it an abſolute perpetuity, but it ſignifies according to the ſubject it is joyned with. So when it is apply'd to God, it ſignifies Eternity,

Manaſſ. Concil. in Levit. 9. 7.

not ſo much from the mere importance of the word, as from the neceſſary existence of the Divine Nature. *Maimon. More Nev. p. 2. c. 28.* Thence *Maimonides* himſelf can ſay, *Proinde ſciendum eſt quod Olam non neceſſario ſignificet æternitatem, niſi ei conjungantur Ed* (עֵד *vel* עַד) *idque vel poſt illud ut Olam vaed, vel ante at Ad Olam.* Altho' this Rule of his hath no certainty at all in it, as appears from his Collection of it, which is becauſe it is ſaid, *Pſal.* 10. 16. *The Lord he is King Olam vaed, for ever and ever:* but as I ſaid already, that it is not from the ſignification of the word, but the nature of the thing. And it is moſt plain in Scripture that עולם is ſo far from implying a neceſſary perpetuity, that it is apply'd to ſuch things as can have no long duration, as *Exod.* 21. 6. *and he ſhall ſerve him,* לעולם, that is, (as the *Jews* themſelves expound it) *to the next Jubilee, tho' it were near or a far off.* So 1 *Sam.* 1. 22. where *Samuel* is ſaid *to abide before the Lord* עדעולם *for ever,* where we find *Maimonides* his *Ad Olam* in a ſenſe very far ſhort of Eternity; this is ſo plain that the formerly cited *R. Joſeph Albo* doth in terms confeſs it, and produceth a multitude of other places to the ſame purpoſe. For which tho' he be ſufficiently cenſured by his Brethren, yet we may ſee there may be ſome ingenuity left in a *Jewiſh Rabbi*, even in the grand diſpute concerning the Eternity of the Law of *Moſes*.

VIII. All the difficulty now is to aſſign ſome rational accounts why ſuch Precepts which God did not intend ſhou'd be always obligatory, yet ſhou'd be enforced upon them in ſuch expreſſions which may ſeem at leaſt to imply a Perpetuity. Of which theſe may be given. Firſt, *That theſe Precepts to which theſe expreſſions are annexed, ſhou'd not be looked on as mere ambulatory Laws that did only concern them in their travels thro' the Wilderneſs, and not continue obligatory when they were ſettled in* Canaan. For which purpoſe we are to obſerve, That tho' all the Laws were given in one body in the Wilderneſs, yet the obligation to all of them did not commence at the ſame time, neither were they to continue for the ſame duration; theſe three ſorts of Precepts may be obſerved among them; firſt ſuch as concerned them only in their preſent condition, as that about the Tabernacle, which was then a moveable Temple among them, ſuitable to their condition; but when they were ſettled, God was to have a ſettled Houſe too. So that Precept of going without *the camp*, Deut. 32. 12. had an immediate reſpect to their Peregrination. *Secondly,* Such Precepts as were given them, but they were not bound to perform them 'till their ſettlement in *Canaan, as driving out the Canaanites,* Numb. 33. 52. *building the Temple in the place which God ſhou'd chooſe, erecting Judicatories in their ſeveral Cities, chooſing a King,* &c. *Thirdly,* There were ſuch Precepts as concern them where-ever they were, whether in the Wilderneſs or in *Canaan*; now theſe are the Precepts which are ſaid to be perpetual. This is the account given of it by *H. Grotius*; *Grot. de Verit. Rel. Chriſt. l. 5. ſ. 7.* but becauſe this may be liable to ſome Exceptions, I therefore add, *Secondly,* That the reaſon of thoſe expreſſions being annexed to the Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, is, *Becauſe they were to continue obligatory 'till ſuch a remarkable period of time came which ſhould alter the ſtate of things among them.* And ſuch a period of time the coming of the *Meſſias* is by themſelves ſuppoſed to be, when in their famous computation they make three *Epocha's*, Before the Law, Under the Law, and the Coming of the *Meſſias*. And it is evident yet by them, that they do ſtill expect a wonderful alteration of the ſtate of things when the *Meſſias* comes; doth it not therefore ſtand to reaſon that לעולם ſhou'd be added to ſuch things which were to continue 'till ſo great alteration as ſhou'd be on the coming of the *Meſſias*, eſpecially if the Coming of the *Meſſias* had been deferred ſo long as they falſly ſuppoſe it to be? But however, granting that a new ſeries of times or αἰὼν is to commence from the *Meſſias*, there is very great reaſon why that expreſſion ſhou'd be added to thoſe things which were to continue as long as the αἰὼν did, *i. e.* 'till *Meſſias* came, which we freely acknowledge. And in this ſenſe is עולם often taken for ſuch a duration of things which had ſome remarkable period to conclude it, as in the caſe of the *Jubilee*, in the Servant mentioned, and the ſpecial imployment which God called *Samuel* to, in this caſe, as to the event, or the end of his life in *Hannah*'s deſignation, when ſhe ſaid he ſhou'd attend upon the Lord for ever. *Thirdly*, Thoſe Precepts are ſaid *to endure for ever, which would ſtill have continued obligatory, unleſs God himſelf had altered the obligatian of them by a new Revelation of his Will.* For in this caſe it is moſt certain that all poſitive Precepts coming immediately from God, do carry with them an unalterable obligation, unleſs the Legiſlator himſelf do in as evident a way repeal them as he did once eſtabliſh them; that is in ſuch Laws which depend merely upon God's Poſitive and Arbitrary Will. For in this caſe God allows none to alter any thing concerning his Law; but indiſpenſable obedience is our duty 'till God himſelf repeal his former Laws. And this we aſſert to be the caſe of the Goſpel. So that it appears plainly that it implies nothing inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God to repeal an eſtabliſhed Poſitive Law, tho' ſome expreſſions to prejudiced minds ſeem to imply a perpetuity in it.

IX. We come therefore to the third thing which may make a Poſitive Law unalterable, which is, when the reaſon of it is immutable; for then, ſay they, it wou'd argue mutability in God to repeal it. If we can therefore make it evident that the Ceremonial Law was not eſtabliſhed on an immutable Reaſon, and that the Reaſon on which it was eſtabliſhed doth ſuppoſe a ſtate of things to come, in which it ſhou'd expire, then there cannot be the leaſt pretence of mutability in God on the repeal of ſuch a Law. Firſt, *That it was not eſtabliſhed upon an immutable Reaſon:* The immutable Reaſon of a Law muſt either be fetched from the nature of the things commanded, or the grounds of the eſtabliſhing of it; we have already proved that the nature of the Poſitive Precepts of the Ceremonial Law do not carry in them an intrinſecal goodneſs. And here the Sophiſtry of the *Jews* is apparently diſcovered, that when they are preſſed with this, they take ſanctuary in the *Decalogue*, or ſome Spiritual Precepts, which comprehend in them the general foundation of the Law; as *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. whereas theſe are very remote from the matter in controverſy, which concerns not what Precepts were moral in their Law, but what were purely ceremonial; which were ſo far from being founded on an immutable Reaſon, that the particular occaſion of the giving of many of them, is particularly aſſigned them by their own Writers; eſpecially in the main parts of the Ceremonial Worſhip of God among them, the reaſons of which *Maimonides* ſaith may be deduced from the Cuſtoms of the *Zabaiſts*, the knowledge of whoſe Opinions and Cuſtoms, he tells us, is *porta magna ad reddendas præceptorum cauſas*, *gives much light to the Law of* Moſes; and particularly of himſelf, he ſaith, *Quod multarum legum rationes & cauſæ mihi innotuerint ex cognitione fidei, rituum*

Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 29.

rituum & cultus Zabiorum; that he came to the right underſtanding of many of the Laws of *Moſes* by his knowledge in the Rites and Cuſtoms of theſe *Zabaiſts*. Granting therefore the *Hypotheſis* of this learned *Rabbi*, that the Precepts of the Law had moſt of them a particular reſpect to the idolatrous Cuſtoms of theſe People; what will hence follow but only this, that the reaſon of the Ceremonial Precepts did reſpect the Cuſtoms in uſe when they were given, and ſo are not founded upon an immutable Reaſon? And the more the Precepts are whoſe Reaſon is to be fetched from hence, the more plain and evident is the thing we intended by it, *viz. That the Ceremonial Law is not founded upon an unalterable Reaſon.*

X. Now from this one head of the idolatrous Cuſtoms of thoſe Nations about them hath that learned Author deduced the Reaſons of very many of the moſt obſcure Commands of the Ceremonial Law: As that concerning *rounding the corner of their heads*, which *Herodotus* tells us was the Cuſtom of the *Arabians*, and others of the *Babylonian* Prieſts; by both which the *Zabii* may be meant, the ſuperſtition of the *Zabii* being *Chaldæan*, as I have ſhewed already, and their Name, as ſome conceive, from *Saba* the Son of *Chus*, whoſe poſterity were ſeated in *Arabia*, near to the Red Sea; and that which confirms this opinion, is, that the *Sabeans* did as *Philoſtorgius* ſaith, *Worſhip the Sun and Moon*, as the *Zabaiſts* did in *Maimonides*; and withal *Bochartus* makes it evident from *Strabo*, that ſome of the *Babylonians* called *Gerrhæi*, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Country of the *Sabeans*, whereby this originally *Chaldaic* ſuperſtition might ſpread its ſelf in theſe parts near the confines of *Judæa*, which might be the cauſe why all thoſe Rites, which were uſed by theſe idolatrous People, are ſo ſeverely forbidden to the *Jews*: God thereby ſetting up a Wall of Separation between his People and the Nations round about them, by making the Cuſtom of the *Jews* almoſt *Antipodes* to theirs; as thoſe of *Japan* are to them of *China*. Upon the ſame ground it is ſuppoſed that other Precepts were made againſt *wearing a garment of linen and woollen*, becauſe the idolatrous Prieſts *uſed to go ſo cloathed*, as *Maimonides* tells us out of their Books, and likewiſe that prohibition of a *woman's wearing the armour of a man, and a man's wearing the garments of a woman* is very probably ſuppoſed to have had its original from that idolatrous Cuſtom mentioned by the ſame Author, *Ut vir geſtet Veſtimentum muliebre coloratum quando ſtat coram ſtella Veneris; ſimiliter ut mulier induat loricam & arma bellica quando ſtat coram ſtella Martis*; but that Author doth not deny a further reaſon to be couched in it for the preſervation of publick honeſty. Many other Precepts are drawn from the ſame fountain by that ſame Author, as *the ſowing of divers ſeeds in the ſame ground; the forbidding the eating of the fruit of their trees for the firſt three years after they came to* Canaan; that being the furtheſt time wherein the trees of their own plantation wou'd begin to bear in that Country. Now it was the Cuſtom of all thoſe idolatrous People, that the firſt time any tree did bear, part of the fruit was to be burnt up in an offering to the Idol, and the other part eaten in the Idol-Temple; or elſe they ſuppoſed their trees wou'd never proſper: Now in oppoſition to this, God bids them bring the fruit of the Fourth year to him, and eat of the Fifth themſelves, *that it may yield unto you the increaſe thereof.* So the Idolaters threatned all parents that their Children wou'd never live, unleſs they *cauſed them to paſs thro' the fire*; from which Cuſtom *Maimonides* ſaith, *Some even in his time would take the children that were new*

Levit. 19. 27. *V. Voſſ. in Maimon. de Idololat. c.* 12.

Bochart. Phaleg l. 4. *c.* 8.

Levit. 19. 19.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. *c.* 37.
Deut. 22. 5.

V. Selden de Diis Syris, Synt. 2. *cap.* 4.

Lev. 19. 19.
Lev. 19. 23.

Levit. 19. 24, 25.

born, and move them up and down over a fire wherein odoriferous ſmells were caſt. Thence comes that ſtrict Prohibition of *giving the children to* Moloch, which was by that Cuſtom of paſſing through the fire. To this ſame Head, the ſame Author refers that of *not eating the member of a living creature*, which we render *fleſh with the life thereof*; which was forbidden, as he elſewhere tells us, not only for avoiding cruelty, but becauſe the *Heathen Nations were wont in their idolatrous Feaſts to take a member off from a living creature, and eat it afterwards*; and in them likewiſe he ſuppoſeth they uſed the *boiling the fleſh and the milk together, which*, ſaith he, *beſides that it affords a moſt groſs nouriſhment, ſavours of their idolatrous practices too*; *and therefore*, ſaith he, *it is obſervable that twice where this Precept is mentioned, it follows that of the ſolemn appearance of the males at* Jeruſalem *trice a year, whereby it ſeems to be imply'd that this action had relation to ſome great ſolemnity.* Theſe and ſeveral other Precepts of the Law of *Moſes* are deduced by that very learned *Rabbi* from idolatrous Cuſtoms, as the occaſions of them; which ſeem to have the more reaſon in them, becauſe that God did in the general ſo ſtrictly *forbid the Jews to walk after the cuſtom of the Nations about them.* Thence *Origen* takes notice of the τὸ ξενίζον τῶν νόμων· καὶ τὴν ἰδιότροπον καθ' αὐτοὺς πολιτείαν; for which he ſaith, they were διαβεβλημένοι, *reproached by the Heathens, becauſe their Laws and Polity were ſo different from the Cuſtom of other Nations.* Thus we ſee then that many Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, were founded neither on the goodneſs of the things themſelves, nor on any unalterable reaſon, but were enforced on a peculiar reaſon on the People of the *Jews* at that time, as they were a People ſeparated from the reſt of the world for the worſhip of the true God. And for the other great offices wherein their Religion did ſo much conſiſt, *viz.* Sacrifices, Diſtinction of Meats, Obſervation of Feſtivals, Circumciſion, and ſuch like: The particular account and reaſon of them is either ſo evident in the Law its ſelf, or ſo fully acknowledg'd by their own Writers, that it is here ſuperfluous to inſiſt on them; eſpecially ſince ſo many have done that ſo largely already (particularly *Grotius*) whoſe labours I intend not to tranſcribe.

Levit. 20. 2, 3.
Gen. 9. 4.
Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 48.
Exod. 23. 17, 19. 34. 26.
Levit. 20. 23.
Origen. contra Celſum l. 4.
Grot. de veritate Rel. Chriſt. l. 5.

XI. I come therefore to the ſecond thing, which is, *That the Ceremonial Law was ſo far from being founded on an immutable reaſon, that while it was in its greateſt force ſuch a ſtate of things was plainly foretold, with which the obſervation of that Law would be inconſiſtent.* For which we are to conſider, that tho' the Law of *Moſes* ſeemed outwardly to reſpect the temporal advantages of the People embracing it in the Land of *Canaan*; yet there was a Spring of Spiritual Promiſes whoſe head was higher than *Jordan* was, that ran down from the Patriarchs, and was more fully opened to ſome of them, which tho' it ſeemed to run under ground in the midſt of the Ceremonial Obſervations of the Law; yet it frequently brake forth and opened its ſelf in the midſt of them, and by degrees in the Prophetical Age did make its ſelf a larger Channel, 'till in the time of the *Meſſias* by its force and violence it overthrew thoſe banks which ſtood in the way of it, and overſpread the face of the whole Earth. It is evident by the whole ſeries of the Scripture of the Old Teſtament, that God's ultimate intention was not to confine the ſaving Knowledge of his Will only to the *Jews*; for the great Promiſe to *Abraham* was, *That in his ſeed all the nations of the earth ſhould be bleſſed*; And as *Abraham rejoyced to ſee that day afar off*; ſo good *Jacob*, when he leaned on his *Jacob*'s Staff, took the height of that *Day-Star from*

from on high, which tho' like ſome of the fix'd Stars, might not for ſome time be viſible to the inferior World; yet foretold the time when he ſhou'd deſcend into a lower Orb, and become conſpicuous in our Horizon. And conſequently to his appearance in the World, wou'd be the drawing not ſo much the Eyes as the Hearts of the World to him; Gen.2. 49. 10. for no ſooner is it mentioned that *Shiloh comes when the Scepter departs from Judah*; but it immediately follows, *And to him ſhall the gathering of the people be.* Thus we ſee before ever the Law of *Moſes* came to incloſe the People of the *Jews* as *Gods peculiar people*, there was a deſign on foot, for inlarging the bounds of God's Inheritance, and *making the uttermoſt parts of the earth his Son's poſſeſſion.* Can we then think that the Law which came afterwards, cou'd diſannul the Covenant made Gal. 4. 17. 430 years before, as the Apoſtle excellently reaſons? Can we believe the Moſaical diſpenſation was the utmoſt of what God did intend, when God had before promiſed that the Bleſſing of *Abraham* ſhou'd come Rom. 4. 10. 11. upon us *Gentiles* alſo? To which purpoſe it is very obſervable, that *Abraham was juſtify'd not in circumciſion, but in uncircumciſion; for he received the ſign of circumciſion, a ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith, being uncircumciſed, that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumciſed; that righteouſneſs might be imputed unto them alſo.* Whereby it is evident that the great Bleſſings promiſed to *Abraham*, did not reſpect him merely as Progenitor of the *Iſraelites*, but in a higher capacity, as *Father of the faithful*; and that ground of his acceptance with God did not depend on any Ceremonial Rite, ſuch as Circumciſion was, God imputing his Faith for Righteouſneſs before his being circumciſed. But becauſe the time was not yet come wherein the grand Myſtery of Man's Salvation by the death of the Son of God was to be revealed; therefore when God called the Nation of the *Jews* from their bondage, he made choice of a more obſcure way of repreſenting this Myſtery to them through all the umbrages of the Law: and withall inforced the Precepts with ſuch terrible ſanctions of curſes to *all that continued not in all that was written in that Law to do it*, to make them the more apprehenſive that the ground of their acceptance with God, cou'd not be the performance of the Precepts of that Law, but they ought to breathe after that higher diſpenſation wherein the way and method of Man's Salvation ſhould be fully *revealed when the fulneſs of time was come.* Now therefore God left them under the tutorage and *Pædagogy* of the Law, which ſpake ſo ſeverely to them, that they might not think this was all God intended in order to the happineſs of Men, but that he did reſerve ſome greater thing in ſtore to be enjoy'd by his People when they were come to Age.

XII. So that tho' the Ceremonies of the Law had not a Mouth to ſpeak out *Chriſt*; yet they had a Hand to point to him; for they were the ſhadow or dark repreſentation of that which was to be drawn afterwards to the greateſt life. And this was underſtood by all thoſe whoſe hearts were carried beyond the outward ſapleſs Letter of the Law, to the more inward and ſpiritual meaning of it, (there being an εἰσωτερικὰ and ἐξωτερικὰ in the Law as well as Philoſophy,) theſe Myſteries were too not ſo veiled and hidden, but all that were ἐπόπται, *fully initiated*, might fully underſtand them; which made that true Spiritual *Cabbala*, which was conſtantly preſerved among the *Iſraelites*, which was more largely commented on by the Prophets of ſucceeding Ages; whoſe care it was to unlock this *Cabbala*, and to raiſe up the hearts of the People in a higher expectation of the great things which were to come. Thence we not only read of the ſolemn Prayer of the Church of the *Jews*, that the knowledge of God might be *diſperſed over all the Nations of the earth*, Pſal. 67. 2. but we have many Prophecies *that when the mountain of the Lord's houſe* Iſaiah 2. 2. *ſhou'd be exalted, all nations ſhould flow unto it: that from the riſing of the* Mal. 1. 11. *Sun to the going down thereof, God's name ſhall be great among the Gentiles, and in every place incenſe ſhould be offered to his name, and a pure offering, for his name ſhall be great among the Heathen.* That the Inſcription on the High-Prieſt's Forehead, *Holineſs to the Lord*, ſhou'd by reaſon of the large diffuſion of a Spirit of Holineſs in the days of the Goſpel, *be ſet upon the bells of Horſes, that the pots in the Lord's houſe* Zach. 14. 20. *ſhould be as the bowls before the Altar, i. e.* that when the Levitical Service ſhou'd be laid aſide, and that Holineſs, which was that appropriated to the Prieſts and Inſtruments of the Temple, ſhou'd be diſcerned in thoſe things which ſeemed moſt remote from it. That a *Prieſthood after another order than that of* Aaron *ſhould be eſtabliſhed*, viz. *after the* Pſal. 110. 4, 5, 6. *order of* Melchiſedec; and that he that was the *Prieſt after this order, ſhould judge among the Heathen, and wound the heads over many Countries*; Ver. 3. *that in the day of his power the People* ſhou'd not be frighted to obedience with thunder-claps and earth-quakes, (as at Mount *Sinai*) but ſhou'd come and *yield themſelves* as a *free-will offering* unto him, and yet their number be as great as the *drops of the dew which diſtil in the morning.* That *God* Iſa. 66. 21. *out of other Nations would take unto himſelf for Prieſts and for Levites*; Hag. 2. 7. *that the deſire of all Nations ſhould ſpeedily come*; Mal. 3. 1. *that the Meſſenger of the Covenant ſhould come unto his Temple*; nay, that *ſeventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy City*; Dan. 9. 24. 26. 27. *that then the Viſion and Prophecy ſhould be ſealed up; that the Sacrifice and Oblation ſhould be cauſed to ceaſe; that the City and the Sanctuary ſhould be deſtroyed, and the end thereof ſhall be with a flood, and unto the end of the War deſolations are determined; that after threeſcore and two weeks* Meſſias *ſhould be cut off, but not for himſelf; that by him tranſgreſſion ſhould be finiſhed, and reconciliation for iniquity ſhould be made, and everlaſting righteouſneſs ſhould be brought in.* And leſt all theſe things ſhould be apprehended to be only a higher advancing of the Levitical Worſhip, and the way of external Ceremonies, God expreſly ſaith, *That he would make a new Covenant with the Houſe of* Jer. 31. 31. 32. Iſrael, *and with the Houſe of* Judah; *not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers, in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out of the Land of Ægypt, which my Covenant they brake, although I was an husband to them, ſaith the Lord: But this ſhall be the Covenant that I will make with the Houſe of* Iſrael *after thoſe days, ſaith the Lord; I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write in their hearts, and will be their* God, *and they ſhall be my people.* Can any one that now conſiders ſeriouſly the ſtate of things thus deſcribed as it ſhould come to paſs, ever imagine that the Levitical Service was ever calculated for this State? Was God's Worſhip to be confin'd to his Temple at *Jeruſalem*, when all the Nations of the Earth ſhould come to ſerve him? Was the High-Prieſt to make an Atonement there, when an Order of Prieſthood different from the *Aaronical* ſhould be ſet up? Muſt the Tribe of *Levi* only attend at the Temple, when God ſhould take the Prieſts and *Levites* out of all Nations that ſerve him? What wou'd become of the magnificence and glory of the Temple, when both City and Sanctuary ſhall be deſtroyed, and that muſt be within few prophetical Weeks after the *Meſſias* is cut off? And muſt the Covenant of God made with the *Iſraelites* continue for ever, when God expreſly ſaith, he wou'd make a New one, and that not according to the Covenant which he made with them then? It is ſo evident then as nothing can well be more, that under the Old Teſtament, ſuch a ſtate of Religion was deſcrib'd and promis'd, with which the Levitical Worſhip wou'd be inconſiſtent; and ſo that the Ceremonial Law was not at firſt eſtabliſhed upon an immutable Reaſon, which was the thing to be proved.

169:2:G

CHAP. VIII.

General *Hypotheſes* concerning the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST.

I. *The great prejudice againſt our Saviour among* Jews *and Heathens, was the meanneſs of his appearance. The difference of the Miracles at the delivery of the Law and Goſpel.* II. *Some general* Hypotheſes *to clear the ſubſerviency of Miracles to the Doctrine of* CHRIST. 1. *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence, but Authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Teſtimony of the Revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on Evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of Natural Knowledge.* III. *The Exiſtence of* GOD, *the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matter of Faith proved from the ſame Principle. Our knowledge of any thing ſuppoſeth ſomething incomprehenſible.* IV. *The certainty of Faith as great as that of Knowledge; the grounds of it ſtronger. The Conſiſtency of Rational Evidence with Faith. Yet objects of Faith exceed Reaſon; the abſurdities following the contrary opinion.* VI. *The uncertainty of that which is called Reaſon.* VII. *Philoſophical Dictates no ſtandard of Reaſon. Of Tranſubſtantiation and Ubiquity,* &c. *why rejected as contrary to Reaſon. The foundation of Faith in matters above Reaſon.* VIII. *Which is infallible Teſtimony; that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved.* 2. Hypoth. *A Divine Teſtimony the moſt infallible. The reſolution of Faith into* GOD's *veracity as its formal object.* IX. 3. Hypoth. *A Divine teſtimony may be known, tho'* GOD *ſpeak not immediately. Of Inſpiration among the* Jews, *and Divination among the Heathens.* XII. 4. Hypoth. *The evidence of a Divine Teſtimony muſt be clear and certain.* XIII. *Of the common motives of Faith, and the obligation to faith ariſing from them. The original of Infidelity.*

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169:2:H

I. HAving now cleared that the Law of *Moſes* was capable of a repeal, I come to the ſecond Enquiry, *Whether the Miracles of our Saviour did*

did give a ſufficient Evidence of his power and Authority to repeal it. I ſhall not (to prevent too large an excurſion) inſiſt on any other Evidences of our Saviour's being the promiſed *Meſſias*, but keep cloſe to the matter of our preſent debate, concerning the Evidence which ariſeth from ſuch a power of Miracles as our Saviour had in order to his eſtabliſhing that Doctrine which he came to publiſh to the World. The great ſtumbling-block in reference to our Bleſſed Saviour among both the *Jews* and learned *Heathens*, was the meanneſs of his appearance in the World, not coming attended with that ſtate and magnificence, which they thought to be inſeparable from ſo Great a Perſon. The *Jews* had their ſenſes ſo poſſeſſed with the Thunderings and Lightnings on Mount *Sinai*, that they cou'd not imagine the ſtructure of their Ceremonial Worſhip cou'd be taken down with leſs noiſe and terror than it was erected. And withal collecting all thoſe paſſages of the Old Teſtament, which ſeemed to foretel ſuch glorious things of the days of the *Meſſias*, (which either refer to his ſecond Coming, or muſt be underſtood in a Spiritual ſenſe) they having their Minds oppreſſed with the ſenſe of their preſent calamities apply'd them wholly to an external Greatneſs, whereby they might be delivered from the Tyranny of the *Roman* Power. The *Heathens*, as appears by *Celſus* and others, thought it very ſtrange, that the Son of God ſhou'd appear in the World with ſo little Grandeur, and have no greater Train than twelve ſuch obſcure Perſons as the Apoſtles were. For, ſaith *Celſus*, ὥσπερ ὁ ἥλιος πάντα τὰ ἀλλὰ φωτίζων πρῶτον αὐτὸν δεικνὺς, οὕτως ἐχρῆν πεποιηκέναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ· *As the Sun, which enlightens all other things, doth firſt diſcover himſelf, ſo it was fitting the Son of God ſhould do when he appeared to the World.* And ſo we ſay he did to all ſuch whoſe Minds were not blinded thro' obſtinacy and wilful ignorance. For altho this Son of Righteouſneſs was pleas'd for the better carrying on his deſign in the World to wrap up himſelf in a cloud, yet his glory cou'd not be confin'd within it, but did break thro' that dark veil of his Humane Nature, and did diſcover its ſelf in a moſt clear and convincing manner. His appearances indeed were not like thoſe upon Mount *Sinai*, becauſe his deſign was not to amuſe Men with the Glory of his Majeſty, and to terrify them from Idolatry, (which was a great reaſon of thoſe dreadful *Phænomena* at the delivery of the Law) but he came to draw all Men to him by the power and Energy of his Grace, and therefore afforded them all Rational Convictions in order to it. And therefore the quality of our Saviour's Miracles was conſiderable, as well as the greatneſs of them. The intent of them all was to do good, and thereby to bring the World off from its ſin and folly, to the embracing of that holy Doctrine which he came to publiſh to the World. 63:1:C. 160:2.D.

Apud Orig. l. 2.

II. Now that ſuch a Power of Miracles in our Saviour had the greateſt ſubſerviency to the giving full and convincing Evidence that he was the Perſon he declared himſelf to be, and that his Doctrine was thereby ſo clearly atteſted, that it was nothing but obſtinacy which cou'd withhold aſſent, will appear by theſe following *Hypotheſes* which I lay down in order to the proving it.

1. *Hypoth.* *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on the Evidence of the things themſelves, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, there the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Teſtimony of him that revealed it to be infallible.* Several things are neceſſary to be proved for the clearing this Propoſition.

1. *That it is not repugnant to Reaſon, that a Doctrine ſhould be true which depends not upon the Evidence of the thing it ſelf.* By evidence of the thing I underſtand ſo clear and diſtinct a Perception of it, that every one who hath the uſe of his rational Faculties, cannot but upon the firſt apprehenſions of the Terms yield a certain aſſent to it; as That the whole is greater than a part; That if we take away equal things from equal, the remainder muſt be equal. Now we are to obſerve, that as to all theſe common Notices of Humane Nature which carry ſuch Evidence with them, the certainty of them lies in the Propoſition as it is an act of the Mind abſtracted from the things themſelves; for theſe do not ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of the things; but whether there be any ſuch things in the World or no as Whole or Parts, the Underſtanding is aſſured that the Idea of the whole carries more in its repreſentation than that of a part does. This is the great Reaſon of the certainty and evidence of *Mathematical* truths, not as ſome imagine, becauſe Men have no intereſt, or deſign, in thoſe things, and therefore they never queſtion them, but becauſe they proceed not upon ſenſible but abſtracted matter, which is not liable to ſo many doubts as the other is: for that a Triangle hath three Angles no Man queſtions; but whether ſuch ſenſible parts of Matter make a Triangle, may be very queſtionable. Now that the truth of Beings, or the certainty of Exiſtence of things cannot be ſo certain as *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, appears from hence: becauſe the manner of conveyance of theſe things to my Mind cannot be ſo clear and certain as in purely Intellectual operations, abſtracted from exiſtent Matter. For the higheſt Evidences of the Exiſtence of things muſt be either the judgment of Senſe, or clear and diſtinct perception of the Mind: now proceeding in a mere Natural way, there can be no infallible certainty in either of theſe; For the Perception of the Mind in reference to the exiſtence of things being cauſed ſo much thro' thoſe *Ideas* or *Phantaſms* which are conveyed to the Underſtanding thro' the impreſſions of Senſe, if theſe may be demonſtrated to be fallacious, I may well queſtion the certainty of that, which I am certain I have been deceived by; ſuppoſing then I ſhou'd queſtion the truth of every thing which is conveyed in an uncertain way to my Mind, I may ſoon out go even *Pyrrho* himſelf in real *Scepticiſm*. Neither can I conceive how clear and diſtinct perception of any thing, tho' not coming thro' the ſenſes, doth neceſſarily infer the exiſtence of the thing; for it only implies a Non-repugnancy of it to our Natural Faculties, and conſequently the bare poſſibility of it. For otherwiſe it were impoſſible for us to have a clear perception of any thing any longer than it exiſts; nay, than we know it to exiſt; for Exiſtence or Non-Exiſtence is all one to the Underſtanding, while it is not aſſured of either. And it is withal evident that things imaginary may clearly affect the Mind as well as real, for I may have as real and diſtinct Perception of a *Phœnix* in my Mind, as of a *Partridge*; doth it therefore follow that the one is really exiſtent as well as the other? and it will be a very hard matter to aſſign a certain difference between Imagination and pure Intellection in ſuch things, which tho' not actually exiſtent, yet imply no repugnancy at all to the Faculties of Mens Minds. It is evident then, that there cannot be ſo great certainty of the exiſtence of things as there may be of *Mathematical* Demonſtrations.

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III. And if that Principle be ſuppoſed as the foundation of all *Phyſical* certainty as to the Being of things, *viz.* That there is a God, who being

ing infinitely good, will not ſuffer the Minds of Men to be deceived in thoſe things which they have a clear and diſtinct perception of (without which ſuppoſition we cannot be aſſured of the certainty of any operations of the Mind, becauſe we cannot know but we were ſo made, that we might be then moſt deceived, when we thought our ſelves moſt ſure:) If this Principle, I ſay, be ſuppoſed as the foundation of all certain Knowledge, then from it I infer many things which are very much advantageous to our certainty in matters of Faith.

1. *That the foundation of all certainty lies in the neceſſary exiſtence of a Being abſolutely perfect.* So that unleſs I know that there is a God, I cannot be aſſured that I know any thing in a certain manner; and if I know there is a God, I muſt neceſſarily apprehend him to be abſolutely perfect; becauſe the grounds of my Knowledge, that there is a God, are from thoſe abſolute perfections, which there are in him; and if I cou'd ſuppoſe him not abſolutely perfect, I muſt ſuppoſe him not to be God; for that is neceſſarily imply'd in his Definition. Now then if all certainty doth ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a Being ſo abſolutely perfect, I muſt, before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of Knowledge, Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs in this God; for thoſe are things which all who underſtand them will grant to be perfections; and if they be in God, they muſt be abſolute, *i. e.* infinite. And if they be infinite, it neceſſarily follows that they muſt tranſcend our apprehenſions; ſo that now we have gained this Principle in order to Faith, that we muſt grant ſomething to be unconceivable before we can come certainly to know any thing. From whence it follows that thoſe who will not believe any thing to be true, becauſe it is above their apprehenſions, muſt deny the foundation of all certainty, which (as we have proved) doth ſuppoſe ſomething to be infinite, or above our capacity to comprehend. 186:2:U.

2. *That we have as great certainty of whatever is revealed to us from God, as we can have of the truth of any thing which we moſt clearly underſtand.* For the truth of Knowledge depending on this ſuppoſition, That there is a God, whoſe goodneſs will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in the things we clearly underſtand; there is the ſame foundation for the act of Faith as for that of Knowledge, *viz.* That God will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in matters which himſelf hath reveal'd to us. Nay, there ſeems to be greater on theſe accounts. *Firſt*, That there is not ſo great danger to be deceiv'd in reference to objects of ſenſe, as there is in reference to objects of Divine Revelation: becauſe objects of ſenſe make a continual impreſſion upon the organs of ſenſe; and as to theſe things we ſee the whole World agrees in them ſo far as they are neceſſary to life, and withal they bear a greater correſpondency to the preſent ſtate of imperfection which the Soul is now in: but now matters of Divine Revelation are of a more ſublime and ſpiritual nature, which Mens Minds on that account are more apt to doubt of, than of things obvious to ſenſe; and withal they call the Mind ſo much off from ſenſe, that on theſe accounts the proneneſs to doubt is greater, and therefore the foundation of Certainty from God's not ſuffering us to be deceiv'd muſt be ſtronger. *Secondly*, There is not ſo great danger in being deceiv'd as to matters of ſenſe or knowledge, as there is in things of Divine Revelation. For we ſee, granting ſenſe to be deceiv'd, and that we have no certainty at all in natural things, yet affairs of Life are managed ſtill; Mens outward welfare depends not on the judgment of ſenſe; IV.

the Merchant hath never the leſs gold in his Ship, becauſe his ſenſe deceives him in judging that the Earth moves from him, when the Ship moves from it. The Sun doth never the leſs enlighten the World, tho' our Senſes be all of *Epicurus* his Mind, that the Sun is no bigger than he ſeems to be; but now as to Matters of Divine Revelation, they are things of the moſt unſpeakable weight and importance, which depend upon our believing or diſbelieving them. And therefore if the Goodneſs of God be ſuch as it will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd in our judgment of material and ſenſible Beings; how much leſs in reference to the foundation of our certainty as to things divinely reveal'd? We ſee then what Rational Evidence there is not only conſiſtent with, but neceſſarily imply'd in the foundation of Faith, even as great as in any thing which we do moſt perfectly know; ſo that the in-evidence, which is ſo much ſpoken of as an ingredient of the nature of Faith, muſt not be underſtood of the foundation whereon the act of Faith doth ſtand, but of the condition of the object, which being a matter of Divine Revelation, is a thing not obvious to our Senſes. In which ſenſe the Apoſtle ſpeaks, that Faith is ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων, *The firm expectation of things hoped for, and ſtrong conviction of things which are not ſeen:* In which words, as *Eraſmus* obſerves, is contain'd only an high *Encomium* of Faith, and no dialectical Definition of it; *viz.* that Faith ſoars above things of ſenſe or preſent enjoyment; yea, tho' the objects of it be never ſo remote from either, yet where there is ſufficient Evidences of Divine Revelation, Faith boggles at no difficulties, but is firmly reſolv'd that that God who hath reveal'd theſe things, can and will bring them to paſs in his own time. There is not then any ſuch contrariety between the foundation of Faith and Knowledge, as the Schoolmen have perſuaded the World; we ſee both of them proceed on the ſame foundation of certainty; all the difference is, Faith fixeth on the veracity of God immediately in reference to a Divine Teſtimony; Knowledge proceeds upon it, ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation as to the thing it doth diſcover.

V. 3. We hence infer, That if the certainty of our Knowledge depends on this Principle, That God will not ſuffer us to be deceiv'd, then we are bound to believe whatever God doth reveal to us, tho' we may not be able to comprehend the nature of the things revealed. For as to theſe things, we have the ſame ground of certainty which we have as to any Natural Cauſes; for as to them, we now ſuppoſe from the former Principles, that ſetting aſide the exiſtence of God, we cou'd have no certainty of them, but that the formal Reaſon of our certainty is reſolv'd into this, That God's Goodneſs will not ſuffer the Underſtanding to be deceiv'd as to theſe things: the ſame I ſay as to Spiritual Myſteries reveal'd by God; the ground of our certainty lies not in the Evidence of the things, but in the undoubted veracity of God, who hath reveal'd them. All that I can imagine poſſible to be reply'd to this, is, That God's veracity aſſures us in Natural Cauſes that we are not deceiv'd, only where we have a clear and diſtinct perception of the things, but now in matters above our Reaſon to comprehend, there can be no clear and diſtinct Perception. To this I anſwer,

Firſt, It is evident in the foundation of all certainty of Knowledge, that there may be a clear and diſtinct Perception of that which we cannot comprehend, *viz.* of a Being abſolutely perfect; for if we have not a clear and diſtinct Perception of God, the foundation of all certainty is deſtroy'd, which is the neceſſary Exiſtence of ſuch a Being; and he that ſhall ſay he cannot have a clear Perception of God without comprehending him, doth contradict himſelf; for if he be a Being infinite, he muſt be incomprehenſible; therefore there may be a clear Perception, where the object it ſelf is above our capacity. Now whatever foundation there is in Nature for ſuch a Perception without Comprehenſion; that and much more is there in ſuch things as are reveal'd by God, tho' above our Apprehenſion: For the Idea of God upon the Soul of Man cannot be ſo ſtrong an Evidence of the Exiſtence of a Being above our Apprehenſion, as the Revelation of matters of Faith is, that we ſhou'd believe the things ſo reveal'd, tho' our Underſtandings loſe themſelves in ſtriving to reach the natures of them, and the manner of their Exiſtence.

Secondly, That which is the only foundation of a ſcruple in this caſe is a Principle moſt unreaſonable in it ſelf, That we are to embrace nothing for truth, tho' divinely reveal'd, but what our Reaſon is able to comprehend as to the nature of the thing, and the manner of its exiſtence; on which account the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Satisfaction*, and conſequently the whole Myſtery of the Goſpel of CHRIST muſt be rejected as incredible, and that on this bare pretence, becauſe altho' many expreſſions in Scripture ſeem to import all theſe things, yet we are bound to interpret them to another ſenſe, becauſe this is incongruous to our Reaſon. But altho' *Chriſtianity* be a Religion which comes in the higheſt way of Credibility to the Minds of Men altho' we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have ſufficient reaſon to make it appear that it is reveal'd by God; yet that any thing ſhou'd be queſtioned whether it be of Divine Revelation, merely becauſe our Reaſon is to ſeek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a moſt abſurd and unreaſonable pretence: And the Aſſertors of it muſt run themſelves on theſe unavoidable abſurdities.

Firſt, Of believing nothing either in Nature or Religion to be true, but what they can give a full and ſatisfactory account of, as to every mode and circumſtance of it. Therefore let ſuch perſons firſt try themſelves in all the appearances of Nature; and then we may ſuppoſe they will not believe that the Sun ſhines till they have by demonſtrative Arguments prov'd the undoubted truth of the *Ptolemaic* or *Copernican Hypotheſis*; that they will never give credit to the flux and reflux of the Sea, till they clearly reſolve the doubts which attend the ſeveral opinions of it. That there is no ſuch thing as Matter in the World, till they can ſatisfactorily tell us how the Parts of it are united; nor that there are any Material Beings, till they have reſolv'd all the perplexing difficulties about the ſeveral Affections of them; and that themſelves have not ſo much as a rational Soul, till they are bound to ſatisfy us of the manner of the union of the Soul and Body together. And if they can expedite all theſe, and many more difficulties about the moſt obvious things (about which it is another thing to frame handſome and conſiſtent *Hypotheſes*, than to give a certain account of them) then let them be let looſe to the matters of Divine Revelation; as to which yet (if they cou'd perform the other) there were no reaſon for ſuch an undertaking; for that were,

Secondly, To commenſurate the Perfections of God with the narrow capacity of the humane Intellect; which is contrary to the natural Idea of God; and to the manner whereby we take up our conceptions of

God: for the Idea of God doth ſuppoſe Incomprehenſibility to belong to his Nature; and the manner whereby we form our Conceptions of God, is, by taking away all the imperfections we find in our ſelves, from the Conception we form of a Being abſolutely perfect, and by adding Infinity to all the Perfections we find in our own Natures. Now this method of proceeding doth neceſſarily imply a vaſt diſtance and diſproportion between a finite and infinite Underſtanding. And if the Underſtanding of God be infinite, why may not he diſcover ſuch things to us, which our ſhallow Apprehenſions cannot reach unto? What ground or evidence of Reaſon can we have that an infinite Wiſdom and Underſtanding, when it undertakes to diſcover matters of the higheſt nature and concernment to the World, ſhou'd be able to deliver nothing but what comes within the compaſs of our imperfect and narrow Intellects? And that it ſhou'd not be ſufficient that the matters reveal'd do none of them contradict the prime Reſults or common Notions of Mankind (which none of them do) but that every particular mode and circumſtance, as to the manner of exiſtence in God, or the extent of his omnipotent Power, muſt paſs the ſcrutiny of our Faculties, before it obtains a *placet* for a Divine Revelation?

VI. *Thirdly*, It muſt follow from this Principle, That the Pretenders to it muſt affirm the Rules or Maxims which they go by in the judgment of things, are the infallible ſtandard of Reaſon: Elſe they are as far to ſeek in the judgment of things as any others are. They muſt then, to be conſiſtent with their Principle, affirm themſelves to be the abſolute Maſters of Reaſon: Now Reaſon conſiſting of Obſervations made concerning the natures of all Beings, for ſo it muſt be conſidered, as it is a Rule of judging, (*viz.* as a *Syſtem* of infallible Rules collected from the natures of things) they who pretend to it, muſt demonſtrate theſe general Maxims according to which they judge, to be collected from an univerſal undoubted Hiſtory of Nature, which lies yet too dark and obſcure for any to pretend to the full Knowledge of, and wou'd be only a demonſtration of the higheſt Arrogance after ſo many ſucceſleſs endeavours, of the moſt ſearching Wits, in any ſociety of Perſons to uſurp it to themſelves, eſpecially if ſuch Perſons are ſo far from ſearching into the depths of Nature, that they ſuffer themſelves very fairly to be led by the Noſe by the moſt Dogmatical of all Philoſophers; and that in ſuch Principles which the more inquiſitive World hath now found to be very ſhort, uncertain and fallacious. And upon ſevere enquiry we ſhall find the grand Principles which have been taken by theſe adorers of Reaſon, for almoſt the ſtandard of it, have been ſome *Theories* which have been taken up merely from obſervation of the courſe of Nature by ſuch Perſons, who ſcarce own'd any hand of Providence in the World. Now it cannot otherwiſe be conceiv'd but that theſe *Theories* or Principles formed from ſuch a narrow inſpection into the natures of things, muſt make ſtrange work when we come to apply thoſe things to them, which were never look'd at in the forming of them: Whence came thoſe two receiv'd Principles, That nothing can be produc'd out of nothing; That there is no poſſible return from a privation to a habit, but from thoſe Philoſophers who believ'd there was nothing but matter in the World; or if they did aſſert the Exiſtence of a God, yet ſuppoſed him unconcerned in the Government of the World. Whence come our Maſters of Reaſon to tell us, That the Soul cannot ſubſiſt after death without the Body? from what Philoſophy was this derived? certainly

tainly from that which was very loath to acknowledge the immortality of the Soul of Man: and any one who ſtrictly obſerves the cloſe coherence of the Principles of the *Peripatetic* Philoſophy, will find very little room left for an eternal Being to interpoſe it ſelf in the World; and therefore ſome have ſhrewdly obſerv'd that *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks more favourably of the Being of God in his *Exoterics*, than in his *Acromatics*, which all that know the reaſon of the Names, will gueſs at the reaſon of. I demand then, Muſt the received Principles of Philoſophy, and thoſe ſhort imperfect *Theories* which were formed more from Tradition than Experience, by the ancient *Greeks*, be taken from the ſtandard of Reaſon or no? If they muſt, we may ſoon forſake not only the ſublimer Myſteries of the *Trinity*, *Divinity* of CHRIST, *Reſurrection*, &c. but we ſhall ſoon ſhake hands with *Creation*, *Providence*, if not *Immortality* of *Souls*, and the Being of God himſelf. If theſe things be diſown'd as the ſtandard of Reaſon, let us know what will be ſubſtituted in the room of them; and what Laws our Faith muſt be try'd by. Are they only *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, or the undoubted common Notions of Humane Nature, which whoſoever underſtands aſſents to them? let any of the forementioned Myſteries be made appear to contradict theſe, and we will readily yield up our ſelves captives to Reaſon: But in the mean time let no *jejune* unproved *Hypotheſes* in *Philoſophy*, be ſet as Judges over matters of Faith, whoſe only warrant for that office muſt be *Stat pro ratione voluntas*. Let the Principles we proceed by, be firſt manifeſted to be collected from a moſt certain and univerſal inſpection into the nature of all Beings, let the manner of proceſs be ſhewed how they were collected (leſt they labour with the common fault of the *Chymiſts*, of eſtabliſhing *Hypoſtatical* Principles from the Experiments of ſome particular Bodies, which others do as evidently refute) and laſtly, let it be made appear that theſe Principles, thus collected, will ſerve indifferently for all Beings, ſpiritual as well as material, infinite as well as finite, and when this Task is exactly perform'd, we will make room for Reaſon to ſit upon the Bench, and bring the Scripture as the priſoner to its Bar.

Fourthly, According to this Principle, what certainty can we have at all of any thing we are to believe? who hath fixed the bounds of that which Men call Reaſon? how ſhall we know that thus far it will come and no further? If no Banks be raiſed againſt it to keep it in its due Channel, we may have cauſe to fear it may in time overthrow not only the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Reſurrection of the dead*, but all other Articles of the Creed too. What Preſcription can be pleaded by one ſort of Men for Reaſon more than for another? One will not believe this Article of his Faith, becauſe againſt his Reaſon; and why not another reject another Article on the ſame pretence? for whatever the ground of Unbelief be, if it be but baptized by the name of Reaſon, it muſt by this Principle paſs uncontrouled. If a ſullen Philoſopher ſhall tell us, that the Notion of an immaterial ſubſtance contradicts his Reaſon as much as the *Trinity* doth theirs, and that the Univerſe is nothing elſe but a Syſtem of Bodies; by what Artifice will our Maſter of Reaſon purge away all that black Choler, that ſo clouds his Mind, that he cannot ſee the Notion of a Spirit thro' it? And ſuch a one will make a hard ſhift, but he will reconcile his Opinion with Scripture too; and therefore why ſhou'd he be bound up to Mens Explications of Scripture, when there is no neceſſity, that he can ſee, of underſtanding it in any other way VII.

than his own? If another ſhou'd come and tell us, that we muſt be all *Anthropomorphites*, and that otherwiſe the Scripture were not intelligible; ſhall not this Man put in for Reaſon too? Nay, *laſtly*, if another ſhall come and ſpeak out, and tell us Religion is but a device of ſubtle Men, that all things come to paſs thro' chance, that the World was made by a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, and that all are fools which are not *Atheiſts*, and that it is impoſſible to apprehend the Being of a God, and therefore by the ſame Reaſon that they reject ſome Myſteries of Religion, he rejects the foundation of all; becauſe an infinite Being is incomprehenſible: whither now hath our Reaſon carried us? while we pretend to reject any thing as divinely revealed, merely on that account, that it is above our Reaſon? But it may be reply'd, *On what account then do we reject the Doctrine of* Tranſubſtantiation, *and the ubiquity of the Body of* CHRIST, *as repugnant to Reaſon, if we do not make Reaſon judge in matters of Faith?* I anſwer, 1. We reject theſe opinions not only as repugnant to Reaſon, but as inſufficiently proved from Scripture; whereas we here ſuppoſe (it not being our preſent buſineſs to prove it) that the ſeveral Doctrines of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation Reſurrection of Bodies*, &c. are only rejected on that account, that tho' Scripture ſeems to ſpeak fair for them, yet it is otherwiſe to be interpreted, becauſe ſuppoſed to be repugnant to Reaſon. 2. Thoſe Doctrines before mentioned are eminently ſerviceable to promote the great end of the Goſpel, and are inlaid in the very foundation of it, as that of the *Trinity*, and *Divinity* of CHRIST; but theſe we now mention are no ways conducible to that end, but ſeem to thwart and overthrow it; and *Tranſubſtantiation* eſtabliſheth a Worſhip contrary to the Goſpel. 3. All the foundation of *Tranſubſtantiation* is laid upon ambiguous places of Scripture, which muſt of neceſſity have ſome Tropes and Figures in them; but the Doctrine of the *Trinity* is not only contained in plain Scripture, but is evidenced by viſible appearance, as particularly at the Baptiſm of our Saviour. 4. There is far greater ground why we ſhou'd reject *Tranſubſtantiation* and *Ubiquity*, as inconſiſtent with Reaſon, than that they ſhou'd the *Trinity*, on this account, becauſe the grounds of Reaſon on which we reject thoſe opinions, are fetched from thoſe eſſential and inſeparable properties of Bodies, which are inconſiſtent with thoſe opinions; now theſe are things within the reach of our Underſtandings (in which caſe God himſelf ſometimes appeals to Reaſon) but it is quite another caſe, when we ſearch into the incomprehenſible Nature of God, and pronounce with confidence that ſuch things cannot be in God, becauſe we cannot comprehend them; which gives a ſufficient anſwer to this objection. The ſubſtance then of this Diſcourſe is, that whatever Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted to be of Divine Revelation, is to be embraced and believed as undoubtedly true, tho' our Reaſon cannot reach to the full apprehenſion of all the Modes and Circumſtances of it. So that as to theſe ſublime Myſteries our Faith ſtands upon this twofold bottom. *Firſt*, That the Being, Underſtanding, and Power of God doth infinitely tranſcend ours, and therefore he may reveal to us matters above our reach and capacity. *Secondly*, That whatever God doth reveal is undoubtedly true, tho' we may not fully underſtand it; for this is a moſt undoubted Principle, That God cannot and will not deceive any in thoſe things which he reveals to Men. Thus our firſt Suppoſition is cleared, That it is not repugnant to Reaſon, that a Doctrine may be true, which depends not on the evidence of the thing it ſelf.

The Second is, *That in matters whoſe truth depends not on the evidence of the things themſelves, infallible teſtimony is the fulleſt demonſtration of them.* For theſe things not being of *Mathematical* evidence, there muſt be ſome other way found out for demonſtrating the truth of them. And in all thoſe things whoſe truth depends on Teſtimony, the more creditable the Teſtimony is, the higher Evidence is given to them; but that Teſtimony which may deceive, cannot give ſo pregnant an Evidence as that which cannot; for then all imaginable objections are taken off. This is ſo clear, that it needs no further Proof; and therefore the Third follows.

That there are certain ways whereby to know that a Teſtimony delivered is infallible; and that is fully proved by theſe two Arguments. 1. That it is the duty of all thoſe to whom it is propounded to believe it; now how cou'd that be a duty in them to believe, which they had no ways to know whether it were a Teſtimony to be believed, or no? 2. Becauſe God will condemn the World for Unbelief: In which the Juſtice of God's proceeding doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe that there were ſufficient Arguments to induce them to believe, which cou'd not be, unleſs there were ſome certain way ſuppoſed whereby a Teſtimony may be known to be infallible. Theſe three things now being ſuppoſed, *viz.* That a Doctrine may be true which depends not on evidence of Reaſon; that the greateſt demonſtration of the truth of ſuch a Doctrine, is its being delivered by infallible Teſtimony; and that there are certain ways whereby a Teſtimony may be known to be infallible: Our firſt Principle is fully confirmed, which was, *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence of Reaſon, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Teſtimony of him that reveals it to be infallible.*

VIII. 2. *Hypoth.* The next Principle or *Hypotheſis* which I lay down, is, *That there can be no greater evidence that a Teſtimony is infallible, than that it is the Teſtimony of God himſelf.* The truth of this depends upon a common Notion of Humane Nature, which is the Veracity of God in whatever way he diſcovers himſelf to Men; and therefore the ultimate Reſolution of our Faith, as to its formal object, muſt be alone into the Veracity of God revealing things unto us; for the *Principium certitudinis*, or foundation of all certain aſſent can be fetched no higher, neither will it ſtand any lower than the infallible Verity of God himſelf; and the *Principium patefactionis*, or the ground of diſcovery of Spiritual truth to our Minds muſt be reſolved into Divine Teſtimony, or Revelation. Theſe two then not taken aſunder, but jointly, *God, who cannot lye, hath revealed theſe things*, is the only certain foundation for a Divine Faith to reſt it ſelf upon. But now the particular exerciſe of a Divine Faith lies in a firm aſſent to ſuch a particular thing as divinely reveal'd; and herein lies not ſo much the Teſtimony, as the peculiar energy of the Spirit of God in inclining the Soul to believe peculiar objects of Faith, as of Divine Revelation. But the general ground of Faith, which they call the formal object, or the *ratio propter quam credimus*, is the general infallibility of a Divine Teſtimony. For in a matter concerning Divine Revelation, there are two great Queſtions to be reſolved: The firſt is, Why I believe a Divine Teſtimony with a firm aſſent? The Anſwer to that is, Becauſe I am aſſur'd, that whatever God ſpeaks is true: the other is, Upon what grounds do I believe this to be a Divine Teſtimony? The reſolution of which, as far as I can underſtand, muſt be fetch'd from thoſe rational Evidences whereby a Divine Teſtimony muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from one merely Humane and fallible. For the Spirit of God in its workings upon the Mind, doth not carry it on by a brutiſh impulſe, but draws it by a Spiritual diſcovery of ſuch ſtrong and perſuaſive grounds to aſſent to what is reveal'd, that the Mind doth readily give a firm aſſent to that which it ſees ſuch convincing Reaſon to believe. Now the ſtrongeſt reaſon to believe, is the manifeſtation of a Divine Teſtimony; which the Spirit of God ſo clearly diſcovers to a true Believer, that he not only firmly aſſents to the general foundation of Faith, the Veracity of God, but to the particular object propounded, as a matter of Divine Revelation. But this latter Queſtion is not here the matter of our Diſcourſe; our Propoſition only concerns the general foundation of Faith, which appears to be ſo rational and evident, as no Principle in Nature can be more. For if the Teſtimony on which I am to rely be only God's, and I be aſſur'd from Natural Reaſon, that his Teſtimony can be no other than infallible, wherein doth the certainty of the foundation of Faith fall ſhort of that in any *Mathematical* demonſtration? Upon which account a Divine Teſtimony hath been regarded with ſo much veneration among all who have own'd a Deity, altho' they have been unacquainted with any certain way of Divine Revelation. And the reaſon why any rejected ſuch a Teſtimony among the *Heathens*, was either, becauſe they believed not a *Deity*; or elſe that the particular Teſtimonies produced were mere frauds and impoſtures, and therefore no Divine Teſtimony, as it was given out to be. But the Principle ſtill remain'd indiſputable, that on ſuppoſition the Teſtimony were what it pretended to be, there was the greateſt reaſon to believe it, altho' it came not in ſuch a way of probation, as their Sciences proceeded in. From which Principle aroſe that ſpeech of *Tully*, which he hath tranſlated our of *Plato*'s *Timæus*; *Ac difficillimum factu à Diis ortis fidem non habere, quamquam nec argumentis nec rationibus certis eorum ratio confirmetur.* By which we ſee what a preſumption there was of Truth, where there was any evidence of a Divine Teſtimony. And no doubt upon the advantage of this Principle it was the Devil gain'd ſo great credit to his Oracles; for therein he did the moſt imitate Divine Revelation. From hence then we ſee what a firm bottom Faith in the general ſtands upon, which is nothing ſhort of an infallible Divine Teſtimony: other things may conduce by way of ſubſerviency for the diſcovery of this; but nothing elſe can be a ſure foundation for a Divine Faith, but what is a Teſtimony of God himſelf.

Fragm. Cicer.

IX. 3. *Hypoth.* *A Teſtimony may be known to be divine and infallible, tho' God himſelf do not ſpeak in an immediate way.* By being known, I do not mean the firm perſwaſion of a Mind enlightned by the Spirit of God, but that there are ſufficient Evidences *ex parte rei*, to convince Men of it, which are not wilfully blind and obſtinate, *i. e.* that the ground of unbelief in any cannot be imputed to the defect of ſufficient Motives to Faith, but to their own perverſeneſs and prejudice in not diſcerning them. Now that God may reveal and declare his Mind to the World, not in an immediate way, but by ſome Inſtruments he may make uſe of to that end, is not only evident from the great ſutableneſs of ſuch a way to the conditions of the Perſon he ſpeaks to, but from the general perſuaſion of the World concerning the poſſibility of Inſpiration. The *Jews* are ſo far from denying this, that it is the very foundation of their Religion as well as ours; God diſcovering the moſt of his Will to them by the Prophets, or by Perſons divinely inſpir'd. And this general conſent of all other Nations, that there is ſuch a Principle as Divination in the World, doth make it evident, that it carries no repugnancy at all to Natural Light, ſuppoſing that there is a God, that he ſhou'd reveal his Mind by ſome particular Perſons unto the World. For which purpoſe the teſtimony of *Tully* in the entrance of his Books *de Divinatione*, is very conſiderable. *Vetus opinio eſt jam uſque ab Heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque & populi Romani & omnium gentium firmata conſenſu, verſari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci* μαντικὴν *appellant*, i. e. *præſenſionem & ſcientiam rerum futurarum*; and ſoon after adds, *gentem quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam, neque tam immanem atque barbaram, quæ non ſignificari futura, & à quibuſdam intelligi, prædicique poſſe cenſeat.* He makes it appear to be an univerſal ſentiment of all Nations in the World, and inſtanceth particularly in the *Aſſyrians*, *Ægyptians*, *Cilicians*, *Piſidians*, *Pamphylians*, *Grecians*, *Romans*, *Etrurians*, and others. It is true indeed he after mentions ſome Philoſophers who deny'd it; but they were moſt part the followers of *Epicurus*, who deny'd any *Providence*, and therefore might well take away *Divination*: but if *Xenophanes Colophonius* had any followers who aſſerted the one, and deny'd the other (as *Tully* ſeems to intimate that he was alone in that perſuaſion) yet we may probably ſuppoſe the reaſon of their rejecting it might be the Impoſtures which went under the name of *Divination* among them; which are excellently diſcover'd by that Prince of *Roman* Philoſophers as well as Orators, in his ſecond Book of *Divination*: But it is apparent by the ſame Author, that the generality of Philoſophers conſented with the People in this perſuaſion, as the Followers of thoſe three great Sects of *Socrates*, *Pythagoras* and *Ariſtotle*, were all approvers of it; but of all Perſons the *Stoics* were the moſt zealous contenders for it, eſpecially *Chryſippus*, *Diogenes Babylonius*, *Antipater* and *Poſſidonius*. Some indeed rejected ſome ways of *Divination*, yet embraced others, as *Dicæarchus* and *Cratippus*, who rejected all but Dreams and Ecſtaſies; but in the general we find theſe two Principles went together among them, the exiſtence of a *Deity*, and the certainty of *Divination*; ſo that from *Divination* they prov'd a *Deity*, and from a *Deity Divination*. *Si ſunt genera divinandi vera, eſſe Deos; viciſſimque ſi Dii ſint, eſſe qui divinent*, as *Quintus Cicero* there ſpeaks: and at laſt thus triumphs in the multitude of his witneſſes, *An dum beſtiæ loquantur exſpectamus, hominum conſentiente auctoritate contenti non ſimus?* It may not be amiſs to produce the chief Argument on which the *Stoics* inſiſted to prove the neceſſity of *Divination*, ſuppoſing the exiſtence of a *Deity*. *If there be Gods*, ſay they, *and they do not reveal to Men things to come; it either is becauſe they do not love them, or becauſe they do not know themſelves what ſhall come to paſs, or they think it is of no concernment to Men to know future things, or that it doth not become their Majeſty to reveal them, or that they cannot reveal them to Men if they would: but neither is it true that they do not love Men; for the Gods are of a bountiful nature, and friends to Mankind; neither can they be ignorant of future things, becauſe they are appointed and decreed by them; neither is it of no concernment to Men to know future things; for that makes them more cautious if they know them; neither is it repugnant to their Majeſty to reveal them, for nothing is more noble than bounty and doing good; and they muſt needs know theſe things; therefore they may make them known to others; and if they do make them known, there muſt be ſome*

Cicero l. 2. de Divin.

way whereby to know that they do ſo; or elſe they ſignifie them to no purpoſe. If now inſtead of the knowledge of future contingencies, and the multitude of their Gods, they had inſiſted on the diſcovery and revelation by the true God of thoſe ways, which may lead Men to eternal Happineſs; that Argument had been ſtrong and convincing, which as it ſtands is ſophiſtical and fallacious. So that it is very plain, that not only a poſſibility of *Divination* was acknowledg'd by thoſe who wanted Divine Revelation, but that this *Divination* did not ariſe from mere Natural Cauſes, but from an *afflatus Divinus*, and a *concitatio quædam animi*, as they there ſpeak, which imports nothing ſhort of Divine Inſpiration. Nay the opinion of this was ſo common among them, that they thought any extraordinary Perſons had ſomething of Divine Enthuſiaſm in them, as *Tully* elſewhere tells us, *Nemo vir magnus ſine aliquo afflatu Divino unquam fuit.* Altho' then theſe Heathens were greatly miſtaken as to thoſe things they took for a Divine *Afflatus* and *Divination*, yet we cannot conceive ſo general a Senſe ſhou'd be imprinted on the minds of Men of ſuch a thing as that was, were it not a thing highly conſonant to Principles of Reaſon, that God ſhou'd communicate his mind to the World by the Inſpiration of ſome Perſons. And therefore I conceive that *Cicero* and his Brother *Quintus*, who manage that excellent diſpute of *Divination* between them, have divided the Truth between them too. For on the one ſide *Quintus* evidently proves the poſſibility of the thing, the conſequence of it upon the acknowledgement of a Deity, and the general conſent of Mankind in the owning of it; and on the other ſide *Tully* himſelf excellently lays open the vanity, folly and uncertainty, not only of the common ways of *Divination*, but of the Oracles which were in ſuch great eſteem among the Heathens. And altho' *Tully* doth ſo ſharply and ſarcaſtically anſwer the Argument from the common conſent of Men; *quaſi vero quidquam ſit tam valde, quam nihil ſapere, vulgare; as though nothing Men did more generally agree in, than in being Fools:* yet as it is evident that the ground of that Scoff was from the ſeveral manners of *Divination* then in uſe, ſo it cannot be thought to be a general impeachment of Human Nature in a thing ſo conſequent upon the being of a God, which as himſelf elſewhere proves, is as clear from reaſon as from that *Teſtimonium gentium in hac una re non diſſidentium*, as the Chriſtian *Cicero*, *Lactantius* ſpeaks, *The conſent of Nations, which ſcarce agree in any thing elſe, but that there is a God.* That which we now inferr from hence is, That God may make known his Mind in a way infallible, tho' not immediate; for in caſe of Inſpiration of mere Men, it is not They ſo much which ſpeak, as God by them; and in caſe that God himſelf ſhou'd ſpeak thro' the veil of Humane Nature, the Teſtimony muſt needs be infallible, tho' the appearance of the Divinity be not viſible.

Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deorum.

Lactant. de falſ. relig. cap. 2.

X. *Hyp. 4.* *Thoſe evidences whereby a Divine Teſtimony may be known, muſt be ſuch as may not leave Mens minds in ſuſpence, but are of their own nature convincing proofs of it.* For altho' as to the event ſome may doubt, and others disbelieve the Teſtimony ſo prov'd; yet it is ſufficient for our purpoſe, that in the nature of the things (ſuppoſing them to be ſuch as we ſpeak of) they are ſufficient for the eviction that the Teſtimony atteſted by them is divine and infallible. I know it is a great diſpute among many, whether thoſe things, which are uſually call'd the common Motives of Faith, do of their own nature only induce a probable perſuaſion of the truth of the Doctrine as probable which they are join'd with, or elſe are they ſufficient for the producing a firm aſſent to the Doctrine as true? I grant they are not demonſtrative ſo as to inforce aſſent; for we ſee the contrary by the experience of all Ages; but that they are not ſufficient foundation for an unprejudic'd Mind to eſtabliſh a firm aſſent upon, is a thing not eaſie to be granted; chiefly upon this account, that an obligation to believe doth lie upon every one to whom theſe evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are ſufficiently diſcover'd. And otherwiſe of all ſins the ſin of Unbelief, as to God revealing his mind, were the moſt excuſable and pardonable ſin; nay, it wou'd be little leſs than a part of prudence; becauſe what can it be accounted but temerity and imprudence in any to believe a Doctrine as true, only upon probable inducements? and what can it be but wiſdom to with-hold aſſent upon a mere Veriſimilitude? conſidering what the *Lyrick* Poet hath long ſince truly told us;

καὶ πού τι καὶ βροτῶν φρένα
ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον
δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις
ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.

Pindar Olymp. Od. 1.

That a Falſhood may frequently ſeem truer to common underſtandings than Truth it ſelf: and as *Menander* ſpeaks, τὸ πιθανὸν ἰσχὺν τῆς ἀληθείας ἔχει ἐνίοτε μείζω, καὶ πιθανωτέραν ὄχλου, *that a mere veriſimilitude may have more force on vulgar minds than Truth hath.* If therefore there be no evidences given ſufficient to carry the minds of Men beyond mere probability, what ſin can it be in thoſe to disbelieve who cannot be obliged to believe as true what is only diſcover'd as probable? I cannot therefore ſee how an obligation to believe a Divine Teſtimony is conſiſtent with their opinion, who make the utmoſt which any outward evidences can extend to, to be only the bare credibility of the Doctrine atteſted by them. I can very well ſatisfie my ſelf with the ground and reaſon why the more ſubtle Wits of the Church of *Rome* do aſſert this; for if nothing elſe can be produced by all motives of Faith but only a probable perſuaſion of the Truth of Chriſtian Doctrine, then here comes in the faireſt pretence for the Infallibility of their Church: for otherwiſe they tell us we can have no foundation for a Divine Faith; for how can that be a foundation for Divine Faith, which can reach no higher than a Moral Inducement, and beget only a probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt? But on what account thoſe who diſown the Infallibility of the Church of *Rome* in the propoſal of matters of Faith, ſhou'd yet conſent with thoſe of it in an *Hypotheſis* taken up in probability, merely out of ſubſerviency to that moſt advantageous piece of the myſtery of Iniquity, is not eaſie to reſolve. Unleſs the over-fondneſs of ſome upon the Doctrine of the Schools, more than of the Goſpel, hath been the occaſion of it. For how agreeable can that opinion be to the Goſpel, which ſo evidently puts the moſt defenſive weapons into the hands of Unbelief? For doubtleſs in the judgment of any rational Perſon, a mere probable perſuaſion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Chriſt, where an aſſent to it as true is requir'd, can never be look'd on as an act of Faith: for if my aſſent to the Truth of the thing be according to the ſtrength of the Arguments inducing me to believe, and theſe Arguments do only prove a probability of Divine Teſtimony, my aſſent can be no ſtronger than to a thing merely probable; which is, that it may be, or not be true; which is not properly aſſent, but a ſuſpending our judgments till ſome convincing Argument be produced on either ſide. And therefore according to this opinion thoſe who ſaw all the Miracles which Chriſt did, cou'd not be bound to believe in Chriſt, but only to have a favourable opinion of his Perſon and Doctrine, as a thing which tho' not evidenc'd to be true by what he did, yet it was very piouſly credible; but they muſt have a care withal of venturing their Belief too far, only on ſuch Moral Inducements as Miracles were, for fear they ſhou'd go further than the force of the Arguments wou'd carry them. Had not this opinion now, think we, been a very probable way to have converted the World upon the Preaching of Chriſt and his Apoſtles; when Joh. 10. 38. Chriſt ſaith, *though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him?* Nay, ſaith this opinion, that is more than we are bound to do; tho' we ſee thy Works we are not bound to believe thy Teſtimony to be Divine and certainly true: but we will do all we are bound to do; we will entertain a favourable opinion of thy Perſon and Doctrine, and wait for ſomewhat elſe, but we do not well know what, to perſuade us to believe. When Heb. 2. 3. 4. the Apoſtles preach the danger of Unbelief, becauſe *the Doctrine of the Goſpel was confirmed by ſigns and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghoſt*; what a fair anſwer doth this opinion put into the mouths of Infidels, that notwithſtanding all theſe Signs and Wonders, they were never bound to believe the Goſpel as a certain Truth, and therefore they hope the danger is not ſo great in neglecting the Salvation promis'd by the Goſpel?

XI. I cannot conceive that Men otherwiſe learned and ſober, ſhou'd with ſo much confidence aſſert that the rational evidences of a Divine Teſtimony are inſufficient to prove a Doctrine true, unleſs it be from hence, that they find that notwithſtanding the ſtrongeſt evidences many Perſons continue in Unbelief. For ſay they, *If theſe Arguments were ſcientifical and demonſtrative,* (as they ſpeak) *of the truth of the Doctrine atteſted by them, then all perſons to whom they are propounded, muſt certainly believe.* But this is very eaſily anſwer'd; for we ſpeak not of internal, but outward Evidence; not of that in the Subject, but of the Object, or more fully of the Reaſon of the thing, and not the Event in us; for doubtleſs there may be undoubted Truth and Evidence in many things which ſome perſons either cannot or will not underſtand. If *Epicurus* ſhou'd contend ſtill that the Sun and Stars are no bigger than they ſeem to be, will it hence follow that there can be no rational Demonſtration of the contrary? Nay, if the way of demonſtration be offer'd him, and Teleſcopes put into his hands, yet if he be reſolv'd to maintain his credit, and therefore his Opinion, and will not uſe the Teleſcopes, or ſuſpect ſtill they are intended only to deceive his ſight; what poſſible way will there be of convincing ſuch a Perſon, tho' the thing be in its ſelf demonſtrable? Now if the ſtrength of Prejudice or maintaining of Credit can prevail ſo much in matters of Mathematical evidence, to with-hold aſſent; what power may we think a corrupt Intereſt may have upon the Underſtanding, as to the Arguments which tend to prove the truth of that Doctrine, which is ſo repugnant to that carnal Intereſt which the heart is already devoted to! Our bleſſed Saviour hath himſelf given us ſo full an account of the original and cauſes of Unbelief in the perſons he convers'd with, that that may yield us a ſufficient Anſwer to this Objection. He tells us the ground of it was not want of light, nay, there was light ſufficient to convince any, but that thoſe to whom Joh.3.19. the light came *lov'd darkneſs rather than it, becauſe their deeds were evil.* Joh.5.44. *That they could not believe while they received honour one of another, and ſought not the honour which was of God only*, i. e. That they were ſo greedy of Applauſe from each other, that they wou'd not impartially ſearch into the truth of that Doctrine, which did touch their Sores ſo to the quick, that they had rather have them feſter upon them, than go to the trouble of ſo ſharp a cure. That the reaſon ſo few follow'd him was becauſe *the way was narrow and the gate ſtrait which men muſt go in* Mat.7.14. *at*; and therefore no wonder ſo few of the rich and proud Phariſees cou'd get in at it; they were partly ſo ſwell'd with a high opinion of themſelves, and partly ſo loaden with their riches, that they thought it was to no purpoſe for them to think of going in at ſo ſtrait a gate, while they were reſolv'd to part with neither.

That the final ground of the rejection of any, was not want of evidence to bring them to believe, nor want of readineſs in Chriſt to receive them if they did, but it was *a peeviſh, wilful, obſtinate, malicious* Joh.5.40. *ſpirit that they would not come to Chriſt*, nor believe his Doctrine (for thoſe import the ſame) but when the moſt convincing Miracles were us'd, they wou'd rather *attribute them to the Prince of Devils than to the* Matth.11.24. *power of God*. And tho' our Saviour preſently by rational and demonſtrative Arguments did prove the contrary to their faces; yet we ſee thereby it was a Reſolution not to be convinc'd, or yield to the Truth, which was the cauſe why they did not believe. Now from this very inſtance of our Saviour's proceedings with the *Phariſees* by rational Arguments, I demand, whether theſe Arguments of our Saviour were ſufficient foundations for a Divine Aſſent to that Truth, that our Saviour did not his Miracles by any Diabolical but by Divine power, or no? If they were, then it is evident that rational Evidence may be a foundation for Divine Faith, or that ſome motives to believe may be ſo ſtrong, as to be ſufficient evidence of the Truth and certainty of the Doctrine: If theſe Arguments were not ſufficient proofs of what our Saviour ſpake, then welfare the *Phariſees*; it ſeems they ſaid nothing but what might be thus far juſtify'd, that the contrary to it cou'd not be demonſtrated. And if the evidence of our Saviours Miracles were ſo great, as ſome ſuppoſe, that the *Phariſees* cou'd not but be convinced that they were Divine; but out of their malice and envy they uttered this Blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt, to keep the people from following Chriſt; then we hence infer two things: *Firſt, How ſtrong an evidence there was in the Miracles of Chriſt*, when it convinced his moſt reſolute enemies that they were Divine. *Secondly, What power a corrupt will may have over a convinced Underſtanding.* For altho the Will may not hinder the conviction, yet it may ſoon ſtifle it, by ſuggeſting thoſe things to the Mind which may divert it from thoſe convictions of Truth; and ſeek to find out any ways to diſgrace it. It wou'd be no difficult task to diſcover in all thoſe inſtances wherein the Unbelief of Men is diſcover'd in the New Teſtament, that the Perſons guilty of it did not proceed like rational Men, or ſuch as deſir'd Truth, but were wholly carried away thro' paſſion, intereſt, prejudice, diſaffection, or ſome other cauſe of that nature, which may give us a ſufficient account why thoſe perſons did not believe, altho' there might be clear and undoubted evidence to perſuade them to it. But altho I aſſert that theſe rational evidences are ſufficient arguments of the truth of the Doctrine they come to manifeſt; yet I wou'd not be ſo underſtood, that I thereby reſolve all Religion into a mere act of Reaſon and Knowledge, and that no more power is requir'd in the Underſtanding to believe the Goſpel, than to believe a *Mathematical* Demonſtration: which is another Objection ſome lay in the way of this Opinion; but it is not difficult getting over it. For the ſufficiency which I attribute to rational Evidence, is not abſolute and ſimple, but *in ſuo genere*, as an objective Evidence. Notwithſtanding this the whole work of the Spirit of God in its peculiar energy and way of operation upon the Soul, is left intire to it ſelf: But then when the Spirit works as to the planting of a truly Divine Faith, I do not think that it only perſuades the Soul of the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, but withal repreſents the truths reveal'd by that Teſtimony, with all that excellency and ſuitableneſs that there is in them, that by the moſt agreeable, yet effectual influence of the Spirit upon the Soul, it cheerfully embraceth that Truth which is reveal'd, and cordially yields up it ſelf in obedience to it. This is the Divine Faith which the Scripture acquaints us with, and not ſuch a one as merely believes the truth of a Divine Teſtimony: and as to the production of this Faith, I acknowledge mere rational Evidence to be inſufficient, becauſe they proceed in two very different ways; the one is to ſatisfy Mens Minds in the truth of the Doctrine, the other is to bring them effectually to adhere unto it. The aſſerting of the one therefore doth no more tend to deſtroy the other, than the ſaying that a Teleſcope will help us to diſcover very much of the heavenly Bodies, doth imply that a blind Man may ſee them, if he makes but uſe of them. Altho' therefore the natural Man cannot ſavingly apprehend the things of God; yet there may be ſo much rational Evidence going along with Divine Revelation, that ſuppoſing Reaſon to be pure, and not corrupted and ſteep'd in Senſe as now it is, it wou'd diſcover Spiritual Evidence to be the moſt real and convincing Evidence. Thus far we have prov'd, *That where there is any infallible Teſtimony, there is ſufficient rational Evidence going along with it, to make it appear that it is from* God.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The rational Evidence of the truth of Chriſtian Religion from Miracles.

160:2-9

I. *The poſſibility of Miracles appears from* God *and Providence; the evidence of a Divine Teſtimony by them.* God *alone can really alter the courſe of Nature. The Devil's power of working Miracles conſider'd. Of* Simon Magus, Apollonius. *The cures in the Temple of* Æſculapius *at* Rome, *&c.* II. God *never works Miracles, but for ſome particular end. The particular reaſons of the Miracles of* Chriſt. *The repealing the Law of* Moſes, *which had been ſettled by Miracles. Why* Chriſt *check'd the* Phariſees *for demanding a Sign, when himſelf appeals to his Miracles. The power of* Chriſt's *Miracles on many who did not throughly believe.* III. Chriſt's *Miracles made it evident that he was the* Meſſias, *becauſe the Predictions were fulfill'd in him. Why* John Baptiſt *wrought no Miracles.* IV. Chriſt's *Miracles neceſſary for the overthrow of the Devil's Kingdom.* V. *Of the Demoniacs and Lunatics in the Goſpel, and in the Primitive Church. The power of the Name of* Chriſt *over them largely prov'd by ſeveral Teſtimonies.* VI. *The evidence thence of a Divine Power in* Chriſt. VII. *Of counterfeit diſpoſſeſſions. Of Miracles wrought among Infidels.* VIII. *Of the future ſtate of the Church.* IX. *The neceſſity of the Miracles of* Chriſt, *as to the propagation of Chriſtian Religion: that prov'd from the condition of the Publiſhers, and the ſucceſs of the Doctrine. The Apoſtles knew the hazard of their employment, before they entred into it.* X. *The boldneſs and reſolution of the Apoſtles notwithſtanding this, compar'd with heathen Philoſophers.* XI. *No motive cou'd carry the Apoſtles thro' their employment, but the truth of their Doctrine;* XII. *not ſeeking the honour, profit or pleaſure of the World.* XIII. *The Apoſtles evidence of the truth of their Doctrine lay in being eye-witneſſes of our Saviour's Miracles and Reſurrection.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. *That atteſted by themſelves; their ſufficiency thence for preaching the Goſpel.* XIX. *Of the nature of the Doctrine of the Goſpel; contrariety of it to Natural Inclinations.* XX. *Strange ſucceſs of it, notwithſtanding it came not with humane power: No Chriſtian Emperour till the Goſpel univerſally preach'd.* XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. *The weakneſs and ſimplicity of the inſtruments which preach'd the Goſpel. From all which the great Evidence of the power of Miracles is prov'd.*

Of

I.
5. Hypoth.

OF all rational Evidences which tend to confirm the truth of a Divine Teſtimony, there can be none greater than a power of working Miracles for confirmation that the Teſtimony which is reveal'd is infallible. The poſſibility of a power of Miracles cannot be queſtion'd by any who aſſert a *Deity* and a *Providence*; for by the ſame Power that things were either at firſt produced, or are ſtill conſerv'd (which is equivalent to the other) the courſe of Nature may be alter'd, and things caus'd which are beyond the power of inferiour Cauſes: For tho' that be an immutable Law of Nature as to *Phyſical* Beings, that every thing remains in the courſe and order wherein it was ſet at the Creation; yet that only holds till the ſame power which ſet it in that order ſhall otherwiſe diſpoſe of it. Granting then the poſſibility of Miracles, the ſubject of this *Hypotheſis* is: That a power of Miracles is the cleareſt Evidence of a Divine Teſtimony, which will appear from theſe following Conſiderations.

1. God *alone can really alter the courſe of Nature.* I ſpeak not of ſuch things which are apt only to raiſe admiration in us, becauſe of our unacquaintedneſs with the cauſes of them, or manner of their production, which are thence call'd *Wonders*, much leſs of mere juggles and impoſtures, whereby the Eyes of Men are deceiv'd; but I ſpeak of ſuch things as are in themſelves either contrary to, or above the courſe of Nature, *i. e.* that order which is eſtabliſh'd in the Univerſe. The Devil no queſtion may, and doth often deceive the World, and may by ſubtility and the agility of his nature, perform ſuch things as may amuſe the Minds of Men, and ſometimes put them to it, to find a difference between them and real Miracles, if they only make their Senſes judges of them. And ſuch kind of Wonders, tho' they are but ſparingly done, and with a kind of ſecreſy (as tho' they were conſulting with *Catiline* about the burning *Rome*) yet the Devil wou'd have ſome (eſpecially when Ignorance and Superſtition are aſcendants) to keep up his intereſt in the World. Or elſe, when he is like to be diſpoſſeſs'd and thrown out of all, he tries his utmoſt to keep as many to him as may be: Thus when the Spirit of God appear'd in the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apoſtles and the Primitive Church, he then conjur'd up all the infernal Powers to do ſomething parallel, to keep poſſeſſion of his idolatrous Temples, as long as he cou'd. Thus we find *Simon Magus* dogging the Apoſtles (as it were) at the heels, that by his Magic he might ſtagger the People concerning the Miracles wrought by the Apoſtles: After him *Apollonius* appear'd upon the Stage; but his wonders are ſuch pitiful things, compar'd with thoſe wrought by *Chriſt* or his Apoſtles, that it cou'd be nothing but malice in *Hierocles* to mention him in competition with *Chriſt*. But thoſe things which ſeem a great deal more conſiderable than either of theſe, were, The cure of a blind Man by *Veſpaſian* in *Ægypt*, mention'd by *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, wherein there was (Sueton. Veſp. cap. 7.) a palpable imitation of our Saviour's curing the blind Man in the Goſpel; for the Man told *Veſpaſian*, *Reſtituturum oculos ſi inſpuiſſet, That he ſhould receive his ſight by his ſpittle:* So *Spartianus* tells us of a Woman that was cur'd of her blindneſs by kiſſing the knees of the Emperour *Adrian*; and * *Boxhornius* hath produced an old Table in the Temple of *Æſculapius* at *Rome* of ſeveral diſeaſed perſons that were cured there: *A blind Man in the time of* Antoninus *was cured by this Oracle; he muſt come to the Altar, and kneel there; from the right ſide he muſt turn to the left, and put five fingers upon the Altar, and then lift up his hands and touch his eyes and ſo was cured: Another called* Lucius *cured of the pain of his*

* Boxhorn. Qu. Rom. qu. 7.

ſide, by mixing the aſhes of the Altar with the wine, and applying it to his ſide; another cured of ſpitting of blood by the kernel of a pine-apple and honey, uſed three days; a fourth cured of Blindneſs by the blood of a white cock and honey uſed three days upon his eyes. Theſe are the moſt conſiderable of all the pretended Miracles done about that time, when the noiſe of the Chriſtian Miracles were ſpread ſo far and done ſo frequently, that they challenged the Heathens again and again to bring forth any perſon poſſeſs'd with a Devil; if he did not confeſs to them that he was a Devil, tho' he made the Heathens believe that he was a God, they were contented to leave their blood in the place.

For thus *Tertullian* ſpeaks in his *Apology* to them: *Edatur hic aliquis* *Tertull. Apol. c.* 23. *ſub tribunalibus veſtris, quem dæmone agi conſtet: juſſus à quolibet Chriſtiano loqui ſpiritus ille, tam ſe Dæmonem confitebitur de vero, quam alibi Deum de falſo: æque producatur aliquis ex iis qui de deo pati exiſtimantur, qui aris inhalantes numen de nidore concipiunt, qui ructando curantur, qui anhelando profantur. Iſta ipſa Virgo cœleſtis pluviarum pollicitatrix, iſte ipſe Æſculapius Medicinarum demonſtrator, alias de morituris ſcordii & denatii & Aſclepiadoti ſubminiſtrator, niſi ſe Dæmones confeſſi fuerint, Chriſtiano mentiri non audentes, ibidem illius Chriſtiani procaciſſimi ſanguinem fundite. Quid iſto opere manifeſtius, quid hac probatione fidelius? ſimplicitas veritatis in medio eſt; virtus illi ſua aſſiſtit; nihil ſuſpicari licebit, magia aut aliqua fallacia fieri. Dictis non ſtetis, ſi oculi veſtri & aures permiſerint vobis.* In theſe very daring words, we ſee how the Chriſtians appeal'd to their Senſes, even with the hazard of their own lives, that they wou'd make even *Æſculapius* himſelf confeſs what he was, and by whoſe power all the cures were wrought upon the Dreamers in his Temples. And for the manner of the Devil's cures, the ſame Author explains it thus. *Lædunt primo, dehinc remedia præcipiunt ad miraculum* *Ibid. c.* 22. *nova, ſive contraria, poſt quæ deſinunt lædere, & curaſſe creduntur. They firſt poſſeſs the bodies themſelves* (as Demoniacs were common in thoſe times) *and affect it with various diſtempers, afterwards upon uſing the ſtrange remedies preſcribed by* Æſculapius, *they forſake their ſtation, and the perſon is cured.* And for the cures perform'd by the Emperours, thoſe who conſider what various artifices were about that time uſed to procure an opinion of Divinity in the Emperours, will not much wonder that ſuch reports ſhou'd be ſpread of them, or that any perſons ſhou'd fain theſe diſtempers to give themſelves out to be cured by them. But granting ſomewhat wonderful in theſe, what are they, compar'd with thoſe done by *Chriſtians?* and who ever wou'd lay down his life to atteſt any of them? So that tho' the Devil by his ſubtilty may eaſily impoſe upon Spectators eyes, yet it was impoſſible for him by any power of his own to alter the courſe of Nature, or produce any real Miracle. For every true Miracle is a production of ſomething out of nothing (which cannot be done by leſs than an omnipotent arm) and that either in the thing it ſelf, when it is of that nature that it cannot be produced by any Second Cauſes, as the raiſing of the dead; in the manner of doing it, when tho' the thing lies within the poſſibility of Second Cauſes, yet it is perform'd without the help of any of them, as in the cure of diſeaſes without any uſe of means, *by a word ſpeaking, the touch of a garment,* &c. Now that all thoſe Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of the Chriſtian Doctrine were ſuch true and proper Miracles, will be diſcover'd afterwards.

2. God *never alters the courſe of Nature, but for ſome very conſiderable* II.

end. For otherwiſe when he did it, it wou'd not be taken notice of nor thought to be an alteration of the order of Nature, but only ſome rare contingiences which lie hid in the order of Cauſes, but only break out at ſome times: of which ſort are all thoſe things which the ignorant World is apt to account as Prodigies. Of all which rare contingences
Cicero de Div. l. 2. in Nature, I ſay, as the *Roman* Orator doth, *Si quod raro fit, id portentum putandum eſt, ſapientem eſſe portentum eſt; ſæpius enim mulum peperiſſe arbitror, quam ſapientem fuiſſe. If all rare contingences be accounted prodigies, a wiſe Man is certainly the greateſt Prodigy.* But theſe are quite of another nature from true Miracles, which are immediately produced by a Divine Power, and intended for a confirmation of ſome Divine Teſtimony. There are now ſeveral weighty Reaſons, which might make Miracles neceſſary in the time of our Saviour, as an Evidence of his Divine Authority and Power.

1. *That he came to take down that way of worſhip, which had been at firſt ſettled by a power of Miracles in* Moſes. God wou'd not be ſo much wanting to the Faith of that People, which had receiv'd their Law by Signs and Wonders from Heaven, but that there ſhou'd be as ſtrong an Evidence given to them, that the fulneſs of time was come when that diſpenſation was to have an end, and to give place to one more perfect, which was to be eſtabliſh'd inſtead of it. Upon which account the *Jews* might rationally enquire after a Sign, where any new Revelation was diſcover'd, which might null the obligation of any former Law: and when they enquire ſo much after a Sign, our Saviour doth not reject the enquiry as in it ſelf unreaſonable, but as made in an unreaſonable manner; for they wou'd not be contented with the Miracles which our Saviour wrought, which ſufficiently manifeſted a Divine Power; but
Matth. 12 38. 16. 1. all that they deſired was, *A Sign from Heaven*, i. e. ſuch as were done at the giving of the Law, the Thundring and Lightnings there; or, as the *raining of Manna in the wilderneſs*: Now our Saviour juſtly checks this demand as importunate and impudent; partly as knowing upon what account they asked it, merely to tempt him and not out of any real deſire of ſatisfaction; and partly becauſe on that abundant Evidence which was given in the Miraculous cures which were wrought by him, which were more ſutable to that deſign of doing good in the World, than all the Thunder-claps on Mount *Sinai* were: neither were the People in a condition to be fed by *Manna* as they were in the Wilderneſs, God graciouſly ſuiting the diſcoveries of his Power to the peculiar advantages of the People which they were made to, and the diſpenſation they uſher'd in. Thoſe terrible Signs at Mount *Sinai* being very ſuitable to the ſeverity and rigor of the Law: and the gracious Miracles of our Saviour to the ſweetneſs and grace of the Goſpel. And on this account our Saviour charged the *Jews* with Hypocriſy in requiring a σημεῖον, as ſomething above δύναμις, a *Prodigy* rather than a Miracle;
Math. 12. 39. *An evil and adulterous generation ſeeketh after a Sign, and there ſhall no Sign be given it but that of the Prophet* Jonas, *i. e.* this People which are ſo far from the Faith of *Abraham*, (and therefore are ſuppoſititious Children) that no Miracles which I do, will convince them, but they ſeek only to have their Humours gratify'd more than their Faith confirm'd by ſome Prodigy from Heaven, ſhall not by me be thus gratify'd; but having done enough already to perſuade them, if they had any heart to believe, inſtead of a Sign from Heaven, they ſhall have only one from the Earth, and that not ſo much intended for the converſion of

ſuch wilful Unbelievers, as for the teſtifying my innocency to the World, *viz.* his Reſurrection from the dead. And ſo elſewhere when the *Jews*, demand a Sign, it was upon the doing of that, which if they had attended to, had been a ſufficient Sign to them, *viz. his driving the* Joh.2.18. *buyers and ſellers out of the Temple:* Which being a thing permitted by the *Sanhedrin* and the *Prieſts*, how cou'd they think ſo mean a Perſon, in appearance, as our Saviour was, cou'd ever have effected it, had it not been for a Divine Majeſty and Power which appear'd in him? It was not then the expectation of Miracles which our Saviour rebuked in the *Jews*, but being unſatisfy'd with the kind and nature of our Saviour's Miracles. It was their Hypocriſy and unbelief which *Chriſt* condemn'd, notwithſtanding the frequent Miracles which he wrought among them: For we plainly find our Saviour very often appealing to his Miracles as the evidences of his Divine Commiſſion: *If I had not done the works* Joh.5.36. *among them which no man elſe did, they had not had ſin*, i. e. in not be- 10.25. Joh.15. lieving me. 20. Whereby *Chriſt* both ſets forth the neceſſity of his working Miracles, in order to the conviction of the World, and the greatneſs of the Miracles which he wrought: he did thoſe no Man elſe had done, no not *Moſes* and *Elias*, in curing all manner of diſeaſes by the Word of his Mouth; and thoſe Miracles which they had done, he exceeded them in the manner of doing them. *Moſes* fed them with bread from Heaven; but *Chriſt* multiply'd on Earth ſome *few loaves* and *fiſhes*, to the *feeding* of *many thouſands*: *Elias* indeed raiſed one from the dead; but *Chriſt* raiſed more, and one after he had been *four days* in the *grave.* And upon this very evidence of our Saviour's Miracles we find many believing on him. And even of thoſe who were not ſo far wrought upon as to become followers of Chriſt, as the only *Meſſias*, yet we find Joh.1.49. them ſo far perſuaded by the power of his Miracles, that they looked 2.11. upon him as a great Prophet, or one that was ſent from God. So *Nicodemus*, who came firſt to Chriſt more as a rational Enquirer than a Believer, yet we ſee he was *perſuaded that he was a teacher come from God,* Joh.3.2. *becauſe no man could do the miracles which Chriſt did unleſs God were with him.* And before him many of the *Jews* at *Jeruſalem believed in his name when they ſaw the miracles which he did*; yet theſe perſons *Chriſt would not truſt himſelf with, becauſe he knew their hearts* were not ſubdued to his Joh.2.23. Doctrine, tho' their underſtandings were convinced by his Miracles. And after this other of the *Jews* that looked not on him as the *Meſſias*, yet it is ſaid they believ'd on him on the account of his Miracles. Joh.7.31. *And many of the people believed on him, and ſaid, When Chriſt cometh will he do more Miracles than theſe which this man hath done?* Altho' herein they were moſt unreaſonable in believing the Evidence, and not the Truth atteſted by it, in believing Chriſt to be one ſent from God by his Miracles, and yet not believing him to be the *Meſſias*, which was the thing atteſted by them. Not that mere Miracles wou'd prove the Perſon to be the *Meſſias* who did them, but the Miracles prov'd the Teſtimony to be Divine; now that which Chriſt deliver'd to them as a Divine Teſtimony, was his being the *Meſſias* and therefore by the ſame reaſon they believ'd him to be ſent from God, they ought to have believ'd him to be the *Meſſias*; for one ſent from God cou'd never falſifie in the main of his Meſſage, as this was of our Saviour's preaching. And hence it is obſervable our Saviour did not ſhew forth his Divine Power till he entred upon his Office of Preaching; thereby making it appear he intended this as the great evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he preached to them. And herein the blind man in the Goſpel ſaw more Truth and Reaſon than the whole Court of *Sanhedrin*, before which in probability he was convented about his cure by Chriſt; for when they ſought to get ſomething out of him in diſparagement of our Saviour's perſon and miracle, he ſharply and roundly tells them, when they ſaid they knew Joh. 9. 29, 30. God ſpake to *Moſes*, *but for this fellow, we know not from whence he is*; *Why herein*, ſaith he, *is a marvellous thing, that ye know not from whence* Ver. 33. *he is, and yet he hath opened mine eyes. If this man were not of* God, *he could do nothing*; (as tho' he had ſaid) is it not plain that this man is imploy'd by God in the World by the Miracles which he doth? for otherwiſe God wou'd not ſo readily aſſiſt him in doing ſuch great Works Ver. 31. *for we know that God heareth not ſinners: but if any man be a worſhipper of God, and doth his will, him he heareth*; *i. e.* if this man pretended a Commiſſion from Heaven falſly (whereby he wou'd be the greateſt of Sinners) can we think God wou'd ſo miraculouſly aſſiſt him? but we know by our Law, if one comes with a Commiſſion from God, and draw men not to Idolatry, which is meant by a worſhipper of God; ſuch a one God is preſent with, and we are bound to believe him. And for this very miracle, or curing one born blind, was the like ever heard of before? did ever *Moſes* or the Prophets do it? Thus we ſee what ſtrong Rational Evidence there was in this Miracle of Chriſt in the judgment of this blind man, which he utter'd with ſo much reaſon before the Court of *Sanhedrin*, when he knew how like he was to be excommunicated for it; and yet this very perſon was as yet ignorant that Ver. 36. Chriſt was the true *Meſſias*, as appears by the Sequel of the Chapter; Ver. 38. but upon Chriſt's Revelation of himſelf to him, *he preſently believed on him.* How ſtrangely irrational were the *Jews* then in rejecting our Saviour, when his Miracles not only exceeded thoſe of *Moſes* both in number and quality; but which was more, they ſaw themſelves the Miracles which Chriſt did, but they received thoſe of *Moſes* only upon the credit of their Fathers! And from the ſtrength of the Evidence ariſing from the power of Miracles it is that St. *Peter* tells the promiſcuous Aſſembly, *Act.* 2. 22. *That Jeſus of* Nazareth *was a man approved of God among them, by miracles, wonders and ſigns, which God did by him in the midſt of them, as they themſelves alſo knew.* He appeals to their own knowledge, which he wou'd not certainly have done, had it not been in a caſe beyond all diſpute among them. Which was a thing ſo notorious among them, that we find the *Phariſees* themſelves confeſſing it; Joh. 11. 47. *What do we? For this man doth many miracles:* Now then in a Nation whoſe Religion had been eſtabliſh'd by Miracles, and the certainty of the truth of it, among thoſe who then profeſs'd it, did depend ſo much upon the conſtant credit which the report of the Miracles done at the ſettling of their Law had among them; what cou'd be a more rational and convincing way of proceeding, than for our Saviour to manifeſt by a greater Power of Miracles in himſelf the undoubted credentials of his Commiſſion from Heaven; and that he was the true *Meſſias*, which was foretold by their own moſt ſacred and authentical Records? Which will appear more,

III. *Hyp.* 2. *Becauſe the power of miracles did evidently declare that he was the very perſon promiſed.* For if the exact correſpondency of the event to the Predictions in a Nation owning them as Divine, be an undoubted evidence, that they are exactly fulfill'd; our Saviour was moſt certainly the Perſon ſo often ſpoken of in the Old Teſtament. For many of the

Prophecies of the Old Teſtament concerning the *Meſſias*, if they were not fulfill'd in Chriſt, in the conditions the *Jews* have been in ſince their diſperſion, (which fell out exactly according to the Prediction of Chriſt) it is impoſſible that they ſhou'd be fulfill'd at all. So that either the Predictions muſt loſe their Divine Authority, or they muſt be accompliſhed in our bleſſed Saviour. For as *Tertullian* ſharply ſays to the *Jews*, *Redde ſtatum Judææ quem Chriſtus inveniat, & alium contende venire*; *Let the people of the Jews be in their former condition, and then plead for a Meſſias to come.* Tertull. c. Judæos, c. 13. For can any thing be more plain than that the *Meſſias* was to be born in *Bethlehem* of *Judæa*? but where is that now? and how long ſince the *Jews* enjoy'd any civil Polity there? What is become of the ſecond Temple, in the time of which the Deſire of all Nations ſhou'd come. Is not *Jeruſalem* already deſtroy'd, and the Oblation there long ſince ceaſed, which was to come to paſs ſo ſoon after the *Meſſias*, and did accordingly? Is not *the Scepter yet departed from* Judah, and *the Lawgiver from between his feet*, and is not *Shiloh* yet come? What ſtrange unintelligible Weeks were thoſe of *Daniel*, if they were extended to ſo indefinite a period; what certain ground cou'd from hence be gather'd of any time wherein their Accompliſhment was to be expected? But not to Expatiate on thoſe things which are already ſo largely prov'd beyond all poſſibility of contradiction, by the ancient and modern learned Writers the *Jews*: To inſiſt therefore on our preſent buſineſs; are not the Prophecies concerning the Miracles which the *Meſſias* ſhou'd work, exactly fulfill'd in Chriſt? *Then the eyes of the blind ſhall be opened, and the ears of the deaf ſhall be unſtopped; then ſhall the lame man leap as an Hart, and the tongue of the dumb ſhall ſing.* Iſa. 35. 5, 6. He muſt be a great ſtranger in the Hiſtory of the New Teſtament that is to ſeek for an exact fulfilling of this Prophecy. Nay, and the *Jewiſh Midraſch*, upon *Pſal.* 146. 8. V. Grot. in Joh. 9. 32. ſaith, that when *Meſſias comes, he ſhould open the eyes of the blind*; and the *Jews* themſelves often ſpeak of the great Miracles which the *Meſſias* ſhou'd do when he appears; and therefore out of their own mouths will they be condemned, when the Miracles of Chriſt make it ſo evident that he was the true *Meſſias*. Hence when *John Baptiſt* ſent his Diſciples to Chriſt for them to be fully ſatisfy'd concerning him; he bids them tell him, *the blind receive their ſight, and the lame walk, and the lepers are cleanſed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raiſed up*, &c. Mat. 11. 5. as tho' the mentioning of theſe Miracles was ſufficient to make it appear to them who he was whom they came to enquire after. And therefore it is obſervable that *John Baptiſt* himſelf, tho' greater than the Prophets, nay, *than whom there was not a greater born of women*, by our Saviour's own Teſtimony; Mat. 11. 9, 11. yet of him it is ſaid, *that he wrought no miracle*: Joh. 10. 41. of which no account can be given ſo probable and rational, as that God in his infinite Wiſdom was pleas'd ſo to order it, that the Evidence of our Saviour's being the *Meſſias* might be made more clear by the Miracles which he wrought, that the minds of the People might not be diſtracted between *John* and *Chriſt*; he therefore reſerv'd the glory of Miracles wholly to the name of *Chriſt*, that there might be no pretence of Competition between *John* and *him*.

IV. Hyp. 3. Another reaſon of the neceſſity of Miracles in our Saviour by way of Rational Evidence, is, *the overthrowing the power and kingdom of the Devil in the world*. For which purpoſe it is obſervable that the Devil had ſcarce ever greater power over the Bodies of Men as well as their Souls, than at that time; thence we read of ſuch a multitude of *Demoniacs*

niacs in the Goſpel. For it ſeems very harſh to interpret thoſe merely of Epileptical and Lunatic Perſons, both becauſe the δαιμονιζόμενοι, and
Mat. 4. 24. σεληνιαζόμενοι, and παραλυτικοὶ, are mention'd diſtinctly, and that it appears by the Primitive Church afterwards how frequent it was to eject the Devil out of poſſeſſed perſons. Nay, ſo far am I from thinking that the Demoniacs were mere Lunatics, that I rather think with
Voſſius de Idolat. l. 2. c. 19. *Voſſius* that the Lunatics were truly Demoniacs, only they were not conſtantly under the power of the Devil, but as their paroxyſms return'd upon them, the Devil loving to Fiſh in ſuch troubled Waters. And thence
Mat. 17. 14. Luke. 9. 39. the ſame perſon is called a Lunatic in one place, who is called a Demoniac in another; becauſe he did *ruere in principiis lunationum*, as the *Arabic* verſion expreſſeth it; or as *Ruſticus Elpidius* more fully explains it,

Ruſt. Elpid. lib. 5.

> *Repſerat in medium rabies horrenda furoris*
> *Dæmonis afflatu, propria qui peſte nocivus*
> *Allidit captas fœdo diſcrimine mentes,*
> *Menſtrua deciduos cum Luna recolligit ignes.*

Theophylact is of opinion, that the *Jews* in the time of our Saviour ſup-
Mat. 8. 28. pos'd, that the Souls of dead men became Demons, and thence we read in Scripture of the Demoniacs among the Tombs: but it is far more probable which *Grotius* conceives, that the *Jews* were of opinion, that the Souls of dead men did hover up and down about their Bodies, and that theſe were ſo long under the Devils power, which many of the *Jews* to this day believe, and make uſe of the inſtance of the *Pythoniſs* raiſing *Samuel*; on which account the Devils, to favour an Opinion ſo advantageous to their intereſt, might appear with greater terror and fury about their burying places, as we ſee they did in thoſe poſſeſſed perſons. But on whatever account it was, we find it evident that about the time of our Saviour's appearance, and ſome time after, the truly ἐνεργούμενοι were very frequent; whether it were that the Devil by ſuch frequent poſſeſſions of perſons, and making them to do ſuch ſtrange things, might thereby endeavour to invalidate the evidence of our Saviour's Miracles (from whence it is probable the *Phariſees* raiſed their Calumny, that Chriſt did Miracles by *Beelzebub*, becauſe they ſaw ſo many ſtrange appearances caus'd by poſſeſſed perſons) or whether it were thro' the Admirable Providence of God, which might give Satan the greater liberty at that time, on purpoſe to heighten the glory of our Saviour in diſpoſſeſſing of him, and thereby to give the higheſt Rational Evidence, that his Power was of God, which tended ſo much to the deſtruction of the Kingdom of Satan.

V. And hence the Primitive Chriſtians did ſo much triumph, and as it were inſult over the Devil where-ever they found him, making him to remove his lodgings from poſſeſs'd perſons, by a Writ of Ejection from the Name of Chriſt. Thence *Origen* rationally concludes that Chriſt had his Power given him from above, becauſe at his very Name the
Orig. c. Celſ. l. 3. Devils forſook the bodies which they had poſſeſs'd, Εἰ γὰρ μὴ θεόθεν ἦν αὐτῷ δοθεῖσα σύστασις, οὐκ ἂν καὶ δαίμονες τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἀπαγγελλομένῳ μόνον εἴκοντες ἀνεχώρουν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν πολεμουμένων. And he elſewhere tells us, that even the meaneſt ſort of Chriſtians without any Ceremony, but merely by their Prayers, did ordinarily eject the Devil out of mens
Lib. 7. bodies: ὡς ἐπίπαν γὰρ ἰδιῶται τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττουσι, παριστάσης τῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ χριστοῦ χάριτος τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων εὐτελὲς καὶ ἀσθενὲς, οὐ πάντως δεόμενον πρὸς τὸ

ἡττηθῆναι καὶ εἶξαι ὑπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ σώματος, σοφοῦ τινὸς καὶ δυνατοῦ ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς περὶ τ πίστεως ἀποδείξεσι. *Ordinary Chriſtians,* ſaith he, *moſt commonly do this, the Grace of Chriſt by its word thereby diſcovering the contemptibleneſs and infirmity of the Devils, that in order to their Ejection they did not want any learned or experienced Chriſtian,* And for this they appeal to the Heathens themſelves, as appears not only by the challenge of *Tertullian* already mention'd, but by the Teſtimony of almoſt all of them who have writ againſt the Heathens in vindication of the Chriſtian Religion. Thence *Minutius Felix, Hæc omnia ſciunt plerique, pars veſtrum, ipſos dæmonas de ſemetipſis confiteri, quoties à nobis tormentis verborum, & orationis incendiis de corporibus exiguntur. Ipſe Saturnus, & Serapis, & Jupiter, & quicquid dæmonum colitis, victi dolore quod ſunt eloquuntur, nec utique in turpitudinem ſui nonnullis præſertim veſtrum aſſiſtentibus, mentiuntur. Ipſis teſtibus eos eſſe Dæmonas, de ſe verum confitentibus credite; adjurati enim per Deum verum & ſolum, inviti, miſeri corporibus inhorreſcunt; & vel exſiliunt ſtatim, vel evaneſcunt gradatim, prout fides patientis adjuvat, aut gratia curantis aſpirat.* Can we now think the Devil ſhou'd not only forſake his Tyranny over the bodies of men, but let go ſo advantageous a pillar of his Tyranny over the Conſciences of men in Idolatrous worſhip, as the concealing himſelf was, had he not been forc'd to it by a Power far greater than his own? So *Cyprian ad Demetrianum*, appeals to him being the Proconſul of *Africa*, about the ſame thing (who had written ſharply againſt the Chriſtians) for ſpeaking of the Devils whom they worſhipped in their Idols, *O ſi audire eos velles & videre, quando à nobis adjurantur & torquentur Spiritualibus flagris & verborum tormentis de obſeſſis corporibus ejiciuntur, quando ejulantes & gementes voce humana, & poteſtate divina flagella & verbera ſentientes, venturum judicium confitentur; veni & cognoſce vera eſſe quæ dicimus:* and a little after, *videbis ſub manu noſtra ſtare vinctos, & tremere captivos, quos tu ſuſpicis & veneraris ut Dominos.* Did ever any of the Heathen Magicians (of which there were good ſtore) extort ſuch things from the Devils, as the Chriſtians did, merely by their Prayers, and Invocations of the name of God and Chriſt? did they ever make them confeſs to be what they were, not only in poſſeſs'd bodies but in their Temples too? that was beyond the power of their *Epheſian* Letters, or any of their Magical Incantations. Did the Devils ever dread ſo much the Name of *Socrates* or *Ariſtides* as they did that of God and Chriſt? Of which *Lactantius* thus ſpeaks, *Quo audito tremunt, exclamant, & uri ſe verberarique teſtantur, & interrogati qui ſint, quando venerint, quando in hominem irrepſerint, confitentur ſic extorti, & excruciati virtute divini numinis exulant; propter hæc verbera & minas, ſanctos & juſtos viros ſemper oderunt.* And even *Apollo* himſelf at the name of Chriſt trembled as much as ever the *Pythian* Propheteſs did in her greateſt furies; ſo *Prudentius* tells us.

Minut. Felix. p. 31. ed. Oxz.

Cyprian. ad Demetr. ſ. 12.

Lactant. de juſtitia, lib. 5. c. 21.

Torquetur Apollo
Nomine percuſſus Chriſti, nec fulmina verbi
Ferre poteſt; agitant miſerum tot verbera linguæ,
Quot laudata Dei reſonant miracula Chriſti.

Prudent. Apotheoſ.

To theſe we may add what *Firmicus* ſaith to the ſame purpoſe, *Ecce Dæmon eſt quem colis; cum Dei & Chriſti ejus nomen audierit, contremiſcit, & ut interrogantibus nobis reſpondeat trepidantia verba, vix ſe colligit;*

Firmicus de errore prof. relig.

adhærens homini laceratur, uritur, vapulat, & ſtatim de commiſſis ſceleribus confitetur. By which Teſtimonies it appears what power over Satan, when he was in his Kingdom, the Chriſtians by the power of Chriſt had; not as tho the bare name of Chriſt had ſo great an efficacy in the
Origen. l. 1. c. Celſ. ejection of Devils, as *Origen* ſeems to be of opinion (in a diſcourſe about the efficacy of Names, unworthy of ſo great a Philoſopher) but that God might manifeſt to the World the truth that was contain'd in that Name, he did give a power to ſuch as made uſe of it, of working Miracles by it. And thence we read in Scripture, that ſome who were not throughly Chriſtians, but yet profeſs'd the Truth of the Goſpel, and
Matt. 7. 22. that what they did was for the honour of Chriſt, *had a power of caſting out Devils and doing many wonderful things thro' his name.*

VI. By theſe and many other Teſtimonies which might be produced out of the Primitive Church, we find an exact accompliſhment of our Savi-
Mark 16. 17. our's promiſe to his Diſciples when he took his leave of them. *And theſe ſigns ſhall follow them that believe, In my name ſhall they caſt out Devils*, &c. This power then in the Primitive Church had a twofold Argument in it, both as it was a manifeſtation of the truth of the Predictions of our Saviour, and as it was an Evidence of the Divine Power of *Chriſt*, when his Name ſo long after his Aſcenſion had ſo great a command over all the Infernal Spirits; and that ſo evidently, that at that time when the *Chriſtians* did as it were tyrannize over *Satan* ſo in his own territories, yet then the greateſt of his *Magicians* had no Power to hurt the bodies of the *Chriſtians*, which is a thing *Origen* takes much notice of. For when *Celſus* ſaith from *Diogenes Ægyptius* that *Magic* cou'd *only hurt ignorant and wicked Men, and had no power over Philoſophers*; *Origen* replies, *firſt*, that *Philoſophy* was no ſuch charm againſt the power of *Magic*, as appears by *Mæragenes* who writ the Story of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, the famous Magician Philoſopher, who therein mentions how *Euphrates* and an *Epicurean* (οὐκ ἀγενεῖς φιλόσοφοι, *no vulgar Philoſophers*) were catched by the *Magic* of *Apollonius*, (and altho' *Phi-
Lud. Vives de trad. diſc. l. 5. loſtratus* diſowns this Hiſtory of *Mæragenes* as fabulous, yet he that thinks *Philoſtratus* for that, to be of any greater credit, is much deceived, of whom *Lud. Vives* gives this true Character, that he doth *magna
Origen. contr. Celſ. l. 6. p. 302. Homeri mendacia majoribus mendaciis corrigere, Mend one hole and make three*,) but ſaith *Oregen*, as to the *Chriſtians*, this is undoubtedly true: Διαβεβαιούμεθα γὰρ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῇ πείρᾳ παραλαβόντες, ὅτι οἱ κατὰ χριστιανισμὸν διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεραπεύοντες θεὸν, καὶ βιοῦντες κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον αὐτοῦ ταῖς προσταχθείσαις γὰρ εὐχαῖς συνεχέστερον καὶ δεόντως νύκτος καὶ ἡμέρας χρώμενοι, οὔτε μαγείᾳ οὔτε δαιμονίοις εἰσὶν ἁλωτοί. *This*, ſaith he, *we are moſt certain of, and have found it by experience true, that thoſe who according to the Principles of Chriſtianity do worſhip God over all, thro' Jeſus, and do live according to the Goſpel, being conſtant in their ſolemn Prayers night and day, are not obnoxious to the power of any Magic or Devils whatever.* Now then if the Devil who had then ſo much power over others, had none upon the true followers of *Chriſt*; and if inſtead of that they had ſo great a commanding Power over the Devil even in things which tended moſt to his diſadvantage, not only diſlodging him out of Bodies, but out of his idolatrous Temples; what can be more evident, than that this power which was ſo efficacious for the overthrowing the Kingdom of *Satan*, muſt needs be far greater than the power of *Satan* is? For it is an undoubted Maxim in Natural Reaſon, That *whatever is put out of its former place by force and violence, is extruded by ſomething ſtronger than*

than its ſelf; for if the force on either ſide were equal, there cou'd be no diſpoſſeſſing of either; if any thing then be caſt out of its former poſſeſſion unwillingly, it is an undeniable proof there was ſome power greater than his who was diſpoſſeſſed. Now we cannot conceive, if there be ſuch malignant Spirits, as by many undeniable proofs it is evident there are, that they ſhou'd willingly quit their poſſeſſions to ſuch a Doctrine which tends to the unavoidable ruin of their Intereſt in the World: if then the power of this Doctrine hath overthrown the Devil's Kingdom in the World, where-ever it hath been truly entertain'd, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that this power is far above the power of any damned Spirits. Now what folly and madneſs was it in the *Heathens* to worſhip thoſe for Gods, which they cou'd not but ſee, if they wou'd open their eyes, were under ſo great ſlavery to a power above them, which cou'd make them confeſs what was moſt to their diſadvantage in the preſence of their great adorers?

VII. Neither ought the many Counterfeits and Impoſtures which have been in the World in this kind ſince the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtian Religion (among the advancers of particular intereſts and deſigns) make us ſuſpect the truth of thoſe things which were done in the firſt Ages of the Church of *Chriſt*. For, *firſt*, it ſtands to the greateſt Reaſon, that the ſtrongeſt Arguments for the truth of a Religion ought to be fetched from the Ages of its firſt appearance in the World; if then the Evidence be undoubted as to thoſe firſt times, we ought to embrace our Religion as true, whatever the impoſtures have been among thoſe who have apparently gone aſide from that purity and ſimplicity of the Goſpel, which had ſo great power. Then, *ſecondly*, if all that hath been done in this kind of ejecting Devils, where Chriſtianity is own'd, be acknowledg'd for impoſtures; one of theſe two things muſt be ſuppoſed as the ground of it: either that there was no ſuch thing as a real diſpoſſeſſion by the Devil, or elſe there was no ſuch thing as a diſpoſſeſſing him. If the *firſt*, then hereby will be ſeen a confirmation of our former Argument, that where Chriſtianity is own'd, by the power of that, the Devil is more curb'd and reſtrain'd, than where it is not, or elſe is much over-run with ignorance and ſuperſtition. Of the latter, the Ages of the Chriſtian Church, from the 10th Century to the beginning of the 16th Current, are a clear Evidence; Of the *firſt*, all thoſe who have been converſant in the places where *Paganiſm* or groſs *Idolatry* do yet reign, will bring in their creditable Teſtimonies, how tyrannical the power of the Devil is yet among them. If it be not ſo then, where careful endeavours have been uſed for retrieving the ancient purity of Chriſtian Doctrine and Worſhip, we ought to impute it to the power of him who is ſtronger than *Satan*, who where-ever he comes to dwell, doth diſpoſſeſs him of his former habitations. If the *ſecond* then be entertained as the ground of concluding all things as impoſtures, which are accounted diſpoſſeſſions of *Satan*, *viz.* that he never is really diſpoſſeſſed; then it muſt either be ſaid, that where he is once ſeized, there is no poſſibility of ejecting him; which is to ſay, that the Devil hath an abſolute and infinite power, and that there is no power greater than his, which is to own him for God; or elſe that God ſuffers him to tyrannize where and how he will, which is contrary to Divine Providence, and the care God takes of the World, and of the good of Mankind; or elſe, *laſtly*, that thoſe Perſons who pretend to do it, are not ſuch Perſons who are armed ſo much with the power of *Chriſt*, nor poſſeſs poſſeſſed with ſuch a due Spirit of the Goſpel, which hath command over theſe infernal Spirits. And this in the caſes pretended by the great Juglers and Impoſtors of the Chriſtian World, the *Popiſh* Prieſts have been ſo notorious, that none of their party of any great faith or credit would ſtand to vouch them. And we have this impregnable Argument againſt all ſuch Impoſtures, that the matters which they by ſuch actions would give an Evidence to, being ſo vaſtly different from, if not in ſome things diametrically oppoſite to the firſt delivery and deſign of the Chriſtian Faith, it is inconſiſtent with the way uſed for the confirmation of Chriſtian Religion in the firſt publiſhing of it: to atteſt the truth of ſuch things by any real Miracles: For ſo it would invalidate the great force of the Evidences of the truth of Chriſtianity, if the ſame Argument ſhou'd be uſed for the proving of that which in the judgment of any impartial Perſon was not delivered, when the truth of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* was confirmed by ſo many and uncontrouled Miracles. But hereby we ſee what unconceivable prejudice hath been done to the true primitive Doctrine of the Goſpel; and what ſtumbling-blocks have been laid in the way of conſiderative Perſons, to keep them from embracing the truly Chriſtian Faith, by thoſe who wou'd be thought the infallible Directors of Men in it, by making uſe of the Broad-ſeal of Heaven (ſet only to the truth of the Scriptures) to confirm their unwritten and ſuperſtitious ways of worſhip. For if I once ſee that which I looked on as an undoubted Evidence of Divine Power, brought to atteſt any thing directly contrary to Divine Revelation; I muſt either conclude that God may either contradict himſelf by ſealing both parts of a contradiction, which is both blaſphemous, and impoſſible; or that that Society of Men which own ſuch things is not at all tender of the honour of Chriſtian Doctrine, but ſeeks to ſet up an intereſt contrary to it, and matters not what diſadvantage is done to the grounds of Religion by ſuch unworthy pretences: and which of the two is more rational and true, let every one's Conſcience judge. And therefore it is much the intereſt of the Chriſtian World to have all ſuch Frauds and Impoſtures diſcovered, which do ſo much diſſervice to the Chriſtian Faith, and are Matth. 16. 17. ſuch ſecret fomenters of *Atheiſm* and *Infidelity*. But how far that promiſe of our Saviour: *That they which believe in his Name, ſhall caſt out Devils and do many Miracles*, may extend even in theſe laſt Ages of the World to ſuch generous and Primitive-ſpirited Chriſtians, who out of a great and deep ſenſe of the truth of Chriſtianity and tenderneſs to the Souls of Men, ſhou'd go among *Heathens* and *Infidels* to convert them only to Chriſt (and not to a ſecular intereſt, under pretence of an infallible Head) is not here a place fully to enquire. I confeſs I cannot ſee any reaſon why God may not yet for the conviction of *Infidels*, employ ſuch a power of Miracles, altho' there be not ſuch neceſſity of it, as there was in the firſt propagation of the Goſpel, there being ſome Evidences of the power of Chriſtianity now, which were not ſo clear then, (as the overthrowing the kingdom of *Satan* in the World; the prevailing of Chriſtianity, notwithſtanding force uſed againſt it; the recovery of it from amidſt all the corruptions which were mixed with it; the conſent of thoſe parties in the common foundations of Chriſtianity, which yet diſagree from each other with great bitterneſs of Spirit,) tho' I ſay it be not of that neceſſity now, when the Scriptures are convey'd to us in a certain uninterrupted manner; yet God may pleaſe out of his abundant proviſion for the ſatisfaction of the Minds of Men, concerning the truth of Chriſtian Doctrine, to employ good Men to do ſomething which may manifeſt the power of Chriſt to be above the Devil's, whom they worſhip. And therefore I ſhou'd far ſooner believe the relation of the Miracles of *Xaverius* and his Brethren employ'd in the converſion *Infidels*, than *Lipſius* his *Virgo Hallenſis* and *Aſprecollis*, cou'd it but be made evident to me that the deſign of thoſe Perſons had more of *Chriſtianity* than *Popery* in it; that is, that they went more upon a deſign to bring the Souls of the *Infidels* to Heaven, than to enlarge the Authority and Juriſdiction of the *Roman* Church.

VIII.

But what-ever the truth of thoſe Miracles, or the deſign of thoſe perſons were, we have certain and undoubted Evidence of the Truth of thoſe Miracles, whereby Chriſtianity was firſt propagated, and the Kingdom of Satan over-thrown in the World; Chriſt thereby making it appear that his Power was greater than the Devil's *who had poſſeſſion, becauſe he over-came him, took from him all his armour wherein he truſted, and divided his ſpoils*; i. e. diſpoſſeſs'd him of Mens Bodies, and his Idolatrous Temples, ſilenced his Oracles, nonpluſt his Magicians, and at laſt, when Chriſtianity had overcome by ſuffering, wreſted the worldly Power and Empire out of the Devil's hands, and employ'd it againſt himſelf. Neither may we think, becauſe ſince that time the Devil hath got ſome ground in the world again by the large ſpread of *Mahometiſm*, and the general Corruptions in the Chriſtian world, that therefore the other was no argument of Divine Power; becauſe the truth of Chriſtianity is not tied to any particular places; becauſe ſuch a falling away hath been foretold in the Scripture, and therefore the truth of them is prov'd by it; and becauſe God himſelf hath threatned that thoſe who will not receive the Truth in the love of it, ſhall be *given up to ſtrong deluſions*. Doth not this then inſtead of abating the ſtrength of the Argument, confirm it more, and that nothing is fallen out in the Chriſtian world, but what was foretold by thoſe whom God employ'd in the converting of it? But we are neither without ſome fair hopes even from that Divine Revelation which was ſeal'd by uncontroul'd Evidence, that there may be yet a time to come when Chriſt will recover his Churches to their priſtine Purity and Simplicity; but withal, I think we are not to meaſure the future Felicity of the Church by outward Splendor and Greatneſs (which too many ſo ſtrongly fanſie) but by a recovery of that true Spirit of Chriſtianity which breathed in the firſt Ages of the Church, what-ever the outward condition of the Church may be: For if worldly greatneſs, and eaſe, and riches, were the firſt Impairers of the purity of Chriſtian Religion, it is hard to conceive how the reſtoring the Church of Chriſt to its true Glory, can be by the advancing of that, which gives ſo great an occaſion to Pride and Senſuality, which are ſo contrary to the deſign of Chriſtian Religion; unleſs we ſuppoſe Men free from thoſe Corruptions, which continual experience ſtill tells the World the Rulers as well as Members of the Chriſtian Society are ſubject to. Neither may that be wonder'd at, when ſuch unevenneſs of parts is now diſcover'd in the great Luminaries of the World, and the Sun himſelf is found to have his *Maculæ*, as tho' the Sun had a purple Fever, or as *Kircher* expreſſeth it, *Ipſe Phœbus, qui rerum omnium in univerſo naturæ Theatro aſpectabilium longè pulcherrimus omnium opinione eſt habitus hoc ſeculo tandem fumoſa facie, ac infecto vultu maculis prodiit*; *diceres eum variolis laborare ſeneſcentem*: I ſpeak not this as tho' an outward flouriſhing condition of the Church were inconſiſtent with its Purity; for

Luk. 11. 21, 22.

Kircher. Propyl. Agoniſt. ad Oedipum, cap. 2.

then the way to refine it, were to throw it into the flames of Perſecution; but that the advancement of the flouriſhing condition of the Church, is not merely by outward Pomp and Grandeur, and that the Purity of the Church is not inconſiſtent with a ſtate of outward difficulties, which the experience of the Primitive Church gives an irrefragable demonſtration of. Thus much may ſerve to ſhew the neceſſity of a Power of Miracles, conjoyned with the Chriſtian Doctrine, to manifeſt the truth of it by overthrowing the Kingdom of that great *Antichriſt* the Devil, who had uſurped ſo much Tyranny over the World.

IX. The laſt Reaſon why a power of Miracles was ſo neceſſary for confirming the Truth of the Goſpel, is, *becauſe the Goſpel was to be propagated over the World without any other rational evidence than was contained in the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it.* Now the admirable ſucceſs which this Doctrine found in the World, conſidering all the Circumſtances of it, do make it clear what certainty there was that the Miracles which were wrought were true, and they were certain Evidences that the Doctrine atteſted by them was from God. Now this will appear from theſe two things:

1366:1:0.2.

1. *That no rational account can be given why the Apoſtles ſhould undertake to publiſh ſuch a Doctrine, unleſs they had been undoubtedly certain that the Doctrine was true, and they had ſufficient Evidence to perſuade others to believe it.*

2. *That no ſatisfactory account can be given, conſidering the nature of the Doctrine of Chriſt, and the manner of its propagation, why it ſhould meet with ſo great acceptance in the World, had there not been ſuch convincing Evidence as might fully perſuade Men of the truth of it.*

I begin with the *firſt, from the Publiſhers of this Doctrine in the World.* All that I here require by way of a *Poſtulatum* or Suppoſition, are only theſe two things, which no Man right in his wits I ſuppoſe will deny: 1. *That Men are ſo far rational Agents, that they will not ſet upon any work of moment and difficulty, without ſufficient grounds inducing them to it*; and ſo much the greater the work is, the more ſure and ſtedfaſt had the grounds need to be which they proceed upon. 2. *That the Apoſtles or firſt Publiſhers of the Chriſtian Doctrine were not men diſtracted, or bereft of their wits, but acted by principles of common ſenſe, reaſon and underſtanding, as other men in the World do:* Which if any one ſhou'd be ſo far beſide his wits as to queſtion, if he have but patience and underſtanding enough to read and conſider thoſe admirable Writings of theirs which are convey'd to us by as certain uninterrupted a Tradition as any thing in the world hath been, by that time he will ſee cauſe to alter his Judgment, and to ſay that *they are not mad, but ſpeak the words of the greateſt Truth and Soberneſs.* Theſe things ſuppoſed, I now proceed to the proving of the thing in hand, which will be done by theſe three things; Firſt, *That the Apoſtles could not but know how hazardous an employment the preaching of the Goſpel would be to them.* Secondly, *That no motive can be conceived ſufficient for them to undertake ſuch an employment, but the infallible Truth of the Doctrine which they preached.* Thirdly, *That the greateſt aſſurance they had themſelves of the truth of their Doctrine, was by being eye-witneſſes of the Miracles of Chriſt.*

First, *That the Apoſtles could not but underſtand the hazard of their employment, notwithſtanding which they cheerfully undertook it.* That Men armed with no external Power, nor cried up for their Wit and Learning, and carrying a Doctrine with them ſo contrary to the general Inclinations of the World, having nothing in it to recommend it to Mankind but the Truth of it, ſhou'd go about to perſuade the World to part with the Religion they owned, and was ſettled by their Laws, and to embrace ſuch a Religion as called them off from all the things they loved in this World, and to prepare themſelves by Mortification and Self-denial for another World, is a thing to Humane Reaſon incredible, unleſs we ſuppoſe them acted by a higher Spirit than Mankind is ordinarily acted by. For what is there ſo deſirable in continual Reproaches and Contumelies? what delight is there in Racks and Priſons? what agreeableneſs in Flames and Martyrdoms to make Men undergo ſome, nay all of theſe, rather than diſown that Doctrine which they came to publiſh? Yet theſe did the Apoſtles cheerfully undergo in order to the Converſion of the World to the truth of that Doctrine which they deliver'd to it. And not only ſo, but tho' they did foreſee them, they were not diſcouraged from this undertaking by it. I confeſs, when Men are upon hopes of profit and intereſt in the World, engaged upon a deſign which they promiſe themſelves impunity in, having Power on their ſide, tho' afterwards things ſhou'd fall out contrary to their expectation, ſuch Perſons may die in ſuch a Cauſe, becauſe they muſt, and ſome may carry it out with more reſolution, partly thro' an innate fortitude of Spirit, heightned with the advantages of Religion, or an Enthuſiaſtic temper. But it is hard to conceive that ſuch perſons wou'd have undertaking ſo hazardous an employment, if before-hand they had fore-ſeen what they muſt have undergone for it. But now the Apoſtles did fore-know that Bonds and Impriſonment, nay Death it ſelf muſt be undergone in a violent manner, for the ſake of the Doctrine which they preached; yet notwithſtanding all this, they go boldly and with reſolution on with their work, and give not over becauſe of any Hardſhips and Perſecutions they met withal. Joh. 21. 19. One of the chiefeſt of them, St. *Peter*, and as forward as any in preaching the Goſpel, had the very manner of his death foretold him by Chriſt himſelf, before his Aſcenſion; yet ſoon after we find him preaching Chriſt in the midſt of thoſe who had Crucify'd him, and telling them to their faces the greatneſs of their ſin in it, and appealing to the Miracles which Chriſt had done among them, and *bidding them repent and believe in him whom they had crucified, if ever they would be ſaved:* Act. 2. 22, 23, 38. Act. 3. 13. 14, 15, 19. Act. 4. 5. And this he did, not only among the People who gave their conſent to the Crucifying of Chriſt; but ſoon after, being convented together with *John*, before the Court of *Sanhedrin* (probably the very ſame which not long before had ſentenced Chriſt to death) for a Miracle wrought by them, with what incredible boldneſs doth he to their faces tell them of their Murdering of Chriſt; and withall, that their was no other way to ſalvation but by him whom they had Crucified! Act. 4. 10, 12. *Be it known unto you all* (ſaith *Peter* to the *Sanhedrin*) *and to all the people of* Iſrael, *that by the name of Jeſus Chriſt whom ye have crucified, whom God raiſed from the dead, even by him doth this man ſtand here before you whole. Neither is there ſalvation in any other: for there is none other name under Heaven given among men, whereby we muſt be ſaved.* What an heroic freedom of Spirit appears in theſe words! what magnanimity and courage was there now in that Perſon, who durſt in the face of this Court tell them of their Murther, and that there was no Salvation but by him whom they had Crucified! Well might they wonder at the boldneſs of the Men, who fear'd not the ſame Death which they had ſo lately brought their Lord and Maſter to.

X. Neither was this ſingly the caſe of *Peter* and *John*, but all the reſt of the Apoſtles undertook their work with the ſame reſolution and preparation of Spirit to undergo the greateſt hardſhip in the World for the ſake of the Truths they Preached. And accordingly as (far as Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory can aſcertain us of it,) they did allbut *John* (and that to make good the Prediction of Chriſt) ſuffer violent deaths by the hands of thoſe who perſecuted them merely for their Doctrine. And which is moſt obſervable, when Chriſt deſign'd them firſt of all for this work, he told them before-hand of reproaches, perſecutions, all manner of hardſhips, nay of death it ſelf, which they muſt undergo for his ſake. All that he gave them by way of encouragement, was, that they cou'd only *kill the body* and not the *ſoul*, and therefore *that they ſhould fear him only who could deſtroy both body and ſoul in Hell*; all the ſupport they had, was an expectation in another World, and that animated them to go thro' all the hardſhips of this. Where do we ever read of any ſuch boldneſs and courage in the moſt knowing Philoſophers of the Heathens? with what faintneſs and miſgiving of Mind doth *Socrates* ſpeak in his famous diſcourſe ſuppos'd to be made by him before his death? how uncertainly doth he ſpeak of a State of Immortality? and yet in all probability *Plato* ſet it forth with all advantages imaginable. Where do we ever find that ever any of the great Friends of *Socrates* who were preſent at his death, as *Phædo*, *Cebes*, *Crito* and *Simmias*, durſt enter the *Areopagus*, and condemn them there for the Murther of *Socrates*, tho' this would be far ſhort of what the Apoſtles did? Why were they not ſo charitable as to inform the World better of thoſe grand Truths of the Being of God and Immortality of Souls, if at leaſt they were fully convinced of themſelves? Why did not *Plato* at leaſt ſpeak out, and tell the World the Truth and not diſguiſe his diſcourſes under feigned Names, the better to avoid Accuſation and the Fate of *Socrates*? How doth he mince his excellent matter, and plays as it were at *Bo-peep* with his Readers, ſometimes appearing and then pulling in his Horns again? It may not be an improbable conjecture that the death of *Socrates* was the foundation of the Academy: I mean of that cautelous Doctrine of with-holding Aſſent, and being both *pro* and *con*, ſometimes on this ſide, ſometimes on that: for *Socrates*'s death hath made all his Friends very fearful of being too Dogmatical. And *Plato* himſelf had too much Riches, and withal too much of a Courtier in him to hazard the dear Priſon of his Soul, *viz.* his Body, merely for an *æthereal vehicle*. He had rather let his Soul flutter up and down in *Terreſtrial Matter*, or the Cage it was pent up in, than hazard ſo violent an opening of it by the hands of the *Areopagus*. And the great *Roman* Orator, among the reſt of *Plato*'s Sentiments, had learnt this too; for altho' in his diſcourſes he hath many times ſufficiently laid open the folly of the Heathen Worſhip and Theology, yet he knows not how to bring himſelf off ſafe enough with the People; and will be ſure to be Dogmatical only in this, *That nothing is to be innovated in the Religion of a Commonwealth*, and that the *Cuſtoms of our Anceſtors are inviolably to be obſerved.* Which Principles, had they been true as they were ſafe for the Perſons who ſpoke them, the Chriſtian Religion had never gain'd any entertainment in the World; for where-ever it came, it met with this potent Prejudice that it was look'd on as an Innovation, and therefore was ſhrewdly ſuſpected by the Governours of Common-wealths

and

Joh. 21. 22.

Mat. 10. 17, 18, 21, 22, 28.

Plato in *Phæd.*

and the Preachers of it puniſhed as factious and ſeditious Perſons; which was all the pretext the wiſe Politicians of the World had for their cruel and inhumane Perſecutions of ſuch multitudes of peaceable and innocent Chriſtians. Now when theſe things were fore-told by the Apoſtles themſelves before their going abroad ſo plainly, that with the ſame Faith they did believe the Doctrine they Preached to be true, they muſt believe that all theſe things ſhou'd come to paſs, what courage and magnanimity of Spirit was it in them thus to encounter dangers, and as it were court the Flames? Nay and before the time was come that they muſt die, to ſeal the truth of their Doctrine, their whole Life was a continual Peregrination, wherein they were as ſo many *Jobs* in Pilgrimage, encountred with perils and dangers on every ſide; of which one of the moſt painful and ſucceſsful, St. *Paul*, hath given in ſuch a 2. Cor. 6.
large Inventory of his perils, that the very reading of them were enough 4, 5, 8, 9.
to undo a poor *Epicurean Philoſopher*, and at once to ſpoil him of the two Pillars of his Happineſs, the quietneſs of his Mind and eaſe of his Body. Thus we ſee what a hazardous imployment that was which the Apoſtles went upon, and that it was ſuch as they very well underſtood the difficulty of before they ſet upon it.

Secondly, *We cannot find out any rational motive which could carry them* XI.
through ſo hazardous an employment, but the full convictions of their minds of the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine which they deliver'd. We find before that no vulgar motives in the World cou'd carry them upon that deſign which they went upon; cou'd they be led by Ambition and Vain-glory, who met with ſuch Reproaches where-ever they went; and not only Perſecutions of the Tongue, but the ſharper ones of the Hands too? We never read of any but the Primitive Chriſtians who were ambitious of being Martyrs, and thought long till they were in the Flames: which made *Arrius Antonius* being Pro-conſul of *Aſia*, when Chriſtians in multitudes beſet his Tribunal and thronged in to be Condemn'd, ſay to them, ὦ δειλοὶ, εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνοὺς ἢ βρόχους ἔχετε. *O miſerable People, had not ye ways enough to end your lives at* Tertull. ad
home, but ye muſt croud for an execution! This was a higher ambition by Scapul. c.
far than any of thoſe *mancipia gloriæ*, thoſe *Chamæleons* that liv'd on 5.
the breath of Applauſe, the Heathen Philoſophers ever reached to, who were, as *Tertullian* expreſſeth it, *Homines gloriæ & eloquentiæ ſolius libidinoſi, unſatiable thirſters after the honour and eloquence of the world*; Idem. Apolog. c. 47.
but the Spirit of a Chriſtian did ſoar too high to quarry on ſo mean a Prey. When the more ſober Heathens had taken a ſtricter notice of the Carriages and Lives of the Preachers of the Goſpel and all their genuine Followers, they inſtead of the common and rude name of Impoſtures, gave them a more civil title of *Philoſophers*, and looked upon their Doctrine as a ſublimer kind of Philoſophy, *Non utique divinum negotium exiſtimant ſed magis Philoſophiæ genus*, as *Tertullian* tells us, be- Ibid. c. 45.
cauſe the Philoſophers pretended ſo much to Moral Vertues which they ſaw the Chriſtians ſo excellent in; but as *Tertullian* there replies, *Nomen hoc Philoſophorum Dæmonia non fugat, The Devil was never afraid of a Philoſopher's beard*, nor were diſeaſes cured by the touch of a Philoſophic *pallium*. There was ſomething more Divine in Chriſtians than in the grave Philoſophers; and that not only in reference to their lives, and the Divine Power which was ſeen in them, but in reference to the truth and certainty of their Doctrine, it being a true Character given of both, by that ſame excellent Writer in behalf of the Chriſti-

ans

Idem ad Nationes. l. 1. c. 4. ans of his time: *Veritatem Philoſophi quidem affectant, poſſident autem Chriſtiani*; *What the Philoſophers deſired only, the Chriſtians enjoy*, which was *Truth*: and as he elſewhere more fully ſpeaks, Idem Apol. c. 46. *Mimice Philoſophi affectant veritatem, & affectando corrumpunt, ut qui gloriam captant; Chriſtiani eam neceſſario appetunt, & integri præſtant, ut qui ſaluti ſuæ curant. Truth is the Philoſopher's Miſtreſs, which by courting he vitiates and corrupts, looking at nothing but his own glory: but Truth is the Chriſtian's Matron, whoſe directions he obſerves and follows, becauſe he regards no glory but that to come.* And to let them further ſee what a difference there was between a *Chriſtian* and a *Philoſopher*, he concludes that diſcourſe with theſe words. *Quid adeo ſimile Philoſophus & Chriſtianus? Græciæ Diſcipulus & cœli? famæ negotiator & vitæ? verborum & factorum operator? rerum ædificator & deſtructor? amicus & inimicus erroris? veritatis interpolator & integrator? furator ejus & cuſtos. As much diſtance* (ſaith he) *as there is between* Greece *and* Heaven, *between applauſe and eternal glory, between words and things, between building and deſtroying, between truth and error, between a plagiary and a corrupter of truth, and a preſerver and advancer of it; ſo much is there between a Philoſopher and a Chriſtian.* The *Heathens* might ſuſpect indeed ſome kind of affinity between the firſt Preachers of the Goſpel and the ancient Sophiſts of *Greece*, becauſe of their frequent going from place to place, and pretending a kind of *Enthuſiaſm* as they did: but as much difference as there is between a *Knight-Errant* and *Hercules*, between a *Mountebank* and *Hippocrates*, that and much greater there is between a *Greek Sophiſt* and an *Apoſtle*. *Socrates* in *Plato*'s *Euthydemus* hath excellently diſcover'd the vanity and futility of thoſe Perſons under the Perſons of *Euthydemus* and *Dionyſodorus*, and ſo likewiſe in his *Protagoras*; their intent was only like the *Retiaries* in the *Roman* Spectacles, to catch their adverſaries in a Net, to entangle them with ſome captious Queſtion or other: but how vaſtly different from this was the deſign of the Apoſtles, who abhorr'd thoſe endleſs Contentions which then were in the heathen World; and came to ſhew them that *Truth* which was revealed, with an intent of making them better Men!

XII. We ſee the Apoſtles were not carried forth by any mean and vulgar Motives, neither did they drive on any private ends of their own; all that they minded was the promoting of the Doctrine which they preached. Nay they accounted no hazards comparable with the advantage which the World enjoy'd thro the propagation of the Chriſtian Religion. This ſhewed a truly noble and generous Spirit in them, which wou'd not be hinder'd from doing the World good, tho' they found ſo bad entertainment from it; yea they rejoyced in their greateſt ſufferings which they underwent in ſo good a cauſe; wherein thoſe Primitive Chriſtians who Tertullian. Apol. c. 46. were the genuine followers of the Apoſtles, did ſo far imitate them, that, *etiam damnati gratias agunt*, they gave the *Judges thanks* that they Min. Felix. thought them worthy to loſe their Lives in a cauſe which they had reaſon to triumph in, tho' they died for it. And when any of them were apprehended, they diſcover'd ſo little fear of puniſhment, *Ut unum ſolummodo quod non ante fuerint pœniteret, That nothing troubled them ſo much as that they had been Chriſtians no ſooner*, as one of their number Tertullian. Apol. c. 5. ſpeaks. And when the *Heathens* uſually ſcoffed at them, and call'd them *Sarmentitii* and *Semaxii*, becauſe they were burn'd upon the Croſs, one of them in the name of the reſt anſwers, *Hic eſt habitus victoriæ noſtræ, hæc palmata veſtis, tali curru triumphamus*; The Croſs was only their

Triumphant-chariot, which carried them ſooner to Heaven. Now this courage and reſolution of Spirit which was ſeen in the firſt Planters of Chriſtianity in the World, made all ſerious and inquiſitive Perſons look more narrowly into thoſe things, which made Men ſlight ſo much the common bug-bears of Humane Nature, ſufferings and death. *Quis enim non contemplatione ejus concutitur, ad requirendum quid intus in re ſit? quis non ubi requiſivit accedit? ubi acceſſit pati exoptat.* Theſe Sufferings made Men enquire; this Enquiry made them believe; that Belief made them as willing to ſuffer themſelves, as they had ſeen others do it before them. Thus it appear'd to be true in them, *Exquiſitior quæque crudelitas, illecebra magis eſt ſectæ; plures efficimur quoties metimur à vobis; ſemen eſt ſanguis Chriſtianorum; The cruelty of their enemies did but encreaſe their number; the harveſt of their pretended juſtice was but the ſeed-time of Chriſtianity, and no ſeed was ſo fruitful as that which was ſteeped in the Blood of Martyrs.* Thence *Juſtin Martyr* ingenuouſly ſaith of himſelf, That while he was a *Platonic* Philoſopher, he derided and ſcoffed at the Chriſtians; but when he conſider'd their great courage and conſtancy in dying for their Profeſſion, he cou'd not think thoſe cou'd poſſibly be Men wicked and voluptuous, who when offers of Life were made them, wou'd rather chooſe death than deny Chriſt. By which he found plainly that there was a higher Spirit in *Chriſtianity* than cou'd be obtain'd by the ſublime Notions and Speculations of *Plato*, and that a poor ignorant Chriſtian wou'd do and ſuffer more for the ſake of Chriſt than any of the Academy in defence of their Maſter *Plato*. Now ſince all Men naturally abhor ſufferings, what is it which ſhou'd ſo powerfully alter the nature and diſpoſition of Chriſtians above all other Perſons, that they alone ſhou'd ſeem in that to have forgot Humanity, that not only with patience, but with joy they endur'd torments and abode the flames? What! were they all poſſeſſed with a far more than *Stoical Apathy*, that no ſenſe of pain cou'd work at all upon them? or were they all beſotted and infatuated Perſons that did not know what it was they underwent? It is true ſome of the more blind and wilful *Heathens* derided them as ſuch; but who were the moſt infatuated, let any ſober Perſon judge: they who ſlighted and rejected a Doctrine of ſo great concernment, which came atteſted with ſo much reſolution and courage in the Profeſſors of it, or they who were ſo far perſuaded of the truth of it, that they wou'd rather die than deny it? *Dicimus & palam dicimus, & vobis torquentibus lacerati & cruenti vociferamur, Deum colimus per Chriſtum.* They were not aſhamed to believe in the Blood of Chriſt, even when their own Blood ran down before their Eyes, and confeſs Chriſt with their Mouths, when their Bodies were upon the rack. Certainly then there were ſome very powerful and convincing Arguments which buoyed up the Spirits of true Chriſtians in that deluge of Suffering which they were to ſwim thro'; it muſt be a ſtrong and well-grounded Faith which wou'd hold out under ſo great Tryals, and they cou'd not be to ſeek for the moſt perſuaſive Motives to Faith, who were ſo ready to give an account to others of the Hope that was in them, and to perſuade all other Perſons to the embracing of it. With what face and confidence otherwiſe cou'd they perſuade Men to embrace a Doctrine ſo dangerous as that was, had there not been Motives ſufficient to bear up againſt the weight of Sufferings, and Arguments perſuaſive to convince them of the undoubted certainty of that Doctrine which they encouraged them to believe?

Id. ib.

*Tertullian. Apol.c.*21.

Now

XIII. Now that which appears to have been the main ground of ſatisfaction to the Primitive Chriſtians as to the truth and certainty of the Doctrine of Chriſt, was this, That the Doctrine of the Goſpel was at firſt delivered to the World by thoſe Perſons, who were themſelves Eye-witneſſes of all the Miracles which our Saviour wrought in confirmation of the truth of what he ſpake. They were ſuch Perſons who had been themſelves preſent, not only to hear moſt of our Saviours admirable diſcourſes when he was in the World, but to ſee all thoſe glorious things which were done by him, to make it appear that he was immediately ſent from God. Let us now appeal to our own Faculties and examine a little what rational Evidence cou'd poſſibly be deſired, that the Doctrine of the Goſpel was true, which God did not afford to the World? What cou'd the Perſons who were the Auditors of our Saviour deſire more as an Evidence that he came from God, than his doing ſuch things which were certainly above any created power, either Humane or Diabolical, and therefore muſt needs be Divine? What cou'd other Perſons deſire more who were not preſent at the doing of theſe Miracles, but that the report of them ſhou'd be convey'd to them in an undoubted manner, by thoſe Perſons who were Eye-witneſſes of them, and made it appear to the World they were far from any intention of deceiving it? Now this makes the Apoſtles themſelves in their own Writings (tho they were divinely inſpir'd) appeal to the rational Evidence of the truth of the things, in that they were deliver'd by them who were Eye-witneſſes, of
2Pet.1.16 them. There St *Peter* ſpeaks thus to the diſperſed *Jews* οὐ γὰρ σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑμῖν τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δύναμιν καὶ παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπόπται γενηθέντες τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος. *For we have not followed cunningly deviſed fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but were eye-witneſſes of his Majeſty.* The power and coming of Chriſt which the Apoſtle ſpeaks of, was not as ſome improbably conceive, either his general coming to Judgment upon the World, or his particular coming upon the Nation of the *Jews*; but by an *Hendyadis*, by his power and coming is meant his powerful appearance in the World, whereby he mightily diſcover'd himſelf to be the Son of God. Now this, ſaith the Apoſtle, was no σεσοφισμένος μῦθος, not like the *Heathen Mythology* concerning the παρουσίαι and ἐπιφανείαι of their Gods among them (which were ſo frequently believed among them, that *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* condemns
Dionyſ. the *Epicureans*, becauſe they did deride τὰς ἐπιφανείας τῶν θεῶν, *the appe-*
Halic. l. 2 *rances of their Gods in the World*) now, ſaith the Apoſtle, aſſure your
pag. 128. ſelves, this is no ſuch appearance of a God on Earth as that among the *Heathens* was; for, ſaith he, we our ſelves who declare theſe things were ἐπόπται, we fully underſtood this μέγα μυστήριον, *this great Myſtery of godlineſs, God manifeſt in the fleſh*, for we ſaw his μεγαλειότης, *that great Majeſty which attended him in all which he ſpake or did*; we ſaw all
Act. 2.11. thoſe μεγαλεῖα τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the great things of God*, which were manifeſt in him, all thoſe miraculous operations which were wrought by him. Therefore as this was a great confirmation of the Faith of the Apoſtles themſelves that they ſaw all theſe things, ſo we ſee it was of great concernment to the World in order to their belief that the Goſpel was no cunningly-deviſed fable, in that it was delivered by ſuch who were ἐπόπται, *Eye-witneſſes* of what they declared. To the ſame purpoſe St. *John* ſpeaks *ad conciliandam fidem*, to make it appear how true what they delivered was, in the entrance of his Epiſtle; *That which was from*

the beginning, which we have heard, which we have ſeen with our Eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life, 1 Joh. 1. 1, 2, 3. *(for the life was manifeſted, and we have ſeen it, and bear witneſs, and ſhew unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifeſted unto us)That which we have ſeen and heard, declare we unto you.* We ſee what great force and weight the Apoſtle lays upon this, that they delivered nothing but what they had ſeen and heard; as they heard the Doctrine of Chriſt, ſo they ſaw the Miracles which he wrought in confirmation of it. St. *Luke* likewiſe in the beginning of his Goſpel declares that he intended to write nothing but *what he had perfect underſtanding of from ſuch perſons who had been* αὐτόπται, *Eye-witneſſes and inſtruments themſelves in part of what was written,* Luk. 1. 1, 2, 3. for that is meant by ὑπηρέται τοῦ λόγου· *and thoſe things which were written,* he ſaith were πεπληροφορημένα ἐν ἡμῖν πράγματα, *things which are abundantly proved to be true*; for being Matters of Fact, there cou'd be no ſtronger proof of them, than by ſuch who were eye-witneſſes of what they ſpake. And this we find the Apoſtles themſelves very cautious about, in the choice of a new Apoſtle in the room of *Judas, Wherefore of theſe Men which* Act. 1. 12, 22. *have companied with us all the time that the Lord* Jeſus *went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptiſm of* John, *unto that ſame day that he was taken from us, muſt one be ordained to be a witneſs of his Reſurrection from the dead,* (as that which was the great Seal of our Saviour's being the Son of God) therefore we find the Apoſtles ſo frequently atteſting the truth of the Reſurrection of Chriſt, and that themſelves were eye-witneſſes of it. *This Jeſus,* ſaith Peter, *hath God raiſed up, whereof we all are witneſſes.* Act. 2. 32. And again, *And killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raiſed up from the dead, whereof we are witneſſes*; 3. 15. and both Peter and *John* to the *Sanhedrin*; *For we cannot but ſpeak the things which we have ſeen and heard.* 4. 20. And the whole College of Apoſtles afterwards, *And we are his witneſſes of the things, and ſo is alſo the Holy Ghoſt, whom God hath given to them that obey him.* 5. 32. In which they give them that twofold rational Evidence which did manifeſt the undoubted truth of what they ſpake; for they deliver'd nothing but what themſelves were witneſſes of, and withal was declar'd to be true by the power of the Holy Ghoſt in the Miracles which were wrought by and upon Believers. Afterwards we read the ſum of the Apoſtles preaching; and the manner uſed by them to perſuade Men of the truth of it, in the words of *Peter* to *Cornelius* and his company, *How God anointed* Jeſus *of* Nazareth *with the Holy Ghoſt and with power, who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppreſſed of the Devil, for God was with him: And we are witneſſes of all things which he did both in the land of the* Jews *and in* Hieruſalem, 10. 39, 40, 41, 42. *whom they ſlew and hanged on a tree: Him God raiſed up the third day, and ſhewed him openly, not to all the people, but unto witneſſes choſen before of God, even to us who did eat and drink with him after he aroſe from the dead. And he commanded us to preach unto the people, that it is he which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead.* By all which we ſee what care God was pleaſed to take for the ſatisfaction of the World in point of rational Evidence, as to the truth of the matters which were diſcover'd concerning our Saviour *Chriſt*, becauſe he made choice of ſuch Perſons to be the Preachers and Writers of theſe things who were the beſt able to ſatisfy the World about them, *viz.* ſuch as had been eye-witneſſes of them.

XIV. Now in order to the making it more fully evident what ſtrength there was in this Teſtimony given by the Apoſtles to the Miracles of *Chriſt*, we ſhall more fully manifeſt the rational Evidence which attended it in theſe following Propoſitions.

Prop. 1. *Where the truth of a Doctrine depends upon a matter of fact, the truth of the Doctrine is ſufficiently manifeſted, if the matter of fact be evidently proved in the higheſt way it is capable of.* Thus it is in reference to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*; for the truth of that is ſo interwoven with the truth of the ſtory of *Chriſt*, that if the Relations concerning *Chriſt* be true, his Doctrine muſt needs be Divine and Infallible. For if it be undoubtedly true, that there was ſuch a Perſon as *Chriſt* born at *Bethlehem*, who did ſo many Miracles, and at laſt ſuffered the death of the Croſs, and after he had lain three days in the Grave *roſe again* from the dead; what reaſon imaginable can I have to queſtion, but that the teſtimony of this Perſon was certainly Divine, and conſequently whatever he preached to the World was moſt certain and undoubted truth? So that if we have clear Evidence as to the truth of theſe paſſages concerning our Saviour, we muſt likewiſe believe his Doctrine, which came atteſted with ſuch pregnant Evidences of a Divine Commiſſion which he had from God to the World. No Prince can think he hath any reaſon to refuſe audience to an Embaſſador, when he finds his Credentials ſuch as he may rely upon, altho' himſelf doth not ſee the ſealing of them; much leſs reaſon have we to queſtion the truth of the Doctrine of the Goſpel, if we have ſufficient Evidence of the truth of the matters of fact concerning *Chriſt*, in ſuch a way as thoſe things are capable of being proved.

Prop. 2. *The greateſt evidence which can be given to a matter of fact, is the atteſting of it by thoſe perſons who were eye-witneſſes of it.* This is the foundation whereon the firmeſt Aſſent is built, as to any matter of fact; for altho' we conceive we have reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of a Story, as long as it is convey'd only in a general way, by an uncertain Fame and Tradition; yet when it comes to be atteſted by a ſufficient number of credible Perſons who profeſs themſelves the eye-witneſſes of it, it is accounted an unreaſonable thing to diſtruſt any longer the Truth of it; eſpecially in theſe two caſes. 1. *When the matter they bear witneſs to is a thing which they might eaſily and clearly perceive.* 2. *When many witneſſes exactly agree in the ſame Teſtimony.*

1. *When the matter it ſelf is of that nature that it may be fully perceived by thoſe who ſaw it: i. e.* if it be a common Object of Senſe. And thus it certainly was as to the Perſon and Actions of Jeſus Chriſt. For he was of the ſame nature with Mankind; and they had as great Evidence that they converſ'd with Jeſus Chriſt in the Fleſh, as we can have that we converſe one with another. The Miracles of Chriſt were real and viſible Miracles; they cou'd be no illuſions of Senſes, nor deceits of their Eyes; the Man who was born blind and cured by our Saviour, was known to have been born blind thro' all the Country, and his Cure
Joh. 9. 26. was after as public as his blindneſs before, and acknowledged by the
Luk. 7. 12. greateſt Enemies of Chriſt at the time of its being done. When Chriſt raiſed up the dead Man at *Naim*, it was before much People, and ſuch Perſons in probability who were many of them preſent at his Death. But leſt there might be any ſuſpicion as to him, that he was not really dead, the caſe is plain and beyond all diſpute in *Lazarus*, who had
Joh. 11. 39. been to the knowledge of all perſons thereabouts dead four days; here cou'd be no deceit at all when the Stone was rowl'd away, and *Lazarus* came forth in the preſence of them all. And yet further the Death and

and Paſſion of our Saviour was a plain object of ſenſe, done in preſence of his greateſt Adverſaries. The Souldiers themſelves were ſufficient Witneſſes of his being really dead, when they came to break his Bones, and ſpared him becauſe they ſaw he was dead already. At his reſurrection the Stone was rowl'd away from the Sepulchre and no body found therein, altho' the Sepulchre was guarded by Souldiers, and the Diſciples of Chriſt all ſo fearful, that they were diſperſed up and down in ſeveral places. And that it was the ſame real Body which he roſe withal, and no *aëreal vehicle*, appears by *Thomas*'s ſcrupuloſity and unbelief, *who would not believe unleſs he put his hands into the hole of his ſide,* Joh. 20. 25, 27. *and ſee in his hands the print of the nails*; now our Saviour condeſcending ſo far as to ſatisfy the incredulity of St. *Thomas*, hath made it thereby evident that the Body which our Saviour roſe from the grave with, was the ſame individual Body which before was crucified and buried in the Sepulchre. And we find all the Apoſtles together upon our Saviour's appearance to them after his Reſurrection, ſo far from being credulous in embracing a Phantaſm, inſtead of Chriſt, that they ſuſpected that it was either a mere Phantaſm, or an evil Spirit which appeared among them; Luk. 24. 37. upon which it is ſaid, *They were terrified and affrighted, and ſuppoſed they had ſeen a ſpirit.* Which our Saviour cou'd not beat them of from, Ver. 39. but by appealing to the judgment of their Senſes, *Handle me and ſee; for a ſpirit hath no fleſh and bones as ye ſee me have*; and afterwards more fully Ver. 43. to convince them, *he did eat in the midſt of them.* Now the more ſuſpicious and incredulous the Apoſtles themſelves at firſt were, the greater evidence is it how far they were from any deſign of abuſing the World in what they after preached unto it, and what ſtrong conviction there was in the thing it ſelf, which was able to ſatisfie ſuch ſcrupulous and ſuſpicious perſons.

2. *When many witneſſes concur in the ſame Teſtimony.* Nothing can diſparage more the Truth of a Teſtimony, than the counter-witneſs of ſuch who were preſent at the ſame actions; but when all the Witneſſes fully agree not only in the ſubſtance, but in all material circumſtances of the Story, what ground or reaſon can there be to ſuſpect a Forgery or Deſign in it; eſpecially when the perſons cannot by any Fears or Threatnings be brought to vary from each other in it? Thus it is in our preſent caſe, we find no real diſſent at all mention'd either as to the Birth, Miracles, Life, Death, or Reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt; all the Witneſſes atteſt the ſame things tho' writing in different places, and upon different occaſions; no alteration in any circumſtance of the Story, out of any deſign of pleaſing or gratifying any Perſons by it. Moſt of our Saviour's Miracles, not only his Apoſtles, but the People and his very Enemies were witneſſes of, whoſe poſterity to this day dare not deny the truth of ſuch ſtrange Works which were wrought by him. And for his Reſurrection, it wou'd be very ſtrange that five hundred Perſons ſhou'd all agree in the ſame thing, and that no Torments or Death cou'd bring any of them to deny the truth of it, had there not been the greateſt certainty in it.

XV. Prop. 3. *There can be no reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony which is given by eye-witneſſes, but either from queſtioning their knowledge of the things they ſpake of, or their fidelity in reporting them.* Now there is not the leaſt ground to doubt either of theſe, in reference to thoſe perſons who gave Teſtimony to the World concerning the Perſon and Actions of our bleſſed Saviour.

For *firſt, they were ſuch as were intimately converſant both with the perſon*

ſon and actions of Jeſus Chriſt; whom he had choſen and trained up for that very end, that they might be ſufficiently qualify'd to acquaint the World with the truth of things concerning himſelf after his Reſurrection from the Dead. And accordingly they follow'd him up and down whereſoever he went; they were with him in his Solitudes and Retirements, and had thereby occaſion to obſerve all his Actions, and to take notice of the unſpotted innocency of his Life. Some of his Diſciples were with him in his Tranſfiguration, others in his Agony and bloody Sweat, they heard the Expreſſions which came from his mouth; in all which he diſcover'd a wonderful ſubmiſſion to the Will of God, and a great readineſs of Mind to ſuffer for the good of the World. Now therefore the firſt thing cannot at all be queſtion'd, their means of knowing the truth of what they ſpake.

Neither, *ſecondly*, is there any *reaſon to ſuſpect their fidelity in reporting what they knew:* For, 1. *The truth of this Doctrine wrought ſo far upon them, that they parted with all their worldly ſubſiſtence for the ſake of it.* Altho' their Riches were not great, yet their way of ſubſiſtence in the World was neceſſary; they left their Houſes, their Wives and Children, and all for Chriſt, and that not to gain any higher Preferments in this World (which had they done, it wou'd have rendred their deſign ſuſpicious to the curious and inquiſitive World) but they let go at leaſt a quiet and eaſie life, for one moſt troubleſome and dangerous. So that it is not, how much they parted withal, but how freely they did it, and with what cheerfulneſs they underwent Diſgraces, Perſecutions, nay Death it ſelf for the ſake of the Goſpel. Now can it be imagin'd, that ever Men were ſo prodigal of their Eaſe and Lives, as to throw both of them away upon a thing which themſelves were not fully aſſur'd of the Truth of? It had been the higheſt folly imaginable, to have deceiv'd themſelves in a thing of ſo great moment to them, as the truth of that Doctrine which they preached was; becauſe all their Hopes and Happineſs depended upon the truth of that Doctrine which they preached. And as *Tertullian* obſerves, *Non fas eſt ulli de ſua religione mentiri*; for, ſaith he, *He that ſays he worſhips any thing beſides what he doth, he denies what he doth worſhip, and transfers his worſhip upon another, and thereby doth not worſhip that which he thus denies*; Beſides what probability is there Men ſhou'd lye for the ſake of that Religion, which tells them that thoſe which do ſo will not receive the Reward which is promiſed to thoſe who cordially adhere unto it? Nay, they declar'd themſelves to be the moſt miſerable of all perſons *if their hopes were only in this preſent life.* Can we now think that any who had the common Reaſon of Men wou'd part with all the contentments of this World, and expoſe themſelves to continual hazards, and at laſt undergo death it ſelf for the ſake of ſomething which was merely the Fiction of their own Brains? What ſhou'd make them ſo Sedulous and Induſtrious in preaching ſuch things, that they cou'd *ſay neceſſity was laid upon them, yea, wo was unto them if they preached not the Goſpel,* when they ſaw ſo many Woes attending them in the Preaching of it, had there not been ſome more powerful attractive in the beauty and excellency of the Doctrine which they preached, than any cou'd be in the Eaſe and Tranquility of this preſent World? Thus we ſee the Fidelity of the Apoſtles manifeſted in ſuch a way as no other Witneſſes were ever yet willing to hazard theirs. And therefore *Origen* deſervedly condemns *Celſus* of a ridiculous Impertinency, when he wou'd parallel the Relations

1 Cor. 15. 19.

1 Cor 9. 16.

Origen. c. Celſum, l. 3. *p.*127.

ons of *Herodotus* and *Pindarus* concerning *Ariſteus Proconneſius* with thoſe of the Apoſtles concerning Chriſt; For ſaith he, *Did either of theſe two venture their lives upon the truth of what they writ concerning him, as the Apoſtles did to atteſt the truth of what they preached concerning our Lord and Saviour Jeſus Chriſt?*

XVI. 2. The Fidelity of the Apoſtles is evident in their *manner of reporting the things which they deliver*. For if there may be any thing gather'd from the manner of Expreſſion, or the τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λόγου, concerning the particular Temper and Diſpoſition of the Perſon from whom it comes, we may certainly read the great Fidelity in the Apoſtles from the peculiar manner of their expreſſing themſelves to the World. Which they do,

1. *With the greateſt impartiality:* not declaring only what was glorious and admirable to the World, but what they knew wou'd be accounted fooliſhneſs by it. They who had ſought only to have been admir'd for the rare Diſcoveries which they brought to the World, wou'd be ſure to conceal any thing which might be accounted ridiculous; but the Apoſtles fixed themſelves moſt on what was moſt contemptible in the Eyes of the World, and what they were moſt mocked and derided for, that they delighted moſt in the preaching of, which was the Croſs of Chriſt. *Paul* was ſo much in love with this, which was a ſtumbling-block to the *Jews*, and fooliſhneſs to the *Greeks*, *that he valued the knowledge of nothing elſe in compariſon of the knowledge of Chriſt and him crucified.* Nay he elſewhere ſaith, *God forbid that I ſhould glory ſave in the Croſs of Chriſt.* What now ſhou'd be the reaſon that they ſhould rejoyce in that moſt which was moſt deſpicable to the World, had not they ſeen far greater truth and excellency in it, than in the moſt ſublime ſpeculations concerning God or the Souls of Men in the School of *Plato*, or any other *Heathen* Philoſophers? That all Men ſhou'd be bound in order to their Salvation, to believe in one who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*, was a ſtrange Doctrine to the unbelieving World: but if the Apoſtles had but endeavour'd to have ſuited their Doctrine to the School of *Plato*, what rare Perſons might they have been accounted among the *Heathen* Philoſophers! Had they only in general terms diſcours'd of the Benignity of the Divine Nature, and the Manifeſtations of Divine Goodneſs in the World; and that, in order to the bringing of the Souls of Men to a nearer participation of the Divine Nature, the perfect Idea of true Goodneſs, and the expreſs Image of the Perſon of God, and the reſplendency of his Glory had veil'd himſelf in Humane Nature, and had every where ſcatter'd ſuch beams of light and Goodneſs, as warm'd and invigorated the frozen Spirits of Men with higher ſentiments of God and themſelves, and raiſed them up above the feculency of this terreſtrial Matter to breath in a freſher air, and converſe with more noble objects, and by degrees to fit the Souls of Men for thoſe more pure illapſes of real Goodneſs, which might always ſatisfy the Soul's deſires, and yet always keep them up 'till the Soul ſhou'd be ſunning it ſelf to all eternity under the immediate beams of Light and Love: And that after this Incarnate Deity had ſpread abroad the wings of his Love for a while upon this lower World, 'till by his gentle heat and incubation he had quickned the more pliable World to ſome degree of a Divine Life, he then retreated himſelf back again into the ſuperiour World, and put off that veil by which he made himſelf known to thoſe who are here confin'd to the priſons of their Bodies:

1 Cor. 2. 2.
Phil. 8. 3.
Gal. 6. 14.

dies: Thus, I ſay, had the Apoſtles minded applauſe among the admired Philoſophers of the *Heathens*, how eaſy had it been for them to have made ſome conſiderable additions to their higheſt ſpeculations, and have left out any thing which might ſeem ſo mean and contemptible as the death of the Son of God! But this they were ſo far from, that the main thing which they preached to the World, was, the vanity of Humane Wiſdom without *Chriſt*, and the neceſſity of all Mens believing in that *Jeſus* who was crucify'd at *Hieruſalem*.

The Apoſtles indeed diſcover very much, infinitely more than ever the moſt lofty *Platoniſt* cou'd do, concerning the Goodneſs and Love of God to Mankind; but that wherein they *manifeſted the love of God to the World*, was, *that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh but have everlaſting life*. And that *herein was the love of God manifeſted, that while we were yet ſinners, Chriſt died for us*. And that *this was the greateſt truth and worthy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the World to ſave ſinners*. They never dreamt of any Divine Goodneſs which ſhou'd make Men happy without *Chriſt:* No, it was their deſign to perſuade the World that all the communications of God's Goodneſs to the World were wholly in and thro' *Jeſus Chriſt*; and it is impoſſible that any ſhou'd think otherwiſe, unleſs *Plato* knew more of the mind of God than our Bleſſed Saviour, and *Plotinus* than St. *Paul*. Can we think now that the Apoſtles ſhou'd hazard the reputation of their own Wits ſo much as they did to the World, and be accounted bablers, and fools, and mad-men, for preaching the way of Salvation to be only by a Perſon *crucify'd between two thieves at Hieruſalem*, had they not been convinced not only of the truth but importance of it, and that it concern'd Men as much to believe it, as it did to avoid eternal Miſery? Did St. *Paul* preach ever the leſs the Words of truth and ſoberneſs, becauſe he was told to his face, *that his learning had made him mad?* But if he was *beſides himſelf, it was for Chriſt*; and what wonder was it if the *Love of Chriſt* in the Apoſtle ſhou'd make him willing to loſe his reputation for him, ſeeing *Chriſt made himſelf of no reputation*, that he might be in a capacity to do us good? We ſee the Apoſtles *were not aſhamed of the Goſpel of Chriſt*, becauſe they knew *it was the power of God unto ſalvation*; and therefore neither in their preaching nor their Writings wou'd they omit any of thoſe paſſages concerning our Saviour's death, which might be accounted the moſt diſhonourable to his Perſon. Which is certainly as great an Evidence of their fidelity as can be expected; which makes *Origen* ſay, that the Diſciples of *Chriſt* writ all things φιλαλήθως καὶ εὐγνωμόνως, *with a great deal of candor and love of truth*. οὐχ ὑποκλέψαντες τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ παράδοξα ἱστορίας τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχύνην τῷ λόγῳ τῶν Χριστιανῶν φέρειν· *not concealing from the World thoſe paſſages of the Life of Chriſt, which would be accounted moſt fooliſh and ridiculous.*

Joh. 3. 16.
Rom. 5. 8.
1Tim. 1. 15.
Origen. contr. Celſum, l. 3.

2. *With the greateſt plainneſs and ſimplicity of ſpeech.* Such whoſe deſign is to impoſe upon the Minds of Men with ſome cunningly-deviſed fables, love as much ambiguity as ever *Apollo* did in his moſt winding *Oracles*, of whom it is ſaid,

Ambage nexa Delphico mos eſt Deo
Arcana tegere.

Servius tells us, that *Jupiter Ammon* was therefore pictur'd with Rams-

Servius in 4. *Æneid.*

horns becauſe his anſwers had as many turnings and windings as they had. But the Horns which *Moſes* was wont to be pictur'd with, did only note the light and perſpicuity (from the ambiguity of קרן, which notes *the ſending forth of rays of light like a horn,*) and yet *Moſes* himſelf was veil'd in compariſon of the openneſs and plainneſs of Speech which was in the Apoſtles. Impoſtors caſt a miſt of many dark and cloudy words before them; but when they are once brought into the open light, their vizard falls off, and their deformity appears. Such Perſons delight in ſoaring quite out of the apprehenſions of thoſe who follow them, and never think themſelves better recompenſed for their pains, than when they are moſt admired and leaſt underſtood. But never was Chriſtianity more diſhonoured, than when Men brought it from its native ſimplicity and plainneſs, into a company of cloudy and inſignificant expreſſions, which are ſo far from making Men better underſtand the truth of it, that it was certainly the Devil's deſign by ſuch obſcure terms to make way for a Myſtery to be advanced, (but it was of Iniquity,) and ſoon after, we ſee the effect of it in another *Oracle* ſet up at *Rome* inſtead of *Delphos*; and all the pretence of it, was the obſcurity ſuppoſed in Scripture. What! Darkneſs come by the riſing of the Sun! Or is the Sun at laſt grown ſo beggarly, that he is fain to borrow light of the Earth? Muſt the Scripture be beholding to the Church for its Clearneſs, and Chriſt himſelf not ſpeak intelligibly, unleſs the *Pope* be his Interpreter? Did Chriſt reveal to the World the way of Salvation, and yet leave Men to ſeek which was it, 'till a Guide, never heard of in the Scripture, come to direct them in the way to it? What ſtrange witneſſes were the Apoſtles, if they did not ſpeak the truth with plainneſs? How had Men been to ſeek as to the truth of Chriſtianity, if the Apoſtles had not declar'd the Doctrine of the Goſpel with all evidence and perſpicuity? Whom muſt we believe in this caſe, the *Apoſtles* or the *Roman Oracles*? The *Apoſtles* they tell us *they ſpeak with all plainneſs of ſpeech*, and for that end purpoſely lay aſide *all excellency of words* and *humane wiſdom*, that Men might not be to ſeek for their meaning in a matter of ſo great a moment; that *the Goſpel was hid to none but ſuch as are loſt, and whoſe eyes are blinded by the God of this World*; that the Doctrine reveal'd by them is a Light to direct us in our way to Heaven, and a Rule to walk by; and it is a ſtrange property of Light to be obſcure, and of a Rule to be crooked. But it is not only evident from the *Apoſtles* own affirmations, that they laid aſide all affected Obſcurity, ambiguous Expreſſions, and Philoſophical Terms, whereby the World might have been to ſeek for what they were to believe, but it is likewiſe clear from the very nature of the Doctrine they preached, and the deſign of their preaching of it. What need *Rhetoric* in plain Truths? or affected Phraſes in giving Evidence? How incongruous wou'd obſcure Expreſſions have been to the deſign of ſaving Souls by the fooliſhneſs of preaching? For if they had induſtriouſly ſpoken in their preaching, above the capacities of thoſe they ſpake to, they cou'd never have converted a Soul without a Miracle: for the ordinary way of converſion muſt be by the Underſtanding; and how cou'd that work upon the Underſtanding, which was ſo much above it? But, ſaith the Apoſtle, *We preach not our ſelves but Chriſt Jeſus the Lord, and our ſelves your ſervants for Jeſus ſake.* If they had ſought themſelves or their own Credit and Reputation, there might have been ſome reaſon that they ſhou'd have uſed the way of the *Sophiſts* among the *Greeks*,

2 Cor. 3. 12.
1 Cor. 2. 1. 4.
1 Cor. 4. 3, 4.
2 Cor. 4. 5.

and by declamatory Speeches to have inhanced their eſteem among the vulgar. But the *Apoſtles* diſown'd and rejected all theſe vulgar artifices of mean and low-ſpirited Men; they laid aſide all thoſe enticing words
1 Cor. 2. 4. ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας *of the way of the Heathen Sophiſts*, and declar'd the Te-
2 Cor. 4. 2. ſtimony of God with Spiritual Evidence; *they handled not the Word of God deceitfully, but by manifeſtation of the truth, commended themſelves to every Man's conſcience in the ſight of God*: Now what could be ſo ſutable to ſuch a deſign, as the greateſt plainneſs and faithfulneſs in what they ſpake? We find in the Teſtimony of the *Apoſtles*, οὐδὲν νόθον καὶ κυ-
Origen. c. Celſ. l. 3. p. 135. βευτικὸν καὶ πεπλασμένον καὶ πανοῦργον, as *Origen* ſpeaks, *Nothing that is ſpurious or counterfeit, nothing ſavouring of the cunning craftineſs of ſuch as lie in wait to deceive*; *and*, ſaith he, *it is impoſſible to think that Men never bred up in the Sophiſtry of the Greeks, nor experienced in the Rhetorical inſinuations uſed among them, could ever be able ſo ſuddenly to perſwade the World to embrace that which had been a figment of their own Brains.* The truth is, the *Apoſtles* ſpeak like Men very confident of the truth of what they ſpeak, and not like ſuch who were fain to fetch in the help of all their *Topics*, to find out ſome probable Arguments to make Men believe that which it is probable they did not believe themſelves; which was moſt commonly the caſe of the great *Orators* among the *Heathens*. We find no Pedantic Flouriſhes, no flattering Inſinuations, no affected Cadencies, no ſuch great care of the riſing and falling of Words in the ſeveral Sentences; which make up ſo great a part of that which was accounted *Eloquence* in the *Apoſtles* time. Theſe things were too mean a prey for the Spirits of the *Apoſtles* to quarry upon; every thing in them was grave and ſerious, every Word had its due weight, every Sentence brim-full of Spiritual matter, their whole Diſcourſe moſt becoming the Majeſty and Authority of that Spirit which they ſpake by. And therein was ſeen a great part of the infinite Wiſdom of God in the choice he made of the Perſons who were to propagate the Doctrine of Chriſt in the World, that they were not ſuch who by reaſon of their great repute and fame in the World, might eaſily draw whole Multitudes to embrace their Dictates, but (that there might not be the leaſt foundation for an implicit Faith) they were of ſo mean rank and condition in the World, that in all probability their Names had never been heard of, had not their Doctrine made them Famous. To this purpoſe
Origen. c. Celſ. l. 3. *Origen* excellently ſpeaks, Οἶμαι δὲ τὸν Ἰησοῦν διὰ τοῦτο βεβουλῆσθαι διδασκάλοις τοῦ δόγματος χρήσασθαι τοιούτοις, ἵνα μηδεμίαν μὲν ἔχῃ χώραν ὑπόνοια πιθανῶν σοφισμάτων· λαμπρῶς δὲ τοῖς συνιέναι δυναμένοις ἐμφαίνηται, ὅτι τὸ ἄδολον τῆς προαιρέσεως τῶν γραψάντων, ἐχούσης πολὺ τὸ ἀφελὲς, ἠξιώθη θειοτέρας δυνάμεως, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀνυούσης, ἤπερ ἀνύειν δύνασθαι δοκεῖ περιβολὴ λόγων, καὶ λέξεων σύνθεσις, καὶ μετὰ διαιρέσεων καὶ τεχνολογίας Ἑλληνικῆς ἀκολουθία. *I am of opinion*, ſaith he, *that Jeſus did purpoſely make uſe of ſuch Preachers of his Doctrine, that there might be no place for ſuſpicion that they came inſtructed with the art of Sophiſtry; but that it be clearly manifeſt to all that would conſider it, that there was nothing of deſign in thoſe who diſcovered ſo much ſimplicity in their Writings, and that they had a more Divine Power which was more efficacious than the greateſt volubility of Expreſſions, or ornaments of ſpeech, or the artifices which were uſed in the Grecian compoſitions.*

3. The *Apoſtles* delivered their *Doctrine with the greateſt openneſs and freedom of ſpirit*; they did not give out one thing to the World, and another to their private Diſciples; but with great freedom and boldneſs

declared their doctrine in the moſt public places, and before their greateſt enemies. They knew they were looked on as deceivers by the World, but yet they knew themſelves to be true, ὡς πλάνοι, καὶ ἀληθεῖς. 2 Cor 6. 8. This is the uſual requital good Men have from the World, that they are looked on as the greateſt deceivers of it; if it be ſo with others, they have much leſs cauſe to wonder at it, when even He, who by one Prophet Hag. 2. 7. is ſtiled *the deſire of Nations*, is by another ſaid *to be deſpiſed and rejected of Men*; and when Chriſt was in the World, he was called ὁ Iſa. 53. 3. πλάνος, *the deceiver*; no wonder then if his Diſciples were accounted Matth. 27. 63. ſuch, altho' they manifeſted their veracity by their open carriage and free ſpeaking to the faces of their greateſt adverſaries. The *Apoſtles* neither feared the *Jews* skill in their Law, nor the wiſdom and ſubtilty of the *Greeks:* Saint *Paul* preacheth Chriſt openly among the *Jews* in their Synagogues, and among the *Athenians* he encounters the *Epicureans* and *Stoics*, and preacheth to them Jeſus and the *Reſurrection*. If the *Apoſtles* had any thing of deceivers in them, as to the things they Act. 17. 18. related concerning Chriſt, they wou'd not certainly have ſpoken with ſo much confidence concerning Chriſt in the preſence of thoſe who had been his murtherers; but we ſee they appeal'd to themſelves, as to the Miracles which he had wrought among them, and for his Reſurrection they were ready to lay down their Lives in giving Teſtimony to the truth of it. That his body was gone, was evident; that the *Apoſtles* ſhou'd take it away was impoſſible, conſidering what guard of Souldiers they had ſet upon it, and how timorous and fearful the *Apoſtles* were, that they fled upon Chriſt's being apprehended. Now what cou'd it be, cou'd make ſuch fearful Perſons afterwards ſo courageous and reſolute as they were, had there not been ſome more than ordinary power to convince and encourage them?

4. The *Apoſtles* deliver their *Teſtimony with the greateſt particularity as to all circumſtances*. They do not change nor alter any of them upon different Examinations before ſeveral Perſons; they all agree in the greateſt conſtancy to themſelves and uniformity with each other. As to matters of Indifferency, we find the *Apoſtles* very yielding and condeſcending; but as to any thing which concern'd their Teſtimony, moſt conſtant and reſolved. Had the Goſpel been ſome cunningly-contrived fancy, it had been impoſſible but ſo many different Perſons, in ſuch different places, and under ſuch different conditions, wou'd have varied as to ſome material circumſtance of it: Or elſe they would have been ſo wiſe as to have deliver'd it in general terms, without inſiſting much upon ſuch particular circumſtances, which if they had been falſe, might have been very eaſily diſprov'd; but with what particular enumeration of circumſtances do the *Apoſtles* preach Chriſt to the World? *Peter* tells the *Jews* that it was *Jeſus of* Nazareth *whom he preached*; Act 2. 22. and leſt they ſhou'd think it was not the ſame Perſon which roſe again, with great boldneſs and freedom of Spirit he ſaith unto them, *Therefore let all* 2. 36. *the houſe of* Iſrael *know aſſuredly, that God hath made that ſame Jeſus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Chriſt*. Yea, that ſame individual Perſon who was converſant in the World, and died upon the *Croſs*, *is now* Act. 5. *become a Prince and Saviour, to give repentance to* Iſrael *and remiſſion of* 31, 32. *ſins*. If there had been any ground of ſuſpicion as to theſe things, who had been ſo able to diſprove them, or ſo ready to do it, as thoſe Perſons who had crucify'd him? For we cannot conceive but thoſe who had a hand in his death, wou'd endeavour by all poſſible means to diſprove

his Reſurrection from the dead. For what a caſe were they like to be in, if thoſe things which the *Apoſtles* ſo confidently preached were true? If *Chriſt had all power now in his hands*, and *there were ſalvation in no other Name, but only in his whom they had crucify'd*, they were like to be in a moſt deſperate condition; therefore if any Men can be ſuppos'd inquiſitive after the truth of theſe circumſtances, no doubt theſe were: And if they cou'd have found the leaſt flaw in their Teſtimony, the World wou'd ſoon have ring'd of it; and the *Jews* who were then ſo much diſperſed abroad, would have divulg'd it into all parts, the *Apoſtles* wou'd have been told of it as they preached Chriſt in the *Synagogues*. And can we in any reaſon think, but thoſe *Jews* who perſecuted *Paul* as he preached in the *Synagogues* of *Aſia*, and afterwards impeach'd him ſo openly in *Jeruſalem*, wou'd there enquire into all the circumſtances concerning Chriſt, and all the other *Jews* wou'd write to their Friends at *Jeruſalem* to be fully inform'd of thoſe ſtrange things which were told them openly in all places in their *Synagogues* by Men of their own Nation and Language, concerning one *Jeſus* who was crucify'd and *roſe again* from the *dead*? Had there been now any ſo much as plauſible pretext that any of theſe circumſtances were not true, can we think but that a People ſo unmeaſurably given to their own ways and Traditions, wou'd in all places have vented any thing that might have tended to the diſparagement of Chriſt and his *Apoſtles*? But we ſee Malice it ſelf cou'd not find any flaw in the *Apoſtles* Teſtimony; for if it had, we ſhou'd certainly have heard of it, either from the *Jews*, or from the great oppoſers of *Chriſtianity* among the *Heathens*, who pretended to be curious and inquiſitive Perſons, ſuch as *Celſus*, *Julian*, *Hierocles* and *Porphyry* were. What reaſon can we have then in the leaſt to ſuſpect ſuch a Teſtimony, which paſſed ſo uncontrouled in that time when it was alone capable of being diſprov'd, and Mens Intereſt and Deſign wou'd put them ſo much upon it? The ſtrength of which will appear in the next Propoſition, which is,

XVII. Prop. 4. *No Teſtimony ought to be taken againſt a matter of fact thus atteſted, but from ſuch Perſons who had greater knowledge of the things atteſted, and manifeſt greater fidelity in reporting them.* It is eaſy to make it appear, that ſuppoſing any Perſons at that time had contradicted the Teſtimony of the *Apoſtles* concerning our Saviour, yet there had been no reaſon in the world to have hearkned to their Teſtimony in oppoſition to that of the *Apoſtles*; and that on theſe accounts. 1. The *Apoſtles* witneſſed the *Affirmative*, which is more capable of being atteſted than any *Negative* can be. 2. The *Apoſtles* were more converſant with Chriſt than any other Perſons were, becauſe they were choſen for that very end by him to be conſtantly with him: cou'd any therefore be more capable of knowing the truth of all particulars concerning Chriſt than theſe were? Had there been any ground of ſuſpicion concerning the deſign of Chriſt why cou'd not the *Jews* prevail with *Judas* to diſcover it as well as to betray his Perſon? *Judas* had done but a good work, if Chriſt had been ſuch an Impoſtor as the *Jews* blaſphemouſly ſaid he was: what made *Judas* then ſo little ſatisfy'd with his work, that he grew weary of his Life upon it, and threw himſelf away in the moſt horrid deſpair? No Perſon certainly had been ſo fit to have been produced as a witneſs againſt Chriſt, as *Judas* who had been ſo long with him, and had heard his Speeches, and obſerv'd his Miracles; but he had not patience enough to ſtay after that horrid fact to be a witneſs againſt him:

nay he was the greateſt witneſs at that time for him, when he who had betray'd him came to the *Sanhedrin* when conſulting about his death, and told them *that he had ſinned in betraying innocent blood.* What poſſible Evidence cou'd have been given more in behalf of our Saviour than that was? When a Perſon ſo covetous as to betray his Maſter for *thirty pieces of ſilver*, was ſo weary of his bargain, that he comes and throws back the Money, and declares the Perſon innocent whom he had betray'd? And this Perſon too was ſuch a one as knew our Saviour far better than any of the Witneſſes whom afterwards they ſuborn'd againſt him, who yet contradicted each other; and at laſt cou'd produce nothing which in the judgment of the heathen Governour cou'd make him judge Chriſt worthy of death. 3. The *Apoſtles* were freer from deſign than any counter-witneſs at that time cou'd be; we have already prov'd the *Apoſtles* cou'd not poſſibly have any other motive to affirm what they did, but full conviction of the truth of what they ſpake; but now if any among the *Jews* at that time had aſſerted any thing contrary to the *Apoſtles*, we have a clear account of it, and what motive might induce them to it; *viz.* the preſerving of their Honour and Reputation with the People, the upholding their Traditions, beſides their open and declar'd enmity againſt Chriſt without any ſufficient reaſon at all for it; now who wou'd believe the Teſtimony of the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* who had ſo great authority among the People, which they were like to loſe, if Chriſt's Doctrine were true, before that of the *Apoſtles* who parted with all for the ſake of Chriſt, and ventur'd themſelves wholly upon the truth of our Saviour's Doctrine? 4. None ever did ſo much to atteſt the *Negative*, as the *Apoſtles* did to prove their Fidelity as to the *Affirmative*. Had ſufficient counter-witneſs been timely produced, we cannot think the *Apoſtles* wou'd have run ſo many continual hazards in preaching the things which related to the Perſon and Actions of Chriſt. Did ever any lay down their Lives to undeceive the World, if the *Apoſtles* were guilty of abuſing it? 5. The number of ſuch Perſons had been inconſiderable in compariſon of thoſe who were ſo fully perſuaded of the truth of thoſe things which concern our Saviour; who were all ready (as moſt of them did) to ſeal the truth of them with their Lives. Whence ſhou'd ſo many Men grow ſo ſuddenly confident of the truth of ſuch things which were contrary to their former Perſuaſions, Intereſt, Education, had they not been deliver'd in ſuch a way, that they were aſſur'd of the undoubted truth of them? which brings me to the laſt Propoſition, which is,

Mat. 27. 5.

XVIII. Prop. 5.

Matters of fact being firſt believ'd on the account of eye-witneſſes, and receiv'd with an univerſal and uncontrouled aſſent by all ſuch perſons who have thought themſelves concern'd in knowing the truth of them, do yield a ſufficient foundation for a firm aſſent to be built upon. I take it for granted that there is ſufficient foundation for a firm aſſent, where there can be no Reaſon given to queſtion the Evidence; which that there is not in this preſent caſe, will appear from theſe following conſiderations.

1. *That the multitudes of thoſe perſons who did believe theſe things, had liberty and opportunity to be ſatisfy'd of the truth of them before they believ'd them.* Therefore no Reaſon or Motive can be aſſign'd, on which they ſhou'd be induced to believe theſe things, but the undoubted Evidence of Truth which went along with them. I confeſs in *Mahometiſm* a very great number of perſons have for ſome Centuries of years continu'd in the Belief of the Doctrine of *Mahomet*; but then withal there is a

ſufficient account to be given of that, *viz. the power of the ſword* which keeps them in awe, and ſtrictly forbids all the Followers of *Mahomet* to diſpute their Religion at all, or compare it with any other. Therefore I can no more wonder at this, than I do to ſee ſo great a part of the World under the Tyranny of the great *Turk:* Neither on the other ſide do I wonder that ſuch a multitude of thoſe profeſſing Chriſtianity ſhou'd together with it, believe a great number of erroneous Doctrines, and live in the practice of many groſs Superſtitions, becauſe I conſider what ſtrange prevalency Education hath upon ſofter Spirits and more eaſie intellectuals, and what an awe an Inquiſition bears upon timorous and irreſolv'd Perſons. But now when a great multitude of perſons ſober and inquiſitive, ſhall, contrary to the Principles of their Education, and without fear of any humane Force, (which they beforehand ſee will perſecute them) and after diligent enquiry made into the Grounds on which they believe, forſake all their former Perſuaſions, and reſolvedly adhere to the truth of the Doctrine propounded to them, tho' it coſt them their lives; if this give us not reaſon to think this Doctrine true, we muſt believe Mankind to be the moſt unhappy creatures in the World; that will with ſo much reſolution part with all Advantages of this Life for the ſake of one to come, if that be not undoubtedly certain, and the Doctrine propoſing it infallibly true. It is an obſervable Circumſtance in the propagation of the Chriſtian Religion, that tho' God made choice at firſt of perſons generally of mean rank and condition in the World to be Preachers of the Goſpel, God thereby making it appear that *our faith did not ſtand in the wiſdom of men, but in the power of God*, and therefore *choſe the weak things of the world to confound the ſtrong*; yet ſoon after the Goſpel was preached abroad in the World, we find perſons of great place and reputation, of great parts and abilities engaged in the Profeſſion of the Chriſtian Faith. In the Hiſtory of the *Acts* we read of *Sergius* a Proconſul, of *Dionyſius* the *Areopagite* converted to the Faith, and in the following Ages of the Church many perſons of great eſteem for their excellent Learning and Abilities; ſuch was *Juſtin Martyr*, one who before he became a Chriſtian, was converſant with all Sects of *Philoſophers, Stoics, Peripatetics, Pythagoreans*, and at laſt was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt* till he was converted from *Plato* to *Chriſt*, and then found that true which he ſpeaks of in his *Dialogue* with *Trypho*, that after all his enquiries into Philoſophy, ſpeaking of the Doctrine of Chriſt, ταύτην μόνην εὕρισκον φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ σύμφορον, *I found this at laſt to be the only ſure and profitable Philoſophy.* And when *Trypho* after derides him as a Man of very eaſie Faith, who wou'd leave the Doctrine of *Plato* for that of Chriſt, (for it ſeems by him the *Jews* then had a more favourable Opinion of the State of *Platoniſts* than *Chriſtians*) *Juſtin* is ſo far from being mov'd with ſuch Reproaches, that he tells him he wou'd undertake to demonſtrate to him, ὅτι οὐ κενοῖς ἐπιστεύσαμεν μύθοις, οὐδὲ ἀναποδείκτοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ μεστοῖς πνεύματος θείου καὶ δυνάμει βρύουσι, καὶ τεθηλόσι χάριτι: *That the Chriſtians did not give credit to empty Fables, and unprovable Aſſertions, but to ſuch a Doctrine that was full of a Divine Spirit and Power, and flouriſhed with Grace:* The proving of which is the ſubject of that diſcourſe. At *Alexandria* we meet with a ſucceſſion of excellent Perſons, all which were not only Embracers themſelves, but Defenders of the Chriſtian Faith; for ſetting aſide there *Abilius, Juſtus, Cerdo, Eumenes, Marcus, Celadion, Agrippinus, Julianus, Demetrius*, and others who flouriſhed about the

1 Cor. 2. 5.
1 Cor. 1. 27.

Juſtin. Dialog. cum Tryph. p. 125. ed. Par.

ſecond Century, I ſhall only fix on thoſe perſons, who were famous Enquirers after Truth, and noted for excellency in Heathen Learning; yet theſe perſons after all their enquiries found nothing to fix on but the Chriſtian Faith, and valu'd no other diſcovery of Truth in compariſon with that. Such was *Pantænus*, who as *Euſebius* tells us, was an excellent *Stoic* before he became a Chriſtian, and was after ſo eminent a one, that in imitation of the Apoſtles he went into *India* to convert the Inhabitants to the Chriſtian Faith, and at his return was made Rector of the School at *Alexandria*; which as the ſame Author tells us was much frequented by ſuch who were ἐν λόγῳ καὶ τῇ περὶ τὰ θεῖα παιδείᾳ δυνατοί, *well skill'd in Humane as well as Divine Learning.* *Euſeb. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 5. c. 10.* How excellent *Pantænus* was in Humane Learning, may appear in that *Origen* and *Hierome* both make his example their plea for their ſtudying of it. *Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.* After him ſucceeded *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Pantænus*'s Scholar, a perſon of great depth of learning and exquiſitely skill'd in all Heathen Antiquities, as appears by his remaining Writings. The learning of *Origen* is ſufficiently known, which was in ſuch great reputation in his own time, that not only Chriſtians but Philoſophers flock'd to his Lectures at *Alexandria*, as *Euſebius* tells us, *Ibid. l. 6. c. 18.* wherein he read the *Mathematics*, and other parts of Philoſophy as well as the Scriptures; and the ſame Author informs us that the Philoſophers did dedicate their Books to him, and ſometimes choſe him as Arbitrator between them in matters of Diſpute; and *Porphyry* himſelf in his Books againſt the Chriſtians vouchſafed a high *Encomium* of *Origen* for his excellent Learning. In *Origen*'s time *Heraclas* a Presbyter of *Alexandria* for five years together frequented the Schools of the Philoſophers, and put on the Philoſophic *pallium* *Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.* βιβλία τε ἑλλήνων καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οὐ παύεται φιλολόγων, *and was very converſant in the Books of the Grecian Learning.* Beſides theſe we read of *Pierius* and *Achillas* two Presbyters of *Alexandria*, who were τῇ καθ᾽ ἕλληνας παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ δεδοκιμασμένοι, as *Nicephorus Calliſtus* ſpeaks, *Perſons well skilled in the Grecian Learning and Philoſophy.* *Nicephor. Hiſt. Eccl. l. 6. c. 35.* If from *Alexandria* we go to *Cæſarea*, there we not only meet with a School of learning among the Chriſtians, but with perſons very eminent in all kinds of learning; ſuch were the famous *Pamphilus* and *Euſebius* ſo great an admirer of him, that ever ſince he is called *Euſebius Pamphilus.* At *Antioch* was *Dorotheus* ἀνὴρ παντοίων λόγων καὶ παιδείας ἐλευθερίου, as *Nicephorus* ſpeaks, *a perſon verſed in all kind of ingenuous Literature.* *Anatolius* Biſhop of *Laodicea*, one verſed in *Geometry*, *Aſtronomy*, and all kind of *Philoſophy*, as well as the Doctrine of Chriſt. *Idem, lib. 6. c. 36.* Thus we ſee how in thoſe early days of the *Greek* Church what excellent perſons many of thoſe were who were zealous Profeſſors of Chriſtianity; and concerning thoſe of the *Latin* Church, I ſhall only mention that ſpeech of St. *Auſtin* who was himſelf an inſtance of the ſame nature and a Star of the firſt magnitude among them. *Nonne aſpicimus quanto auro & argento & veſte ſuffarcinatus exierit de Ægypto Cyprianus Doctor ſuaviſſimus & Martyr beatiſſimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius? ut de vivis taceam: quanto innumerabiles Græci? quod prior ipſe fideliſſimus Dei ſervus Moſes fecerat, de quo ſcriptum eſt, quod eruditus fuerit omni ſapientia Ægyptiorum.* *S. Auguſt. in. de doctr. Chriſtiana, l. 2. cap. 40.* To whoſe Catalogue of learned perſons, among the *Latin* Chriſtians *Tertullian*, *Arnobius* and ſeveral others may be deſervedly added. But as St. *Auſtin* there well obſerves, *tho' the* Iſraelites *went rich out of* Ægypt, *yet it was their eating the Paſſover which ſaved them from deſtruction*; ſo tho' theſe were accompliſhed with thoſe perfections and riches of the Soul, the ornaments of Learning, yet it was their eating

ting the true Paſſover which was Chriſt, by their adhering to his Doctrine, was that which wou'd be of more advantage to them, than all their Accompliſhments wou'd be. Now then ſince in the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church, we find not only innumerable multitudes of Perſons of great Integrity and Sobriety in their Lives embracing the Doctrine of Chriſt, but ſo many Perſons that were curious enquirers after the truth of things; we can certainly have no reaſon to diſtruſt ſuch a Teſtimony which was receiv'd in ſo unanimous a manner by perſons as able to judge of the truth of things, and as fearful of being deceiv'd in reference to them as any now in the World can be.

XIX. 2. As this Teſtimony was receiv'd by perſons inquiſitive after the Truth of things, ſo *the Doctrine conveyed by it was a matter of the higheſt moment in the world:* and therefore we cannot conceive but perſons ordinarily inquiſitive about other things wou'd be more than ordinarily ſo about this, becauſe their eternal welfare and happineſs did depend upon it. All perſons that are truly Religious, muſt at leaſt be allow'd to be perſons very inquiſitive after the ſtate and condition of their Souls when they ſhall be diſlodged from their Bodies. And if we do but grant this, can we in any reaſon think that ſuch a multitude of perſons in ſo many Ages ſhou'd continue venturing their Souls upon a Teſtimony which they had no aſſurance of the truth of? And that none of all theſe perſons, tho' Men otherwiſe Rational and Judicious, ſhou'd be able to diſcover the Falſity of that Doctrine they went upon, if at leaſt any upon conſideration of it can imagine it to be ſo? It is not reconcilable with the general preſumption of Humane Nature concerning Divine Providence and the Care God takes of the welfare of Men, to ſuffer ſo many perſons who ſincerely deſire to ſerve God in the way which is moſt pleaſing to him, to go on in ſuch a continual Deluſion, and never have it at all diſcover'd to them. If all Men then who have believ'd the Doctrine of Chriſt to be the only way to Salvation have been deceiv'd, either we muſt deny altogether a Divine Providence, or ſay the Devil hath more power to deceive Men than God hath to direct them, which is worſe than the former; or elſe aſſert that there are no ſuch things at all as either God or Devils, but that all things come to paſs by Chance and Fortune: and if ſo, it is ſtill more inexplicable why ſuch multitudes of rational and ſerious Men, and the moſt inquiſitive part of the World as to ſuch things ſhou'd all be ſo poſſeſs'd with the truth and certainty of theſe things; and the more prophane, wicked and ignorant any perſons are, the more prone they are to mock and deride them. If ſuch Men then ſee more into Truth and Reaſon than the ſober and judicious part of Mankind, let us bid adieu to Humanity and adore the Brutes, ſince we admire their judgment moſt who come the neareſt to them.

3. *The multitude of theſe perſons thus conſenting in this Teſtimony, could have no other engagements to this conſent, but only their firm perſuaſion of the truth of the Doctrine conveyed by it*; becauſe thoſe who unanimouſly agree in this thing are ſuch perſons, whoſe other deſigns and intereſts in this World differ as much as any Men's do. If it had been only a conſent of the *Jews*, there might have been ſome probable pretence to have ſuſpected a matter of Intereſt in it; but as to this thing, we find the *Jews* divided among themſelves about it; and the ſtiffeſt deniers of the truth of it, do yet inviolably preſerve thoſe ſacred Records among them, from which the Truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt may be undoubtedly prov'd. Had the Chriſtian Religion been enforced upon

the World by the *Roman* Emperors at the time of its firſt promulgation, there wou'd have been ſome ſuſpicion of particular deſign in it; but it came with no other ſtrength but the evidence of its own Truth; yet it found ſudden and ſtrange entertainment among perſons of all Nations and Degrees of Men. In a ſhort time it had eaten into the Heart of the *Roman* Empire, and made ſo large a ſpread therein, that it made *Tertullian* ſay, *Heſterni ſumus, & veſtra omnia implevimus, urbes, inſulas, caſtella, municipia, conciliabula, caſtra ipſa, tribus, decurias, palatium, ſenatum, forum; ſola vobis relinquimus Templa. We have but newly appeared,* ſaith he, *and yet we have filled all places with our Company, but only your Temples*; and before ſpeaking of the Heathens, *Obſeſſam vociferantur civitatem, in agris, in caſtellis, in inſulis Chriſtianos, omnem ſexum, ætatem, conditionem, etiam dignitatem tranſgredi ad hoc nomen quaſi detrimento mœrent. All ſorts and conditions of Men in all places, were ſuddenly become Chriſtians.* What common tye cou'd there be now to unite all theſe perſons together, if we ſet aſide the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine of Chriſt which was firſt preached to them by ſuch who were Eye-witneſſes of Chriſt's Actions, and had left ſacred Records behind them, containing the ſubſtance of the Doctrine of Chriſt, and thoſe admirable Inſtructions which were their only certain Guides in the way to Heaven?

Tertull. Apol. c 36.

Ibid. c. 1.

4. *Becauſe many perſons do join in this conſent with true Chriſtians, who yet could heartily wiſh that the Doctrine of Chriſtianity were not true.* Such are all thoſe perſons who are ſenſual in their Lives, and walk not according to the Rules of the Goſpel, yet dare not queſtion or deny the Truth of it. Such who cou'd heartily wiſh there were no future State, nor Judgment to come, that they might indulge themſelves in this World without fear of another; yet their Conſciences are ſo far convinced of, and aw'd by the truth of theſe things, that they raiſe many perplexities and anxieties in their Minds which they wou'd moſt willingly be rid of; which they can never throughly be, till inſtead of having the name of Chriſtians, they come to live the Life of Chriſtians, and become experimentally acquainted with the Truth and Power of Religion. And withal we find that the more Men have been acquainted with the practice of Chriſtianity, the greater Evidence they have had of the truth of it, and been more fully and rationally perſuaded of it. To ſuch I grant there are ſuch powerful Evidences of the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt by the effectual workings of the Spirit of God upon their Souls, that all other Arguments, as to their own ſatisfaction, may fall ſhort of theſe. As to which thoſe Verſes of the Poet *Dantes*, render'd into *Latin* by *F. S.* are very pertinent and ſignificant: for when he had introduced the Apoſtle *Peter*, asking him what it was which his Faith was founded on, he anſwers,

Deinde exivit ex luce profunda
Quæ illic ſplendebat pretioſa gemma,
Super quam omnis virtus fundatur.

i. e. *That God was pleaſed by immediate revelation of himſelf, to diſcover that Divine Truth to the World whereon our Faith doth ſtand as on its ſure foundation*; but when the Apoſtle goes on to enquire how he knew this at firſt came from God, his anſwer to that is,

—— larga pluvia
Spiritus Sancti, quæ eſt diffuſa
Super veteres & ſuper novas membranas,
Eſt ſyllogiſmus ille qui eam mihi concluſit
Adeo acute, ut præ illa demonſtratione
Omnis demonſtratio alia mihi videatur obtuſa.

i. e. *That the Spirit of God doth fully diſcover it ſelf both in the Old and New Teſtament, that all other Arguments are but dull and heavy if compared with this.* It is true they are ſo to a truly inlightned Conſcience which diſcovers ſo much Beauty and Glory in the Scriptures, that they raviſh the Soul, altho' it be unable to give ſo full an account of this unto others who want the Eyes to ſee that Beauty with, which a Heart truly gracious hath. We ſee ordinarily in the World, that the attraction of Beauty is an unaccountable thing; and one may diſcern that which raviſheth him, which another looks on as mean and ordinary; and why may it not be much more thus in Divine objects which want Spiritual Eyes to diſcover them? Therefore I grant that good Men enjoy that ſatisfaction to their own Conſciences, as to the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt, which others cannot attain to; but yet I ſay, that ſuch do likewiſe ſee the moſt ſtrong, rational and convincing Evidence which doth induce them to believe; which Evidence is then moſt convincing, when it is ſeconded by the peculiar Energy of the Spirit of God upon the Souls of true Believers. But yet we ſee that the power and force of the truth of theſe things may be ſo great, even upon ſuch Minds which are not yet moulded into the faſhion of true Goodneſs, that it may awe with its light and clearneſs, where it doth not ſoften and alter by its heat and influence. Now whence can it be that ſuch convictions ſhou'd ſtick ſo faſt in the Minds of thoſe who wou'd fain pull out thoſe piercing arrows, but that there is a greater power in them than they are Maſters of, and they cannot ſtand againſt the force whereby they come upon them; nor find any ſalve to cure the wounds which are made within them, but by thoſe weapons which were the cauſes of them? And therefore when wicked perſons under conflicts of Conſcience, cannot eaſe themſelves by direct *Atheiſm*, or finding reaſon to caſt off ſuch convictions by diſcerning any invalidity in the Teſtimony whereon the truth of theſe things depends, it is a certain Argument that there is abundant truth in that Teſtimony, when Men wou'd fain perſuade themſelves to believe the contrary, and yet cannot.

5. The Truth of this conſent appears, *from the unanimity of it among thoſe perſons who have yet ſtrangely differ'd from each other in many controverſies in Religion.* We ſee thereby this unanimity is no forced or deſign'd thing, becauſe we ſee the Perſons agreeing in this, do very much diſagree from each other in other things. And the ſame grounds and reaſons whereon they diſagree as to others things, wou'd have held as to theſe too, were there not greater evidence of the certainty of theſe things, than of thoſe they fall out about. It hath not yet become a Queſtion among thoſe who differ ſo much about the ſenſe of Scripture, whether the Scripture it ſelf be the Word of God, altho' the very accounts on which we are to believe it to be ſo, hath been the ſubject of no mean Controverſies. All the divided parts of the Chriſtian World do yet fully agree in the matters of fact, viz. *That there was ſuch a Per-*

ſon as Jeſus Chriſt, *and that he did many great Miracles, that he died on the Croſs at* Jeruſalem, *and roſe again from the dead*; now theſe contain the great foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*, and therefore the multitude of other Controverſies in the World ought to be ſo far from weakning our Faith, as to the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt (which Men of weak judgments and *Atheiſtical* Spirits pretend) that it ought to be a ſtrong confirmation of it, when we ſee Perſons which ſo peeviſhly quarrel with each other about ſome inferior and leſs weighty parts of Religion, do yet unanimouſly conſent in the principal foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*, and ſuch whereon the neceſſity of Faith and Obedience, as the way to Salvation, doth more immediately depend. And this may be one great Reaſon why the infinitely wiſe God may ſuffer ſuch lamentable Contentions and Diviſions to be in the Chriſtian World, that thereby inquiſitive perſons may ſee that if Religion had been a mere Deſign of ſome few politic Perſons, the quarrelſome World (where it is not held in by force) wou'd never have conſented ſo long in the owning ſuch common Principles which all the other Controverſies are built upon. And altho' it be continually ſeen that in divided parties, one is apt to run from any thing which is receiv'd by the other, and Men generally think they can never run far enough from them whoſe Errors they have diſcover'd, that yet this Principle hath not carried any conſiderable party of the Chriſtian World (out of their indignation againſt thoſe great corruptions which have crept into the World under a pretence of Religion) to the diſowning the foundation of *Chriſtian Faith*, muſt be partly imputed to the ſignal hand of Divine Providence, and partly to thoſe ſtrong Evidences which there are of the truth of that Teſtimony which conveys to us the foundations of *Chriſtian Faith*. Thus we ſee now, how great and uncontrouled this conſent is, as to the matters of fact delivered down from the eye-witneſſes of them, concerning the Actions and Miracles of our Bleſſed Saviour, (which are contain'd in the Scriptures as authentic Records of them,) and what a ſure foundation there is for a firm aſſent to the truth of the things from ſo univerſal and uninterrupted a Tradition.

XX. Thus far we have now manifeſted the neceſſity of the Miracles of Chriſt, in order to the propagation of *Chriſtianity* in the World, from the conſideration of the Perſons who were to propagate it in the World; the next thing we are to conſider, is, the admirable ſucceſs which the Goſpel met with in the World upon its being preached to it: Of which no rational account can be given, unleſs the Actions and Miracles of our Saviour were moſt undoubtedly true. That the Goſpel of Chriſt had very ſtrange and wonderful ſucceſs upon its firſt preaching, hath been partly diſcover'd already, and is withal ſo plain from the long continuance of it in theſe *European* parts, that none any ways converſant in the Hiſtory of former Ages, can have any ground to queſtion it. But that this ſtrange and admirable ſucceſs of the Doctine of Chriſt ſhou'd be an Evidence of the truth of it, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of it, will appear from theſe two Conſiderations. 1. *That the Doctrine its ſelf was ſo directly contrary to the general inclinations of the World.* 2. *That the propagation of it was ſo much oppoſed by all worldly power.*

1. *That the Doctrine it ſelf was ſo oppoſite to the general inclinations of the World.* The Doctrine may be conſider'd either as to its *credenda*, or matters of Faith; or as to its *agenda*, or matters of Life and Practice;

both theſe were contrary to the inclinations of the World; the former ſeem'd hard and incredible, the latter harſh and impoſſible.

1. The matters of Faith which were to be believ'd by the World, were not ſuch things which we may imagine the vulgar ſort of Men wou'd be very forward to run after, nor very greedy to embrace. 1. *Becauſe contrary to the Principles of their Education, and the Religion they were brought up in*; the generality of Mankind is very tenacious of thoſe Principles and Prejudices which are ſucked in in the time of Infancy. There are ſome Religions one would think it were impoſſible that any rational Men ſhould believe them; but only on this account, becauſe they are bred up under them. It is a very great advantage any Religion hath againſt another, that it comes to ſpeak firſt, and thereby inſinuates ſuch an apprehenſion of its ſelf to the Mind that it is very hard removing it afterwards. The underſtanding ſeems to be of the nature of thoſe things which are *communis juris*, and therefore *primi ſunt poſſidentis*; when an opinion hath once got poſſeſſion of the Mind, it uſually keeps out whatever comes to diſturb it. Now we cannot otherwiſe conceive but all thoſe Perſons who had been bred up under *Paganiſm* and the moſt groſs Idolatry, muſt needs have a very potent Prejudice againſt ſuch a Doctrine which was wholly irreconcilable with that Religion which they had been devoted to. Now the ſtronger the Prejudice is which is convey'd into Mens Minds by the force of Education, the greater ſtrength and power muſt there needs be in the Goſpel of Chriſt, which did ſo eaſily demoliſh theſe ſtrong holds, and captivate the Underſtandings of Men to the obedience of Chriſt. To which purpoſe *Arnobius* excellently ſpeaks in theſe words to the *Heathens*; *Sed non creditis geſta hæc. Sed qui ea conſpicati ſunt fieri & ſub oculis ſuis viderunt agi, teſtes optimi certiſſimique auctores, & crediderunt hæc ipſi, & credenda poſteris nobis haud exilibus cum approbationibus tradiderunt. Quinam iſti fortaſſe quæritis? gentes, populi, nationes & incredulum illud genus humanum. Quod niſi aperta res eſſet, & luce ipſa quemadmodum dicitur clarior, nunquam rebus hujuſmodi credulitatis ſuæ commodarent aſſenſum. An nunquid dicimus illius temporis homines uſque adeo fuiſſe vanos, mendaces, ſtolidos, brutos, ut quæ nunquam viderant vidiſſe ſe fingerent? & quæ facta omnino non erant falſis proderent teſtimoniis aut puerili aſſertione firmarent? Cumque poſſent vobiſcum & unanimiter vivere, & inoffenſas ducere conjunctiones, gratuita ſuſciperent odia & execrabili haberentur in nomine? Quod ſi falſa ut dicitis hiſtoria illa rerum eſt, unde tam brevi tempore totus mundus iſta religione completus eſt? Aut in unam coire qui potuerunt mentem gentes regionibus diſſitæ, ventis cœlique convexionibus dimotæ? Aſſeverationibus illectæ ſunt nudis, inductæ in ſpes caſſas, & in pericula capitis immittere ſe ſponte temeraria deſperatione voluerunt, cum nihil tale vidiſſent quod eas in hos cultus novitatis ſuæ poſſit excitare miraculo. Imo quia hæc omnia ab ipſo cernebant geri & ab ejus præconibus qui per orbem totum miſſi beneficia patris & munera ſanandis animis hominibuſque portabant, veritatis ipſius vi victæ, & dederunt ſe Deo, nec in magnis poſuere diſpendiis membra vobis projicere, & viſcera ſua lanianda præbere.* The ſubſtance of whoſe Diſcourſe is, that it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe ſo many Perſons of ſo many Nations to be ſo far beſotted and infatuated, as not only to believe a Religion to be true which was contrary to that they were educated in, but to venture their Lives as well as Eſtates upon it, had it not been diſcover'd to them in a moſt certain and infallible way by ſuch who had been eye-witneſſes of the Actions and Miracles of Chriſt and

Arnobius contr. gentes l. 1.

his

Ibid. lib. 2. p. 44.

his *Apoſtles.* And as he elſewhere ſpeaks, *Vel hæc ſaltem fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi tempore & parvo immenſi nominis hujus ſacramenta diffuſa ſunt; quod nulla jam natio eſt tam barbari moris, & manſuetudinem neſciens, quæ non ejus amore verſa molliverit aſperitatem ſuam, & in placidos ſenſus aſſumpta tranquilitate migraverit; quod tam magnis ingeniis præditi Oratores, Grammatici, Rhetores, Conſulti juris ac Medici, Philoſophiæ etiam ſecreta rimantes, magiſteria hæc expetunt, ſpretis quibus paulo ante fidebant, &c.* Will not this perſuade the World what firm foundations the Faith of *Chriſtians* ſtands on, when in ſo ſhort a time it is ſpread over all parts of the World? that by it the moſt inhumane and barbarous Nations are ſoftn'd into more than civility? That men of the greateſt Wits and Parts, *Orators, Grammarians, Rhetoricians, Lawyers, Phyſicians, Philoſophers,* who not? have forſaken their former ſentiments, and adhered to the Doctrine of Chriſt. Now, I ſay, if the power of Education be ſo ſtrong upon the Minds of Men to perſuade them of the truth of the Religion they are bred up under, (which *Atheiſtically* diſpos'd Perſons make ſo much advantage of,) this is ſo far from weakning the truth of *Chriſtianity*, that it proves a great confirmation of it, becauſe it obtain'd ſo much upon its firſt Preaching in the World, notwithſtanding the higheſt prejudices from Education were againſt it. If then Men be ſo prone to believe that to be moſt true, which they have been educated under, it muſt argue a more than ordinary Evidence and Power in that Religion which unſettles ſo much the Principles of Education, as to make Men not only queſtion the truth of them, but to renounce them and embrace a Religion contrary to them.

XXI. Eſpecially when we withal conſider what ſtrong holds theſe Principles of Education were back'd with among the *Heathens*, when the Doctrine of Chriſt was firſt divulg'd among them, *i. e.* what plauſible pretences they had of continuing in the Religion which they were brought up in, and why they ſhou'd not exchange it for *Chriſtianity*; and thoſe were,

Tertull. ad Nat. l. 1. cap. 10. Symmach. Ep. l. 10. ep. 61. Liban. orat. de Templis.

1. *The pretended Antiquity of their Religion above the Chriſtian*; the main thing pleaded againſt the *Chriſtians* was *divortium ab inſtitutis majorum*, that they thought themſelves wiſer than their Fore-fathers; and *Symmachus, Libanius,* and others plead this moſt in behalf of *Paganiſm*; *ſervanda eſt tot ſæculis fides, & ſequendi ſunt nobis parentes qui ſecuti ſunt feliciter ſuos*; their Religion pleaded Preſcription againſt any other, and they were reſolv'd to follow the ſteps of their Anceſtors wherein they thought themſelves happy and ſecure. *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix* firſt argues much againſt dogmatizing in Religion, but withal ſays it moſt becomes a lover of truth, *Majorum excipere diſciplinam, religiones traditas colere, deos quos à parentibus ante imbutus es timere; nec de numinibus ferre ſententiam, ſed prioribus credere.* So *Arnobius* tells us the main thing objected againſt the *Chriſtians* was *novellam eſſe religionem noſtram, & ante dies natam propemodum paucos, neque vos potuiſſe antequam & patriam linquere, & in barbaros ritus peregrinoſque traduci.* And *Cotta* in *Tully* long before laid this down as the main Principle of *Pagan* Religion, *majoribus noſtris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere, to believe the Tradition of our Fathers, altho' there be no evidence in reaſon for it:* And after he had diſcover'd the vanity of the *Stoical* Arguments about Religion, concludes with this as the only thing he reſolv'd his Religion into, *Mihi unum ſatis erit, majores noſtros ita tradidiſſe, It is enough for*

Minutius Felix. p. 6.

Arnob. contra gentes. l. 2. p. 90.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

Lactant. de orig. Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Ambroſ. ep. c. Symmach.

Lactant. de orig. Error. l. 2. c. 6.

Arnobius contr. gent. l. 2.

me that it comes by tradition from our Fore-fathers. *Lactantius* fully ſets forth the manner of pleading us'd by the *Heathens* againſt the *Chriſtians*, in point of Antiquity. *Hæ ſunt religiones quas ſibi à majoribus ſuis traditas, pertinaciſſime tueri ac defendere perſeverant; nec conſiderant quales ſint, ſed ex hoc probatas atque veras eſſe confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt; tantaque eſt auctoritas vetuſtatis, ut inquirere in eam ſcelus eſſe dicatur.* The *Engliſh* is, They accounted Tradition infallible, and knew no other way whereby to find the truth of Religion but by its conveyance from their Fore-fathers. How like herein do they ſpeak to thoſe who contend for the corruptions crept into the *Chriſtian Church?* who make uſe of the ſame pretences for them, *viz.* that they were deliver'd down from their Fathers; *tantaque eſt auctoritas vetuſtatis, ut inquirere in eam ſcelus eſſe dicatur; who are we who will ſee further than Antiquity?* But it is no wonder if Antiquity be accompany'd with dimneſs of ſight; and ſo it was undoubtedly as to the *Pagan* World; and as to the *Chriſtian* too, when ſuch a mixture of *Heatheniſm* came into it. And the very ſame Arguments by which the pleaders for *Chriſtianity* did juſtify the truth of their Religion, notwithſtanding this pretended Antiquity, will with equal force hold for a Reformation of ſuch inveterate abuſes, which under a pretence of Antiquity, have crept into the *Chriſtian Church. Nullus pudor eſt ad meliora tranſire*, ſaith *Ambroſe* in his Anſwer to *Symmachus, what ſhame is it to grow better? Quid facies?* ſaith *Lactantius, majoreſne potius an rationem ſequeris? Si rationem mavis, diſcedere te neceſſe eſt ab inſtitutis & auctoritate majorum: quoniam id ſolum rectum eſt, quod ratio præſcribit. Sin autem pietas majores ſequi ſuadet: fateris igitur & ſtultos illos eſſe qui excogitatis contra rationem religionibus ſervierint; & te ineptum qui id colas quod falſum eſſe conviceris.* Where Reaſon and mere Authority of Fore-fathers ſtand in competition, he is more a Child than a Man that knows not on which ſide to give his Suffrage. But with the greateſt ſtrength, and cleareſt reaſon *Arnobius* ſpeaks in this caſe. *Itaque cum nobis intenditis averſionem à Religione priorum, cauſam convenit ut inſpiciatis, non factum; nec quid reliquerimus opponere, ſed ſecuti quid ſimus potiſſimum contueri. When you charge us,* ſaith he, *that we are revolted from the Religion of our Fore-fathers, you ought not preſently to condemn the fact, but to examine the reaſons of it; neither ought you ſo much to look at what we have left, as what it is we have embraced. Nam ſi mutare ſententiam culpa eſt ulla vel crimen, & à veteribus inſtitutis in alias res novas voluntateſque migrare, criminatio iſta & vos ſpectat, qui toties vitam conſuetudinemque mutaſtis; qui in mores alios, atque alios ritus priorum condemnatione tranſiſtis.* If mere departing from the Religion of our Anceſtors be the great fault, all thoſe who own themſelves to be *Chriſtians*, were themſelves guilty of it when they revolted from *Heatheniſm*. If it be here ſaid that the caſe is different, becauſe there was ſufficient reaſon for it, which there is not as to the corruptions of the *Chriſtian Church*; if ſo, then all the diſpute is taken off from the matter of fact, or the revolt to the cauſes inducing to it; and if the *Proteſtant* be not able as to the cauſes of our Separation from *Rome* to manifeſt that they were ſufficient, let him then be triumph'd over by the *Romaniſt*, and not before. I aſſert then, and that with much aſſurance of Mind, that the Principles of the Reformation are juſtifiable upon the ſame grounds of Reaſon, which the embracing *Chriſtianity* was, when Men of *Heathens* became *Chriſtians*; and that the Arguments made uſe of by *Romaniſts* againſt our Separation from them, are ſuch as wou'd have juſtify'd a *Pagan* Philoſopher in not embracing *Chriſtianity*. For if it be unlawful for any party of Men, to divide from others in a matter of Religion which pretends Antiquity and Univerſality, it had been unlawful for a Philoſopher to have deſerted *Paganiſm*, as well as for a *Proteſtant* to depart from *Rome*. For according to the Principles of the *Romaniſts*, the judgment in the cauſe of the Separation, and of the truth of Religion lies in that party from which we depart; if we do now but apply this to the old *Roman* Senate or Emperors in the caſe of *Chriſtian Religion*, and dividing from *Heathen* Worſhip, we ſhall quickly ſee how eaſy a matter it will be to make *Chriſtianity* it ſelf a Schiſm and the Doctrine of Chriſt the greateſt Hereſy. But as ſtrong as thoſe pretences were then, or have been ſince, the power of the Doctrine of Chriſt hath been ſo great, as to conquer them and thereby to manifeſt, that it was of God, when ſuch potent Prejudices were not able to withſtand it. Of which *Antiquity* is the firſt.

2. *The large and univerſal ſpread of Pagan Religion*, when *Chriſtianity* came into the World: there was never ſo great *Catholiciſm*, as in *Heathen* Worſhip, when the *Apoſtles* firſt appear'd in the *Gentile* World. *Inde adeo per univerſa imperia, provincias, oppida, videmus ſingulos ſacrorum ritus gentiles habere, & Deos colere municipes*, ſaith *Cæcilius* in *Minutius Felix*. The great charge againſt the *Chriſtians* was *Novelliſm*, that they brought in a ſtrange and unheard of Religion. The common Queſtion was *Where was your Religion before* Jeſus *of* Nazareth? as it has been ſince, *Where was your Religion before* Luther? and the ſame anſwer which ſerv'd then, will ſtand unmoveable, *There, where no other Religion is, in the Word of* God. For this was the weapon whereby the Primitive *Chriſtians* defended themſelves againſt the aſſaults of *Paganiſm*, and the Evidences they brought that the Doctrine preach'd by them, and contain'd in the Scriptures, was originally from God, were the only means of overthrowing *Paganiſm*, notwithſtanding its pretended Univerſality.

Minut in Octa. p. 6.

3. *Settlement by Laws of Heathen Worſhip.* This was ſo much pretended and pleaded for, that as far as we can find, by the Hiſtory of the Primitive Church, the pretence on which the *Chriſtians* ſuffer'd, was Sedition, and oppoſing the eſtabliſh'd Laws. The *Chriſtians* were reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*, as appears by *Tertullian*, among *Unlawful Corporations*; the Politicians and Stateſmen were all for preſerving the Laws; they troubled not themſelves much about any Religion, but only That which was ſettled by Law they ſought to uphold, becauſe the acting contrary to it might bring ſome diſturbance to the civil State. There were ſeveral Laws which the *Chriſtians* were then brought under, and condemn'd for the breach of. 1. The Law againſt *Hetæriæ*, or *Conventicles*, as they were pleas'd frequently to ſtile the Meeting of *Chriſtians* together: thence the places where the *Chriſtians* aſſembled for worſhip, were commonly call'd *Conventicula*; *Ita appellabant loca*, ſaith *Heraldus, ubi congregabantur Chriſtiani oraturi, & verbi divini interpretationem accepturi, ac ſacras Synaxes habituri:* but *Elmenhorſtius* more ſhortly; *Conventicula loca ſunt ubi Chriſtiani congregati orare conſueverunt. The places where the Chriſtians did meet and pray together, were called Conventicles: in Baſilica Sicinnini ubi ritus Chriſtiani eſt conventiculum*, ſaith *Ammianus Marcellinus*; *cur immaniter conventicula dirui?* ſaith *Arnobius*; *qui univerſum populum cum ipſo pariter conventiculo concremavit*, as *Lactantius* likewiſe ſpeaks. Now the reaſon of the Name was, becauſe

Tertull. Apol. c. 38.

Herald. Obſervat. in Arnob. l. 4.

Am. Marc. Hiſt. l. 27.
Arnob. l. 4.
Lactant. l. 5. *c.* 11.

the Heathens judged theſe Aſſemblies of Chriſtians to be illegal Societies. For which we are to underſtand; that in the time of the *Roman* Emperors, when they grew ſuſpicious of their own ſafety, they ſeverely prohibited all thoſe *Sodalitia*, or Societies and Colleges, which were very much in uſe in the *Roman* Common-wealth, in imitation of the ἑταιρείαι in the Cities of *Greece*. Theſe were ſuch Societies of Perſons, which voluntarily confederated together either for ſome particular deſign, or for preſerving Love and Friendſhip among each other, and thence had their frequent Meetings in common together. Now the more numerous theſe were, and the more cloſely they confederated, the more jealous Eye the *Roman* Emperours had upon them, becauſe of ſome Clandeſtine deſign, which they ſuſpected might be carried on for diſturbance of the public Peace in ſuch ſuſpicious Meetings. Thence came out many particular Edicts of the Emperours againſt all ſuch kinds of Societies.

Now when the Chriſtians began to be ſomewhat numerous, and had according to the Principles of their Religion frequent Aſſemblies for Divine worſhip, and did confederate together by ſuch Symbols, of being waſhed with water, and eating and drinking together (which was all the Heathens apprehended by their uſe of Baptiſm, and the Lord's Supper) the Proconſuls and other Magiſtrates in their ſeveral Provinces bring the Chriſtians under theſe Edicts, and ſo puniſh'd them for the *Plin. Epiſt.* breach of the Laws. Which as appears by *Pliny*'s Epiſtle to *Trajan* was *l. 10. ep. 97.* the only account on which the wiſer Heathens did proceed againſt the Chriſtians; for we ſee he troubled not himſelf much about the Truth and Evidence of the Chriſtian Religion, but ſuch Perſons were brought before him; and after he had Interrogated them whether they were Chriſtians, or no, ſeveral times, if they perſiſted, he then puniſhed them, not ſo much for their Religion, as for their obſtinacy and contempt of Authority. For ſo much is imply'd in thoſe words of his, *Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque eſſet quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe, & inflexibilem obſtinationem debere puniri : That whatever their Religion was their obſtinacy and diſobedience deſerved puniſhment.* That which the Chriſtians now pleaded for themſelves, why they ſhou'd not be reckon'd among the Factions of the People, was that which they gave to *Pliny*, that all their fault was, *Quod eſſent ſoliti ſtato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Chriſto quaſi Deo dicere ſecum invicem; ſeque ſacramento non in ſcelus aliquod obſtringere, ſed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depoſitum appellati abnegarent. That they were wont upon their ſolemn days to meet together for Divine Worſhip, and to covenant with each other only for the practice of thoſe things which were as much for the good of Mankind as their own,* viz. *that they would not* *Tertull.* *wrong and defraud others, as to their Bodies or Eſtates*, And *Tertullian* *Apol. c. 38.* approves of the Law againſt Factions, as *de providentia & modeſtia publica, ne civitas in partes ſcinderetur*, as wiſely intended to prevent Seditions; but withal pleads, that the Society of Chriſtians cou'd not be reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*; for ſaith he, *hæc coitio Chriſtianorum merito ſane illicita, ſi illicitis par; merito damnanda ſi quis de ea queritur eo titulo quo de factionibus querela eſt. In cujus perniciem aliquando convenimus? Hoc ſumus congregati quod & diſperſi; hoc univerſi quod & ſinguli; neminem lædentes, neminem contriſtantes; quum probi, quum boni coeunt, quum pii, quum caſti congregantur, non eſt factio dicenda ſed curia. If,* ſaith he, *the Societies of Chriſtians were like others, there might be ſome* *reaſon to condemn them, under the head of Factions: but as long as we meet together for no Man's injury, that whether divided, or aſſembled, we are ſtill the ſame, that we grieve and injure no body; when ſuch a company of good Men meet together, it is rather a Council than a Faction.*

2. Another Law the Chriſtians were brought under, was, That againſt Innovations in Religion; thence it was laid ſo much to the charge of the Chriſtians, that they did ζῆν παρανόμως, *go contrary to the eſtabliſh'd Law*; as *Porphyry* ſaid of *Origen*, becauſe he was a a Chriſtian, he did χριστιανῶς ζῆν καὶ παρανόμως; and when he ſpeaks of *Ammonius* revolting from *Chriſtianity* to *Paganiſm*, εὐθὺς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ νόμους πολιτείαν μετεβάλετο, *he turn'd to the way of Life, which was agreeable to the eſtabliſh'd Laws.* Now Chriſtianity was every where look'd on as a great Innovation, inſomuch that the Chriſtians were accuſed to be *legum, morum, naturæ inimici*, as *Enemies to Mankind as well as the Laws*, becauſe they drew Men off from that way of Religion which Mankind had generally agreed in. Thence *Æmilianus* the Præfect of *Ægypt*, when he bids the Chriſtians return to Paganiſm, he us'd theſe Expreſſions, ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τρέπεσθαι· ἐπιλαθέσθαι δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, *to return to the common ſenſe of Mankind, and to forget what was ſo much againſt it*, as he ſuppos'd Chriſtianity to be. When *Paul* preach'd at *Athens*, his firſt Accuſation was, that *he was a Preacher of ſtrange Deities, becauſe he preached to them Jeſus and the Reſurrection.* And *Demetrius* at *Epheſus* knew no ſuch potent Argument againſt *Paul*, as that his Religion *deſtroyed the worſhip of* Diana, *whom all* Aſia *and the world worſhip.* So that the Primitive Chriſtians were then accounted the *Antipodes* to the whole World, on which account they were ſo ſeverely dealt with; moſt Common-wealths obſerving the counſel of *Mæcenas* to *Auguſtus*, in *Dio*, to be ſure to have a watchful eye upon all Innovations in Religion, becauſe they tend ſo much to the diſturbance of the Civil State.

Euſeb. l. 6. Eccleſ. hiſt. cap. 19.

Tertull. Apol. c. 4.

Euſeb. Eccl hiſt. l. 7. c. 11.

Act. 17. 18.

19. 27.

3. The Law of Sacrilege. Thence *Lactantius* calls their Laws, *Conſtitutiones Sacrilegæ. Quin etiam ſceleratiſſimi homicidæ contra pios jura impia condiderunt; nam & conſtitutiones Sacrilegæ, & diſputationes Juriſperitorum leguntur injuſtæ*; and as he tells us, *Domitius Ulpianus* had collected all thoſe *Reſcripta nefaria* together, which concern'd the Chriſtians; from hence it was, Chriſtianity by *Pliny*, is called *amentia*, by *Tacitus exitiabilis ſuperſtitio*, by *Suetonius ſuperſtitio nova & exitiabilis*; ſo much did theſe three great Men agree, in condemning the beſt Religion in the World for madneſs, and new, and deteſtable Superſtition; the ground of the great *pique* was the enmity declar'd by Chriſtians againſt the Idolatrous Temples, and Worſhip of the Heathens.

Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.

Tacit. An. l. 15. Sueton in Nerone.

Plin. Ep. l. 10. ep. 97.

4. The Law againſt Treaſon; for ſometimes they proceeded ſo high, as to accuſe the Chriſtians *læſæ Majeſtatis*, and thence they are commonly called *publici hoſtes, enemies to all civil Government.* Which they inferred from hence: 1. *Becauſe they would not ſacrifice for the Emperour's ſafety*; *Ideo committimus*, ſaith *Tertullian*, *in Majeſtatem Imperatorum, quia illos non ſubjicimus rebus ſuis; Quia non ludimus de officio ſalutis eorum, qui eam non putamus in manibus eſſe plumbatis.* The Accuſation for Treaſon lay in their refuſing to ſupplicate the Idols for the Emperour's welfare. 2. *Becauſe they would not ſwear by the Emperour's Genius.* Thence *Saturnius* ſaid to the Martyr, *Tantum jura per genium Cæſaris noſtri*, if he wou'd but ſwear by the *Genius* of *Cæſar*, he ſhou'd be ſaved. Yet tho' they refuſ'd to ſwear by the Emperour's *Genius*, they did not refuſe to teſtify their Allegiance, and to ſwear by the Emperour's ſafety.

Tertull. Apol. 27. c. 35.

Ibid. c. 29

Herald. in Tertull. Apol. cap. 29.

Tertull. Apol c. 32. *Sed & juramus*, ſaith *Tertullian*, *ſicut non per genios Cæſarum, ita per ſalutem eorum quæ eſt auguſtior omnibus geniis.* 3. *Becauſe they would not worſhip the Emperours as Gods*; which was then grown a common Cuſtom. Ibid. c. 33. *Non enim Deum Imperatorem dicam, vel quia mentiri neſcio, vel quia illum deridere non audeo, vel quia nec ipſe ſe Deum volet dici ſi homo ſit*, as the ſame Author ſpeaks. Nay the Primitive Chriſtians were very ſcrupulous of calling the Emperour *Dominus*, *hoc enim Dei eſt cognomen*, becauſe the name Lord was an Attribute of God's, and apply'd as his name to him in Scripture. The reaſon of this ſcrupuloſity was not, from any queſtion they made of the Sovereignty of Princes, or their obligation to obedience to them, (which they are very free in the acknowledgment of,) but from a jealouſie and juſt ſuſpicion that ſomething of Divine honour might be imply'd in it, when the Adoration of Princes was Ibid. c. 34. grown a Cuſtom. Therefore *Tertullian* to prevent miſ-underſtandings, ſaith, *Dicam plane Imperatorem Dominum, ſed more Communi, ſed quando non cogor ut Dominum Dei vice dicam.* They refus'd not the name in a common ſenſe, but as it imply'd Divine honour.

5. *Becauſe they would not obſerve the public Feſtivals* of the Emperours in the way that others did, which it ſeems were obſerved with abundance of Looſeneſs and Debauchery by all ſorts of Perſons; and as *Tertullian* Ibid. c. 35. ſmartly ſays, *Malorum morum licentia pietas erit; & occaſio luxuriæ religio deputabitur? Debauchery is accounted a piece of Loyalty, and Intemperance a part of Religion.* Which made the Chriſtians rather hazard the reputation of their Loyalty, than bear a part in ſo much Rudeneſs as was then us'd, and then they abhorred all the ſolemn ſpectacles Tertull. cap. 38. of the *Romans*; *Nihil eſt nobis*, ſaith the ſame Author, *dictu, viſu, auditu, cum inſania Circi, cum impudicitia Theatri, cum atrocitate arenæ, cum Xyſti vanitate. They had nothing to do either with the madneſs of the Cirque, or the immodeſty of the Theatre, or the cruelty of the Amphitheatre, or the vanity of the public Wreſtlings.* We ſee then what a hard Province the Chriſtians had, when ſo many Laws were laid as Bird-lime in their way to catch them, that it was impoſſible for them to profeſs themſelves Chriſtians, and not to run into a *præmunire* by their Laws. And therefore it cannot be conceiv'd that many out of affection of Novelty ſhou'd then declare themſelves Chriſtians, when ſo great hazards were run upon the profeſſing of it. Few ſoft-ſpirited Men, and lovers of their own eaſe, but wou'd have found ſome fine diſtinctions and nice evacuations to have reconcil'd themſelves to the public Laws by ſuch things which the Primitive Chriſtians ſo unanimouſly refus'd, when tending to Prophaneneſs or Idolatry. And from this diſcourſe we cannot but 2 Cor. 10. 4, 5. conclude with the Apoſtle *Paul*, *That the weapons* whereby the Apoſtles and Primitive Chriſtians *encountred* the *Heathen world*, *were not fleſhly or weak*, but exceeding ſtrong and powerful, in that they obtain'd ſo great a conqueſt over the Imaginations and carnal Reaſonings of Men (which were their ſtrong holds they ſecur'd themſelves in) as to make them readily to forſake their Heathen worſhip, and become chearful Servants to Chriſt. Thus we ſee the power of the Doctrine of Chriſt, which prevail'd over the Principles of Education, tho' back'd with pretended Antiquity, Univerſality, and Eſtabliſhment by civil Laws.

XXII. But this will further appear if we conſider that not only the matters of Faith were contrary to the Principles of Education, but becauſe many of them ſeem'd incredible to Men's natural Reaſon; that we cannot think Perſons wou'd be over-forward to believe ſuch things. Every one being ſo ready to take any advantage againſt a Religion which did ſo little flatter corrupt Nature either as to its power or capacity; inſomuch that thoſe who preached this Doctrine, declar'd openly to the World, that ſuch Perſons who wou'd judge of the Chriſtian Doctrine, by ſuch principles which mere natural Reaſon did proceed upon (ſuch a one I ſuppoſe it is whom the Apoſtle calls Ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος, one that own'd nothing but natural Reaſon, whereby to judge of Divine Truths) cou'd not entertain matters of Faith, or of Divine Revelation, becauſe ſuch things wou'd ſeem but folly to him that own'd no higher principle than Philoſophy, or that did not believe any Divine Inſpiration; neither can ſuch a one know them, becauſe a Divine Revelation is the only way to come to a thro' underſtanding of them: and a perſon who doth not believe ſuch a Divine Revelation, it is impoſſible he ſhou'd be a competent judge of the truth of the Doctrine of Chriſt. So that the only ground of receiving the Doctrine of the Goſpel is upon a Divine Revelation, that God himſelf by his Son and his Apoſtles, hath reveal'd theſe deep Myſteries to the World, on which account it is we are bound to receive them, altho' they go beyond our reach and comprehenſion. But we ſee generally in the Heathen World how few of thoſe did believe the Doctrine of Chriſt in compariſon, who were the great admirers of the Philoſophy, and way of Learning which was then cry'd up: the reaſon was, becauſe Chriſtianity not only contain'd far deeper Myſteries than any they were acquainted with, but deliver'd them in ſuch a way of Authority, commanding them to believe the Doctrine they preached on the account of the Divine Authority of the Revealers of it. Such a way of propoſal of Doctrines to the World the Philoſophy of the *Greeks* was unacquainted with, which on that account they derided, as not being ſuited to the exact method which their Sciences proceeded in. No doubt had the Apoſtles come among the *Greeks* μετὰ πολλῆς φαντασίας, with a *great deal of pomp and oſtentation*, and had fed Mens curioſities with vain and unneceſſary Speculations, they might have had as many Followers among the *Greeks* for their ſakes, as Chriſt had among the *Jews* for the ſake of the Loaves. But the matters of the Goſpel being more of inward worth and moment, than of outward pomp and ſhew, the vain and empty *Greeks* preſently find a quarrel with the manner of propoſing them; that they came not in a way of clear demonſtration, but ſtood ſo much upon Faith as ſoon as they were deliver'd. Thence *Celſus* and *Galen* think they have reaſon enough to reject the Laws of *Moſes* and Chriſt, becauſe *Celſus* calls them νόμους ἀναποδείκτους, *Galen Chriſtianity* Διατριβὴν ἀναπόδεικτον, that they were ſuch Doctrines which require Faith and Obedience, without giving Mens reaſon an account of the things commanded. As tho' the Authority of a *Legiſlator* ſufficiently manifeſted, were not enough to inforce a Law, unleſs a ſufficient account were given of the thing requir'd to the purblind Reaſon of every individual Perſon acted by paſſions and private intereſts, as to the Juſtice and Equity of it. And ſo the primary obligation on Man's part to Faith and Obedience, muſt ariſe not from the evidence of Divine Authority, but of the thing it ſelf which is reveal'd, to the moſt partial judgment of every one to whom it is propos'd. Which thoſe who know how ſhort the ſtock of Reaſon is at the beſt in Men, and how eaſily that which is, is faſhion'd and moulded according to prejudices and intereſts already entertain'd, will look upon only as a deſign to comply with the carnal deſires of Men, in that thereby none

2 Cor. 2. 14.

Orig. l. 1. *c. Celſ.* *Gal. de diff. pulſ. lib.* 2. *c.* 4.

ſhall be bound to go any further, than this blind and corrupted Guide
ſhall lead them. Now theſe being the terms on which the Goſpel of
Chriſt muſt have expected entertainment in the *Gentile* World, how impoſſible
had it been ever to have found any ſucceſs among Men, had
there not been ſufficient Evidence giving by a power of Miracles, that
however ſtrange and incredible the Doctrine might ſeem, yet it was to
be believ'd, becauſe there was ſufficient means to convince Men that it
was of Divine Revelation.

XXIII. Neither were the matters of Faith only contrary to the inclinations
of the World, but ſo were the precepts of Life, or thoſe things in Chriſtianity
which concern'd practice. Theſe are two things which are the
main ſcope and deſign of Chriſtianity in reference to Mens Lives, and
to take them off from their Sins, and from the World; and of all things
theſe are they which Mens hearts are ſo bewitch'd with. Now the
Matt. 5. 8. precepts of the Goſpel are ſuch which require the greateſt *purity of heart*
16, 24. Tit. 2. 12. *and life*, which call upon Men *to deny themſelves, and all ungodlineſs, and*
2 Tim. 2. *worldly luſts, and to live ſoberly, and righteouſly, and godly in this preſent*
19. 2 Cor 7. 1. *world*; that, *all that name the name of Chriſt muſt depart from iniquity*;
that, *all true Chriſtians muſt be cleanſed from all filthineſs of fleſh and ſpirit,*
and muſt perfect holineſs in the fear of God. And the Goſpel inforceth
theſe precepts of Holineſs with the moſt terrible Denunciations of the
2 Theſ. 1. wrath of God on thoſe who diſobey them; that, *the Lord Jeſus*
7, 8. *Chriſt ſhall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire,*
taking vengeance on them that know not God, *and that obey not the Goſpel of*
Rom. 1. *Jeſus Chriſt.* That, *the wrath of* God *is revealed from Heaven againſt all*
18. *ungodlineſs and unrighteouſneſs of men, who hold the truth in unrighteouſneſs.*
1Cor. 6. That, no perſons who live in the habitual practice of any known
9. 10. Gal. 4. 20. ſin, *ſhall inherit the Kingdom of God.* That, *no man ſhould deceive them*
Epheſ. 5. *with vain words, for becauſe of theſe things comes the wrath of* God *upon*
5, 6. *the Children of diſobedience*; that Men do but vainly flatter themſelves
when they ſeek to reconcile unholy Lives with the hopes of future
Heb. 12. Happineſs; for *without holineſs no man ſhall ſee the Lord.* And then
14. in reference to the things of this preſent Life which Men buſie themſelves
1 Joh. 2. ſo much about, the Goſpel declares, that *they who love this world, the*
14. *love of the Father is not in them*; that, *the friendſhip of this world is enmity*
Jam. 4. 4. *with God; and whoſoever will be a friend of the world is an enemy to*
Col. 3. 1, 2. *God : That* *Chriſtians muſt not ſet their affections on Earth, but on the*
Phil. 3. 20. *things in Heaven*; That *the converſation of true Chriſtians is in Heaven.*
Matt. 6. 20. That we ought not to *lay up our treaſure on Earth, but in Heaven*; That,
2 Cor. 4. *we muſt not look at the things which are ſeen, but at the things which are not*
18. *ſeen; for the things which are ſeen are temporal, but the things which are*
not ſeen are eternal. Now the whole deſign of the Doctrine of Chriſt
being to perſuade Men to lead a Holy and Heavenly Life while they are
Col. 1. 12. in this World, and thereby to *be made meet to be partakers of the inheritance
with the Saints in light*, can we think ſo many Men whoſe hearts
were wedded to Sin, and the World cou'd ſo ſuddenly be brought off
from both without a Divine Power accompanying that Doctrine which
Rom. 1. 16. was preached to them? And therefore the Apoſtle ſaith, οὐκ ἐπαισχύνομαι
τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, *I am not aſhamed of the Goſpel of Chriſt*; i. e. tho'
the Goſpel of Chriſt be the only true Myſtery, yet I do not by it
as the Heathens are wont to do with their famous *Eleuſinian* Myſteries,
which were kept ſo ſecret by all the *Myſtæ* and ἐπόπται; but ſaith he,
I know no reaſon I have to be aſhamed of any thing in the Goſpel, that I
ſhould

ſhould labour its concealment to advance its veneration; but the more public the Goſpel is, the more it manifeſts its power; for thro' it God is pleas'd mightily to work, in order to the Salvation both of *Jew* and *Gentile*. And of all the ſucceſs of the Goſpel, that upon the Hearts and Lives of Men deſerves the greateſt conſideration.

The great Efficacy and Power of the Goſpel was abundantly ſeen in that great alteration which it wrought in all thoſe who were the hearty embracers of it. The Philoſophers did very frequently and deſervedly complain of the great inefficacy of all their Moral Precepts upon the minds of Men, and that by all their Inſtructions, *politiora non meliora, ingenia fiunt*, Men improv'd more in Knowledge than Goodneſs; but now *Chriſtianity* not only inforced Duties on Men with greater Power and Authority: For the Scriptures do, as Saint *Auſtin* ſpeaks, *Non tanquam ex Philoſophorum concertationibus ſtrepere, ſed tanquam ex oraculis & Dei nubibus intonare*, not make ſome obſtreperous clamours, like thoſe *tinkling Cymbals*, the Philoſophers, but awe the Souls of Men with the Majeſty of that God from whom they came. *Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 2. c. 19.* Neither was it only a great and empty ſound which was heard in the Preaching of the Goſpel; but when God thundred therein, he broke down the *ſtately Cedars* and *ſhook the Wilderneſs*, and *made the Hinds to calve*, (as it is ſaid of Thunder, call'd the *Voice of the Lord* in Scripture,) he humbl'd the Pride of Men, unſettled the Gentile World from its former foundations, and wrought great alterations on all thoſe who hearkened to it. Pſal. 29. 5, 8, 9. The whole deſign of the Goſpel is couched in thoſe words which Saint *Paul* tells us were ſpoken to him by Chriſt himſelf, when he appointed him to be an Apoſtle, *to open Mens eyes, and to turn them from darkneſs to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveneſs of ſins, and inheritance among them which were ſanctified by faith in Chriſt.* Act. 26. 18. And the efficacy of this Doctrine in order to theſe great ends, was abundantly ſeen in the preaching of that Apoſtle, who was ſo inſtrumental in converting the World to piety and ſobriety, as well as to the Doctrine of *Chriſt*. What ſtrange Perſons were the *Corinthians* before they became *Chriſtians!* for when the Apoſtle had enumerated many of the vileſt Perſons of the World, he preſently adds, *And ſuch were ſome of you; but ye are waſhed, but ye are ſanctified, but ye are juſtified in the name of the Lord Jeſus, and by the ſpirit of our God.* 1 Cor. 6. 10, 11. The more dangerous the diſtemper is, the more malignant its nature; the more inveterate its continuance, the greater the Efficacy of the remedy which works a cure of it. The power of Grace is the more ſeen in converſion, the greater the ſins have been before it. It is an eaſy matter in compariſon to remove a diſeaſe at its firſt on-ſet, of what it is to cure it when it becomes Chronical. The power of the Goſpel wrought upon all ſorts and kinds of Perſons, to manifeſt to the World there was no diſtemper of Men's Souls ſo great, but there was a poſſibility of a Remedy for it; and not only ſo, but pregnant and viſible inſtances were given of the Power and Efficacy of it. *For they themſelves ſhew of us*, ſaith the Apoſtle, *what manner of entring in we had among you, and how ye turned to God from Idols, to ſerve the living and true God, and to wait for his Son from Heaven, whom he raiſed from the dead, even* Jeſus, *which delivered us from the wrath to come.* 1 Theſſ. 1. 9, 10. Now that which manifeſts the exceeding great power and excellency of the Goſpel, was, that it not only turn'd Men from one way of worſhip to another, which is a matter of no great difficulty, but that it turn'd Men together with that from their Luſts and Senſuality, to a holy and unblameable Life. For Men being more in love with their Sins, than with their Opinions, it muſt needs be a greater Power which draws Men from the practice of habitual Sins, than that which only makes them change their Opinions, or alter the way of worſhip they were brought up in. This is that which *Origen* throughout his Books againſt *Celſus* triumphs in as the moſt ſignal Evidence of a Divine power in the Doctrine of Chriſt, that it wrought ſo great an alteration on all that truly embraced it, that of vicious, debauched, and diſſolute, it made them temperate, ſober, and religious, ὅτι τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐπιστρέφει ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως τῶν κακῶν, ἐπὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν μετὰ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν βίον. *The Doctrine of Chriſt did convert the moſt wicked Perſons who embraced it, from all their debaucheries, to a life moſt ſutable to Nature and Reaſon, and to the practice of all Vertues.* Therefore certainly the Goſpel cou'd not want that commendation among all ingenuous Moraliſts, that it was the moſt excellent inſtrument in the World to reform the lives of Men, and to promote real goodneſs in it. When they cou'd not but take notice of ſo many Perſons continually ſo brought off from their follies and vain converſations, to a life ſerious, ſober, and unblameable; nay and ſome of the *Chriſtians* were of ſo much integrity and goodneſs, that their greateſt Enemies were forced to ſay that their only fault was, that they were *Chriſtians*. *Bonus vir Caius Sejus, tantum quod Chriſtianus. A very good man, only a Chriſtian.* But one wou'd think this ſhou'd have made them have a higher opinion of *Chriſtianity*, when it did ſo ſuddenly make ſo many Men good in the World. Eſpecially when this power was ſo manifeſt on ſuch Perſons who were ſuppos'd uncapable of being reform'd by Philoſophy, young, illiterate, and mean-ſpirited Perſons; therefore it may be juſtly ſuppos'd that it was not by the ſtrength of their own Reaſon that this alteration was wrought within them, but by that Divine power which was able to tame the moſt unruly; to inſtruct the moſt ignorant, to raiſe up the moſt ſordid Perſons to ſuch a Generous temper, as to ſlight the good things of this life, in compariſon with thoſe to come. And ſo remarkable was the difference of life then between thoſe that were *Chriſtians*, and thoſe who were not (as there is ſtill between true *Chriſtians*, and mere Pretenders) that *Origen* dares *Celſus* to compare them in point of Morality with any other Societies in the World. αἱ γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ Χριστῷ μαθητευθεῖσαι ἐκκλησίαι, συνεξεταζόμεναι ταῖς ὧν παροικοῦσι δήμων ἐκκλησίαις, ὡς φωστῆρές εἰσιν ἐν κόσμῳ· τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαι καὶ τοὺς χείρους τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, καὶ συγκρίσει βελτιόνων ἐλάττους, πολλῶν κρείττους τυγχάνειν τῶν ἐν τοῖς δήμοις ἐκκλησιῶν; *For the Churches of* God, *which are diſcipled to* Chriſt, *being compared with other Societies, ſhine among them like lights in the world. For who can but confeſs, that even the worſer part of the Chriſtian Churches exceeds the beſt of the popular Aſſemblies? For*, as he goes on, *the Church of* God *which is at* Athens, *that is* πραεῖά τις καὶ εὐσταθής, *very quiet and peaceable, becauſe it ſeeks to approve it ſelf to* God; *but the popular Aſſembly at* Athens, *that is* στασιώδης, *ſeditious and quarelſome, and in nothing comparable to the Church of* God *there. So it is, if we compare the Churches of* Corinth *and* Alexandria *with the Aſſemblies of the People there.* So that any candid Inquirer after Truth will exceedingly wonder (how ſuch fair Iſlands ſhou'd appear *nantes in gurgite vaſto*, in the midſt of ſuch a Sea of wickedneſs as it was in thoſe Cities) how theſe *Churches* of God ſhou'd be planted in ſuch rude and profane places. So the ſame Author goes on to compare the Church's State with that of the Cities, the Church's Officers with theirs;

Origen. c. Celſum, l. 2. p. 78. 85 lib. 1. p. 21.

Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 3. p. 128.

theirs; and appeals to themſelves, that even thoſe among them who were moſt luke-warm in their Office, did yet far exceed all the City-Magiſtrates in all manner of Vertues. From whence he rationally concludes, εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πῶς οὐκ εὔλογον μὲν νομίζειν περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοσαῦτα συστῆσαι δεδυνημένου, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα, θειότης ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ; *If theſe things be ſo, how can it but be moſt rational to adore the Divinity of* Jeſus, *who was able to accompliſh ſuch great things?* And that not upon one or two, but upon ſuch great multitudes as were then converted to the *Chriſtian Faith.* We read of one *Phædon*, and one *Polemon* brought from their debaucheries by *Socrates* and *Xenocrates*, but what are theſe compar'd with thoſe who were turn'd from their Sins to God by the Goſpel of Chriſt! καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, εἷς τις Φαίδων καὶ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ δεύτερος, καὶ εἷς Πολέμων, μεταβαλόντες ἀπὸ ἀσώτου καὶ μοχθηροτάτου βίου, ἐφιλοσόφησαν· παρὰ δὲ τῷ Ἰησοῦ οὐ μόνοι τότε οἱ δώδεκα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ πολλαπλασίους, &c. *The twelve Apoſtles were but the firſt-fruits of that plentiful Harveſt of Converts which followed afterwards.* And altho' *Celſus* (like an *Epicurean*) ſeems to deny the poſſibility of any ſuch thing as Converſion, becauſe cuſtomary ſins become a ſecond Nature, that no puniſhments can reform them; *Yet*, ſaith *Origen*, *herein he not only contradicts us* Chriſtians, *but all ſuch as were* γενναίως φιλοσοφήσαντες, *who own'd any generous principles of Philoſophy, and did not deſpair of recovering vertue, as a thing feaſible by humane nature*; and gives inſtances *ad hominem*, to prove the poſſibility of the thing from the ancient Heroes, *Hercules*, and *Ulyſſes*, from the two Philoſophers, *Socrates* and *Muſonius*, and the two famous Converts to Philoſophy, *Phædon* and *Polemon*. *But yet*, ſaith he, *theſe are not ſo much to be wondred at, that the eloquence and reaſon of the Philoſophers ſhou'd prevail on ſome very few perſons, but that the mean and contemptible language of the Apoſtles ſhou'd convert ſuch multitudes from intemperance to ſobriety, from injuſtice to fair-dealing, from cowardice to the higheſt conſtancy, yea ſo great as to lay down their lives for the ſake of virtue; how can we but admire ſo Divine a Power as was ſeen in it?* *And therefore*, ſaith he, *we conclude*, ὅτι τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ ἀμεῖψαι κακίαν φυσιώσασαν ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, *That it is ſo far from being impoſſible, that it is not at all difficult for corrupt nature to be chang'd by the Word of* God. *Lactantius* excellently manifeſts that Philoſophy cou'd never do ſo much good in the World as *Chriſtianity* did, becauſe that was not ſuted at all to common capacities, and did require ſo much skill in the Arts to prepare Men for it, which it is impoſſible all ſhou'd be well skill'd in, which yet are as capable of being happy, as any others are. And how inefficacious the Precepts of Philoſophy were, appears by the Philoſophers themſelves, who were far from having command by them over their maſterleſs paſſions, and were fain ſometimes to confeſs that Nature was too head-ſtrong to be kept in by ſuch weak Reins as the Precepts of Philoſophy were; *But*, ſaith he, *what great command Divine Precepts have upon the Souls of Men, daily experience ſhews. Da mihi virum qui ſit iracundus, maledicus, effrenatus; pauciſſimis Dei verbis, tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da cupidum, avarum, tenacem; jam tibi eum liberalem dabo, & pecuniam ſuam plenis manibus largientem. Da timidum doloris ac mortis; jam cruces, & ignes, & taurum contemnet. Da libidinoſum, adulterum, ganeonem; jam ſobrium, caſtum, continentem videbis. Da crudelem, & ſanguinis appetentem; jam in veram clementiam furor ille mutabitur. Da injuſtum, inſipientem, peccatorem; continuo & æquus, & prudens, & innocens erit.* In which words that elegant Writer doth by a

Origen. l. 1. p. 50.

Origen. l. 3. p. 150.

Lactant. de falſ. ſap. l. 3. c. 25.

Cap. 26.

Rhetorical Scheme ſet out the remarkable alteration which was in any who became true *Chriſtians*, that altho' they were paſſionate, covetous fearful, luſtful, cruel, unjuſt, vicious, yet upon their being *Chriſtians*, they became mild, liberal, courageous, temperate, merciful, juſt and unblameable; which never any were brought to by mere Philoſophy, which rather teacheth the Art of Concealing vices than of healing them. But now when *Chriſtianity* was ſo effectual in the cure of thoſe diſtempers, which Philoſophy gave over as beyond its skill and power, when it cur'd them with ſo great ſucceſs, and that not in a *Paracelſian* way, for then to relapſe afterwards with greater violence, but it did ſo throughly unſettle the *fomes morbi*, that it ſhou'd never gather to ſo great a head again; doth not this argue a power more than Philoſophical, and that cou'd be no leſs than Divine Power which tended ſo much to reform the World, and to promote true goodneſs in it?

XXIV. Thus we have conſider'd the contrariety of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* to Mens Natural Inclinations, and yet the ſtrange ſucceſs it had in the World, which in the laſt place will appear yet more ſtrange, when we add the almoſt *continual oppoſition it met with from worldly power and policy*. Had it been poſſible for a cunningly-deviſed fable, or any mere contrivance of Impoſtors to have prevail'd in the World, when the moſt potent and ſubtile Perſons bent their whole Wits and Deſigns for ſuppreſſing it? Whatever it were in others, we are ſure of ſome of the *Roman* Emperours, as *Julian* and *Diocleſian*, that it was their Maſter-deſign to root out and aboliſh *Chriſtianity*; and was it only the ſubtilty of the *Chriſtians* which made theſe Perſons give over their work in deſpair of accompliſhing it? If the *Chriſtians* were ſuch ſubtile Men, whence came all their Enemies to agree in one common calumny, that they were a company of poor, weak, ignorant, inconſiderable Men? and if they were ſo, how came it to paſs that by their power and wiſdom they cou'd never exterminate theſe Perſons; but as they cut them down, they grew up the faſter, and multiply'd by their ſubſtraction of them? There was ſomething then certainly peculiar in *Chriſtianity*, from all other Doctrines, that it not only was not advanc'd by any civil power, but it got ground by the Oppoſition it met with in the World. And therefore it is an obſervable circumſtance, that the firſt Chriſtian Emperour (who acted as Emperour for *Chriſtianity*) viz. *Conſtantine* (for otherwiſe I know what may be ſaid for *Philippus*) did not appear in the World 'till *Chriſtianity* had ſpread it ſelf over moſt parts of the habitable World. God thereby letting us ſee, that tho' the civil Power, when become Chriſtian, might be very uſeful for protecting *Chriſtianity*, yet that he ſtood in no need at all of it, as to the Propagation of it abroad in the World. But we ſee it was quite otherwiſe in that Religion which had *Mars* its Aſcendant, viz. *Mahometiſm*: For like *Paracelſus* his *Dæmon*, it always ſat upon the pummel of the Sword, and made its way in the World merely by force and violence; and as its firſt conſtitution had much of Blood in it, ſo by it hath it been fed and nouriſh'd ever ſince. But it was quite otherwiſe with the *Chriſtian* Religion, it never thriv'd better than in the moſt barren places, nor triumph'd more, than when it ſuffer'd moſt; nor ſpread it ſelf further, than when it encounter'd the greateſt Oppoſition. Becauſe therein was ſeen the great force and efficacy of the Doctrine of Chriſt, that it bore up Mens Spirits under the greateſt miſeries of Life, and made them with cheerfulneſs to undergo the moſt exquiſite torments which the cruelty of Tyrants cou'd invent. The *Stoics* and *Epicureans* Boaſt, that their wiſe Man wou'd be happy in the Bull of *Phalaris*, were but empty and *Thraſonical* words, which none wou'd venture the truth by an experiment upon themſelves. It was the *Chriſtian* alone, and not the *Epicurean*, that cou'd truly ſay in the midſt of torments, *Suave eſt & nihil curo*, and might juſtly alter a little of that common ſaying of the *Chriſtians*, and ſay, *Non magna loquimur, ſed patimur*, as well as *vivimus*; *The* Chriſtians *did not ſpeak great things, but do and ſuffer them.* And this gain'd not only great reputation of integrity to themſelves, but much advanc'd the honour of their Religion in the World, when it was ſo apparently ſeen, that no force or power was able to withſtand it. Will not this at leaſt perſuade you that our Religion is true and from God, ſaith *Arnobius*? *Quod cum genera pœnarum tanta ſint a vobis propoſita Religionis hujus ſequentibus leges, augeatur res magis, & contra omnes minas atque interdicta formidinum animoſius populus obnitatur, & ad credendi ſtudium, prohibitionis ipſius ſtimulis excitetur? ——Itane iſtud non divinum & ſacrum eſt, aut ſine Deo, eorum tantas animorum fieri converſiones, ut cum carnifices unci, aliique innumeri cruciatus, quemadmodum diximus, impendeant credituris, veluti quadam dulcedine, atque omnium virtutum amore correpti, cognitas accipiant rationes, atque mundi omnibus rebus præponant amicitias Chriſti? That no fears, penalties, or torments, were able to make a* Chriſtian *alter his profeſſion, but he wou'd rather bid adieu to his life than to his Saviour.* This *Origen* likewiſe frequently takes notice of, when *Celſus* had objected the Novelty of *Chriſtianity*; *The more wonderful it is* (ſaith *Origen*) *that in ſo ſhort a time it ſhou'd ſo largely ſpread it ſelf in the World; for if the cure of Mens Bodies be not wrought without Divine Providence, how much leſs the cure of ſo many thouſands of Souls which have been converted at once to Humanity and* Chriſtianity, *eſpecially when all the Powers of the World were from the firſt engaged to hinder the progreſs of this Doctrine, and yet notwithſtanding all this oppoſition*, ἐνίκησε, μὴ πεφυκὼς κωλύεσθαι ὡς λόγος Θεοῦ καὶ γενόμενος τοσούτων ἀνταγωνιστῶν ἰσχυρότερος, πάσης μὲν Ἑλλάδος, ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῆς βαρβάρου ἐκράτησε, καὶ μετεποίησε μυρίας ὅσας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν θεοσέβειαν, *The Word of* God *prevail'd, as not being able to be ſtopt by Men, and became Maſter over all its enemies, and not only ſpread it ſelf quite thro'* Greece, *but thro' a great part of the World beſides, and converted an innumerable company of Souls to the true worſhip and ſervice of* God. Thus we have now manifeſted from all the circumſtances of the propagation of the Doctrine of Chriſt, what evidence there was of a Divine Power accompanying of it, and how uſeful the firſt Miracles were in order to it.

Arnob. l. 2. c. gentes.

Origen. l. 1. c. Celſ. p. 21. Vid. etiam l. 2. p. 110.

J. O R.

CHAP. X.

160:2:K

The difference of true Miracles from falſe.

I. The unreaſonableneſs of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, becauſe of Impoſtures. That there are certain rules of diſtinguiſhing true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical, prov'd from God's intention in giving a power of Miracles, and the Providence of God in the World. II. *The inconvenience of taking away the rational grounds of Faith, and placing it on ſelf-evidence. Of the ſelf-evidence of the Scriptures, and the Inſufficiency of that for reſolving the queſtion about the Authority of the Scriptures.* III. *Of the pretended Miracles of Impoſtors and falſe Chriſts, as* Barchochebas, David *el-*David *and others.* IV. *The rules whereby to judge true Miracles from falſe.* 1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.* V. *No Miracles neceſſary for the certain conveyance of a Divine Teſtimony: prov'd from the Evidences that the Scriptures cou'd not be corrupted.* VI. 2. *No Miracles Divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of Popiſh Miracles.* VII. 3. *Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on thoſe who believe them. Of the Miracles of* Simon Magus. VIII. 4. *Divine Miracles tend to the overthrow of the Devil's power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of Chriſt to the Devil's deſign in the World.* IX. 5. *The diſtinction of true Miracles from others, from the circumſtances and manner of their operation. The Miracles of Chriſt compar'd with thoſe of the Heathen Gods.* X. 6. *God makes it evident to all impartial judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed Created power. This manifeſted from the unparallell'd Miracles of* Moſes *and our Saviour. From all which the rational evidence of Divine Revelation is manifeſted, as to the Perſons whom God imploys to teach the World.*

I. HAving thus far ſtated the caſes wherein Miracles may juſtly be expected as a rational Evidence of Divine Authority in the Perſons whom God imploys by way of peculiar meſſage to the World, and in the proſecution of this diſcourſe manifeſted the Evidences of Divine Authority in *Moſes* and the Prophets, and in our Saviour and his Apoſtles; the only remaining queſtion concerning this ſubject, is, *How we may certainly diſtinguiſh true and real Miracles from ſuch as are only pretended and counterfeit?* For it being as evident that there have been Impoſtures and Deluſions in the World as real Miracles, the minds of Men will be wholly to ſeek when to rely upon the Evidence of Miracles as an Argument of Divine Authority in thoſe perſons who do them, unleſs a way be found out to diſtinguiſh them from each other. But if we can make it appear, that, unleſs Men thro' weakneſs of Judgment or Incogitancy deceive themſelves, they may have certain Evidence of the truth of Miracles, then there can be nothing wanting as to the eſtabliſhment of their Minds in the truth of that Doctrine which is confirm'd by them. There hath been nothing which hath made Men of better Affections than Underſtandings, ſo ready to ſuſpect the ſtrength of the Evidence from Miracles concerning Divine Teſtimony, as the multitude of Impoſtures in the World under the name of Miracles, and that the Scripture it ſelf tells us we muſt not hearken to ſuch as come with lying wonders. But may we not therefore ſafely rely on ſuch Miracles which we have certain Evidence cou'd not be wrought but by Divine Power, becauſe forſooth the Devil may ſometimes abuſe the ignorance and credulity of unwary Men? or is it becauſe the Scripture forbids us to believe ſuch as ſhou'd come with a pretence of Miracles, therefore we cannot rely on the Miracles of Chriſt himſelf? Which is as much as to ſay, becauſe the Scripture tells us that we muſt not believe every Spirit, therefore we muſt believe none at all; or becauſe we muſt not entertain any other Doctrine beſide the Goſpel, therefore we have no reaſon to believe that. For the ground whereby we are aſſur'd by the Scriptures, that the Teſtimony of Chriſt was Divine, and therefore his Doctrine true, is becauſe it was confirm'd by ſuch Miracles as he did; now if that Argument were inſufficient which the Scriptures tell us was the great Evidence of Chriſt's being ſent from God, we cannot give our ſelves a ſufficient account in point of Evidence, on which we believe the Doctrine of the Goſpel to be true and Divine. But the only rational pretence of any ſcruple in this caſe muſt be ſuppos'd uncertainty in our Rules of judging concerning the nature of Miracles; for there be no certain κριτήρια, or notes of difference, whereby to know Divine Miracles from Deluſions of Senſes and the Impoſtures of the Devil. I muſt confeſs that there is an apparent inſufficiency in the Evidence from Miracles; but if there be any certain Rules of proceeding in this caſe, we are to blame nothing but our Incredulity, if we be not ſatisfy'd by them. For the full clearing of this, I ſhall firſt *make it appear that there may be certain Evidence found out, whereby we may know true Miracles from falſe, and Divine from Diabolical.* And, Secondly, *Inquire into thoſe things which are the main notes of difference between them.* Firſt, *That there may be certain Evidence whereby to know the truth of Miracles.* I ſpeak not of the difference *ex parte rei* between Miracles, and thoſe called Wonders, as that the one exceeds the power of created Agents, and the other doth not; for this leaves the Inquirer as far to ſeek for ſatisfaction as ever; for granting that by a Divine Power is ſeen in one, and not in the other, he muſt needs be ſtill diſſatisfy'd, unleſs it can be made evident to him that ſuch things are from Divine Power and others cannot be. Now the main diſtinction being placed here in the natures of the things abſtractly conſider'd, and not as they bear any Evidence to our Underſtandings, inſtead of reſolving doubts it increaſeth more; for, as for inſtance, in the caſe of the *Magicians* Rods turning into Serpents, as well as *Moſes*'s; what ſatisfaction cou'd this yield to any Spectator, to tell him, that in the one there was a Divine Power, and not in the other, unleſs it were made appear by ſome Evidence from the thing, that the one was a mere Impoſture, and the other a real Alteration in the thing it ſelf? I take it then for granted, that no general diſcourſes concerning the formal difference of Miracles and Wonders conſider'd in themſelves

ſelves, can afford any rational ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind; that which alone is able to give it, muſt be ſomething which may be diſcern'd by any judicious and conſiderative Perſon. And that God never gives to any a power of Miracles, but he gives ſome ſuch ground of ſatisfaction concerning them, will appear upon theſe two conſiderations.

1. *From God's intention in giving to any this power of doing Miracles.* We have largely made it manifeſt that the end of true Miracles is to be a confirmation to the World of the Divine Commiſſion of the Perſons who have it, and that the Teſtimony is Divine which is confirm'd by it. Now if there be no way to know when Miracles are true or falſe, this power is to no purpoſe at all; for Men are as much to ſeek for Satisfaction, as if there had been no ſuch things at all. Therefore if Men are bound to believe a Divine Teſtimony, and to rely on the Miracles wrought by the Perſons bringing it, as an Evidence of it, they muſt have ſome aſſurance that theſe Miracles cou'd not come from any but a Divine Power.

2. *From the Providence of God in the World*; which if we own, we cannot imagine that God wou'd permit the Devil, whoſe only deſign is to ruin Mankind, to abuſe the credulity of the World ſo far, as to have his lying Wonders paſs uncontroul'd; which they muſt do, if nothing can be found out as a certain difference between ſuch things as are only of Diabolical, and ſuch as are of Divine Power. If then it may be diſcover'd that there is a malignant Spirit which acts in the World and doth produce ſtrange things, either we muſt impute all ſtrange things to him, which muſt be to attribute to him an infinite Power, or elſe that there is a Being infinitely perfect which croſſeth this malignant Spirit in his Deſigns; and if ſo, we cannot imagine he ſhou'd ſuffer him to uſurp ſo much Tyranny over the minds of Men, as to make thoſe things paſs in the more ſober and inquiſitive part of the World for Divine Miracles, which were only Counterfeits and impoſtures. If then the Providence of God be ſo deeply engaged in the diſcovering the deſigns of Satan, there muſt be ſome means of this diſcovery, and that means can be ſuppos'd to be no other in this caſe, but ſome rational and ſatisfactory Evidence, whereby we may know when ſtrange and miraculous things are done by Satan to deceive Men, and when by a Divine Power to confirm a Divine Teſtimony.

II. But how is it poſſible, ſay ſome, that Miracles ſhou'd be any ground on which to believe a Teſtimony Divine when Chriſt himſelf hath told us, *That there ſhall ariſe falſe Chriſts, and falſe Prophets, and ſhall ſhew great ſigns and wonders; inſomuch that if it were poſſible they ſhould deceive the very elect?* and the Apoſtle tells us *that the coming of Antichriſt will be with all power and ſigns, and lying wonders.* How then can we fix on Miracles as an Evidence of Divine Teſtimony, when we ſee they are common to good and bad Men, and may ſeal indifferently either Truth or Falſhood? To this I reply;

Mat. 24. 24.

2 Theſ. 2. 9.

1. Men are guilty of doing no ſmall diſſervice to the Doctrine of Chriſt, when upon ſuch weak and frivolous pretences they give ſo great an advantage to Infidelity, as to call in queſtion the validity of that which yielded ſo ample a Teſtimony to the truth of Chriſtian Religion. For if once the rational grounds on which we believe the Doctrine of Chriſt to be true and Divine, be taken away, and the whole evidence of the Truth of it be laid on things not only derided by Men of Atheiſtical

cal Spirits, but in themſelves ſuch as cannot be diſcern'd or judg'd of by any but themſelves; upon what grounds can we proceed to convince an Unbeliever that the Doctrine which we believe is true? If they tell him, *That as light and fire manifeſt themſelves, ſo doth the Doctrine of the Scripture* to thoſe who believe it; it will be ſoon reply'd, that Self-evidence in a matter of Faith can imply nothing but either a firm perſuaſion of the Mind concerning the thing propounded; or elſe that there are ſuch clear Evidences in the thing its ſelf, that none who freely uſe their Reaſon can deny it. The firſt can be no Argument to any other perſon any further than the authority of the perſon who declares it to have ſuch Self-evidence to him, doth extend it ſelf over the mind of the other; and to ones ſelf it ſeems a ſtrange way of arguing, *I believe the Scripturers becauſe they are true, and they are true becauſe I believe them*; for Self-evidence implies ſo much, if by it be meant the perſuaſion of the Mind, that the thing is true: But if by ſelf-evidence be further meant ſuch clear Evidence in the matter propounded, that all who do conſider it, muſt believe it; I then further inquire whether this Evidence doth lie in the naked propoſal of the things to the Underſtanding; and if ſo, then every one who aſſents to this Propoſition, that the whole is greater than the part, muſt likewiſe aſſent to this, that the Scripture is the Word of God; or whether doth the Evidence lie, not in the naked Propoſal, but in the efficacy of the Spirit of God, on the minds of thoſe to whom it is propounded. Then, 1. The Self-evidence is taken off from the written Word which was the object, and remov'd to a quite different thing which is the efficient cauſe. 2. Whether then any Perſons who want this efficacious operation of the Spirit of God, are or can be bound to believe the Scriptures to be God's Word? If they are bound, the duty muſt be propounded in ſuch a way as may be ſufficient to convince them that it is their duty; but if all the Evidence of the Truth of the Scripture lie on this Teſtimony of the Spirit, then ſuch as want this, can have none at all. But if, laſtly, by this Self-evidence be meant ſuch an impreſs of God's authority on the Scriptures, that any who conſider them as they ought, cannot but diſcern; I ſtill further inquire, whether this impreſs lies in the poſitive aſſertions in Scripture that they are from God, and that cannot be unleſs it be made appear to be impoſſible that any Writing ſhou'd pretend to be from God when it is not; or elſe in the written Books of Scripture, and then let it be made appear that any one merely by the evidence of the Writings themſelves without any further Arguments can pronounce the *Proverbs* to be the word of God, and not the Book of *Wiſdom*; and *Eccleſiaſtes* to be Divinely inſpir'd, and not *Eccleſiaſticus*: or elſe the Self-evidence muſt be in the excellency of the Matters which are reveal'd in Scripture; but this ſtill falls very ſhort of reſolving wholly the queſtion, whether *the Scripture be the Word of God?* For the utmoſt that this can reach to is, that the things contain'd in Scripture are of ſo high and excellent a nature, that we cannot conceive that any other ſhou'd be the Author of them but God himſelf; all which being granted, I am as far to ſeek as ever what grounds I have to believe that thoſe particular Writings which we call the Scripture are the Word of God, or that God did immediately imploy ſuch and ſuch Perſons to write ſuch and ſuch Books: for I may believe the ſubſtance of the Doctrine to be of God, and yet not believe the Books wherein it is contain'd, to be a divine and infallible Teſtimony; as is evident in the many excellent Devotional Books which are in the World.

But yet further, if the only ground on which we are to believe a Doctrine Divine be the Self-evidencing Light, and power of it, then I ſuppoſe there was the ſame ground of believing a Divine Teſtimony when the Doctrine was declar'd without Writing, by the firſt Preachers of it. So that by this method of proceeding, the ground of believing Chriſt to be ſent as the *Meſſias* ſent from God, muſt be wholly and ſolely reſolv'd into this, that there was ſo much Self-evidence in this propoſition utter'd by Chriſt, *I am the light of the World*, that all the *Jews* had been bound to have believ'd him ſent from God, (for light manifeſts its ſelf,) altho' our Saviour had never done any one Miracle, to make it appear that he came from God. And we cannot but charge our Saviour on this account with being at a very unneceſſary expence upon the World in doing ſo many Miracles, when the bare naked affirmation that he was the *Meſſias*, had been ſufficient to have convinced the whole World. But is it conceivable then upon what account our Saviour ſhou'd lay ſo much force on the Miracles done by himſelf in order to the proving his Teſtimony to be Divine, that he ſaith himſelf, Joh. 5. 36. *That he had a greater witneſs than that of* John, (who yet doubtleſs had Self-evidencing light going along with his Doctrine too,) *for the works which the Father hath given me to finiſh, the ſame works that I do, bear witneſs of me that the Father hath ſent me?* Can any thing be more plain, or have greater Self-evidence in it, than that our Saviour in theſe words doth lay the evidence of his Divine Teſtimony upon the Miracles which he wrought, which on that account he ſo often appeals to, on this very Joh. 19 25, 38. 14. 11. 15. 24. Reaſon, *becauſe they bear witneſs of him; and if they would not believe him on his own Teſtimony, yet they ought to believe him for his works ſake?* Doth all this now amount only to a removing of Prejudices from the Perſon of Chriſt? which yet according to the tenor of the Objection we are conſidering of, it is impoſſible the power of Miracles ſhou'd do, if theſe Miracles may be ſo far done or counterfeited by falſe Chriſts, that we can have no certain evidence to diſtinguiſh the one from the other.

III. Which the objection pretends; and was the great thing wherein Orig. lib. 2. c. Celſ. *Celſus* the *Epicurean* triumph'd ſo much, that *Chriſt ſhould foretell that others ſhould come and do Miracles which they muſt not hearken to*, and thence wou'd infer as from Chriſt's own confeſſion that Miracles have in them οὐδὲν θεῖον, *nothing divine but what may be done by wicked Men:* πῶς ἂν οὐ σχέτλιον ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων τὸν μὲν θεὸν, τοὺς δὲ γόητας ἡγεῖσθαι; *Is it not a wretched thing*, ſaith he, *that from the ſame works one ſhould be accounted a God, and others Deceivers?* Whereby thoſe who wou'd invalidate the Argument from Miracles, may take notice how finely they fall in with one of the moſt bitter Enemies of Chriſtian Religion, and make uſe of the ſame Arguments which he did; and therefore *Origen*'s reply to him, will reach them too. *For*, ſaith he, *our Saviour in thoſe words of his doth not bid Men beware in general of ſuch as did Miracles*, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῖς ἀναγορεύουσιν ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι τὸν χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ πειρωμένοις διὰ τινῶν φαντασιῶν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιστρέφειν τοὺς Ἰησου μαθητάς· *but bids them beware of that when Men gave themſelves out to be the true Chriſt the Son of God, and endeavour'd to draw Chriſt's Diſciples from him, by ſome mere Appearances inſtead of Miracles.* Therefore Chriſt being evidently made appear to be the Son of God, by the powerful and uncontroul'd Miracles which he wrought, what pretence of Reaſon cou'd there be to hearken to any one who gave themſelves out to be Chriſts, merely from ſome ſtrange Wonders which they wrought? And from hence, as he further obſerves may be juſtly inferr'd contrary to what *Celſus* imagin'd, that there was certainly an evidence of Divine Power in Miracles, when theſe falſe Chriſts gave themſelves out to be Chriſts merely from the ſuppoſal that they had this power of doing Miracles. And ſo it is evident in all the falſe Chriſts which have appear'd, they have made this their great pretence that they did many Signs and Wonders; which God might juſtly permit them to do, to puniſh the great Infidelity of the *Jews*, who wou'd not believe in Chriſt notwithſtanding thoſe frequent and apparent Miracles which he did, which did infinitely tranſcend thoſe of any ſuch Pretenders. Such among the *Jews* were *Jonathas*, who after the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, as *Joſephus* tells us, drew many of the People into the Wilderneſs of *Cyrene*, σημεῖα καὶ φάσματα δείξειν ὑπισχνούμενος, *promiſing to ſhew them many Prodigies and ſtrange Appearances.* Not long after in the times of *Adrian* appear'd that famous Blazing-ſtar *Barchochebas*, who not only portended but brought ſo much miſchief upon the *Jews*; his pretence was that he vomited Flames; and ſo he did, ſuch as conſum'd himſelf and his Followers: after him many other Impoſtors aroſe in *Ægypt*, *Cyprus* and *Crete*, who all went upon the ſame pretence of doing Miracles. In latter times the famous Impoſtor was *David el-David*, whoſe ſtory is thus briefly reported by *David Ganz*. *David el-David pretended to be the true Meſſias and rebelled againſt the King of* Perſia, *and did many Signs and Prodigies before the* Jews *and the King of* Perſia: *at laſt his head was cut off, and the* Jews *fined an hundred Talents of Gold.* In the Epiſtle of *Rambam* or *R Moſes Maimon.* it is ſaid, *That the King of* Perſia *deſired of him a Sign, and he told him that he ſhould cut off his Head and he would riſe again*; (which he cunningly deſir'd to avoid being tormented,) *which the King was reſolv'd to try, and accordingly executed him*; but I ſuppoſe his Reſurrection and *Mahomet*'s will be both in one day, altho' *Maimonides* tells us, *ſome of the* Jews *are yet ſuch Fools as to expect his Reſurrection.* Several other Impoſtors *Maimonides* mentions in his Epiſtle *de Auſtrali regione.* One who pretended to be the *Meſſias* becauſe he cur'd himſelf of the *Leproſy* in a night; ſeveral others he mentions in *Spain*, *France*, and other Parts, and the iſſue of them all was only a further aggravation of the Miſeries and Captivities of the poor *Jews*, who were ſo credulous in following Impoſtors, and yet ſuch ſtrange Infidels where there were plain and undoubted Miracles to perſuade them to believe in our bleſſed Saviour as the true *Meſſias*. We freely grant then that many pretended Miracles may be done in the World, to deceive Men with; but doth it hence follow that either there are no true Miracles done in the World, or that there are no certain Rules to diſtingiſh the one from the other? But as *Origen* yet further replies to *Celſus*, as a Wolf doth very much reſemble a Dog, yet they are not of the ſame kind; nor a Turtle-Dove and a Pigeon; ſo that which is produced by a Divine Power is not of the ſame nature with that which is produced by *Magic*; but as he argues, *Is it poſſible that there ſhould be only deceits in the World and Magical operations? and can there be no true Miracles at all wrought? Is Humane nature only capable of Impoſtures, or can none work Miracles but Devils? Where there is a worſe, there may be a better; and ſo from the Impoſtures and Counterfeits, we may infer that there are true Miracles, wrought by a Divine Power; otherwiſe it were all one as to ſay, there are Counterfeits but no Jewels; or there are Sophiſms and Paralogiſms, but no legitimate Demonſtrations: if then there be ſuch deceits, there are true Miracles too; all the buſineſs is*

Tzemach David n. 895.

V. ep. Maimon. in not. Vorſtii and Tzem. Dav.

βεβασανισμένως τοὺς ἐπαγγελλομένους τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξετάζειν, ſtrictly and ſeverely to examine the pretenders to them, and that from the Life and Manners of thoſe that do them, and from the effects and conſequents of them, whether they do good or hurt in the world, whether they correct Mens manners, or bring Men to goodneſs, holineſs, and truth; and on this account we are neither to reject all Miracles, nor embrace all pretences, but carefully and prudently examine the rational evidences whereby thoſe which are true and Divine, may be known from ſuch as are Counterfeit and Diabolical.

IV. And this now leads us to the main ſubject of this Chapter, *viz. What Rules we have to proceed by, in judging Miracles to be true or falſe* which may be theſe following.

1. *True divine Miracles are wrought in confirmation of ſome Divine Teſtimony.* Becauſe we have manifeſted by all the precedent diſcourſe, that the intention of Miracles is to ſeal ſome Divine Revelation. Therefore if God ſhou'd work Miracles when no Divine Teſtimony is to be confirm'd, God would ſet the Broad-Seal of Heaven to a Blank. If it be ſaid no, *becauſe it will witneſs to us now the truth of that Teſtimony which was deliver'd ſo many Ages ſince*; I anſwer, 1. The truth of that Teſtimony was ſufficiently ſeal'd at the time of the delivery of it, and is conveyed down in a certain way to us. Is it not ſufficient that the Charter of a Corporation had the Prince's Broad-Seal in the time of the giving of it, but that every ſucceſſion of Men in that Corporation muſt have a new Broad-Seal, or elſe they ought to queſtion their Patent? What ground can there be for that, when the original Seal and Patent is preſerv'd, and is certainly convey'd down from Age to Age? So I ſay it is as to us, God's Grand Charter of Grace and Mercy to the World thro' Jeſus Chriſt, was Seal'd by Divine Miracles, at the delivery of it to the World; the original Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures wherein the Charter is contain'd, is convey'd in a moſt certain manner to us; to this Patent the Seal is annex'd, and in it are contain'd thoſe undoubted Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of it; ſo that a new ſealing of this Patent is wholly needleſs, unleſs we have ſome cauſe of ſuſpicion, that the original Patent it ſelf were loſt, or the firſt ſealing was not true. If the latter, then Chriſtian Religion is not true, if the Miracles wrought for confirmation of it were falſe, becauſe the truth of it depends ſo much on the Verity and Divinity of the Miracles which were then wrought. If the firſt be ſuſpected, *viz.* the certain conveyance of the Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures, ſome certain grounds of ſuch a ſuſpicion muſt be diſcover'd in a matter of ſo great moment, eſpecially when the great and many Societies of the Chriſtian World do all conſent unanimouſly in the contrary. Nay it is impoſſible that any rational Man can conceive that the Patent which we now rely upon, is ſuppoſititious or corrupted in any of thoſe things which are of concernment to the Chriſtian World; and that on theſe accounts.

1. *From the watchfulneſs of Divine Providence for the good of Mankind.* Can we conceive that there is a God who rules and takes care of the World, and who to manifeſt his ſignal love to Mankind, ſhou'd not only grant a Patent of Mercy to the World, by his Son Chriſt, and then ſeal'd it by Divine Miracles, and in order to the certain conveyance of it to the World, caus'd it by Perſons imploy'd by himſelf, to be recorded in a Language fitteſt for its diſperſing up and down the World, (all which I here ſuppoſe:) Can we I ſay conceive that this God ſhou'd ſo far have caſt off his care of the World and the good of Mankind, which

was the original ground of the Grant it ſelf, as to ſuffer any wicked Men or malignant Spirits to corrupt or alter any of thoſe Terms in it, on which Mens eternal Salvation depends; much leſs wholly to ſuppreſs and deſtroy it, and to ſend forth one that is counterfeit and ſuppoſititious inſtead of it, and which ſhou'd not be diſcover'd by the Chriſtians of that Age wherein that corrupt Copy was ſet forth, nor by any of the moſt learned and inquiſitive Chriſtians ever ſince? They who can give any the leaſt entertainment to ſo wild, abſurd and irrational an Imagination, are ſo far from Reaſon, that they are in good diſpoſition to *Atheiſm*; and next to the ſuſpecting the Scriptures to be corrupted, they may rationally ſuſpect there is no ſuch thing as a God and Providence in the World; or that the World is govern'd by a Spirit moſt malignant and envious of the good of Mankind. Which is a ſuſpicion only becoming thoſe Heathens (among whom it was very frequent) who worſhipped the Devils inſtead of God.

2. *Becauſe of the general diſperſion of Copies in the World upon the firſt publiſhing of them.* We cannot otherwiſe conceive, but that Records containing ſo weighty and important things wou'd be tranſcrib'd by all thoſe Churches which believe the truth of the things contain'd in them. We ſee how far curioſity will carry Men as to the care of tranſcribing ancient *MSS.* of old Authors, which contain only ſome Hiſtory of things paſt that are of no great concernment to us: Can we then imagine thoſe who ventur'd Eſtates and Lives upon the truth of the things reveal'd in Scripture, wou'd not be very careful to preſerve the authentic Inſtrument whereby they are reveal'd in a certain way to the whole World? And beſides this, for a long time the Originals themſelves of the Apoſtolical Writings were preſerv'd in the Church; which makes *Tertullian* in his time appeal to them. *Age jam qui voles curioſitatem melius exercere in negotio ſalutis tuæ; percurre Eccleſias Apoſtolicas, apud quas ipſæ adhuc cathedræ Apoſtolorum ſuis locis præſidentur, apud quas ipſæ authenticæ eorum literæ recitantur, ſonantes vocem, & repræſentantes faciem uniuſcujuſque.* Now how was it poſſible that in that time the Scriptures could be corrupted, when in ſome of the Churches the original Writings of the Apoſtles were preſerv'd in a continual ſucceſſion of Perſons from the Apoſtles themſelves, and from theſe Originals ſo many Copies were tranſcrib'd, as were convey'd almoſt all the World over, thro' the large ſpread of the Chriſtian Churches at that time? And therefore it is impoſſible to conceive that a Copy ſhould be corrupted in one Church, when it wou'd ſo ſpeedily be diſcovered by another; eſpecially conſidering theſe three circumſtances. 1. The innumerable multitude of Copies which wou'd ſpeedily be taken, both conſidering the moment of the thing, and the eaſineſs of doing it; God, probably for that very end, not loading the World with *Pandects* and *Codes* of his Laws, but contriving the whole Inſtruments of Man's Salvation in ſo narrow a compaſs, that it might be eaſily preſerv'd and tranſcrib'd by ſuch who were paſſionate admirers of the Scriptures. 2. The great numbers of learned and inquiſitive Men who ſoon ſprung up in the Chriſtian Church; whoſe great care was to explain and vindicate the ſacred Scriptures; can we then think that all theſe Watchmen ſhould be aſleep together when the Evil one came to ſow his Tares, which it is moſt unreaſonable to imagine, when in the Writings of all theſe learned Men, which were very many and voluminous, ſo much of the Scripture was inſerted, that had there been corruptions in the Copies themſelves, yet comparing them

De præſcript. adv. hæret. c. 36.

them with thoſe Writings, the corruptions wou'd be ſoon diſcover'd? 3. The great veneration which all Chriſtians had of the Scripture, that they placed the hopes of their eternal Happineſs, upon the truth of the things contain'd in the Scriptures: Can we then think theſe would ſuffer any material Alteration to creep into theſe Records without their obſerving and diſcovering it? Can we now think when all perſons are ſo exceeding careful of their Deeds, and the Records whereon their Eſtates depend, that the Chriſtians who valu'd not this World in compariſon of that to come, ſhould ſuffer the *Magna Charta* of that to be loſt, corrupted, or imbezzelled away? Eſpecially conſidering what care and induſtry was us'd by many Primitive Chriſtians to compare Copies together, as is evident in *Pantænus*, who brought the *Hebrew* Copy of *Matthew* out of the *Indies* to *Alexandria*, as *Euſebius* tells us in *Pamphilus* and the Library he errected at *Cæſarea*, but eſpecially in *Origen*'s admirable *Hexapla*, which were mainly intended for this end.

3. It is impoſſible to conceive a corruption of the Copy of the Scriptures, becauſe of the great differences which were all along the ſeveral ages of the Church, between thoſe who acknowledg'd the Scriptures to be Divine. So that if one party of them had foiſted in, or taken out any thing, another party was ready to take notice of it, and wou'd be ſure to tell the World of it. And this might be one great reaſon, why God in his wiſe Providence might permit ſuch an encreaſe of *Hereſies* in the Infancy of the Church, *viz.* that thereby Chriſtians might be forced to ſtand upon their guard, and to have a ſpecial Eye to the Scriptures, which were always the great Eye-ſores of *Heretics*. And from this great warineſs of the Church it was that ſome of the Epiſtles were ſo long abroad before they found general entertainment in all the Churches of Chriſt, becauſe in thoſe Epiſtles which were doubted for ſome time, there were ſome paſſages which ſeemed to favour ſome of the Hereſies then abroad; but when upon ſevere enquiry they are found to be what they pretended, they were receiv'd in all the Chriſtian Churches.

4. Becauſe of the agreement between the Old Teſtament and the New: the Prophecies of the Old Teſtament appear with their full accompliſhment in the New which we have; ſo that it is impoſſible to think the New ſhould be corrupted unleſs the Old were too, which is moſt unreaſonable to imagine, when the *Jews*, who had been the great Conſervators of the Old Teſtament, have been all along the moſt inveterate Enemies of the Chriſtians: So that we cannot at all conceive it poſſible that any material Corruptions or Alterations ſhou'd creep into the Scriptures, much leſs that the true Copy ſhou'd be loſt, and a new one forged.

V. Suppoſing then that we have the ſame Authentic Records preſerv'd and handed down to us by the care of all Chriſtian Churches, which were written in the firſt Ages of the Church of Chriſt: what neceſſity can we imagine that God ſhou'd work new Miracles to confirm that Doctrine which is convey'd down in a certain uninterrupted way to us, as being ſeal'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine in the firſt Promulgation and Penning of it? And this is the firſt Reaſon why the truth of the Scriptures need not now be ſeal'd by new Miracles. 2. Another may be, becauſe God in the Scripture hath appointed other things to continue in his Church, to be as Seals to his People of the truth of the things contain'd in Scriptures. Such are outwardly, the Sacraments of the Goſpel,

ſpel, Baptiſm, and the Lord's Supper, which are ſet apart as Seals to confirm the truth of the Covenant on God's part towards us in reference to the great Promiſes contain'd in it, in reference to pardon of Sin, and the ground of our Acceptance with God by Jeſus Chriſt: and inwardly God hath promis'd his Spirit to be as a Witneſs within them, that by its working and ſtrengthning Grace in the hearts of Believers, it may confirm to them the truth of the Records of Scripture, when they find the Counter-part of them written in their Hearts by the finger of the Spirit of God. It cannot then be with any reaſon at all ſuppos'd, that when a Divine Teſtimony is already confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine, that new Miracles ſhou'd be wrought in the Church to aſſure us of the truth of it. So *Chryſoſtom* fully expreſſeth himſelf concerning Miracles, ſpeaking of the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church: καὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε χρησίμως ἐγένετο, καὶ νῦν χρησίμως οὐ γίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων γραφῶν καὶ τῶν τότε σημείων τὴν πίστιν ὧν λέγομεν παρεχόμεθα. *Miracles were very uſeful then, and not at all now; for now we manifeſt the truth of what we ſpeak from the ſacred Scriptures, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of them.* Which that excellent Author there fully manifeſts in a Diſcourſe on this ſubject, *Why Miracles were neceſſary in the beginning of the Chriſtian Church, and are not now.* To the ſame purpoſe St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks, where he diſcourſeth of the truth of Religion: *Accepimus majores noſtros viſibilia miracula ſecutos eſſe: per quos id actum eſt ut neceſſaria non eſſent poſteris*; becauſe the World believed by the Miracles which were wrought at the firſt preaching of the Goſpel, therefore Miracles are no longer neceſſary. For we cannot conceive how the World ſhou'd be at firſt induced to believe without manifeſt and uncontrouled Miracles. For as *Chryſoſtom* ſpeaks, εἰ σημείων χωρὶς ἔπεισαν, πολλῷ μεῖζον τὸ θαῦμα φαίνεται. *It was the greateſt Miracle of all, if the World ſhou'd believe without Miracles.* Which the Poet *Dantes* hath well expreſs'd in the Twenty fourth *Canto* of *Paradiſe*. For when the *Apoſtle* is there brought in, asking the Poet upon what account he took the Scriptures of the *Old and New Teſtament to be the Word of* God; his Anſwer is,

Chryſoſt. in 1 Cor. 2. *Hom.* 6. p. 266. *To.* 3. ed. *Æton.*

De ver. Relig. cap. 25.

Probatio quæ verum hoc mihi recludit,
Sunt opera, quæ ſecuta ſunt, ad quæ Natura
Non candefecit ferrum unquam aut percuſſit incudem.

i. e. *The evidence of that is the Divine Power of Miracles which was in thoſe who deliver'd thoſe things to the World.* And when the *Apoſtle* catechiſeth him further, *how he knew thoſe Miracles were ſuch as they pretended to be,* viz *that they were true and Divine*; his Anſwer is,

Si orbis terræ ſeſe convertit ad Chriſtianiſmum,
Inquiebam ego; ſine miraculis: hoc unum
Eſt tale, ut reliqua non ſint ejus centeſima pars.

i. e. *If the World ſhou'd be converted to the* Chriſtian Faith *without Miracles, this wou'd be ſo great a Miracle, that others were not to be compar'd with it.* I conclude this then with that known ſaying of St. *Auſtin*; *Quiſquis adhuc prodigia, ut credat, inquiret, magnum eſt ipſe prodigium qui mundo credente non credit. He that ſeeks for Miracles ſtill to induce him to Faith, when the World is converted to the* Chriſtian Faith, *he needs not ſeek*

De Civit. Dei, l. 22. *cap.* 8.

'*ſeek for prodigies abroad; he wants only a looking-glaſs to diſcover one.* For as he goes on, *Unde temporibus eruditis, & omne quod fieri non poteſt reſpuentibus, ſine ullis miraculis nimium mirabiliter incredibilia credidit mundus? Whence came it to paſs that in ſo learned and wary an Age as that was which the Apoſtles preach'd in, the World without Miracles ſhou'd be brought to believe things ſo ſtrangely incredible as thoſe were which* Chriſt *and his Apoſtles preached?* So that by this it appears that the intention of Miracles was to confirm a Divine Teſtimony to the World, and to make that appear credible which otherwiſe wou'd have ſeemed incredible; but to what end now, when this Divine Teſtimony is believ'd in the World, ſhou'd Miracles be continu'd among thoſe who believe the Doctrine to be Divine, the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it to have been true, and the Scriptures which contain both, to be the undoubted Word of God? To what purpoſe then the huge out-cry of Miracles in the *Roman* Church is, is hard to conceive, unleſs it be to make it appear how ambitious that Church is of being called by the 2 Theſ. 2. 9. 10. name of him, *whoſe coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and ſigns, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableneſs of unrighteouſneſs in them that periſh, becauſe they receiv'd not the love of the Truth that they might be ſav'd.* For had they not receiv'd the Love of the Truth of the Goſpel, they wou'd have believ'd it on the account of thoſe Miracles, and Signs, and wonders which were wrought for the confirmation of it, by Chriſt and his *Apoſtles*; and not have gone about by their Juglings and Impoſtures, inſtead of bringing Men to believe the Goſpel, to make them queſtion the truth of the firſt Miracles when they ſee ſo many Counterfeits; had we not great aſſurance the *Apoſtles* were Men of other deſigns and Intereſts than *Popiſh* Prieſts are, and that there is not now any ſuch neceſſity of Miracles, as there was then when a Divine Teſtimony revealing the truth of *Chriſtian Religion* was confirm'd by them.

VI. 2. *Thoſe Miracles cannot be Divine, which are done now for the confirmation of any thing contrary to that Divine Teſtimony, which is confirm'd by uncontrouled Divine Miracles.* The caſe is not the ſame now, which was before the coming of Chriſt; for then tho' the Law of *Moſes* was confirm'd by Miracles; yet tho' the Doctrine of Chriſt did null the obligation of that Law, the Miracles of Chriſt were to be look'd on as Divine, becauſe God did not intend the Ceremonial Law to be perpetual; and there were many Prophecies which cou'd not have their accompliſhment but under a new State: But now under the Goſpel, God hath declar'd this to be the laſt Revelation of his Mind and Will to the World by his Son, that now the Prophecies of the Old Teſtament are accompliſh'd, and the Prophecies of the New reſpect only the various conditions of the *Chriſtian Church*, without any the leaſt intimation of any further Revelation of God's Mind and Will to the World: So that now the Scriptures are our adequate Rule of Faith, and that according to which we are to judge all pretenders to Inſpiration or Miracles. And according to this Rule we are to proceed in any thing which is propounded to us to believe by any Perſons, upon any pretences whatſoever. Under the Law after the eſtabliſhment of the Law its ſelf by the Miracles of *Moſes*, the Rule of judging all pretenders to Miracles, was by the Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. worſhip of the true God. *If there ariſe among you a Prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a ſign, or a wonder, and the ſign or the wonder come to paſs, whereof he ſpake to thee, ſaying,* Let us go after other

Gods (which thou haſt not known) and let us ſerve them; thou ſhalt not hearken unto the words of that Prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your ſoul. Whereby it is plain, that after the true Doctrine is confirm'd by Divine Miracles, God may give the Devil or falſe Prophets power to work, if not real Miracles, yet ſuch as Men cannot judge by the things themſelves whether they be real or no; and this God may do for the tryal of Mens Faith, whether they will forſake the true Doctrine confirm'd by greater Miracles for the ſake of ſuch Doctrines which are contrary thereto, and are confirm'd by falſe Prophets, by Signs and Wonders. Now in this caſe our Rule of tryal muſt not be ſo much the Wonders conſider'd in themſelves whether real or no, as the comparing them with the Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of that Doctrine, which is contrary to this, which theſe Wonders tend to the proving of. Therefore God's People under the Law were to examine the ſcope and drift of the Miracles; if they were intended to bring them to Idolatry, whatever they were, they were not to hearken to thoſe who did them. So now under the Goſpel, as the worſhip of the true God was then the Standard whereby to judge of Miracles by the Law of *Moſes*, ſo the worſhip of the true God thro' Jeſus Chriſt, and by the Doctrine reveal'd by him, is the Standard whereby we ought to judge of all pretenders to work Miracles. So that let the Miracles be what they will, if they contradict that Doctrine which Chriſt reveal'd to the World, we are to look upon them as only tryals of our Faith in Chriſt, to ſee whether we *love him with our whole hearts* or no. And therefore I think it needleſs to examine all the particulars of *Lipſius* his Relations of Miracles wrought by his *Diva Virgo Hallenſis* and *Aſprecollis*; for if I ſee that their intention and ſcope is to ſet up the worſhip of *Dæmons*, or a middle ſort of *Deities* between God and us, which the Scripture is ignorant of, on that very account I am bound to reject them all. Altho' I think it very poſſible to find out the difference between true Miracles and them, in the manner and circumſtances of their operation; but this, as it is of more curioſity, ſo of leſs neceſſity; for if the Doctrine of the Scriptures was confirm'd by Miracles infinitely above theſe, I am bound to adhere to that, and not to believe any other Doctrine, *though an Angel from Heaven ſhould preach it*, much leſs, altho' ſome *Popiſh* Prieſts may boaſt much of Miracles to confirm a Doctrine oppoſite to the Goſpel: which I know not how far God may in judgment give thoſe Images Power to work, or others Faith to believe, becauſe they wou'd not receive the truth in the love of it: and theſe are now thoſe τέρατα ψεύδους, *lying wonders*, which the Scripture forewarns us that we ſhould not believe, *viz.* ſuch as lead men to the belief of Lyes, or of Doctrines, contrary to that of the Goſpel of Jeſus Chriſt. 2 Theſ. 2. 9.

VII. 3. *Where Miracles are true and divine, there the effects which follow them upon the Minds of thoſe who believe them, are true and divine, i. e.* the effect of believing of them, is the drawing of men from ſin unto God. This the Primitive *Chriſtians* inſiſted much upon, as an undoubted Evidence that the Miracles of Chriſt were wrought by a Divine power, becauſe the effect which follow'd them, *was the work of converſion of Souls from ſin and Idols to God and Chriſt, and all true piety and vertue.* As the effect of the Miracles of *Moſes* was the drawing a People off from Superſtition and Idolatry to the worſhip of the true God; ſo the effect which follow'd the Belief of the Miracles of Chriſt in the World was the purging Mens Souls from all ſin and wickedneſs to make them New Creatures, and to live in all exactneſs and holineſs of converſation. And thereby *Origen* diſcovers the great difference between the Miracles of Chriſt and *Antichriſt*, that the intent of all *Antichriſt*'s Wonders was *to* Lib.2.cont. Ceſ. *bring men* εἰς ἀπάτην τῆς ἀδικίας, *to the deceivableneſs of unrighteouſneſs, whereby to deſtroy them*; *but the intent of the Miracles of Chriſt was* οὐκ ἀπάτη ἀλλὰ σωτηρία ψυχῶν, *not the deceiving but the ſaving of Souls*; τίς γὰρ τὸν κρείττονα βίον καὶ συστέλλοντα τὰ τῆς κακίας ὁσημέραι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, εὐλόγως φησὶν ἀπὸ ἀπάτης γίνεσθαι; *who can with any probability ſay that reformation of life and daily progreſs from evil to good ſhould be the effect of mere deceit?* And therefore he ſaith, *Chriſt told his Diſciples, that they ſhou'd do greater works than he had done*; *becauſe by their Preaching and Miracles the eyes of blind Souls are opened, and the ears of ſuch as were deaf to all goodneſs are opened ſo far as to hearken to the Precepts and Promiſes of the Goſpel: and the feet of thoſe who were lame in their inward man, are ſo healed as to delight to run in the ways of God's Commandments.* Now is it poſſible that theſe ſhou'd be the effects of any evil Spirit? But on the contrary we ſee the effects of all Impoſtures, and pretended Miracles wrought by Diabolical power, was to bring men off from God to ſin, and to diſſolve that ſtrict obligation to duty which was laid upon Men by the Goſpel of *Chriſt*. Thus it was in that early Ape of the *Apoſtles*, *Simon Magus*, who far out-went *Apollonius Tyanæus* or any other Heathen in his pretended Miracles, according to the report which is given of him by the Primitive Chriſtians; but we ſee the intent of his Miracles, was to raiſe an admiration of himſelf, and to bring men off from all holineſs of converſation, by aſſerting among other damnable Hereſies, that God did not at all regard *what Men did, but only what they believed*: wherein the *Gnoſtics* where his followers. Now when Miracles are wrought to be Patrons of ſin, we may eaſily know from whom they come. V. Grot. in 2 Theſ. 2. 9. in opuſc.

VIII. 4. *Thoſe Miracles are wrought by a Divine Power, which tend to the overthrow of the Kingdom of Satan in the World.* This is evident from hence, becauſe all ſuch things as are out of Man's power to effect, muſt either be done by a Power *Divine* or *Diabolical*: For as our Saviour argues, *Every Kingdom divided againſt its ſelf is brought to deſolation, and every City or Houſe divided againſt its ſelf cannot ſtand*; *and if Satan caſt out Satan, he is divided againſt himſelf, how ſhall then his Kingdom ſtand?* Matth.12. 25, 26. Now *Chriſt* by his Miracles did not diſpoſſeſs Satan out of Mens Bodies, but out of his Temples too, as hath been ſhewn already. And beſides, the Doctrine of Chriſt which was confirm'd by thoſe Miracles, was in every thing directly contrary to the Devils deſign in the World. For, as The Devil's deſign was to conceal himſelf among thoſe who worſhipp'd him; the deſign of the Goſpel was to diſcover him whom the *Gentiles* worſhipped, to be an evil and malignant Spirit, that deſign'd nothing but their ruin. Now it appears in the whole Hiſtory of *Gentiliſm*, the grand Myſtery of Satan which the Devil us'd among the *Heathens* was to make himſelf to be taken and worſhipp'd for God, and to make them believe that their *Dæmons* were very good and benign Spirits; which made the *Platoniſts* and other Philoſophers ſo much incenſed againſt the Primitive *Chriſtians*, when they declar'd their *Dæmons* to be nothing elſe but infernal and wicked Spirits which ſought the deſtruction of Souls.

2. *The Devil's great deſign was to draw men to the practice of the greateſt wickedneſs under a pretence of Religion*; as is very obſervable in all the *Heathen* Myſteries, which the more *recondite* and hidden they were, the greater wickedneſs lay at the bottom of them, and ſo were to purpoſe *Myſteries of Iniquity:* But now the deſign of the Goſpel was to promote the greateſt purity both of Heart and Life; there being in no other Religion in the World either ſuch incomparable Precepts of Holineſs, or ſuch incouraging Promiſes to the practice of it (from eternal Life hereafter as the Reward, and the aſſiſtance of God's Spirit to help Men here) or ſuch prevailing motives to perſuade men to it, from the *love of God in Chriſt to the World*, the *Undertakings of Chriſt for us* in his Death and Sufferings, the excellent Pattern we have to follow in our Saviour's own example: now theſe things make it plain that the deſign of *Chriſt* and the *Devil* are diametrically oppoſite to each other. 3. The deſign of the *Devil* is to ſet God and Mankind at the greateſt diſtance from each other; the deſign of *Chriſt* in the Goſpel is to bring them nearer together. The *Devil* firſt tempts to ſin, and then from ſin he makes Men preſume to ſin, and to deſpair becauſe they have ſinned. *Chriſt* firſt keeps Men from ſin, by his Precepts and Threatnings; and then ſuppoſing ſin, incourageth them to repent with hopes of pardon procur'd by himſelf for all truly penitent and believing Sinners. Thus in every thing the deſign of *Chriſt* and the *Devil* are contrary, which makes it evident that the Miracles wrought in confirmation of the Doctrine of *Chriſt* cou'd be from no evil Spirit, and therefore muſt be from a truly Divine Power.

IX.

5. *True and Divine Miracles may be known and diſtinguiſhed from falſe and diabolical, from the circumſtances, or the manner of their operation.* There were ſome peculiar Signatures on the Miracles of *Chriſt* which are not to be found in any wrought by a power leſs than Divine. Which *Arnobius* well expreſſeth in theſe words to the *Heathens*. *Poteſtis aliquem nobis deſignare, monſtrare ex omnibus illis Magis qui unquam fuere per ſecula, conſimile aliquid Chriſto milleſima ex parte qui fecerit? qui ſine ulla vi carminum, ſine herbarum aut graminum ſuccis, ſine ulla aliqua obſervatione ſollicita ſacrorum, libaminum, temporum?*——*Atqui conſtitit Chriſtum ſine ullis adminiculis rerum, ſine ullius ritus obſervatione, vel lege, omnia illa quæ fecit, nominis ſui poſſibilitate feciſſe, & quod proprium, conſentaneum, Deo dignum fuerat, vero nihil nocens aut noxium, ſed opiferum, ſed ſalutare, ſed auxiliaribus plenum bonis poteſtatis munificæ liberalitate donaſſe?* He challengeth the *Heathens* to produce any one of all their *Magicians* who did the thouſandth part of what our Saviour did: who made uſe of none of their *Magical* Rites and Obſervations in whatever he did; and whatever he did was merely by his own power, and was withal moſt becoming God, and moſt beneficial to the World. And thence he proceeds to anſwer the *Heathens* about the Miracles wrought by their Gods, which fell ſhort of thoſe of Chriſt in three main particulars, the *Manner* of their working, the *Number* of them, and the *Quality* of the things done.

Arnob. c. gentes, l. 1. pag. 25, 26, &c.

1. *The manner of their working.* What they did was with a great deal of pomp and ceremony; what Chriſt did was with a word ſpeaking, and ſometimes without it by the touch of his Garment: *Non inquiro, non exigo*, ſaith he, *quis Deus, aut quo tempore, cui fuerit auxiliatus, aut quem fractum reſtituerit ſanitati; illud ſolum audire deſidero, an ſine ullius adjunctione materiæ*, i. e. *medicaminis alicujus ad tactum mor-*

bos juſſerit ab hominibus evolare, imperaverit, fecerit, & emori valetudinum cauſam, & debilium corpora ad ſuas remeare naturas. Omitting all other circumſtances, name me, ſaith he, *but which of your Gods ever cured a Diſeaſe without any adjoined matter, ſome preſcriptions or other; or which of them ever commanded Diſeaſes out of Bodies by their mere touch, and quite remov'd the cauſe of the Diſtempers. Æſculapius,* he ſays, cured Diſeaſes, but in the way that ordinary *Phyſicians* do, by preſcribing ſome thing or other to be done by the Patients. *Nulla autem virtus eſt medicaminibus amovere quæ noceant; beneficia iſta rerum, non ſunt curantium poteſtates. To cure Diſeaſes by Preſcriptions argues no power at all in the preſcriber, but virtue in the Medicine.*

2. *In the number of the Perſons cured.* They were very few which were cured in the *Heathen* Temples; Chriſt cured whole multitudes, and that not in the Reveſtries of the Temples where fraud and impoſture might be eaſily ſuſpected, but in the preſence of the People who brought to him all manner of Perſons ſick of all ſorts of Diſeaſes, which were cured by him, and theſe ſo numerous, that the *Evangeliſt* who records many of Chriſt's Miracles which had been omitted by the other, yet tells us at laſt, the Miracles of Chriſt were ſo many, *that the whole World would not contain them.* But now *Arnobius* tells the *Heathens, Quid prodeſt oſtendere unum aut alterum fortaſſe curatos, cum tot millibus ſubvenerit nemo, & plena ſint omnia miſerorum infeliciumque delubra? What matter is it to ſhew one or two cured, when thouſands lie continually periſhing for want of cure?* yea ſuch as did *Æſculapium ipſum precibus fatigare, & invitare miſerrimis votis,* that cou'd not beg a cure of *Æſculapius* with all their earneſtneſs and importunity. Joh. 21. 25.

3. *In the quality of the Diſeaſes cured.* The cures among the *Heathens* were ſome ſlight things in compariſon of thoſe performed by Chriſt; the moſt Acute, the moſt Chronical, the moſt Malignant of Diſeaſes, cur'd by a Touch, a Word, a Thought. A Learned *Phyſician* hath undertaken to make it evident from the circumſtances of the Hiſtory, and from the received Principles among the moſt Authentic *Phyſicians,* that the Diſeaſes cured by our Saviour, were all incurable by the Rules of *Phyſic*; if ſo, the greater the power of our Saviour, who cured them with ſo much facility as he did. And he not only cured all Diſeaſes himſelf, but gave a power to others, who were not at all verſed in matters of Art and Subtilty, that they ſhou'd do Miracles likewiſe *ſine fucis & adminiculis, without any fraud or aſſiſtance: quid dicitis O mentes incredulæ, difficiles, duræ! alicuine mortalium Jupiter ille Capitolinus hujuſmodi poteſtatem dedit?* When did ever the great *Jupiter Capitolinus give a power of working Miracles to any? I do not ſay,* ſaith he, *of raiſing the dead, or curing the blind, or healing the lame; ſed ut puſtulam, reduviam, populam, aut vocis imperio aut manus contrectatione comprimeret: but to cure a wart, a pimple, any the moſt trivial thing, with a word ſpeaking, or the touch of the hand.* Upon this *Arnobius* challengeth the moſt famous of all the *Heathen Magicians, Zoroaſtres, Armenius, Pamphilus, Apollonius, Damigero, Dardanus, Velus, Julianus,* and *Bæbulus,* or any other renowned *Magician* to give power to any one to make the dumb to ſpeak, the deaf to hear, the blind to ſee, or bring life into a dead Body. Or if this be too hard, with all their *Magic* Rites and *Incantations,* but to do that *quod à ruſticis Chriſtianis juſſionibus factitatum eſt nudis, which ordinary* Chriſtians *do by their mere words:* So great a difference was there between the higheſt that cou'd be done by Gul. Ader. de morbis Evangel.

Magic, and the leaſt that was done by the Name and Power of Chriſt.

6. *Where Miracles are truly Divine, God makes it evident to all impartial judgments that the things done exceed all created power.* X. For which purpoſe we are to obſerve that tho' Impoſtures and Deluſions may go far, the power of *Magicians* further when God permits them; yet when God works Miracles to confirm a Divine Teſtimony, he makes it evident that His power doth infinitely exceed them all. This is moſt conſpicuous, in the caſe of *Moſes* and our Bleſſed Saviour. Firſt *Moſes*, he began to do ſome Miracles in the preſence of *Pharaoh* and the *Ægyptians*, 8. 10, 12. *turning his Rod into a Serpent*; but we do not find *Pharaoh* at all amaz'd at it, but ſends preſently for the *Magicians* to do the ſame, who did it (whether really or only in appearance, is not material to our purpoſe,) but Aaron's *Rod ſwallowed up theirs.* The next time *the waters are turned into blood* by *Moſes*. Exod. 7. 19, 22. The *Magicians they do ſo too.* After this, *Moſes brings up Frogs upon the land, ſo do the Magicians.* 8. 6, 7. So that here now is a plain and open conteſt in the preſence of *Pharaoh* and his People, between *Moſes* and the *Magicians*, and they try for Victory over each other; ſo that if *Moſes* do no more than they, they wou'd look upon him but as a *Magician*; but if *Moſes* do that which by the acknowledgment of theſe *Magicians* themſelves cou'd be only by Divine Power, then it is demonſtrably evident that his power was as far above the power of *Magic*, as God is above the *Devil*. Accordingly we find it in the very next Miracle in *turning the duſt into Ciniphes* (which we render) *lice*, the *Magicians* are *non-pluſt*, and give out, ſaying in plain terms, *This is the finger of God.* And what greater acknowledgment 8. 19. can there be of Divine Power than the confeſſion of thoſe who ſeem'd to conteſt with it, and to imitate it as much as poſſible? After this we find not the *Magicians* offering to conteſt with *Moſes*, and in the plague of *Boils*, we particularly read *that they could not ſtand* before 2. 11. *Moſes*. Thus we ſee in the caſe of *Moſes* how evident it was that there was a power above all power of *Magic* which did appear in *Moſes*. And ſo likewiſe in the caſe of our Bleſſed Saviour; for altho' *Simon Magus*, *Apollonius*, or others might do ſome ſmall things, or make ſome great ſhew and noiſe by what they did; yet none of them ever came near the doing things of the ſame kind which our Saviour did, curing *the born-blind*, *reſtoring the dead to life after four days*, and ſo as to live a conſiderable time after; or in the manner he did them, with a Word, a Touch, with that frequency and openneſs before his greateſt Enemies as well as Followers, and in ſuch an uncontroul'd manner, that neither *Jews* nor *Heathens* ever queſtion'd the truth of them. And after all theſe, when he was laid in the grave after his *Crucifixion*, exactly according to his own prediction, he aroſe again the third day, and appear'd frequently among his Diſciples for forty days together. After which in their preſence, he *aſcended up to Heaven*, and ſoon after, made good his promiſe to them, *by ſending his Holy Spirit upon them*, by which they ſpake with Tongues, wrought Miracles, went up and down preaching the Goſpel of Chriſt with great boldneſs, cheerfulneſs and conſtancy, and after undergoing a great deal of hardſhip in it, they ſeal'd the truth of all they ſpake with their Blood, laying down their Lives to give witneſs to it. Thus abundantly to the ſatiſfaction of the minds of all good Men hath God given the higheſt Rational Evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he hath reveal'd to the World. And thus I have finiſhed the Second

Part of my Task, which concern'd the *Rational Evidence* of the truth of *Divine Revelation* from the Perſons who were imploy'd to deliver God's mind to the World: And therein have, I hope, made it evident that both *Moſes* and the *Prophets*, our *Saviour* and his *Apoſtles*, did come with ſufficient *Rational Evidence* to convince the World that they were Perſons immediately ſent from God. K

ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRÆ.

BOOK III.

3:1:E.

CHAP. I.

Of the Being of God.

I. *The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul: from them the neceſſity of a particular Divine Revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine Authority of the Scriptures.* II. *Why* Moſes *doth not prove the Being of God, but ſuppoſe it.* III. *The notion of a Deity very conſonant to Reaſon. Of the nature of* Idea's, *and particularly of the* Idea *of God.* IV. *How we can form an* Idea *of an infinite Being.* V, VI. *How far ſuch an* Idea *argues exiſtence.* VII, VIII. *The great unreaſonableneſs of Atheiſm demonſtrated. Of the Hypotheſes of the* Ariſtotelian *and* Epicurean *Atheiſts.* IX. *The Atheiſts pretences examin'd and refuted.* X, XI, XII, XIII. *Of the nature of the Arguments whereby we prove there is a God. Of univerſal conſent and the Evidence of that to prove a Deity and Immortality of Souls.* XIV, XV. *Of neceſſity of Exiſtence imply'd in the notion of God, and how far that proves the Being of God.* XVI. *The order of the World and uſefulneſs of the parts of it, and eſpecially of Man's body an argument of a Deity.* XVII. *Some higher Principle prov'd to be in the World than Matter and Motion.* XVIII. *The nature of the Soul, and poſſibility of its ſubſiſting after Death.* XIX. *Strange appearances in Nature not ſolvable by the power of Imagination.*

I. Having in the precedent Book largely given a rational account of the grounds of our Faith, as to the Perſons whom God imploys to reveal his Mind to the World; if we can now make it appear that thoſe ſacred Records which we embrace as Divinely inſpir'd, contain in them nothing unworthy of ſo great a name, or unbecoming Perſons ſent from God to deliver; there will be nothing wanting to juſtify our Religion in point of Reaſon to be True, and of Revelation to be Divine. For the Scriptures themſelves coming to us in the name of God, we are bound to believe them to be ſuch as they pretend to be, unleſs we have ground to queſtion the general Foundations of all Religion as uncertain, or this particular way of Religion as not ſutable to thoſe general foundations. The foundations of all Religion lie in two things; *That there is a God* who rules the World, Heb. 11. 6. and that the *Souls of Men are capable of ſubſiſting after Death*; *for he that comes unto God, muſt believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that ſeek him*; ſo that if theſe things be not ſuppos'd as moſt agreeable to Humane Reaſon, we cannot imagine upon what grounds Mankind ſhou'd embrace any way of Religion at all. For if there be not a God whom I am to ſerve and obey, and if I have not a Soul of an immortal nature, there can be no ſufficient obligation to Religion, nor motive inducing to it: For all obligation to Obedience muſt ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of ſuch a Being which hath power to command me; and by reaſon of the promiſcuous ſcatterings of good and evil in this Life, the Motives engaging Men to the practice of Religion, muſt ſuppoſe the certainty of a future State. If theſe things be ſure, and the foundations of Religion in general thereby firmly eſtabliſh'd, it will preſently follow as a matter moſt agreeable to reaſon, that the God whom we are to ſerve ſhou'd himſelf preſcribe the way of his own worſhip; and if the right of Donation of that happineſs which Mens Souls are capable of be alone in himſelf, that he alone ſhou'd declare the Terms on which it may be expected: For Man being a Creature endu'd with a free Principle of acting, which he is conſcious to himſelf of, and therefore not being carry'd to his end by neceſſity of Nature or external Violence, without the concurrence of his own Reaſon and Choice, we muſt ſuppoſe this Happineſs to depend upon the performance of ſome Conditions on Man's part, whereby he may demonſtrate that it is the matter of his free choice, and that he freely quits all other Intereſts that he might obtain the Enjoyment of it. Which Conditions to be perform'd, being Expreſſions of Man's obedience towards God as his Creatour and Governour, and of his gratitude for the Tenders of ſo great a Happineſs which is the free gift of his Maker, we cannot ſuppoſe any one to have power to preſcribe theſe Conditions, but he that hath power likewiſe to deprive the Soul of her Happineſs upon non-performance, and that muſt be God himſelf. But in order to Man's underſtanding his Duty, and his obligation to Obedience, it is neceſſary that theſe Conditions muſt not be lock'd up in the Cabinet Council of Heaven, but muſt be ſo far declar'd and reveal'd, that he may be fully acquainted with thoſe Terms which his Happineſs depends upon; elſe his neglect of them wou'd be excuſable, and his miſery unavoidable. Had Man indeed remain'd without offending his Maker, he might ſtill have ſtood in his favour upon the general terms of Obedience due from the Creature to his Creator, and to all ſuch particular Precepts which ſhou'd bear the impreſs of his Maker's will upon them; beſide which, the whole Volume of the Creation, without, and his own Reaſon within wou'd have been ſufficient Directors to him in the performance of his duty. But he abuſing his liberty, and being thereby guilty of *Apoſtaſy* from God (as is evident by a continu'd propenſity to Sin, and the ſtrangeneſs between God and the Souls of Men) a particular Revelation is now become neceſſary, that Mankind may thereby underſtand on what terms God will be pleas'd again, and by what means they may be reſtored into his favour. And laſtly, it not agreeing with the free and communicative nature of Divine Goodneſs (which was the firſt Original of the World's creation) to ſuffer all Mankind to periſh in their own folly, we muſt ſuppoſe this way for Man's recovery to be ſomewhere preſcrib'd, and the Revelation of it to be ſomewhere extant in the World. So that from the general Principles of the exiſtence of God, and immortality of the

Soul, we have deduced by clear and evident Reaſon the neceſſity of ſome particular Divine Revelation, as the Standard and Meaſure of Religion. And according to theſe Principles we muſt examine whatever pretends to be of Divine Revelation; for it muſt be ſutable to that Divine nature from whom it is ſuppos'd to come, and it muſt be agreeable to the conditions of the Souls of Men; and therefore that which carries with it the greateſt evidence of Divine Revelation, is, a faithful repreſentation of the ſtate of the caſe between God and the Souls of Men, and a Divine diſcovery of thoſe ways whereby Mens Souls may be fitted for eternal Happineſs. A Divine Revelation then muſt be faithful and true in all its Narrations; it muſt be excellent and becoming God in all its Diſcoveries. And therefore all that can with any reaſon be deſir'd for proof of the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, will lie in theſe three things. Firſt, *That the foundations of Religion are of undoubted certainty, or that there is a God, and that Mens Souls are Immortal.* Secondly, *That the Scriptures do moſt faithfully relate the matters of greateſt Antiquity therein contain'd* (which do moſt concern the Hiſtory of the Breach between God and Man.) Thirdly, *that the Scriptures are the only Authentic Records of thoſe terms on which happineſs may be expected in another World.*

II. I begin with the firſt of them, which concerns the Exiſtence of God, and Immortality of the Soul; both which ſeem to be ſuppos'd as general *Prolepſes* in the Writings of *Moſes*, and as things ſo conſonant to Humane nature, that none to whom his Writings ſhou'd come cou'd be ſuppos'd to queſtion them. And therefore he ſpends no time in the operoſe proving of either of theſe, knowing to how little purpoſe his Writings wou'd be to ſuch who deny'd theſe firſt Principles of all Religion. But beſide this, there may be theſe accounts given, why theſe main foundations of all Religion are no more inſiſted on in the firſt Books of the Scripture, which contain the Originals of the World. Firſt, *Becauſe theſe were in the time of the writing of them, believed with an univerſal conſent of Mankind.* In thoſe more early days of the World, when the Tradition of the firſt Ages of it was more freſh and intire, it is ſcarce imaginable that Men ſhou'd queſtion the Being of a God, when the Hiſtory of the Flood, and the Propagation of the World after it by the Sons of *Noah*, and the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah* were ſo freſh in their memories, as having been done ſo few Generations before them. And by what remains of any Hiſtory of other Nations in thoſe elder times, Men were ſo far from *Atheiſm*, that *Polytheiſm* and *Idolatry* were the common practice of the World, as is moſt evident in all Relations of the ancient *Chaldeans*, *Ægyptians*, *Phœnicians*, and other Nations, who all ſuppos'd theſe two Principles, as well as thoſe who ſerv'd the true God. And in all probability, as Men are apt to run from one extreme to another, *Polytheiſm* was the firſt occaſion of *Atheiſm*, and *Idolatry* of *Irreligion.* And thence we find the firſt appearance of *Atheiſts* to be in the moſt blind and ſuperſtitious Age of *Greece*, when the obſcene Poets had ſo debauch'd the common underſtandings of the People, as to make them believe ſuch things concerning their Gods, which were ſo incongruous to Humane Nature, that all who had any ſenſe of goodneſs left, cou'd not but loath and abhor ſuch Deities. And therefore we find all the flouts and jeers of the reputed *Atheiſts* among them, ſuch as *Dionyſius*, *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Euhemerus*, *Meſſenius* and others, were caſt upon their venerable *Deities*, which they ſo ſolemnly wor-

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 38.

ſhipped, who had been before, as *Euhemerus* plainly told them, poor mortal Men, and thoſe not of the beſt reputation neither: and therefore as the *Epicurean* in *Tully* well ſays, *omnis eorum cultus eſſet in luctu*, the moſt ſutable Devotion for them had been lamenting their Death. Now when theſe common *Deities* were ſo much derided by intelligent Men, and yet the order of the World ſeem'd to tell them there was really a God, tho' thoſe were none; thoſe who had Philoſophical wits, ſuch as *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, ſet themſelves to work to ſee if they cou'd ſolve the *Phænomena* of Nature without a *Deity*; and therefore aſſerted the Origin of the Univerſe to be only by a fortuitous Concourſe of infinite little Particles: but herein they befool'd themſelves and their greedy Followers, who were glad to be rid of thoſe Anxieties of mind which the thought of a *Deity* and an immortal Soul did cauſe within them. And altho' *Lucretius* in a bravado tells us of his Maſter, *that when Mens minds were ſunk under the burden of Religion*,

Lucret. l. 1.

Humana ante oculos fœde cum vita jaceret
In terris oppreſſa gravi ſub relligione:
Primum Graius homo mortales tollere contra
Eſt oculos auſus, primuſque obſiſtere contra.

That Epicurus *was the firſt true Gyant who durſt encounter the Gods*, and if we believe him, *overthrew them in open field*;

Quare relligio pedibus ſubjecta viciſſim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 86.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 44.

Yet *Cotta* in *Tully* reports the iſſue of this Battle quite otherwiſe; for altho' the greateſt triumph in this Victory had been only to become like the Beaſts that periſh; yet if we believe *Cotta*, *Epicurus* was ſo far from gaining any of his belov'd Eaſe and Pleaſure by his Sentiments, that never was School-boy more afraid of a Rod, nor did any Enemy more dread a Conquerour, than *Epicurus* did the thoughts of a God and Death. *Nec quenquam vidi qui magis ea quæ timenda eſſe negaret, timeret; mortem dico & Deos.* So hard it is for an *Epicurean* even after he hath Proſtituted his Conſcience, to ſilence it; but (whatever there be in the Air) there is an Elaſtical power in Conſcience that will bear its ſelf up notwithſtanding the weight that is laid upon it. And yet after all the labours of *Epicurus*, he knew it was to no purpoſe to endeavour to root out wholly the belief of a Deity out of the World, becauſe of the unanimous conſent of the World in it; and therefore he admits of it as a neceſſary *Prolepſis* or Anticipation of Humane Nature, *quod in omnium animis Deorum notionem impreſſiſſet ipſa natura, that nature its ſelf had ſtamp'd an Idea of God upon the minds of Men*; *cum enim non inſtituto aliquo aut more aut lege ſit opinio conſtituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma conſenſio, intelligi neceſſe eſt Deos eſſe, quoniam inſitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura conſentit, id verum eſſe neceſſe eſt*, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* argues. Since the belief of a Deity, neither riſes from Cuſtom nor was enacted by Law, yet is unanimouſly aſſented to by all Mankind; it neceſſarily follows that there muſt be a Deity, becauſe the Idea of it is ſo natural to us. If it were thus acknowledg'd in the Philoſophical Age of *Greece*, when Men bent their wits to unſettle the Belief of ſuch things as tended to Religion;

gion; how much more might it be eſteem'd a general Principle of Humane Nature in thoſe elder times, when not ſo much as one Diſſenter appear'd that we read of among the more ancient Nations? But *Secondly*, it was leſs needful for *Moſes* to inſiſt much on the proof of a Deity in his Writings, when his very imployment, and the Hiſtory he wrote, was the greateſt Evidence that there was one. Cou'd any of them queſtion, whether there were a God, or no, who had heard his voice at Mount *Sinai*, and had receiv'd a Law from him, who had been preſent at ſo many Miracles which were done by *Moſes* in *Ægypt* and the Wilderneſs? What more evident demonſtration of God cou'd be deſir'd, than thoſe many unparallell'd Miracles, which were wrought among them? And thoſe who wou'd not be convinced by them that there was a God, wou'd certainly be convinced by nothing. *Thirdly*, It was unſutable to the purpoſe of *Moſes* to go about to prove any thing he deliver'd by the mere force of Humane Reaſon, becauſe he writ as a perſon imploy'd by God; and therefore by the Arguments on which they were to believe his Teſtimony in whatever he writ, they cou'd not but believe there was a God that imploy'd him. And from hence it is that *Moſes* with ſo much Majeſty and Authority begins the Hiſtory of the Creation, with, *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth.* There cou'd be no greater Evidence that there was an infinitely wiſe, good, and powerful God, than that the Univerſe was produced out of nothing by him; and what reaſon cou'd there be to diſtruſt his Teſtimony who relates it, who manifeſted not only that there was a God, but that he was imploy'd by him, by the Miracles which he wrought? So that all our former diſcourſe concerning the Evidences of Divine Revelation, are a moſt palpable demonſtration of a Deity; for if there be ſuch a power which can alter the courſe of Nature when he pleaſes, the Being wherein it is, muſt needs be infinite; which is the ſame which we mean by God.

III. But yet for thoſe whoſe minds are ſo coy and ſqueamiſh as to any thing of Divine Revelation, we want not ſufficient Evidence in point of Reaſon to prove to them the Exiſtence of a Deity. In order to which, I ſhall clear theſe following Propoſitions.

1. *That the true notion of a Deity is moſt agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and moſt conſonant to Reaſon and the Light of Nature.*
2. *That thoſe who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far leſs Reaſon, and muſt by their own Principles deny ſome things which are apparently true.*
3. *That we have a certain Evidence that there is a God, as it is poſſible for us to have, conſidering his nature.*

Prop. 1. *That the true notion of God is moſt agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and moſt conſonant to Reaſon and the Light of Nature: i. e.* that the Idea of God (or that which we conceive in our minds when we think of God) is ſo far from being any ways repugnant to any Principle of Reaſon within us, that it is hard to pitch on any other Notion which hath fewer entanglements in it, to a mind ſo far *Metaphyſical* as to abſtract from Sence and Prejudice. I grant it very difficult, nay impoſſible, for thoſe to have any true ſettl'd notion of a God, who ſearch for an Idea of him in their Fancies, and were never conſcious to themſelves of any higher faculty in their Souls than mere Imagination. Such may have *imaginem Jovis*, or *galeatæ Minervæ*, as he in *Tully* ſpeaks, ſome Idea of an Idol in their minds, but none of a true God. For we may as ſoon come by the ſight of colours to underſtand the nature of Sounds, as by any corporal Phantaſms come to have a true Idea of God. And altho' ſometimes an Idea be taken for that impreſſion of things which is lodg'd in the Phantaſy, yet here we take it in a more general ſence, as it contains the repreſentation of any thing in the Mind; as it is commonly ſaid in the Schools that the Divine Intellect doth underſtand things by their Ideas, which are nothing elſe but the things themſelves as they are objectively repreſented to the Underſtanding. So that an Idea in its general ſence in which we take it, is nothing elſe but the objective Being of a thing as it terminates the Underſtanding, and is the form of the act of Intellection: that which is then immediately repreſented to the mind in its perception of things, is the Idea or Notion of it. Now ſuch an Idea as this is, may be either true or falſe. For better underſtanding of which we muſt conſider that an Idea in the Soul may be conſider'd two ways. 1. As it is a mode of Cogitation, or the act of the Soul apprehending an Object; now this way no Idea can be falſe; for as it is an act of the Mind, every Idea hath its truth: for whether I imagine a Golden Mountain, or another, it matters not here; for the one Idea is as true as the other, conſidering it merely as an act of the Mind. For the mind is as really imploy'd about the one as the other; as the Will is about an Object whether it be feaſible or no. 2. The Idea may be conſider'd in regard of its Objective Reality, or as it repreſents ſome outward object; now the truth or falſhood of the Idea lies in the Underſtanding paſſing judgment concerning the outward Object, as exiſtent, which doth correſpond to the Idea which is in the Mind. And the proneneſs of the Underſtanding's error in this caſe ariſeth from the different nature of thoſe things which are repreſented to the Mind; for ſome of them are general and abſtracted things, and do not at all ſuppoſe exiſtence, as the nature of Truth, of a Being, of Cogitation; other Ideas depend upon Exiſtence ſuppos'd, as the Idea of the Sun, which I apprehend in my Mind becauſe I have ſeen it; but beſides theſe, there are other Ideas in the Mind, which the Underſtanding forms within its ſelf by its own power, as it is a Principle of Cogitation; ſuch are thoſe which are called *entia rationis*, and have no other Exiſtence at all but only in the Underſtanding, as *Chimæra's*, *Centaures*, &c. Now as to theſe, we are to obſerve, that altho' the compoſition of theſe things together by the Underſtanding, be that which makes theſe Ideas to be only fictitious, yet the Underſtanding would not be able to compound ſuch things, were they not ſeverally repreſented to the Mind; as unleſs we had known what a Horſe and a Man had been, our minds cou'd not have conjoyn'd them together in its apprehenſion. So that in theſe which are the moſt fictitious Ideas we ſee, that altho' the Idea its ſelf be a mere creature of the Underſtanding, yet the Mind cou'd not form ſuch an Idea but upon Pre-exiſtent matter, and ſome objective reality muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the intellectual Conception of theſe Anomalous Entities. By which we ſee that that ſtrange kind of Omnipotency which ſome have attributed to Underſtanding, lies not in a Power of conceiving things wholly impoſſible, or fanſying Ideas of abſolute Non-entities, but in a kind of *African* Copulation of ſuch Species of things together, which in Nature ſeem wholly incompoſſible, (as the Schools ſpeak) or have no congruity at all in the order of the Univerſe. So that had there never been any ſuch things in the World as *matter* and *motion*, it is very hard to conceive, how the Underſtanding

ing cou'd have form'd within its ſelf the variety of the Species of ſuch things, which are the reſults of thoſe two grand Principles of the Univerſe. But becauſe it is ſo impoſſible for minds not very Contemplative and Metaphyſical to abſtract from matter, thence it is we are apt to imagine ſuch a Power in the Underſtanding, whereby it may form Ideas of ſuch things which have no objective reality at all. I grant thoſe we call *entia rationis* have no external reality as they are ſuch; but yet I ſay, the exiſtence of matter in the World, and the corporeal Phantaſms of outward Beings, are the foundation of the Soul's conception of thoſe Entities, which have no exiſtence beyond the Humane Intellect.

IV. The great inquiry then is, how far this Plaſtic Power of the Underſtanding, may extend its ſelf in its forming an Idea of God. That there is ſuch a one in the minds of Men, is evident to every one that conſults his own Faculties, and enquires of them, whether they cannot apprehend a ſettl'd and conſiſtent Notion of a Being which is abſolutely Perfect. For that is all we underſtand by the Idea of God; not that there is any ſuch connate Idea in the Soul, in the Senſe which connate Ideas are commonly underſtood; but that there is a Faculty in the Soul, whereby upon the free uſe of Reaſon, it can form within its ſelf a ſettl'd Notion of ſuch a Being, which is as perfect as it is poſſible for us to conceive a Being to be. If any difficulty be made concerning the forming ſuch a Notion in ones mind, let the Perſon who ſcruples it, only inquire of himſelf whether he judges all Beings in the World equal; whether a *Muſhroom* hath in it all the perfections which Man hath? which I ſuppoſe none, who have a Mind within them can queſtion. If then it be granted that Man hath ſome Perfection in him above inferior Creatures, it will be no matter of difficulty to ſhew wherein Man exceeds other inferior Beings. For is not Life a greater Perfection than the want of it? Is not Reaſon and Knowledge, a Perfection above Senſe? and ſo let us proceed to thoſe things, wherein one Man differs from another; for it is evident, that all Men are not of equal Accompliſhments; is not then Forecaſt and Prudence above Incogitancy and Folly? Is not the knowledge of Cauſes of things better than Stupidity and Ignorance? Is not Beneficence and Liberality more noble than Parſimony and Narrowneſs of Spirit? Is not true Goodneſs far above Debauchery and Intemperance? And are not all theſe far better, when they are joyn'd with ſuch a power as hath no limits or bounds at all? Now then is it not poſſible for a Man's mind, proceeding in its ordinary way of Intellection, to form a notion of ſuch a Being, which hath Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power in it, without any limits and bounds at all, or any of thoſe Abatements which any of theſe Perfections are found with in Man? For it is unconceivable, that the mind of Man can attribute to its ſelf abſolute Perfection, when it cannot but ſee its own defects in thoſe things it excells other Creatures in; and ſuppoſing it had Power, Goodneſs and Knowledge far above what it hath; yet it cannot but ſay, that theſe Perfections wou'd be greater if it were always poſſeſs'd of them, and it were impoſſible that it ſhould ever ceaſe to be, or not have been. So that now joyning infinite Goodneſs, Wiſdom and Power, with Eternity and neceſſity of Exiſtence, the reſult is the notion of a Being abſolutely perfect. So that now whoever queſtions the ſutableneſs of ſuch a Notion or Idea to the faculties of Mens Souls, muſt queſtion the truth of his own Faculties, and the method they proceed in, in their cleareſt Conceptions and Ratiocinations. And the Mind of Man may as well queſtion the truth of any Idea it hath within its ſelf, as of this we now diſcourſe of. Nay, it may be far ſooner puzl'd in any of thoſe Ideas, which are tranſmitted into the Phantaſy by the Impreſſions of Corporeal Beings upon the Organs of Senſe, than in this more intellectual and abſtracted Idea, which depends wholly upon the Mind.

V. All the difficulty now is, whether this Idea of ſuch an abſolutely perfect Being, be any thing elſe but the Underſtanding's Plaſtic power, whereby it can unite all theſe Perfections together in one Conception; or doth it neceſſarily imply, that there muſt be ſuch a Being really exiſtent, or elſe I cou'd never have form'd ſuch a ſettl'd Notion of him in my mind? To this I anſwer, 1. It is as much as I deſire at preſent, that the forming of ſuch an Idea in the Mind, is as ſutable and agreeable to our Faculties as the forming the Conception of any other Being in the World. For hereby it is moſt evident that the notion of a God imports nothing incongruous to Reaſon, or repugnant to the Faculties of our Souls; but that the Mind will form as ſettl'd and clear a notion of God, as of any thing which in the judgment of *Epicurus*, his infallible Senſes did the moſt aſſure him of. So that there can be no ſhadow of a pretence, why any ſhou'd reject the Being of a God becauſe of the impoſſibility to conceive any ſuch Being as God is. If to this it be objected, *that ſuch things are imply'd in this Idea, which make it unconceivable, in that all the Perfections in this Being are ſuppos'd to be infinite, and Infinity tranſcends our capacity of apprehenſion.* To this I anſwer, 1. That thoſe who deny Infinity in God, muſt neceſſarily attribute it to ſomething elſe, as to infinite Space, infinity of ſucceſſion of Ages and Perſons, if the World were Eternal; and therefore it is moſt unreaſonable to reject any Notion for that which it is impoſſible, but if I deny that, I muſt attribute it to ſomething elſe, to whoſe Idea it is far leſs proper than it is to God's. 2. Leſt I ſhou'd rather ſeek to avoid the Argument than to ſatisfy it, I ſay, that tho' infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet we may clearly and diſtinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature, that no limits can be aſſign'd to it, as to its Power or Preſence; which is as much as to underſtand it to be infinite. The *ratio formalis* of Infinity may not be underſtood clearly and diſtinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity its ſelf cannot be on this account, becauſe however Poſitive we apprehend it, yet we always apprehend it in a Negative way, becauſe we conceive it by denying all limitations and bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a Poſitive Manner, altho' not adequately, becauſe we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and diſtinctly ſee the Sea, tho' we cannot diſcover the bounds of it; ſo may we clearly and diſtinctly apprehend ſome Perfections of God when we fix our Minds on them, altho' we are not able to graſp them altogether in our narrow and confin'd Intellects, becauſe they are infinite. Thus we ſee that God's Infinity doth not at all abate the clearneſs and diſtinctneſs of the Notion which we have of God; ſo that tho' the Perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnancy at all to Mens natural Faculties, to have a ſettl'd Idea of a Being infinitely perfect in their Minds.

VI. To the Queſtion, I anſwer, It ſeems highly probable and far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary, that this Idea of God upon the mind of Man, is no merely fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whoſe Idea it is, and therefore doth ſuppoſe a reality in the Thing correſpondent to that objective reality which is in the Underſtanding. For altho' I am not ſo well ſatisfy'd that the mere objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly conſider'd in it ſelf, becauſe of the unlimited power of the Underſtanding in conception: Yet I ſay, conſidering that Idea in all the circumſtances of it, it ſeems highly probable that it is no mere *ens rationis*, or figment of the underſtanding; and that will appear on theſe conſiderations. 1. This Idea is of ſuch a Nature as cou'd not be fram'd from the Underſtanding's conſideration of any corporeal Phantaſms. Becauſe whatever hath any thing of Matter in it, involves of neceſſity many imperfections along with it; for every part of Matter is diviſible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to Natural Light, that it is a greater Perfection not to be diviſible than to be ſo. Beſides, corporeal Phantaſms are ſo far from helping us in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a diſtinct Conception of it, while we attend to them; becauſe theſe bear no proportion at all to ſuch a Being. So that this Idea however muſt be a pure act of Intellection, and therefore ſuppoſing there were no other faculty in Man but Imagination, it wou'd bear the greateſt repugnancy to our Conceptions, and it wou'd be according to the Principles of *Epicurus* and ſome modern Philoſophers, a thing wholly impoſſible to form an Idea of God, unleſs with *Epicurus* we imagine him to be Corporeal, which is to ſay, he is no God. Which was the reaſon that *Tully* ſaid, *Epicurus* did only, *nomine ponere, re tollere Deos*, becauſe ſuch a Notion of God is repugnant to Natural Light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abſtract from corporeal Phantaſms; it thereby appears that there is a higher faculty in Man's Soul than mere Imagination, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends it to an infinite object, ſhou'd come, but from an infinite Being: eſpecially if we conſider, Secondly, That the Underſtanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by diſtinct acts firſt collect one Perfection, and then another, and at laſt unite theſe together, but the ſimplicity and unity of all theſe Perfections is as neceſſarily conceiv'd as any of them. Granting then that the Underſtanding by the obſerving of ſeveral Perfections in the World, might be able to abſtract theſe ſeverally from each Being wherein they were, yet whence ſhou'd the Idea of the Unity and Inſeparability of all theſe Perfections come? The Mind may, it is true, knit ſome things together in fictitious Ideas, but then thoſe are ſo far from unity with each other, that in themſelves they ſpeak mutual Repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper *entia rationis*; but theſe ſeveral Perfections are ſo far from ſpeaking repugnancy to each other, that the Unity and Inſeparability of them is as neceſſary to the forming of this Idea, as any other Perfection whatſoever. So that from hence it appears that the conſideration of the Perfections which are in the Creatures, is only an occaſion given to the Mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea it ſelf depends upon thoſe Perfections as the cauſes of it: as in the cleareſt *Mathematical* truths the Manner of demonſtration may be neceſſary to help the Underſtanding to its clearer aſſent, tho' the things in themſelves be undoubtedly true. For all minds are not equally capable of the ſame truths; ſome are of quicker apprehenſion than others are; now altho' to ſlower apprehenſions a more particular way of demonſtrating things be neceſſary, yet the truths in themſelves are equal, tho' they have not equal Evidence to ſeveral Perſons.

3. It appears that this is no mere fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all perſons who have freed themſelves from the Entanglements of corporeal phantaſms. Thoſe we call *entia rationis*, we find by experience in our Minds that they are form'd *ad placitum*; we may imagine them as many ways as we pleaſe; but we ſee it is quite otherwiſe in this Idea of God; for in thoſe Attributes or Perfections which by the light of Nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform conſent in all thoſe who have diveſted their Minds of corporeal phantaſms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a Being abſolutely perfect, there hath been no diſſent in the Perfections which have been attributed to it; none have queſtion'd but infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Power, joyn'd with neceſſity of Exiſtence, have been all imply'd in this Idea. So that it is ſcarce poſſible to inſtance in any one Idea, no not of thoſe which are moſt obvious to our Senſes, wherein there hath been ſo great an uniformity of Mens conceptions as in this Idea of God. And the moſt groſs corporeal Idea of the moſt ſenſible matter hath been more liable to heats and diſputes among *Philoſophers*, than this Idea of a Being infinite and purely ſpiritual. Which ſtrongly proves my preſent Propoſition, That this Idea of God is very conſonant to Natural light; for it is hardly conceivable that there ſhou'd be ſo univerſal a Conſent of minds in this Idea, were it not a Natural reſult from the free uſe of our Reaſon and Faculties. And that which adds further weight to this Argument is, that altho' Infinity be ſo neceſſarily imply'd in this Idea of God, yet Men do not attribute all kind of infinite Things to God; for there being conceivable infinite Number, infinite Longitude, as well as infinite power and knowledge, our minds readily attribute the latter to God, and as readily abſtract the other from his Nature, which is an Argument this Idea is not fictitious, but argues Reality in the thing correſpondent to our conception of it. So much may ſuffice to clear the firſt Propoſition, *viz. That the notion of a God is very ſutable to the Faculties of Mens Souls, and to that light of Nature which they proceed by in forming the conceptions of things.*

VII. Prop. 2. *Thoſe who deny that there is a God, do aſſert other things on far leſs evidence of Reaſon, and muſt by their own principles deny ſome things which are apparently true.* One wou'd expect that ſuch perſons who are apt to condemn the whole World of folly in believing the truth of Religion, and wou'd fain be admir'd as Men of a deeper reach, and greater wit and ſagacity than others, wou'd, when they have exploded a *Deity*, at leaſt give us ſome more rational and conſiſtent account of things, than we can give that there is a God. But on the contrary we find the reaſons on which they reject a *Deity* ſo lamentably weak, and ſo eaſily retorted upon themſelves, and the *Hypotheſes* they ſubſtitute inſtead of a *Deity* ſo precarious, obſcure and uncertain, that we need no other Argument to evince the reaſonableneſs of Religion, than from the manifeſt folly as well as impiety of thoſe who oppoſe it. Which we ſhall make evident by theſe two things: 1. *That while they deny a Deity, they aſſert other things on far leſs reaſon.* 2. *That by thoſe principles on which they deny a Deity, they muſt deny ſome things which are apparently true.*

1. 1. *That they aſſert ſome things on far leſs reaſon than we do that there is a God.* For if there be not an infinitely powerful God who produced the World out of nothing, it muſt neceſſarily follow according to the different Principles of the *Ariſtotelian* and *Epicurean Atheiſts*, that either the World was as it is from all eternity, or elſe that it was firſt

made by the fortuitous concourſe of Atoms. Now I appeal to the Reaſon of any Perſon, who hath the free uſe of it, Whether either of theſe two *Hypotheſes* urged with the ſame or greater difficulties, *&c.* be not far more weakly prov'd than the exiſtence of a *Deity* is, or the production of the World by Him.

1. *They run themſelves into the ſame difficulties which they wou'd avoid in the belief of a* Deity; and nothing can be a greater evidence of an entangled Mind than this is: To deny a thing becauſe of ſome difficulty in it, and inſtead of it to aſſert another thing which is chargeable with the very ſame difficulty in a higher degree. Thus when they reject a *Deity*, becauſe they cannot underſtand what Infinity means; both theſe *Hypotheſes* are liable to the ſame intricacy in apprehending the nature of ſomething infinite. For according to the *Epicureans*, there muſt be an infinite Space, and what greater eaſe to the Mind is there in conceiving an Idea of that than of an infinite Being? And if the World be eternal, there muſt have been paſt an infinite ſucceſſion of Ages, and is not the Underſtanding as eaſily loſt in this, as in an eternal Being which created the World? For if the courſe of Generations in the World had no beginning at all, (which neceſſarily follows upon the eternity of the World) then an infinite number of ſucceſſions are already paſt, and if paſt, then at an end, and ſo we find an infinite which hath had an end, which is a conſequence becoming one who avoids the belief of a *Deity*, becauſe Infinity is an unconceivable thing. Beſides, if the number of Generations hath been infinite, theſe two Conſequences will unavoidably follow, which the reaſon of any one but an *Atheiſt* wou'd startle at, That one infinite may be greater than another, and that the part is equal to the whole. For let him fix where he pleaſe, in the courſe of Generations, I demand whether in the Great-grand-father's time the ſucceſſion of Generations was finite or infinite; if finite, then it had a beginning, and ſo the World not eternal; if infinite, then I ask, whether there were not a longer ſucceſſion of Generations in the time of his Great-grand-children, and ſo there muſt be a number greater than that which was infinite; for the former ſucceſſion was infinite, and this hath more Generations in it than that had: but if it be ſaid that they were equal, becauſe both infinite, then the ſucceſſions of Generations to the Grand-father, being but a part of that which extends to his Grand-children and poſterity, the part is equal to the whole. And is not the notion of an infinite Being enough to ſtumble an *Atheiſt's* Reaſon, when he can ſo nimbly leap over ſo apparent contradictions? I inſiſt not on this as an evident Demonſtration to prove a *Deity*, which poſſibly it may not amount to, becauſe it may only demonſtrate the impoſſibility of our Underſtandings comprehending the nature of Infinity. But however it doth moſt evidently demonſtrate the folly and unreaſonableneſs of the *Atheiſt*, who rejects the Being of God on the account of his infinity, when his Underſtanding is more loſt in apprehending an infinite ſucceſſion of Generations which follows from his ſuppoſition of the eternity of the World. If then it be impoſſible, as it is, upon any Principles whatſoever, to avoid the conception of ſomewhat infinite and eternal, either Matter or Space, or ſome Being, let any one appeal to his own Reaſon, whether it be not more agreeable to that, to attribute theſe Perfections to ſuch a Being, to whoſe Idea they neceſſarily belong, than to attribute them to this World, in whoſe conception they are not at all imply'd; but on the contrary they do far more puz-

zle our Underſtandings than when we conceive them to be in God. If ſomewhat muſt have continued duration and be of an unbounded nature, how much more rational is it to conceive Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs to be conjoyn'd with Eternity and Infinity, than to beſtow theſe Attributes upon an empty Space, or upon dull and unactive Matter? It cannot be Reaſon then, but ſome more baſe and unworthy Principle which makes the *Atheiſt* queſtion the Being of God, becauſe his Perfections are unconceivable, when according to his own Principles the moſt puzzling Attributes of God return upon him with more force and violence, and that in a more inexplicable manner.

VIII. 2. As the *Atheiſt* muſt admit thoſe things himſelf which he rejects the Being of God for; ſo he admits them upon far weaker grounds than we do attribute them to God. If any thing may be made evident to Man's natural Reaſon concerning the exiſtence of a Being ſo infinite as God is, we doubt not but to make it appear that we have great aſſurance of the Being of God; but how far muſt the *Atheiſt* go, how heartily muſt he beg before his *Hypotheſis* either of the fortuitous Concourſe of *Atoms*, or Eternity of the World will be granted to him? For if we ſtay till he proves either of theſe by evident and demonſtrative Reaſons, the World may have an end before he proves his *Atoms* cou'd give it a beginning, and we may find it Eternal, *à parte poſt*, before he can prove it was ſo *a parte ante*. For the proof of a Deity we appeal to his own Faculties, Reaſon and Conſcience; we make uſe of Arguments before his Eyes; we bring the univerſal Senſe of Mankind along with us: But for his Principle, we muſt wholly alter the preſent Stage of the World, and crumble the whole Univerſe into little Particles; we muſt grind the Sun to Powder, and by a new way of Interment turn the Earth into Duſt and Aſhes, before we can ſo much as imagine how the World cou'd be fram'd. And when we have thus far begg'd leave to imagine things to be what they never were, we muſt then ſtand by in ſome infinite Space to behold the friskings and Dancings about of theſe little Particles of Matter, till by their frequent Rencounters and Juſtlings one upon another, they at laſt link themſelves together, and run ſo long in a round till they make Whirl-pools enough for Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Bodies of the Univerſe to emerge out of. But what was it which at firſt ſet theſe little Particles of Matter in motion? Whence came ſo great variety in them to produce ſuch wonderful diverſities in Bodies as there are in the World? How came theſe caſual Motions to hit ſo luckily into ſuch admirable Contrivances as are in the Univerſe? When I once ſee a thouſand blind Men run the point of a Sword in at a Key-hole without once miſſing; when I find them all frisking together in a ſpacious Field, and exactly meeting all at laſt in the very middle of it; when I once find, as *Tully* ſpeaks, the *Annals* of *Ennius* fairly written in a heap of Sand, and as *Kepler*'s Wife told him, a Room full of Herbs, moving up and down fall down into the exact order of Sallets, I may then think the *Atomical Hypotheſis* probable, and not before. But what Evidence of Reaſon or Demonſtration have we, that the great Bodies of the World did reſult from ſuch a Motion of theſe ſmall Particles? *It is poſſible to be ſo*, ſaith *Epicurus*. What if we grant it poſſible? Can no things in the World be, which it is poſſible might have been otherwiſe? What elſe thinks *Epicurus* of the Generations of things now? They are ſuch certainly as the World now is, and yet he believes it was once otherwiſe: Muſt therefore a bare poſſibility of the contrary make us deny our Reaſon, ſilence Conſcience, contradict the univerſal Senſe of Mankind by excluding a Deity out of the World? But whence doth it appear poſſible? Did we ever find any thing of the ſame nature with the World produced in ſuch a manner by ſuch a concourſe of *Atoms?* Or is it becauſe we find in natural Beings, how much theſe Particles of Matter ſerve to ſolve the *Phænomena* of Nature? But doth it at all follow, becauſe now under Divine Providence which wiſely orders the World, and things in it, that theſe Particles, with their ſeveral Affections and Motion, may give us a tolerable account of many Appearances as to Bodies, that therefore the Univerſe had its Original merely by a Concretion of theſe, without any Divine Hand to order and direct their Motion? But of this more when we come to the Creation of the World; our deſign now is only to compare the Notion of a Deity, and of the *Atheiſt's Hypatheſis* in point of Perſpicuity and Evidence of Reaſon: of which let any one who hath Reaſon judge. Thus we ſee how the *Atheiſt* in denying a Deity, muſt aſſert ſomething elſe inſtead of it, which is preſs'd with the ſame, if not greater difficulties, and prov'd by far leſs Reaſon.

IX. 2. *The Atheiſt by the ſame principles on which he denies a* God, *muſt deny ſome things which are apparently true.* Which will be evident by our running over the moſt plauſible pretences which he inſiſts upon.

1. Becauſe the Being of a God cannot be demonſtrated. But how doth the *Atheiſt* mean it? Is it becauſe God cannot be demonſtrated to Senſe, that we cannot [*digito monſtrari & dicier hic eſt*] point at him with our Fingers? It is a ſign there is little of Reaſon left, where Senſe is made the only Umpire of all kinds of Beings. Muſt all intellectual Beings be proſcrib'd out of the order of Nature, becauſe they cannot paſs the ſcrutiny of Senſe? And by the ſame reaſon all Colours ſhall be daſh'd out becauſe they cannot be heard; all Noiſes ſilenced, becauſe they cannot be ſeen; for why may not one Senſe be ſet to judge of all objects of Senſe with far more Reaſon, than Senſe it ſelf be ſet as Judge over Intellectual Beings? But yet it is wiſely done of the *Atheiſt* to make Senſe his Judge; for if we once appeal to this, he knows our Cauſe is loſt; for as he ſaid of a Phyſician, when one ask'd him whether he had any experience of him? No, ſaid he, *Si periculum feciſſem, non viverem*; *If I had try'd him, I had been dead e'er now*; ſo here, If God were to be try'd by the judgment of Senſe, he muſt ceaſe to be God; for how can an infinite and ſpiritual Being be diſcern'd by the judgment of Senſe? and if he be not an infinite and ſpiritual Being, he is not God. But it may be the *Atheiſt*'s meaning is not ſo groſs, but he intends ſuch a *demonſtration to reaſon as That two and two make four, or That the whole is greater than the parts*; with ſuch a demonſtration he wou'd ſit down contented. But will no leſs than this ſerve him? What becomes then of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms? Is this as evident as that two and two make four? And will the Philoſophical *Atheiſt* really believe nothing in Nature, but what is as evident to him in material Beings, as *that the whole is greater than the parts?* By any means let *Atheiſts* then write Philoſophy, that at the laſt the Clocks in *London* may ſtrike together, and the Philoſophers agree; for I ſuppoſe none of them queſtion that. But yet it is poſſible the *Atheiſt* may in a good humour abate ſomething of this, and mean by demonſtration ſuch a proof as takes away all difficulties. If he means as to the Ground of Aſſent, we undertake it; if as to the Object apprehended, we

reject it as unreaſonable, becauſe it is impoſſible a Being Infinite ſhou'd be comprehended by us; for if it cou'd, it were no longer Infinite. But let us try this Principle by other things, and how evident is it, that on this account ſome things muſt be deny'd which himſelf will confeſs to be true? For inſtance, that *opprobrium Philoſophorum*, the diviſibility of Quantity, or extended matter into finite or infinite parts; let him take which ſide he pleaſe, and ſee whether by the force of theſe Arguments on either ſide, if he hold to this principle, he muſt not be forced to deny that there is any ſuch thing as matter in the World: and then we may well have an infinite empty ſpace, when by force of this one Principle, both God and Matter are baniſh'd quite out of the World. But if the *Atheiſt* will but come one ſtep lower, and by his demonſtration intend nothing elſe but ſuch a ſufficient proof of it as the nature of the thing is capable of, he will not only ſpeak moſt conſonant to Reaſon, but may be in ſome hopes of gaining ſatiſfaction. For it is moſt evident, that all things are not capable of the like way of proof; and that in ſome caſes the poſſibility of the contrary muſt be no hindrance to an undoubted aſſent. What theſe proofs are, will appear afterwards. I come to the next ground of the *Atheiſt*'s opinion which is,

2. *The weakneſs of ſome Arguments brought to prove a Deity.* But let us grant that ſome Arguments will not do it, doth it therefore follow that none can do it? What if ſome have prov'd the Sun to be the Center of the World; and the motion of the Earth, by very weak Arguments, will the Atheiſt therefore queſtion it? What if *Epicurus* hath prov'd his *Atomical Hypotheſis* by ſome ſilly *Sophiſms*, will the *Atheiſt* therefore rather believe the Creation of the World than it? What if the *Atheiſt* may make himſelf ſport at ſome Stories of Apparitions inſiſted on to prove a Deity, doth it therefore follow there is no God, becauſe ſome Perſons have been over-credulous? What if ſome having more Zeal than Knowledge, may attribute ſuch things to God's immediate hand, which may be produced by natural Cauſes, doth it thence follow that God hath no hand in governing the World at all? What if Fears, and Hopes, and Perſuaſions, may depend much on Principles of Education, muſt Conſcience then be reſolv'd wholly into theſe? What if ſome devout *Melancholiſt* may embrace the iſſues of his own Imagination for the impreſſions of the Divine Spirit, doth it therefore follow, that Religion is nothing but ſtrength of Fancy improv'd by principles of Education? What if ſome of the numerous proofs of a Deity were cut off, and only thoſe made uſe of, which are of the greateſt force, wou'd the Truth ſuffer at all by that? I grant, advantage is often taken againſt a thing more by one weak Argument brought for it, than for it by the ſtrongeſt Proofs: but I ſay, it is unreaſonable it ſhou'd be ſo; and were Men Rational and Ingenuous it wou'd not be ſo. Many times Arguments may be good in their order, but they are miſ-placed; ſome may prove the thing rational, which may not prove it true; ſome may ſhew the Abſurdities of the Adverſaries, rejecting the thing, which may not be ſufficient to prove it; now when Men number and not weigh their Arguments, but give them in the lump to the main queſtion, without fitting them to their ſeveral places, they do more diſſervice to the main of the Battle by the diſorder of their Forces, than they can advantage it by the number of them.

3. Another great pretence the *Atheiſt* hath, is, that Religion is only an invention of Politicians, which they awe People with as they pleaſe,

and therefore tell them of a God, and another World, as Mothers ſend young Children to School to keep them in better order, that they may govern them with the greater eaſe. To this I anſwer, 1. Religion I grant, hath a great influence upon the well-governing the World, nay ſo great, that were the *Atheiſts* opinion true, and the World perſuaded of it, it were impoſſible the World cou'd be well govern'd. For the Government of the World in civil Societies, depends not ſo much on Force, as the ſacred Bonds of Duty and Allegiance, which hold a Nation that owns Religion as true, in far ſurer Obligations to endeavour the peace and welfare of a Nation than ever Violence can do. For in this caſe only an opportunity is watch'd for to ſhake off that which they account a Yoke upon their Necks; whereas when Mens minds are poſſeſs'd with a ſenſe of duty and obligation to Obedience out of Conſcience, the Reins may be held with greater eaſe; and yet the People be better manag'd by them, than by ſuch as only gall and inrage them. So that I grant true Religion to be the moſt ſerviceable Principle for the governing of civil Societies; but withal, I ſay, 2. It were impoſſible Religion ſhou'd be ſo much made uſe of for the governing of People, were there not a real propenſity and inclination to Religion imprinted on the Minds of Men. For as, did not Men love themſelves, and their Children, their Eſtates and Intereſts, it were impoſſible to keep them in Obedience to Laws; but doth it follow, becauſe Magiſtrates perſuade People to Obedience by ſuting Laws to the general intereſt of Men, that therefore the Magiſtrates firſt made them love themſelves and their own concerns? So it is in Religion, the Magiſtrate may make uſe of this propenſity to Religion in Men for civil ends, but his making uſe of it doth ſuppoſe it and not inſtill it. For were Religion nothing elſe in the World but a deſign only of Politicians, it wou'd be impoſſible to keep that deſign from being diſcover'd at one time or other; and when once it came to be known, it wou'd hurry the whole World into confuſion; and the People wou'd make no ſcruple of all Oaths and Obligations, but every one wou'd ſeek to do others what miſchief he cou'd if he had opportunity, and obey no further than Fear and Force conſtrain'd him. Therefore no Principle can be ſo dangerous to a State as *Atheiſm*, nor any thing more promote its Peace than true Religion; and the more Men are perſuaded of the truth of Religion, they will be the better Subjects, and the more uſeful in civil Societies. As well then may an *Atheiſt* ſay there is no ſuch thing as Good Nature in the World, becauſe that is apt to be abus'd, nor any ſuch thing as Love, becauſe that may be cheated, as that Religion is nothing but a deſign, becauſe Men may make it ſtalk to their private ends. Thus we ſee how the *Atheiſt* by the force of thoſe Principles on which he denies a God, muſt be forced to deny other things, which yet by his own confeſſion are apparently true.

X. Prop. 3. So I come to the third *Propoſition*, which is, *That we have as certain Evidence that there is a God, as we can have, conſidering his Nature.* When we demand the proof of a thing, our firſt eye muſt be to the nature of the thing which we deſire may be prov'd; for things equally true, are not capable of equal evidence, nor have like manners of probation. There is no demonſtration in *Euclide* will ſerve to prove that there are ſuch places as the *Indies:* we cannot prove the Earth is round by the judgment of ſenſe; nor that the Soul is immortal by corporeal Phantaſms. Every diſtinct kind of Being hath its peculiar way of probation;

bation; and therefore it ought not to be at all wondred at, if the ſupreme and infinite Being have his peculiar way of demonſtrating himſelf to the minds of Men. If then we have as evident proofs of the Exiſtence of God, as we can have, conſidering the infinity of his Nature, it is all which in reaſon we can deſire; and of that kind of proofs we have theſe following. For, 1. *If God hath ſtamped an univerſal Character of himſelf upon the minds of Men.* 2. *If the things in the World are the manifeſt effects of infinite Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power.* 3. *If there be ſuch things in the World which are unaccountable without a Deity*, then we may with ſafety and aſſurance conclude *that there is a God.*

1. *That God hath imprinted an univerſal Character of himſelf on the minds of Men*; and that may be known by two things, 1. *If it be ſuch as bears the ſame importance among all Perſons.* 2. *If it be ſuch as cannot be miſtaken for the Character of any thing elſe.*

1. I begin with the firſt, whereby I ſhall prove this Character to be univerſal, becauſe the whole World hath conſented in it. This Argument we may rely on with the greater ſecurity, becauſe it was the only Argument which retain'd the Deity in the ancient School of *Epicurus*; which cou'd he have thought of as eaſy a way of evading, as he thought he had found out as to the Origin of the Univerſe, he was no ſuch great Friend to the very name of a God, as to have retain'd it as an Anticipation or Prolepſis of Humane Nature. And this Argument from the univerſal conſent of the World, was that which bore the greateſt ſway among the Philoſophers, who went by nothing but Dictates of natural Light, which they cou'd not ſo clearly diſcover in any things, as in thoſe which all Mankind did unanimouſly conſent in. Two things I ſhall make this out by. 1. *That no ſufficient account can be given of ſo univerſal a conſent, unleſs it be ſuppos'd to be the voice of Nature.* 2. *That the diſſent of any particular Perſons is not ſufficient to controul ſo univerſal an Argument.*

1. *That no ſufficient account of it can be given, but only by aſſerting it to be a Dictate of Nature.* In ſo ſtrange a diſſent as there hath been in the World concerning moſt of thoſe things which relate to Mankind in common, as the Models of Government, the Laws they are rul'd by, the particular Rites and Cuſtoms of Worſhip; we have the greateſt reaſon to judge that thoſe common Principles which were the Foundations on which all theſe ſeveral different Cuſtoms were built, were not the effect of any poſitive Laws, nor the mere force of principles of Education, but ſomething which had a deeper root and foundation in the Principles of Nature it ſelf. A common and univerſal Effect muſt flow from ſome common and univerſal Cauſe. So the *Stoic* argues in *Tully*, If there were no God, *non tam ſtabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum ſeculis ætatibuſque hominum inveterare potuiſſet.* It is ſtrange to think that Mankind in ſo many Ages of the World ſhou'd not grow wiſe enough to rid it ſelf of ſo troubleſome an Opinion as that was, of the Being of God, had it not been true.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

We ſee in all the alterations of the World, other vain Opinions have been detected, refuted and ſhaken off; if this had been ſuch, how comes it to remain the ſame in all Ages, and Nations of the World? *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.* It is a great diſcredit to Time to make it like a River in that ſenſe, that it bears up only lighter things, when matters of greateſt weight are ſunk to the bottom and paſt recovery. This may paſs for a handſome Alluſion, as to the

Opinions and Writings of particular Perſons, but cannot be underſtood of ſuch things which are founded on the univerſal conſent of the World; for theſe common Notions of Humane Nature are ſo ſuted to the temper of the World, that they paſs down the ſtrong current of Time with the ſame facility that a well built Ship, tho' of good burden, doth furrow the Ocean. So that if we muſt adhere to the Allegory, it is eaſily reply'd, that it is not the weight of things which makes them ſink, but the unſutableneſs of their Superficies to that of the water; ſo we ſee a ſmall piece of Wood will ſink, when a ſtately Ship is born up; ſo ſuch things which have not that agreeableneſs in them to the Dictates of Nature may ſoon be loſt, but ſuch as lie ſo even upon the ſuperficies of the Soul, will ſtill float above the Water, and never be loſt in the ſwifteſt current of Time. Thus we aſſert this univerſal conſent of Mankind, as to the exiſtence of a Deity, to be a thing ſo conſonant to our Natural reaſon, that as long as there are Men in the World it will continue.

XI But now it is hardly conceivable, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, how Mankind ſhou'd univerſally agree in ſome common Sentiments; much leſs how it ſhou'd have ſuch an Anticipation as himſelf grants of the Being of God. For if the Soul be nothing elſe but ſome more active and vigorous Particles of Matter (as *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, that his Opinion was, that the Soul was nothing elſe but a *Syſtem* ἐξ ἀτόμων λειοτάτων ϗ στρογγυλωτάτων, *of the moſt ſmooth and round Atoms*) if ſo, it is very hard apprehending how any ſuch things as Anticipations or common Notions can be lodg'd in the Soul; for if our Souls be nothing elſe but ſome ſmall Sphærical Corpuſcles which move up and down the Body, as the *Epicurean* Philoſophy ſuppoſeth, then all our Knowledge and Perception muſt depend on Motion, which Motion muſt be by the impreſſion of external Objects: which *Lucretius* acknowledgeth and contends for.

Laertius l. 10. in v. Epic. v. Gaſſend. To. 2d. l. 3. ſect. 3.

> *Invenies primis à ſenſibus eſſe creatam*
> *Notitiam veri.*

Lucret. l. 4.

If then our knowledge of Truth comes in by our Senſes, and Senſation doth wholly depend upon the impreſſion of outward Objects, what becomes of all common Notions and of the *Prolepſis* of a Deity? unleſs we ſuppoſe the knowledge of a Deity came in by Senſe, which *Epicurus* himſelf denies when he attributes to the Deity not *corpus*, but *quaſi corpus*, as *Tully* tells us, and therefore he is not a proper object of Senſe. So that it is impoſſible there ſhou'd be any ſuch thing as a natural Notion which may be the ground of univerſal conſent among Men, according to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*. And therefore it ſtands to all reaſon in the World, that if our Senſes be the only competent Judges of Truth, Men ſhou'd differ about nothing more than ſuch things which cannot be try'd by the judgment of Senſe; ſuch as the notion of a God is; (for where ſhou'd Men be more uncertain in their judgments, than in ſuch things which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of?) but we are ſo far from finding it ſo, that Men are nothing ſo much agreed about the objects of Senſe, as they are about the exiſtence of a Deity; and therefore we ſee this univerſal conſent of Mankind concerning a God, cannot be ſalv'd by the Principles of thoſe who deny it; according to which no account at all can be given of any ſuch things as univerſal or common Notions.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

XII. Neither can this univerſal conſent of Mankind be enervated with any greater probability by thoſe *Atheiſts* who aſſert the Eternity of the World, and reſolve this conſent wholly into mere Tradition, ſuch as the Fables of Poets were convey'd in from one to another. For I demand concerning this Tradition, whether ever it had any beginning or no? If it had no beginning, it cou'd be no Tradition; for that muſt run up to ſome Perſons from whom it firſt came; again, if it had no beginning, it was neceſſary that it ſhou'd always be, on the ſame accounts on which they make the World eternal. And if it be neceſſary, it muſt be antecedent to any free Act of Man's Will which Tradition ſuppoſeth; and ſo ſome falſe Opinion wou'd be found to be as neceſſary as the World's being eternal, (and by conſequence the World's being eternal may be a neceſſary falſe Opinion) but if any falſe Opinion be once granted neceſſary, it then follows that our Faculties are not true, and that Nature is a neceſſary cauſe of ſome notorious Falſity, which is the higheſt Impeachment the *Atheiſt* cou'd have laid upon his only ador'd Nature; which muſt then have done that, (which *Ariſtotle* was aſham'd to think ever Nature ſhou'd be guilty of) which is, ſomething in vain; for to what purpoſe ſhou'd Man have rational Faculties, if he be under an unavoidable neceſſity of being deceiv'd? If then it be granted that this Tradition had once a beginning, either it began with Humane Nature, or Humane Nature did exiſt long before it: if it began with Mankind, then Mankind had a beginning, and ſo the World was not eternal; if Mankind did exiſt before this Tradition, I then inquire in what time, and by what means, came this Tradition firſt to be embraced, if it doth not ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a Deity? Can any Age be mention'd in Hiſtory, wherein this Tradition was not univerſally receiv'd? and which is moſt to our purpoſe, the further we go back in Hiſtory, the fuller the World was of Deities, if we believe the Heathen Hiſtories; but however no Age can be inſtanc'd in, wherein this Tradition began firſt to be believ'd in the World; we can trace the Poetic Fables to their true Original, by the Teſtimonies of thoſe who believ'd them; we know the particular Authors of them, and what courſe they took in divulging of them; we find great diverſities among themſelves in the meaning of them, and many Nations that never heard of them. But all things are quite otherwiſe in this Tradition; we have none to fix on as the firſt Authors of it; if the World were eternal, and the belief of a Deity fabulous, we cannot underſtand by what Artifice a fabulous Tradition cou'd come to be ſo univerſally receiv'd in the World, that no Nation of old cou'd be inſtanced in by the inquiſitive Philoſophers, but however rude and barbarous it was, yet it own'd a Deity. How cou'd ſuch a Tradition be ſpread ſo far, but either by Force or Fraud? It cou'd not be by force, becauſe embraced by an unanimous conſent where no force at all hath been us'd, and hath been ſo rooted in the very Natures of thoſe People who have been moſt tender of their Liberties, that they have reſented no Indignity ſo highly, as any Affronts they conceiv'd to be offer'd to their Gods. Nay, and where any Perſons ſeem to quit the belief of a Deity, we find what Force and Violence they have us'd to their own Reaſon and Conſcience to bring themſelves to *Atheiſm*, which they cou'd not ſubdue their Minds to any longer than the Will cou'd command the Underſtanding; which when it gained but a little liberty to examine it ſelf, or view the World, or was alarmed with Thunder, Earth-quakes or violent Sickneſs, did bring back again the ſenſe of a Deity with greater force and power than they had endeavour'd to ſhake it off with. Now had this tradition come by force into the World, there would have been a ſecret exultation of Mind to be freed from it, as we ſee Nature rejoyceth to ſhake off every thing which is violent, and to ſettle every thing according to its due order. It is only Fraud then which can be with any Reaſon imagin'd in this caſe; and how unreaſonable it is to imagine it here, will appear to any one who doth conſider how extremely jealous the World is of being impoſed upon by the Subtilty of ſuch who are thought to be the greateſt Politicians. For the very Opinion of their Subtilty makes them apt to ſuſpect a Deſign in every thing they ſpeak or do, ſo that nothing doth more generally hinder the entertaining of any motion ſo much among vulgar People, as that it comes from a Perſon reputed very Politic. So that the moſt politic way of gaining upon the Apprehenſions of the Vulgar, is by taking upon one the greateſt appearance of Simplicity and Integrity; and this now cou'd not be done by ſuch Politicians which we now ſpeak of, but by accommodating themſelves to ſuch things in the People which were ſo conſonant to their Natures, that they cou'd ſuſpect no deſign at all in the matters propounded to them. And thus I aſſert it to have been in the preſent caſe, in all thoſe Politic Governours who at firſt brought the World into both Civil and Religious Societies, after they were grown Rude and Barbarous; for as it had been impoſſible to have brought them into Civil Societies, unleſs there had been ſuppos'd an inclination to Society in them, ſo it had been equally impoſſible to have brought them to embrace any particular way of Religion, unleſs there had been a natural propenſity to Religion implanted in them, and founded in the general belief of the exiſtence of a Deity. And therefore we never find any of the ancient Founders of Common-wealths go about to perſuade the People that there was a God, but this they ſuppos'd and made their advantage of it, the better to draw the People on to embrace that way of Worſhip, which they deliver'd to them, as moſt ſutable to their own deſign. And this is plainly evident in the vaſt difference of Deſigns and Intereſts which were carry'd on in the Heathen World upon this general apprehenſion of a Deity. How came the World to be ſo eaſily abus'd into Religions of all ſhapes and faſhions had not there been a natural inclination in Mens Souls to Religion, and an indelible Idea of a Deity on the Minds of Men? Were then this propenſity groundleſs, and this Idea fictitious, it were the greateſt ſlur imaginable, which cou'd be caſt upon Nature, that when the Inſtincts of irrational Agents argue ſomething real in them; only Man the moſt noble Being of the viſible World, muſt be fatally carry'd to the belief of that which never was. Which yet hath ſo great a force and awe upon Man, that nothing creates ſo great Anxieties in his life as this doth; nothing lays him more open to the deſigns of any who have an intent to abuſe him. But yet further, theſe Politicians who firſt abus'd the world, in telling them there was a God, did they themſelves believe there was a God or no? If they did, then they had no ſuch end as abuſing the world into ſuch a belief. If they did not, upon what accounts did they believe there was none, when the People were ſo ready to believe there was one? Was that as certain a Tradition before that there was no God, as afterwards they made it to be that there was? If ſo, then all thoſe People whom they perſuaded to believe there was a God, did before, all believe there was none; and how can it poſſibly enter into the Reaſon of any Man to think, that People who had been brought up in the belief that there was no God at all, nor any State after this Life, ſhou'd all unanimouſly quit the Principles of Education which tended ſo much to their Eaſe and Pleaſure here, to believe there was a God and another Life, and thereby to fill themſelves full of Fears and Diſquietments, merely becauſe their Rulers told them ſo? Again, if theſe Rulers themſelves were ſo wiſe as not to believe a Deity, can we imagine there ever was ſuch an Age of the World wherein it fell out ſo happily, that only the Rulers were Wiſe, and all the Subjects Fools? But it may be, it will be ſaid, *That all who were wiſe themſelves did not believe a Deity, but yet conſented to the practice of Religion, becauſe it was ſo uſeful for the Government of Mankind*; but can it be thought that all theſe wiſe Men, which we muſt ſuppoſe of ſeveral Ranks and Degrees, (for Philoſophers are not always States-men, nor States-men Philoſophers) ſhou'd ſo readily concur in ſuch things which tended moſt to the intereſt of the Prince, and to the abuſe of the World? Wou'd none of them be ready to aſſert the Truth, tho' it were but to make a Party of their own, and diſcover to the People, that it was only the Ambition and Deſign of their Governours which ſought to bring the People to Slavery by the belief of ſuch things, which were contrary to the Tradition of their Fore-fathers, and wou'd make their Lives, if they believ'd them, continually troubleſome and unquiet? Or if we cou'd ſuppoſe things ſhou'd hit thus in one Nation, what is this to the whole World which the *Atheiſt* here ſuppoſeth eternal? What, did all the Rulers of the World exactly agree in one moment of time; or at leaſt in one Age thus to abuſe the World? Did the deſigns of Governours and the credulity of all People fall out to be ſo ſutable together? But on the contrary, we do not find that Governours can have the Judgments of People ſo at their command, that they can make them to believe what they pleaſe; if it were ſo, we may well ſay with that *Atheiſtical* Pope, *Heu quam minimo regitur Mundus*; *What a twine thread will Rule the World!* But granting theſe things, (which any but an *Atheiſt* will ſay are impoſſible) yet whence ſhou'd it come to paſs that the World, which is generally led more by the Opinions of their Fore-fathers, than by Reaſon, ſhou'd ſo cancel that former Tradition that there was no God, that no remaining foot-ſteps of it can be traced in any Hiſtory of thoſe times? Or did the Governours at all conſent to aboliſh all Records of it? Public and Written I grant they might, but not thoſe out of Mens Minds and Memories; which wou'd have been for the eaſe of the Minds of their Poſterity conveyed in ſome ſecret *Cabala* from Fathers to their Children. It may be it will be ſaid, *ſo it was, but Men durſt not profeſs it for fear of the Laws*: but, it is not evident that the Laws of all ancient Common-wealths were ſo ſevere againſt *Atheiſm*; and withal how came ſome of the wiſeſt and moſt philoſophical Men of *Greece* and *Rome* to embrace the exiſtence of a Deity, as a thing far more conſonant to Reaſon than the contrary Opinion, and eſtabliſh'd their belief on ſuch Evidences from Nature it ſelf, that none of their *Antagoniſts* were able to anſwer them? It was not certainly the fear of Laws which made Men rational and inquiſitive into the Natures and Cauſes of things; and yet thoſe who were ſuch amidſt the great Idolatries of the Heathen, and being deſtitute of Divine Revelation, yet freely and firmly aſſented to the exiſtence of a Deity. Had it been only Fraud and Impoſture which brought Men to believe a God, whence came it to paſs that this Fraud was not diſcover'd by theſe Philoſophers, who were far better able by their nearneſs to thoſe eldeſt times and much converſe abroad in other Nations (for ſome Travell'd into *Ægypt*, *Chaldea*, *Perſia*, *India*, merely to gain Knowledge) to have found out ſuch an Impoſture, had it been ſuch, than any of our modern *Atheiſts*? Whence come theſe now in this almoſt decrepit Age of the World to be the firſt ſmellers out of ſo great a Deſign? By what Means, what tokens and Evidences came ſuch an Impoſture to their knowledge? Becauſe, forſooth, the World is ſtill apt to be abus'd by a pretence of Religion; but he that doth not ſee how ſilly and ridiculous a Sophiſm that is, either by his own Reaſon, or by what hath gone before; hath Wit and Reaſon little enough to be an *Atheiſt*. Some therefore who wou'd ſeem a little wiſer than the vulgar ſort of *Atheiſts* (for it ſeems there is a *Vulgus* among them too, I wiſh it be more for their Meanneſs than Multitude) are ſo far convinced of the unreaſonableneſs of judging that the belief of a Deity came in by Fraud, that finding it ſo general and univerſal, they attribute it to as general and univerſal a Cauſe, which is the influence of the Stars. So true ſtill is that of the Poet, *Cœlum ipſum petimus ſtultitia*; for by what imaginable influence come the Stars to plant Opinions in Mens Minds ſo deeply and univerſally? But yet further, is this Opinion which is thus caus'd by the Stars, true or falſe? If the Opinion be true, we have what we deſire; if falſe, what malignant Influence is this of the Stars, ſo powerfully to ſway Men to the belief of a Falſity? How far are the Stars then from doing good to Mankind, when they are ſo influential to deceive the World; but then, by what peculiar Influence come ſome Men to be freed from this general Impoſture? If the Cauſe be ſo univerſal, the Effect muſt be univerſal too. But if only the nativity and continuance of ſome particular Religions may be calculated by the Stars, (as *Cardan* and *Vaninus*, Atheiſtically ſuppoſe) whence then comes the general propenſity and inclination to Religion in all Ages and Nations of the World? If it be then caus'd by the Heavens in general, it muſt be produced neceſſarily and univerſally, and ſo to be an *Atheiſt*, were impoſſible; if it be caus'd by the influence of ſome particular Stars, then when that influence ceaſeth, the World wou'd univerſally relapſe into *Atheiſm*. So that there is no poſſible way of avoiding this univerſal conſent of Mankind, as an Argument that there is a God, when all the Pretences of the *Atheiſt* againſt it are ſo weak, ridiculous and impertinent.

VIII. The only thing then left for him, is, to deny the truth of the thing, *viz.* that there is ſuch an univerſal conſent; becauſe ſome Perſons have been found in the World who have not agreed with the reſt of Mankind in this Opinion. To this I anſwer, (which was the ſecond Particular for clearing this Argument) that the diſſent of theſe Perſons is not ſufficient to manifeſt the conſent not to be univerſal, and to ariſe from a Dictate of Nature: For I demand of the greateſt *Atheiſt*, whether it be ſufficient to ſay, that it is not natural for Men to have two Legs, becauſe ſome have been born with one, or that it is not natural for Men to deſire Life (which the *Atheiſt* loves ſo dearly) becauſe there have been ſo many who have taken away their own Lives? If it be ſaid that theſe are Monſters and *Anomalies* in Nature, and therefore not to be reckon'd in the regular Account of things, the ſame I may with as great reaſon ſay of *Atheiſts*, that they are to be diſpung'd out of the *Cenſus* of ſuch who act upon free Principles of Reaſon; becauſe there

may be ſome peculiar Reaſons given of their Diſſent from the reſt of Mankind in the denial of a Deity. We ſee by the old Philoſophers how far the Affectation of Novelty, and Ambition, of being cry'd up for no vulgar Wits, may carry Men to deny ſuch things, which are moſt common and obvious in the World. Is there any thing more plain and evident to Reaſon, than that it implies a contradiction for the ſame
Ariſt. Metaphyſ. l. 4. c. 4. thing to be and not to be at the ſame time? and yet if we believe *Ariſtotle*, who largely diſputes againſt them, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχεσθαί φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ϗ μὴ εἶναι. *There were ſome who affirm'd that a thing might be and not be at the ſame time.* What ſo evident in Nature as Motion? yet the Philoſopher is well known who diſputed againſt it, and thought himſelf ſubtile in doing ſo too. What are Men more aſſur'd of, than that they live, and yet (if it be not too Dogmatical, even in that to believe the *Sceptics*) it was a thing none cou'd be aſſur'd of? What are our Senſes more aſſur'd of than that the Snow is white, yet all the Philoſophers were not of that Opinion? Is this then ſufficient Reaſon on which to deny an univerſal conſent, becauſe ſome Philoſophers
Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3. oppos'd it, when it is moſt undoubtedly true, which *Tully* ſharply ſpeaks of the ancient Philoſophers, *Nihil tam abſurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philoſophorum; There was no abſurdity ſo great, but it found a Philoſopher to vouch it?* But in this caſe thoſe Philoſophers who queſtion'd the exiſtence of a Deity, tho' they were not for number to be compar'd with thoſe who aſſerted it, yet were not ſo inexcuſable therein as our modern *Atheiſts*; becauſe they then knew no other way of Religion, but that which was joyn'd with horrible Superſtition, and ridiculous Rites of Worſhip; they were Strangers to any thing of Divine Revelation, or to any real Miracles wrought to confirm it, and to ſuch a way of ſerving God which is moſt agreeable to the Divine Nature, moſt ſutable to our Reaſon, moſt effectual for advancing true Godlineſs in the World. And altho' this moſt excellent Religion, *viz.* the Chriſtian, be ſubject to many Scandals by reaſon of the Corruptions which have been mix'd with it by thoſe who have profeſs'd it, yet the Religion it ſelf is clear and untainted, being with great Integrity preſerved in the ſacred Records of it. So that now *Atheiſm* hath far leſs to plead for its ſelf than it had in the midſt of the Ignorance and Superſtition of the Heathen Idolatries. But if we ſhou'd grant the *Atheiſt* more than he can prove, that the number of ſuch who deny'd a Deity hath been great in all Ages of the World; is it probable they ſhou'd ſpeak the Sence of Nature, whoſe Opinion, if it were embraced, wou'd diſſolve all Ties and Obligations whatſoever; wou'd let the World looſe to the higheſt Licentiouſneſs, without check or controul, and wou'd in time overturn all
Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. & de Legib. l. 2. Civil Societies? For as *Tully* hath largely ſhewn, *Take away the Being and Providence of God out of the World, and there follows nothing but Perturbation and Confuſion in it, not only all Sanctity, Piety and Devotion is deſtroy'd, but all Faith, Vertue and Humane Societies too*; which are impoſſible to be upheld without Religion, as not only he, but *Plato*, *Ariſtotle* and *Plutarch*, have fully demonſtrated. Shall ſuch Perſons then who hold an Opinion ſo contrary to all other Dictates of Nature, rather ſpeak the Senſe of Nature, than they who have aſſerted the belief of a Deity, which tends ſo much to advance Nature, to regulate the World, and to reform the Lives of Men? Certainly if it were not a dictate of Nature that there was a God, it is impoſſible to conceive the World ſhou'd be ſo conſtant in the belief of him, when the thoughts of

him breed ſo many Anxieties in Mens Minds, and withal, ſince God is neither obvious to Senſe, nor his nature comprehenſible by Humane Reaſon. Which is a ſtronger Evidence it is a Character of himſelf which God hath imprinted on the Minds of Men, which makes them ſo unanimouſly agree that he is, when they can neither ſee him, nor yet fully comprehend him. For any whole Nation, which have conſented in the denial of a *Deity*, we have no evidence at all; ſome ſuſpicions it is true there were at firſt concerning ſome very barbarous People in *America*, but it is ſince evident, tho' they are groſly miſtaken as to the Nature of God, yet they worſhip ſomething inſtead of him, ſuch as the *Toupinamboults*, *Caribes*, *Patagons*, *Tapuiæ*, and others; of the laſt of which *Voſſius* from one *Chriſtophorus Arciſſewski*, a *Polonian* Gentelman, who was among them, hath given a large account of their Religion, and the manner of their Worſhipping of their Gods, both good and bad. And that which among theſe *Indians* much confirms our preſent Argument, is, That only thoſe who have been the moſt barbarous and ſalvage Nations, have been ſuſpected of Irreligion, but the more civiliz'd they have been, the more evident their ſenſe of Religion. The *Peruvians* worſhip one chief God, whom they call *Virachocha*, and *Pachacamak*, which is as much as *The Creator of Heaven and Earth.* And of the Religion of the *Mexicans*, *Lipſius* and others ſpeak. So that the nearer any have approach'd to Civility and Knowledge, the more ready they have been to own a Deity, and none have had ſo little ſenſe of it, as they who are almoſt degenerated to Brutes; and whether of theſe two now comes nearer to Reaſon, let any one who hath it judge.

Voſſius Addend. ad l. 1. de Idol. p. 2.

Vid. Acoſtam, l. 5. c. 3.

Lipſ. Mon. & Exempl. Politic.

XIV. 2.

Another great Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character or Idea of himſelf on the Minds of Men, is, *becauſe ſuch things are contain'd in this Idea of God, which do neceſſarily imply his exiſtence.* The main force of this Argument lies in this, *That which we do clearly and diſtinctly perceive to belong to the nature and eſſence of a thing, may be with truth affirmed of the thing*; not that it may be affirm'd with truth to belong to the nature of the thing, for that were an empty *Tautology*, but it may be affirm'd with truth of the thing its ſelf; as if I clearly perceive upon exact enquiry, that to be an Animal doth belong to the nature of Man, I may with truth affirm that Man is a living Creature; if I find it demonſtrably true that a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones, then I may truly affirm it of any Triangle: But now we aſſume, That upon the moſt exact ſearch and inquiry, I clearly perceive that neceſſary exiſtence doth immutably belong to the nature of God; therefore, I may with as much truth affirm, that God exiſts, as that Man is a living Creature; or, a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones. But becauſe many are ſo apt to ſuſpect ſome kind of *Sophiſm* in this Argument, when it is managed from the Idea in Mens Minds, becauſe that ſeems to imply only an objective reality in the Mind, and that nothing can be thence inferr'd as to the exiſtence of the thing whoſe Idea it is, I therefore ſhall endeavour to manifeſt more clearly the force of this Argument, by proving ſeverally the ſuppoſitions which it ſtands upon, which are theſe three: 1. *That clear and diſtinct perception of the Mind is the greateſt Evidence we can have of the truth of any thing.* 2. *That we have this clear perception that neceſſary exiſtence doth belong to the nature of God.* 3. *That if neceſſary exiſtence doth belong to God's nature, it unavoidably follows, that he doth exiſt.* Nothing can be deſir'd more plain or full, to demonſtrate the force of this Argument, than by proving every one of theſe.

1. *That the greateſt Evidence we can have of the truth of a thing, is a clear and diſtinct perception of it in our Minds.* For otherwiſe the rational Faculties of Man's Soul wou'd be wholly uſeleſs, as being not fitted for any end at all, if upon a right uſe of them, Men were ſtill liable to be deceiv'd. I grant the imperfection of our Minds in this preſent ſtate is very great, which makes us ſo obnoxious to error and miſtake; but then that imperfection lies in the proneneſs in Man's Mind to be led by intereſt and prejudice in the judgment of things; but in ſuch things as are purely ſpeculative and rational, if the Mind cannot be certain it is not deceiv'd in them, it can have no certainty at all of any *Mathematical* Demonſtrations. Now we find in our own Minds a clear and convincing Evidence in ſome things, as ſoon as they are propounded to our Underſtandings, as that a *thing cannot be and not be at the ſame time*; that a *non-entity can have no proper Attributes*; that *while I reaſon and diſcourſe, I am*; theſe are ſo clear, that no Man doth ſuſpect himſelf deceiv'd at all in them. Beſides, if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things, to what purpoſe is there an Idea of true and falſe in our Minds, if it be impoſſible to know the one from the other? But I ſay not, that in all Perceptions of the Mind we have certain Evidence of truth, but only in ſuch as are clear and diſtinct; that is, when upon the greateſt conſideration of the nature of a thing, there appears no ground or reaſon at all to doubt concerning it; and this muſt ſuppoſe the Mind's abſtraction wholly from the Senſes; for we plainly find that while we attend to them, we may judge our ſelves very certain and yet be deceiv'd, as thoſe who have an *Icteriſm* in their Eyes, may judge with much confidence that they ſee things as clearly and diſtinctly as any other doth. Beſides, there are many things taken for granted by Men, which have no Evidence of Reaſon at all in them: Now if Men will judge of the truth of things by ſuch Principles, no wonder if they be deceiv'd. But when we ſpeak of clear and diſtinct Perception, we ſuppoſe the Mind to proceed upon evident Principles of Reaſon, or to have ſuch Notions of things, which as far as we can perceive by the light of Reaſon, do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend; if in ſuch things then there be no ground of certainty, it is as much as to ſay, our Faculties are to no purpoſe; which highly reflects either upon God or Nature. It is a noble Queſtion as any is in *Philoſophy*, What is the certain κριτήριον of the truth of things, or what ground of certainty the Mind hath to proceed upon in its judgment of the truth of ſuch objects as are repreſented to it? Nothing can render the *Philoſophy* of *Epicurus* more juſtly ſuſpected to any rational and inquiſitive Mind, than his making the Senſes the only conveyers of the truth of things to the Mind. The Senſes I grant do not in themſelves deceive any; but if I make the impreſſions of Senſe to be the only rule for the Mind to judge by of the truth of things, I make way for the greateſt impoſtures, and the moſt erring judgments. For if my Mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature according to that Idea which the Imagination hath receiv'd from the impreſſions upon the organs of Senſe, it will be impoſſible for me ever to underſtand the right natures of things. Becauſe the natures of things may remain the ſame, when all thoſe things in them which affect the organs of Senſe may be alter'd, and becauſe the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter may make ſuch an impreſſion upon the Senſes, which may cauſe an Idea in us of that in the things themſelves, which yet may

be only in the manner of Senſation; as ſome Philoſophers ſuppoſe it to be in Heat and Cold. Now if the Mind judgeth of the nature of things according to thoſe Ideas which come from the impreſſions made upon the organs of Senſe; how is it poſſible it ſhou'd ever come to a right judgment of the natures of things? So that in reference even to the groſſeſt material Beings, it muſt be the Perception only of the Mind, which can truly inform us of their proper Nature and Eſſence. Beſides, there are many Ideas of things in the Mind of Man which are capable to have Properties demonſtrated of them, which never ow'd their original to our Senſes; and were never imported to the Mind at the Keys of the Senſes. Such are moſt *Mathematical* Figures, which have their peculiar Properties and Demonſtrations; ſuch are all the mutual reſpects of things to each other, which may be as certain and evident to the Mind as its ſelf is: now it is plain by this, that all certainty of Knowledge is not convey'd by the Senſes; but our trueſt way of certain underſtanding the Nature of any thing, is by the clear and diſtinct Perception of the Mind, which is founded on the truth of our Faculties; and that however we may be deceiv'd when we do not make a right uſe of our Reaſon, becauſe of the imperfection of our preſent ſtate; yet if we ſay our Minds may be deceiv'd when things are evident and clear to them upon plain Principles of Reaſon, it is highly to reflect upon that God who gave Men rational Faculties, and made them capable of diſcerning Truth from Falſhood.

2. *That we have clear and diſtinct Perception that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth belong to the Nature of God.* For which we are to conſider the vaſt difference which there is in our Notion of the Nature of God, and of the Nature of any other Being. In all other Beings, I grant we may abſtract eſſence and Exiſtence from each other; now if I can make it appear, that there is evident Reaſon, *ex parte rei*, why I cannot do it in the Notion of God, then it will be more plain that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to his Nature. It is manifeſt to our Reaſon, that in all other Beings, which we apprehend the Natures of, nothing elſe can be imply'd in the Natures of them beyond bare poſſibility of Exiſtence; no, altho' the things which we do apprehend, do really exiſt; becauſe in forming an Idea of a thing, we abſtract from every thing which is not imply'd in the very Nature of the thing: now Exiſtence being contingent and poſſible, as to any other Being, it cannot be any ingredient of its Idea, becauſe it doth not belong to its Eſſence; for we may fully apprehend the Nature of the thing, without attributing Exiſtence to it. But now in our Conception of a Being, abſolutely perfect, bare poſſibility or contingency of Exiſtence ſpeaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of him; for how can we conceive that Being abſolutely perfect, which may want that which gives life to all other Perfections, which is *Exiſtence?* The only ſcruple which Mens Minds are ſubject to in apprehending the force of this Argument lies in this, *Whether this neceſſary Exiſtence doth really belong to the Nature of that Being whoſe Idea it is, or elſe it be only a Mode of our Conception in apprehending God?* For clearing of this, we muſt conſider by what certain Rules we can know when the compoſition of things together in the Underſtanding doth depend upon

the mere Operation of the Mind, and when they do belong to the things themſelves and their immutable Nature. For which we have no Rule ſo certain and evident as this is, that in thoſe things which depend merely on the Act of the Mind joyning together, the Underſtanding cannot only abſtract one thing from another, but may really divide them in its Conceptions from each other: but in ſuch things which cannot be divided from each other, but the Eſſence of the thing is quite alter'd, it is a certain evidence that thoſe things were not conjoyn'd by the mere Act of the Mind, but do immutably belong to the Natures of the things themſelves. As for inſtance, when I conceive a Triangle inſcrib'd in a Square, a Man walking, a Horſe with wings, it is evident I may underſtand the Natures of all theſe things without theſe Affections of them, becauſe I can fully apprehend the Nature of a Triangle, without imagining a Square, a Man without walking, a Horſe without wings; thence it neceſſarily follows, that the joyning of theſe things together, was merely an Act of the Mind: But now I cannot conceive a Triangle not to have three Angles equal to two right ones, nor a Man that hath not Rationality belonging to him; for if I divide theſe Attributes from them, I deſtroy their Natures; and therefore the joyning of theſe together is not any mere Act of the Mind; but theſe are ſuch things as are imply'd in the very notion of them, and therefore immutably belongs to them. So now, when I conceive the notion of a Body, I can imagine all Perfections belonging to it, without conceiving it neceſſarily to exiſt; for it may be a Body ſtill, tho' it hath not its Being from it ſelf; but when I conceive a Being abſolutely perfect, it is impoſſible to imagine it ſhou'd have its Being from any other; and if it be from it ſelf, it muſt of neceſſity exiſt. For tho' the Mind ſtill be apt to doubt, whether Exiſtence in this Idea be only a Mode of Cogitation; yet that doubt may be eaſily remov'd, if the Mind doth but attend to this, that at leaſt Poſſibility of Exiſtence doth belong to all thoſe Beings which we have a clear Idea of in our Minds; and the reaſon why we attribute bare poſſibility to them, is becauſe we apprehend ſome Reaſon in our Minds which keeps us from attributing neceſſity of Exiſtence to them, as that it is not imply'd in its Nature, or that it doth depend on ſome other Being, or that it wants infinite Power, &c. Now all theſe Reaſons which make us attribute bare poſſibility of Exiſtence to any Being, are taken away when we conceive a Being abſolutely perfect; for then Exiſtence is imply'd among the number of Perfections; and this Being is independant upon all others, and infinitely powerful; ſo that nothing can hinder its Exiſtence; and therefore we muſt conclude that neceſſity of Exiſtence doth immutably belong to the Nature of God, and is not any Mode only of our Conception; becauſe if we take away neceſſity of Exiſtence from God, we loſe the notion of a Being abſolutely perfect.

The third thing, *That if neceſſary Exiſtence belongs to the Nature of God, he doth exiſt*, not only follows as a neceſſary Concluſion from the other two, as the Premiſſes, but is in its ſelf evident to any one's Reaſon; for it implies no leſs than a Contradiction for a Being to exiſt neceſſarily, and yet it be queſtionable, Whether it doth exiſt or no? Thus much I ſuppoſe may ſuffice here to explain and enforce this Argument; if any are yet unſatiſfy'd, I refer them to thoſe judicious Authors, who have made it their peculiar buſineſs to manage it, and vindicate it from all objections: which falls in only here as an Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character of himſelf on the Minds of Men, ſeeing we have ſo clear and diſtinct an Idea of ſuch a Being, from whom, if we take away neceſſity of Exiſtence, we deſtroy that Notion which our Minds have of an abſolutely perfect Being. This is the firſt way whereby we can conceive an infinite Being may make himſelf known to Mankind, by imprinting an indelible Character of himſelf upon the Soul, which can be attributed to none beſides himſelf without doing manifeſt violence to our own Faculties, and ſuſpecting our ſelves deceiv'd in things which are moſt clear and evident to us.

Vid. Des Cartes Metaphyſ. Medit. & Reſp. ad Object. D H. *More* Antidote againſt Atheiſm, *l.* 1. *ch.* 8. *Append. ch.* 5, 6, 7.

XV. I come to the ſecond Evidence which God hath given us of his own Exiſtence, which is the mark, and *impreſſion which he hath left of an infinite Wiſdom and Counſel, in the appearances which are in Nature.* There needs no great Criticiſm to find out the true Author of all the Works of Nature; the Works themſelves ſhew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curioſity and contrivance of any artificial Engine ſpeak the excellency of the Mechanical Wit of the Framer of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare Mechaniſm of the Works of Nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of ſome Particles of Matter? Suppoſe a multitude of Letters caſually thrown together, ſhou'd fall ſo handſomely in order, that we might read in them the Names of *Troja*, *Juno*, *Æneas*, *Dido*, *Turnus*, *Aſcanius* or the like; is it poſſible for any to imagine that ever they ſhou'd reach the Grandeur, Stile, Matter and Accuracy of the whole Books of the *Æneids*? So granting, that now Matter being ſet in Motion by a Divine Power, may by its continual agitation, at laſt produce ſome of the appearances of Nature; yet what is this to the whole Univerſe, or the admirable Contrivance of any one part in it? If theſe things had been the reſult of mere Matter and Motion, when once the Particles of Matter had been ſo united and ſettled together, as to produce any one ſpecies of Animals in the World (which it is almoſt unconceivable they ſhou'd) yet we cannot think that if there had been but Symmetry of Parts enough for it merely to ſubſiſt it ſelf, and propagate more, there cou'd have been any further Attempt made by thoſe *Atoms*, which had been once ſettl'd in a determinate figure. How came it then to paſs that there is not any one ſpecies of Animals in the World, but what hath ſuch an Order, Symmetry and Contrivance of parts, which ſpeaks more than mere neceſſity of Subſiſtence, and therefore ſpeaks them to be the Effect of a Supreme Governour of the World, and not the Products of mere Matter? Is it poſſible, that any who is not before-hand reſolv'd to exclude a *Deity*, ſhou'd imagine that any Particles of Matter ſhou'd fall into the exact Form, Order, Motion, and ſerviceableneſs to the World which the Heavenly Bodies are in, without Divine Counſel and Wiſdom diſpoſing of them? *Tully* tells us of a Speech of *Ariſtotle* to this purpoſe; *If we cou'd ſuppoſe Perſons to have liv'd in ſome caverns of the earth, and to have enjoy'd every thing there of pleaſure, and*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2. *c.* 95.

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XV.

I come to the ſecond Evidence which God hath given us of his own Exiſtence, which is the mark, and *impreſſion which he hath left of an infinite Wiſdom and Counſel, in the appearances which are in Nature.* There needs no great Criticiſm to find out the true Author of all the Works of Nature; the Works themſelves ſhew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curioſity and contrivance of any artificial Engine ſpeak the excellency of the Mechanical Wit of the Framer of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare Mechaniſm of the Works of Nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of ſome Particles of Matter? Suppoſe a multitude of Letters caſually thrown together, ſhou'd fall ſo handſomely in order, that we might read in them the Names of *Troja*, *Juno*, *Æneas*, *Dido*, *Turnus*, *Aſcanius* or the like; is it poſſible for any to imagine that ever they ſhou'd reach the Grandeur, Stile, Matter and Accuracy of the whole Books of the *Æneids?* So granting, that now Matter being ſet in Motion by a Divine Power, may by its continual agitation, at laſt produce ſome of the appearances of Nature; yet what is this to the whole Univerſe, or the admirable Contrivance of any one part in it? If theſe things had been the reſult of mere Matter and Motion, when once the Particles of Matter had been ſo united and ſettled together, as to produce any one ſpecies of Animals in the World (which it is almoſt unconceivable they ſhou'd) yet we cannot think that if there had been but Symmetry of Parts enough for it merely to ſubſiſt it ſelf, and propagate more, there cou'd have been any further Attempt made by thoſe *Atoms*, which had been once ſettl'd in a determinate figure. How came it then to paſs that there is not any one ſpecies of Animals in the World, but what hath ſuch an Order, Symmetry and Contrivance of parts, which ſpeaks more than mere neceſſity of Subſiſtence, and therefore ſpeaks them to be the Effect of a Supreme Governour of the World, and not the Products of mere Matter? Is it poſſible, that any who is not before-hand reſolv'd to exclude a *Deity*, ſhou'd imagine that any Particles of Matter ſhou'd fall into the exact Form, Order, Motion, and ſerviceableneſs to the World which the Heavenly Bodies are in, without Divine Counſel and Wiſdom diſpoſing of them? *Tully* tells us of a Speech of *Ariſtotle* to this purpoſe; *If we cou'd ſuppoſe Perſons to have liv'd in ſome caverns of the earth, and to have enjoy'd every thing there of pleaſure, and*

Cicero de Nat. Deor. *l.* 2. *c.* 95.

riches, or whatever it is which we think makes Mens Lives happy, and had never been abroad upon the ſurface of the earth, but had only had ſome obſcure report of an infinite Power and Being; and that afterwards theſe Perſons ſhou'd by an opening of the caverns wherein they were, come abroad into theſe parts of the World, and ſhou'd ſuddenly behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, and obſerve the vaſtneſs of the Clouds, and violence of Winds, and behold the bigneſs, beauty and influence of the Sun, and how the Day depended upon his preſence, and upon his withdrawing ſhou'd view the face of the Heavens again (as it were the *ſecond courſe* of Nature.) *the order and ornament of the Stars, the varieties of the light of the Moon, their riſing and ſetting, and their fixed and immoveable courſes; they cou'd not hold from believing there was a* Deity, *and that theſe were the effects of his Power.* So vaſtly different are the free and natural emanations of our Souls, from that which we force and ſtrain out of our ſelves by diſtorting and wringing thoſe free Principles of Reaſon which God hath given us. When a few ſorry Experiments and ſome arbitrary *Hypotheſes*, muſt make us form other Conceptions of things, than the Majeſty, Order and Beauty of them do naturally ſuggeſt to us: We ſee, when once we can but abſtract our Minds from thoſe prejudices which continual converſation with the World brings upon us, by that Speech of *Ariſtotle*, how readily our Minds will frame an excellent Commentary upon thoſe words of the Royal *Pſalmiſt*, *The Heavens declare the glory of* God, *and the Firmament ſhews his handy-work.* To which purpoſe likewiſe thoſe words of the excellent *Orator* himſelf in another place, are very obſervable; *Quid eſt enim verius quam neminem eſſe oportere tam ſtulte arrogantem, ut in ſe mentem & rationem putet ineſſe, in cælo mundoque non putet? aut ea quæ vix ſumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putat? Quem vero aſtrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque viciſſitudines, quem menſium temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum eſſe cogant, hunc hominem omnino numerare qui dicet? What monſtrous arrogancy wou'd it be in any Man to think there is a Mind and Reaſon in himſelf, and that there is none in the World? Or to think thoſe things are mov'd without Reaſon and Underſtanding, which all that he hath is ſcarce able to comprehend? Neither can he deſerve the name of a Man, from whom the obſervation of the courſes of the Stars, the ſucceſſion and order of Seaſons, and the innumerable benefits which he enjoys in the World, doth not extort gratitude towards that Being which order'd all theſe things.* What a low opinion then had thoſe more refin'd and generous Spirits, who went only upon Principles of pure and undiſtorted Reaſon, of thoſe mean and ignoble Souls, which were inclin'd to *Atheiſm*; eſpecially then, when Religion was ſo abus'd, that it was true of the wiſeſt of them, what one ſaid of *Eraſmus*, *Magis habuit quid fugeret quam quid ſequeretur*, they knew what to avoid, but not what they ſhou'd embrace: And yet when they ſaw ſo much into the Folly and Superſtition of Heathen Worſhip, they ſaw the greateſt reaſon ſtill to adhere to the belief of a Deity, as may be clearly ſeen, eſpecially in the ſecond of thoſe excellent Dialogues of *Tully*, *De Natura Deorum:* Where this particular Argument to prove a Deity from the

Cicero *de Legibus*, l. 2.

admirable contrivance of the Works of Nature, is manag'd with a great deal of Eloquence and Reaſon, and by particular enumeration of moſt conſiderable parts of the Univerſe. So unbecoming a late Philoſopher was that Reaſon of his, why he wav'd the Argument from the conſideration of the World, to infer a Deity, becauſe the ends of God are unſearchable, as flowing from his Infinite Wiſdom. For what tho' God may conceal ſome things from Men, which he intends, and are of no concernment for Men to know, muſt therefore of neceſſity thoſe ends of his be unſearchable in his works of Creation, which refer ſo immediately to the advantage of Life, and tend ſo much to the veneration of the Deity?

XVI. Nay, the peculiar uſe and ſerviceableneſs of many parts of the Univerſe, eſpecially of Animals, and chiefly of Man, is ſo evident, that this hath been the main Argument which hath induced ſome, otherwiſe *Atheiſtical* enough to acknowledge and adore a Deity. And altho' the *Epicureans* be lamentably puzled to give any tolerable account of many other appearances in Nature, yet they no where diſcover ſo much Weakneſs and Ignorance, as when they come to diſcourſe *De uſu partium*, about the contrivance of the parts of Man's Body. Whoſe Opinion is thus briefly deliver'd by *Lucretius*;

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti Lucret. l. 4.
Poſſemus; ſed quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.

i. e. *that no parts of Man's body were deſign'd for that uſe which they are imploy'd for, but the parts by chance fell into that form they are in, and Men by degrees brought them to their preſent uſe and ſerviceableneſs.* An Opinion at firſt view ſo ſtrangely unreaſonable, that we cannot think *Epicurus* ſhou'd have ever embraced it, had it not unavoidably follow'd upon his *Hypotheſis* of all things in the Univerſe reſulting only from a fortuitous Concourſe of Atoms: According to which he ſuppos'd in Man a different configuration of Parts wou'd happen from the various Agitation and Concretion of thoſe little Particles which at firſt run together in the faſhion of a Man; and becauſe that Man had in him a more florid and vivacious Spirit, made up of the moſt ſubtle and movable Atoms, thence Motion came into the ſeveral parts ſutable to the different Conformation of them. And becauſe thoſe Atoms of which the Soul is compos'd, are capable of Senſation, thence it comes to paſs, that it ſees in the Eye, hears in the Ear, and ſmells in the Noſtrils. This is the moſt which is made of the Opinion of *Epicurus* by the late ſedulous Vindicator of him, which yet himſelf calls *intoleranda opinio*; and it will appear to be ſo, not only as contradicting, what God himſelf hath deliver'd concerning Man, but what Reaſon it ſelf will eaſily ſuggeſt from the conſideration of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body. It muſt be confeſs'd there were ſome Philoſophers elder than *Epicurus*, who were much inclin'd to this Opinion, as *Democritus*, *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*, and others; yet we find thoſe who more narrowly ſearch'd into the Natures of living Creatures, were thereby brought to acknowledge a Divine Providence, which with a great deal of Wiſdom did order the ſeveral parts of Animals, and adapted them to their peculiar uſes. And altho' *Ariſtotle* in his Book *de partibus Animalium*, hath ſaid enough to refute the fond Opinion of thoſe Philoſophers; yet none hath handled this Argument with more exactneſs and accuracy, and with a more peculiar reflection on *Epicurus*, than *Galen* hath done in his excellent piece *De uſu partium*. Which *Gaſſendus* thinks *Galen* writ with a kind of *Enthuſiaſm* upon him (*adeo totum opus videre conſcriptum* ἐνθουσιαστικῶς) and ſo all thoſe ſeventeen Books of his on that ſubject, are a kind of 119th *Pſalm* in Philoſophy, or a perpetual *Hymn* upon the praiſe of the great Creator, a juſt Commentary on thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt*, Pſal. 139. 14. *I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my Soul knoweth right well.* In the entrance of thoſe Books, *Galen* firſt ſhews the great variety of parts which is in ſeveral Animals ſutable to their ſeveral Natures; the Horſe becauſe of his Swiftneſs and Pride, hath the ſtrongeſt Hoofs and moſt curl'd Main; the Lion becauſe of his Fierceneſs and Courage hath his Strength lying in his Teeth and Paws; the Bull in his Horns; the Boar in his Tusks; the Hart and Hare being timorous Creatures, their parts are made fitteſt for flight: but Man becauſe he hath a principle of Reaſon in him, hath no defenſive or offenſive Weapons in his Body, but he hath Hands to make uſe of both; which being joyn'd with, and imploy'd by his Reaſon, far exceed all thoſe advantages which any other Creatures have, being imploy'd not only to defend himſelf, but to build Houſes, make Cloaths, Arms and Nets, whatever is uſeful for himſelf, or hurtful to thoſe Creatures which he hath command over; but becauſe Man was made for Society and civil Converſe, therefore his hands were not only imploy'd to defend himſelf or hurt other Creatures, but for the mutual benefit and advantage of Mankind; for by theſe were Laws written, Temples built, all Inſtruments of Arts fram'd; by them we enjoy the benefit of others Wits, we can diſcourſe with *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hippocrates*, and other Ancients, tho' at ſuch a diſtance from us. 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As *Galen* ſaith, he had often ſeen a Bull-calf puſhing with his Head before any Horns were grown out, and a Colt kicking when his Hoofs were yet tender, and a young Boar defending himſelf with his Jaws before he had any Tusks, which is an evident Argument that the parts were deſigned for the uſe, and not the uſe to follow the parts. *So*, ſaith he, *take three Eggs, one of an Eagle, another of a Duck, and a third of a Serpent, and after they are hatch'd thro' a moderate heat, we ſhall find when they are but newly hatch'd, the two firſt will be ſtriving to fly before they have Wings, and the third endeavouring to creep away on its Belly; and if you breed them up to greater Perfection, and bring them into the open Air, you will preſently ſee the young Eagle mounting into the Air, the Duck quoddling in a Pool, and the Serpent creep under Ground.* After-

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Afterwards he comes particularly to handle the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and firſt begins with the Hand, and ſhews in each part that it were impoſſible to have fram'd them with greater conveniency for their ſeveral uſes than they have. The uſe of the Hand is to take hold of any thing which Man can uſe; now there being things of ſuch different ſizes which Men may uſe, it had been impoſſible for the Hand, if it had been one intire thing, and undivided, that it cou'd have held things greater or leſſer than its ſelf, but it muſt have been equal to it. But now as the Fingers are placed and divided, they are equally fit for laying hold of Objects of any ſize or quantity; for the leaſt things, as a Barley Corn, are taken up with the Fore-finger and the Thumb, things ſomewhat bigger are taken up by the ſame, but not by the extremities of them as before; things ſomewhat bigger than theſe, with the Thumb, Fore-finger and Middle-finger, and ſo on by degrees, till at laſt the whole Hand is us'd: ſo that the diviſion of the Hand into Fingers is neceſſary. Neither were this enough, but the very poſition of the Fingers as they are, is neceſſary too; for they had been uſeleſs if they had been all divided in a right line; for the firmeſt hold is either circular, or at leaſt in two oppoſite points; but now this is provided for, by the poſition of the Thumb, which may equally joyn with any of the Fingers in taking hold of any thing. After this, he largely ſhews the particular neceſſity of the ſoftneſs, roundneſs of the Fleſh, and Nails on the tops of the Fingers, and the ſpecial uſefulneſs of theſe; and then comes to the Bones of the Fingers, how neceſſary they are for firm-hold, and if there had been but one Bone in each Finger, they wou'd have ſerv'd only for thoſe things which we take up when they are extended; but now ſeeing they have three ſeveral joynts, they are fitted for all kinds of things; for when we bow our Fingers, we uſe them as tho' they had no bones at all, and when we ſtretch them out, as tho' they were all but one intire Bone; and the ſeveral inflections of the Joynts ſerve for all kind of Figures: and then he ſhews the neceſſity of the Fleſh within the Fingers, and on either ſide of them, and upon them; and ſo with wonderful accuracy handles the magnitude, number, figure of the Bones, and nature of the Joynts of the Fingers, and then the Tendons and Muſcles belonging to the ſeveral Fingers, which after he hath diſcours'd on thro' his firſt Book he concludes it with the manifeſt inconveniency which wou'd follow in the hand, were not every thing in it in that exact magnitude, poſition, and figure in which it is. With the ſame exactneſs he goes thro' all the parts of the Body, handling in the ſecond Book all that belongs to the Arm, in the third the Legs, in the fourth and fifth the Organs of Nutrition, in the ſixth and ſeventh the Lungs, in the eighth and ninth the Head, in the tenth the peculiar and admirable Fabrick of the Eyes, in the eleventh the other parts of the Face, in the twelfth the parts of the Back, and ſo in the thirteenth, in the fourteenth and fifteenth the Genitals, in the ſixteenth the Arteries, Veins, and Nerves, and in the laſt the peculiar Diſpoſition and Figure of all theſe Parts, and the uſefulneſs of the whole Deſign: Which is as great as can be in any Work whatſoever, which is for us to take notice of the admirable Wiſdom of God in contriving the ſeveral parts

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parts

Ariſtot. de part. Anim. l. 1.

parts of the Body of Man: So that, that whole Book contains in it a moſt full and pregnant demonſtration of a Deity, which every Man carries about with him in the Structure of his Body, on which account Men need not go out of themſelves to find proof of a Deity, whether they conſider their Minds or their Bodies, of which it may be more truly ſaid than *Heraclitus* of old did of his Stove, *Etiam hic Dii ſunt*. So that of all Perſons, I ſhou'd moſt wonder at thoſe whoſe Employment particularly leads them to the Underſtanding the parts and nature of Man's Body, if the Proverb be not a great injury to them, ſince they have fuller inſight into this demonſtration of a Deity in the Fabric of Man's Body, than many others who converſe only with ſome jejune and ſapleſs Writings. And certainly, whatever is imagin'd to the contrary by Men of weak Underſtandings, the beſt way to cure the World of *Atheiſm*, is true Philoſophy, or a ſearch into the Natures of things; which the more deep and profound it is, the more impoſſible will it be found to explicate all the *Phænomena* of Nature by mere Matter and Motion. It was wiſely obſerv'd of a great Perſon and Philoſopher, that a narrow and ſlight Inſpection into Nature, inclin'd Men of weak Heads to *Atheiſm*; but a more thorow-inſight into the cauſes of things, made them more evidently ſee the neceſſary dependance of things on the great and wiſe Creator of them. A little knowledge of Philoſophy is apt to make Mens heads dizzy, and then in danger of falling into the Gulf of *Atheiſm*, but a more careful and diligent view of it, brings them into Sobriety and their right Wits again. Such a ſlight Inſpection had the Followers of *Epicurus* into the Nature of things; for when they found how in the preſent State of the World the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter wou'd handſomely ſalve many appearances of Nature, they, drunk with the ſucceſs, reel preſently into an Infinite Space, and there imagine they behold Infinite Worlds made of the concretion of Atoms, and ever ſince their Eyes have been ſo duſted with theſe little Atoms, that they cou'd ſee nothing elſe in the World but them. Which how groſs and unreaſonable it is, will appear from our preſent ſubject; for who but *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* cou'd ever think that our Noſtrils were at firſt faſhion'd as they are merely by the violent impulſe of the Air within, which wou'd force it ſelf a paſſage out? But how came the Air into the Body before it was forced out? Did it break open the Lips, make all that round cavity in the Mouth, for a paſſage thro' the *aſpera Arteria?* But if when it was in, it wou'd come out again, was not the Mouth wide enough to let it go? Or did the firſt Man ſhut his Mouth on purpoſe to find another vent for the Air? If ſo, how chance the force of the Air did not carry away the *Epiglottis?* Or if it got ſafely up to the Noſe, how came it not to force a paſſage out about the Eyes rather than to go down ſo low firſt? But if we believe theſe rare Contrivers of Man's Body, all the inward Veſſels of the Body were made by the courſe of Water, as Channels are; but how is it poſſible, to imagine, that the *Oeſophagus* and the Stomach ſhou'd be ſo curiouſly contriv'd by the mere force of Water? and that all the *Inteſtines* ſhou'd be made only as Channels, to let it out again when it was once in? but how comes then ſuch a kind of Reciprocation and

Periſtaltic Motion in thoſe Veſſels? how comes the ſeveral Coats of them to be ſo firm? if it had been only a forced paſſage, it wou'd have been direct and thro' the ſubſtance of the parts, as we find it to be in all forced paſſages in the Body of the Earth. Beſides, if the Water receiv'd into the Stomach forced the paſſage thro' the Guts, how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for it ſelf? or did it not like that paſſage when other things came into it, and therefore found out a more ſecret one into the Bladder? but if that were made by the Water, how came it to be ſo full of Membranes, and ſo ſubject to dilatation? Thus ridiculous will Men make themſelves, rather than ſhew themſelves Men in owning and adoring that infinitely wiſe and powerful God, who *orders all things in the World, according to the counſel of his Will.* What can be more plain and evident than the peculiar uſefulneſs of the ſeveral parts of Man's Body is? What other intent can be imagin'd that Man is form'd with a Mouth, but only for taking in of Nouriſhment, and for receiving and letting forth of Air? or that an Infant is ſo ready to open his Mouth, but that there are Breaſts and Milk for him to ſuck in order to his Nouriſhment? Why ſhou'd the *Oeſophagus* be ſo hollow and the Stomach ſo wide, but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the Meat down, and the other for the Fermentation of it? Whence come all the other Veſſels to be ſo conveniently plac'd, were it not for the diſtribution of Nouriſhment into the ſeveral parts, or for conveying away the Excrements of it? Can any one think that the ſeveral Muſcles and Tendons ſhou'd be plac'd in the more ſolid parts for any other end than for the better Motion of them? or that the Nerves ſhou'd be deriv'd from the Brain into the ſeveral parts of the Body for any other deſign than to be the inſtruments of Senſe and Motion? or that the continual motion of the Heart ſhou'd be for any other purpoſe, than for receiving and diſtributing of the Blood thro' the Arteries into the parts of the Body? or that the Eye with all its curious Fabric ſhou'd be only accidentally imploy'd in ſeeing? Theſe things are ſo plain, that however the *Epicureans* may more eaſily loſe themſelves, and deceive others in explaining the appearances of Nature in ſome inanimate Beings, yet when they come with their blind concourſe of *Atoms* to give an account of the parts of Animals, they miſerably befool themſelves, and expoſe themſelves only to contempt and pity. It were eaſy to multiply examples in this kind, but I ſhall only mention one thing more, which is, If all the parts of Man's Body have no higher original than the concourſe of *Atoms* in the firſt Man and Woman, by what were the Umbilical Veſſels form'd whereby the Child in the Womb receives its Nouriſhment? by what *Atoms* was the paſſage of the *Succus nutritius* fram'd from the Mother to the Child? how come thoſe Veſſels to cloſe up ſo naturally upon the birth of the Child, and it to ſeek its Nouriſhment in quite another way? Will the Particles of Matter which by their concretion form'd the Firſt Pair, ſalve this too? Thus ſtill we ſee how impoſſible it is (to go no further than our ſelves) to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite Power and Being which produc'd all theſe things, and hath left ſo plain an inſcription of Himſelf upon the works of Nature, that none but thoſe who ſhut their Eyes can abſtain from ſeeing it.

XVII. 3. I come now to the third Evidence of a *Deity*, which is, *That there are ſome Beings in the World, which cannot depend upon Matter or Motion, i. e.* that there are ſome Spiritual and Immaterial Subſtances or Beings, (for if the thing be acknowledg'd, it is unbecoming a Man to contend about words) the conſequence of this for the proving a *Deity*, neither hath been, nor I ſuppoſe will be deny'd, by ſuch who queſtion an infinite Being; the ſame Principles leading to the denying and the Proof of both, and immaterial Beings being the ſtrongeſt proof that there is ſomething above Matter in the World. If there be then ſuch things in the World, which Matter and Motion cannot be the cauſes of, then there are certainly ſpiritual and immaterial Beings, and that I ſhall make appear both as to the Minds of Men, and ſome extraordinary effects which are produc'd in the World.

1. I begin with the nature of the Soul of Man. And herein I muſt confine my ſelf to thoſe Arguments which directly prove my preſent purpoſe, and on that account muſt quit all thoſe common Arguments to prove the Soul's immortality from the Attributes of God; for all theſe do ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a *Deity* as already evident; neither can I rely with ſafety on the way which ſome have taken to prove the immortality of the Soul merely from the *Phænomena* of Senſation, which they endeavour to prove, cannot be perform'd by mere Matter and Motion; for granting all this, yet the utmoſt that can be prov'd by it is no greater immortality in our Souls than in the Souls of Brutes; and in the ſenſe in which that is admitted, I ſuppoſe an *Epicurean* will not deny the Soul of Man to be immortal, as *Demonax* in *Lucian* ſaid, when he was ask'd whether the Soul were immortal or no, *It is* (ſaid he) *but as all things elſe are*; for thoſe who make the Soul to be nothing but ſome more ſubtile and active Particles of matter, do not think that upon death they are annihilated, but that only they are diſpers'd and diſſipated; or in the *Platoniſts* Phraſe, may *return to the Soul of the World*. Theſe ways I cannot think to be ſufficient probations of ſuch a ſpiritual and immaterial Being in Man, which we now inquire for, much leſs can I make uſe of ſo precarious and infirm an *Hypotheſis* as *Præ-exiſtence*, which makes Men apt to ſuſpect the cogency of ſuch Reaſons which tend to prove the immortality of the Soul, which are link'd with a ſuppoſition, not only inevident either to Senſe or Reaſon, but likewiſe needleſs and impertinent. For I know no one Argument which doth directly prove the immateriality of the Soul, that doth in the leaſt infer any neceſſity of *Præ-exiſtence*, but on the ſame accounts it will prove the Soul's eternity. Being therefore thus at liberty to inquire into the Nature of the Soul conſider'd in her ſelf, our only way muſt be to find out ſuch peculiar properties in the Soul of Man, which cannot be ſalv'd on ſuppoſition, there were nothing elſe but Matter and Motion in the World. Suppoſing then that all Senſation in Man doth ariſe from corporeal Motion which is ſo ſtrongly aſſerted by the modern Philoſophers, and that the higheſt Conceptions which depend on Senſe, can amount no higher than Imagination,

gination, which is evident; if it can then be prov'd that there is a Principle of Action in Man, which proceeds in a different way of operation than Senſation doth, and that there are ſuch operations of the Soul which are not Imaginations, it will be then clear that there is a Principle in Man higher than Matter and Motion. Now altho' it be a task ſufficiently difficult to explain the manner of Senſation it ſelf in a mere mechanical way, ſuppoſing no higher Principle than mere Matter, yet it will appear far more difficult, nay impoſſible without a ſpiritual or immaterial Being to ſalve ſuch appearances in Man which tranſcend the power of Imagination; which will appear by theſe following Operations of the Mind, which every one who hath it, may find within himſelf.

1. *Correcting the errors of Imagination.* For if all our Perceptions were nothing elſe but the Images of corporeal things left in the Brain, the judgment of the Mind muſt of neceſſity be according to the impreſſions, which are made upon the Organs of Senſe. But now if our Minds can and do form apprehenſions of things quite different from thoſe which are convey'd by Senſe, there muſt be a higher Principle of knowledge in Man than Imagination is. For which the common inſtance of the juſt magnitude of the Sun is very plain; If we judge according to the image which is convey'd to the Brain by our Eyes, we can never imagine the Sun to be bigger than he ſeems to us to be; nay tho the ſight be advantaged by the help of *Teleſcopes*, it cannot receive ſuch an Image or Idea of the Sun which anſwers to its juſt magnitude, *viz.* that it is 160 times bigger than the Earth. From whence now comes this apprehenſion of the bigneſs of the Sun above that proportion which can poſſibly come in at our Senſes? If it be ſaid, *That by the obſervation of the leſſening of objects according to the proportion of diſtance, the Mind may come to underſtand how much bigger the Sun may be than he ſeems*; I grant it, but withal inquire how the Imagination comes to have Proportions and Diſtances which are mere reſpects, and can have no corporeal phantaſms whereby to be repreſented to it; ſo that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident, that there is ſome principle in Man beyond Imagination. Again, when the Mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far, and finds the Sun to be ſo great, what Idea is there of this magnitude in the Mind? the Mind cannot fix it ſelf on any thing but it muſt have an Idea of it; from whence comes this Idea? not from corporeal phantaſms; for none of them cou'd ever convey the due magnitude of the Sun to the Mind, and therefore the forming of this Idea muſt be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of Imagination, and is a Principle above it. So in the ſight of a ſtick, when under water, the repreſentation of it by the Senſe to Imagination is as crooked; for corporeal Motion carries things to the Eye, without any judgment upon them; the Eye conveys the Imagination to the Brain; and according to the rules of corporeal Perception muſt preſently take every thing for true which is convey'd thither; now from what Principle is it that this error of our Senſes is corrected? So in many other things wherein our Imaginations are quite puzl'd, and when we go according to them, it is impoſſible to apprehend things as our

Reaſon tells us they are; thus as to the *Antipodes* our Imaginations are wholly of the Mind of the Ancients, that the *Antipodes* to us muſt needs be in danger of knocking their heads againſt the Stars, and if they go upon any thing, it muſt be their Heads, and that that part of the Heavens which is in the other *Hemiſphere* is below us; theſe are pertinacious errors of Imagination while we adhere to that, and are only corrigible by our Reaſon, which makes it evident to be otherwiſe. Beſides, there are many things our Reaſon and Underſtanding inform us that they may be, and yet our Imaginations can form no Idea of them; let an *Epicurean* Philoſopher try the power of his Imagination in his *Inane* or *Infinite empty Space*, and he will ſoon find, that as ſtrong as his Phancy is, it will ſoon tire and retreat, as not being able to courſe thro' ſo unimaginable a Space. So for Eternal Duration our Reaſon tells us the thing is poſſible, but when our Imaginations begin to fardle up ſome Conceptions of it, they are preſently tying both ends together; which will make a ſtrange Idea of Eternity; the caſe is the ſame in the infinite Diviſibility of Quantity, which *Epicurus* was ſomewhat aware of when he deny'd the thing. But how many *Mathematical Problems* are there which will jade our Imaginations preſently, and yet our Reaſon ſtands ſtill and aſſures us of the poſſibility of the things, as in *two lines coming nearer ſtill to each other, and yet never meeting*, and in many other things, which moſt clearly evince that there is a higher Faculty in Man which exceeds Matter and Motion, when it is able thus to correct the faults and to ſupply the defects of Imagination.

XVIII. 2. *Reflex acts of the Mind upon it ſelf, argue a higher Principle than Imagination.* That there are ſuch things is evident to any one who hath any uſe of Cogitation; and if any one doubt of it, his very doubting argues he hath reflex Acts; for he cou'd not doubt whether he had or no, but by Reflection upon himſelf. Now that reflex Acts ſhou'd be cauſ'd thro' Matter and Motion, or thro' mere Imagination is unconceivable. For we ſee no Matter can act upon it ſelf: indeed one part of extended Matter may act upon another, but not purely upon it ſelf; the extremities of the Fingers can never feel themſelves, tho' they can touch each other; neither can Imagination reflect on it ſelf; for that proceeding upon Corporeal Images, muſt have ſuch a repreſentation from the Senſes of what it acts upon; now what image of it ſelf can be convey'd to the Imagination thro' the external Organs of Senſe? The Eye may ſee thro' the motion of the objects of Sight preſſing upon it; but how can it ſee that it ſees? ſo the Imagination receives the images convey'd to the Brain; but what ſhop hath it to make new ones in of it ſelf, and ſo to be guilty of the greateſt Idolatry or worſhipping its own Image? But tho' the Imagination cannot thus reflect, yet we find ſuch a Principle within us that is very apt to retire into it ſelf, and recollect things which cou'd never have been conſerv'd ſo long in that ſhop of ſhadows, the Imagination. For if Imagination be nothing elſe, but, as a modern * Philoſopher defines it, *Conception remaining, and a little and little decaying from and after the act of Senſe, like the Motion of Water after a ſtone is thrown into it*; how is it poſſible that at ſo great a diſtance of Years, as we commonly find, the image of

a thing

* Hobbs's *Humane Nature*, ch. 3. ſect. 1.

a thing may be retriev'd with as much facility and freſhneſs as to circumſtances, as if it were but new done? And that account which he gives of Remembrance is very weak and inſufficient, when he tells us, that *Remembrance is nothing elſe but the miſſing of parts, which every Man expecteth ſhould ſucceed after they have a conception of the whole.* For according to this, it is impoſſible for the Mind to retrieve any object without mutilation of it; and ſo there cannot poſſibly be a recollecting of all circumſtances, when an object is once paſs'd, and the Motion begins to decay. But all this while, we underſtand nothing by what means this decaying Motion ſhou'd continue ſo long as our Memory can fetch things back, or by what means an object when once paſs'd, can be recover'd again, if Memory be nothing elſe but decaying Motion. Such perplexities muſt needs ariſe, when Men will undertake to ſalve the inward operations of the Soul by mere Motion; but is it not evident that many times when the Mind is imploy'd about other things, ſome Phantaſms of things long ago paſt will come and preſent themſelves to the Mind with as much clearneſs as if new done? whereas if Memory were decaying Motion, the longer paſt, the more impoſſible wou'd it be to recover any thing; but, do we not find that many old Men will better remember the circumſtances of many things they did in their Childhood, than a year or two before? Beſides we ſee what quickneſs and vivacity there is in our Intellectual Faculties above Corporeal Motion, with what facility the Mind turns it ſelf from one object to another, how ſuddenly it rangeth the whole World, how it trips over Mountains, croſſeth the Ocean, mounts to the Skies, and at laſt quarries upon it ſelf, and all in the twinkling of an intellectual Eye. As quick as the Eye of the Body is, the Mind far exceeds it, and can withdraw the Imagination from attending the Organs of Senſe; thus do Men who have their Minds much fix'd, fix their Eyes too; and yet afterwards can ſcarce tell themſelves what they have look'd on all that while. Sometimes the Mind ſits and compares Phantaſms together, and ſports it ſelf in ſorting them into ſeveral ranks and orders, and making matches between ſuch things which are ſure to have no affinity with each other, which are thence called *entia rationis*, or the Creatures of the Mind. And can all theſe and many other ſuch operations which Men are conſcious to themſelves of, be nothing elſe but the Motion of ſome flegmatic Matter, the Reaction of the Brain, and the mere effects of Imagination?

3. *The profound ſpeculations of the Mind argue a power far above Imagination and Corporeal Motion.* I wonder how *Epicurus* his Soul, when, if we believe him, it was made up of *Atoms*, cou'd ever imagine an *Infinite Vacuity*? Cou'd mere *Atoms* ever diſpute whether they were *Atoms* or no? For I doubt not but *Epicurus* was fain to argue much againſt himſelf, before he cou'd perſuade himſelf to ſo ſtupendious a piece of folly. Were there nothing in Man but mere Corporeal Motion, whence came the diſpute, whether the Soul were Corporeal or no? Can *Atoms* frame *Syllogiſms* in *Mood* and *Figure*? and mere Matter argue *pro* and *con*, whether it be Matter or ſomething elſe? What kind of Aereal Particles were their Souls compounded of, who firſt fanſy'd themſelves to be immaterial? What ſtrange agitations of Matter were thoſe

which firſt made Men think of an Eternal ſtate? which thoughts have ever ſince ſo ſtuck upon theſe little Spherical Bodies, that they cou'd never yet disburthen themſelves of them? Whence come ſuch amazing fears, ſuch dreadful apprehenſions, ſuch ſinking thoughts of their future condition in Minds that wou'd fain eaſe themſelves by believing, that death wou'd put a period both to Soul and Body? Whence on the other ſide come ſuch incouraging hopes, ſuch confident expectations, ſuch comfortable prepoſſeſſions of their future ſtate, in the Souls of good Men, when their Senec. præf. ad Quæſt. Natur. Bodies are neareſt to the grave? *Seneca*, who was ſomewhat dubious ſometimes as to the future condition of the Soul, yet cou'd tell his dear *Lucilius* with what pleaſure he cou'd think of it; and cou'd elſewhere ſay of the Soul, *Et hoc habet argumentum divinitatis ſuæ quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis intereſt ſed ut ſuis: The Soul had that mark of Divinity in it, that it was moſt pleas'd with Divine Speculations, and convers'd with them as with matters which nearly concern'd it.* And when it hath once view'd the dimenſions of the Heavens, *contemnit domicilii prioris anguſtias*, it was aſham'd of the Cottage it dwelt in; nay, were it not for theſe Speculations, *non fuerat operæ pretium naſci*, it had not been worth while for the Soul to have been in the Body; and as he goes on, *detrahe hoc ineſtimabile bonum, non eſt vita tanti ut ſudem, ut æſtuem.* Cou'd there be now ſo great an *Epicuriſm* in Contemplation, were the Soul of Man of *Epicurus* his mould, a mere complexion of *Atoms*? wou'd dull and heavy Matter ever have delighted to have ſearch'd ſo much into the cauſes of things, to have gone over the World in its Speculations, and found more ſweetneſs in Knowledge, than the little *Epicure*, the Bee, taſts in his choiceſt Flowers? *Epicurus* his own Philoſophy is a demonſtration againſt himſelf; if his Soul had not been of a purer Nature than he fanſy'd, when his Brain had been well heated at his Study, thoſe more vivid and ſpirituous Particles, like the ſpirits of Wine, had been in danger of evaporation, and leaving the more lumpiſh matter to complete his work. Of all Perſons, I moſt admire that Philoſophers, who make ſo much uſe of their Underſtandings, ſhou'd ſo ungratefully requite them, and ſerve them like old Horſes, when they have made them do all the ſervice they cou'd, turn them into the high-ways, and let them die in a ditch. But yet all Philoſophers have not been ſo unthankful, ſome have underſtood the worth of their Souls, and aſſerted it, if they have not us'd too high, i. e *Platonical* expreſſions of it, making it a Particle, not of Matter, but of the Divine Nature it ſelf, a little Deity in a Cottage, that ſtays here a-while, and returns to that upper Region from whence it came. As *Manilius* ſpeaks,

Manil. l. 4. *An dubium eſt habitare Deum ſub pectore noſtro,*
In cœlumque redire animas, cœloque venire?

And while the Soul is here in its Cage, it is continually fluttering up and down, and delighteth to look out now at this part, and then at another, to take a view by degrees of the whole Univerſe, as the ſame Poet goes on,

Quid mirum noſcere mundum
Si poſſunt homines, quibus eſt & mundus in ipſis:
Exemplumque Dei quiſque eſt in imagine parva?

The Soul hath nothing more delightful to it than Knowledge, and no Knowledge ſo pleaſing and ſatisfactory as of him whoſe Image and Superſcription it bears, who makes Himſelf moſt known to ſuch as enquire after him;

Seque ipſum inculcat & offert
Ut bene cognoſci poſſit.

I conclude this with that of *Seneca*, in that excellent Preface to his *Natural Queſtions, O quam contempta res eſt homo niſi ſupra humana ſe erexerit! What a pitiful thing is Man, were it not that his Soul was apt to ſoar above theſe earthly things?* And by this Aptneſs to ſoar ſo high above theſe Terrene Objects, and to converſe with ſo much freedom with ſpiritual Beings, as well as abſtracted Notions we may certainly infer that our Rational Souls are of a far more noble and refin'd Nature than that more feculent Principle of Imagination, which always converſes in *fæce Romuli*, and can go no further than our Senſes carry it. And thus I have made good the firſt proof, that there is ſomething above Matter and Motion in the World, which is from that immaterial Being which is in Man.

XIX. 2. The next Evidence which we have of a Being above Matter and Motion, is, from *the extraordinary effects which have been in Nature.* I ſpeak not now merely of ſuch things which by their Natures and Effects are manifeſted to proceed from ſome Beings which bear ill-will to Mankind, multitudes of which are related by Men philoſophical and inquiſitive, with ſuch enumerations of circumſtances, and particular Evidences, that they are not mere impoſtures, that one may on the ſame grounds queſtion any Matter of fact which himſelf did not ſee, as ſuch relations which are deliver'd by Perſons without intereſt or deſign, and ſuch as were able to judge of the truth of circumſtances; ſuch are both ancient and modern Philoſophers, Phyſicians, States-men, and others. Neither ſhall I inſiſt on ſuch Prodigies, which oft-times preſage revolutions in States, if we believe *Machiavel* himſelf, who in a whole Chapter deſignedly proves it; and profeſſeth himſelf utterly to ſeek for the cauſes of them, unleſs they may be attributed to ſome Spirits and Intelligences in the Air, which give the World notice of ſuch things to come. But thoſe things which I ſuppoſe have the moſt clear and undoubted Evidence of true and undoubted Miracles (the Matters of fact being affirm'd by Eye-witneſſes, who ſeal'd the truth of them with their Lives) are thoſe recorded in the Holy Scriptures; which there are only two ways to evade, either by queſtioning the truth of the things, which I ſuppoſe in the precedent Book we have prov'd with as much rational Evidence as any thing of that nature is capable of, or elſe that the things therein recorded might be ſalv'd without a *Deity*. For which only two ways have been excogitated by *Atheiſtical* Spirits, either attri-

Machiav. diſput. l. 1. c. 56.

buting them to the power and influence of the Stars, the foundations of which fond and abſurd Opinion have been taken away by thoſe many Writers, who have rationally confuted the whole Art of *Judicial Aſtrology*, or elſe that they are done by mere power of Imagination, which is the way of *Avicenna* and ſome other *Arabic* Writers, which is ſo wild an effect of the power of Imagination, that nothing doth ſo much demonſtrate the irregular Motions of it, as ſuch an Opinion doth; and is ſufficiently derided and refuted by *Pomponatius* himſelf. Now then, it being an acknowledg'd Principle in Nature, *That every thing continues in the courſe it is in, till ſomething more powerful put it out*, if then ſuch things have been in the World, which have been real alterations of the courſe of Nature, as the *Sun's ſtanding ſtill in the time of* Joſhua, then there muſt be ſomething above Matter and Motion, and conſequently that there is a God.

Vid. D. H. *More's* Myſtery of Godlineſs, *l.* 7. *c.* 14, 15, 16, 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

23:1-B:

Of the Origin of the Univerſe.

I. *The neceſſity of the belief of the Creation of the World, in order to the truth of Religion. Of the ſeveral Hypotheſes of the Philoſophers who contradict* Moſes*: With a particular examination of them.* II. *The ancient Tradition of the World conſonant to* Moſes*; prov'd from the Ionic Philoſophy of* Thales, *and the Italic of* Pythagoras. III. *The Pythagoric Cabala rather Ægyptian than Moſaic. Of the fluid Matter, which was the material Principle of the Univerſe.* IV. *Of the Hypotheſis of the Eternity of the World aſſerted by* Ocellus Lucanus *and* Ariſtotle. V. *The weakneſs of the Foundations on which that Opinion is built. Of the manner of forming principles of Philoſophy.* VI. *The poſſibility of Creation prov'd. [No arguing from the preſent ſtate of the World againſt its beginning, ſhew'd from* Maimonides.*]* VII. *The Platoniſts arguments from the goodneſs of God for the Eternity of the World, anſwer'd.* VIII. *Of the Stoical Hypotheſis of the Eternity of Matter; whether reconcileable with the Text of* Moſes. IX. *Of the Opinions of* Plato *and* Pythagoras *concerning the præ-exiſtence of Matter to the formation of the World.* X. *The contradiction of the Eternity of Matter to the Nature and Attributes of God.* XI, XII, XIII, *Of the Atomical Hypotheſis of the Origin of the Univerſe.* XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. *The World cou'd not be produced by a caſual concourſe of Atoms prov'd from the nature and motion of* Epicurus's *Atoms, and the Phænomena of the Univerſe, eſpecially the Production and Nature of Animals.* XVIII. *Of the* Carteſian *Hypotheſis, that it cannot ſalve the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity giving Motion to Matter.*

I. THE Foundations of Religion being thus eſtabliſh'd in the Being of GOD, and the Immortality of the Soul, we now come to erect our Superſtructure upon them, by aſſerting the undoubted Truth and Certainty of that account of the World which is given us in the Writings of *Moſes*. Which beginning with the World it ſelf, leads us to a particular conſideration of the Origin of the Univerſe, the right underſtanding of which hath great influence upon our Belief of all that follows in the Word of GOD. For altho' we ſhou'd aſſert with *Epicurus* the Being of a Deity, if yet with him we add, that the World was made by a caſual concourſe of Atoms, all that part of Religion which lies in obedience to the Will of GOD is unavoidably deſtroy'd. All that is left, is only a kind of Veneration of a Being more excellent than our own, which reacheth not to the government of Mens Lives, and ſo will have no force at all upon the generality of the World, who are only allur'd by Hopes or aw'd by Fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Beſides, what expreſſions of Gratitude can be left to God for his Goodneſs, if he interpoſe not in the Affairs of the World? What dependence can there be on Divine Goodneſs, if it be not at all manifeſted in the World? What apprehenſions can we have of God's Infinite Wiſdom and Power, if neither of them are diſcernible in the Being of the World? And as the Opinion of *Epicurus* deſtroys Religion, ſo doth that of *Ariſtotle*, which attributes Eternity to the Univerſe, and a neceſſary Emanation of it from the firſt Cauſe, as Light comes from the Sun; for if ſo, as *Maimonides* well obſerves, *The whole Religion of Moſes is overthrown, all his Miracles are but Impoſtures, all the Hopes which are grounded on the Promiſes of God, are vain and fruitleſs.* For if the World did of neceſſity exiſt, then God is no free Agent; and if ſo, then all inſtituted Religion, is to no purpoſe; nor can there be any expectation of Reward, or fear of Puniſhment from him who hath nothing elſe to do in the World, but to ſet the great Wheel of the Heavens going. So much is it our concernment to inquire into the true Original of the World, and on what Evidence of Reaſon thoſe Opinions are built, which are ſo contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the Books of *Moſes*. Wherein we read the true Origin of the World to have been by a Production of it by the Omnipotent Will and Word of God. This being then the plain Aſſertion of *Moſes*, we come to compare it, in point of Reaſon, with all thoſe ſeveral *Hypotheſes* which are repugnant to it, which have been embrac'd in ſeveral Ages by the Philoſophers of greateſt eſteem in the World. Which may be reduc'd to theſe four: 1. *Such as ſuppoſe the World to have exiſted as it is from all Eternity.* 2. *Such as attribute the Formation of the World as it is to God; but withal aſſert the præ-exiſtence and eternity of Matter.* 3. *Such as deny any eternity to the World, but aſſert the Origin of it to have been by a caſual concourſe of Atoms.* 4. *Such as endeavour to explain the Origin of the Univerſe, and all appearances of Nature, merely by the Mechanical Laws of the motions of Matter.*

Maimon. More Nevoch. p. 2. *c.* 25.

II. I begin with thoſe who aſſert the eternity of the World as it is, among whom *Ariſtotle* hath born the greateſt name; who ſeems to have arrogated this Opinion to himſelf; for when he inquires into the judgment of Philoſophers, who had writ before him, he ſays of them, γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, *all the Philoſophers aſſerted that the World was made*, tho' ſome one way, ſome another. And were this true which *Ariſtotle* ſaith, it wou'd be the ſtrongeſt Prejudice againſt his Opinion; for if the World had been eternal, how ſhou'd it come to paſs, that the eldeſt Philoſophers ſhou'd ſo readily and unanimouſly embrace that Opinion, which aſſerted the Production of the World? Was it not a ſtrong preſumption of the novity of the Univerſe, that all Nations, to whom the Philoſophers reſorted, had Memorials left among them of the firſt Origin of Things? And from hence it is obſervable, that when the humour of philoſophizing began to take the *Greeks* (about the XL *Olympiad*, when we may ſuppoſe *Thales* to flouriſh) the beginning of the World was no matter of Diſpute, but, taking that for granted, the inquiry was, out of what material Principle the Univerſe was form'd; of which *Thales* thus delivers his Opinion in *Tully*;

Ariſtot. de cœlo, l. 1. *c.* 10.

aquam

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 25.

aquam dixit eſſe initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret; wherein he plainly diſtinguiſheth the efficient from the material Cauſe of the World. The prime efficient was God, the material principle, Water. It is a matter of ſome inquiry, Whether the firſt principles of Philoſophy among the *Greeks*, were not rather ſome Traditional Things conveyed to them from others, than any certain Theories which they had form'd from their own Experiments and Obſervations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this, that the firſt Principles of the two Founders of the chief Sects of Philoſophers, *viz.* the *Ionic* and *Italic* (for all the other were but the various iſſues of theſe two) did come ſo near to that which we have the greateſt Reaſon to believe to have been the moſt certain account of the Origin of the World. For this Opinion of *Thales* ſeems to have been part of that Univerſal Tradition which was continu'd in the World, concerning the firſt Principles of Things: For I do not ſee any Reaſon to aver with ſo much confidence, as ſome do, that thoſe Philoſophers who ſpake any thing conſonantly to *Moſes*, muſt preſently converſe with the *Jews*, tranſcribe their Opinions out of the Scriptures, or have them convey'd to them in ſome ſecret *Cabala* of the Creation; as it is affirm'd of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, and may with no leſs reaſon of *Thales*. But this, I ſuppoſe, may be made evident to any conſiderative Perſon, that thoſe Philoſophers of *Greece*, who convers'd moſt abroad in the World, did ſpeak far more agreeably to the true Account of Things, than ſuch who only endeavour'd by their own Wits to improve or correct thoſe Principles which were deliver'd by the other Philoſophers. Which I impute not ſo much to their converſe with the *Moſaic* Writings, as to that Univerſal Tradition of the firſt Ages of the World, which was preſerv'd far better among the *Phœnicians*, *Ægyptians*, *Chaldeans*, and others, than among the *Greeks*. For which we have this evident Reaſon, that *Greece* was far more barbarous and rude in its elder Times, than thoſe other Nations were, which had means of preſerving ſome Monuments and general Reports of the firſt Ages of the World, when the *Græcians* wanted them. And therefore we find that *Greece* from its beginning ſhin'd with a borrow'd Light; and ſaw not by an extramiſſion of Rays of Knowledg from its ſelf, but by an intromiſſion of thoſe repreſentations of things which were receiv'd from other Nations. Thoſe who form'd *Greece* firſt into civil Societies, and lick'd it into the ſhape of well order'd Commonwealths, were ſuch who had been Traders for knowledg into foreign Parts. To which purpoſe *Diodorus Siculus* informs us, *That* Lycurgus *and* Solon, *as well as the Poets*, Orpheus, Muſæus, Melampus *and* Homer, *and the Philoſophers afterwards*, Pythagoras, Plato, *and others*, *had gain'd moſt of their Knowledg and Wiſdom out of* Ægypt; nay, he ſaith in general, ὅσοι τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι δεδοξασμένων ἐπὶ συνέσει καὶ παιδείᾳ, παρέβαλον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, ἵνα τῶν ἐνταῦθα νομίμων καὶ παιδείας μετάσχωσιν. *All thoſe who were renown'd among the* Greeks *for Wiſdom and Learning, did in ancient time reſort to* Ægypt, *to be acquainted with their Laws and Knowledg.* On this account therefore we are not to ſeek for the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World from the native and home-bred *Greeks*, ſuch as *Ariſtotle* and *Epicurus*, but from thoſe who took the Pains themſelves to ſearch into thoſe Records which were preſerv'd among the elder and more knowing Nations: And altho' the Nations they reſorted to, ſought to advance their own Reputation in the Hiſtories of their ancient Times, of which we

Diodorus, l. 1. V. Euſeb. Præp. Evangel. l. 10.

have already given a large Account, yet they were more faithful in the account they gave of the Origin of the whole Univerſe. For it appears from *Diogenes Laertius*, that the *Ægyptians* did conſtantly believe, *That the World had a beginning, and was corruptible; that it was Spherical, and the Stars were of the nature of Fire; that the Soul was of an Immortal nature, and did paſs up and down the World.* Which *Laertius* cites from *Hecatæus* and *Ariſtagoras.* So that we need not make *Pythagoras* acquainted with ſuch a *Cabala* of the Creation, which in all probability neither the *Jews* nor he ever dreamt of; we find a fair account may be given of moſt of the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, and whence he deriv'd them, without forcing the words of *Moſes* into ſuch a ſenſe, which the plainneſs and perſpicuity of the Writings of *Moſes*, argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny from thoſe concurrent Teſtimonies of *Hermippus* and *Ariſtobulus*, beſides *Origen*, *Porphyry*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and others, that *Pythagoras* might have had an opportunity of converſing with the *Jews*, (which it is moſt probable was in *Chaldæa*, after the Captivity, at which time *Pythagoras* was there among them) but that *Pythagoras* ſhou'd converſe with the Succeſſors of *Eliſha* on Mount *Carmel*, as *Voſſius* thinks; or that *Moſchus* the *Sidonian* Philoſopher, in *Iamblichus*, ſhou'd be *Moſes*, as others fancy; or that præ-exiſtence of Souls ſhou'd be part of the *Moſaic Cabala*; or that the *Pythagoric* numbers, as they are explain'd by *Nichomachus Geraſenus* in *Photius*, ſhould be adæquate to the Creation Cabaliſtically underſtood, are fancies too extravagant and *Pythagorean*, to be eaſily embraced. If *Pythagoras* was circumcis'd, it was more for love of the *Egyptians* than the *Jews*, among whom he ſpent twenty two Years; if præ-exiſtence of Souls be a rational *Hypotheſis*, we may thank the *Ægyptians* for it, and not *Moſes*; if numbers be ſo expreſſive of the Work of Creation, we are beholding to the Arithmetical Hieroglyphics of *Ægypt* for them. But altho' *Pythagoras* might not be acquainted with ſuch a philoſophic *Cabala* of the Creation, which none of the *Jews*, as far as we can find, underſtood, till one more vers'd in *Plato* and *Pythagoras* than in the Learning of his own Nation, *viz.* *Philo* of *Alexandria*, began firſt to exerciſe his Wit on the Text of *Moſes*, with *Platonic* Notions; yet I ſhall eaſily grant, that *Pythagoras*, by means of his great Induſtry and Converſe with the learned Nations, might attain to far greater knowledg of many myſterious things in Natural Philoſophy; and as to the Origin of the Univerſe, than any of the home-bred Philoſophers of *Greece*, or it may be, than any one of the Nations he reſorted to, becauſe he had the advantage of comparing the ſeveral accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judg'd the beſt of them. And hence *Plutarch* tells us, that the firſt Principles of the World, according to *Pythagoras*, were theſe two, the one was τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς) *an active and forming Principle*, and that was God whom he call'd Mind, (as *Anaxagoras* likewiſe did) the other τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος) *paſſive and material*, which is, *the viſible World.*

Diog. Laert. proœm. p. 7.

V. Selden. de jure Nat. & Gen. apud Ebræos. l. 1. c. 2.

Voſſ. de Sectis Philoſoph. c. 6. ſect. 5.

V. Mathem. Hierogl. Kircheri. Tom. 3. Oedip. Ægypt.

Plutarch. de Plat. Philoſ. l. 1. cap. 3.

III. And thus we ſee theſe two renowned Founders of the *Ionic* and *Italic* Societies of Philoſophers, both giving their concurrent Teſtimony with *Moſes* as to the true Origin of the World, and not at all differing from each other; for thus *Thales* ſpeaks in *Diogenes Laertius*, πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων, θεός· ἀγέννητον κάλλιστον, γὰρ κόσμος· ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ, *God is the eldeſt Being, becauſe unbegotten; the World the moſt beautiful, becauſe it is God's workmanſhip.*

Diog. Laer. V. Thalet.

ſhip. To which thoſe expreſſions of *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, come very near (whoſe Philoſophy was for ſubſtance the ſame with the *Pythagorean*) when he had before aſcrib'd the Production of the World to the goodneſs of God, which goodneſs of his did incline him to make all other things like himſelf. Θέμις οὔτ' ἦν οὔτ' ἔστι τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾷν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον. *For the moſt excellent Being cannot but produce the moſt excellent Effects.* And as to the material Principle out of which the World was made, there appears no great difference between the ὕδωρ of *Thales*, and the ὕλη of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, for *Plato*, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material Principle was, he deſcribes it thus, οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, which as *Calcidius* renders it, is *motu importuno fluctuans neque unquam quieſcens*, it was a *viſible corporeal thing* (πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν·) *which was never at reſt, but in continual diſorderly Motion and Agitation:* which is a full Explication, I ſuppoſe, of what *Thales* meant by his Water, which is the ſame with that ἰλὺς or mixture of Mud and Water together which others ſpeak of as the Principle of the Univerſe; as *Orpheus*, in *Athenagoras*, and the Scholiaſt on *Apollonius* cited by *Grotius* and others. Which we have the more reaſon to believe, becauſe the Succeſſors of *Thales*, *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*, expreſs themſelves to that purpoſe. *Anaximander* call'd the Sea, τῆς πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, *the remainder of the primitive moiſture:* and *Anaxagoras* ſays, before the Νοῦς, or God, ſet things in their order, πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ πεφυρμένα, *all things were at firſt confus'd together:* which muſt needs make that which *Chalcidius* tells us *Numenius* attributes to *Pythagoras*, which his Tranſlator calls *Sylvam fluidam*, or *fluid Matter*. Which is the ſame likewiſe with the *Phœnicians* Μὼτ, which as appears by *Euſebius*, ſome call ἰλὺν, others ὑδατώδους μίξεως σῆψιν, ſome, *Mud* or *Slime*, others, the *putrefaction of watery Mixtures*, which they ſay was, σπορὰ κτίσεως καὶ γένεσις ὅλων, *the Seed-plot of the Creation and the Generation of things.* Thus we ſee how *Thales* with the *Phœnicians* from whom he was deriv'd, as *Laertius* tells us and *Pythagoras*, with the *Ægyptians* and others, concur with *Moſes*, not only in the production of the World, but in the manner of it, wherein is expreſs'd a fluid Matter which was the material Principle out of which the World was form'd, when we are told that *The Earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters*, *i. e.* that all at firſt was but fluid Matter; for *P. Fagius*, from *R. Kimchi*, renders רוח by ὕλη, which fluid Matter was agitated and mov'd by the Divine Spirit, or the *vis plaſtica mundi*, ſo *Chryſoſtom* calls it, ἐνέργεια ζωτική. And ſo *Druſius* and *P. Fagius* explain רחף by Motion or Agitation. And herein we have likewiſe the conſent of thoſe forenamed excellent Philoſophers, who attribute the Origin of particular things in the World to this Agitation or Motion of the fluid Matter. For *Chalcidius* ſpeaking not only of *Thales*, *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, but of *Anaximenes*, *Heraclitus*, and others, ſays thus of them, *omnes igitur hi—in motu poſitam rerum originem cenſuerunt: they all agreed in this, that the Origin of things was to be aſcrib'd to the motion of the parts of Matter.* So the *Phœnicians* call'd this Motion of the Particles of Matter ἀέρα ζοφώδη καὶ πνευματώδη *a dark and bluſtering Wind.* And how ſutable this Explication of the Origin of things from the motion of fluid Matter is to the Hiſtory of Nature, appears by thoſe many Experiments by which mixt Bodies are ſhew'd to ſpring from no other material Principle than the Particles of fluid Matter. Of which you may read a Diſcourſe of that ingenious

Plato in Tim. p. 1047. ed. Ficini.

Chalcid. Tim. p. 25. ed. Meurſ.

Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Ver. Chriſt. Rel.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.

Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Gen. 1. 2.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 378

Boyle's Sceptical Chymiſt, p. 115. &c. and learned Gentleman Mr. *Boyle* in his *Sceptical Chymiſt*. Only thus much may here ſuffice to have made it appear, that all thoſe Philoſophers, who were moſt inquiſitive after the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World concerning the firſt beginning of things, did not only concur with *Moſes* in the main thing, that its beginning was from God, but in the particular Circumſtances of it, as to the fluid Matter and motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add, if it be material, the Teſtimony of *Homer* in *Plutarch*.

Homer. Iliad. ξ.

Ὠκεανὸς, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

Odyſſ. ε. Chalcid. p. 178. V. Meurſ. in Chal. p. 37. Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. l. 1. c. 3.

And in *Chalcidius*: *Inque eadem ſententia Homerus eſſe invenitur, cum Oceanum & Thetin dicat parentes eſſe geniture; cumque jusjurandum Deorum conſtituat aquam, quam quidem ipſe appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, & jurejurando nihil conſtituens reverentius.* To which purpoſe likewiſe *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks in his Metaphyſics, that the reaſon why *Styx* was made the Oath of the Gods, was becauſe Water was ſuppos'd to be the material Principle of things, which he ſaith was ἀρχαία τις αὔτη καὶ παλαιὰ περὶ τῆς φύσεως δόξα, *a moſt ancient Tradition concerning the Origin of the Univerſe.* And tells us before, that ſome were of opinion, τοὺς παμπαλαίους, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας, *that the moſt ancient and remote Perſons and firſt Writers of Theology held this Opinion of Water being the firſt material Principle of things.*

Having thus made it appear what a conſent there was between the ancient Tradition of the World, and the Writings of *Moſes* concerning the Origin of the World; I now come to conſider upon what pretenſe of Reaſon this Tradition came to be contradicted, and the Eternity of the World aſſerted. For which we are to conſider, that the difference of the former Philoſophers of the *Ionic* Sect, after the time of *Thales*, as to the material Principle of the World, one ſubſtituting Air, another Fire inſtead of Water, rendred the Tradition it ſelf ſuſpected among other Philoſophers, eſpecially when the humor of innovating in Philoſophy was got among them, and they thought they did nothing unleſs they contradicted their Maſters; thence came that multiplicity of Sects preſently among them, and that Philoſophy which at firſt went much on the original Tradition of the World, was turn'd into Diſputes and Altercations, which help'd as much to the finding out of Truth, as the fighting of two Cocks on a Dung-hill doth to the finding out the Jewel that lies there. For which, ſcraping and ſearching into the Natures of things had been far more proper, than contentions and wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humor, Philoſophy from being a Deſign, grew to be a mere Art, and he was accounted the beſt Philoſopher, not that ſearch'd farther into the Bowels of Nature, but that dreſs'd and trick'd up the Notions he had, in the beſt poſture of defence againſt all who came to oppoſe him. From hence thoſe Opinions were moſt plauſible, not which were moſt true, but which were moſt defenſible, and which like *Des-Cartes* his ſecond Element, had all the Angles cut off, on which their Adverſaries might have an advantage of juſtling upon them, and then their Opinions were accounted moſt pure when they were ſo Sphærical, as to paſs up and down without interruption. From ſuch a degeneracy of Philoſophy as this we have now mention'd, aroſe the Opinion of the Eternity of the World; for the certain Tradition of the World being now loſt in a crowd of Philoſophers, whoſe main aim was to ſet up for themſelves, and not to Trade with the Common-bank, ſo that there cou'd be no certain and convictive Evidence given to a ſhuffling Philoſopher that things were ever otherwiſe than they are; they found it moſt defenſible to aſſert that the World never had a beginning, nor wou'd have an end, but always did, and wou'd continue in the ſtate they were in. This Opinion, tho' *Ariſtotle* ſeems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatched, as far as we can find, at firſt, under *Pythagoras* his Succeſſors by *Ocellus Lucanus*, as appears by his Book ſtill extant, περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, *of the nature of the Univerſe*; to whom *Ariſtotle* hath not been a little beholding, as *Ludov. Nogarola* hath in part manifeſted in his Notes on *Ocellus*, altho' *Ariſtotle* had not the Ingenuity of *Pliny*, *agnoſcere per quos profecerit.* From *Ariſtotle* this Opinion together with his Name, ſpread it ſelf much farther, and became the Opinion moſt in vogue among the Heathen Philoſophers, eſpecially after the riſe of Chriſtianity; for then not only the *Peripatetics*, but the modern *Platoniſts*, *Plotinus*, *Apuleius*, *Taurus*, *Iamblichus*, *Alcinous*, *Proclus*, and others, were all engaged in the defence of the Eternity of the World, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Chriſtianity. Hence came the hot and eager Conteſts between *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, and *Philoponus*, who undertook to anſwer *Proclus* his eighteen Arguments for the Eternity of the World, and to charge *Ariſtotle* with ſelf-contradiction in reference to it. But nothing were they more troubl'd about, than to reconcile the *Timæus* of *Plato* with the Eternity of the World, which they made to be a mere *Hypotheſis*, and a kind of *Diagramme* to ſalve Providence withal; altho' the plain words of *Plato* not only there, but elſewhere do expreſs, as far as we can judge by his way of writing, his real Judgment to have been for the production of the World by GOD. For which purpoſe we have this obſervable Teſtimony in his *Sophiſta*, where he divides all manner of Productions of things into *Divine* and *Human*, and oppoſes the Opinion that conceiv'd all things to be produc'd by an eternal Power, to the Opinion of the vulgar, which, ſaith he, was τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτις καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, *that all things were produc'd by a blind force of Nature, without any Reaſon or Counſel*, to which he oppoſeth the other Opinion, that they are made μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης, *by a Divine Power with Infinite Reaſon and Wiſdom*; and when *Theætetus* expreſſeth himſelf in an Academical way as to either of theſe Opinions, the *Hoſpes Eleatenſis*, who there acts the part of the Philoſopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other Opinion, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν. *He wou'd undertake to make him confeſs the contrary by the Evidence of Reaſon which he wou'd bring.* And we ſhall ſee what great reaſon there is for this Opinion, when we conſider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the Arguments which either *Ocellus*, or *Ariſtotle*, or the modern *Platoniſts* make uſe of, are built on theſe following Suppoſitions which are all falſe. 1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been in any other ſtate than they are.* 2. *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* 3. *That* GOD *is no free Agent, but produced the World by neceſſity of Nature.*

Plato Sophiſt. p. 185. ed. Fic.

1. *That it is unconceivable that things ſhou'd ever have been any otherwiſe than they are.* The Reaſon of which ſuppoſition was this, That the general Concluſions of Reaſon, which they proceed upon in *Philoſophy*,

were taken up from the Obſervation of things as they are at preſent in the World. Which is evident from the ground of *Ariſtotle*'s condemning the Opinion of *Empedocles*, who aſſerted the Production of the World, and yet the Incorruptibility of it, τὸ μὲν ὂν γίνεσθαι μὲν ἀΐδιον δ' ὅμως εἶναι φάναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, which he acounts impoſſible, and gives this as his Reaſon, μόνα γὰρ ταῦτα θετέον εὐλόγως, ὅσα ἐπὶ πόλλων ἢ πάντων ὁρῶμεν ὑπάρχοντα. *For*, ſaith he, *nothing elſe can be rationally aſſerted, but what we find to be in all things or at leaſt in moſt*; now becauſe there cou'd nothing be found in the World which was produc'd (*i. e.* by Generation) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impoſſible it ſhou'd be ſo with the Univerſe. By which we evidently ſee what the grand Principles of Reaſon among the Philoſophers were: *viz.* ſuch Obſervations as they had made from the preſent courſe of Nature in the order of the Univerſe. From hence aroſe that ſtrong preſumption among them, which hath been ſo taken for granted, that it hath been look'd on as a common Notion of Human Nature, *viz. Ex nihilo nihil fit*, which was the main Argument us'd by them to prove the Eternity of the World: and by others to prove the *Præ-exiſtence of Matter*. So *Ocellus* argues againſt both the Diſſolution and Production of the World from this Principle; *If the World be diſſolv'd*, ſaith he, *it muſt either be* ἤτοι εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, *either into that which is, or into that which is not:* It cannot *be diſſolv'd into that which is, becauſe then the Univerſe cannot be deſtroy'd; for that which is, is either the Univerſe, or a part of it: neither can it be diſſolv'd into that which is not,* ἀμήχανον γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἀπολέσθαι ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναλυθῆναι. *For it is impoſſible that a thing ſhou'd be made out of that is not, or be diſſolv'd into nothing.* And *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere tells us, that it is a Principle which all the Writers of *Natural Philoſophy* are agreed in, (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ τῆς φύσεως) which is ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, *that it's impoſſible for any thing to come out of nothing.* But now when we obſerve upon what grounds this Principle was took up by theſe Philoſophers, we have no reaſon to admit of it as an univerſal ſtandard of Nature. For we find theſe Naturaliſts, who thus aſſerted this Principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the courſe of Generations in the World, or from the works of *Art*, both which ſuppoſe *Matter Præ-exiſtent*, and from theſe ſhort collections they form this univerſal Maxim. And from hence when they diſcours'd of the manner whereby God did produce the World, their Imaginations ran preſently upon that which the *Epicurean* in *Tully* inquires after, *Quæ molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? quæ machinæ? qui miniſtri tanti operis fuerunt?* they apprehend God only as an Artificer that contrives the World firſt into a Platform, and then uſeth inſtruments to erect it, and conſequently ſtill ſuppoſe the Matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of *Balbus* in *Tully*, when he comes to diſcourſe of the Nature of God; *In quo nihil eſt difficilius quam a conſuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere; nothing is more difficult than to abſtract our Minds from the obſervations of this viſible World when we ſeek to apprehend the Nature of the Deity.* Thus we ſee upon what general grounds the Philoſophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how inſufficient any collections from the preſent order of the Univerſe are to determine any thing concerning its Production by. For ſuppoſing a Production of the World, ſeveral things muſt of neceſſity be ſuppos'd in it, different from what the preſent order of the World is; and it is an unreaſonable thing to argue from

Ariſt. de cœlo, l. 1. *cap.* 10.

Vid. Laert. in vit. Democriti.

*Ocellus Lucanus, p.*16. *ed. Comm.*

Ariſtot. Phyſic. l. 1.

Cicero de Nat. l. 1.

Ibid. l. 2.

from a thing when it is in its greateſt perfection, to what muſt always have been in the ſame thing; for by this means we muſt condemn many things for falſities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently falſe. For which *Maimonides* uſeth an excellent ſimilitude. *Suppoſe*, ſaith he, *one of exquiſite Natural parts, whoſe Mother dies aſſoon as he is born, and his Father brings him up in an Iſland, where he may have no ſociety with Mankind till he be grown up to years of underſtanding, and that he never ſaw any Female of either Man or Beaſt: Suppoſe now this Perſon to enquire of the firſt Man he ſpeaks with, how Men are born, and how they come into the World. The other tells him, that every Man is bred in the Womb of one of the ſame kind with our ſelves, thus and thus form'd; and that while we are in the Womb we have a very little Body, and there move and are nouriſhed, and we grow up by little and little till we come to ſuch a bigneſs, and then we come forth into the World, and yet grow ſtill till we come to ſuch a proportion as we are of. Here preſently this young Man ſtops him and inquires, when we were thus little in the Womb and did live, move and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breath at our Mouth and Noſtrils as we do now? did we not eaſe Nature as we do now? If it be anſwer'd him, No; then he preſently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring demonſtrations that it was utterly impoſſible that it ſhou'd ſo be: For, ſaith he, if either of us ceaſe breathing but for an hour, our Motion and Life is gone; how is it then poſſible for one of us tho' never ſo little, to live and move in the Womb for ſo many Months, when it is ſo cloſe, and ſhut up, and in the middle of the Body? If one of us*, ſaith he, *ſhou'd ſwallow a little Bird, it wou'd preſently die as ſoon as it came into the Stomach, how much more if it were in the Belly? If we ſhou'd be but for few days without eating and drinking, we cou'd not live; how can a Child then continue ſo many Months without it? Again, if one doth eat and not void the excrement of what he eats, he will be kill'd with it in few days; how can it poſſibly be otherwiſe with a Child? If it be reply'd that there is a paſſage open in the Belly at which the Child receives his nouriſhment, he will preſently ſay that it is as impoſſible as the other; for if our Bellies were ſo open, we ſhou'd be quickly deſtroy'd. And again, if the Child hath all its Limbs perfect and ſound, how comes it not to open its Eyes, uſe the Feet, Mouth and hands, as we do? And ſo concludes it impoſſible that Man ſhou'd ever be born after this manner.* Much after this way, ſaith that excellent Author, do *Ariſtotle* and others argue againſt the Production of the World; for if the World were produc'd, ſay they, it muſt have been thus, and thus; and it is impoſſible that it ſhou'd have been ſo: Why? Becauſe we ſee things are otherwiſe now in the World. Which how infirm a way of arguing, it appears from the conſideration of the former ſimilitude, in which the Arguments are as ſtrong to prove the impoſſibility of that which we know to be true, as in the caſe about which we diſpute.

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 17.

VI. 2. And this now leads us to the ſecond falſe *Hypotheſis* which the Opinion of the World's Eternity was founded on, which is, *That there is no other way of Production but by Generation.* Moſt of the Arguments which are us'd by *Ocellus* and *Ariſtotle*, againſt the Production of the World, run upon this ſuppoſition, That it muſt be generated as we ſee things are in the World. So *Ocellus* argues, Πᾶν τε τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν εἰληφὸς, καὶ διαλύσεως ὀφεῖλον κοινωνῆσαι, δύο ἐπιδέχεται μεταβολάς· μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀφ'

Ocell. Luc. p. 8.

ὅπερ ἂν ἄρξηται μεταβάλλειν γένεσις· τὸ δὲ εἰς ὃ ἀφικνεῖται ἀκμή· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τῆς μεταβολῆς ταύτης ὀνομάζεται φθορὰ καὶ διάλυσις. *Every thing that comes into Being, and is ſubject to diſſolution, hath two obſervable mutations in it; the one is, whereby it grows from leſs to greater, and from worſe to better; and this is called Generation, and the height of this Mutation, Perfection: The other begins from better to worſe, and from bigger to leſs; and the concluſion of this is Corruption, and Diſſolution. But now,* ſaith he, *if the World had a beginning, there wou'd be ſuch a mutation in it, and it wou'd have grown by degrees greater, till it had come to its Perfection, and from thence it wou'd ſenſibly decay till it came to Diſſolution: But no body hath ever obſerv'd ſuch a mutation in the World, neither is there any appearance of it;* ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, *but the World is ſemper idem, it varies not, nor alters any thing from it ſelf.* For which he particularly inſtanceth in the Courſes, Symmetries, Figures, Poſitions, Intervals, Proportions of Motion which are in the World, which things all are capable of ſuch a Mutation, yet we ſee no ſuch thing in the Univerſe; from whence he infers, that the Univerſe was always and will be as it is. Upon the ſame Principle doth *Ariſtotle* diſpute for the Eternity of the World, from the Nature of his *materia prima*; becauſe if the Firſt Matter were generated, it muſt be generated of other Matter, and ſo *in infinitum*; and ſo argues from the Nature of the Heavens, that they are not capable of Generation and Corruption as other Bodies are. All which Arguments ſignify no more than this, that the World was not generated as Plants or Animals are; and whoever right in his Wits aſſerted that it was? But do any of theſe Arguments prove it impoſſible, that God having infinite Power, ſhou'd produce the Univerſe after another way, than any of thoſe things are produc'd in, which we obſerve in the World? For we aſſert an Infinite and Eternal Being, which was the Efficient Cauſe of the World, who by his Omnipotent Power produc'd it out of nothing, and continues it in its Being; which is well expreſs'd by the Author of the Refutation of *Ariſtotle* in *Juſtin Martyr*'s Works. *We aſſert,* ſaith he, *one* God *who is eternal himſelf, that hath nothing elſe co-equal with himſelf, neither by way of ſubjection or oppoſition, whoſe Power is ſo great that nothing can hinder it; by which Power he produc'd the World,* ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ τί εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διαμένειν, τὴν ἐκείνου θέλησιν. *which hath no other Cauſe, either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his Will.* Who fully anſwers in a Philoſophical manner, the particular Allegations out of *Ariſtotle*, concerning the *Eternity of the World*; his deſign being, as he ſaith, to ſhew μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην, καθ' ἣν ἐπαγγέλλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κτίσεων τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηκότας, ἀλλ' εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένους. *That the Greek Philoſophers in their Diſcourſes concerning* God *and the Creation, were very far from being as good as their word, to obſerve the Laws of Demonſtration, but inſtead of them proceeded only upon Opinions and Conjectures.* And to this particular, of the Poſſibility of another way of Production, beſides that of Generation, he proves it from *Ariſtotle*'s own Opinion, from the equal neceſſity of the Exiſtence of Matter, as of God. *For,* ſaith he, *if* God *can produce any thing out of Matter, which is as neceſſarily exiſtent as himſelf, he may produce ſomething out of nothing. For the ſame repugnancy that there is in that which is abſolutely nothing, to be produc'd, the ſame muſt there be in that which*

Ariſtot. dogmat. everſ. p. 111.

Juſt. Mar. ep. p. 113.

is neceſſarily exiſtent. How then can God produce ſomething out of Matter which neceſſarily exiſts, and not be able to produce ſomething out of nothing? For if Matter have its Original from it ſelf, how can it be ſubject to the Power of another? And beſides, if we acknowledge God to have his Being from himſelf, and on that account attribute infinite Power to him, by the ſame Reaſon we muſt attribute it to Matter. But whatever hath infinite Power in it ſelf, hath a Power upon ſomething beyond it ſelf; but if God and Matter have it both, they can never have Power upon each other, or without themſelves. Which is a far greater Abſurdity than the mere aſſerting a Power to produce ſomething out of nothing, which is imply'd in the very Notion of infinite Power; for if it be confin'd to any Matter, the Power is not infinite, becauſe we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than Matter doth. So that a Power of Creation is imply'd in the very Notion of a *Deity*; and therefore it is a mere *Sophiſm* to argue, becauſe the World cou'd not be generated, therefore it cou'd not be produc'd, unleſs any other way of Production but by Generation, be prov'd impoſſible.

VII. 3. A third falſe *Hypotheſis* they proceeded on was this, *That the Being of the World was no effect of* God's *Will, but of the neceſſity of Nature.* For altho' the Philoſophers we now ſpeak of, did aſſert a *Deity*, which in ſome ſenſe might be call'd the Cauſe of the World, yet they withal aſſerted that the World was co-equal with God himſelf; and ſo tho' there might be ſome priority in order of Cauſes between them, yet there was none in order of Time, or Duration; as we ſee the Light, tho' it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without Light. This *Ariſtotle* proves from the neceſſity of Motion and Time: *For,* ſaith he, *whatever is mov'd, muſt be mov'd by ſomething elſe, and conſequently there muſt be a running, in infinitum:* But this runs on a falſe Suppoſition of the neceſſity of a continual *Phyſical* Motion in Things, which we deny, ſince God by his infinite Power may give Motion to that which had it not before; and ſo all that can be prov'd, is the neceſſity of ſome firſt Cauſe, which we aſſert, but no neceſſity at all of his continual Acting, ſince he may cauſe Motion when he pleaſe. And for Time continually exiſting, it denotes nothing real in it ſelf exiſting, but only our manner of Conception, of the Duration of Things, as it is conceiv'd to belong to Motion; and ſo can argue nothing as to the real Exiſtence of Things from all Eternity. But the latter *Platoniſts* look upon theſe as inſufficient ways of Probation, and therefore argue from thoſe Attributes of God, which they conceive moſt neceſſary and agreeable to God's Nature; and by which the World was produc'd if at all: So that by the ſame Arguments whereby we prove that the World was made by God, they prove it to have been from all Eternity. It was well and truly ſaid in *Plato*, in his *Timæus, That the Goodneſs of* God *was the Cauſe of the Production of the World:* From which Speech the more modern *Platoniſts* gather a neceſſity of the World's Eternity; for from hence they infer, That ſince God was always Good, he muſt always have an Object to exerciſe his Goodneſs upon; as the *Sun diſperſeth his light as ſoon as he is himſelf.* True, were God of the Nature of the Sun, it wou'd be ſo with him; or were the Sun of the Nature of God, it wou'd not be ſo with it. But there is this vaſt difference between them, that tho' God be eſſentially and neceſſarily Good, yet the communications of his Goodneſs are the effects of his Will, and not ὅπερ ἂν ἄρξηται μεταβάλλειν γένεσις· τὸ δὲ εἰς ὃ ἀφικνεῖται ἀκμή· δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τῆς μεταβολῆς ταύτης ὀνομάζεται φθορὰ καὶ διάλυσις. *Every thing that comes into Being, and is ſubject to diſſolution, hath two obſervable mutations in it; the one is, whereby it grows from leſs to greater, and from worſe to better; and this is called Generation, and the height of this Mutation, Perfection: The other begins from better to worſe, and from bigger to leſs; and the concluſion of this is Corruption, and Diſſolution. But now,* ſaith he, *if the World had a beginning, there wou'd be ſuch a mutation in it, and it wou'd have grown by degrees greater, till it had come to its Perfection, and from thence it wou'd ſenſibly decay till it came to Diſſolution: But no body hath ever obſerv'd ſuch a mutation in the World, neither is there any appearance of it;* ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, *but the World is ſemper idem, it varies not, nor alters any thing from it ſelf.* For which he particularly inſtanceth in the Courſes, Symmetries, Figures, Poſitions, Intervals, Proportions of Motion which are in the World, which things all are capable of ſuch a Mutation, yet we ſee no ſuch thing in the Univerſe; from whence he infers, that the Univerſe was always and will be as it is. Upon the ſame Principle doth *Ariſtotle* diſpute for the Eternity of the World, from the Nature of his *materia prima*; becauſe if the Firſt Matter were generated, it muſt be generated of other Matter, and ſo *in infinitum*; and ſo argues from the Nature of the Heavens, that they are not capable of Generation and Corruption as other Bodies are. All which Arguments ſignify no more than this, that the World was not generated as Plants or Animals are; and whoever right in his Wits aſſerted that it was? But do any of theſe Arguments prove it impoſſible, that God having infinite Power, ſhou'd produce the Univerſe after another way, than any of thoſe things are produc'd in, which we obſerve in the World? For we aſſert an Infinite and Eternal Being, which was the Efficient Cauſe of the World, who by his Omnipotent Power produc'd it out of nothing, and continues it in its Being; which is well expreſs'd by the Author of the Refutation of *Ariſtotle* in *Juſtin Martyr*'s Works. *We aſſert,* ſaith he, *one* God *who is eternal himſelf, that hath nothing elſe co-equal with himſelf, neither by way of ſubjection or oppoſition, whoſe Power is ſo great that nothing can hinder it; by which Power he produc'd the World,* ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ τὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διαμένειν, τὴν ἐκείνου θέλησιν. *which hath no other Cauſe, either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his Will.* Who fully anſwers in a Philoſophical manner, the particular Allegations out of *Ariſtotle*, concerning the *Eternity of the World*; his deſign being, as he ſaith, to ſhew μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην, καθ' ἣν ἐπαγγέλλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κτίσεων τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηκότας, ἀλλ' εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένους. *That the Greek Philoſophers in their Diſcourſes concerning* God *and the Creation, were very far from being as good as their word, to obſerve the Laws of Demonſtration, but inſtead of them proceeded only upon Opinions and Conjectures.* And to this particular, of the Poſſibility of another way of Production, beſides that of Generation, he proves it from *Ariſtotle*'s own Opinion, from the equal neceſſity of the Exiſtence of Matter, as of God. *For,* ſaith he, *if* God *can produce any thing out of Matter, which is as neceſſarily exiſtent as himſelf, he may produce ſomething out of nothing. For the ſame repugnancy that there is in that which is abſolutely nothing, to be produc'd, the ſame muſt there be in that which*

Ariſtot. dogmat. everſ. p. 111.

Juſt. Mar. ep. p. 113.

is neceſſarily exiſtent. How then can God produce ſomething out of Matter which neceſſarily exiſts, and not be able to produce ſomething out of nothing? For if Matter have its Original from it ſelf, how can it be ſubject to the Power of another? And beſides, if we acknowledge God to have his Being from himſelf, and on that account attribute infinite Power to him, by the ſame Reaſon we muſt attribute it to Matter. But whatever hath infinite Power in it ſelf, hath a Power upon ſomething beyond it ſelf; but if God and Matter have it both, they can never have Power upon each other, or without themſelves. Which is a far greater Abſurdity than the mere aſſerting a Power to produce ſomething out of nothing, which is imply'd in the very Notion of infinite Power; for if it be confin'd to any Matter, the Power is not infinite, becauſe we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than Matter doth. So that a Power of Creation is imply'd in the very Notion of a *Deity*; and therefore it is a mere *Sophiſm* to argue, becauſe the World cou'd not be generated, therefore it cou'd not be produc'd, unleſs any other way of Production but by Generation, be prov'd impoſſible.

A third falſe *Hypotheſis* they proceeded on was this, *That the Being of the World was no effect of* God's *Will, but of the neceſſity of Nature.* VII. 3.
For altho' the Philoſophers we now ſpeak of, did aſſert a *Deity*, which in ſome ſenſe might be call'd the Cauſe of the World, yet they withal aſſerted that the World was co-equal with God himſelf; and ſo tho' there might be ſome priority in order of Cauſes between them, yet there was none in order of Time, or Duration; as we ſee the Light, tho' it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without Light. This *Ariſtotle* proves from the neceſſity of Motion and Time: *For,* ſaith he, *whatever is mov'd, muſt be mov'd by ſomething elſe, and conſequently there muſt be a running, in infinitum:* But this runs on a falſe Suppoſition of the neceſſity of a continual *Phyſical* Motion in Things, which we deny, ſince God by his infinite Power may give Motion to that which had it not before; and ſo all that can be prov'd, is the neceſſity of ſome firſt Cauſe, which we aſſert, but no neceſſity at all of his continual Acting, ſince he may cauſe Motion when he pleaſe. And for Time continually exiſting, it denotes nothing real in it ſelf exiſting, but only our manner of Conception, of the Duration of Things, as it is conceiv'd to belong to Motion; and ſo can argue nothing as to the real Exiſtence of Things from all Eternity. But the latter *Platoniſts* look upon theſe as inſufficient ways of Probation, and therefore argue from thoſe Attributes of God, which they conceive moſt neceſſary and agreeable to God's Nature; and by which the World was produc'd if at all: So that by the ſame Arguments whereby we prove that the World was made by God, they prove it to have been from all Eternity. It was well and truly ſaid in *Plato*, in his *Timæus, That the Goodneſs of* God *was the Cauſe of the Production of the World:* From which Speech the more modern *Platoniſts* gather a neceſſity of the World's Eternity; for from hence they infer, That ſince God was always Good, he muſt always have an Object to exerciſe his Goodneſs upon; as the *Sun diſperſeth his light as ſoon as he is himſelf.* True, were God of the Nature of the Sun, it wou'd be ſo with him; or were the Sun of the Nature of God, it wou'd not be ſo with it. But there is this vaſt difference between them, that tho' God be eſſentially and neceſſarily Good, yet the communications of his Goodneſs are the effects of his Will, and not

merely of his Nature: For, were not the Acts of Beneficence and Goodneſs in God the free acts of his Will, Man muſt be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his firſt Exiſtence in the World, but as long as it ſhou'd continue, by mere neceſſity of Nature, without any intervention of the Will or Actions of Men. And ſo there cou'd be no ſuch difference as that of good and bad Men in the World; For, if the lettings forth of God's Goodneſs to the World be ſo neceſſary, all Men muſt become neceſſarily Good, if God's Goodneſs be ſo great as to be able to make Men ſo; which I ſuppoſe will not be queſtion'd. By this then, when we ſee that the communications of God's Goodneſs to the World are free, and depend upon the eternal Counſels of his Will, which is a depth too great for us to approach, or look into: By what neceſſity then, if God be a free Agent, and of infinite Wiſdom, as well as Goodneſs, muſt we either aſſert the Eternity of the World, or fear to deprive God of his eſſential Goodneſs? Whereas to make the communications of God's Goodneſs *ad extra* neceſſary, and therefore to make the World from Eternity, that he might have an Object to exerciſe his Goodneſs on, is, to take as much off from the infinite Perfection and Self-ſufficiency of the Divine Nature, as it wou'd ſeem to flatter his Goodneſs. For God cannot be himſelf without his Goodneſs; and if his Goodneſs cannot be without ſome Creature to ſhew or diſplay it upon, God cannot be perfect nor happy, without his Creatures, becauſe theſe are neceſſary iſſues of his Goodneſs; and conſequently we make the Being of the Creatures neceſſary to his being God. Which is the higheſt derogation from the abſolute Perfection of the Divine Nature. We aſſert then ſo much Goodneſs in God, as none can be imagin'd greater; we aſſert, that it was from the communication of this Divine Goodneſs which gave Being to the World; but withal we acknowledg God to be an Agent infinitely wiſe and free, who diſpenſeth this Goodneſs of his in ſuch a way and manner as is beſt pleaſing to himſelf, tho' ever agreeable to his Nature. As God is infinitely good in himſelf, ſo whatever he doth is ſutable to this Nature of his; but the particular determinations of the Acts of God's Beneficence belong to the Will of God, as he is a moſt free and independent Agent; ſo that Goodneſs, as it imports the neceſſary rectitude of the Divine Nature, implies a Perfection inſeparable from the true Idea of God; but as it is taken for the expreſſions of Divine Bounty to ſomewhat without, as the Object of it, it is not imply'd in our conception of God, as to his Nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his Will. We cannot then, neither ought we to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of God's Bounty towards the whole Univerſe, or any part of it, any farther than God himſelf hath declar'd it to us. Now we ſee the World exiſts, we have cauſe to adore that Goodneſs of God, which not only gave a Being to the Univerſe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for the Creatures which he hath made in it. Which the *Heathen* was ſo ſenſible of, that the *Stoic* in *Tully* taking notice of the abundant proviſion which is made in the World, not only for Man's neceſſity, but for delight and ornament, cries out, *Ut interdum Pronœa noſtra Epicurea eſſe videatur: God's Providence doth abundantly exceed Man's Neceſſity.* We ſee then from this Diſcourſe, how unſafe and unſatisfactory (that I may not ſay bold and preſumptuous) thoſe Arguments are, which are drawn from a general Conſideration of the Divine Nature and Goodneſs, without regard had to the determinations of his

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

Will, as to the exiſtence of things in the World. It cannot certainly then be an Argument of any great force with any candid Inquirers after Truth and Reaſon, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf of that *Pythagorean Hypotheſis*, of the *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls, *viz. That if it be good for Men's Souls to be at all, the ſooner they are, the better; but we are moſt certain that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God will do that which is beſt; and therefore if they can enjoy themſelves before they come into theſe terreſtrial Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themſelves than not) they muſt be before they come into theſe Bodies. Wherefore the Præ-exiſtence of Souls is a neceſſary reſult of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, who can no more fail to do that which is beſt, than he can to underſtand it.* I now ſeriouſly inquire of ſuch who love Reaſon above *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, whether if the Eternity of the World were put into the Argument inſtead of the *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls, this Argument wou'd not hold as ſtrongly for that, as it doth for *Præ-exiſtence*; and if I am bound to believe *Præ-exiſtence* on this ground, I be not likewiſe bound to believe at leaſt the Souls of Men eternal, if not the Univerſe? But how reconcilable the Eternity of the World is to the *Pythagoric Cabala* of the Creation, I am yet to underſtand. But if this Argument doth not at all infer the Eternity of the World, as we have ſhew'd it doth not, much leſs doth it *Præ-exiſtence* of Souls.

VIII. We have thus far conſider'd the firſt *Hypotheſis*, which is repugnant to *Moſes*, concerning the Origin of the Univerſe, which is that which aſſerts the *Eternity of the World as it is*; we come now to the ſecond, which attributes the Formation of the World as it is, to God, as the efficient Cauſe; but attributes Eternity to the Matter out of which the World was fram'd. I am not ignorant that ſome who wou'd be taken for the Maſters of Reaſon, are ſo far from conceiving this *Hypotheſis* to be repugnant to the Text of *Moſes*, that they conceive it to be the genuine ſenſe of it, *viz.* That there was a *præ-exiſtent Matter*, out of which God form'd the World. But I wou'd willingly underſtand how *Moſes* wou'd have expreſs'd that Matter it ſelf was created, ſuppoſing it had been his intention to have ſpoken it; for altho' the word ברא may not of it ſelf imply neceſſarily the Production of things out of nothing, *i. e.* out of no *præ-exiſtent Matter*; yet it is acknowledg'd by all, that no word us'd by the *Jews* is more proper to that than ברא is; and *P. Fagius* cites it from *R. Nachmani*, *That the Hebrew Language hath no other word to ſignify ſuch a Production out of nothing but* ברא. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, That becauſe ברא is ſometimes us'd for no more than עשה, therefore the World was created out of *præ-exiſtent* Matter; all that can rationally be inferr'd, is, that from the mere force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collected: But if other places of Scripture compar'd, and the evidence of Reaſon, do make it clear, that there could be no *præ-exiſtent* Matter which was uncreated, then it will neceſſarily follow, that Creation muſt be taken in its proper Senſe. And in this Senſe it is evident, that not only *Jews* and *Chriſtians*, but even the *Heathens* themſelves underſtood *Moſes*, as is plain by *Galen*, where he compares the Opinion of *Moſes* with that of *Epicurus*, and ingenuouſly confeſſeth that of *Moſes*, which attributed the Production of Things to God, to be far more rational and probable than that of *Epicurus*, which aſſign'd the Origin of Things to a mere caſual concourſe of *Atoms:* But withal adds, that he muſt diſſent from both; and ſides with *Moſes* as to the Origin of ſuch

Volkelius de vera rel. l. 2. c. 4.

Galen. de uſu part. l. 11.

ſuch Things as depend on Generation, but aſſerts the *præ-exiſtence* of Matter, and withal, that *God's power could not extend it ſelf beyond the capacity of the Matter which it wrought upon. Atque id eſt*, ſaith he, *in quo ratio noſtra ac* Platonis, *tum aliorum qui apud Græcos de rerum natura recte conſcripſerunt, a* Moſe *diſſidet.* How true theſe words are, will appear afterwards. *Chalcidius* in his Commentaries on *Plato*'s *Timæus*, where he ſpeaks of the Origin of ὕλη, which in him is ſtill tranſlated *Sylva*, and inquires into the different Opinions of all Philoſophers *Chalcid. in Tim. p. 372.* about it, takes it for granted, that according to *Moſes*, this ὕλη had its Production from God. *Hebræi Sylvam generatam eſſe confitentur; quorum ſapientiſſimus* Moyſes *non humana facundia, ſed Divina, ut ferunt, inſpiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi cenſetur, ab exordio ſic eſt profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; Initio Deus fecit cœlum & terram. Terra autem erat inviſibilis & incompta. Ut vero ait Aquila; Caput rerum condidit Deus cœlum & terram; terra porro inanis erat & nihil; velut Symmachus; Ab exordio condidit Deus cœlum & terram. Terra porro fuit otioſum quid, confuſumque & inordinatum. Sed* Origenes *aſſeverat ita ſibi ab Hebræis eſſe perſuaſum, quod in aliquantum ſit a vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuiſſe enim in exemplari, Terra autem ſtupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia tamen hæc in unum aiunt concurrere, ut & generata, ſic ea quæ ſubjecta eſt univerſo corpori, ſylva, ſermoneſque ipſos ſic interpretantur.* Where we find by the Teſtimony of *Chalcidius*, an univerſal conſent as to the Production of the Univerſal Corporeal Matter by God; for that is all which is underſtood by his term of *generata eſt*. But this ſame Author afterwards tells us, that by *Heavens* and *Earth* in the firſt Verſe of *Geneſis*, we are not to underſtand the viſible Heavens and Earth: *For*, ſaith he, *the Heavens, which are called the Firmament, were created after, and on the third Day, when the Waters were ſeparated, the dry Land appeared, which was called Earth. Qui tumultuario contenti ſunt intellectu, cœlum hoc quod videmus, & terram qua ſubvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant hoc cœlum ab initio factum, ſed ſecundo die.* And therefore by the *Heavens* he underſtands *Incorpoream Naturam*, and by *Earth*, ὕλη, or the *Primogenial Matter*. *And this*, ſaith he, *appears by the following words, The Earth was inviſible and without form*; i. e. this Corporeal Matter, before it was brought into order by the Power and Wiſdom of God, remain'd a rude and indigeſted Lump; and that which is ſo, might well be call'd Inviſible and without Form. And therefore it is called *inanis* and *nihil*, becauſe of its capacity of receiving all Forms, and having none of its own. *Symmachus* calls it *otioſa & indigeſta*; the former, becauſe of its inability to produce any thing of its ſelf; the latter, becauſe it wanted a Divine Power to bring it into due order. The ſtupidity and admiration which *Origen* attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the Majeſty of God, who was the Orderer and Contriver of it, *ſiquidem Opificis & Auctoris ſui Majeſtate capta ſtupuerit.* Thus we ſee, that according to *Moſes*, the firſt Matter of the *Origen. Philoc. c. 24. Tertull. ad Hermog. per tot.* World was produced by God, which is largely manifeſted by *Origen* againſt the *Marcioniſts*, a fragment of which is extant in his *Philocalia*; and by *Tertullian* againſt *Hermogenes*, and others, who from the Opinion of the præ-exiſtence of Matter, are call'd *Materiarii*.

IX. Having thus clear'd the Senſe of *Moſes*, it is far more difficult to find out the true Opinions of the ancient Philoſophers, concerning the production or eternity of Corporeal Matter, there having been ſo great diſſentions, not only about the thing it ſelf, but about the Opinions of ſome about it. For it is plain by *Plutarch* his ψυχογονία, as well as the Diſcourſes of the later *Platoniſts*, how eager ſome have been to interpret *Plato*'s *Timæus* in favour of the Eternity, at leaſt of Matter, if not of the World. *Plutarch. de Animæ procreat. e Tim.* But altho' *Plato* doth aſſert therein a præ-exiſtence of rude Matter, before the formation of the World, yet I ſee no reaſon why he ſhould be otherwiſe underſtood than in the ſame Senſe that we believe a *Chaos*, to have gone before the bringing the World into the order it is now in. And in that Senſe may thoſe places in *Plutarch* be interpreted, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος· and ſo likewiſe thoſe following words, ὁ γὰρ θεὸς οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, οὔτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν· for the meaning may be no more, than that *Plato* conceiv'd that all the Productions of the kinds of Things which are in the World, was out of a præ-exiſtent Hyle, the one Spiritual and Intelligible, out of which he ſuppos'd Souls to be form'd, the other Senſible and Corporeal, out of which other Beings which were more groſs and material, were produced. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that *Chalcid. in Tim. p.* 377. both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* look'd upon *conſtitutionem Sylvæ* to be *opus Providentiæ*; which I ſuppoſe relates not only to the bringing of Matter into Form, but to the production of Matter it ſelf. But after this he takes a great deal of Pains to ſearch out the true meaning of *Plato*, concerning the Origin of Hyle; *Pag.* 401. and mentions the great diſſentions among the *Platoniſts* about it, and the obſcurity of the *Timæus* in it. To him therefore I refer the Reader: Who likewiſe brings in *Numenius* largely diſcourſing concerning the Opinion of *Pythagoras* about it, who condemns all thoſe, as not underſtanding *Pythagoras*, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate Hyle. These are his words, *Pag.* 393. *Numenius ex Pythagoræ Magiſterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, Pythagoræ dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram, Deum quidem ſingularitatis nominâſſe (nomine appellâſſe) ſylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam eſſe dicere. Hoc eſt, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque & ordinem nanciſceretur, ſine ortu & generatione; exornatam vero atque illuſtratam, a Digeſtore Deo eſſe generatam. Atque ita quia generationis ſit fortuna poſterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, æquævum Deo, a quo eſt ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim ſententiæ non recte aſſecutos, putâſſe, dici etiam illam indeterminatam & immenſam duitatem, ab una ſingularitate inſtitutam, recedente a natura ſua ſingularitate, & in duitatis habitum migrante.* But however theſe *Pythagoreans* might be deceiv'd, who thought the Unity it ſelf became the Deity; yet it is evident by *Numenius*, that he look'd on the undetermin'd and confuſ'd Matter to have been *co-æval* with God himſelf, and not produced by him. And if *Numenius* be as much to be credited in this as when he calls *Plato*, *Moſes Atticus*, then the Creation of Univerſal Matter can be no part of *Pythagoras* his philoſophic *Cabala*. But whatever were the Opinions of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, concerning the firſt Origin of Matter, we are certain that the *Stoics* generally aſſerted the improduction of Matter, and make that to be as neceſſary a paſſive Principle for the Being of the World, as God is the active and efficient Cauſe. So *Diogenes Laertius* reports of the *Stoical* Principles concerning the Origin of the Univerſe: *Laer. V. Zenon.* Δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο· τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν· *They make two principles of the Univerſe,* *V. Lipſium in Phyſiol. Sto. l.* 1. *c.* 4.

one active, and the other paſſive; the paſſive, an Eſſence without quality, called Hyle or confuſed Matter; the active, the Reaſon which acts on the other, which is God. These two Principles *Seneca* calls *Cauſa & materia; eſſe vero debet*, ſaith he; *aliquid unde fiat; deinde, a quo fiat; hoc cauſa eſt, illud materia.* Altho' *Seneca* ſeems to make a Query of it elſewhere; *quantum Deus poſſit? materiam ipſe ſibi formet, an datâ utatur?* But *Zeno* is expreſs in *Stobæus*, Οὐσίαν [illegible] τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον, οὔτε πλείω γινομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω. *The firſt Eſſence of all is Matter, which is eternal, and not capable of acceſſion or diminution.* To the ſame purpoſe *Chalcidius* ſpeaks, *Stoici ortum ſylvæ rejiciunt, quin potius ipſam & Deum; duo totius rei ſumunt initia; Deum, ut opificem; Sylvam, ut quæ operationi ſubjiciatur. Una quidem eſſentiâ præditos facientem, & quod fit ac patitur, id corpus eſſe; diverſa vero virtute; quia faciat Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam eſſe.*

Senec. Epiſt. 65.

Idem Præfat. ad Nat. Quæſt.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſic.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 388.

X. Having now found out the certain Aſſertors among the Heathen Philoſophers of the eternity and improduction of Matter as the paſſive Principle of things, we come to examin the reaſon of this *Hypotheſis*, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to ſubſiſt upon to all Eternity? It might be ſufficient prejudice againſt this Opinion, that it was built on the ſame infirm Concluſions which that of the Eternity of the whole World was, *viz.* that Maxim which *Lipſius* attributes to *Democritus*, but was embraced by all thoſe Philoſophers who deny'd production of Matter, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι, *that nothing cou'd be produced out of nothing, nor could return into nothing*; which as we have already ſaid, was only taken up from the eſtabliſhed order of the Univerſe, and the manner of production of material Beings. But this is not all we have to charge this *Hypotheſis* with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural Notion of a Deity, which muſt imply in it an Omnipotent Power; For otherwiſe we degrade him to the imbecillity of finite Creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God ſhou'd give a Being to that which had none before? For that is all we underſtand by Creation, *viz.* the producing of ſomething out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was produc'd. Now what repugnancy is there to any free Principle of Reaſon, that a Power infinite ſhou'd raiſe an Inſect into Being without any paſſive Principle out of which it was cauſ'd; and if an Infinite Power can do that, it may as well produce the World out of nothing, elſe the Power wou'd not be Infinite; for it wou'd have its bounds ſet, that thus far it cou'd go and no farther. Now if ſuch a Power in God implies no contradiction in it ſelf, I ſay, the aſſerting the neceſſary exiſtence of Matter implies a contradiction to this Power. For, 1. a Power to produce ſomething out of nothing wou'd be to no purpoſe, if a paſſive Principle or præ-exiſtent Matter be neceſſary to the Production of any thing; and ſo that Being which hath a power to produce ſomething out of nothing, hath only a power to produce ſomething out of ſomething, which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath a power to produce ſomething out of nothing, either this power doth extend to the production of this Matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not Infinite, and ſo the ſame power is Infinite and not Infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to

the Notion of a God, to aſſert the neceſſary and eternal exiſtence of Matter.

2. If Matter be unproduced, then neceſſary Exiſtence muſt belong to it as well as to God; and if neceſſary Exiſtence belongs to Matter, Infinite Power muſt belong to it too; for whatever neceſſarily exiſts is Self-originated; whatever is Self-originated, cou'd not by any Cauſe whatſoever be hinder'd from Being; what cannot by any Cauſe be hinder'd from Being, hath Infinite Power; what hath Infinite Power, may produce any thing, and is God, and ſo Matter cannot be a mere paſſive Principle, but muſt be an active, and muſt be God himſelf, or elſe there muſt be more Gods than one. To an Argument ſomething of this nature *Hermogenes* in *Tertullian* replies, that Matter wou'd not loſe the Name or Nature of Matter, becauſe of its Co-eternity with God, neither cou'd it be God merely on that account, unleſs it had other things that were agreeable to the Nature of God as well as that. But I have already ſhew'd that neceſſary Exiſtence implies other Perfections going along with it: which is likewiſe thus prov'd by *Tertullian* in anſwer to *Hermogenes*; The reaſon of the Imperfections which are to be ſeen in any Creatures, is from hence, that they derive their Beings from a higher Cauſe, who creates them in what order he pleaſes; but that which hath its original from it ſelf, muſt on that account want thoſe Imperfections which other Creatures in the World have; and therefore if neceſſary Exiſtence be of the Nature of Matter, all other Perfections muſt belong to it too: and ſo there can be no ſuperiority and inferiority between God and Matter, becauſe on both ſides there will be neceſſary Exiſtence. *Divinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica:* and ſo the eternal exiſtence of Matter, is repugnant to the Unity of God.

Tertull: adverſ. Hermog: c. 4.

Tertul. c. 7.

3. It is repugnant to the Independency of God: for it makes God ſubject to Matter, and not Matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without præ-exiſtent Matter, the Matter is neceſſary to his Action, and ſo God muſt depend on that which he can do nothing without; and ſo God's uſing Matter, is as *Tertullian* ſpeaks, *ex neceſſitate mediocritatis ſuæ*, to help him in the production of things. *Nemo non ſubjicitur ei cujus eget ut poſſit uti*, as he goes on. Thus Matter at laſt is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and ſo as *Tertullian* ſharply ſays, *God is beholding to Matter for every Being known to the World*; *grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognoſceretur, & omnipotens vocaretur, niſi quod jam non omnipotens, ſi non & hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre.* Thus we ſee how irreconcilable this *Hypotheſis* is with theſe Attributes of God.

Ibid. c. 8.

4. It is repugnant to the Immenſity of God. For either God did exiſt ſeparate from this Eternal Matter, or was conjoyn'd with it: if conjoyn'd with it, then both made but one Being, as *Maximus*, or *Origen* argues; if ſeparate from it, then there muſt be ſomething between them, and ſo there will be three real improduced things. If it be anſwer'd that they are neither conjoyn'd nor ſeparate, but God is in Matter as in his proper place, as the *Stoics* aſſerted, it is eaſily reply'd, that either then he is in a part of Matter, or the whole Matter; if in a part only, he cannot be immenſe; if in the whole as his adequate place, how cou'd he then ever frame the World? For either he muſt then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himſelf into a narrower compaſs, that he might faſhion that part of the World which he

Orig. Philoc. c. 24.

was about, or elſe he might likewiſe frame part of himſelf with that part of the World which he was then framing of, which conſequence is unavoidable on the *Stoical Hypotheſis* of God's being Corporeal and confin'd to the World as his proper place. And ſo much for this ſecond *Hypotheſis* concerning the Origin of the Univerſe, which ſuppoſeth the eternity of Matter as co-exiſting with God.

XI. I come now to that which makes moſt noiſe in the World, which is the *Atomical or Epicurean Hypotheſis*; but will appear to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origin of the Univerſe. For otherwiſe ſuppoſing a Deity which produc'd the World and put it into the order it is now in, and ſupremely governs all things in the World, that many of the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, are far more intelligibly explain'd by Matter and Motion than by ſubſtantial Forms, and real Qualities, few free and unprejudic'd Minds do now ſcruple. But becauſe theſe little Particles of Matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of Nature, that therefore there ſhou'd be nothing elſe but Matter and Motion in the World, and that the Origin of the Univerſe ſhou'd be from no wiſer Principle than the caſual concourſe of theſe *Atoms*, is one of the Evidences of the proneneſs of Mens minds to be intoxicated with thoſe Opinions they are once in love with. When they are not content to allow an *Hypotheſis* its due place and ſubſerviency to God, and Providence, but think theſe *Atoms* have no force at all in them unleſs they can extrude a Deity quite out of the World. For it is moſt evident that it was not ſo much the truth as the ſerviceableneſs of this *Hypotheſis*, which hath given it entertainment among Men of *Atheiſtical* Spirits. *Epicurus* himſelf in his Epiſtle to *Pythocles* urgeth that as a conſiderable circumſtance in his Opinion that he brought no God down upon the Stage to put things in order, καὶ ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω, which his Paraphraſt *Lucretius* hath thus rendred.

Diog. Laert. l. 10. *Lucret. de Nat. l.* 5.

> *Nequaquam nobis divinitus eſſe paratam*
> *Naturam rerum.*

If this Opinion then be true, the Hiſtory of the Creation quite falls to the ground; on which account we are oblig'd more particularly to conſider the reaſon of it. The *Hypotheſis* then of *Epicurus* is, *that before the World was brought into that Form and Order it is now in, there was an infinite empty Space, in which were an innumerable company of ſolid Particles or Atoms of different ſizes and ſhapes, which by their weight were in continual motion, and that by the various occurſions of theſe, all the Bodies of the Univerſe were fram'd into that order they now are in.* Which is fully expreſs'd by *Dionyſius* in *Euſebius*, and very agreeably to the Sence of *Epicurus* in his Epiſtles to *Herodotus* and *Pythocles*, and to what *Plutarch* reports of the Sence of *Epicurus*, tho' he names him not (if at leaſt that Book be his, which *Muretus* denies) the words of *Dionyſius* are theſe concerning the *Epicureans*, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀτόμους προσειπόντες ἄφθαρτά τινα καὶ σμικρότατα σώματα, πλῆθος ἀνάριθμα, καὶ τι χωρίον κενὸν, μέγεθος ἀπερίοριστον προσβαλλόμενοι, ταύτας δή φασι τὰς ἀτόμους ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν τῷ κενῷ φερομένας, αὐτομάτως τε συμπεπτούσας ἀλλήλαις διὰ ῥύμην ἄτακτον καὶ συμπλεκομένας διὰ τὸ πολύσχημον ἀλλήλων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω τόν τε κόσμον, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ κόσμους ἀπείρους ἀποτελεῖν. So that according to this Opinion, all the account we have of the Origin of the World, is from this general Rendezvous of Atoms in this infinite Space, in which after many encounters and

Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 14. *c.* 22. *p.* 421. *R. St. Plutarch. de Placitis Phil. l.* 1. *c.* 4. *Muret. Annot. in Senec. de provid.*

and facings about, they fell into their ſeveral Troops, and made up that order'd Battalia which now the World is the Scheme of. It was not imprudently done of *Epicurus* to make the Worlds infinite, as well as his Space and Atoms; for by the ſame reaſon that his Atoms wou'd make one World, they might make a thouſand; and who wou'd ſpare for Worlds, when he might make them ſo eaſily? *Lucretius* gives us in ſo exact an account of the ſeveral courſes the Atoms took up in diſpoſing themſelves into Bodies, as tho' he had been Muſter-Maſter General at the Rendezouz; for thus he ſpeaks of his Atoms.

> *Quæ quia multa modis multis mutata per omne* Lucret. l. 1.
> *Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis,*
> *Omne genus motus & cœtus experiundo,*
> *Tandem deveniunt in taleis diſpoſituras,*
> *Qualibus hæc rerum conſiſtit ſumma creata.*

And more particularly afterwards,

> *Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum* Lucret. l. 5.
> *Ex Infinito jam tempore percita plagis,*
> *Ponderibuſque ſuis conſuêrunt concita ferri,*
> *Omnimodiſque coire, atque omnia pertentare,*
> *Quæcunque inter ſe poſſunt congreſſa creare;*
> *Ut non ſit mirum, ſi in taleis diſpoſituras*
> *Deciderunt quoque, & in taleis venêre meatus,*
> *Qualibus hæc rerum genitur nunc ſumma novando.*

Thus we ſee the ſubſtance of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, that there was an infinite number of Atoms, which by their frequent occurſions did at laſt meet with thoſe of the ſame nature with them, and theſe being conjoyn'd together made up thoſe Bodies which we ſee; ſo that all the account we are able to give according to this *Hypotheſis* of all the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, is from the fortuitous concourſe of the Atoms in the firſt forming of the World, and the different contexture of them in Bodies. And this was deliver'd by the ancient *Epicureans* not with any Doubt or Heſitation, but with the greateſt Confidence imaginable. So *Tully* obſerves of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, beginning his Diſcourſe, *fidenter ſane ut ſolent iſti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, & ex Epicuri intermundiis deſcendiſſet:* Confidence was the peculiar Genius of that Sect, which we ſhall ſee in them to be accompany'd with very little reaſon.

XII. For thoſe two things which make any principles in Philoſophy to be rejected, this Atomical *Hypotheſis* is unavoidably charg'd with; and thoſe are, *If the principles be taken up without ſufficient ground in reaſon for them; and if they cannot give any ſufficient account of the* Phænomena *of the World.* I ſhall therefore make it appear, *That this Hypotheſis*, as to the Origin of the Univerſe, is *firſt, merely precarious, and built on no ſufficient grounds of Reaſon. Secondly, That it cannot give any ſatisfactory account of the Origin of things.*

1. That it is a precarious *Hypotheſis*, and hath no evidence of Reaſon on which it ſhou'd be taken up; and that will be prov'd by two things. 1. *It is ſuch an Hypotheſis as the* Epicureans *themſelves cou'd have no certainty of according to their own principles.* 2. *That the main*

principles of the Hypotheſis its ſelf are repugnant to thoſe Catholic Laws of Nature which are obſerv'd in the Univerſe.

I. *The* Epicureans *according to their own Principles, cou'd have no certainty of the truth of this Hypotheſis.* And that, 1. *Becauſe they cou'd have no certain Evidence of its Truth.* 2. *Becauſe their way of proving it was inſufficient.*

1. *That they cou'd have no certain evidence of the truth of it,* I prove from thoſe *Criteria,* which *Epicurus* lays down as the only certain Rules of judging the truth of things by; and thoſe were *Senſe, Anticipation* and *Paſſion.* Let Senſe be never ſo infallible a Rule of Judgment, yet it is impoſſible there ſhou'd be any Evidence to Senſe of the truth of this *Hypotheſis*; and let him extend his τὸ προσμενόμενον as long as he pleaſe, which was his great help for correcting the errors of Senſe, *viz.* as it was in the *Roman* Court when the Caſe was not clear, *ampliandum eſt:* So *Epicurus* wou'd have the Object repreſented every way it cou'd be before he paſt his Judgment; yet this prudent Caution wou'd do him no good for this *Hypotheſis,* unleſs he were ſo wiſe as to ſtay till this World were crumbl'd into Atoms again, that by That he might judg of the Origin of it. There is but one way left to find out the truth of Things inevident to Senſe, (as by *Epicurus*'s own Confeſſion all theſe Atoms are, which are now the component Particles of Bodies; much more thoſe which by their fortuitous concourſe gave Being to the World) and that is, if ſomething evident to Senſe doth apparently prove it, which is his way of proving a Vacuity in Nature and Motion: But tho' that be eaſily anſwer'd by Principles different from thoſe of *Epicurus,* and more rational; yet that very way of Probation fails him in this preſent *Hypotheſis.* For what is there evident to Senſe which proves a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms for the production of Things? Nay, if we grant him, that the compoſition of Bodies is nothing elſe but the Contexture of theſe inſenſible Particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to Senſe, that theſe Particles without any wiſe and directing Providence ſhou'd make up ſuch Bodies as we ſee in the World. And here, when we ſpeak of the evidence of Senſe, we may well aſk, as the *Stoic* in *Tully* doth, whether ever *Epicurus* found a Poem made by the caſual throwing of Letters together; and if a concourſe of Atoms did produce the World, *cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non poteſt? Why did it never produce a Cloyſter, a Temple, a Houſe, a City,* which are far eaſier things than the World? I know *Epicurus* will ſoon reply, *That things are otherwiſe in the World now than when it was produc'd*; I grant it, and from thence prove, that becauſe no ſuch thing ever happens in the World now, as a merely caſual concourſe of Atoms to produce any things, *Epicurus* could have no Evidence from Senſe at all to find out the truth of his *Hypotheſis* by. And as little relief can he find from his ſecond *Criterium,* viz. *Anticipation*; for by his own acknowledgment, all Anticipation depends on the Senſes, and Men have it only one of theſe four ways, 1. By Incurſion, as the Species of a Man is preſerv'd by the ſight of him. 2. By Proportion, as we can enlarge or contract that Species of a Man either into a Gyant or Pigmy. 3. By Similitude, as we may fancy the image of a City by reſemblance to one which we have ſeen. 4. By Compoſition, whereby we may joyn different Images together, as of a Horſe and a Man to make a Centaur. Now tho' it be very queſtionable how ſome of theſe ways belong to a *Criterium* of Truth, yet none of them reach our caſe; for there can be no

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

V. Gaſſend. de Logica Epicuri, Op. To. 1. c. 7. Can. 7.

Incurſion of inſenſible Particles as ſuch upon our Senſes; we may indeed by proportion imagine the parvitude of them: But what is this to the proving the truth of the *Hypotheſis*? Similitude can do no good, unleſs *Epicurus* had ever ſeen a World made ſo: The only relief muſt be from Compoſition, and that will prove the Origin of the World by Atoms to be as true as that there are Centaurs in the World, which we verily believe. Theſe are the only *Criteria* which *Epicurus* wou'd judg of the truth of natural Things by (for the third, Paſſion, relates wholly to things Moral and not Phyſical) and now let any one judg, whether the *Hypotheſis* of the Origin of the Univerſe by Atoms can ever be prov'd true, either by the judgment of Senſe, or by Anticipation.

XIII. 2. The way they had to prove this *Hypotheſis* was inſufficient; and that was by proving that the Bodies of the World are compounded of ſuch inſenſible Particles; now, granting the thing, I deny the conſequence; for what tho' the compoſition of Bodies be from the contexture of Atoms, doth it therefore follow, that theſe Particles did caſually produce theſe Bodies? Nay, doth it at all follow, that becauſe Bodies upon their reſolution do fall into inſenſible Particles of different ſize, figure and motion, therefore theſe Particles muſt be præ-exiſtent to all Bodies in the World? For it is plain, that there is now an univerſal Lump of Matter out of which theſe inſenſible Particles ariſe, and whither they return on the diſſolution of Bodies; and all theſe various Corpuſcles may be of the ſame uniform Subſtance only with the alteration of ſize, ſhape and motion; but what then? Doth this prove, that becauſe particular Bodies do now emerge out of the various Configuration and Motion of inſenſible Particles of that Matter which exiſts in the World, that therefore this whole Matter was produc'd by the caſual occurſions of theſe Atoms? It will aſk more Time and Pains than is uſually taken by the Philoſophers either ancient or modern, to prove that thoſe things whatſoever they are, whether Elements or Particles, out of which Bodies are ſuppos'd to be compounded, do exiſt ſeparately from ſuch compounded Bodies, and antecedently to them. We find no *Ariſtotelian* Elements pure in the World, nor any Particles of Matter deſtitute of ſuch a ſize, figure and motion, as doth make ſome Body or other. From whence then can we infer, either the exiſtence of *Ariſtotle*'s *materia prima*, without quiddity, quantity, or quality; or the *Epicurean* Atoms without ſuch a contexture as makes up ſome Bodies in the World? Our profound Naturaliſt, Dr. *Harvey*, after his moſt accurate ſearch into the Natures and Generation of Things, delivers this as his Experience and Judgment concerning the commonly reputed Elements, or Principles of Bodies. For ſpeaking of the different Opinions of *Empedocles*, and *Hippocrates*, and *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, concerning the compoſition of Bodies, he adds, *Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla corporum ſimilarium generatione, (ſive ea partium animalium, ſive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium,* &c. *fuerit) vel congregationem ejuſmodi, vel miſcibilia diverſa in generationis opere unienda præ-exiſtere, obſervare unquam potui.* And after explaining the way which he conceiv'd moſt rational and conſonant to Experience in the generation of Things, he concludes his Diſcourſe with theſe words; *Idemque in omni generatione fieri crediderim; adeo ut corpora ſimilaria miſta, elementa ſua tempore priora non habeant, ſed illa potius elementis ſuis prius exiſtant (nempe Empedoclis atque Ariſtotelis igne, aqua, aere, terra, vel Chymicorum ſale, ſulphure, & mercurio, aut Democriti atomis) utpote natura quoque ipſis perfectiora.*

Harvey, de Generat. Anim.

Sunt, inquam, miſta, & compoſita, etiam tempore priora elementis quibuſlibet ſic dictis, in quæ illa corrumpuntur & deſinunt; diſſolvuntur ſcilicet, in iſta ratione potius quam re ipſa & actu. Elementa itaque quæ dicuntur, non ſunt priora iſtis rebus quæ generantur aut oriuntur; ſed poſteriora potius, & reliquiæ magis quam principia. Neque Ariſtoteles ipſemet aut alius quiſpiam unquam demonſtravit, elementa in rerum natura ſeparatim exiſtere, aut principia eſſe corporum ſimilarium. If then none of theſe things which Bodies are reſolv'd into, and are ſuppos'd to be compounded of, either have been, or can be prov'd to exiſt ſeparate from and antecedent to thoſe Bodies which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of Atoms, which are ſuppos'd by their concourſe in an infinite Space to be the Origin of the World? I know not where to find them, unleſs dancing with the School-men's *Chimera's* in a *vacuum*, or in a Space as empty as the infinite one, *viz.* ſome *Epicurean's* Brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great Maſter *Epicurus*, if we believe the Character which the *Stoic* in *Tully* gives of him, who ſaith he was *homo ſine arte, ſine literis, inſultans in omnes, ſine acumine ullo, ſine auctoritate, ſine lepore.* But allowing the *Stoic* ſome of that Paſſion, (which he diſclaim'd ſo much) in theſe words; yet we may rather believe what *Tully* himſelf elſewhere ſpeaks of *Epicurus's* Sentiments, that they were none of them handſom or becoming a Man. *At ille quid ſentit?* ſaith he of *Epicurus*; and ſoon replies, *ſentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum:* And in another place ſpeaking of his Morals, he ſaith, *nihil generoſum ſapit atque magnificum, there was nothing Noble and Generous in him.* Which cenſure of *Epicurus*, all the pains that *P. Gaſſendus* hath taken in the vindication of the Life and Opinions of *Epicurus*, hath not been able to wipe off. For altho' we ſhou'd yield what that Learned Man ſo much contends for, that all the Calumnies which were caſt on *Epicurus* ariſe from the antipathy between *Zeno* and the following *Stoics*, and the School of *Epicurus*; yet all this will not make *Epicurus* to have been comparable with ſome other Philoſophers for Parts and Judgment, whoſe Principles have ſomewhat more generous and venerable in them, than the Morals of *Epicurus* had, taking them in their more refin'd Senſe.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2.

Idem de Divinat. l. 1.

Idem de Finibus, l. 1.

XIV. But it is not the Morality of *Epicurus* which we now inquire after; our buſineſs is to ſee how well he acquits himſelf in rendring an account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity. And ſo we come to conſider the *Hypotheſis* it ſelf, whether it be rational or no, or conſiſtent with the Catholic Laws of Nature which appear in the World. Two things I ſhall here inquire into, which are the main Principles of *Epicurus*, *viz.* the Motion of theſe Atoms in the infinite Space, and the manner of the concretion of Bodies by the concourſe of theſe Atoms.

1. I begin with their Motion; which *Epicurus* attributes to his Atoms without any heſitation, and yet never undertakes to give an account of the Origin of that Motion; which argues his whole *Hypotheſis* to be extremely precarious. The thing then, (which he muſt aſſume as his main Principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, That Motion doth inſeparably belong to the leaſt Atom or inſenſible Particle; for without this there cannot be imagin'd any concourſe of Atoms at all, much leſs any ſuch contexture of Bodies out of them. But for one to ſay that Atoms move, becauſe it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is ſo precarious, that it will never give the

leaſt ſatisfaction to an inquiſitive Mind. And it will be the leaſt of all pardonable in the exploders of ſubſtantial Forms and occult Qualities, when the Origin of the whole World is reſolv'd into an occult Quality, which gives Motion to Atoms. And herein the *Atomiſts* out-do the moſt credulous *Peripatetics*, ſeeing they lay the prime Foundation of the World and of their own Philoſophy together, in a thing they can give no rational account of at all; which is, the Motion of Atoms in an infinite Vacuity. If it be reply'd, which is all *Epicurus* hath to ſay, *That the Motion of Atoms depends upon their Gravity*; the queſtion returns upon him with the ſame violence, How comes this Gravity to belong to theſe Atoms in ſuch an empty Space, where there can be no impulſion from other Bodies, no attraction from any magnetic Particles which are ſuppos'd to be the Cauſes of the deſcent of heavy Bodies; Nay, *Epicurus* himſelf takes away any center of that Motion of Atoms, and yet attributes a neceſſary deſcent to his Atoms by virtue of their Gravity; and if a Philoſopher may beg ſuch things as theſe are, ſo repugnant to the *Phænomena* of Nature, without aſſigning any other Reaſon for them, but that it is their Nature, let us never venture Philoſophizing more, but ſit down in that contented piece of Ignorance, which attributes the Cauſes of every thing unto ſpecific Forms and occult Qualities. For this is ſo ſhameful a piece of Beggery, that *P. Gaſſendus* doth more than once diſclaim it, and in his Diſcourſe of Motion, doth prove an impoſſibility of Motion in an infinite empty Space. Might not *Epicurus* then have ſav'd his Credit better, by ſitting down with the Opinions of his Forefathers, than thus to go a begging for ſuch *Hypotheſes*, which none, who are not reſolv'd to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him?

Gaſſendus Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 3. c. 7. De apparent. magnitud. Solis humilis & ſublimis, ep. 4. ſ. 3. De motu Phyſ. ſ. 1. l. 5. c. 2. V. ep. de motu impreſſo a motore tranſlato. To. 3. op.

XV. But yet this is not all, but according to this fundamental Principle of *Epicurus*, *viz.* That there is a principle of Motion in every inſenſible Particle of Matter, he plainly overthrows another Principle of his, which is, the ſolidity and different Magnitude of theſe Atoms. Theſe Particles are ſuppos'd ſo ſolid, that *Dionyſius* in *Euſebius* tells us the Account given, why they are call'd ἄτομοι was, διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον ϛεῤῥότητα, becauſe of their indiſſoluble firmneſs; and the different ſizes of theſe Atoms is ſo neceſſary a Principle, that from thence they undertake to reſolve many *Phænomena* of the Univerſe; let us now ſee how conſiſtent theſe things are with the inſeparable property of Motion belonging to Atoms: For if there be Particles of ſuch different ſizes, then it is plain, that there are ſome Particles which may not only be conceiv'd to be bigger than others, but are really ſo; and ſo there muſt be more parts of Matter imagin'd in this bigger Particle than in another leſs; and if there be more Parts, theſe Parts may be conceiv'd ſeparate from each other, that this Particle may be equal to the other: Now then, I demand, if Motion doth inſeparably belong to the leaſt Particle of Matter, how comes one to be bigger than the other? For herein we ſee, that every Particle is not in diſtinct Motion; for there cannot but be more imaginable Particles in an Atom of a bigger ſize than in a leſs; and if ſo, there muſt be ſome union of thoſe imaginable Particles in that bigger Atom; and how cou'd ſuch an union be without Reſt? And what Reſt cou'd there be if Motion doth inſeparably belong to every Particle of Matter? And ſo it muſt be in all thoſe Atoms which are ſuppos'd to have Angles and Hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other, for the compoſition of Bodies; how come theſe Hooks and Angles to be annex'd to this Atom? For an Atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if ſuch a

Euſeb. præp. Evang. l. 14. c. 22.

principle of motion be in each Particle? If it be anſwer'd, *That Motion did belong to all theſe Particles, but by degrees the leſſer Particles hitting together made up theſe angled and hooked Particles*; I ſoon reply, that the difficulty returns more ſtrongly; for if theſe angled and hooked Particles be ſuppos'd neceſſary to the contexture and union of Bodies; how came thoſe leaſt imaginable Particles ever to unite without ſuch Hooks and Angles? And ſo the Queſtion will return *in infinitum.* If then the ſolidity and indiviſibility of theſe angled Atoms, doth depend on the union and reſt of thoſe leſſer imaginable particles joyn'd together, then it is evident that Motion is no inſeparable property of all theſe Particles, but ſome are capable of union, in order to the making of ſuch Hooks and Angles, which are neceſſary for the contexture of Bodies; and where there is union and ſolidity, there is reſt, which is at leaſt accompany'd with it, if it be not one of the great Cauſes of it. And without which the *Atomiſts*, of all other Philoſophers, will be leaſt able to give an account of firmneſs in Bodies, when they make Bodies to conſiſt of an aggregation of Particles, by which it will be very hard finding a ſufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm Bodies, unleſs it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid Bodies, and the reſt of the ſmall and contiguous parts that make up the firm Body, according to that Catholic Law of Nature, whereby things continue in the ſtate they are in till ſome ſtronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the *Epicurean Atomiſts* have left to give any account of the ſolidity of Particles of ſuch different ſizes, is, the want of Vacuity; for ſay they, *The ground of diviſibility of Bodies is the interſperſion of a diſſeminated Vacuum; now where there is no Vacuity, tho' the particles be of different ſize, yet they may be ſolid and indiviſible.* But this is taken off by the inſtance produced againſt other perſons by that Ingenious and Honorable Perſon Mr. *Boyle* in his *Phyſiological Eſſays*, which is to this purpoſe, *Suppoſe two of theſe preſum'd indiviſible particles, both ſmooth and of a cubical figure, ſhould happen to lie upon one another, and a third ſhould chance to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two; what ſhould hinder but that this Aggregate may by the violent knock of ſome other Corpuſcles be broken in the midſt of the whole Concretion, and conſequently in the middlemoſt Body?* For ſuppoſe them as ſolid as may be, yet ſince Corpuſcles as hard as they, can be made very violently to knock againſt them, why may not thoſe grate or break the middlemoſt Corpuſcle, or any of the others? And if there be a poſſibility of breaking off theſe cubical particles in the middle, then mere want of Vacuity is no ſufficient account of their being indiviſible. By this we ſee how far the *Atomiſts* are from giving any rational account of the Origin of the motion of the Atoms themſelves without a Deity.

V. Deſcartes, princip. p. 2. art. 54, 55, 56.

Hiſtory of Fluid. and Firm. p. 202.

XVI. 2. Suppoſing this Motion to be granted them, yet they *cannot give any ſatisfactory account of the manner of concretion of Bodies by the caſual occurſions of theſe Atoms moving in an infinite empty ſpace.* Which appears from thoſe groſs and extravagant ſuppoſitions of *Epicurus*, in order to the making theſe *Atoms* of his ſo hit together that they make up any Bodies by their Contexture.

1. He ſuppoſeth as it were two Regions, a Superior and Inferior in an infinite empty Space, which hath no center at all in it, nor any Body, from which to meaſure thoſe reſpects of above and below, as appears by his Epiſtle to *Herodotus*, wherein he ſaith, *Theſe terms of* ἄνω

and

*

and κάτω, *or upwards and downwards, muſt be conceiv'd without any bounds or limits at all. So that tho' we conceive ſomething ſuperior, we muſt imagin nothing ſupreme, and ſo on the contrary.* Whereby it is evident, as *Gaſſendus* confeſſeth, that *Epicurus* thought the ſurface of the Earth to be a plain, and this plain to be continued up in a level ſuperficies to the Heavens, and ſo to all that immenſe ſpace of the Univerſe. **Gaſſend. Phyſic. ſ. 1. l. 3. c. 7.** So that all thoſe heavy Bodies which ſhould fall downwards in any parts of the wideſt diſtance on the Earth, as in *Europe, Aſia*, and *Africa*, would never meet (if they continued their Motion) in the center of the Earth, but would continue their Motion ſtill in a parallel line; and ſo he imagin'd that which is ſaid to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the World, and ſo the deſcent of his *Atoms*, muſt neceſſarily be downwards towards the Earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy *Mathematical* Suppoſition, for one who would undertake to give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a *Deity*?

This Motion of deſcent by reaſon of the gravity of *Atoms* would not ſerve his turn; for if the *Atoms* mov'd downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it poſſible for them ever to meet for the contextures of Bodies? Now for this purpoſe he invented a *Motion of declination*; for finding the Motion *ad lineam*, or *ad perpendiculum* as ſome call it, could not poſſibly produce thoſe varieties of Bodies which are in the Univerſe, he ſuppos'd therefore the Deſcent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that ſo ſeveral Particles in their deſcent might make ſome occurſions one upon another. And this *Epicurus* added to *Democritus*; but therein, as *Tully* obſerves, was very unhappy, that **Cicero de Fin. l. 1.** where he adds to *Democritus*, *ea quæ corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur*; that he marr'd what *Democritus* had ſaid, by mending of it. The reaſon of which Motion of Declination is thus given by *Lucretius*;

Quod niſi declinare ſolerent, omnia deorſum **Lucret. l. 2.**
Imbris uti guttæ caderent per Inane profundum;
Nec foret offenſus natus, neque plaga creata
Principiis, ita nil unquam natura creâſſet,

It was obvious to object, That, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, there could have been no concourſe at all of *Atoms* in an infinite ſpace, on the two grounds he went on, which were the Natural Deſcent of *Atoms*, and the *æqui-velocity* of the Motion of all *Atoms* of what ſize ſoever, which he likewiſe aſſerted (altho' one would think, if Gravity were the cauſe of Motion, then the more Gravity, the ſwifter the Motion would be) from hence, I ſay, it were not eaſie to conceive how the *Atoms* ſhould embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down, as *Lucretius* expreſſeth it, *like drops of rain*; and therefore they ſaw a neceſſity to make their Motion decline a little, that ſo they might juſtle and hit one upon another. But this oblique Motion of the *Atoms*, tho' it be the only refuge left to ſalve the origin of things by a concourſe of *Atoms*, is yet as precarious and without reaſon as any other Suppoſition of theirs whatſoever. *Tully* chargeth this Motion of Declination **Cicero de Fin. bon. & mal. lib. 1.** with two great faults, *Futility*, and *Inefficacy*, *quæ cum res tota ficta ſit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem quod vult.* It is a childiſh Fancy, and to no purpoſe: For, *firſt*, It is aſſerted without any reaſon at all given for it, which is unworthy a *Philoſopher*; neither is to any purpoſe; for if all *Atoms*, ſaith he, decline in their Motion, then none of them will ſtick together; if ſome decline, and others do not, this is as precarious as any thing can be imagin'd, to aſſign a diverſity of Motion in indiviſible Particles, which yet have all the ſame velocity of Motion; and, as *Tully* ſaith, *Hoc erit quaſi provincias Atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur*; as tho' *Epicurus* were the General at this *Rendezvous* of *Atoms*, who ſtands ready to appoint every one his Task and Motion. This *Plutarch* tells us was the great charge againſt *Epicurus*, ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπεισάγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, *becauſe he introduced ſuch a Motion of Declination out of nothing, upon no pretence of reaſon.* And *Turnebus* tells us that the ground why they deſir'd ſo ſmall a Declination, was, becauſe they were conſcious to themſelues, that it was founded upon no ground of Reaſon; *Et Epicurei ſibi concii culpæ, timide eam ponebant, & minimam ſibi poſtulabant.* To which purpoſe *Turnebus* cites thoſe Verſes of *Lucretius*,

Plutarch. de Anim. procreat. è Timæo.
Turnebus in Ciceron. de Fato.

Lucret. l. 2.

Quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare neceſſe eſt
Corpora, nec pluſquam minimum, ne fingere motus
Obliquos videamur, & id res vera refutet.
Nam hoc in promptu manifeſtumque eſſe videmus,
Pondera quantum in ſe eſt, non poſſe obliqua meare
E ſupero cum precipitant, quod cernere poſſis.
Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai
Declinare quis eſt qui poſſit cernere ſeſe?

But this Argument of *Lucretius* will hold, if at all, farther than this little Declination (for it is no more they deſire than as little as may be imagin'd, *quo nihil poſſit fieri minus*, as *Tully* expreſſeth it) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? nay, it is impoſſible to conceive, but a little oblique Motion at firſt will in an infinite Space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the Motion which way it bends: now if there be never ſo little Motion of Declination, the *Atom* will be inclin'd that way; and what then ſhould hinder, but that the obliquity in a Motion thro' a great Space ſhould at laſt come to be very great; there being no center at all to guide the Motion towards, and the gravity not hindring this little Declination? Therefore *Tully* asks that Queſtion, *Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus? Why only it declines one minim, and not two or three? For*, ſaith he, *it is no impulſion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minim; neither is there any impediment in the Space to hinder it from declining more; ſo that*, as he well ſaith, *optare hoc quidem eſt, non diſputare*, this is to beg *Hypotheſes*, and not to prove them, which is the thing we have prov'd *Epicurus* to do. Which was the firſt thing premis'd, *viz.* that this *Hypotheſis* of *Epicurus* was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of Reaſon.

Cicero de Fato.

XVII. 2. *It is unſatisfactory and inſufficient, as well as precarious*; for ſhould we grant his two main Principles, *Atoms*, and his *Infinite empty Space*; yet we deny that ever his *Atoms* with all their occurſions would ever produce thoſe things which are in the Univerſe. To run thro' the noted *Phænomena* of the Univerſe, and to ſhew how inſufficient an account the *Epicureans* are able to give of them, from a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I ſhall rather ſuggeſt than inſiſt upon, to ſee what miſerable ſhifts the *Epicureans* are driven to for the ſalving of them, and ſhall then leave it with the *Reader* to judg, what unmeaſurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the ſake of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the World ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*.

1. *The great variety of appearances in Nature*, which are attributed to Particles of the ſame Nature, only with the alteration of Size, Shape and Motion. That ſome things in the World ſhould have no other Reaſon given of them, may not only be tolerable, but rational, as in the Objects and Operations on the Organs of Senſe, thoſe Affections which are miſtaken for real Qualities, &c. But that all thoſe Effects which are ſeen in Nature ſhould have no other Cauſe but the different Configuration and Motion of *Atoms*, is the height of Folly as well as impiety. To imagine that the Particles of Matter, as they are in Men, ſhould be capable of Senſation, Memory, Intellection, Volition, &c. merely becauſe of a different Shape, Size and Motion from what they have in a piece of Wood, is a Riddle that requires a new Configuration of *Atoms* in us to make us underſtand. May it not be hoped, that at leaſt one time or other by this caſual concourſe of *Atoms*, the Particles may light to be of ſuch a Nature in Stones, as to make them fly; in Plants, to make them all Senſitive; and in Beaſts to make them Reaſon and Diſcourſe? What may hinder ſuch a Configuration or Motion of Particles, if all theſe effects are to be imputed to no higher Principles? We ſee in other Bodies, what different appearances are caus'd by a ſudden alteration of the Particles of the Matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out ſo in the things mention'd? Neither can this be unreaſonable to demand. 1. Becauſe the Motion of theſe Particles of Matter is caſual ſtill, according to them; and who knows what Chance may do? For the ſeminal Principles themſelves are, I ſuppoſe, according to them, of the ſame uniform Matter with the reſt of the World, and ſo are liable to different Motion and Configuration. 2. Becauſe all Particles of Matter are ſuppos'd to be in continual Motion, becauſe of that diſſeminated Vacuity which is preſum'd to be in the World, and becauſe a *Coacervate Vacuity* is not only aſſerted as poſſible, but as probably exiſtent: I aſſume only then (that which is inſiſted on as probable) *viz.* That that Space which lies between our *Atmoſphere* and the *Stars*, is empty of any other thing, but only the Rays of the *Stars* which paſs thro' it; I then ſuppoſing it a Vacuity, whether would not the Particles of thoſe Bodies which lie contiguous to that Space, preſently diſlodge from the Bodies wherein they are, and begin a new *Rendezvous* of *Atoms* there? For all *Atoms* are ſuppos'd to be in perpetual Motion; and the Cauſe aſſign'd, why in ſolid Bodies they do not fly away, is becauſe of the repercuſſion of other *Atoms*, that when they once begin to ſtir, they receive ſuch knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the Bodies contiguous to this Space; for both thoſe Bodies are more fluid, and ſo there is no ſuch knocking of Particles to keep them at reſt; but which is more, thoſe which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from Motion, and ſo thoſe Particles will neceſſarily remove into that empty Space, where there is no impediment of their Motion, and ſo the next *Atoms* to thoſe muſt remove, becauſe that Space wherein the other were, is made empty by their removal; and ſo the next, and ſo on, till not only the Air, but the whole Maſs of the

Earth will, on ſuppoſition of ſuch a Vacuity, be diſſolv'd into its firſt Particles, which will all mutiny in the ſeveral Bodies wherein they are, and never reſt till they come to that empty Space, where they may again *Rendezvous* together. So dangerous is the news of Liberty, or of an empty Space to theſe *Democratical* Particles of the Univerſe. Neither can I ſee how a diſſeminated Vacuity can ſalve the difficulty; for thoſe Particles of the moſt ſolid Bodies being in continual Motion, and the ground of their union being repercuſſion, it thence follows, that towards that part where the diſſeminated *vacuum* is, the Particles meeting with no ſuch ſtrokes may fairly take their leaves of the Bodies they are in, and ſo one ſucceed in the place of another, till the Configuration of the whole be alter'd, and conſequently different appearances and effects may be caus'd in the ſame Bodies, tho' it reſults from ſeminal Principles: So that according to the *Atomical* Principles, no rational Account can be given of thoſe Effects which are ſeen in Nature. This *Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 24.* *Dionyſius*, in *Euſebius*, urgeth againſt the *Atomiſts*, that from the ſame Principles, without evident reaſon given for it, they make of the ſame uniform Matter ſome things conſpicuous to Senſe, others not, ſome ſhort-liv'd, others extremely long-liv'd. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον μιᾶς οὔσης καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἁπασῶν οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, πλὴν τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὥς φασι, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων, τὰ μὲν ἔστι θεῖα καὶ ἀκήρατα καὶ αἰώνια, ὡς αὐτοὶ φήσαιεν ἂν, πύματα, ἢ μακραίωνά γε κατὰ τὸν οὕτως ὀνομάσαντα, φαινόμενά τε καὶ ἀφανῆ; *What ground can there be aſſign'd of ſo vaſt a difference between things, if they all be of the ſame Nature, and differ only in Size and Shape?* ſaith that excellent Perſon, who there, with a great deal of Eloquence, lays open the Folly of the *Atomical* Philoſophy, Θαυμαστή γε τῶν ἀτόμων, ἡ δημοκρατία δεξιουμένων τε ἀλλήλας τῶν φίλων καὶ περιπλεκομένων εἰς μίαν τε κατασκηνοῦν συνοικίαν ἐπειγομένων. *It is a rare Democracy of Atoms,* ſaith he, *where the friendly Atoms meet and embrace each other, and from thence forward live in the cloſeſt Society together.*

2. Not only the variety, but the *exact Order and Beauty of the World* is a thing unaccountable by the *Atomical Hypotheſis.* Were the whole World ſtill a *Heſiod*'s *Chaos* (from the conſideration of which *Diogenes* *Laer. l. 10.* *Laertius* tells us, *Epicurus* began to philoſophize) we might probably believe an Agitation of Particles (ſuppoſing Matter created) might ſettle it in ſuch a confus'd manner; but that there ſhould be nothing elſe but a blind *impetus* of *Atoms* to produce thoſe vaſt and moſt regular Motions of the heavenly Bodies, to order the paſſage of the *Sun* for ſo great conveniency of Nature, and for the alternate ſucceſſion of the Seaſons of the Year, which ſhould cut ſuch Channels for the *Ocean*, and keep that vaſt Body of the Water (whoſe Surface is higher than the Earth) from overflowing it, which ſhould furniſh the Earth with ſuch ſeminal and prolific Principles, as to provide Food and Nouriſhment for thoſe Animals which live upon it, and furniſh out every thing neceſſary for the Comfort and Delight of Man's Life; to believe, I ſay, that all theſe things came only from a blind and fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, is the moſt prodigious piece of Credulity and Folly that human Nature is ſubject to. But this part which concerns the Order and Beauty of the parts of the Univerſe, and the Argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous Principle, but an infinitely wiſe GOD, hath been ſo fully *D. H. More's Antidote againſt Atheiſm. part 2.* and judiciouſly handled by a Learned Perſon already, that I ſhall rather chooſe to refer the Reader to his Diſcourſe, than inſiſt any more upon it.

3. *The Production of Mankind* is a thing which the *Atomiſts* are moſt ſhamefully puzzled with, as well as the Formation of the internal parts of Man's Body, of which I have already ſpoken in the precedent Chapter. It would pity one to ſee what lamentable ſhifts the *Atomiſts* are put to, to find out a way for the Production of Mankind, *viz. That our teeming Mother the Earth at laſt caſt forth ſome kind of Bags like Wombs upon the Surface of the Earth, and theſe by degrees breaking, at laſt came out Children, which were nouriſh'd by a kind of Juice of the Earth like Milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be Men.* Oh what will not *Atheiſts* believe, rather than a DEITY and *Providence!* But leſt we ſhould ſeem to wrong the *Atomiſts*, hear what *Cenſorinus* ſaith of *Epicurus*; *Is enim credidit limo calefactos uteros neſcio quos radicibus terræ cohærentes, primum increviſſe, & infantibus, ex ſe editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura miniſtrante præbuiſſe; quos ita educatos & adultos, genus humanum propagâſſe.* But becauſe *Lucretius* may be thought to ſpeak more impartially in the caſe, how rarely doth he deſcribe it?

Cenſor. de die Nat. c. 2.

Creſcebant uteri terræ radicibus apti,
Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit ætas
Infantum, fugiens humorem, auraſque petiſſens,
Convertebat ibi natura foramina terræ,
Et ſuccum venis cogebat fundere apertis
Conſimilem lactis; ſicut nunc fœmina quæque
Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis
Impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti:
Terra cibum pueris, veſtem vapor, herba cubile
Præbebat, multa & molli lanugine abundans.

Had *Lucretius* been only a Poet, this might have paſs'd for a handſomely deſcrib'd Fable; but to deliver it for a piece of Philoſophy, makes it the greater Mythology: That Man's Body was form'd out of the Earth we believe, becauſe we have reaſon ſo to do; but that the Earth ſhould caſt forth ſuch *folliculi*, as he expreſſeth it, and then Men ſhould be brought up in ſuch a way as he deſcribes, deſerves a place among the moſt incredible and Poetic Fables. But if Poets muſt be credited, how much more like a Man did he ſpeak, who told us,

Natus homo eſt; ſive hunc divino ſemine fecit
Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris origo;
Sive recens tellus, ſeductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat ſemina cœli;
Quam ſatus Iapeto miſtam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Thus have we conſider'd the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, both as to the Principles on which it ſtands, and the ſutableneſs of it to the *Phænomena* of the Univerſe; and I ſuppoſe now there cannot be the leaſt ſhadow of Reaſon found from the *Atomical Philoſophy*, to make us at all queſtion that Account of the Origin of the Univerſe, which aſcribes it not to the fortuitous concourſe of *Atoms*, but to the infinite Wiſdom of a DEITY. I conclude then this Diſcourſe of the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*, with the words of *Automedon*, in the *Greek Epigram*.

Antholog. l. 1. c. 15.

Ταῦτ᾽ εἰδὼς σοφὸς ἴσθι, μάτην δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρον ἔασον
Ποῦ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν, καὶ τίνες αἱ μονάδες.

Learn to be wiſe ; let Epicurus *chaſe*
To find his Atoms, *and his empty Space.*

XVIII. I come now to the laſt *Hypotheſis* mention'd, which undertakes to give an account of the Origin of the Univerſe, *from the mere Mechanical Laws of Motion and Matter.* Which is the *Hypotheſis* of the late Famous *French* Philoſopher Mr. *Des-Cartes.* For altho' there be as much Reaſon as Charity to believe that he never intended his *Hypotheſis* as a foundation of *Atheiſm*, having made it ſo much his buſineſs to aſſert the Exiſtence of a Deity, and Immateriality of the Soul: yet becauſe it is apt to be abus'd to that end by Perſons *Atheiſtically* diſpos'd, becauſe of his aſcribing ſo much to the power of Matter ; we ſhall therefore ſo far conſider it, as it undertakes to give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a Deity. His *Hypotheſis* therefore is briefly this. He takes it for granted, that all the Matter of the World was at firſt of one Uniform Nature, diviſible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in Motion: from hence he ſuppoſeth, 1. *That all the Matter of which the Univerſe is compoſed, was at firſt divided into equal particles of an indifferent ſize, and that they had all ſuch a Motion as is now found in the World.* 2. *That all thoſe particles were not at firſt Sphærical, becauſe many ſuch little Globes joyn'd together will not fill up a continued Space, but that of whatever figure they were at firſt, they would by continual Motion become Sphærical, becauſe they would have various circular Motions ; for ſeeing that at firſt they were mov'd with ſo great force that one particle would be disjoyn'd from the other, the ſame force continuing would ſerve to cut off all angles which are ſuppos'd in them, by their frequent occurſions againſt each other ; and ſo when the angles were cut off, they would become Sphærical.* 3. *He ſuppoſeth that no Space is left empty, but when thoſe round particles being joyn'd, leave ſome intervals between them, there are ſome more ſubtile particles of Matter, which are ready to fill up thoſe void Spaces, which ariſe from thoſe angles which were cut off from the other particles to make them Sphærical ; which fragments of particles are ſo little, and acquire thereby ſuch a celerity of Motion, that by the force of that, they will be divided into innumerable little fragments, and ſo will fill up all thoſe Spaces which other particles could not enter in at.* 4. *That thoſe particles which fill up the intervals between the Sphærical ones, have not all of them the ſame celerity of Motion, becauſe ſome of them are more undivided than others are, which fill'd up the ſpace between three globular particles when their angles were cut off, and therefore thoſe particles muſt neceſſarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for Motion, and thence it comes to paſs that ſuch particles eaſily ſtick together, and transfer the greateſt part of their Motion upon thoſe other particles which are leſs, and therefore have a ſwifter motion ; and becauſe theſe particles are to paſs thro' ſuch triangular ſpaces which lie in the midſt of three globular particles touching each other, therefore he ſuppoſeth them as to their breadth and depth to be of a triangular figure ; but becauſe theſe particles are ſomewhat long, and the globular particles thro' which they paſs with ſo ſwift motion have their rotation about the poles of the Heavens, thence he ſuppoſes that thoſe triangular particles come*

Carteſii Princip. p. 3. Art. 46, &c.

to be wreathed. Now from theſe things being thus ſuppos'd, *Des Cartes* hath ingenuouſly and conſonantly to his Principles undertaken to give an Account of the moſt noted *Phænomena* of the World, and thoſe three ſorts of particles mention'd, he makes to be his three Elements. The *firſt* is that ſubtile Matter which was ſuppos'd to ariſe from the cutting off the angles of the greater particles; and of this he tells us the *Sun* and Fix'd *Stars* conſiſt, as thoſe particles of that ſubtile Matter being in continual motion have made thoſe ſeveral *vortices* or *Æthereal Whirlpools.* The *ſecond* Element conſiſts of the *Sphærical* particles themſelves, which make up the *Heavens*; out of the *third* Element, which are thoſe *Wreathed Particles*, he gives an Account of the Formation of the *Earth*, and *Planets*, and *Comets*; and from all of them, by the help of thoſe common Affections of Matter, Size, Figure, Motion, *&c.* he undertakes to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the World. How far his Principles do conduce to the giving Mens Minds ſatisfaction, as to the particular *Phænomena* of *Nature*, is not here our buſineſs to inquire, but only how far theſe Principles can give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a DEITY? And that it cannot give a ſatisfactory account how the World was fram'd without a *Deity*, appears by the two grand Suppoſitions on which all his Elements depend, both which cannot be from any other Principle but GOD. Thoſe are, 1. *The Exiſtence of Matter in the World*, which we have already prov'd cannot be independent on GOD, and neceſſarily exiſtent; and therefore ſuppoſing that Matter exiſtent and put into Motion, would grind it ſelf into thoſe ſeveral particles by him ſuppos'd, yet this cannot give an Account of the Origin of the Univerſe without a *Deity*. 2. *The motion of the particles of Matter ſuppoſeth a* Deity; for Matter is no ſelf-moving Principle, as hath been fully demonſtrated in ſeveral places by that judicious Philoſopher Dr. *H. More*, who plainly manifeſts that if Motion did neceſſarily belong to Matter, it were impoſſible there ſhould be *Sun*, or *Stars*, or *Earth*, or *Man* in the World; for the Matter being uniform, it muſt have equal Motion in all its particles, if Motion doth belong to it. For Motion being ſuppos'd to be natural and eſſential to Matter, muſt be alike every where in it, and therefore every particle muſt be ſuppos'd in motion to its utmoſt capacity, and ſo every particle is alike and mov'd alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in Bigneſs or Motion, it is manifeſt that this *Univerſal Matter*, to whom Motion is ſo eſſential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in Nature; for nothing could be caus'd by this thin and ſubtile Matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our Senſes: and what a ſtrange kind of viſible World would this be? From hence then it appears that there muſt be an infinitely powerful and wiſe GOD, who muſt both put Matter into Motion, and regulate the Motion of it, in order to the producing all thoſe varieties which appear in the World. And this neceſſity of the Motion of Matter by a power given it from GOD is freely acknowledg'd by Mr. *Des Cartes* himſelf in theſe words; *Conſidero materiam ſibi libere permiſſam, & nullum aliunde impulſum ſuſcipientem, ut plane quieſcentem; illa autem impellitur a Deo, tantundem motus ſive tranſlationis in ea conſervante quantum ab initio poſuit.* So that this great improver and diſcoverer of the Mechanical power of Matter, doth freely confeſs the neceſſity not only of GOD's giving Motion in order to the Origin of the Univerſe, but of his conſerving

Dr. *More* *Antidote* *b.* 2. *ch.* 1. Immortality of the Soul, *b.* 1. *c.* 11. *ſ.* 3. &c. *Ep.* 3. *ad Carteſ. p.* 88.

Carteſ. reſp. ad ep. 3. *H. Mori, p.* 104.

ving Motion in it for the upholding it: So that we need not fear from this *Hypotheſis* the excluding of a *Deity* from being the prime efficient cauſe of the World. All the Queſtion then is concerning the particular manner, which was us'd by God as the efficient cauſe in giving Being to the World. As to which I ſhall only in general ſuggeſt what *Maimonides* ſays of it. *Omnia ſimul creata erant, & poſtea ſucceſſive ab invicem ſeparata*; altho' I am ſomewhat inclinable to that of *Gaſſendus*, *Majus eſt mundus opus, quam ut aſſequi mens humana illius molitionem poſſit*: To which I think may be well apply'd that Speech of *Solomon*; *Then I beheld all the work of* God, *that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the Sun: becauſe tho' a man labour to ſeek it out, yea farther, tho' a wiſe man think to know it, yet ſhall he not be able to find it.*

Maimon. More Nev. l. 2. c. 30.
Gaſſendi Phyſic. ſ. 1. l. 7. c. 6.
Eccl. 8.17.

B.

160:1.H
26.2.7K

CHAP. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. Epicurus *his Arguments againſt it refuted. The neceſſity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence prov'd from a conſideration of the nature of* God, *and the things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great objections againſt Providence propounded. The firſt concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. God *cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of Man, doth not charge* God *with Man's fault.* God'*s power to govern Man by Laws, tho' he gives no particular reaſon of every poſitive Precept.* VI. *The reaſon of* God'*s creating Man with freedom of Will, largely ſhew'd from* Simplicius; *and the true account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. God'*s permitting the Fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil compar'd with that of Heathen Philoſophers.* IX. *The antiquity of the opinion of aſcribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the judgment of the* Perſians, Ægyptians, *and others about it.* X. *Of Manichæiſm.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV. *The opinion of the ancient Greek Philoſophers; of* Pythagoras, Plato, *the* Stoics; *the Origin of Evil not from the neceſſity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The remainders of the Hiſtory of the Fall among the Heathens.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the malignity of* Dæmons. XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the ſufferings of the good and impunity of bad Men. An account of both from Natural Light, manifeſted by* Seneca, Plutarch, *and others.*

I. IT being now manifeſted not only that there is a GOD, but that the World had its Being from Him; it thence follows by an eaſy and rational Deduction, that there is a particular Hand of Divine Providence, which upholds the World in its Being, and wiſely diſpoſeth all Events in it. For it is a moſt irrational and abſurd Opinion to aſſert a *Deity*, and deny *Providence:* and in nothing did *Epicurus* more diſcover the weakneſs and puerility of his judgment than in this. Indeed, if *Epicurus* had no other deſign in aſſerting a *Deity*, than (as many ancient Philoſophers imagin'd) to avoid the imputation of direct *Atheiſm*, and yet to take away all foundations of Religion; he muſt needs be ſaid to ſerve his *Hypotheſis* well, tho' he did aſſert the Being of an *Excellent Nature*, which he call'd GOD; while yet he made Him ſit as it were with his Elbows folded up in the Heavens, and taking no cognizance of Human actions. For he well knew, that if the belief of Divine Providence were once rooted out of Mens Minds, the thoughts of an *Excellent Being* above the Heavens, would have no more awe or power upon the Hearts and Lives of Men, than the telling Men that there are Jewels of ineſtimable value in the *Indies*, makes them more ready to pay Taxes to their Princes. For that Philoſopher could not be ignorant, that it is not Worth but Power, nor Speculation but Intereſt that rules the World. The poor Tenant more regards his petty Landlord, than the greateſt Prince in the World that hath nothing to do with him: and he thinks he hath great reaſon for it; for he neither fears puniſhment, nor hopes for reward from him; whereas his Landlord may diſpoſſeſs him of all he hath upon diſpleaſure, and may advantage him the moſt if he gains his favour: Suppoſing then that there were ſuch an *Excellent Being* in the World which was compleatly happy in Himſelf, and thought it an impairing of his happineſs to trouble Himſelf with an inſpection of the World; Religion might then be indeed deriv'd *à relegendo*, but not *à religando*; there might be ſome pleaſure in contemplating his Nature, but there could be no obligation to Obedience. So that *Epicurus* was the firſt founder of a kind of *Philoſophical Antinomianiſm*, placing all Religion in a Veneration of *the Deity*, purely for its own Excellency, without any ſuch mercenary Eye (as thoſe who ſerve GOD for their own ends, as they ſay are apt to have) to reward and puniſhment. And I much doubt that Good-woman whom the Story goes of, who in an *Enthuſiaſtic* poſture ran up and down the Streets with Emblems in her Hands, *Fire* in the one, as ſhe ſaid, to burn up *Heaven*, and *Water* in the other, to quench *Hell*, that Men might ſerve GOD purely for Himſelf, would, if ſhe had compaſs'd her deſign, ſoon have brought *Proſelytes* enough to *Epicurus*, and by burning *Heaven* would have burnt up the Cords of *Religion*, and in quenching *Hell* would have extinguiſh'd the Awe and Fear of a *Deity* in the World. Indeed the incomparable Excellency and Perfection which is in the *Divine Nature*, to Spirits advanc'd to a Noble and Generous height in Religion, makes them exceedingly value their Choice; while they diſregard whatever rivals with GOD for it; but were it not for thoſe Magnetical hooks of Obedience and Eternal Intereſt, there are few would be drawn to a due Conſideration of, much leſs a Delight in ſo Amiable and Excellent a Nature. And it is impoſſible to conceive, why GOD in the Revelation of his Will ſhould ever ſo much as mention a future puniſhment, or promiſe an eternal Reward, were not the Conſideration of theſe things the Sinews of *Religion*.

Diog. Laert. l. 10.

Max. Tyr. Diſſert. 29.

Cicero de Finib. l. 1. De Nat. Deor. l. 2. Plutarch. adverſ. Colot.

II. Which they whoſe deſign was to undermine the very Foundations on which all Religion was built, underſtood far better, than thoſe weak pretended advancers of Religion, who while in ſuch a way they pretend to advance it, do only blow it up. For if Men ought not to have an Eye and reſpect to their own future Condition, nor ſerve God on the account of his Power to make our Souls miſerable or happy, much leſs ought Men to ſerve God with any regard to his Providence, ſince the Matters which Providence is employ'd about in this World, are of infinitely leſs moment, than thoſe which concern our Future State. And if we have no Eye on Divine Providence in the exerciſe of Religion, we ſhall ſcarce be able to underſtand for what end God ſhould take ſo much care of Mankind, and manifeſt ſo much of his Goodneſs to them, were it not to quicken them in their ſearch after him, and excite them to the more cheerful Obedience to him. And when once we queſtion to what end God troubles himſelf with the World, we are come next Door to *Epicurus*, and may in few ſteps more delight in the Flowers of his Garden. For this was his ſtrongeſt Plea againſt Providence, that it was beneath the Majeſty and Excellency of the Divine Nature to ſtoop ſo low, and trouble himſelf ſo far, as to regard what was done on Earth. This being one of his *Ratæ Sententiæ*, or undoubted Maxims, τὸ μακάριον ϗ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, *The bleſſed and immortal Being, neither hath any Imployment himſelf, nor troubles himſelf with others.* Which as *Maximus Tyrius* well obſerves, is rather a deſcription of a *Sardanapalus*, than a Deity; nay, of a worſe than a *Sardanapalus*; for he in the midſt of all his Softneſs and Effeminacy wou'd yet entertain ſome Counſels for the ſafety and good of his Empire: But *Epicurus* his Deity is of ſo tender a nature, that the leaſt thought of Buſineſs wou'd quite ſpoil his Happineſs. This Opinion of *Epicurus* made the more raiſed-ſpirited Moraliſts ſo far contemn the unworthy Apprehenſions which he entertain'd of the Divine Nature, that they degraded him from the very title of a Philoſopher in it, and rank'd him beneath the moſt fabulous *Poets*, who had writ ſuch unworthy things of their Gods, as is evident by the Cenſures which *Tully*, *Plutarch*, and others, paſs upon him for this very Opinion. And they tell him, that ſome of their own Men were of a more noble and excellent Spirit than *Epicurus* his Deity, who abhorr'd Softneſs and Idleneſs, and made it their greateſt delight to do good to their Countries. But *Epicurus* muſt needs make his God of his own humour (the uſual flattery which Men bear to themſelves, to think that moſt excellent which they delight in moſt) as *Xenophanes* was wont to ſay, That if his Horſe were to deſcribe a God, it would be with a curl'd Main, a broad Cheſt, *&c.* and in every thing like himſelf. Had *Epicurus* himſelf ſo little of an *Athenian* in him, as not to make it ſome part of his delight to underſtand the Affairs of the World? Or at leaſt, did he take no pleaſure in the Walks of his famous Garden, nor to order his Trees, and ſet his Flowers, and contrive every thing for his own delight? Wou'd *Epicurus* then count this a part of his Happineſs? And is it inconſiſtent with the Happineſs of a Deity, to take notice of the World, and order all things in it for his own Glory? Muſt ſo excellent a Nature as God's was, by his own acknowledgment, be preſently tired with Buſineſs; when the more excellent any Nature is, the more active and vigorous it is, the more able to comprehend and diſpatch Matters of Moment with the leaſt diſturbance to it ſelf? Is it a pleaſure to a Nurſe to fill the Child with her Milk? Doth

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the Sun rejoice to help the World with his conſtant Light? And doth a Fountain murmur till it be deliver'd of its Streams, which may refreſh the Ground? And is it no delight to the Divine Nature to behold the effects of his Goodneſs upon the World? We ſee here then the Foundation on which *Epicurus* went, *viz.* that his God muſt be like himſelf, or there muſt be none; and truly he might more ſutably to his Principles, queſtion his Exiſtence, than ſuppoſing his Exiſtence, deny his Providence on ſuch miſerable Accounts as theſe are, which yet are the chief which either *Epicurus* or *Lucretius* cou'd bring againſt it, from the conſideration of the Divine Nature.

III. The which to any one who conſiders it, doth neceſſarily infer a peculiar Eye and Hand of Providence in the World. For can we imagine, that a Being of Infinite Knowledg ſhou'd be ignorant of what is done in the World? And of Infinite Power, ſhou'd ſtand by and leave things to Chance and Fortune? Which were at firſt contriv'd and brought into Being by the contrivance of his Wiſdom, and exerciſe of his Power. And where the foundation of Exiſtence lies wholly and ſolely in the power of an infinite Being producing, the ground of continuance of that Exiſtence muſt lie in the ſame Power conſerving. When Men indeed effect any thing, the work may continue, whatever become of him that did it; but the reaſon of that is, becauſe what Man doth, is out of Matter already exiſtent, and his work is only ſetting Materials together: But now what God effects, he abſolutely gives a Being to, and therefore its duration depends on his Conſervation. What is once in its Being, I grant, will continue till ſome greater force than it ſelf put it out of Being; but withal I add, that God's withdrawing his Conſervation is ſo great a force, as muſt needs put that Being which had its Exiſtence from his Power, out of the condition it was in by it. The light of the Sun continues in the Air; and as long as the Sun communicates it, nothing can extinguiſh the Light, but what will put out the Sun: But cou'd we ſuppoſe the Sun to withdraw his Beams, what becomes of the Light then? This is the caſe of all Beings, which come from an infinite Power; their Subſiſtence depends on a continual Emanation of the ſame Power which gave them Being; and when once this is withdrawn, all thoſe Beings which were produced by this Power muſt needs relapſe into nothing. Beſides, what dependence is there upon each other, in the moments of Duration of any created Being? The Mode of Exiſtence in a Creature is but contingent and poſſible, and nothing is imply'd in the Notion of an exiſtent Creature, beyond mere poſſibility of Exiſtence; what is it then which gives actual Exiſtence to it? That cannot be it ſelf, for it wou'd be neceſſarily exiſtent: If another then gives Exiſtence, this Exiſtence muſt wholly depend upon him who gave it; for nothing can continue Exiſtence to it ſelf, but what may give it to it ſelf, (for it gives it for the Moment it continues it) and what gives Exiſtence to it ſelf, muſt neceſſarily exiſt, which is repugnant to the very Notion of a created Being: So that either we muſt deny a poſſibility of Non-exiſtence, or Annihilation in a Creature, which follows upon neceſſity of Exiſtence; or elſe we muſt aſſert, that the duration or continuance of a Creature in its Being, doth immediately depend on Divine Providence and Conſervation, which is with as much reaſon as frequency ſaid to be a continu'd Creation. But yet farther: Was an infinite Wiſdom and Power neceſſary to put things into that Order they are in: And is not the ſame neceſſary for the governing of them? I cannot ſee any reaſon to think, that the Power of Matter when ſet in Motion, ſhou'd either bring things into that exquiſite order and dependence which the parts of the World have upon each other; much leſs that by the mere force of that firſt Motion, all things ſhou'd continue in the ſtate they are in. Perpetual Motion is yet one of the *deſiderata* of the World; the moſt exquiſite *Mechaniſm* cannot put an Engine beyond the neceſſity of being look'd after: Can we then think this dull, unactive Matter, merely by the force of its firſt Motion, ſhou'd be able ſtill to produce the effects which are ſeen in the World, and to keep it from tumbling, at leaſt by degrees, into its priſtine *Chaos*? It was an infinite Power, I grant, which gave that firſt Motion; but that it gave Power to continue that Motion till the Conflagration of the World, remains yet to be prov'd. Some therefore, finding that in the preſent ſtate of the World, Matter will not ſerve for all the noted and common *Phænomena* of the World, have call'd in the help of a Spirit of Nature, which may ſerve inſtead of a Man-midwife to Matter, to help her in her Production of Things. Or, as tho' GOD had a plurality of Worlds to look after, they have taken care to ſubſtitute him a Vicar in this, which is the Spirit of Nature. But we had rather believe GOD himſelf to be perpetually reſident in the World, and that the Power which gives Life, and Being, and Motion to every thing in the World, is nothing elſe but his own Providence; eſpecially ſince we have learnt from himſelf, that it is *in him we live, and move, and have our being.* Acts xvii. 28.

IV. Thus then we ſee a neceſſity of aſſerting Divine Providence, whether we conſider the Divine Nature, or the *Phænomena* of the World; but yet the caſe is not ſo clear but that there are two grand Objections behind, which have been the continual exerciſe of the Wits of inquiſitive Men almoſt in all Ages of the World. The one concerns the firſt Origin of Evil; the other concerns the Diſpenſations of Providence, whence it comes to paſs, that good Men fare ſo hard in the World, when the bad triumph and flouriſh. If theſe two can be clear'd with any ſatisfaction to Reaſon, it will be the higheſt vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures, which give us ſuch clear light and direction in theſe profound Speculations, which the dim Reaſon of Man was ſo much to ſeek in.

I begin with the Origin of Evil; for, if there be a Hand of Providence which orders all things in the World, how comes Evil then into it, without GOD's being the Author of it? Which is a Speculation of as great depth as Neceſſity, it highly concerning us to entertain the higheſt apprehenſions of GOD's Holineſs, and how far he is from being the Author of Sin: And it is likewiſe a Matter of ſome difficulty ſo to explain the Origin of Evil, as to make it appear that GOD is not the Author of it. I eaſily then aſſent to what *Origen* ſaith on this ſubject, when *Celſus*, upon ſome miſtaken places of Scripture, had charg'd the Scripture with laying the Origin of Evil upon GOD; εἴπερ οὖν ἄλλος τις τόπος τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐξετάσεως δεόμενος, δυσθήρατός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ταχθείν ἂν γένεσις. *If any thing which calls for our inquiry be of difficult inveſtigation, that which concerns the Origin of Evils is ſuch a thing*; and as *Simplicius* well begins his Diſcourſe on this Subject; περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῶν κακῶν ὁ λόγος μὴ καλῶς διορθωθεὶς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβείας αἴτιος γέγονε, καὶ τῆς τῶν ἠθῶν διαγωγίας τὰς ἀρχὰς διετάραξε, καὶ πολλαῖς καὶ ἀλύτοις ἀπορίαις ἐνέβαλε τοὺς μὴ καλῶς αἰτιολογοῦντας αὐτήν. *The diſpute concerning the Nature and Origin of Evil, not being well ſtated, is the cauſe of great Impiety towards*

Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. p. 207.

Simplic. in Epictet. c. 34.

wards God, and perverts the principles of good Life, and involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational account of it. So much then is it our great concernment to fix on ſure grounds in the reſolution of this important queſtion; in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intricacies of it, as it relates to any internal purpoſes of God's Will, (which is beyond our preſent ſcope) but I ſhall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the firſt Man. For the clearing of which I ſhall proceed in this method:

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.*
2. *That the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of Evil, doth not charge it upon God.*
3. *That no account given by Philoſophers of the origin of Evil, is ſo clear and rational as this is.*
4. *That the moſt material circumſtances of this account are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves.*

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.* For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without Heſitation to yield our aſſent to them in their plain and direct affirmations; and there can be no ground of ſuſpending aſſent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth, but the want of certain Evidence, whether it be of Divine Revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the moſt effectual ways to put an end to the numerous controverſies of the Chriſtian World (eſpecially to thoſe bold diſputes concerning the method and order of God's Decrees) if the plain and undoubted aſſertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard, whereby we ought to judg of ſuch things as are more obſcure and ambiguous. And cou'd Men but reſt contented with thoſe things which concern their eternal Happineſs, and the means in order to it (which on that account are written with all imaginable perſpicuity in Scripture) and the moment of all other Controverſies be judg'd by their reference to theſe, there wou'd be fewer Controverſies and more Chriſtians in the World. Now there are two grand Principles which concern Mens eternal Condition, of which we have the greateſt certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with ſafety rely, without perplexing our Minds about thoſe more nice and ſubtile Speculations (which it may be are uncapable of all full and particular reſolution) and thoſe are, *That the ruin and deſtruction of Man is wholly from himſelf*; and, *That his ſalvation is from God alone.* If then Man's ruin and miſery be from himſelf; which the Scripture doth ſo much inculcate on all occaſions; then without controverſy that which is the cauſe of all the miſery of Human Nature, is wholly from himſelf too, which is, Sin. So that if the main ſcope and deſign of the Scripture be true, God cannot be the Author of that, by which (without the intervention of the Mercy of God) Man's miſery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what Authority and Majeſty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of Sin? With what earneſtneſs and importunity doth he wooe the Sinner to forſake his ſin? With what loathing and deteſtation doth he mention Sin? With what juſtice and ſeverity doth he puniſh Sin? With what wrath and indignation doth he threaten Contumacious Sinners? And is it poſſible, (after all this and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to expreſs the Holineſs of God's Nature, his hatred of Sin, and his appointing a day of Judgment for the ſolemn puniſhment of Sinners) to imagin that the Scriptures do in the leaſt aſcribe

the Origin of Evil to God, or make him the Author of Sin? *Shall not the Judg of all the world do right?* will a God of infinite Juſtice, Purity, and Holineſs, puniſh the Sinner for that which himſelf was the cauſe of? Far be ſuch unworthy thoughts from our Apprehenſions of a *Deity*, much more of that God whom we believe to have declar'd his Mind ſo much to the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together.

Taking it then for granted in the general, that God cannot be the Author of Sin, we come to inquire, *Whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil, doth any way charge it upon God?* There are only two ways, according to the Hiſtory of the fall of Man recorded in Scripture, whereby Men may have any ground to queſtion whether God were the cauſe of Man's fall; either *firſt*, by the giving him that poſitive Law, which was the occaſion of his fall; or *ſecondly*, by leaving him to the liberty of his own Will. *Firſt*, The giving of that poſitive Law cannot be the leaſt ground of laying Man's fault on God; becauſe, 1. It was moſt ſuitable to the nature of a rational Creature to be govern'd by Laws, or declarations of the Will of his Maker: for conſidering Man as a free Agent, there can be no way imagin'd ſo conſonant to the nature of Man as this was, becauſe thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of Reward and Puniſhment, and acting in the conſideration of them, there muſt be a declaration of the Will of the Law-giver, according to which Man may expect either his Reward or Puniſhment. If it were ſuitable to God's nature to promiſe Life to Man upon Obedience, it was not unſutable to it to expect Obedience to every declaration of his Will; conſidering the abſolute Sovereignty and Dominion which God had over Man as being his Creature, and the indiſpenſable Obligation which was in the nature of Man to obey whatever his Maker did command him. So that God had full and abſolute Right to require from Man, what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive, how there ſhou'd be a Teſtimony of Man's Obedience towards his Creator, without ſome declaration of his Creator's Will. *Secondly*, God had full Power and Authority, not only to govern Man by Laws, but to determin Man's general obligation to Obedience to that particular poſitive Precept by the breach of which Man fell. If God's power over Man was univerſal and unlimited, what reaſon can there be to imagin it ſhou'd not extend to ſuch a poſitive Law? Was it, becauſe the matter of this Law ſeem'd too low for God to command his Creature? But whatever the matter of the Law was, Obedience to God was the great end of it, which Man had teſtify'd as much in that Inſtance of it as in any other whatſoever; and in the violation of it were imply'd the higheſt aggravations of Diſobedience; for God's Power and Authority were as much contemned, his Goodneſs ſlighted, his Truth and Faithfulneſs queſtion'd, his Name diſhonour'd, his Majeſty affronted in the breach of that, as of any other Law whatſoever it had been. If the Law were eaſie to be obſerv'd, the greater was the Sin of Diſobedience; if the weight of the matter was not ſo great in it ſelf, yet God's Authority added the greateſt weight to it; and the ground of Obedience is not to be fetch'd from the nature of the thing required, but from the Authority of the Legiſlator. Or was it then becauſe God conceal'd from Man his Counſel in giving of that poſitive Precept? Hath not then a Legiſlator power to require any thing, but what he ſatisfies every one of his reaſon in commanding it? If ſo, what becomes of Obedience and Subjection? It will be impoſſible to make any probative Precepts on this account; and the Legiſlator muſt be charg'd with the Diſobedience of his Subjects, where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires: which as it concerns Human Legiſlators (who have not that abſolute Power and Authority which God hath) is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general Senſe of the World. This *Plutarch* gives a good account of, when he diſcourſeth ſo rationally of the Sobriety which Men ought to uſe in their inquiries into the grounds and reaſons of God's Actions; *For*, ſaith he, *Phyſicians will give preſcriptions without giving the Patient a particular reaſon of every circumſtance in them:* οὐδὲ γὰρ οὓς ἄνθρωποι νόμους τίθενται, τὸ εὔλογον ἁπλῶς ἔχουσι καὶ πάντοτε φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐνίων καὶ δοκεῖ κομιδῆ γελοῖα τῶν προσταγμάτων. *Neither have Human Laws always apparent reaſon for them, nay ſome of them, are to appearance ridiculous*; for which he inſtanceth in that Law of the *Lacedæmonian Ephori*, μὴ τρέφειν μύστακα, to which no other reaſon was annex'd but this, καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ὡς μὴ χαλεποὶ ὦσιν αὐτοῖς: *They commanded every Magiſtrate at the entrance of his Office to ſhave himſelf, and gave this reaſon for it, that they might learn to obey Laws themſelves.* He farther inſtanceth, in the *Roman* Cuſtom of *Manumiſſion*, their Laws about Teſtaments, *Solon*'s Law againſt Neutrality in Seditions, and concludes thence, καὶ ὅλως πολλὰς ἂν τις ἐξεύροι νόμων ἀτοπίας, μήτε τὸν λόγον ἔχων τοῦ νομοθέτου, μήτε τὴν αἰτίαν συνιεὶς ἑκάστου τῶν γραφομένων. *Any one would eaſily find many Abſurdities in Laws, who doth not conſider the intention of the Legiſlator, or the ground of what he requires.* Τί δὴ θαυμαστὸν, ſaith he, εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὕτως ἡμῖν ὄντων δυσθεωρήτων, οὐκ εὔπορόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τῶν θεῶν εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τινι λόγῳ τοὺς μὲν ὕστερον, τοὺς δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων κολάζουσιν· *What wonder is it, if we are ſo puzled to give an account of the Actions of Men, that we ſhou'd be to ſeek as to thoſe of the Deity?* This cannot be then any ground on the account of mere reaſon, to lay the charge of Man's Diſobedience upon God, becauſe he requir'd from him the obſervance of that poſitive command of not eating of the *forbidden Fruit*.

Plutarch. de his qui ſero puniuntur à numine.

VI. The only thing then left, is, *whether God be not liable to this charge as he left Man to the liberty of his Will:* And that may be grounded on two things; *either that God did not create Man in ſuch a condition, in which it had been impoſſible for him to have ſinned; or that knowing his temptation he did not give him power to reſiſt it.* If neither of theſe will lay any imputation of the Origin of Evil upon God, then God will appear to be wholly free from it. *Firſt, concerning Man's being created a free Agent*; if the determination of the Schools be good, that poſſibility of Sinning is imply'd in the very notion of a Creature; and conſequently that impeccability is repugnant to the nature of a created Being; then we ſee a neceſſary reaſon, why Man was created in a ſtate of Liberty: but endeavouring to ſhew that the grounds of our Religion are not repugnant to natural Reaſon, I ſhall rather make uſe of the Teſtimony of ſuch who profeſs'd to be Followers of nothing elſe but Reaſon and Philoſophy. Among whom I ſhall make choice of *Simplicius* both for the Reaſon he produceth, and becauſe he is fartheſt from any ſuſpicion of partiality, by reaſon of his known oppoſition to the *Moſaic* Hiſtory of the Creation. He then in his *Commentaries* on *Epictetus* profeſſedly diſputes this very ſubject of the Origin of Evil, and after having rejected that fond Opinion of two Principles, one of Good, and the

Vid. Thom. 1. p. q. 63. art. 1. Eſtium in ſentent. l. 2. diſt. 7. ſect. 9.

Simplic. Com. in Epict. c. 34. p. 175.

the other of Evil, undertakes to give an account whence Evil came into the World; which becauſe it tends ſo much to the illuſtrating our preſent ſubject, I ſhall give an account of. GOD, ſaith he, *who is the fountain and principle of all Good, not only produced things which were in themſelves good, nor only thoſe things which were of a middle nature, but the extremes too, which were ſuch things which were apt to be perverted from that which is according to nature, to that which we call Evil. And that after thoſe Bodies which were* (as he ſuppoſeth) *incorruptible, others were produced which are ſubject to Mutation and Corruption; and ſo after thoſe Souls which were immutably fixed in Good, others were produced which were liable to be perverted from it; that ſo the riches of* GOD*'s goodneſs might be diſplay'd in making to exiſt all Beings which are capable of it; and that the Univerſe might be perfect in having all ſorts of Beings in it. Now,* he ſuppoſeth *that all thoſe Beings which are above this ſublunary World are ſuch as are immutably good, and that the loweſt ſort of Beings which are liable to be perverted to Evil, are ſuch which are here below. Therefore,* ſaith he, *the Soul being of a more noble and immutable Nature, while it is by it ſelf, doth not partake of Evil; but it being of a nature apt to be joined with theſe Terreſtrial Bodies (by the Providence of the Author of the Univerſe, who produced ſuch ſouls, that ſo both extremes might be joyned by the Bonds of vital Union) thereby it becomes ſenſible of thoſe Evils and Pains which the Body is ſubject to; but theſe things are not properly Evils but rather Good, conſidering our Terreſtrial Bodies as parts of the Univerſe which is upheld by the changes and viciſſitudes which are in this lower World:* Which he largely diſcourſes on to ſhew that thoſe particular alterations which are in Bodies, do conduce rather to the perfection and beauty of the Univerſe, than are any real Evils in it. *But now,* ſaith he, *for the Origin of thoſe things which are properly Evils,* viz. *Moral Evils, which are* τὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς πταίσματα, *the lapſes and errors of the Human ſoul, we are to conſider, that there are ſouls of a more excellent nature than ours are, which are immutably good; and the ſouls of Brutes are of a lower kind than ours are, and yet are middle between the rational and vegetative, having ſomething in them parallel both to the Appetites and Evils which are in Men, which will therefore be un-*

Ibid. p. 108. ed. Salmaſ. *derſtood by an account of the other.* Ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, μέση προελθοῦσα τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἄνω μενουσῶν ψυχῶν, διά τε τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχικῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀκρότητα, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ μέθεξιν, καὶ τῶν ἀεὶ κάτω διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συγγένειαν τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς, καὶ σύνδεσμος ζωτικὸς γινομένη τῶν τε ἄνω καὶ τῶν κάτω, διὰ τῆς αὐτεξουσίου σχέσεως, ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοιοῦται). *The Soul of Man is nexus utriuſque mundi, in the middle between thoſe more excellent Beings which perpetually remain above, with which it partakes in the ſublimity of its Nature and Underſtanding, and thoſe inferior Terreſtrial Beings with which it communicates thro' the vital Union which it hath with the Body, and by reaſon of that freedom and indifferency which it hath, it ſometimes is aſſimilated to the one, ſometimes to the other of theſe extremes. So that while it aproacheth to the nature of the ſuperior Beings, it keeps it ſelf free from Evil, but becauſe of its freedom it may ſometimes ſink down into theſe lower things,* and ſo he calls *the cauſe of all evil in the Soul* τὴν αὐτοθελῆ κάθοδον εἰς τόνδε θνητὸν τόπον, *its voluntary deſcent into this lower World*, and immerſing it ſelf in the *feculency of Terreſtrial Matter*, Κἂν φύσιν δὲ ἀμφίβολον ἔλαχεν, οὐκ ἀναγκαζομένη κάτεισιν ἢ ἄνεισιν ἀλλ' οὕτως ὑπέστη, ὡς ὅταν αὐτὴ θέλῃ κατιέναι τε καὶ ἀνιέναι. *For tho' the Soul be of a kind of Amphibious Nature, yet it is not forced either upwards or downwards, but acts either way ac-*

cording to its internal liberty. But, ſaith he, *while the rational ſoul keeps that power which it hath in its hands over the Body, and makes uſe of it only as an inſtrument for its own good, ſo long it keeps pure and free from any ſtain of evil; but when it once forgets the ſimilitude it hath with the more excellent Being, and throws away the Scepter of its power, and drowns it ſelf in the Body and Brutiſh Affections (preferring the pleaſure of Senſe above that of Reaſon) when it ſo far degenerates below the principles of Reaſon, that inſtead of commanding the Brutiſh Faculties it becomes a ſlave to them, then it conceives and brings forth evil; but this it doth not thro' any coaction or neceſſity, but thro' the abuſe of that power and liberty which it hath: For the choice is a proper action of the Soul it ſelf: which he proves from hence, becauſe* God, *and the Laws, and all good Men, do not meaſure the good and evil of Actions ſo much by the event, as by the will and intention of the Perſon; and that Puniſhment and Reward have chiefly a reſpect to thoſe. And therefore Men are pardoned for what they do out of conſtraint and force, and the fault is aſcribed,* οὐ τῷ πράττοντι ἀλλὰ βιαζομένῳ, *not to him that did it, but to him that forced him to the doing of it.* And ſo from hence he concludes, *That becauſe of the freedom of the Will of Man, nothing elſe can be ſaid to be the Author of Evil properly, but the Soul of Man*; and concludes that Diſcourſe with this excellent Speech, Ἔχοντες οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κακοῦ, λαμπρᾷ τε φωνῇ βοῶμεν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς κακίας ἀναίτιος, διότι τὸ κακὸν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνεργεῖ αὐτεξουσίως, καὶ οὐχ ὁ Θεός· εἰ μὲν γὰρ βίᾳ τὸ κακὸν ἔπραττεν ἡ ψυχή. τάχα ἄν τις τὸν Θεὸν ᾐτιάσατο τὸν ἀναιτίως αὐτὴν συγχωρήσαντα βιασθῆναι, καί τοι οὐδὲ κακὸν ἦν τὸ βίᾳ πραττόμενον· κατὰ δὲ προαίρεσιν αὐτὸ αἱρουμένη αὐτὴ ἂν αἰτία λέγοιτο δικαίως. *Having thus found out the true origin of Evil, let us cry out with a loud voice, that* God *is not the Author of Sin, becauſe the Soul freely doth that which is evil, and not* God; *for if the Soul were forced to do what it doth, one might juſtly lay the blame on* God, *who permits ſuch a force to be offer'd it, neither could it be properly evil which the Soul was conſtrained to; but ſince it acted freely, out of choice, the Soul muſt alone be accounted the Author and Cauſe of Evil.* Thus we ſee that God cannot with any ſhadow of Reaſon be accounted the Author of Evil, becauſe he gave the Soul of Man a principle of internal freedom, when the very freedom of acting which the Soul had, put it into a capacity of ſtanding as well as falling. And certainly, he can never be ſaid to be the cauſe of the breaking of a Perſon, who gave him a ſtock to ſet up with, and ſuppos'd him able to manage it when he gave it him. Indeed had not Man had this freedom of Will, he could not have fallen; but then neither had he been a rational Agent, which ſuppoſing no corruption, doth ſpeak freedom of Action. So that while we enquire after the origin of Evil we have no other cauſe to aſſign it to, but Man's abuſe of that free power of acting which he had: but if we will be ſo curious as to inquire farther, why God did create Man with a freedom of Will, and not rather fix his Soul immutably on Good; if the order of Beings be no ſatisfactory Reaſon for it, we can give no other than that why he made Man, or the World at all, which was the good pleaſure of his Will.

VII. But ſecondly, *Suppoſing* God's *giving Man this freedom of Will, doth not entitle him to be the Author of Evil*; doth not his leaving Man to this liberty of his in the Temptation, make him the cauſe of Sin? I anſwer no, and that on theſe accounts.

1. *Becauſe Man ſtood then upon ſuch terms, that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary Act:* He had a power to ſtand, in that there

was no principle of Corruption at all in his Faculties, but he had a pure and undefil'd Soul, which could not be polluted without its own conſent: Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which Man ſtood (which were the tryal of his Obedience to his Creator) had he been irreſiſtibly determin'd any way. *Simplicius* puts this queſtion after the former diſcourſe, *Whether* God *may be called the Author of ſin, becauſe he permits the Soul to uſe her liberty?* But, ſaith he, *he that ſays* God *ſhould not have permitted this uſe of its freedom to the Soul, muſt ſay one of theſe two things; either that the Soul being of ſuch a Nature as is indifferent to Good or Evil, it ſhould have been wholly kept from the chooſing Evil, or elſe that it ſhould have been made of ſuch a Nature that it ſhould not have had a power of chooſing Evil. The firſt is irrational and abſurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been, where there was no choice? And what choice could there have been, where the Mind was neceſſitated only to one part? For the ſecond we are to conſider,* ſaith he, *that no Evil is in it ſelf deſirable, or to be choſen; but withal, if this power of determining it ſelf either way muſt be taken away, it muſt be either as ſomething not Good, or as ſome great Evil; and whoever ſaith ſo, doth not conſider, how many things in the World there are, which are accounted good and deſirable Things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will. For it excels all ſublunary Beings; and there is none would rather deſire to be a Brute or Plant than Man; if* God *then ſhew'd his goodneſs in giving to inferior Beings ſuch Perfections which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to* God's *Nature and Goodneſs, to give Man the freedom of his Actions, and a ſelf-determining power, tho' he permitted him the free uſe of it? Beſides,* as that Author reaſons, *had* God, *to prevent Man's ſin, taken away the liberty of his Will, he had likewiſe deſtroyed the Foundation of all Vertue, and the very Nature of Man; for Vertue would not have been ſuch, had there been no poſſibility of acting contrary; and Man's Nature would have been Divine, becauſe impeccable. Therefore,* ſaith he, *tho' we attribute this ſelf-determining Power to* God *as the Author of it, which was ſo neceſſary in the order of the Univerſe, we have no reaſon to attribute the Origin of that Evil to* God, *which comes by the abuſe of that Liberty. For,* as he farther adds, God *doth not at all cauſe that Averſion from Good, which is in the Soul when it ſins, but only gave ſuch a Power to the Soul, whereby it might turn it ſelf to Evil, out of which* God *might afterwards produce ſo much Good, which could not otherwiſe have been without it.* So conſonantly to the Scripture doth that Philoſopher ſpeak on this ſubject.

Simplic. in Epictet. p.186, 187.

2. God *cannot be ſaid to be the Author of Sin, tho' he did not prevent the Fall of Man, becauſe he did not withdraw before his Fall, any Grace or Aſſiſtance, which was neceſſary for his ſtanding.* Had there been indeed a neceſſity of ſupernatural Grace, to be communicated to Man for every Moment, to continue him in his Innocency; and had God before Man's Fall, withdrawn ſuch Aſſiſtance from him, without which it were impoſſible for him to have ſtood, it would be very difficult freeing God from being the Cauſe of the Fall of Man. But we are not put to ſuch difficulties for acquitting God from being the Author of Sin; for there appears no neceſſity at all for aſſerting any diſtinction of ſufficient and efficacious Grace in Man before his Fall; that the one ſhould belong only to a radical Power of ſtanding, the other to every Act of good which *Adam* did: For if God *made Man upright,* he certainly gave him ſuch a Power as might be brought into Act without the neceſ-

ſity of any ſupervenient Act of Grace, to elicite that habitual Power into particular Actions. If the other were ſufficient, it was ſufficient for its end; and how could it be ſufficient for its end, if notwithſtanding that, there were no poſſibility of ſtanding, unleſs efficacious help were ſuperadded to it? God would not certainly require any thing from the Creature in his Integrity, but what he had a Power to obey; and if there were neceſſary farther Grace to bring the Power into Act, the ſubtracting of this Grace muſt be by way of Puniſhment to Man, which it is hard to conceive for what it ſhould be, before Man had ſinned, or elſe God muſt ſubtract this Grace on purpoſe that Man might fall; which would neceſſarily follow on this Suppoſition, in which caſe Man would be neceſſitated to fall, *Veluti cum ſubductis columnis domus neceſſario corruit*, as one expreſſeth it, *As a Houſe muſt needs fall, when the Pillars on which it ſtood are taken away from it.* But now if God withdrew not any effectual Grace from Man, whereby he muſt neceſſarily fall, then tho' God permit Man to uſe his Liberty, yet he cannot be ſaid to be any ways the Author of Evil, becauſe Man had ſtill a *poſſe ſi vellet*, a Power of ſtanding, if he had made right uſe of his Liberty: And God never took from Man his *Adjutorium quo potuit ſtare, & ſine quo non potuit*, as *Divines* call it, Man enjoying ſtill his Power, tho' by the abuſe of his Liberty he fell into Sin: So that granting God to leave Man to the uſe of his Liberty, yet we ſee God cannot in the leaſt be charg'd with being the Author of Sin, or the Origin of Evil, by the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man in Scripture: Which was the thing to be clear'd.

VIII. We come now in the third place, to compare that account given of the Origin of Evil in Scripture, with that which was embrac'd by Heathen Philoſophers, in point of Reaſon and Evidence. There was no one inquiry whatſoever, in which thoſe who had nothing but natural Light to guide them, were more to ſeek for ſatisfaction in, than this concerning the Origin of Evil. They ſaw by continual Experience, how great a Torrent of both ſorts of Evils, of Sin and Puniſhment, did overflow the World; but they were like the *Egyptians*, who had ſufficient evidence of the overflowing their Banks by the River *Nile*, but could not find out the Spring or the Head of it. The reaſon was, as Corruption increas'd in the World, ſo the means of Inſtruction and Knowledg decay'd; and ſo as the *Phænomena* grew greater, the reaſon of them was leſs underſtood; the knowledg of the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, thro' which they could alone come to the full underſtanding of the true cauſe of Evil, inſenſibly decaying in the ſeveral Nations: Inſomuch, that thoſe who are not at all acquainted with that Hiſtory of the World, which was preſerv'd in Sacred Records among the *Jews*, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and ſome kind of obſcure Traditions which were preſerv'd among them; which while they ſought to rectify by their Interpretations, they made them more obſcure and falſe than they found them. They were certain of nothing, but that Mankind was in a low and degenerate Condition, and ſubject to continual Miſeries and Calamities; they who cry'd up the moſt the αὐτεξούσιον, or the Self-determining Power of the Soul, could not certainly but ſtrangely wonder, that a Principle indifferent to be carry'd either way, ſhould be ſo almoſt fatally inclin'd to the worſt of them. It was very ſtrange, that ſince Reaſon ought to have the command of Paſſions, by their own acknowledgment, the Brutiſh part of

Simplic. in *Epictet.* p.186, 187.

was no principle of Corruption at all in his Faculties, but he had a pure and undefil'd Soul, which could not be polluted without its own conſent: Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which Man ſtood (which were the tryal of his Obedience to his Creator) had he been irreſiſtibly determin'd any way. *Simplicius* puts this queſtion after the former diſcourſe, *Whether* God *may be called the Author of ſin, becauſe he permits the Soul to uſe her liberty? But,* ſaith he, *he that ſays* God *ſhould not have permitted this uſe of its freedom to the Soul, muſt ſay one of theſe two things; either that the Soul being of ſuch a Nature as is indifferent to Good or Evil, it ſhould have been wholly kept from the chooſing Evil, or elſe that it ſhould have been made of ſuch a Nature that it ſhould not have had a power of chooſing Evil. The firſt is irrational and abſurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been, where there was no choice? And what choice could there have been, where the Mind was neceſſitated only to one part? For the ſecond we are to conſider,* ſaith he, *that no Evil is in it ſelf deſirable, or to be choſen; but withal, if this power of determining it ſelf either way muſt be taken away, it muſt be either as ſomething not Good, or as ſome great Evil; and whoever ſaith ſo, doth not conſider, how many things in the World there are, which are accounted good and deſirable Things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will. For it excels all ſublunary Beings; and there is none would rather deſire to be a Brute or Plant than Man; if* God *then ſhew'd his goodneſs in giving to inferior Beings ſuch Perfections which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to* God's *Nature and Goodneſs, to give Man the freedom of his Actions, and a ſelf-determining power, tho' he permitted him the free uſe of it? Beſides,* as that Author reaſons, *had* God, *to prevent Man's ſin, taken away the liberty of his Will, he had likewiſe deſtroyed the Foundation of all Vertue, and the very Nature of Man; for Vertue would not have been ſuch, had there been no poſſibility of acting contrary; and Man's Nature would have been Divine, becauſe impeccable. Therefore,* ſaith he, *tho' we attribute this ſelf-determining Power to* God *as the Author of it, which was ſo neceſſary in the order of the Univerſe, we have no reaſon to attribute the Origin of that Evil to* God, *which comes by the abuſe of that Liberty. For,* as he farther adds, God *doth not at all cauſe that Averſion from Good, which is in the Soul when it ſins, but only gave ſuch a Power to the Soul, whereby it might turn it ſelf to Evil, out of which* God *might afterwards produce ſo much Good, which could not otherwiſe have been without it.* So conſonantly to the Scripture doth that Philoſopher ſpeak on this ſubject.

2. God *cannot be ſaid to be the Author of Sin, tho' he did not prevent the Fall of Man, becauſe he did not withdraw before his Fall, any Grace or Aſſiſtance, which was neceſſary for his ſtanding.* Had there been indeed a neceſſity of ſupernatural Grace, to be communicated to Man for every Moment, to continue him in his Innocency; and had God before Man's Fall, withdrawn ſuch Aſſiſtance from him, without which it were impoſſible for him to have ſtood, it would be very difficult freeing God from being the Cauſe of the Fall of Man. But we are not put to ſuch difficulties for acquitting God from being the Author of Sin; for there appears no neceſſity at all for aſſerting any diſtinction of ſufficient and efficacious Grace in Man before his Fall; that the one ſhould belong only to a radical Power of ſtanding, the other to every Act of good which *Adam* did: For if God *made Man upright,* he certainly gave him ſuch a Power as might be brought into Act without the neceſ-

ſity of any ſupervenient Act of Grace, to elicite that habitual Power into particular Actions. If the other were ſufficient, it was ſufficient for its end; and how could it be ſufficient for its end, if notwithſtanding that, there were no poſſibility of ſtanding, unleſs efficacious help were ſuperadded to it? God would not certainly require any thing from the Creature in his Integrity, but what he had a Power to obey; and if there were neceſſary farther Grace to bring the Power into Act, the ſubtracting of this Grace muſt be by way of Puniſhment to Man, which it is hard to conceive for what it ſhould be, before Man had ſinned, or elſe God muſt ſubtract this Grace on purpoſe that Man might fall; which would neceſſarily follow on this Suppoſition, in which caſe Man would be neceſſitated to fall, *Veluti cum ſubductis columnis domus neceſſario corruit*, as one expreſſeth it, *As a Houſe muſt needs fall, when the Pillars on which it ſtood are taken away from it.* But now if God withdrew not any effectual Grace from Man, whereby he muſt neceſſarily fall, then tho' God permit Man to uſe his Liberty, yet he cannot be ſaid to be any ways the Author of Evil, becauſe Man had ſtill a *poſſe ſi vellet*, a Power of ſtanding, if he had made right uſe of his Liberty: And God never took from Man his *Adjutorium quo potuit ſtare, & ſine quo non potuit*, as *Divines* call it, Man enjoying ſtill his Power, tho' by the abuſe of his Liberty he fell into Sin: So that granting God to leave Man to the uſe of his Liberty, yet we ſee God cannot in the leaſt be charg'd with being the Author of Sin, or the Origin of Evil, by the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man in Scripture: Which was the thing to be clear'd.

VIII. We come now in the third place, to compare that account given of the Origin of Evil in Scripture, with that which was embrac'd by Heathen Philoſophers, in point of Reaſon and Evidence. There was no one inquiry whatſoever, in which thoſe who had nothing but natural Light to guide them, were more to ſeek for ſatisfaction in, than this concerning the Origin of Evil. They ſaw by continual Experience, how great a Torrent of both ſorts of Evils, of Sin and Puniſhment, did overflow the World; but they were like the *Egyptians*, who had ſufficient evidence of the overflowing their Banks by the River *Nile*, but could not find out the Spring or the Head of it. The reaſon was, as Corruption increas'd in the World, ſo the means of Inſtruction and Knowledg decay'd; and ſo as the *Phænomena* grew greater, the reaſon of them was leſs underſtood; the knowledg of the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, thro' which they could alone come to the full underſtanding of the true cauſe of Evil, inſenſibly decaying in the ſeveral Nations: Inſomuch, that thoſe who are not at all acquainted with that Hiſtory of the World, which was preſerv'd in Sacred Records among the *Jews*, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and ſome kind of obſcure Traditions which were preſerv'd among them; which while they ſought to rectify by their Interpretations, they made them more obſcure and falſe than they found them. They were certain of nothing, but that Mankind was in a low and degenerate Condition, and ſubject to continual Miſeries and Calamities; they who cry'd up the moſt the αὐτεξούσιον, or the Self-determining Power of the Soul, could not certainly but ſtrangely wonder, that a Principle indifferent to be carry'd either way, ſhould be ſo almoſt fatally inclin'd to the worſt of them. It was very ſtrange, that ſince Reaſon ought to have the command of Paſſions, by their own acknowledgment, the Brutiſh part of the Soul ſhould ſo maſter and enſlave the Rational, and the Beaſt ſhould ſtill caſt the Rider in Man, the ſenſitive Appetite ſhould throw off the Power of the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, of that Faculty of the Soul which was deſign'd for the Government of all the reſt. The Philoſophers could not be ignorant, what Slaves they were themſelves to this *Terreſtrial Hyle*, how eaſily their moſt mettleſome Souls were mir'd in the Dirt, how deep they were ſunk into corporeal Pleaſures, that it was paſt the power of their Reaſon to help them out. Nay, when the Soul begins to be fledg'd again, after her πτεροῤῥύησις, or moulting, at her entrance into the Body, which *Plato* ſpeaks of, and ſtrives to raiſe her ſelf above this lower World, ſhe then feels the weight of ſuch Plummets hanging at her Feet, that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of Earth. So *Hierocles* complains, That when Reaſon begins to carry the Soul to the perception of the moſt noble Objects, the Soul with a generous flight would ſoar above this World, ὅταν μὴ ταῖς παθητικαῖς ὁλκαῖς ὥσπερ τισι μολυβδίσιν, ἀποφέρηται πρὸς κακίαν, *Were it not born down to that which is Evil by the force of Paſſions, which hang like Leads upon the Soul's Feet.* What a ſtrange unaccountable thing muſt this needs be to thoſe who beheld the conſtancy of the Effect, but were to ſeek for the Cauſe of it? It could not but be clear to them that the αὐτεξούσιον they were wont to extol ſo high, was (in the ſtate Man was now in) but a more noble name for Slavery; when themſelves could not but confeſs the ῥοπὴ, or inclination in the Soul was ſo ſtrong to the Evil; and could that be an even Ballance, where there was ſo much down-weight in one of the Scales? unleſs they made, as ſome of them did, the voluntary Inclinations of the Soul to evil, an evidence of her Liberty in this moſt degenerate Condition, as tho' it were any Argument that the Priſoner was the freer, becauſe he delighted himſelf in the noiſe of his Shackles. Neither was this diſorder alone at home in the Soul, where there was ſtill a *Xantippe* ſcolding with *Socrates*, *Paſſion* ſtriving with *Reaſon*; but when they look'd abroad in the World, they could not but obſerve ſome ſtrange Irregularities in the converſe among Men. What debaucheries, contentions, rapines, fightings and deſtroying each other, and that with the greateſt Cruelty, and that frequently among Country-men, Friends, nay, Relations and Kindred! And could this Hoſtility between thoſe of the ſame Nature, and under the moſt ſacred Bonds of Union, be the reſult of Nature, when even Beaſts of Prey are not ſuch to thoſe of their own kind? Beſides all this, when they ſummed up the Life of Man together, and took an account of the Weakneſſes and Follies of Childhood, the Heats and Extravagancies of Youth, the Paſſions, Diſquietments and Diſappointments of Men in their ſtrength and height of Buſineſs, the Inquietude, Aches, and Infirmities of old Age, beſides the Miſeries, which thro' every one of theſe, all Men are ſubject to, and few eſcape; into how ſmall a Sum will the ſolid Pleaſure and Contentment of the Life of Man be reduc'd? Nay, if we take thoſe things in the World which Men pleaſe themſelves the moſt in enjoyment of, and conſider but with what Care they are got, with what Fear they are kept, and with what Certainty they muſt be loſt; and how much the Poſſeſſion of any thing fails of the expectation of it, and how near Men are upon the top of *Tenariff* to fall into the depth of the Sea; how often they are precipitated from the height of Proſperity, into the depthof Adverſity; we ſhall find yet much leſs, that by the greateſt *Chymiſtry* can be extracted of real ſatisfaction out of theſe

Hieroc. in aurea carmina, p. 17.

theſe things. Whence then ſhould it come, that Mens Souls ſhould ſo delight to feed on theſe Huſks, and to embrace theſe Clouds and Shadows, inſtead of that real Good, which is the true Object of the Soul's deſire? They could eaſily ſee there was no pure, unmix'd Good in the World, but there was a Contemperation of both together, according to that of *Euripides*:

Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ ϗ κακά,
Ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις.

There is a kind of continual mixture of Good and Evil in the World; which *Socrates* obſerv'd upon the rubbing of his Thigh, where the Fetters made it itch, ὡς ἄτοπον, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ; ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν; *What a ſtrange thing is that which Men are wont to call Pleaſure? How near a kin is it to that which ſeems ſo contrary to it, Pain?*

Plat. in Phæd.

Now the obſerving the ſtrange and ſudden viciſſitudes of theſe things, and what near neighbours Pain and Pleaſure were to each other, (ſo that there is frequently a paſſage out of one into the other) did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origin of both theſe. Thoſe who believe there was a GOD who produc'd the World, and order'd all things in it, did eaſily attribute whatever was good in the World to the Fountain of all Goodneſs; but that any Evil ſhould come from him, they thought it repugnant to the very Notion of a DEITY; which they were ſo far right in, as it concern'd the Evil of Sin; which we have already ſhew'd GOD could not be the Author of: But therein they ſhew'd their Ignorance of the true cauſe of *Evil*, that they did not look upon the Miſeries of Life as the Effects of GOD's Juſtice upon the World, for the evil of Sin. And therefore that they might ſet the Origin of Evil far enough off from GOD, they made two different Principles of things, the one of Good, and the other of Evil: This *Plutarch* tells us, was the moſt ancient and univerſal account which he could meet with, of the Origin of *Good* and *Evil*. To which purpoſe we have this ample Teſtimony of his, in his learned Diſcourſe, *De Iſide & Oſiride*, Διὸ ϗ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων ϗ νομοθετῶν, εἴς τε ποιητὰς ϗ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν ϗ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ϗ ἀλλὰ ἔν τε τελεταῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις, ϗ βαρβάροις ϗ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένην, ὡς οὔτ' ἄνουν ϗ ἄλογον ϗ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, οὔτε εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν ϗ κατευθύνων, ὥσπερ οἴαξιν ἤ τισι πειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς λόγος· ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ϗ μεμιγμένα κακοῖς ϗ ἀγαθοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄκρατον ἐνταῦθα τῆς φύσεως φερούσης· οὐ δυεῖν πίθων εἷς ταμίας, ὥσπερ νάματα τὰ πράγματα καπηλικῶς διανέμων ἀνακεράννυσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν, ϗ δυεῖν ἀντιπάλων δυνάμεων, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ ϗ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ὑφηγουμένης, τῆς δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἀναστρεφούσης ϗ ἀνακλώσης, ὅ τε βίος μικτὸς, ὅ τε κόσμος εἰ ϗ μὴ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ περίγειος οὗτος ϗ μετὰ σελήνην, ἀνώμαλος ϗ ποικίλος γέγονε, ϗ μεταβολὰς πάσας δεχόμενος, εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὴ κακοῦ τἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν παράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν ϗ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ, ϗ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. Which words I have the more largely cited, becauſe they give us the moſt full account of the Antiquity, Univerſality, and Reaſon of that Opinion, which aſſerts two different Principles of Good and Evil. *It is a Tradition* (ſaith he) *of great Antiquity, deriv'd down from the ancient Maſters of Divine Knowledg, and Formers of Commonwealths, to the Poets*

Plutarch. de Iſide & Oſir. p.369. ed. Fr.

and Philoſophers, whoſe firſt Author cannot be found, and yet hath met with firm and unſhaken Belief, not only in ordinary Diſcourſes and Reports, but was ſpread into the Myſteries and Sacrifices both of Greeks *and others, that the Univerſe did not depend on chance, and was deſtitute of Mind and Reaſon to govern it; neither was there one only Reaſon which ſat at the Stern, or held the Reins, whereby he did order and govern the World: But ſince there is ſo much confuſion and mixture of Good and Evil in the World, that Nature doth not produce any pure untainted Good; there is not any one, who like a Drawer, takes the Liquor out of two ſeveral Veſſels, and mixeth them together, and after diſtributes them; but there are two Principles and Powers contrary to each other, whereof one draws us to the right Hand, and directs us ſtraight forward, the other pulls us back, and turns us the other way; ſince we ſee the Life of Man ſo mixed as it is; and not only that, but the World too, at leaſt ſo much as is ſublunary and terreſtrial, which is ſubject to many Varieties, Irregularities, and Changes. For if nothing be without a Cauſe, and Good cannot be the cauſe of Evil, it neceſſarily follows, that as there is a peculiar Nature and Principle which is the cauſe of Good, ſo there muſt be another, which is the cauſe of Evil.*

But leſt we ſhould think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen *Manichees* which held this Opinion, he tells us, to prevent that, ϗ δοκεῖ τῦτο τοῖς πλείϛοις ϗ σοφωτάτοις, *It was the Opinion of the moſt, and wiſeſt of the Heathen.* Now theſe two Principles ſome (ſaith he) call *Two oppoſite Gods*, whereof the one is the cauſe of *Good*, and the other of *Evil*; him they call Θεὸς, this Δαίμων. By this one would imagine, that this very ancient Tradition was nothing elſe but the true account of the Origin of Evil, a little diſguis'd. For the Scripture making the *Devil* the firſt Author of *Evil* himſelf, and the firſt ſollicitor and tempter of Man to it; who when God directed him ſtraight forward, pull'd Man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the Miſeries of the World came into it: For while Man kept cloſe to his Maker, his Integrity and Obedience were to him what the *vaſa umbilicalia* are to the Child in the Womb; by them he receiv'd whatever tended to his Subſiſtence and Comfort: But Sin cut thoſe Veſſels aſunder, and prov'd the *Midwife* of Miſery, bringing Man forth into a World of Sorrow and Sufferings. Now, I ſay, the Scripture taking ſuch eſpecial notice of one, as the chief of *Devils*, thro' whoſe means Evil came into the World, this gave occaſion to the Heathens, when length of Time had made the Original Tradition more obſcure, to make theſe two, *God* and the *Dæmon*, as two *Anti-gods*, and ſo to be the Cauſes, the one of all *Good*, and the other of all *Evil.* Which at laſt came to that (which was the *Devil*'s great deſign in thus corrupting the Tradition) that both theſe *Anti-gods* ſhould have ſolemn Worſhip by Sacrifices; the one by way of Impetration, for beſtowing of Good; the other by way of Deprecation, for averting of Evil. Such *Plutarch* there tells us, were the *Oromaſdes* and *Arimanius* of *Zoroaſtres*, which were worſhipped by the *Perſians*; the one for doing Good, and the other for avoiding Evil; the one they reſembled to Light (or Fire) the other to Darkneſs and Ignorance: What Animals were good and uſeful they aſcribed to *Oromaſdes*, and all venomous and noxious ones to *Arimanius*; whom *Plutarch* elſewhere calls τ̀ πονηρὸν Δαίμονα Περσῶν, *The evil Dæmon of the Perſians.* The ſame *Diogenes Laertius* relates of the *Magi*, the Philoſophers of *Perſia*, that they made two diſtinct Principles, Ἀγαθὸν Δαίμονα ϗ κακὸν, *a good and bad*

Plut. in Alex.
Diog. Laertius in Proœm.

bad Dæmon; for which he quotes *Dinon*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus*, and others. The ſame *Plutarch* makes to be the Opinion of the ancient *Greeks*, who attribute the good to *Jupiter Olympius*, the bad to *Hades:* The *Chaldeans*, ſaith he, *make the Planets their Gods*, of which, two they ſuppoſe the cauſe of Good; two more of only a malignant Influence; and other three to be indifferent to either. The ſame he affirms of the *Ægyptians*, That whatever was evil and irregular, they aſcrib'd to *Typho*; what was good, comely, and uſeful, they attributed to *Iſis* and *Oſiris*; to *Iſis* as the paſſive, *Oſiris* as the active Principle.

X. Thus we ſee how large a ſpread this Opinion of the Origin of Evil had in the *Gentile* World; neither did it expire with *Heatheniſm:* But *Manes* retain'd ſo much of the Religion of his Country, being a *Perſian*, that he made a ſtrange medly of the *Perſian* and *Chriſtian* Doctrine together. For that was his famous Opinion, of which St. *Auſtin* tells us; *Iſte duo principia inter ſe diverſa atque adverſa, eademque æterna, & coæterna, hoc eſt, ſemper fuiſſe, compoſuit; duaſque naturas atque ſubſtantias, boni, ſcilicet, & mali, ſequens alios antiquos hæreticos, opinatus eſt.* St. *Auſtin* thinks that *Manes* had his Opinion, concerning two Principles, from the ancient Hereticks, by whom I ſuppoſe he means the *Marcioniſts* and *Valentinians:* But it ſeems more probable that *Manes* had his Doctrine immediately from his Country-men, tho' it be generally thought that *Scythianus* and *Buddas* were his Maſters in it. But from whomſoever it came, the Opinion was merely *Heathen*, and not more contrary to Scripture than it is to Reaſon; the former I meddle not with, that Opinion being now extinct in the *Chriſtian* World: I only briefly conſider the Unreaſonableneſs of it, to ſhew what a far better account of the *Origin of Evil* the Scriptures give us, than was diſcover'd by the *Heathen* Philoſophers: For on both ſides, that Opinion is repugnant to the Notion of a *Deity*, ſo that while they would make two ſuch *Gods*, they make none at all. For how can the Principle of Good be God, if he hath not infinite Power as well as Goodneſs? And how can he have infinite Power, if he hath not the Management of things in the World, And how can he have the Management of things, if they be liable to Evil; which the other God, which is the Principle of Evil, may lay upon it; from which, according to this ſuppoſition, the Principle of Good cannot reſcue it? So that they who hold this Opinion cannot, as *Simplicius* tells us, *Give* God τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, *the half of that infinite Power* which belongs to him: For neither can he keep the good Creatures which he makes, from the power of the evil *Dæmon*; and therefore if he loves them, muſt be in continual fears of the Power of the contrary Principle: Neither can he free them from the Evil which the other lays upon them; for then God's Power would be far greater than the evil *Dæmon*, and ſo he could be no *Anti-god*. And on the other ſide, the Notion or Idea of an *infinite evil Being*, is in it ſelf an inconſiſtent Idea; for it is an *infinite Non-entity*, if we ſuppoſe his very Being to lie in *being Evil*, which is only a privation of Goodneſs: And beſides, if he be infinitely Evil, he muſt be infinitely contrary to the good Principle; and how can he be infinitely contrary, which enjoys ſeveral of the ſame Perfections which the other hath, which are *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence?* Now if this Principle of *Evil* be abſolutely contrary to the other, it muſt be contrary in all his Perfections; for whatever is a Perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now

Auguſt. de Hæreſ. c. 46.

if

and Philoſophers, whoſe firſt Author cannot be found, and yet hath met with firm and unſhaken Belief, not only in ordinary Diſcourſes and Reports, but was ſpread into the Myſteries and Sacrifices both of Greeks and others, that the Univerſe did not depend on chance, and was deſtitute of Mind and Reaſon to govern it; neither was there one only Reaſon which ſat at the Stern, or held the Reins, whereby he did order and govern the World: But ſince there is ſo much confuſion and mixture of Good and Evil in the World, that Nature doth not produce any pure untainted Good; there is not any one, who like a Drawer, takes the Liquor out of two ſeveral Veſſels, and mixeth them together, and after diſtributes them; but there are two Principles and Powers contrary to each other, whereof one draws us to the right Hand, and directs us ſtraight forward, the other pulls us back, and turns us the other way; ſince we ſee the Life of Man ſo mixed as it is; and not only that, but the World too, at leaſt ſo much as is ſublimary and terreſtrial, which is ſubject to many Varieties, Irregularities, and Changes. For if nothing be without a Cauſe, and Good cannot be the cauſe of Evil, it neceſſarily follows, that as there is a peculiar Nature and Principle which is the cauſe of Good, ſo there muſt be another, which is the cauſe of Evil.

But leſt we ſhould think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen *Manichees* which held this Opinion, he tells us, to prevent that, ϗ δοκεῖ τῦτο τοῖς πλείςοις ϗ σοφωτάτοις, *It was the Opinion of the moſt, and wiſeſt of the Heathen.* Now theſe two Principles ſome (ſaith he) call *Two oppoſite Gods*, whereof the one is the cauſe of *Good*, and the other of *Evil*; him they call Θεὸς, this Δαίμων. By this one would imagine, that this very ancient Tradition was nothing elſe but the true account of the Origin of Evil, a little diſguis'd. For the Scripture making the *Devil* the firſt Author of *Evil* himſelf, and the firſt ſollicitor and tempter of Man to it; who when God directed him ſtraight forward, pull'd Man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the Miſeries of the World came into it: For while Man kept cloſe to his Maker, his Integrity and Obedience were to him what the *vaſa umbilicalia* are to the Child in the Womb; by them he receiv'd whatever tended to his Subſiſtence and Comfort: But Sin cut thoſe Veſſels aſunder, and prov'd the *Midwife* of Miſery, bringing Man forth into a World of Sorrow and Sufferings. Now, I ſay, the Scripture taking ſuch eſpecial notice of one, as the chief of *Devils*, thro' whoſe means Evil came into the World, this gave occaſion to the Heathens, when length of Time had made the Original Tradition more obſcure, to make theſe two, *God* and the *Dæmon*, as two *Anti-gods*, and ſo to be the Cauſes, the one of all *Good*, and the other of all *Evil*. Which at laſt came to that (which was the *Devil*'s great deſign in thus corrupting the Tradition) that both theſe *Anti-gods* ſhould have ſolemn Worſhip by Sacrifices; the one by way of Impetration, for beſtowing of Good; the other by way of Deprecation, for averting of Evil. Such *Plutarch* there tells us, were the *Oromaſdes* and *Arimanius* of *Zoroaſtres*, which were worſhipped by the *Perſians*; the one for doing Good, and the other for avoiding Evil; the one they reſembled to Light (or Fire) the other to Darkneſs and Ignorance: What Animals were good and uſeful they aſcribed to *Oromaſdes*, and all venomous and noxious ones to *Arimanius*; whom *Plutarch* elſewhere calls τὸν πονηρὸν Δαίμονα Περσῶν, *The evil Dæmon of the Perſians.* The ſame *Diagenes Laertius* relates of the *Magi*, the Philoſophers of *Perſia*, that they made two diſtinct Principles, Ἀγαθὸν Δαίμονα ϗ κακὸν, *a good and bad*

Plut. in Alex.

Diog. Laertius in Proœm.

bad Dæmon; for which he quotes *Dinon*, *Ariſtotle*, *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus*, and others. The ſame *Plutarch* makes to be the Opinion of the ancient *Greeks*, who attribute the good to *Jupiter Olympius*, the bad to *Hades:* The *Chaldeans*, ſaith he, *make the Planets their Gods*, of which, two they ſuppoſe the cauſe of Good; two more of only a malignant Influence; and other three to be indifferent to either. The ſame he affirms of the *Ægyptians*, That whatever was evil and irregular, they aſcrib'd to *Typho*; what was good, comely, and uſeful, they attributed to *Iſis* and *Oſiris*; to *Iſis* as the paſſive, *Oſiris* as the active Principle.

X. Thus we ſee how large a ſpread this Opinion of the Origin of Evil had in the *Gentile* World; neither did it expire with *Heatheniſm:* But *Manes* retain'd ſo much of the Religion of his Country, being a *Perſian*, that he made a ſtrange medly of the *Perſian* and *Chriſtian* Doctrine together. For that was his famous Opinion, of which St. *Auſtin* tells us; *Iſte duo principia inter ſe diverſa atque adverſa, eademque æterna, & coæterna, hoc eſt, ſemper fuiſſe, compoſuit; duaſque naturas atque ſubſtantias, boni, ſcilicet, & mali, ſequens alios antiquos hæreticos, opinatus eſt.* *Auguſt. de Hæreſ. c. 46.* St. *Auſtin* thinks that *Manes* had his Opinion, concerning two Principles, from the ancient Hereticks, by whom I ſuppoſe he means the *Marcioniſts* and *Valentinians:* But it ſeems more probable that *Manes* had his Doctrine immediately from his Country-men, tho' it be generally thought that *Scythianus* and *Buddas* were his Maſters in it. But from whomſoever it came, the Opinion was merely *Heathen*, and not more contrary to Scripture than it is to Reaſon; the former I meddle not with, that Opinion being now extinct in the *Chriſtian* World: I only briefly conſider the Unreaſonableneſs of it, to ſhew what a far better account of the *Origin of Evil* the Scriptures give us, than was diſcover'd by the *Heathen* Philoſophers: For on both ſides, that Opinion is repugnant to the Notion of a *Deity*, ſo that while they would make two ſuch *Gods*, they make none at all. For how can the Principle of Good be God, if he hath not infinite Power as well as Goodneſs? And how can he have infinite Power, if he hath not the Management of things in the World, And how can he have the Management of things, if they be liable to Evil; which the other God, which is the Principle of Evil, may lay upon it; from which, according to this ſuppoſition, the Principle of Good cannot reſcue it? So that they who hold this Opinion cannot, as *Simplicius* tells us, *Give* God τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, *the half of that infinite Power* which belongs to him: For neither can he keep the good Creatures which he makes, from the power of the evil *Dæmon*; and therefore if he loves them, muſt be in continual fears of the Power of the contrary Principle: Neither can he free them from the Evil which the other lays upon them; for then God's Power would be far greater than the evil *Dæmon*, and ſo he could be no *Anti-god*. And on the other ſide, the Notion or Idea of an *infinite evil Being*, is in it ſelf an inconſiſtent Idea; for it is an *infinite Non-entity*, if we ſuppoſe his very Being to lie in *being Evil*, which is only a privation of Goodneſs: And beſides, if he be infinitely Evil, he muſt be infinitely contrary to the good Principle; and how can he be infinitely contrary, which enjoys ſeveral of the ſame Perfections which the other hath, which are *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence?* Now if this Principle of *Evil* be abſolutely contrary to the other, it muſt be contrary in all his Perfections; for whatever is a Perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now if it be contrary in every Perfection, *Infinity of Eſſence*, and *Neceſſity of Exiſtence*, being two, it muſt be as contrary as is imaginable to them, by which this evil Principle muſt be infinitely defective in Being and Exiſtence, and ſo it will be an *Infinite Non-entity* which yet exiſts, which is the height of contradiction. Again, if there be ſuch a contrary Principle, which is the cauſe of all Evil, then all Evil falls out unavoidably, and by the power of this *Infinitely evil Principle*, by which means not only all *Religion*, but all *Vertue* and *Goodneſs* will be taken out of the World, if this evil Principle be infinite; and if not infinite, no *Anti-god:* and not only ſo, but all difference of *Good* and *Evil* will be taken away (and then what need making two ſuch contrary Principles to give an account of the Origin of Evil?) for when once Evil becomes thus neceſſary, it loſeth its Nature as a Moral Evil; for a Moral Evil implies in it a voluntary breach of ſome known Law; but how can that breach be voluntary, which was caus'd by an Infinite Power in the moſt proper way of Efficiency? And thus if all freedom of Will be deſtroy'd (as it is neceſſarily by this Suppoſition) then no Government of the World by Laws can be ſuppos'd, and conſequently no Reward or Puniſhment, which ſuppoſe liberty of Action, and by this means all Religion, Law, and Providence are baniſh'd out of the World, and ſo this evil *Damon* will get all into his own hands, and inſtead of two contrary Principles, there will be but one *Infinitely evil Dæmon.* Which that there is not, appears by this, that notwithſtanding all the Evil in the World, there is ſo much Good left in it, of which there would be none, if this evil *Dæmon* had Infinite Power. By this we ſee there cannot be a Principle infinitely evil; for while they go about to make two ſuch contrary Principles infinite, they make neither of them ſo, and ſo while they make two *Gods*, they take away any at all. So that this Opinion of the *Origin of Evil*, is manifeſtly abſurd, irrational, and contradictious.

XI. But all the *Heathen* Philoſophers were not ſo groſs as to imagin two ſuch *Anti-gods* with infinitely active Power; but yet thoſe who would not in terms aſſert it, might be driven to it by the conſequence of their Opinion concering the *Origin of Evil*, which did ſuppoſe a neceſſity of it in Nature, as flowing from that paſſive Principle out of which the World was produc'd. Hence it was that *Heraclitus*, as *Plutarch* tells us, attributed the Origin of all things to *Diſcord* and *Antipathy*, and was wont to ſay, that when *Homer* wiſh'd

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride.

Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι.

That all contention were baniſh'd out of the World, that he did ſecretly curſe the Origin of things, and wiſh'd the ruin of the World. So *Empedocles* call'd the active Principle which did good, Harmony and Friendſhip, but the other

Νεῖκος οὐλόμενον ϗ δῆριν αἱματόεσσαν.

by which he makes it to be a quarelſom, pernicious, and bloody Principle. The ſame *Plutarch* tells us of theſe two renowned Philoſophers, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. Thence he tells us the *Pythagoreans* call'd the Principle of Good, τὸ ἓν, πεπαρασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθὺ, τὸ περιττὸν, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ δεξιὸν, τὸ λαμπρόν. *Unity*, *finite*, *quieſcent*, *ſtraight*, *uneven number*, *ſquare*, *right*,

right and ſplendid; the Principle of Evil, they call'd τὴν δυάδα, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερὸν, τὸ σκοτεινόν. *The Binary, Infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one ſide, unequal, left, obſcure.* The Opinion of *Plato*, he tells us is very obſcure, it being his purpoſe to conceal it; but he ſaith in his old Age, in his Book *de Legibus*, οὐ δι' αἰνιγμῶν, οὐδὲ συμβολικῶς, *without any ifs or ands*, he aſſerts the World to be mov'd by more than one Principle, by two at the leaſt, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων δημιουργόν. *The one of a good and benign Nature, the other contrary to it both in its Nature and Operations.* *Numenius* in * *Chalcidius* thus delivers the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato de originibus*, as he ſpeaks; *Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam & ſine qualitate ſylvam eſſe cenſet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturæ mediæ, interque malorum, bonorumque viciniam, ſed plane noxiam; Deum quippe eſſe (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium & cauſam bonorum, ſylvam malorum:* So that according to *Numenius*, both *Plato* and *Pythagoras* attributed the Origin of Evil to the Malignity of Matter, and ſo they make Evils to be neceſſarily conſequent upon the Being of Things. For thus he delivers expreſly the Opinion of *Pythagoras*; *qui ait, Exiſtente providentia, mala quoque neceſſaria ſubſtitiſſe, propterea quod ſylva ſit, & eadem ſit malitiâ prædita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet; Unam beneficentiſſimam; malignam alteram, ſc. Sylvam. Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona ſua Dei, tanquam patris liberalitate collata ſunt; mala vero, matris ſylvæ vitio cohæſerunt.* But *Plutarch* will by no means admit, that *Plato* attributes the Origin of Evil merely to Matter, but he makes the Principle of Evil to be ſomething diſtinct from Matter, which he calls τὴν ἄτακτον, καὶ ἀόριστον, αὐτοκίνητον δὲ καὶ κινητικὴν ἀρχὴν, *A confuſed, infinite, ſelf-moving, ſtirring Principle*; which (ſaith he) he elſewhere calls *Neceſſity*, and in his *de Legibus*, plainly, ψυχὴν ἄτακτον καὶ κακοποιὸν, *a diſorderly and malignant Soul*, which cannot be underſtood of mere Matter, when he makes his *Hyle* ἄμορφον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυνάμεως οἰκείας ἔρημον, *Without form or figure, and deſtitute of all qualities and power of operation: and it is impoſſible* (ſaith he) *that that which is of it ſelf ſuch an inert principle as Matter is, ſhould by* Plato *be ſuppos'd to be the cauſe and principle of Evil*, which he elſewhere calls ἀνάγκην πολλὰ τῷ Θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσαν καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσαν, *Neceſſity which often reſiſted* God, *and caſt off his reins.* So that according to *Plutarch*, *Plato* acquits both *God* and *Hyle* from being the Origin of Evil, τήν γε ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τὸν Θεὸν τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος, and therefore attributes it to that malignant Spirit which moves the Matter, and is the cauſe of all the diſorderly Motions in the World. But what this Spirit ſhould be, neither he or any one elſe could ever underſtand: what darkneſs and ignorance then was there among the wiſeſt of Philoſophers concerning the Origin of Evil, when they were ſo confus'd and obſcure in the account which they gave of it, that their greateſt admirers could not underſtand them!

* Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.

Plutarch. de Animæ procreat. è Tim.

XII. But tho' *Plato* ſeem'd ſo ambiguous in his judgment of the Origin of Evil, whether he ſhould attribute it to the *Hyle*, or ſome malignant Spirit in it, the *Stoics* were dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cauſe of Evil to the perverſity of Matter. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that the *Stoics* made Matter not to be evil in it ſelf as *Pythagoras*, but that it was indifferent to either; *perrogati igitur unde mala? perverſitatem ſeminarium malorum cauſati ſunt:* they made the perverſity of Matter the Origin of Evil; but as he well obſerves, *nec expediunt adhuc unde ipſa perverſitas, cum juxta ipſos duo ſint ini-*

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 395.

tia rerum, Deus & ſylva. Deus ſummum & præcellens bonum; ſylva, ut cenſent, nec bonum nec malum. They give no rational account whence this perverſity of Matter ſhould ariſe, when according to the *Stoics*, there are but two Principles of Things, *God* and *Matter*, whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perverſity they tell us is ſomething neceſſarily conſequent upon the Generation of Things. Ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι πάθη τὰ τῇ γενέσει παρεπόμενα, ὥσπερ ἰὸς τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ ὁ ῥύπος τῷ σώματι, *theſe are affections*, (*viz.* the Diſorders in the World) which *follow the Generation of things, as ruſt comes upon braſs, and filth upon the body*, as the counterfeit *Triſmegiſtus* ſpeaks; ſo *Maximus Tyrius* ſaith that Evils in the World are οὐ τέχνης ἔργα, ἀλλ' ὕλης πάθη, *not any works of art, but the affections of Matter. Non poteſt artifex mutare materiam*, ſaith *Seneca*, when he is giving an account *Why God ſuffers Evils in the World:* and elſewhere gives this account why Evils came into the World, *non quia ceſſat ars, ſed quia id in quo exercetur inobſequens arti eſt.* So that the Origin of Evil by this account of it lies wholly upon the perverſity of Matter, which it ſeems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produc'd the World out of that Matter which the *Stoics* ſuppos'd to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cauſe of Evil to God, ſeems to have been the great Reaſon, why they rather choſe to make it matter neceſſary and co-exiſtent with God, and this was the only plauſible pretence which *Hermogenes* had for following the *Platoniſts* and *Stoics* in this Opinion, that he might ſet God far enough off from being the Author of Sin; but I cannot ſee what advantage comes at all by this *Hypotheſis*, but it is chargeable with as
1. many difficulties as any other. For, 1. *It either deſtroys* God's *Omnipotency, or elſe makes him the approver of Evil*; ſo that if he be not *Auctor*, he muſt be *Aſſentator mali*, as *Tertullian* ſpeaks againſt *Hermogenes*, becauſe he ſuffer'd Evil to be in Matter; for, as he argues, *Aut enim potuit emendere ſed noluit; aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus: ſi potuit & noluit, malus & ipſe, quia malo favit; & ſic jam habetur ejus licet non inſtituerit: quia tamen ſi noluiſſet illud eſſe, non eſſet; ipſe jam fecit eſſe, quod noluit non eſſe: quo quid eſt turpius? ſi voluit eſſe quod ipſe noluit feciſſe, adverſum ſemetipſum egit, cum & voluit eſſe quod noluit feciſſe, & noluit feciſſe quod voluit eſſe.* So that little advantage is gain'd for the clearing the true Origin of Evil by this Opinion; for either God could have taken away Evil out of Matter but would not, or elſe would but could not; this laſt deſtroys God's Omnipotency, the former his Goodneſs; for by that means Evil is in the World by his conſent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the Being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindred it, it would not have been, and ſo God by not rooting out of Evil, will be found an Aſſertor of it; *Male ſi per voluntatem, turpiter ſi per neceſſitatem: aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus:* if God's Will were the cauſe why Sin was, it reflects on his Goodneſs; if God's Power could not hinder it, it deſtroys his Omnipotency. So that by this Opinion
2. God muſt either be a ſlave or a friend to Evil. 2. *This Principle overturns the foundations of Religion, and all tranſactions between* God *and Mens Souls in order to their welfare*, becauſe it makes Evil to be neceſſarily exiſtent in the World; which appears from hence, in that Evil doth reſult from the Being of Matter, and ſo it muſt neceſſarily be as Matter is ſuppos'd to be; for whatever reſults from the Being of a thing, muſt be coexiſtent with it; and ſo what flows from what doth neceſſa-

Maxim. Tyr. Serm. 25.

Seneca de Provid. c. 5.

Idem præf. ad natur. quæſt.

Tertull. adverſ. Hermogen. c. 10.

rily exiſt, muſt have the ſame Mode of Exiſtence which the Being it ſelf hath; as is evident in all the Attributes of GOD, which have the ſame immutability with his Nature. Now then, if Evil did exiſt from Eternity together with Matter, it muſt neceſſarily exiſt as Matter doth, and ſo Evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the World; which if once granted, renders Religion uſeleſs, make's GOD's Commands unrighteous, and deſtroys the Foundation of God's Proceedings in the Day of Judgment. 3. *This Opinion makes* GOD *not to be the Author of Good,* 3. while it denies him to be the Author of Evil. For either there was nothing elſe but Evil in this eternal Matter, or there was a mixture of Good and Evil; if nothing elſe but Evil which did neceſſarily exiſt, it were as impoſſible for GOD to produce Good out of it, as to annihilate the neceſſarily exiſtent Matter. If there were a mixture of Good and Evil, they were both there, either neceſſarily or contingently: How could either of them be contingently in that which is ſuppos'd to be neceſſarily exiſtent, and no free Agent? If they be both there neceſſarily, 1. It is hard conceiving how two ſuch contrary things as Good and Evil, ſhould neceſſarily be in the ſame uniform Matter. 2. Then GOD is no more the Author of Good than of Evil in the World; for he is ſaid not to be the Author of Evil, becauſe it comes from Matter; and ſo it appears Good doth too, and ſo GOD according to this Opinion, is no more the Author of Good, than he is of Evil. But if it be ſaid *that Good is not in Matter, but* GOD *produc'd that out of nothing:* Then I reply, 1. If GOD did produce Good out of nothing, why did he not produce Matter out of nothing too? If he were ſo powerful as to do the one, there could be no defect of Power as to the other. What inſufficiency is there in GOD's Nature, for producing all Things out of nothing, if he can produce any thing out of nothing? 2. If GOD did produce Good out of Evil, why could he not have remov'd all Evil out of Matter? For Good could not but be produc'd by the removing of ſome Evil which was before that Good, and ſo GOD might have remov'd all Evil out of Matter. And ſo by not doing it when he might, this Opinion gives not the leaſt Satisfaction in point of Reaſon, for acquitting GOD from being the Author of Sin, nor for clearing the true Origin of Evil.

XIII. Thus we have now compar'd the account given of it in Scripture, with that given by the Heathen Philoſophers, and find it in every thing more clear, rational and ſatisfactory than theirs is: Which doubtleſs is the reaſon, why the more modern Philoſophers, ſuch as *Hierocles*, *Porphyry*, *Simplicius*, and others, tho' otherwiſe great oppoſers of Chriſtianity, did yet in this ſide with the Scriptures, and attribute the original of Evil not to Matter, but to the Will of Man. And whoever is ſeriouſly converſant with the writings of thoſe Philoſophers, who were ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς γενεᾶς of the ſacred ſucceſſion out of the School of *Ammonius* at *Alexandria*, ſuch as *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus* and *Hierocles*, will find them write in a higher ſtrain concerning many weighty and important Truths; as of the degeneracy of Mens Souls from GOD, and the way of the Souls returning to Him, than the moſt ſublime of the ancient Philoſophers had done. Which ſpeculations of theirs no doubt, aroſe not ſo much from the School of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, as of that great reſtorer of Philoſophy *Ammonius* of *Alexandria*, whoſe Scholars *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus* were. Who living and dying a Chriſtian, as *Euſebius* and *Hierom* aſſure us, whatever *Porphyrius* ſuggeſts to the contrary,

Euſeb. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l. 6. c. 19. Hierom. de Script. Eccl.

Holſten. de vit. & Script. Porphyr. c. 6.

trary, did communicate to his Scholars the ſublimer Myſteries of Divine Revelation, together with the Speculations of the ancient Philoſophers; which *Holſtenius* conceives he did with an adjuration of Secrecy, which he tells us *Porphyrius* himſelf acknowledgeth, that thoſe three Scholars of *Ammonius*, *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus*, were under an Obligation to each other, not to reveal and diſcover, tho' it were after violated by them. It is an eaſy matter to conceive, what an excellent improvement might be made of the ancient *Platonic* Philoſophy, by the advantage of the Scriptures, by one who was ſo well vers'd in both of them, as *Ammonius* is ſuppos'd to have been; and how agreeable and becoming would that Philoſophy ſeem, which had only its riſe from *Plato*, but its height and improvement from thoſe rich and truly Divine Truths which were inlaid with them? The want of obſerving this, *viz.* whence it was that thoſe excellent Diſcourſes in the latter *Platoniſts* had their true Original, hath given occaſion to ſeveral miſtakes among Learned Men: As firſt, the over-valuing of the *Platonic* Philoſophy, as tho' in many of the Diſcourſes and Notions of it, it ſeem'd to ſome (who were more in love with Philoſophy than the Scriptures) to out-go what is diſcover'd therein concerning the ſame things. A moſt groundleſs and unworthy Cenſure! when it is more than probable (and might be largely manifeſted, were it here a fit Opportunity) that whatever is truly generous and noble in the ſublimeſt Diſcourſes of the *Platoniſts*, had not only its primitive Riſe, but its acceſſion and improvement from the Scriptures, wherein it is ſtill contain'd in its native Luſtre and Beauty, without thoſe paintings and impure mixtures which the ſublimeſt Truths are corrupted with in the *Platonic* Writings. The reaſon of which is, tho' theſe Philoſophers grew ſuddenly Rich, thro' the Spoils they had taken out of the Scriptures, yet they were loth to be known from whence they had them, and would ſeem to have had that out of their own Gardens, which was only tranſplanted from the Sacred Writings. Therefore we find them not mentioning the Scriptures, and the Chriſtian Doctrine, without ſome Contempt of its meanneſs and ſimplicity; and whatever improvement they had gain'd by them, they would have it leſs taken notice of, by profeſſing their oppoſition to the Chriſtians, as is notorious in thoſe great Philoſophers, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus*, *Hierocles*, *Simplicius*, and others. It being their deſign to take ſo much, and no more, out of the Chriſtian Doctrine as they could well ſuit with their *Platonic* Notions; by which means they ſo diſguis'd the Faces of the Truths they ſtole, that it were hard for the right Owners of them to know them again. Which was the grand Artifice of their great Maſter *Plato*, who doubtleſs by means of his Abode and Acquaintance in *Ægypt*, about the time when the *Jews* began to flock thither, had more certain knowledge of many Truths of grand Importance, concerning the DEITY, the Nature of the Soul, the Origin of the World, than many other *Greek* Philoſophers had; but yet therein lay his great fault, that he wrapt up and diſguis'd his Notions in ſuch a fabulous and ambiguous manner, that partly he might be leſs known from whence he had them, and that they might find better entertainment among the *Greeks*, than they were ever like to do in their plain and native dreſs. Which *Plato* himſelf ſeems ſomewhere to intimate, when he ſaith, That what the *Greeks* receiv'd from the *Barbarians* κάλλιον τοῦτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται, *they put it in a better faſhion, i.e.* they diſguiſe it, alter and change it as they pleaſe, and put it into a *Greek* Habit, that it might never be

Plato in Epinom.

ſuſpected to have been a Foreigner. Thence *Tertullian* ſpeaks with a great deal of Truth and Freedom of ſuch Philoſophers, who did *ingenii ſitim de prophetarum fonte irrigare* (as he expreſſeth it) that quench'd their Thirſt after Knowledge with the Waters of *Jordan* (tho' they did not, like *Naaman*, cure the Leproſie of the Head, by waſhing in them) for as *Tertullian* ſaith, they came only *ex negotio curioſitatis*, more to pleaſe the itch of their Curioſity, than to cure it.

Tertul. Apol. c. 47.

And wherein they ſeem'd moſt to agree with the Scriptures, their difference was beyond their agreement. *Siquidem vera quæque & conſonantia Prophetis aut aliunde commendant aut alior ſum ſubornant, cum maxima injuria veritatis, quam efficiunt aut adjuvari falſis aut patrocinari. Whatever the Philoſophers ſpeak agreeable to the Scriptures, either they do not own whence they had it, or turn it quite another way, whereby they have done the Truth a great deal of injury, by mixing it with their corruptions of it, and making that little Truth a plea for the reſt of their Errors.* Neither was this only among the ancient Philoſophers, but the Primitive Chriſtians began to diſcern the underhand workings of ſuch, who ſought to blend Philoſophy and Chriſtianity together; for *Tertullian* himſelf takes great notice of ſuch, who did, *Veritatis dogmata ad Philoſophicas ſententias adulterare*, ſuborn Chriſtianity to maintain Philoſophy; which makes him cry out, *Viderint qui Stoicum, & Platonicum, & Dialecticum Chriſtianiſmum protulerunt*; by which we ſee what tampering there was betimes, rather to bring Chriſtianity down to Philoſophy, than to make Philoſophy truckle under the truth and ſimplicity of the Scriptures. Whether *Ammonius* himſelf, and ſome others of the School of *Alexandria*, might be guilty in this kind, is not here a place to inquire, tho' it be too evident in the Writings of ſome, that they rather ſeek to accommodate the Scriptures to the Sentiments of the School of *Plato*, than to reform that by the Scriptures: But I ſay, however it were with thoſe who were Chriſtians, yet thoſe who were not, but only Philoſophers, made their great advantage by it. For when they found what was reconcileable with the Doctrine of *Plato* in the Scriptures, done already to their hands, by the endeavours chiefly of *Ammonius* and *Origen*, they greedily embrace thoſe improvements of their Philoſophy, which would tend ſo much to the Credit of it, and as contemptuouſly reject what they found irreconcilable with the Dictates of their Philoſophy. Now what an unreaſonable thing is it, when whatever was noble and excellent in the Heathen Philoſophy was derivative from the Scriptures, as the ſacred Fountain of it; that the meeting with ſuch things ſhould in the leaſt redound to the prejudice of the Scriptures, from whence it was originally deriv'd? When on the other ſide, it ſhould be a great confirmation to our Faith, as to the Scriptures, that they who were profeſs'd Philoſophers, and admirers only of Reaſon, did ſo readily embrace ſome of thoſe grand Truths which are contain'd in the Word of God.

Tertul. de Anima, c. 2.

Tertul. de Præſcrip. adverſ. hæret. c. 7.

XIV. For which we need no other inſtance than that before us, concerning the Origin of Evil, the making out of which will tend to the clearing the laſt thing mention'd concerning it; which was, *That the moſt material things in it are atteſted by the Heathens themſelves.* And this Honey which is gain'd out of the Lion's Mouth, muſt needs taſte ſweeter than any other doth. For it is a weak and groundleſs miſtake on the other ſide, which is the ſecond (which ariſeth from meeting things conſonant to the Scriptures, in the Writings of Philoſophers) preſently to conclude from ſuch things, that they were Chriſtians (as it is ſaid ſome have lately done in the behalf of *Hierocles*.) For there being ſuch clear accounts given in Scripture, of the grand Difficulties and Perplexities which the Minds of Men were troubled with, when theſe came to the knowledge of ſuch who were of Philoſophic and inquiſitive Heads, we cannot but think they would meet with acceptation among them; eſpecially if they might be made conſiſtent with their former Speculations. Thus it was in our preſent Caſe, concerning the Origin of Evil; we have already beheld the lamentable perplexities the ancient Philoſophers were in about it; what *Meander's* they were loſt in, for want of a Clue to guide them thro' them: Now it pleas'd GOD, after the coming of CHRIST in the Fleſh, to declare to the World the only way for the recovery of Souls and their eternal Salvation; the News of which being ſpread ſo far, that it ſoon got among the Philoſophers, could not but make them more inquiſitive concerning the State and Condition of their Souls: And when they had ſearch'd what the Philoſophers had formerly diſcover'd of it, their Curioſity would preſently prompt them to ſee what account of Things, concerning the Souls of Men, was deliver'd by the Preachers of this new Doctrine. By this they could not but preſently underſtand, that they declar'd all Mens Souls to be in a moſt degenerate and low Condition, by being ſo continually under the power of the moſt unreaſonable and unruly Paſſions, that they were eſtranged from GOD, and prone to fix on things very unſutable to their Nature; as to all which, their own inward Senſe and Experience could not but tell them that theſe things were notoriouſly true: And therefore they inquire farther how theſe things came to be ſo; which they receive a full account of in Scripture, that Man's Soul was at firſt created Pure and Holy, and in perfect Friendſhip with GOD; that GOD dealt bountifully and favourably with Man; only expected Obedience to his Laws; that Man being a free Agent, did abuſe his Liberty, and diſobey'd his Maker; and thence came the true πτερορρύησις, the Feathers of the Soul, whereby it ſoared up to Heaven, moulted away, and the Soul ſunk below it ſelf, into a degenerate and apoſtate Condition, out of which it is impoſſible to be recover'd without ſome extraordinary Expreſſion of Divine Favour. Now what is there in all this Account, but what is hugely ſutable to Principles of Reaſon, and to the general Experience of the World, as to thoſe things which were capable of being try'd by it? And thoſe Philoſophers who were any thing ingenuous, and Lovers of Truth, could not but confeſs the Truth of thoſe things which we are now ſpeaking of, *viz. That Mens Souls are in a very degenerate Condition; That the moſt rational account of it is, that Man by the act of his own Will, brought himſelf into it; and that in order to the Happineſs of Mens Souls, there was a neceſſity of recovery out of this Condition.*

XV.
1. *As to the degeneracy of the Souls of Men*; this was the common complaint of thoſe Philoſophers, who minded the government of themſelves, and the practice of Virtue, eſpecially of the *Platoniſts* and *Stoics*. *Seneca* in all his Moral Diſcourſes, eſpecially in his Epiſtles, may ſpeak ſufficiently in behalf of the *Stoics*, how much they lamented the degeneracy of the World. And the *Platoniſts* all complain of the ſlavery of the Soul in the Body, and that it is here by way Puniſhment, for ſomething which was done before; and which makes me ſomewhat inclinable to think, that *Plato* knew more of the lapſe of Mankind, than he would openly diſcover; and for that end diſguis'd it after his uſual

manner in that *Hypotheſis* of Præ-exiſtence, which taking it Cabaliſtically (for I rather think the Opinion of Præ-exiſtence is ſo to be taken, than the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man) may import only this, *That Mens Souls might be juſtly ſuppos'd to be created happy, but by reaſon of the Apoſtacy of Man's Soul from* GOD, *all Souls come now into their Bodies as into a kind of Priſon, they being enſlav'd to the brutiſh part within them, there having been ſuch a true* πτερορρύησις, *the Soul being now depriv'd of her chiefeſt Perfections in this her low and degenerate Condition.* And it ſeems far more rational to me, to interpret thoſe Perſons Opinions to a Cabaliſtical, or an Allegorical Senſe, who are known to have writ deſignedly in a way obſcure and ambiguous, than to force thoſe Mens expreſſings to *Cabala*'s, who profeſs to write a plain Hiſtory, and that with the greateſt ſimplicity and perſpicuity. But it cannot but ſeem very ſtrange, that an *Hypotheſis* capable of being reconcil'd to the plain literal Senſe of the Scriptures (deliver'd by a Perſon who uſeth great artifice and cunning to diſguiſe his Opinions, and ſuch a Perſon withal, who (by ſuch Perſons themſelves who make uſe of this Opinion to that end) is ſuppos'd to have been very converſant with the Writings of *Moſes*) ſhould be taken in its literal Senſe, as it really imports Præ-exiſtence of each particular Soul in the groſſeſt manner: And this ſhould be made to be a part of the Philoſophic Cabala of the Writings of ſuch a Perſon, who uſeth not the leaſt Artifice to diſguiſe his Senſe, nor gives us any where the leaſt intimation, that he left behind him ſuch plaited Pictures in his Hiſtory of the beginning of the World, that if you look ſtraight forward, you may ſee a literal Cabala, on the one ſide a Philoſophical, and on the other a Moral. But now if we remove the Cabala from *Moſes* to *Plato*, we may find no incongruity or repugnancy at all either as to *Plato*'s way of Writing, or the conſonancy of the Opinion ſo interpreted to the plain genuine Senſe of *Moſes*, if by *Plato*'s Opinion of the præ-exiſtence and deſcent of Souls, be underſtood by the former, the happy ſtate of the Soul of Man in conjunction with GOD; and by the latter, the low and degenerate Condition which the Soul is in, after Apoſtacy from him: Which the latter *Platoniſts* are ſo large and eloquent in expreſſing. *Porphyry*, where he ſpeaks of ſome things he counſels Men to do, hath theſe words, *But if we cannot do them, let us at leaſt do that which was ſo much lamented of old,* τὸ θρυλούμενον πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν, which is, ὡς τοίων ἐκ τ' ἐρίδων, ἔκ τε νεικέων γινόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀκήρατον, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀβλαβὲς σώζειν οὐ δυνάμεθα. *Let us at the leaſt join with our Fore-fathers in lamenting this, that we are compounded of ſuch diſagreeing and contrary Principles, that we are not able to preſerve divine, pure and unſpotted Innocency.* And *Hierocles* fully expreſſeth his ſenſe of the Degeneracy of Mankind in theſe words; Οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ καὶ τῆς προσπαθείας ἥττους καὶ πρενοβλαβεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς γῆν νεύσεως γινόμενοι, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἑαυτῶν τὸ κακὸν ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ βουληθῆναι φυγεῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἀπομερίσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς τούτου ὁμιλίας, ἧς ἐτύγχανον ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ διάγοντες· τὸν γὰρ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ χωρισμὸν βλάπτοντα τὰς φρένας ἡ πρὸς γῆν νεῦσις δηλοῖ. *The moſt of Men in the World are bad, and under the command of their Paſſions, and grown impotent thro' their propenſity to Earth; which great Evil they have brought upon themſelves, by their wilful Apoſtacy from* GOD, *and withdrawing themſelves from that Society with him, which they once enjoy'd in pure light: Which departure of Mens Souls from* GOD, *which is ſo hurtful to the Minds of Men, is evident by their ſtrong inclination to the things of this World.* The ſame Author mentions, with much approbation, that Speech of *Heraclitus*, ſpeaking of thoſe Souls which

Porphyr. de Abſtinent. l. 3. ſ. 2.

Hieroc. in Pythag. Carm. p. 261.

which are ἄπτωτοι εἰς κακίαν, which I cannot better render than *undeclinably good*, he ſaith, ὅτι ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον, *We live their Death, and die their Life:* κάτεισι γὰρ καὶ ἀποπίπτει τῆς εὐδαίμονος χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος. *For Man is now fallen down from that bleſſed Region*; and as *Empedocles* the *Pythagorean* ſpeaks,

Φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης
Νείκει μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.

Which words cannot be better rendred, than in the words the Scripture uſeth concerning *Cain*, *And he went from the Preſence of the Lord, and was a fugitive in the Earth*, and under continual perplexities. For the Soul of Man having left τὸν λειμῶνα τῆς ἀληθείας (it is *Hierocles*'s own expreſſion) *the pleaſant meadow of Truth* (a fit deſcription of Paradiſe) τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πτερορρυήσεως εἰς γήϊνον ἔρχεται σῶμα ὀλβίου αἰῶνος ἀμερθεὶς, *through the violence of her moulting, or deplumation, ſhe comes into this earthly Body, deprived of that bleſſed Life, which ſhe before enjoy'd.* Which he tells us is very conſonant to *Plato*'s ſenſe of the κάθοδος, or deſcent of Souls, that when by reaſon of their impotency of fixing wholly on God they ſuffer συντυχίαν καὶ πτερορρύησιν, *ſome great loſs, and a depravation of former Perfections*, (which I ſuppoſe is meant by the πτερορρύησις, the Souls impotency of flying up above this earthly World) then they lapſe into theſe Terreſtrial and Mortal Bodies. So *Hierocles* concludes with this excellent and divine Speech, ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ θεόθεν φυγὴ, καὶ ἡ πτερορρύησις τῶν κουφιζόντων ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ ἄνω εἰς τὸν τῶν θνητῶν ἤνεγκε τόπον, οἷς τὰ κακὰ συνέρχεται· οὕτως οὖν ἡ τῆς θνητῆς προσπαθείας ἀποβολὴ, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν, οἷον πτερῶν τινῶν ἔκφυσις πρὸς τὸν τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐζωΐαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *As therefore by apoſtacy from* God, *and the moulting of thoſe Feathers of our Souls, whereby we may be rais'd up above this World, we have fallen into this place of Mortals which is compaſſed about with Evils; ſo by caſting off carnal Affections, and by the growth of Virtues like new Feathers to the Soul, we ſhall aſcend to the Place of pure and perfect Good, and to the enjoyment of a Divine Life.* So much more becoming Chriſtians do theſe excellent Philoſophers ſpeak of the degeneracy of Mens Souls, and the conſequents of it, than ſome who would be accounted the followers of Reaſon, as well as of Christ, who make it ſo much of their buſineſs to extenuate the Fall of Man. Which we find thoſe who were mere Philoſophers, far more rational and ingenuous in, than thoſe who pretend ſo highly to Reaſon; but I think with as little of it as any, ſuppoſing the Scriptures to be of Divine Authority. But it is not here our buſineſs to conſider the Opinions of thoſe who pretend to Chriſtianity, but only of ſuch who pretending only to Reaſon, have yet conſented with the Doctrine of the Scriptures as to the Degeneracy of the Souls of Men, that it lies in an Apoſtaſie from God, and having loſt thoſe Perfections which they had before.

Hieroc. in Pythag. p. 254.

XVI. 2. *That Man's Fall is the cauſe of his Apoſtaſie*; this we have already manifeſted at large, from the Teſtimony and Reaſon of *Simplicius*; and *Hierocles* is as large and clear in it as the other, with Expreſſions much of the ſame nature. Μέση γὰρ οὖσα ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐσία τῶν τε ἀεὶ νοούντων τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν μηδέποτε νοεῖν πεφυκότων, ἄνεισι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ κάτεισι πρὸς ταῦτα, νοῦ κτήσει καὶ ἀποβολῇ, πρὸς τὴν θείαν ὁμοίωσιν καὶ τὴν θήρειον, διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀμφίβιον ἀναμέρος οἰκειουμένη. *Man's Nature lying between thoſe Beings which perpetually contemplate* God, *and thoſe which are uncapable of it, it ſometimes aſcends*

Hieroc. in aur. Carm. p. 258.

to thoſe, and ſometimes deſcends to theſe, according as it obſerves or rejects the Dictates of Reaſon, and ſo by reaſon of the indifferency of the Will is liable to take upon it the ſimilitude of GOD *or a Beaſt.* Ταῦτ' οὖν ὁ περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐγνωκὼς οὐσίας, οἶδε πῶς αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πῶς τλήμονες καὶ τάλανες τῇ ἑαυτῶν αἱρέσει γίνονται. *And whoever thoroughly conſiders this will eaſily underſtand, how Men are the cauſes of their own Evils, and become unhappy and miſerable thro' their own choice and ſelf-wills:* Which he brings in by way of explication of that truly golden *Pythagorean* Verſe,

Γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχοντας
Τλήμονας.

Men are grown miſerable thro' their own fault. And afterwards *Hierocles* excellently deſcribes the nature of Evil in theſe words, ἓν δὲ συμφυὲς ἅμα καὶ ἐπίκτητον ἡμῖν κακόν, ἡ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις. *Both our natural and contracted pravity, is nothing elſe but the unnatural motion of our free Wills:* According to which, ſaith he, ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς θείοις νόμοις πειρώμεθα, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθανόμενοι ὅσον ἑαυτοὺς βλάπτομεν, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀντιτείνειν Θεῷ. ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦτο τυφλῶς ὁρῶντες, ὅτι ἐδυνήθημεν ἀφηνιάσαι τῶν ἐκείνου θεσμῶν. *We dare to contradict the Laws of* GOD, *not being ſenſible how much we injure our ſelves when we do it; and only look at this, that we are able to caſt off the reins of* GOD's *Laws from our necks.* And he truly ſaith, *That it is the greateſt abuſe of liberty to offend* GOD, *when we either do what he forbids, or neglect what he requires.* Ἵνα ἑκατέρωθεν τὴν ἀθλιότητα ἑαυτοῖς πληρώσωσιν οἱ τὸν θεῖον νόμον ἐκβαίνοντες, τῷ τε μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ προστεταγμένα καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀπηγορευμένα. *So that on both ſides Men bring miſery upon themſelves, by tranſgreſſing the Divine Law, both by not doing what they are commanded, and by doing what they are forbidden.* So that he fully aſcribes the origin of Evil to the τὸ αὐτεξούσιον κίνημα παρὰ φύσιν διατεθὲν, as he calls it, *the irregular motion of the Will of Man*, which we have already ſhew'd to be the Doctrine of the Scriptures.

3. As to the neceſſity of the Soul's recovery from this condition, in order to her felicity, we have theſe Philoſophers expreſſing their conſent with the Scriptures. *Porphyrius*, as St. *Auguſtine* tells us in the end of his firſt Book, *De regreſſu animæ*, doth acknowledge the neceſſity of a way of recovering Souls, which ſhould be univerſal. *Cum autem dicit Porphyrius, Nondum receptam unam quandam ſectam, quæ univerſalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ, ——— nondumque in ſuam notitiam eandem viam hiſtoriali cognitione perlatam, proculdubio confitetur eſſe aliquam, ſed nondum in ſuam veniſſe notitiam.* But the neceſſity of the purgation of the Soul in order for the Felicity, is ſo largely and fully diſcours'd of by all the *Platoniſts* and *Pythagoreans*, that it will be needleſs to inſiſt upon it. Thus far then we find the account given of the origin of Evil in Scripture to be embrac'd by the ſublimeſt of the Heathen Philoſophers, as moſt rational and ſatisfactory; which was the thing to be prov'd.

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 10. c. 32.

XVII. Neither do we find only the main of this account acknowledged as rational, but we may trace ſome not obſcure foot-ſteps of the truth of particular Circumſtances which concern the fall of Man, among the Heathens: ſuch as the *Devil's envying of Man's happineſs, his diſguiſing himſelf under the form of a Serpent, and Man's being thrown out of Paradiſe upon his fall.*

D. Caſaub. Original of temporal Evils.

1. *The Devil's envying the happineſs of Man.* It hath been truly obſerv'd by a learned Man, that the original of that very ancient Opinion among the Heathen, *de invidia Dæmonis*, had its riſe from the Hiſtory of the fall of Man, which he hath made out ſo fully, that I ſhall the leſs need to prove it. And that there was an undoubted Tradition of ſome malignant Spirits, which envy'd the welfare of Mankind, appears by that ample Teſtimony of *Plutarch*, in his *Dio*, mention'd by the ſame Author; Οὐκ οἶδα, μὴ τὸν πάνυ παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον, ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, προσφθονοῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνιστάμενα, ταραχὰς καὶ φόβους ἐπάγει, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ὡς μὴ διαμένοντες ἀπτῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκέραιοι, βελτίονος ἐκείνων μοίρας μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τύχωσιν. *Plutarch* was much troubl'd to give an account of the Apparitions which *Brutus* and *Dio*, who were learned and philoſophical Men, were haunted withal; and doubts he can give no juſt account of it, unleſs he embrac'd that very ancient Tradition (which yet ſeem'd abſurd and incredible,) viz. *That there are certain wicked and malignant Dæmons, which envy good Men, and withſtand their Enterprizes, by raiſing Fears and Troubles to them, that ſo they might hinder them in their purſuit of Vertue; leſt, if they continue ſtedfaſt and unmoveable in Good, they ſhould be at laſt partakers of greater Felicity than they enjoy.* There being ſo ancient a Tradition of ſuch ὑβρισταὶ δαίμονες, (as the learned Man mention'd hath more fully ſhew'd in his Notes on this place of *Plutarch*,) gives a great confirmation to the truth of what the Scripture reports concerning the Devil's being ſo great an Inſtrument in procuring the fall of Man. To him therefore I refer the inquiſitive Reader, and ſhall not add to the Teſtimonies of him cited, that of *Xenocrates* in *Plutarch, de Iſide & Oſiride*, where he ſaith that the calamities of Life and Misfortunes Men meet with, do not agree with that veneration which we have for the Deity and good Spirits, Ἀλλ' εἰσὶ φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυράς, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάς, αἳ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. *But that there are in the Air ſome great and potent Beings, which are of a ſurly and malignant nature, and rejoyce to do Men all the miſchief they can.* *Iamblichus*, in his anſwer to *Porphyrius* concerning the *Ægyptian* Myſteries, undertakes to give an account of theſe evil Spirits or Dæmons, and that from them the origin of Evil in the World is; for thus he ſpeaks (as he is tranſlated by *Ficinus*) *Si verum eſt quod de Idolis dicebamus, improbiſque Dæmonibus, hinc ſane exoritur multiplex origo malorum. Simulant enim Deorum præſentiam, Dæmonumque bonorum, ideoque cultorem ſuum jubent eſſe juſtum, ut ipſi videantur boni, ſicut & Dii; quoniam vero natura ſunt mali, rogati mala inferre, libenter inferunt, atque nobis ad injuſta conducunt. Hi ſunt omnino qui & in oraculis mentiuntur & fallunt, & turpia conſulunt atque peragunt.* By which we ſee he acknowledgeth ſome Spirits whoſe natures are wicked, and help Men to do evil; and that theſe very Spirits may ſometimes command that which is good, leſt they ſhould be ſuſpected to be what they are, of a wicked and malignant Nature, which only deſign the ruin of Men. By which we have a good account of whatever was commendable deliver'd by the Heathen Oracles, which yet might come from the Devil ſtill, by this confeſſion of *Iamblicus* himſelf.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 361.

Iamblich. de myſter. p. 105.

XVIII. 2. *For the Devil's appearing under the form of a Serpent,* It is very probably conjectur'd, that from hence it was that the Prince of thoſe who contended with *Saturn*, was by that Ænigmatical writer *Pherecydes Syrius* call'd Ὀφιονεύς. *Celſus* who had ſo little skill in Antiquity as to think that the Hiſtory of *Moſes* was as to many paſſages of it taken out of Heathen Fables, inſiſts on this very ſtory of *Ophioneus* as the ground-work of that relation in *Geneſis* concering the Fall. But *Origen* well anſwers him, ὅρα οὖν, εἰ ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν ὡς σφαλλομένοις ἀσεβέστατα, καὶ ἀποπεπλανημένοις, θείων αἰνιγμάτων, αὐτὸς σαφῶς σφάλλεται· μὴ κατανοήσας ὅτι τὰ πολλῷ οὐ μόνον Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Φερεκύδου ἀρχαιότερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁμήρου, Μωϋσέως γράμματα εἰσήγαγε τὸν περὶ πονηροῦ τούτου καὶ ἐκπεσόντος τῶν οὐρανίων λόγον. *See therefore if this rare Antiquary who chargeth us with Impiety in corrupting and altering the Heathen Fables, be not himſelf more juſtly chargeable with the ſame fault, not underſtanding the far greater Antiquity of the Writings of* Moſes, *than either of* Heraclitus, *or* Pherecydes, *or* Homer *himſelf, which reports the ſtory of that evil one which fell from Heaven.* ὁ γὰρ ὄφις (παρ᾽ ὃν παρὰ τῷ Φερεκύδῃ γέγονεν Ὀφιονεὺς) αἴτιος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐκβληθῆναι τοῦ θείου παραδείσου τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοιαῦτά τινα αἰνίσσεται), ἐπαγγελίᾳ θειότητος καὶ μειζόνων ἀπατήσας τὸ θηλύτερον γένος· ὡς συνακολουθηκέναι λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ. *For the Serpent (from which* Ophioneus *in* Pherycides *deriv'd his name) which was the cauſe why Man was caſt forth of Paradiſe, doth intimate ſome ſuch thing, while under a pretence of Divinity, and of a better condition, he firſt deceiv'd the Woman, and by her means the Man.* *Cælius Rhodiginus* calls this *Ophioneus Dæmonicum Serpentem, qui anteſignanus fuerit agminis a Divinæ mentis placito deficientis.* This *Pherecydes*, as appears by *Euſebius*, had much converſe with the *Phœnicians*; where he purpoſely ſpeaks concerning this *Ophioneus*. Now the *Phœnicians*, as *Euſebius* likewiſe tells us, worſhipped their God under the form of a Serpent; which probably might be occaſion'd by the Devil's ambition and tyranny over Men, that would be worſhipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done ſo much miſchief to the World. It was very early in the World, when the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians* did begin to adore their Gods under the form of Serpents, for the beginning of it is attributed to *Taautus* by *Euſebius*, τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ Δράκοντος φύσιν καὶ τῶν ὄφεων αὐτὸς ἐξεθείασεν ὁ Τάαυτος, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν αὖθις Φοίνικές τε καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι. Neither was this only among the *Phœnicians* and *Ægyptians*, but where-ever the Devil reign'd, the Serpent was had in ſome peculiar veneration: thence *Juſtin Martyr* ſaith, παρὰ παντὶ νομιζομένων παρ᾽ ὑμῖν θεῶν ὄφις σύμβολον μέγα καὶ μυστήριον ἀναγράφεται· *The Serpent was the Symbol of Adoration among them*; and was the proper *Indicium*, or note of a Conſecrated Place, as is evident by that of *Perſius*.

Orig. c. Celſum, l. 6.

Cæl. Rhodig. Antiq. lect. l. 2. c. 7.

Euſeb. de Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Juſt. Mart. Apolog. 2.

Pinge duos angues: pueri, ſacer eſt locus.

Perſ. Satyr. 1.

Thence the Scholiaſt on *Ariſtophanes* on that place in *Plutus*, ἐξῃξάτην οὖν δύο δράκοντ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ νεώ, obſerves κοινῶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἥρωσι δράκοντες παρετίθεντο, ſo that where-ever any God or Hero was to be worſhipped, there were Serpents painted to denote ſo much. So *Orus Apollo* ſaith of the *Ægyptians*, οὐβαῖον ὅ ἐστιν ἑλληνιστὶ βασιλίσκον χρυσοῦν περιτιθέασι τοῖς θεοῖς, *they were wont to put the form of a golden Baſilisk to their Gods.* *Heinſius* conceives that the firſt worſhip of *Apollo* at *Delphi* was under the form of a Serpent, whither *Nonnus* tells us that *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* went upon his firſt coming into *Bœotia*, and from hence he derives the name *Pytho* from the Hebrew פתן which ſignifies a Serpent. *Ut non dubitandum ſit*, ſaith he, *quin Pythius Apollo, hoc eſt; Spurcus ille ſpiritus, quem Hebræi Ob & Abaddon, Helleniſtæ ad verbum* Ἀπολλύωνα, *cæteri* Ἀπόλλωνα *ſub hac forma qua miſeriam humano generi invexit, primo cultus ſit in Græcia.* And which is farther obſervable, the Devil was always ambitious to have the

Heinſ. Ariſtarch. p. 18. ed. 1627.

World think that the knowledg of Good and Evil was to come by the Serpent ſtill; thence the famous Oracle of *Apollo* here at *Delphi*; thence came the uſe of Serpents ſo much in Divination, thence נחש ſignifies to divine, from נחש a Serpent; and ſo among the *Greeks* οἰωνίζεσθαι, is taken in the ſame Senſe, from οἰωνὸς a Serpent. So that excellent Gloſſographer *Heſychius*; οἰωνὸς, ὄφις· ἐπεικῶς λέγονται εἰς τὰς μαντείας τοὺς ὄφεις ἔχειν ὅθεν καὶ οἰωνοὺς ἔλεγον. The Serpent was reckoned among the *pedeſtria auſpicia* by the *Romans*; and *Homer* tells in that ſolemn Divination, concerning the *Greeks* ſucceſs at *Troy* there appears,

Iliad. β′. Δράκων ἐπὶ νῶτα δαφοινός.

Which, ſaith *Heinſius*, is an exact deſcription of the *Nachas*; whom they would have ſo call'd from the marks on his Back, which they accurately obſerv'd in Divination. Thus we ſee how careful the Devil was to advance his honour in the World under that form, wherein he had deceiv'd Mankind into ſo much Folly and Miſery.

3. We meet with ſome remainders of Man's being caſt out of Paradiſe, upon his Fall among the *Heathens*. *Origen* thinks that *Plato*, by his converſe with the *Jews* in *Egypt*, did underſtand the Hiſtory of the Fall of Man, which he after his way enigmatically deſcribes in his *Sympoſiacs*. Where he brings in *Porus*, *the God of Plenty*, *feaſting with the reſt of the Gods*; *after Supper* Penia *comes a begging to the Door*; Porus *being drunk with Nectar*, *goes into* Jupiter's *Garden*, *and there falls aſleep*; Penia *obſerving it*, *ſteals to him*, *and by this deceit conceiv'd by him*. In this Fable of *Plato*, *Origen* takes notice what a near reſemblance the Garden of *Jupiter* hath to *Paradiſe*, *Penia* to the *Serpent* which circumvented *Adam*, and *Porus* to *Man*, who was deceiv'd by the *Serpent*. Which he conceives more probable becauſe of *Plato*'s Cuſtom, τὰ μεγάλα ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενα δόγματα κρύψαι μὲν διὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῷ τοῦ μύθου σχήματι, *to wrap up thoſe excellent things he knew under ſome Fables*, *becauſe of the Vulgar*; for which he after ſpeaks of his Cuſtom, in altering and diſguiſing what he had from the *Jews*, leſt he ſhould too much diſpleaſe the fabulous *Greeks*, if he ſhould adhere too cloſe to the *Jews*, who were ſo infamous among them. Some have thought the ſtory of Paradiſe was preſerv'd among the *Heathens* in the Fable of the Gardens of *Adonis*, which comes near that of *Eden*; but what foot-ſteps may be gather'd of the truth of Scripture Hiſtory in the *Heathen* Mythology, will appear afterwards. Thus much here then may ſerve to have manifeſted the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil by the Fall of Man to be in it ſelf rational, and atteſted by the conſent of ſuch Perſons who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality to the Scriptures.

Orig. c. Celſ. l. 4. *p.* 189.

XX. We come now to conſider the other grand Difficulty which concerns the Origin of Evil, and the Truth of Divine Providence together. Which is, that if Sin be the cauſe of Miſery, and there be a GOD which Governs the World; *Whence comes it to paſs*, *that the worſt of Men do ſo frequently eſcape ſufferings*, *and the beſt do commonly undergo them?* This hath been in all Ages of the World, where Men have been philoſophical and inquiſitive, one of the great Inquiries which the Minds of Men have been perplex'd about. The true and full Reſolution of which Queſtion, depends much upon thoſe Grounds and Principles which are diſcover'd to us by Divine Revelation in the Scriptures, concerning the grounds of GOD's Patience towards wicked Men, the nature and end of Sufferings which good Men are exercis'd with. And certainly this ſhould very much commend the Scriptures to all ſober and inquiſitive Perſons, that they contain in them the moſt clear and certain grounds of Satisfaction to the Minds of Men, in ſuch things wherein they are otherwiſe ſo irreſolv'd. But of that afterwards. Our preſent buſineſs is to give an account of this difficulty from Natural Reaſon, which will be moſt ſatisfactorily done by the producing thoſe grounds from which they have reſolv'd this Queſtion, *Cur malis bene, & bonis male,* who either have not had, or at leaſt own'd any thing of Divine Revelation. I begin with that which doth concern the Proſperity and Impunity of wicked Men, which Men have with more confidence inſiſted on on this account, becauſe all Men could not but underſtand a general reaſon of Sufferings, by reaſon there were none whoſe Conſciences could wholly acquit them of evil Actions; but why Perſons notoriouſly Wicked ſhould live in Impunity, when others ſuffer, that they were unable to give an account of. And this was the common pretence of *Atheiſm:* And *Simplicius* tells us, Συμβαίνει δέ τινας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀναποδείκτως πιστεύειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ ὁρᾶν ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, ποτὲ δὲ κακοὺς ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εὐποροῦντας, ὀλιγωρεῖν ὧν ἔχουσι περιλήψεων, καὶ χώραν δεδόναι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λέγειν,

Simplic. Comment. in Epictet. c.38. p.223.

Τολμῶ κατειπεῖν μήποτ' οὐκ εἰσὶν Θεοὶ,
Κακοὶ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες ἐκπλήττουσί με.

It comes to paſs, that ſuch who have no grounded belief of a **DEITY**, *when they obſerve the Miſeries of good Men, and the tranquillity and felicity of bad Men, they regard not the common Notions they have of a* DEITY, *and are ready to cry out with the Tragœdian,*

Shall I not dare to ſay there are no Gods,
When thoſe do proſper who have injur'd me?

And it is obſervable, that the moſt of thoſe who have taken occaſion amongſt the *Heathens* to queſtion Providence, have done it upon ſome remarkable injury which they have conceiv'd to be done to themſelves, and ſo we have ground to think that it was more Paſſion and Intereſt, than any clear Reaſon which was the inducement to it. So *Diagoras* reſolves to ſet up for an *Atheiſt*, becauſe the perjur'd Perſon was not ſtruck down in the place.

And *Jaſon* in *Seneca*, when he ſees *Medea* fly away after killing his Children, cries out,

Teſtare nullos eſſe qua veheris Deos.

Thou tell'ſt the World there are no Gods that way
Where thou doſt fly.

And ſo *Claudian*, who largely reaſons the caſe on both ſides, for Providence and againſt it, at laſt tells us what it was which was the main cauſe of his doubts, *viz.* the long impunity of *Rufinus.*

Abſtulit hunc tandem Rufini pœna tumultum
Abſolvitque Deos.

Rufinus's *death doth clear the Gods, and ſet*
My Mind at eaſe.

Cicero. l. 3. de Nat. Deor.

But becauſe ſome carry it higher, as *Cotta* in *Tully*, who reaſons the moſt (as became a Stateſman) in reference to ſuch Perſons who had been uſeful or hurtful to the Commonwealths, we may ſuppoſe there might be ſomewhat more of Reaſon than Intereſt in ſuch Argumentations; and yet even in thoſe Diſcourſes we may ſtill find that the main original of this quarrel againſt Providence, was an over-high eſteem of themſelves, that they thought they deſerv'd better from the Gods, than to receive ſuch Injuries, or undergo ſuch Calamities. Therefore *Cotta* cries out on Providence, becauſe ſuch Perſons who were uſeful to the *Roman* Commonwealth, were deſtroy'd, when the enemies to it eſcap'd, as tho' Providence had been only a *Tutelar Deity* of *Rome*, and had nothing to do elſewhere. Thence he cries out, If there be Providence, why were the two *Scipio*'s deſtroy'd in *Spain* by the *Carthaginians*? Why was *Maximus* killed by *Hannibal*? Why were the *Romans* with *Paulus* ruined at *Cannæ*? Why did *Regulus* undergo ſo much cruelty by the *Carthaginians*? Why did not *Africanus* die in his own Bed? Nay, ſaith he, to come nearer home, why is my Uncle *Rutilius* in baniſhment? Why was my friend *Druſus* killed in his own Houſe? On the other ſide, why did *Marius* die in peace, and the moſt cruel *Cinna* enjoy ſo long tranquillity? With many other inſtances of both ſorts. But this is it which I take notice of theſe for, becauſe we hereby ſee how common it is for Men to queſtion Providence, more out of Paſſion and Intereſt, than out of any ſolid grounds of Reaſon.

XXI. Let us therefore appeal from Perſons who were particularly engaged by ſome private intereſt in thoſe Paſſages, from whence they would infer that there was no Providence, to ſuch who ſtood by unconcern'd, and made uſe of the free dictates of their Reaſon in theſe caſes. And ſuch Perſons when they come to reaſon the caſe like Philoſophers, and Men out of paſſion, have given ſatisfactory and rational accounts why God in his wiſe Providence may ſometimes ſuffer the worſt of Men to go on in Impunity, when good Men may go thro' the troubles of this World. As,

Plutarch. de his qui ſero puniuntur à numine, p. 550. ed Fr.

1. God *forbears wicked Men, to propound the example of his Goodneſs to their imitation, to teach them not to revenge their Injuries too greedily on each other.* This *Plutarch*, in that admirable Diſcourſe of his on this ſubject, inſiſts on as his firſt reaſon, why God doth not preſently puniſh wicked Men. For, ſaith he out of *Plato*, God *hath ſet forth himſelf in the midſt of the World for our imitation; and true Virtue is nothing elſe but an imitation of the Divine Nature. And therefore* God, ſaith *Plato*, *gave Man the uſe of ſight, that by the ſight of the heavenly Bodies, and the exact Motions which are in them, Men ſhould learn* τὸ εὔσχημον ϗ τεταγμένον, *that which was comely and orderly, and hate all diſorderly and irregular Motions:* For as he excellently ſpeaks, Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅ, τι μεῖζον ἄνθρωπος ἀπολαύειν Θεοῦ πέφυκεν ἢ τὸ μιμήσει, ϗ διώξει τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν ϗ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίστασθαι. *There is no greater benefit Man can receive from* God, *than to attain true Virtue by the imitation and purſuit of thoſe Perfections which are in him.* And thence, ſaith *Plutarch*, God forbears to puniſh wicked Men preſently, not leſt if he ſhould puniſh them he might do that he would repent of afterwards, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν τὸ περὶ

τὰς τιμωρίας θηριῶδες καὶ λάβρον ἀφαιρῶν, *but that he might take away the fury and violence of Men, in revenging their injuries on each other*, that they ſhould not do it in Wrath and Anger, with as much eagerneſs as they ſatisfy their Hunger and Thirſt, whereby they do, ἐπιπηδᾷν τοῖς λελυπηκόσιν, *leap upon them who have injur'd them*, with as much fury as a wild Beaſt upon his Prey: But Men ſhould learn to imitate τὴν ἐκείνου πρᾳότητα καὶ μέλλησιν, GOD's *gentleneſs and patience*, whereby he gives the Offender time to conſider with himſelf what he hath done, before he doth ſeverely puniſh him. As *Plato* when his Boy had angred him, ſtood ſtill a while without ſtriking him, τὸν θυμὸν κολάζων, as he ſaid, *puniſhing himſelf firſt for his Anger*, before he would chaſtiſe the Boy for his fault: And *Archytas* when he ſaw how negligent his Workmen had been, and began to be very angry with them, told them, εὐτυχεῖτε ὅτι ὀργίζομαι ὑμῖν, *It is well for you that I am angry with you.* Now ſaith *Plutarch*, if the conſideration of this forbearance in Men ſhould tend to moderate Mens heat and violence, how much more ſhould the conſideration of the Lenity and Patience of GOD, do it! καὶ θεῖον ἡγεῖσθαι μόριον ἀρετῆς τὴν πρᾳότητα καὶ τὴν μεγαλοπάθειαν, *and to account gentleneſs and forbearance to be an imitation of Divine Perfections.* Now what can be more rational and agreeable to our Apprehenſions of a Divine Nature than this is, that he ſhould ſhew his Goodneſs to all, and by his Forbearance of ſo many, teach the World more Meekneſs and Gentleneſs towards each other? For if offences riſe by the quality of the Perſon againſt whom they are committed, no Injuries can be ſo great in one Man to another, as thoſe Affronts are which Men put upon GOD by their continual provocations of Him: And if GOD then be of ſo infinite patience to forbear ſuch who have offended him, what juſtice and reaſon is there, but that Men ſhould expreſs more Lenity and Patience towards each other? So *Hierocles* excellently ſpeaks, Μιμεῖται καὶ ἐν τοῖς φιλίας μέτροις τὸν Θεὸν, ὃς μισεῖ μὲν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, τὸ δὲ φιλανθρωπίας ἀγαθὸν κοινῷ τῷ γένει προτείνων. *A good Man imitates* GOD *in the meaſures of friendſhip, who hates no Man, and extends his loving-kindneſs to all Mankind.* Of which *Seneca* likewiſe ſomewhere ſpeaks: *Ne Deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effuſa benignitate ſacrilegi negligenteſque eorum deterrent; utuntur natura ſua, & cuncta, interque illa ipſos munerum ſuorum malos interpretes, juvant. The Divine Benignity extends it ſelf to all, even to ſuch as affront and diſhonour them, and abuſe the Gifts they beſtow upon them.* And ſince there is ſo much truth and reaſon in that of *Plato*, τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι Θεῷ, *It is the height of goodneſs to be like to* GOD; we ſee what excellent reaſon there is for that Command of our Saviour, *Love* Luke vi. 35, 36. *your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward ſhall be great, and ye ſhall be the Children of the Higheſt; for he is kind unto the unthankful, and to the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful.*

2. GOD *forbears preſently to puniſh wicked Men, to give them time to become better.* This the ſame excellent Moraliſt gives as another account of GOD's patience, that thereby he gives them χρόνον πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, *a ſpace to repent in*, as the Scripture calls it. *For Men*, ſaith *Plutarch*, *in their puniſhments look at nothing farther than mere ſatisfying their revenge and malice, and that makes them purſue thoſe that have offended them with ſo much rage and eagerneſs; but* GOD, ſaith he, *aims at the cure of thoſe who are not utterly incurable*, to ſuch he gives, μεταβαλέσθαι χρόνον, *a time to reform in.* Here he brings in the examples of ſuch who were

Plutarch. p. 551.

Rev. ii. 21.

bad at firſt, and came afterwards to be chang'd from what they were; for which he inſtances in *Cecrops*, who was thence call'd Διφυής, becauſe from a cruel ſevere Prince, he became gentle and mild; and ſo *Gelon* and *Hieron* of *Sicily*, and *Piſiſtratus* the Son of *Hippocrates*, who, from being Uſurpers became excellent Princes. If *Miltiades*, ſaith he, had been cut off while he acted the part of a Tyrant, and *Cimon* in his Inceſt, or *Themiſtocles* in his Debaucheries, what had become of *Marathon*, *Eurymedon*, *Dianium*, by which the *Athenians* got ſo great Glory and Liberty? and as he well obſerves, Οὐθὲν γὰρ αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις μικρὸν ἐκφέρουσιν, *Great Spirits do nothing mean*; Οὐδὲ ἀργεῖ δι' ὀξύτητα τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ δραστήριον, ἀλλ' ἐν σάλῳ διαφέρονται πρὶν εἰς τὸ μόνιμον καὶ καθεστηκὸς ἦθος ἐλθεῖν. *That ſharp and active Spirit that is in them can never lie at reſt by reaſon of its vigor, but they are toſs'd up and down, as it were in a tempeſt, till they come to a ſettled compos'd life.* But as the multitude of weeds argues the richneſs and ſoftneſs of the ground, tho' for the ſake of thoſe weeds one not skill'd in Husbandry would not account ſuch ground worth looking after; ſo, ſaith he, ἄτοπα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα προεξανθοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις· *Great Spirits uſually bring forth no commendable fruits at firſt; which we conſidering the danger and hurtfulneſs of, are preſently for cutting them down: but one that more wiſely conſiders the generous nature which may lie under this ill fruit, waits time and leiſure, till Reaſon and Age begin to maſter theſe head-ſtrong paſſions.* And therefore according to the prudent Law of the *Ægyptians*, *The Woman with Child muſt be repriev'd till the time of her delivery.*

3. God *ſpares ſome wicked Men from puniſhment to make them inſtruments of his juſtice in puniſhing others.* Ἐνίοις γὰρ ἀμέλει καὶ κολασταῖς ἑτέρων πονηρῶν, ἅτε δημοκοίνοις, ἀπεχρήσατο τὸ δαιμόνιον, as *Plutarch* goes on, God *ſpares ſome from puniſhment, that by them he might puniſh others.* Which he ſuppoſeth to be the caſe of all Tyrants; and thereby *Cotta*'s difficulty concerning *Marius*, *Cinna*, *Sylla*, and thoſe other cruel and tyrannical perſons, who uſurp'd Authority among them, is clearly taken off: For Divine Providence might let thoſe Trees grow from whence he intended to take his Rods to ſcourge others withal. God makes the ſame uſe of Tyrants (ſaith *Plutarch*) to Common-wealths, that Phyſicians do of the Gall of a *Hyæna* and other hurtful Creatures; which may be good for curing ſome dangerous Diſeaſes; ſo may the tyrannical ſeverity and ſharpneſs of ſuch perſons be continued ἢ τὸ νοσοῦν ἀπαλλάξαι καὶ καθᾶραι, *till the diſeaſes of the political Body be cur'd by theſe ſharp Medicines.* Such a one was *Phalaris* to the *Agrigentines*, and *Marius* to the *Romans*: and the Oracle told the *Sicyonians* in expreſs terms, μαστιγονόμων δεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν. *The City wanted ſome ſevere diſcipline.* Thence *Totilas*, when he found what ſtrange ſucceſs he had in his enterprizes, call'd himſelf *Flagellum Dei*, and thought God rais'd him up on purpoſe to be a Scourge for the ſins of the World. And no doubt thoſe ſtrange paſſages of the *Roman* Common-wealth (which made *Cato* at leaſt diſpute Providence, and ſay, *Res divinas multum habere caliginis*, when he ſaw *Pompey* ſucceſsful as long as he ſerv'd his Ambition, but preſently overthrown when he ſtood for the Common-wealth) theſe things, I ſay, had a higher end than they look'd at, which was to make both *Pompey* and *Cæſar* the Inſtruments of Divine Juſtice to puniſh the *Romans* for their Luſts, Ambition and Cruelty, which were never greater than in that Age. Now then, if God muſt juſtly puniſh Offenders, why may he not ſpare ſome to make them his Inſtruments in the puniſhing of others, eſpe-

cially ſince after he hath us'd his Rods, he may caſt them into the fire too? as was evident in the inſtance of *Cæſar*, who, after all his ſlaughters and triumphs, was murthered in the *Senate*, and that by ſome who had been as active as any for him. And herein Divine Juſtice, both as to the puniſhment of the perſons, and the means of it, hath been very remarkable in multitude of Inſtances, which every one's reading may afford him.

4. Therefore, another account why God may ſpare wicked Men a while, is, *That Divine Providence might more remarkably be obſerv'd in the manner of their puniſhment afterwards.* *Plutarch* tells us of *Callippus*, who was ſtabb'd by his Enemies with the ſame Dagger with which he had kill'd *Dion* under a pretence of friendſhip. And when *Mitius* the *Argive* was kill'd in a tumult, afterwards, upon the day of a ſolemn Shew, a braſs Statue in the Market place fell upon his Murtherer, and kill'd him there. But moſt remarkable is the Story of *Belſus* recorded by the ſame Author, who having kill'd his Father, and a long time conceal'd it, goes one night to Supper to ſome Friends, and while he was there, thruſts up his Spear into a Swallow's Neſt, and pulls it down, and kills the young ones; his Friends asking him the reaſon of ſo ſtrange an action: Οὐ γὰρ (ἔφη) μου πάλαι καταμαρτυροῦσιν αὗται ψευδῶς καὶ καταβοῶσιν, ὡς ἀπεκτονότος τὸν πατέρα· *Do not you hear*, ſaith he, *how they falſly accuſe me, and cry out, that I have killed my Father?* Which being by the perſons preſent carry'd to the King, and the truth of it found out, he was executed for it. Such ſtrange ways doth Providence ſometimes uſe to ſhew how vigilant it is, even when we think it ſleeps the moſt.

5. *Tho' God ſpares the perſons of wicked Men, he doth not defer their puniſhment*, when the thoughts of their evil actions is the greateſt torment to them; *Maxima peccati pœna eſt, peccaſſe*, as *Seneca* ſpeaks. Sin bears its own puniſhment along with it. Wickedneſs is δεινή τις βίου δημιουργὸς οἰκτροῦ, *the moſt exquiſite contriver of miſery*, which fills the Minds of thoſe who commit it with continual conſternations, anxieties and perplexities of Mind. But as that often and deſervedly cited Author on this ſubject, *Plutarch* tells us, moſt Men are in this like Children, who when they behold Malefactors in the Theatres in their Cloth of Gold, and Purple Robes, with their Crowns on their Heads dancing about, they admire them, and imagin them to be moſt happy Men, till they ſee them laſh'd and beaten, and fire come out from their brave Apparel; ſo, ſaith he, as long as Men ſee others in their Pomp and Grandeur, they think them very far from puniſhment, till they behold their execution; which, ſaith he, is not ſo much the entrance of their puniſhment, as the perfection of it. So that the longer the time of their Lives is, the longer is the time of their puniſhment here; Οὐδὲ γηράσαντες ἐκολάσθησαν, ἀλλ' ἐγήρασαν κολαζόμενοι· *They are not puniſhed when they grow old, but are grown old in puniſhments.* Cannot we ſay a perſon is puniſhed while he is in Priſon and hath his fetters upon him, till his execution comes? nor that one that hath drunk Poiſon, is a dying while he walks about till the cold comes to his Heart, and kills him? *If we deny*, ſaith he, *that all the inquietudes, horrors and anxieties of Mind which wicked Men have, are no part of their puniſhment, we may as well ſay that a Fiſh which hath ſwallow'd the hook is not taken, becauſe he is not fry'd, or cut in pieces.* So it is with every wicked Man, he hath ſwallow'd the hook when he hath committed an evil action (τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς

ἀδικίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ εὐθὺς ἐξεδήδοκε) and this Conſcience within him, as he expreſſeth it,

Θυμὸς βολαῖος πέλαγος ὡς διαστρεβεῖ.

Iſa. 57. 21. Which in the Prophet's expreſſion is, *The wicked are like a troubled ſea, which caſts forth nothing but mire and dirt.* As *Apollodorus* dreamt, that he was flea'd and boyl'd by the *Scythians*, and that his Heart ſpake to him out of the Cauldron, Ἐγώ σοι τούτων αἰτία, *I am the cauſe of all this.* God deals by wicked Men, as *Caligula* was wont to ſay of thoſe he commanded to be executed, *Ferit ut ſentiant ſe mori*, he ſo puniſhes them, as to make them ſenſible of their puniſhments. And as *Tacitus* ſpeaks of cruel and wicked perſons, *quorum mentes ſi recludantur, poſſint aſpici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita ſævitia, libidine, malis conſultis animus dilaceretur.* Wickedneſs is the only Fury which continually haunts and laſhes thoſe who delight in it, and leaves ſtill behind it αἰσχρὰ καὶ φοβερὰ πάθη, *loathſome and terrible perturbations*, ſecret gripings of Conſcience and ſelf-condemning thoughts for their folly and wickedneſs; like *Lyſimachus*, who for extreme thirſt offer'd his Kingdom to the *Getæ* to quench it, which when he had done, φεῦ τῆς ἐμῆς κακίας, ὃς δι' ἡδονὴν οὕτω βραχεῖαν ἐστέρημαι βασιλείας τηλικαύτης. *What a wretch was I* (ſaith he) *to loſe ſuch a Kingdom for ſo ſhort a pleaſure!* And tho' wicked Men be not ſenſible of the loſs of a far more glorious Kingdom than this of *Lyſimachus*, viz. *that of Heaven*, yet they cannot but be ſenſible how much they have loſt that Kingdom which every good Man hath in the tranquillity of his Spirit, and the command of his paſſions.

6. *The time that* God *ſpares wicked Men, is not ſo long as we think for.* It is all one, as *Plutarch* ſaith, as if we ſhould complain, that the Malefactor was puniſhed in the evening, and not in the morning; God's forbearance is but for a very little time, compar'd with his own duration. We meaſure God by the ſhort hour-glaſs of our time, when we are ſo ready to confine him to our meaſures. The time ſeems long to us, but it is as nothing in it ſelf: ἐπεὶ τοῖς τε θεοῖς πᾶν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου διάστημα, τὸ μηδὲν ἐστι. *The whole life of Man compared with eternity is nothing.* Beſides, all this time God ſuffers wicked Men to live here, he hath them under ſafe cuſtody; he doth but let them take the air within the Priſon-wall, or it may be they may play and ſport themſelves there, but there is no poſſibility of eſcaping out of the hands of Divine Juſtice.

7. God *forbears wicked Men here, becauſe the time is to come wherein* God *intends to puniſh them.* This is the higheſt vindication of Divine Providence, as to the preſent impunity of wicked Men in the world, becauſe this is not the proper ſeaſon for the open Execution of Juſtice. There are but few in compariſon whom Juſtice cauſeth to be executed in the Priſon, of what are reſerv'd for the General Aſſizes; God reſerves them for a fair and open Trial, for the greater vindication of his honour, and manifeſtation of his Juſtice to the World. And altho' God's Judgments even in this World be ſometimes ſo remarkable, that we cannot but ſee a hand of Providence in them, yet they are but few whom God doth ſo remarkably puniſh here, to make us more firmly believe a day of Judgment to come. Which tho' it be moſt clearly and fully reveal'd in Scripture, yet the *Heathens* themſelves from mere Reaſon have had ſuch a perſuaſion of it, that they have given this as another great

reaſon, why God did forbear to puniſh wicked Men here, becauſe he did reſerve them for future puniſhment. For, as the ſame Moraliſt ſpeaks in the ſame Diſcourſe concerning the Soul, Ἀγωνίζεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς κατὰ τὸν βίον, ὅταν δὲ διαγωνίζεται τότε τυγχάνει τῶν προσηκόντων, *This preſent life is the place of the Soul's combat, which when it hath finiſh'd, it then receives according to its performance of it.* And as he before ſpeaks, Εἷς ἐστι λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον. *The ſame reaſon which confirms Providence, doth likewiſe confirm the Immortality of the Soul; and if one be taken away, the other follows.* Οὔσῃ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ τὴν τελευτὴν, μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τιμὰς ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ τιμωρίας· *And if the Soul doth ſubſiſt after death, it ſtands to the greateſt reaſon, that it ſhould there receive either reward or puniſhment.* Thus we ſee how far Natural Light, and Moral Reaſon will carry Men in the vindicating of Divine Providence, as to the preſent impunity of wicked Men. *Plutarch. p. 561.*

XXII. The other part which concerns the *ſufferings of good Men*, is not of ſo great difficulty, becauſe there are none ſo good as not to have a mixture of evil in them, and as they have a mixture of evil, ſo they have but a mixture of puniſhment; none lying under ſo great miſeries here, but withal they have ſome ſhare in the comforts of this Life. And therefore it is leſs wonder, that this part of Divine Providence which concerns the ſufferings of Men, hath not wanted ſome among the Heathen Moraliſts, who have made it their deſign to vindicate it; which ſetting aſide what *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, and many others have done, is fully performed by *Seneca* in his Tract on this ſubject, *Cur bonis male ſit, cum ſit Providentia* (as *Muretus* reſtores the title of that Book) wherein theſe following accounts are given of it.

1. God *brings them up as his Children under ſharp diſcipline for their future benefit.* A good Man in *Seneca*'s language is, *Diſcipulus Dei, æmulatorque, & vera progenies:* which in the language of the Scriptures is, *one taught of* God, *and a follower of* God, *and one born of him.* Now, ſaith he, *Parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis exactor, ſicut ſeveri patres, durius educat.* God, *who is the great Father of good Men, keeps them under diſcipline while under age, and by hardſhip fits them for the practice of Vertue.* Thence he bids us take notice of the different indulgence of Fathers and Mothers to their Children; the Father he haſtens them to School, ſuffers them not to be idle on their play-days, makes them toil, and ſometimes cry; the Mother ſhe is all for holding them in her lap, keeping them out of the Sun, and from catching cold, would not willingly have them either cry or take pains. *Patrium habet Deus adverſus bonos animum, & illos fortius amat.* God *bears the indulgence of a Father towards his Children, and loves them with greater ſeverity.* *Seneca de Provid. c. 1.*

2. *Good Men receive benefit by their ſufferings; Quicquid evenit in ſuum colorem trahit,* ſaith *Seneca* of a good Man, which in the language of the Apoſtle is, *Every thing works together for his good. The ſea loſeth nothing,* ſaith he, *of its ſaltneſs by the rivers running into it, neither doth a good Man by the current of his ſufferings.* And of all benefits which he receives, that of the exerciſe and trial of his Vertue and Patience is moſt diſcernable. *Marcet ſine adverſario virtus,* as ſoon as *Carthage* was deſtroy'd, *Rome* fell to Luxury: *True Wreſtlers deſire to have ſome to try their ſtrength upon them; Cui non induſtrio otium pœna eſt?* An active ſpirit hates idleneſs and cowardiſe; For, *etiamſi ceciderit, de genu pugnat, tho' his legs be cut off, he will fight on his knees.*

3. *It redounds to* God's *honor, when good Men bear up under ſufferings. Ecce par Deo dignum, virtus fortis cum mala fortuna compoſitus.* It is a ſpectacle God delights to ſee, a good Man combat with calamities. God doth in *Seneca*'s phraſe *quoſdam faſtidio tranſire*, paſſeth them by in a ſlight; *An old wreſtler ſcorns to contend with a Coward*, one who is *vinci paratus*, ready to yield up preſently. *Calamitates ſub jugum mittere proprium magni viri eſt*, It argues a noble ſpirit to be able to ſubdue miſeries.

4. *It tends to the trial and increaſe of their ſtrength. Seneca* highly extols that ſpeech of the *Philoſopher *Demetrius*, *Nihil infelicius eo cui nihil unquam evenit adverſi; non licuit enim illi ſe experiri.* He is the moſt unhappy Man who never knew what miſery meant; for he could never know what he was able to bear. And, as he ſaith, to paſs one's Life away *ſine morſu animi*, without any trouble, it is *ignorare rerum naturæ alteram partem*, not to know what is upon the reverſe of Nature. *Idem licet fecerint qui integri revertuntur ex acie, magis ſpectatur qui ſaucius redit.* Tho' he that comes home ſound, might fight as well as he that is wounded; yet the wounded perſon hath the more pity, and is moſt cry'd up for his valour. The Pilot is ſeen in a Tempeſt, a Soldier in the Battel, and a good Man in Sufferings. God doth by ſuch as Maſters do by Scholars, *qui plus laboris ab his exigunt, quibus certior ſpes eſt*; who ſet the beſt Wits the hardeſt taſks.

5. God *exerciſeth good Men with ſufferings, to diſcover the indifferency of thoſe things which Men value ſo much in the World, when he denies them to good Men.* Blindneſs would be hateful, if none were blind but ſuch whoſe Eyes were put out; and therefore *Appius* and *Metellus* were blind. Riches are no good things, therefore the worſt as well as the beſt have them. *Nullo modo magis poteſt Deus concupita traducere, quam ſi illa ad turpiſſimos defert, ab optimis abigit.* God could not traduce or defame thoſe things more which Men deſire ſo much, than by taking them away from the beſt of Men, and giving them to the worſt.

6. *That they might be examples to others of patience and conſtancy:* For, as *Seneca* concludes, *Nati ſunt in exemplar*, they are born to be patterns to others. If to theſe things we add what the Word of God diſcovers concerning the nature, grounds, and ends of afflictions, and that Glory which ſhall be reveal'd, in compariſon with *which exceeding weight of Glory, theſe light and momentany afflictions are not at all to be valu'd*; then we have a clear and full vindication of Divine Providence, as to the ſufferings of good Men, as well as to the impunity of ſuch as are wicked. But however, from hence we ſee how far the mere light of Reaſon hath carried Men in reſolving theſe difficulties concerning God's Providence in the World, and what a rational account may be given of them, ſuppoſing evil of puniſhment to ariſe from ſin, and that there is a God in the World, who is ready to puniſh the wicked, and to reward the good: Which was the thing to be ſhew'd.

H

J.K.

CHAP. IV.

219:2:B.

Of the Origin of Nations.

I. All Mankind deriv'd from Adam, *if the Scriptures be true. II. The contrary ſuppoſition an introduction to Atheiſm. III. The truth of the Hiſtory of the Flood. The poſſibility of an univerſal Deluge prov'd. IV. The Flood univerſal as to Mankind, whether univerſal as to the Earth and Animals; no neceſſity of aſſerting either. V. Yet ſuppoſing the poſſibility of it demonſtrated without creation of new Waters. VI. Of the Fountains of the Deep. The proportion which the height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth. No Mountains much above three Mile perpendicular. Of the Origin of Fountains. The opinion of* Ariſtotle *and others concerning it diſcus'd. The true account of them from the Vapours ariſing from the maſs of ſubterraneous Waters. VII. Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from* Buteo *and others. VIII. The truth of the Deluge from the Teſtimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from* Noah's *Poſterity. IX. Of the beginning of the* Aſſyrian *Empire. The multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the* LXX. *Of the time between the Flood and* Abraham, *and the advantages of it. X. Of the pretence of ſuch Nations, who call'd themſelves* Aborigines. *XI. A diſcourſe concerning the firſt Planters of* Greece: *The common Opinion propounded and rejected. The* Hellens *were not the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece, *but the* Pelaſgi. *The large ſpread of them over the parts of* Greece. *XII. Of their Language different from the* Greeks. *XIII. Whence theſe* Pelaſgi *came; that* Phaleg *was the* Pelaſgus *of* Greece, *and the Leader of that Colony, prov'd from* Epiphanius. *XIV. The Language of the* Pelaſgi *in* Greece *Oriental: Thence an account given of the many Hebrew words in the Greek Language, and the remainders of the Eaſtern Languages in the Iſlands of* Greece, *both which not from the* Phœnicians, *as* Bochartus *thinks, but from the old* Pelaſgi. *XV. Of the ground of the Affinity between the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians. *Of the Peopling of* America.

THE next thing we proceed to give a rational account of, in the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World contain'd in Scripture, is the peopling the World from *Adam*. Which is of great conſequence for us to underſtand, not only for the ſatisfaction of our curioſity as to the true Origin of Nations, but alſo in order to our believing the truth of the Scriptures, and the univerſal effects of the Fall of Man. Neither of which can be ſufficiently clear'd without this. For as it is hard to conceive how the effects of Man's Fall ſhould extend to all Mankind, unleſs all Mankind were propagated from *Adam*; ſo it is unconceivable how the account of things given in Scripture ſhould be true, if there were Perſons exiſtent in the World long before *Adam* was. Since the Scripture doth ſo plainly affirm, *That* GOD *hath made of one Blood all Nations of Men, for to dwell on the face of the Earth*; ſome Greek Copies read it ἐξ ἑνὸς, leaving out αἵματος which the vulgar Latin follows: The *Arabic* Verſion to explain both, reads it *ex homine*, or as *de Dieu* renders it *ex Adamo uno*, there being but the difference of one Letter in the Eaſtern Languages between דם and אדם, the one denoting Blood, and the other Man. But if we take it as our more ordinary Copies read it ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, yet thereby it is plain, that the meaning is not, that all Mankind was made of the ſame uniform Matter, as the Author of the *Præ-Adamites* weakly imagin'd (for by that reaſon, not only Mankind, but the whole World might be ſaid to be ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, of the ſame Blood, ſince all things in the World were at firſt form'd out of the ſame Matter) but αἷμα is taken there in the ſenſe in which it occurs in the beſt *Greek* Authors for the ſtock out of which Men come: So *Homer*,

Acts xvii. 26.

Εἰ ἐτεόν γ' ἐμός ἐστὶ καὶ αἵματος ἡμετέροιο.

Hom. Odyſſ. π.

Thence thoſe who are near Relations, are call'd in *Sophocles*, οἱ πρὸς αἵματος, thence the name of Conſanguinity for nearneſs of Relation: and *Virgil* uſeth *ſanguis* in the ſame ſenſe,

Trojano a ſanguine duci.

So that the Apoſtle's meaning is, that however Men now are ſo diſpers'd in their Habitations, and differ ſo much in Language and Cuſtoms from each other, yet they were all originally of the ſame ſtock, and did derive their ſucceſſion from that firſt Man whom GOD created. Neither can it be conceiv'd on what account *Adam* in the Scripture is call'd the firſt Man, and that *he was made a living Soul, and of the Earth, earthy*; unleſs it were to denote that he was abſolutely the firſt of his kind, and ſo was to be the Standard and Meaſure of all that follows. And when our Saviour would reduce all things to the beginning, he inſtanceth in thoſe words which were pronounc'd after *Eve* was form'd. *But from the beginning of the Creation* GOD *made them Male and Female*; *for this cauſe ſhall a Man leave Father and Mother, and cleave unto his Wife.* Now nothing can be more plain and eaſie than from hence to argue thus; thoſe of whom theſe words were ſpoken, were the firſt Male or Female which were made in the beginning of the Creation; but it is evident theſe words were ſpoken of *Adam* and *Eve*: *And* Adam *ſaid, this is now bone of my bone, and fleſh of my fleſh: Therefore ſhall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and ſhall cleave unto his Wife.* If the Scriptures then of the *New Teſtament* be true, it is moſt plain and evident that all Mankind is deſcended from *Adam*; and no leſs conſpicuous is it from the Hiſtory of the Creation as deliver'd by *Moſes*.

1 Cor. xv. 45, 47.

Mark x. 6, 7.

Gen. ii. 23, 24.

For how neceſſary had it been for *Moſes*, when he was giving an account of the Origin of Things, to have diſcover'd by whom the World was firſt planted, if there had been any ſuch Plantation before *Adam*: but to ſay that all the deſign of *Moſes* was only to give an account of the Origin and Hiſtory of the *Jewiſh* Nation, and that *Adam* was only the firſt of that Stock, is manifeſtly ridiculous, it being ſo clear, that not only from *Adam* and *Noah*, but from *Sem*, *Abraham*, and *Iſaac*, came other Nations beſides that of *Jews*. And by the ſame reaſon that it is ſaid, that *Moſes* only ſpeaks of the Origin of the *Jewiſh* Nation in the Hiſtory of *Adam*, it may as well be ſaid that *Moſes* ſpeaks only of the making of *Canaan*, and that part of the Heavens which are over it, when he deſcribes the Creation of the World in the ſix Days work. For why may not the Earth, in the ſecond Verſe of *Geneſis*, be as well underſtood of the Land of *Judæa*, and the Light and Production of Animals and Vegetables refer only to that, as to underſtand it ſo in reference to the Flood, and in many other paſſages relating to thoſe eldeſt times? But the Author of that *Hypotheſis* anſwers, *That the firſt Chapter of* Geneſis *may relate to the true Origin of the World and the firſt Peopling of it, but in the ſecond* Moſes *begins to give an account of the firſt Man and Woman of the Jewiſh Nation.* Very probable! but if this be not a putting aſunder thoſe which God hath joyn'd together, nothing is. For doth not *Moſes* plainly at firſt give an account of the Formation of things in the firſt ſix Days, and of his Reſt on the Seventh? But how could he be ſaid to have reſted then from the Works of Creation, if after this follow'd the Formation of *Adam* and *Eve* in the ſecond Chapter? Beſides, if the forming of Man mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 7. be diſtinct from that mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 27. then by all parity of Reaſon, תולדות השמים והארץ the *Generations* of *Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 2. 4. muſt be diſtinct from the *Creation of the Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen.* 1. 1. And ſo if there were another Creation of Heaven and Earth belonging to the *Jews* in *Gen.* 2. we may likewiſe believe that there was a new Creation of Man and Woman in that Chapter diſtinct from that mention'd in the former. Again farther, if there had been any ſuch Perſons in the World before *Adam*, no doubt *Adam* himſelf was ignorant of them; or elſe it had been a falſe and ridiculous account which he gives of the name of his Wife חוה *becauſe ſhe was* אםכלחי *the Mother of all living*. Not of all living Things, for that had been a more proper deſcription of a *Ceres*, or *Magna Mater*, or *Diana multimammia*, of our Grandmother the Earth, but certainly it extends to all of the kind, that all living Creatures that are of Human Nature came from her. So the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt underſtands it, ſhe was call'd *Hava*, becauſe ſhe was אמא דכל בני אנשא *the Mother of all the Sons of Men*. And ſo the *Arabic* Verſion, *Quia ipſa fuit mater omnis viventis rationalis*. To which purpoſe our Learned *Selden* cites the Verſion of the *Mauritanian Jews*, and the *Perſic* of *Tawaſius*.

II.

Gen. iii. 20.

Selden. de jure natur. & gent. l. 1. *c.* 5. *p.* 65.

But whatever the Credit or Authority of theſe Verſions be, this is moſt certain, that *Adam* had no reaſon at all to have given this name to his Wife, as being *the Mother of all living*, if there had been any of Mankind exiſting in the World from other Mothers, which had been long before *Eve* was form'd. So that we find it plain and clear, that if the report given of things in Scripture be true, the *Hypotheſis* of *Præ-Adamites* is undoubtedly falſe. And certainly who ever ſeriouſly conſiders the frequent Reflections on the Authority of the Scriptures, which were caſt by the Author of that Fiction, and his endeavouring on all occaſions to derogate from the Miracles recorded in it, may eaſily ſuſpect the deſign of that Author was not to gain any credit to his Opinion from thoſe Arguments from Scripture, which he makes ſhew of (which are pitifully weak and ridiculous) but having by the help of ſuch Arguments made his Opinion more plauſible, his hope was, that his Opinion would in time undermine the Scriptures themſelves; when he had made it appear that the account given in the Scriptures of the plantation of the World was unſatisfactory, ſince there were Men before *Adam*, which the Scriptures, to pleaſe the *Jewiſh* Nation, take no notice of. So that after he had attempted to proſtitute the Scriptures to his Opinion, his next work had been to have turn'd them out of Doors, as not of credit to be rely'd on by any, when they were ſo common to every Opinion. But how impious, abſurd, and rude that attempt was upon the ſacred and inviolable Authority of the Scriptures, hath been ſo fully diſcover'd by his very many not unlearned Adverſaries, that it might ſeem needleſs ſo much as to have taken notice of ſo weakly grounded, and infirmly prov'd an Opinion, had it not thus far lain in my way in order to the clearing the true Origin of Nations according to the Scriptures. The main foundations of which fabulous Opinion lying chiefly in the pretended Antiquities of the *Chaldæans*, *Ægyptians*, and others, have been fully taken away in our firſt Book, where our whole deſign was to manifeſt the want of credibility in thoſe accounts of ancient Times, which are deliver'd by Heathen Nations in oppoſition to the Scriptures. There is nothing at all in Scripture from the Creation of *Adam* to the Flood, which ſeems to give any countenance to that Figment, but only what may be eaſily reſolv'd from the conſideration of the great conciſeneſs of the *Moſaic* Hiſtory, in reporting that long interval of time which was between the Fall of *Adam*, and the Flood; by means of which conciſeneſs ſuch things are reported as ſpeedily done, becauſe immediately ſucceeding in the Story, which aſked a very conſiderable time before they could be effected; and beſides all things which were done before the Flood, being all quite obliterated by it, and all the numerous Poſterity of *Adam* being then deſtroy'd (only *Noah* and his Family excepted) to what purpoſe had it been any farther to have reported the paſſages before the Flood, otherwiſe than thereby to let us underſtand the certainty of the ſucceſſion of Perſons from *Adam*, and ſuch Actions in thoſe times which might be remarkable diſcoveries of GOD's Providence and Man's Wickedneſs in it; which being moſt apparent at firſt in *Cain* and his Poſterity, did by degrees ſo ſpread it ſelf over the face of the then inhabited World, that the juſt GOD was thereby provok'd to ſend a Deluge among them, to ſweep away the preſent Inhabitants, to make room for another Generation to ſucced them.

220.2.A.

III. This therefore we now come to conſider, *viz. The Hiſtory of the Flood*, and the certainty of the Propagation of the World, from the Poſterity of *Noah* after the Flood. I begin with the Hiſtory of the Flood it ſelf, as to which two things will be ſufficient to demonſtrate the truth of it. 1. *If there be nothing in it repugnant to Reaſon.* 2. *If we have ſufficient evidence of the truth of it, from ſuch who yet have not believ'd the Scriptures.* There are only two things which ſeem queſtionable to Reaſon concerning the Flood: The *firſt*, is, *concerning the poſſibility of the Flood it ſelf:* The other is, *concerning the capacity of the Ark for preſerving all kinds of Animals.* The only ground of queſtioning the poſſibility of ſuch a Flood, as that is related in Scripture, hath been from hence, that ſome have ſuppos'd it impoſſible, that all the Water which is contain'd in the Air, ſuppoſing it to fall down, ſhould raiſe the ſurface of Water upon the Earth a Foot and a half in height; ſo that either new Waters muſt be created to overflow the Earth, or elſe there muſt be ſuppos'd a Rarefaction of the Water contain'd in the Sea and all Rivers, ſo that it muſt take up at leaſt fifteen times the ſpace that now it doth: But then, they ſay, if the Water had been thus rarefy'd, could neither have deſtroy'd Man nor Beaſt, neither could *Noah's* Ark have been born up by it any more than by liquid Air. To this therefore I anſwer.

Firſt, I cannot ſee any urgent neceſſity from the Scripture to aſſert, that the Flood did ſpread it ſelf over all the ſurface of the Earth. That all Mankind (thoſe in the Ark excepted) were deſtroy'd by it, is moſt certain according to the Scriptures. When the occaſion of the Flood is thus expreſs'd, *And* GOD *ſaw that the wickedneſs of Man was great upon Earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his Heart was only evil continually.* Gen. 6. 5, 7. *And the Lord ſaid, I will deſtroy Man whom I have created from the face of the Earth.* It could not be then any particular Deluge of ſo ſmall a Country as *Paleſtine*, which is here expreſs'd, as ſome have ridiculouſly imagin'd; for we find an univerſal corruption in the Earth mention'd as the cauſe; an univerſal threatning upon all Men for this cauſe; and afterwards an univerſal deſtruction expreſſed, as the effect of this Flood. *And all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth,* Gen. 7. 21. *and every Man. And every living ſubſtance was deſtroyed which was upon the face of the Ground, both Man and Cattle, and the creeping things, and the Fowl of the Heaven, and they were deſtroyed from the* Ver. 23. *Earth, and* Noah *only remained alive, and they that were with him in the Ark.* So then it is evident, that the Flood was univerſal as to Mankind; but from thence follows no neceſſity at all of aſſerting the univerſality of it, as to the Globe of the Earth, unleſs it be ſufficiently prov'd that the whole Earth was Peopled before the Flood: Which I deſpair of ever ſeeing prov'd. And what Reaſon can there be to extend the Flood beyond the occaſion of it, which was the corruption of Mankind? And it ſeems very ſtrange, that in ſo ſhort an interval in compariſon, as that was from *Adam* to the Flood, according to the ordinary computation, *viz.* 1656 Years, and not much above two thouſand, according to the largeſt, the World ſhould then be fully Peopled, when in ſo much longer a ſpace of time ſince the Flood to this Day, the Earth is capable of receiving far more Inhabitants than now it hath. The only probability then left for aſſerting the univerſality of the Flood, as to the Globe of the Earth, is from the Deſtruction of all living Creatures together with Man; now tho' Men might not have ſpread themſelves over the whole ſurface of the Earth, yet Beaſts and creeping Things might, which were all deſtroy'd with the Flood: For it is ſaid, *That all fleſh died that moved upon the Earth, both of Fowl and of Cattle, and of Beaſt, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the Earth, and every Man.* To what end ſhould there be not only a note of univerſality added, but ſuch a particular enumeration of the ſeveral kinds of Beaſts, creeping Things, and Fowls, if they were not all deſtroy'd? To this I anſwer. I grant as far as the Flood extended all theſe were deſtroy'd; but I ſee no reaſon to extend the deſtruction of theſe beyond that compaſs and ſpace of the Earth where Men inhabited: Becauſe the puniſhment upon the Beaſts was accaſion'd by, and could not but be concomitant with the deſtruction of Mankind, but (the occaſion of the Deluge being the Sin of Man, who was puniſh'd in the Beaſts, that were deſtroy'd for his ſake, as well as in himſelf) where the occaſion was not, as where there were Animals, and no Men, there ſeems no neceſſity of extending the Flood thither. But to what end then, it will be replyed, *Did* God *command* Noah *with ſo much care to take of all kind of Beaſts, and Birds, and creeping Things into the Ark with him, if all theſe living Creatures were not deſtroy'd by the Flood?* I anſwer, becauſe all thoſe things were deſtroy'd where ever the Flood was. Suppoſe then the whole Continent of *Aſia* was Peopled before the Flood, which is as much as we may in reaſon ſuppoſe, I ſay, all the living Creatures in that Continent were all deſtroy'd; or if we may ſuppoſe it to have extended over our whole Continent of the anciently known World; what reaſon would there be that in the oppoſite part of the Globe, *viz. America*, which we ſuppoſe to be unpeopled then, all the living Creatures ſhould there be deſtroy'd, becauſe Men had ſinned in this? And would there not on this ſuppoſition have been a ſufficient reaſon to preſerve living Creatures in the Ark for future propagation, when all other living Creatures extant had been in ſuch remote places as would not have been acceſſible by them in many Generations, and thoſe Beaſts growing wild for want of Inhabitants, would not have prov'd preſently ſerviceable for the uſe of Men after the Flood? Which was certainly the main thing look'd at in the preſervation of them in the Ark, that Men might have all of them ready for their uſe after the Flood, which could not have been, had not the ſeveral kinds been preſerv'd in the Ark, altho' we ſuppoſe them not deſtroy'd in all parts of the World.

220.2.35

IV. All this proceeds on ſuppoſition that Animals were propagated much farther in the World than Men were, before the Flood. Which I confeſs ſeems very probable to me on this account, becauſe the production of Animals is parallel in *Geneſis* with that of Fiſhes, and both of them
Gen. 1. 20, 21. different from Man; *For* God *ſaith, Let the waters bring forth every moving Creature that hath life*; viz. *Fiſh, and Fowl*; and accordingly it is ſaid, *that the waters brought forth abundantly every living Creature after their kind, and every Fowl after his kind.* Accordingly in the pro-
Ver. 24. duction of Beaſts, we read, *Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind, Cattle, and creeping thing, and Beaſt of the Earth after his kind, and it was ſo:* But in the production of Man, it is ſaid, *Let us*
Ver. 26. *make Man in our own likeneſs.* From hence I obſerve this difference between the production of Animals, and of Man, that in the one God gave a prolific Power to the Earth and Waters for production of the ſeveral living Creatures which came from them; ſo that the ſeminal principles of them were contain'd in the Matter out of which they were produc'd; which was otherwiſe in Man, who was made by a peculiar Hand
Gen. 2. 6. of the great Creator himſelf, who thence is ſaid to have *formed Man of the duſt of the ground.* Now therefore altho' there were but one Male and Female of Mankind at firſt, which had a ſpecial formation by God himſelf; yet there is no reaſon we ſhould conceive it to be ſo as to the Production of other living Creatures, whether Fiſh, or Fowl, or Beaſts; but the prolific Virtue being by God's power given to that material principle out of which they were form'd, it may very well be ſuppos'd that many of the ſame kind were at firſt produc'd. For it ſeems very ſtrange to imagin that in the whole Ocean there ſhould be only two of a kind produc'd; but Fiſh and Fowl both ariſing from the Water, we

may have juſt reaſon to think, that the Waters being ſeparated before this prolific Virtue was communicated to the whole maſs of Waters, might in the ſeveral parts of the Globe of the Earth, bring forth both Fiſh and Fowl after their kinds. The ſame I ſay of the production of Animals in the ſixth days work, which are rank'd into three ſorts, Cattle, creeping Things, and Beaſts of the Earth after their kinds; now God ſaying, *Let the Earth bring forth her living Creatures*, (and that after the Waters had divided ſome parts of the Earth from other, ſo that there could be no paſſage for the Cattle, creeping Things, and Beaſts out of one part into another, without the help of Man,) it ſeems very probable that at leaſt thoſe parts of the Earth which were thus divided from each other, did bring forth theſe ſeveral living Creatures after their kinds, which did after propagate in thoſe parts without being brought thither by the help of Man. If now this ſuppoſition be embrac'd, by it we preſently clear our ſelves of many difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals in the World, and their converſation in the Ark, which many have been ſo much to ſeek for ſatisfaction in. As how the unknown kind of Serpents in *Braſil*, the ſlow-belly'd Creature of the *Indies*, and all thoſe ſtrange ſpecies of Animals ſeen in the *Weſt-Indies* ſhould either come into the Ark of *Noah*, or be convey'd out of it into thoſe Countries which are divided from that Continent where the Flood was by ſo vaſt an Ocean on the one ſide, and at leaſt ſo large a tract of Land on the other (ſuppoſing any paſſage out of one Continent into another, which yet hath not been diſcover'd.) Beſides, ſome kind of Animals cannot live out of that particular Clime wherein they are; and there are many ſorts of Animals diſcover'd in *America*, and the adjoining Iſland, which have left no remainders of themſelves in theſe parts of the World. And it ſeems very ſtrange that theſe ſhould propagate into thoſe remote parts of the World from the place of the Flood, and leave none at all of their number behind them in thoſe parts from whence they were propagated. Theſe things at leaſt make that Opinion very probable which extends the production of Animals beyond that of Mankind in the old World, and that the Flood tho' it deſtroy'd all Mankind, and every living Creature within that compaſs wherein Mankind inhabited, yet might not extend it ſelf to thoſe parts, and the Animals therein, in which Men had never inhabited. And by this means we need not make ſo many Miracles as ſome are fain to do about the Flood; and all thoſe difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals do of themſelves vaniſh and fall to the ground. This is the firſt way of reſolving the difficulty concerning the poſſibility of the Flood, by aſſerting it not to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, but only over thoſe parts where Mankind inhabited.

V. *Secondly*, Suppoſe the Flood to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, yet there might have been Water enough to have over-whelm'd it to the height mention'd in Scripture. For which we are to conſider that many cauſes concurr'd to the making of this Deluge; *firſt*, the Air was condens'd into Clouds, and thoſe fell down with continu'd force and violence, not breaking into drops, but all in a body (which Sir *Walter Rawleigh* parallels with the ſpouts of the *Weſt Indies*) which are thence call'd the Cataracts or Flood-gates of Heaven, God looſening (as he expreſſeth it) the power retentive which was in the Clouds, and ſo the Waters muſt needs fall in abundance, according to the expreſſion of *Job*, *Behold he with-holdeth the waters, and they dry up, alſo he ſendeth*

Sir Walker Rawleigh's *Hiſtory*.

Job. 12.15.

them out, and they overturn the Earth. Now I ſay, altho' theſe Waters falling down with ſo much fury and violence, as well as in ſo great abundance might quickly deſtroy all living Creatures; yet this was not all; for GOD who held in the Ocean within its bounds, whereby he ſaith to it, *Thus far it ſhall go, and no farther*, might then give it commiſſion to execute his Juſtice upon the ſinful World: and to all this, we have another cauſe of the Deluge, which was, *That the Fountains of the great Deep were broken up.* By which *Vatablus*, moſt probably underſtands, *Immenſam illam & profundam aquarum copiam quæ eſt ſubter terram*, that vaſt body of Water which lies in the bowels of the Earth; now when all theſe Fountains were broken up, and the Waters within the Earth ruſh out with violence and impetuoſity upon it, it muſt needs cauſe an Inundation ſo great as that is mention'd in the Scripture. For as that judicious Hiſtorian Sir *W. Rawleigh* obſerves, Let us conſider that the Earth had above 21000 Miles compaſs, the Diameter of the Earth according to that Circle 7000 Miles, and then from the Superficies to the Center 3500 Miles; take then the higheſt Mountain of the World, *Caucaſus*, *Taurus*, *Teneriff*, or any other, and I do not find, ſaith he, that the higheſt exceeds thirty Miles in height: It is not then impoſſible, anſwering Reaſon with Reaſon, that all thoſe Waters mixed within the Earth, 3500 Miles deep, ſhould be able to cover the ſpace of 30 Miles in height, which 30 Miles upright being found in the depths of the Earth 116 times; for the Fountains of the great Deep were broken and the Waters drawn out of the Bowels of the Earth. But then withal, ſaith he, if we conſider the proportion which the Earth bears to the Air about it, we may eaſily underſtand the poſſibility of the Flood, without any new creation of Waters; for ſuppoſing ſo much Air to be condens'd, and ſo turn'd into Water which doth encompaſs the Earth, it will not ſeem ſtrange to Men of Judgment, yea but of ordinary Underſtanding, that the Earth (GOD ſo pleaſing) was cover'd over with Waters, without any new Creation. But this will yet appear more probable, if the height of the higheſt Mountains doth bear no greater proportion to the Diameter of the Earth, than of the 1670 part to the whole, ſuppoſing the Diameter of the Earth to be 8355 Miles, as *P. Gaſſendus* computes both. And it is more than probable, that Men have exceedingly miſtaken, as to the height of Mountains, which comes ſo ſhort of what Sir *Walter Rawleigh* allows to them, that the higheſt Mountain in the World will not be found to be five direct Miles in height, taking the altitude of them from the Plain they ſtand upon. *Olympus*, whoſe height is ſo extoll'd by the Poets and ancient *Greeks*, that it is ſaid to exceed the Clouds; yet *Plutarch* tells us that *Xenagoras* meaſur'd it, and found it not to exceed a Mile and half perpendicular and about 70 Paces. Much about the ſame height *Pliny* ſaith that *Dicæarchus* found the Mountain *Pelion* to be. The Mount *Athos* is ſuppos'd of extraordinary height, becauſe it caſts its ſhadow into the Iſle of *Lemnos*, which according to *Pliny* was 87 Miles, yet *Gaſſendus* allows it but two Miles in height; but *Iſaac Voſſius* in a learned diſcourſe concerning the height of Mountains in his Notes on *Pomponius Mela*, doth not allow above 10 or 11 Furlongs at moſt to the height of Mount *Athos*. *Caucaſus* by *Ricciolus* is ſaid to be 51 Miles in height: *Gaſſendus* allowing it to be higher than *Athos* or *Olympus*, yet conceives it not above three or four Miles at moſt; but yet *Voſſius* will not yield it above two Miles perpendicular, for which he gives this very good reaſon; *Polybius* affirms, there

Gen. 7. 11.

Sir Walter Rawleigh *Ibid.*

Gaſſend. Tom. 2. op. Phyſ. ſ. 3. l. 1.

Plut. in Æmilian. Plin. l. 2. c. 65.

Voſſ. in Pomp. Melam. l. 5. c. 2. p. 115. &c.

there is no Mountain in *Greece* which may not be aſcended in a days time, and makes the higheſt Mountain there not to exceed 10 Furlongs; which, ſaith *Voſſius*, it is ſcarce poſſible for any one to reach, unleſs he be a Mountainer born; any other will ſcarce be able to aſcend above ſix Furlongs perpendicular; for in the aſcent of a Mountain every Pace doth reach but to an hand breadth perpendicular; but if we do allow eight Furlongs to a Days aſcent, yet thereby it will appear that the higheſt Mountains in the World are not above twenty four Furlongs in height, ſince they may be aſcended in three Days time. And it is affirm'd of the top of Mount *Caucaſus*, that it may be aſcended in leſs than the compaſs of three Days, and therefore cannot be much above two Miles in height. Which may be the eaſier believ'd of any other Mountain, when that which is reputed the higheſt of the World, *viz.* the *Pike* of *Teneriff*, which the Inhabitants call *Pica de Terraria*, may be aſcended in that compaſs of time, *viz.* three Days: For in the Months of *July* and *Auguſt* (which are the only Months in which Men can aſcend it, becauſe all other times of the Year Snow lies upon it, altho' neither in the Iſle of *Teneriff* nor any other of the *Canary-Iſlands*, there be Snow ever ſeen) the Inhabitants then aſcend to the top of it in three Days time; which top of it is not Pyramidal but plain, from whence they gather ſome Sulphurous Stones, which are carry'd in great Quantities into *Spain*. So that according to the proportion of eight Furlongs to a days Journey, this *Pike* of *Teneriff* will not exceed the height of a *German* Mile perpendicular, as *Varenius* confeſſeth, than which he thinks likewiſe that no Mountain in the World is higher. For what *Pliny* ſpeaks of the *Alps* being fifty Miles in height, muſt be underſtood not perpendicular, but in regard of the obliquity of the aſcent of it; ſo that he might account ſo much from the foot of the *Alps* to the top of them, and yet the *Alps* in a perpendicular Line not come near the height of a *German* Mile. If then the higheſt Mountains do not exceed much above three Miles in height, (for the *Spaniards* themſelves affirm, that thoſe lofty Mountains of *Peru*, in compariſon of which, they ſay, the *Alps* are but like Cottages, may be aſcended in four Days compaſs,) we ſee from hence then far greater probability, how the Waters in the time of the general Flood might overtop the higheſt Mountains.

V. Varenium Geogr. General. l. 1. c. 10. prop. 3.

VI. Eſpecially if it be made evident that there is ſo great an Abyſs of ſubterraneous Waters, that the breaking open of the Fountains of it may ſo much increaſe the Inundation ariſing from the Clouds, and from the breaking in of the Ocean upon the main Land. And that there is ſuch a maſs of Waters in the body of the Earth, is evident from the Origin of Fountains; for the Opinion of *Ariſtotle* imputing them to the condenſation of Air in the Caverns of the Earth, and that of other Philoſophers aſcribing them to the fall of Rain-water receiv'd into ſuch Ciſterns in the Earth which are capable of receiving it, are both equally unſatisfactory, unleſs we ſuppoſe a maſs of Waters in the Bowels of the Earth, which may be as the common ſtock to ſupply thoſe Fountains with. For it is very hard conceiving, how mere Air ſhould be ſo far condens'd, as to cauſe not only ſuch a number of Fountains, but ſo great a quantity of Water as runs into the Sea by thoſe Rivers which come from them, (as the River *Volga* is ſuppos'd to empty ſo much Water in a Years time into the *Caſpian* Sea, as might ſuffice to cover the whole Earth,) by which likewiſe it is moſt evident that there muſt be ſome ſubterranean paſſages into the Sea, or elſe of neceſſity, by that abundance of

Water which continually runs into it from the Rivers, it would over-flow and drown the World. And from this multitude of Waters which comes from Fountains, it is likewiſe evident, that the Origin of Fountains cannot be merely from ſuch Water which falls from the Clouds, which would never ſuffice to maintain ſo full and uninterrupted a Stream as many Fountains have: Eſpecially if that be true which ſome aſſert, that Rain-water doth never moiſten the Earth above ten Foot deep, for of far greater profundity many Fountains are. And beſides, the Rain-water runs moſt upon the ſurface of the Earth, and ſo doth rather ſwell the Rivers, which thereby run with greater force in their paſſage to the Ocean, and doth not lodg it ſelf preſently in the Earth, eſpecially if it deſcends in a greater quantity, which alone is able to fill ſuch Ciſterns ſuppos'd to be in the Earth, eſpecially in Mountains, which may keep a Stream continually running. Altho' therefore we may acknowledg that the fall of Rain may much conduce to the over-flowing and continuance of Fountains, as is evident by the greater force of Springs after continu'd Rains, and by the decay of many of them in hot and dry Weather, (which yet I had rather impute to the Sun's exhaling by his continu'd heat thoſe moiſt Vapours in the Earth, which ſhould continually ſupply the Springs, than merely to the want of Rain,) and by the riſe of moſt great Rivers from ſuch Fountains which came from the foot of Mountains; where the Ground is ſuppos'd to be of ſo hard and conſiſtent a ſubſtance, as Stone or Chalk, or ſomething of like nature, which might help to the conſervation of Water there, from whence it after ran in Streams to the Ocean, (which was the great Argument of the famous *Peireſkius* for his Opinion,) altho' I ſay, theſe things may argue thus far, that Rain-water doth much conduce to the preſervation of Springs, yet it cannot give a ſufficient account of the origin of them: Which with the greateſt reaſon and probability is imputed to thoſe ſubterraneous Waters which paſs up and down thro' the Bowels of the Earth. Some have fancy'd the Earth to be as one great Animal, whoſe ſubterraneous paſſages were like Veins in the Body, which receiv'd Water out of the Sea, as the Veins do Blood out of the Liver; and that there are ſome kind of Vapours in the Earth which ſupply the place of vital Spirits, which are diffus'd up and down the Body thro' the Arteries. And that as in an Animal, there are ſome parts which upon the leaſt prick do ſend forth Blood, and others are more callous where the inciſion muſt be deeper before any Blood appears; ſo it is in the Earth: When it is open'd in a right Vein we find preſently a Spring of Water; but if we chance to hit on a wrong place, we go deep and may find none; not that Water is wanting, but we have not hit on the Veins thro' which it runs. And thence the Blood with equal freedom and velocity aſcends into the Head as it runs into the Legs, becauſe it is equally diſpers'd into all the parts from the Center of it; ſo in the body of the Earth it is as natural for the Water to aſcend into the tops of Mountains, as it is to fall down into the Center of the Earth. And that it is no more wonder to ſee Springs iſſue out of Mountains, than it is to ſee a Man bleed in the Veins of his Fore-head when he is let Blood there. So in all places of the Earth the parts of it are not diſpoſed for apertion; for ſome of them are ſo hard and compact, that there ſeems to be no paſſage thro' them, (which is the moſt probable reaſon, why there is no Rain neither in thoſe places, becauſe there is no ſuch exſudation of thoſe moiſt Vapours thro' the ſurface of

V. Gaſſend. vit. Peireſkii, l. 3. p. 292.

the Earth, which may yield Matter for Rain, as it is in many of the ſandy places of *Africa*;) but uſually Mountainous Countries have more large, and as it were Temple-veins thro' which the moiſt Vapours have a free and open paſſage, and thence there are not only more frequent Springs there, but Clouds and Rains too. Now if this account of the Origin of Springs in the Earth be as rational as it is ingenious and handſome, (and there is not much can be ſaid againſt it, but only that then all Fountains ſhould be ſalt as the Water is from whence they come) then we eaſily underſtand how the Earth might be overflow'd in the univerſal Deluge; for then the Fountains of the Deep were broken up, or there was an univerſal opening of the Veins of the Earth, whereby all the Water contain'd in them would preſently run upon the ſurface of the Earth, and muſt needs according to its proportion, advance it ſelf to a conſiderable height. But becauſe the ſalving the difference of the Water in Springs from what it is in the Sea, is ſo conſiderable a *Phænomenon* in our preſent caſe, I therefore rather take this following as the moſt rational account of the Origin of Fountains, *viz.* That there are great Cavities in the Earth, which are capable of receiving a conſiderable quantity of Water, which continually runs into them from the Sea, (which as it continually receives freſh ſupplies from the Rivers which empty themſelves into it, ſo it diſpatcheth away a like quantity thro' thoſe ſpungy parts of the Earth under the Ocean, which are moſt apt to ſuck in and convey away the ſurpluſage of Water,) ſo that by this means the Sea never ſwells by the Water convey'd into it by the Rivers, there being as continual a circulation in the body of the Earth, of the Water which paſſeth out of the Ocean into the ſubterraneous Caverns, and from thence to the Mountains, and thence into the Sea again, as there is a circulation of Blood in Man's Body from the Heart by the Arteries into the exterior parts, and returning back again by the Veins into the Heart. According to which we may imagine ſuch a place in the Heart of the Earth like *Plato*'s *Baratrum*,

> Τῆλε μάλ᾽ ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον.

As *Plato* in his *Phædrus* deſcribes it out of *Homer*, *A long and deep ſubterraneous Cavity.* εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συῤῥέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ, ϗ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν πάντες ἐκρέουσι. *Into which Cavity all the Rivers at laſt flow, and from which they again diſperſe themſelves abroad.* Now this Cavity of the Earth thus fill'd with Water, ſupplies the place of the Heart in the body of the Earth, from which all thoſe ſeveral *Aqueducts* which are in the Earth have their continual ſupply; but that which makes thoſe paſſages of Water which we call Springs and Fountains properly, I ſuppoſe, is thus generated; from thoſe Cavities fill'd with Water in the Earth, by reaſon of the hot ſteams which are in the body of the Earth, there are continually riſing ſome Vapours or little Particles of Water, which are disjoyn'd from each other by the heat, by reaſon of which they attain a greater celerity of Motion, and ſo paſs thro' the inner Pores of the Earth till they come near the ſuperficies of it. Which when they have approach'd to, they are beat back again by the cold, which environs the ſurface of the Earth, or at leaſt are ſo arreſted by the cold and condens'd by it, that they loſe the form of Vapours, and become perfect Water again. Which Water being now more groſs, than while it was a mere Vapour, cannot deſcend again thro' the ſame Pores thro' which it aſcended before, becauſe theſe are not now capable of receiving it: And therefore it ſeeks out ſome wider paſſages near the ſurface of the Earth, by which means it moves in an oblique manner, and is ready to embrace any other Vapours which are arreſted in the ſame manner: Now when theſe are grown to a conſiderable body in the ſurface of a Mountain, or a Plain, and find a vent fit for them, there appears a proper Fountain, whoſe ſtreams are ſtill maintain'd by the ſame condenſation of Vapours, which when they are once come abroad, are in continual Motion, whereby Rivers are made, which are ſtill finding a paſſage thro' the declivity of the ſurface of the Earth, whereby they may return to the Ocean again. Now according to this account, that grand *Phænomenon* of the freſhneſs of Fountain-water, when the Water of the Sea is ſalt, whence it originally comes, is ſufficiently reſolv'd. For mere tranſcolation may by degrees take away that which the *Chymiſts* call the fixed Salt; and for the Volatile Salt of it (which being a more ſpiritous thing, is not removable by Diſtillation, and ſo neither can it be by Tranſcolation,) yet ſuch an evaporation as that mention'd, may ſerve to do it, becauſe it is evident that freſh Water will fall from the Clouds, which hath riſen from thoſe Vapours which have come out of the Sea: And beſides theſe Vapours or ſmall Particles of Water in their paſſage through the Earth (eſpecially when they come near the ſurface of it) do incorporate with other ſweet Vapours; as thoſe which come from Rain, and others, by which means they inſenſibly loſe their former acidity and ſharpneſs. But thoſe Fountains which do retain their former ſaltneſs, as there are many ſuch in the World, may very probably be ſuppos'd not to have come from thoſe Vapours condens'd, but to be a kind of breaking of a Vein, in which the Salt Water was convey'd up and down the body of the Earth. Now then, conſidering that maſs of Waters, and multitude of Vapours ariſing thence which are in the Earth, how eaſie is it for us to underſtand what the breaking open the Fountains of the Deep means in Scripture, and how by that means, together with the falling down of the Cataracts of the Clouds, and the letting looſe of the Ocean, the whole Earth might be overſpread with an univerſal Deluge? The poſſibility of which was the thing to be ſhew'd. 220:2.C. B.

VII. The next thing we come to concerning the Flood, is, the capacity of the Ark for receiving the ſeveral Animals which were to propagate the World afterwards. Concerning which, two things are neceſſary to be underſtood; what the meaſure of the Ark was, and what the number of Animals contain'd in it. The meaſure of the Ark muſt be determin'd by the proportion of the Cubit, which there is no reaſon at all to ſuppoſe either with *Origen* and others, to have been the Geometrical Cubit, which contains ſix ordinary Cubits or nine Feet; both becauſe we find no mention at all of any ſuch Cubit in Scripture, and becauſe the Fabric of the Ark would have been of too vaſt a proportion. Neither yet is it probable, what Sir *W. Rawleigh* ſuppoſeth, that this Cubit muſt be of a proportion as much exceeding ours, as the ſtature of a Giant doth ours, both becauſe there is no certain evidence, either from Scripture or Reaſon, that the proportion Men then did generally exceed what is now. And beſides, this tends not in the leaſt to make the thing more plain; for according to that proportion, we muſt then have imagin'd Beaſts to have been as well as Men; for the Horſe muſt have been proportionably as great to have been ſerviceable to Men of that ſtature, and ſo the Animals would have taken up as much more room in the Ark as the Cubit is ſuppos'd to be bigger. I ſuppoſe then that *Moſes* ſpeaks of the Cubit moſt in uſe in his own time (for he writ ſo that they for whoſe uſe he writ, might be eaſily able to underſtand him,) now this Cubit by the conſent of Writers contain'd a Foot and a half in length; according to which proportion, ſuppoſing the Ark by *Moſes*'s deſcription to have 300 Cubits in length, 50 in breadth, and 30 in height, the whole capacity of the Ark, according to the computation of *Johl Buteo* comes to 450000 ſolid Cubits. For the length of 300 Cubits being multiply'd into the breadth of 50 Cubits, and the product by the height of 30 Cubits, makes the whole Concavity 450000. Which *Matheus Hoſtus* reducing to the *German* meaſure, makes the Longitude of the Ark to be 31 Perches, 4 Cubits, 5 Fingers; the Latitude 5 Perches, 2 Cubits and 11 Fingers; the Altitude 3 Perches 1 Cubit, 9 Fingers; allowing to every Perch 15 *Roman* feet. So that if we take a Perch to contain 10 *Hebrew* Cubits, which exceeds the former 11 Fingers, the whole capacity of the Ark will be 450 cubical Perches. And as he ſaith, *Hujuſmodi ſane ædificii amplitudo capaciſſima eſt, & quamlibet magno animantium numero haud dubie ſufficere potuit*; the Ark of ſo large a capacity might eaſily contain the ſeveral kinds of Animals in it. Which will be eaſily underſtood, if according to our former ſuppoſition, only the Animals of the inhabited part of the World were preſerv'd in the Ark; But admitting that all kinds of Animals were there, there would be room enough for them, and for Proviſion for them. For which Sir *W. Rawleigh* gives a prudent caution, that Men ought not to take Animals of a mixt Nature, as *Mules* and *Hyæna*'s, nor ſuch as differ in ſize and ſhape from each other, as the *Cat* of *Europe*, and *Ownce* of *India*, into the ſeveral ſpecies of Animals. Sir *W. Rawleigh* following *Buteo* reckons 89, or leſt any be omitted, 100 ſeveral kinds of Beaſts; and undertakes to demonſtrate from a triple proportion of all Beaſts, to the Ox, Wolf, and Sheep, that there was ſufficient capacity for them in the Ark. *Hoſtus* allows 150 ſeveral kinds of Animals, yet queſtions not the capacity of the Ark. But theſe things are ſo particularly made out by thoſe Learned Authors, eſpecially by *Buteo*, that I ſhall rather refer the Reader for farther ſatisfaction to the Authors themſelves, than take the pains to tranſcribe them. 219: 2: C. 220: 2: A.

Gen. 6. 15.

Buteo de arca Noe. p. 93.

Hoſtus de fabrica Arcæ Noah. th. 66.

VIII. I come now therefore to the evidence of the truth and certainty of this univerſal Deluge, of which we have moſt clear and concurring Teſtimonies of moſt ancient Nations of the World. For which purpoſe *Grotius* and others, have at large produc'd the Teſtimony of *Beroſus* the *Chaldean* out of *Joſephus*, concerning the Flood and the Ark, in which *Noah* was preſerv'd; of *Abydenus* out of *Cyril* and *Euſebius* concerning *Xiſuthrus*, or *Noah*'s ſending out of the Birds to ſee if the Flood were aſſwag'd; and of *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, concerning the preſervation of Animals in the Ark; of *Plutarch* concerning the ſending out of the Dove; of *Lucian de Dea Syria* concerning the whole ſtory, and ſo of *Molon* and *Nicolaus Damaſcenus*. Beſides, it is manifeſted by others, how among the *Chaldeans* the memory of *Noah* was preſerv'd under the Fable of *Oannes*, which had part of a Fiſh, and part of a Man, as is evident from the fragments of *Apollodorus*, *Abydenus*, and *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, preſerv'd in *Euſebius*'s Greek Chronica; among the *Chineſes*, under the name of *Puoncuus*, who by them is ſaid to have eſcap'd alone with his Family out of the univerſal Deluge, ſaith *Iſaac Voſſius*, who ſuppoſeth *Pu* or *Pi* to be only a prefix to the name, and ſo that *Puoncuus*,

V. Grot. Annot. in l. 1. *de Verit. relig. Chriſt.*

Voſſ. Iſagog. Chron. diſſert. 4. *c.* 2. *&* 3.

Bochar. Geogr. ſacr. l. 1. *c.* 4.

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, l. 18. *c.* 12. *& ibid. Lud. Viv.*

Euſeb. Chr. p. 5. *ed.* 2. *Scaliger.*

Iſ. Voſſ. epiſt. ad Colvium, p. 409.

Martin. hiſt. Sinic. l. 1. p. 12.
Joh. de Laet. de orig. gent. American. l. 1. p. 115.

cuus, is the ſame with ὁ Νῶχος. *Martinius* tells us, *de diluvio multa eſt apud Sinicos Scriptores mentio*, that the ancient Writers of the *Sinic* Hiſtory ſpeak much of the Flood. *Johannes de Laet* tells out of *Leſcharbotus*, how conſtant the Tradition of the Flood is among the *Indians*, both in *New-France*, *Peru*, and other parts. This being therefore ſo fully atteſted by the evident and apparent conſent of ſo many Writers and Hiſtorians, which did not own the Authority of the Scriptures, I ſhall ſuppoſe this ſufficiently prov'd, and proceed to the main thing which concerns the Origin of Nations, which is, *The certainty of the propagation of Mankind from the Poſterity of* Noah. Of which there is this ſtrong and convincing evidence, that in all that account which the Scripture gives of the propagation of Nations from the Sons of *Noah*, there is ſome remainder in the Hiſtory of that Nation, to juſtifie the reaſon of the impoſition of the name from the names of the Nations themſelves, which have preſerv'd the original name of their Founder in their own; as the *Medes* from *Madai*; the *Thracians* from *Thiras*; the *Ionians* from *Javan*; the *Sidonians* from *Sidon*; the *Philiſtins* from *Poleſthim*; the *Arcæans*, *Arcadians*, *Elymæans*, *Aſſyrians*, *Lydians*, from *Arki*, *Arrad*, *Elam*, *Aſſur* and *Lud*, and many others produc'd by *Grotius*, *Montanus*, *Junius*, and eſpecially *Bochartus*, who with admirable Induſtry and Learning hath clear'd all this part of ſacred Hiſtory, which concerns the reaſon of the impoſition of the names of the People which were propagated from the Poſterity of *Noah*, and given a full and ſatisfactory account of the ſeveral places where the Poſterity of *Noah* ſeated themſelves after the Deluge. Inſtead of that therefore, I ſhall conſider the pretences which can be brought againſt it, which are chiefly theſe three. 1. That the *Chaldean* Empire ſeems to have greater Antiquity than can be attributed to it by the Hiſtory of *Moſes*. 2. That the moſt learned Heathen Nations pretend to be ſelf-originated, and that they came not from any other Country. 3. That no certain account is given from whence *America* ſhould be Peopled.

Grot. Annot. ad l. 1. de Verit.
Ari. Montan. Phaleg.
Junius in Gen. 10.
Bochart. Geogr. ſacr. p. 1.

219:2.D.2

IX. 1. The Hiſtory of the *Aſſyrian* Empire ſeems inconſiſtent with the propagation of the World from the Sons of *Noah*; for the Reign of *Ninus* and *Semiramis* is plac'd by many *Chronologers* within the firſt Century after the Flood, which ſeems a manifeſt inconſiſtency with the propagation of Mankind from the Sons of *Noah*; for it ſeems utterly impoſſible that the foundations of ſo great an Empire ſhould be laid in ſo ſmall a compaſs of time by the Poſterity of three Perſons: And beſides, *Ninus* and *Semiramis* were not the firſt who began the *Aſſyrian* Empire; for *Belus* not only reign'd fifty five Years before *Ninus*, but according to the *Chaldean* Antiquities from *Evechous*, who they ſay firſt reign'd among them, are reckon'd 495 Years. But admit that the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire be plac'd ſo low as *Petavius* and other Chronologers would have it, *viz.* in the Year after the Flood, 153, yet the difficulty is only ſomewhat abated, but not remov'd; for it ſeems yet unconceivable, that from three Perſons in 150 Years, ſuch multitudes ſhould ſpring, as to make ſo large an Empire as that of *Ninus*, and that within an hundred Years after the Flood there ſhould be ſuch vaſt multitudes for the building the Tower of *Babel*, and diſperſion up and down the World; ſo that according to the *Hebrew* computation in the compaſs of 300 Years, *viz.* about *Abraham*'s time, the World was ſo fully peopl'd, that we read of ſeveral Kings encountring one another: By which it is evident the World had been peopl'd ſome time before, or elſe there could

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. c. 14. Tom. 2.

not have been ſuch potent Kings as ſome of them were at that time. This being the grand Difficulty, to it I anſwer theſe things.

1. There is no ſuch certainty of the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire; as for the ſake of that, to queſtion the truth of the Propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*. I have already largely manifeſted the want of credibility in the Chronology of the ancient *Chaldeans*, and that we have no certain grounds to rely upon in reference to it. Eſpecially as to theſe ſeven firſt *Babylonian* Kings, which are cited out of *Africanus*, by *Euſebius*, and *Georgius Syncellus*, viz. *Euechous*, *Chomaſbolus*, *Porus*, *Nechubes*, *Abius*, *Oniballus*, *Chinzirus*, who are ſaid to reign 225 years two Months; and alike fabulous, I ſuppoſe, is the other *Dynaſty* of ſix *Arabian* Kings, whoſe Empire is ſaid to have ſtood 215 years to the time of *Belus*, who expell'd the *Arabians*, and took the power to himſelf: And it is much more agreeable to Reaſon to reject theſe two *Dynaſties*, which had no record of them left in any Hiſtory of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, but only in *Beroſus*, whoſe authority in this caſe hath been diſcuſs'd already; than to follow our late excellent Primate of *Armach*, who punctually ſets down the Reign of the Kings of theſe two *Dynaſties*, but cuts off at leaſt eight Ages in the time of the *Aſſyrian* Empire from *Ninus* to *Sardanapalus*, which times he confines to 496 years, and placeth *Ninus* in the 2737 year of the World, according to the *Hebrew* Computation, and ſo to live in the time of the *Judges*, and be contemporary with *Deborah*: Which he builds only on a place in *Herodotus*, which relates not to the time between *Ninias* and *Sardinapalus*, but to the time of the defection of the *Medes* from the *Aſſyrian* Empire, as *Iſaac Voſſius* hath already ſhew'd. We cannot then find any certainty in the beginning of the *Aſſyrian* Empire, which may give us cauſe to queſtion the Propagation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah*.

Uſſer. Ann. vet. Teſt. A. M. 2737.

Caſtigat. adv. Horn. c. 10.

Gen. 9. 1.

2. We have reaſon to think that there was a more than ordinary multiplication of the World from the Sons of *Noah* after the Flood. For as God had before puniſh'd the World by deſtroying Mankind in it by an extrordinary manner; ſo after the Flood, he doth in a particular manner bleſs *Noah* and his Sons, and ſaid unto them, *Be fruitful and multiply, and repleniſh the Earth*, which may well be thought to have then had an extraordinary effect. Several ways have been attempted by Learned Men to make appear, to what a vaſt number the Poſterity of *Noah* would increaſe in the ſpace of two or three hundred years after the Flood. *Petavius* ſuppoſeth that the Poſterity of *Noah* might beget Children at ſeventeen, and that each of *Noah*'s Sons might have eight Children in the eighth year after the Flood, and that every one of theſe eight might beget eight more; by this means in only one Family, as of *Japhet* in the year after the Flood 238, he makes a *Diagram* conſiſting of almoſt an innumerable company of Men. *Johannes Temporarius*, as our moſt Learned *Primate* tells us, takes this way, that all of the Poſterity of *Noah*, when they attain'd twenty years of Age, had every year twins, on which ſuppoſition by *Arithmetical* progreſſion he undertakes to make it appear, that in the 102 year after the Flood, there would be of Males and Females 1554420; but taking away the one half, becauſe of the groundleſs ſuppoſition of twins, yet then in that time there would be 388605 Males beſides Females. Others ſuppoſe that each of the Sons of *Noah* had ten Sons, and by that proportion, in few Generations it would amount to many thouſands within a Century. Others inſiſt on the parallel between the multiplication

Petav. de doct. temp. l. 9. *c.* 14.

Uſſ. Chron. ſacr. c. 5.

of the Children of *Iſrael* in *Ægypt*; that if from 72 Men in the ſpace of 215 years there are procreated 600000, how many will be born of three Men in the ſpace of an hundred years? ſome have ſaid above 23000, but with what ſucceſs in their *Arithmetic*, I ſhall not determin. But whether all or any of theſe ways be ſufficient, and ſatisfactory, we have yet cauſe to believe that there was a more than ordinary multiplication in the Poſterity of *Noah* after the Flood.

Horn. def. diſſert. de ætat. mundi, c. 26.

3. If we embrace the account of thoſe Copies, which the *Septuagint* follow'd in their Verſion, all this difficulty is then ceas'd. For that account doth very much enlarge the times, and makes almoſt a thouſand years between the Flood and *Abraham*, by which means there will be ſufficient ſpace given for the propagation of Mankind, the building the Tower of *Babel*, the diſperſion of Nations, the founding the *Aſſyrian* Empire, the plantation of *Ægypt*, *China*, and other places, all which ſeem to have been in that time, and to concur with that computation, as well as *Joſephus* doth, and the whole Primitive Church before *Hierom*, which certainly ought in no caſe to be diſregarded.

The whole controverſy concerning this part of the Chronology of the World comes at laſt to this; Whether it be more probable that the *Jews* who lived under the ſecond Temple (who then were the Truſtees to whom were committed *the Oracles of* GOD) whom the LXX. follow'd in their Verſion, had the true reading, or the *Talmudic Jews* after their diſperſion and baniſhment from their Countrey, when they were diſcarded by GOD himſelf from being his People, when he broke up houſe among them at the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem* and the Temple. But if the Reader deſire farther ſatisfaction concerning this difference of this Chronology of the LXX. from that of the preſent *Hebrew* Copies, he may conſult the learned diſſertation of the late learned Biſhop of *Cheſter* upon the LXX. and the later Diſcourſes of *Iſaac Voſſius* on this ſubject. Setting aſide then the controverſy between the preſent *Hebrew* Copies and the LXX. in point of integrity and incorruption, which I meddle not with, I cannot but ſubſcribe to the judgment of our judicious Hiſtorian, * Sir *W. Rawleigh: That if we look over all, and do not haſtily ſatisfy our Underſtanding with the firſt things offer'd, and thereby being ſatiated do ſlothfully and drowſily ſit down, we ſhall find it more agreeable rather to follow the reckoning of the LXX. who according to ſome Editions make it above* 1072 *years between the Flood and* Abraham's *Birth, than to take away any part of thoſe* 352 *years given. For if we adviſedly conſider the ſtate and countenance of the World, ſuch as it was in* Abraham's *time, yea before* Abraham *was born, we ſhall find that it were very ill done of us by following opinion without the guide of Reaſon, to pare the time over deeply between* Abraham *and the Flood; becauſe in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole ſtory might perchance bleed thereby, were not the teſtimony of the Scriptures ſupream, ſo as no objection can approach it; And that we did not follow withal this precept of St.* Auſtin, *that wheresoever any one place in the Scriptures may be conceiv'd diſagreeing to the whole, the ſame is by ignorance of miſ-interpretation underſtood. For in* Abraham's *time all the then known parts of the World were peopled: all Regions and Countries had their Kings.* Ægypt *had many magnificent Cities, and ſo had* Paleſtine *and all bordering Countries; yea all that part of the World beſides as far as* India: *and thoſe not built with ſticks, but of hewn ſtones, and defended with Walls and Rampiers, which magnificence needed a Parent of more antiquity than thoſe*

Walton: Proleg. ad Bibl. Polyg. c. 9. §. 58, 63, *&c.*
Iſaac Voſſius de LXX. Interpr. & ætat. Mundi.
* Sir *Walt. Rawleigh Hiſt. p.* 1. *b.* 2. *c.* 1. *ſect.* 7.

other Men have ſuppos'd. And therefore where the Scriptures are plaineſt and beſt agreeing with Reaſon and Nature, to what end ſhould we labour to beget doubts and ſcruples, or draw all things into wonders and marvels? giving alſo ſtrength thereby to common cavillers, and to thoſe Mens apiſh brains, who only bend their Wits to find impoſſibilities and monſters in the Story of the World and Mankind. Thus far that excellent Hiſtorian, whoſe words deſerve conſideration. Thus much for the firſt Objection.

219:2:F. D.:E.

X. 2. The ſecond is, *From the great pretence of ſeveral Nations that they were ſelf-originated*, or came not from any other place. This was the pretence of the *Ægyptians*, *Græcians*, ancient Inhabitants of *Italy*, and others. But how little reaſon we have to give credit to theſe pretences, will appear on theſe accounts. 1. The Impoſſibility in Nature that Mankind ſhould be produc'd in ſuch a way as they imagin'd, which we have manifeſted already in our Diſcourſe of the Origin of the Univerſe. 2. That the Nations which pretended this, were never able to give ſufficient Evidence of it to any other Nation which demanded it; which is manifeſt by their want of any certain Records of their ancient times, which is fully prov'd in our Diſcourſe in the firſt Book of the want of credibility in the *Heathen* Hiſtory. 3. The only probable Reaſon which induc'd theſe Nations to make themſelves *Aborigines*, was, becauſe they ſuppos'd themſelves to be the firſt Inhabitants of the Countries they liv'd in: which altho' I may allow to the *Ægyptians*, and ſome other ancient Nations, yet I cannot do it to the *Hellens* or *Greeks*, who moſt vainly and arrogantly pretend to it. Which becauſe it may give more light into the greateſt Antiquities of *Greece*, and ſome other Nations than hath been yet diſcover'd or taken notice of, and becauſe it may farther tend to clear the truth of the Scriptures, as to the Origin of Nations, I ſhall more particularly inquire into the firſt Plantation of *Greece*. That it was firſt inhabited by ſome of *Noah*'s Poſterity, is out of queſtion with all thoſe who prefer the moſt ancient and undoubted Records of Scripture before the fabulous Impoſtures of Mens Brains. But by whoſe immediate Poſterity the Country of *Greece* was firſt inhabited, is not yet ſo clear as it hath been generally preſum'd to be, by moſt who had rather follow the dictates of others, than ſpend time in ſuch enquiries themſelves: Which yet certainly are ſo far from being unworthy Mens labour and induſtry, that nothing tends more clearly to advance the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, than the reconciling the Antiquities of the elder Nations to what we find deliver'd of the Plantation of the World from the Poſterity of *Noah*. As to this particular therefore of the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, I ſhall firſt propound the opinion generally embraced among Learned Men, and then ſhew how far it is defective, and what other more true account may be given of it. It is evident from *Moſes*, Gen. 10. 5. that the Poſterity of *Japhet* took poſſeſſion of the Iſles of the *Gentiles*, i. e. according to the *Hebrew* Idiom, not only ſuch as are properly ſo call'd, but all thoſe Countries which lay much upon the Sea, being at any diſtance from *Palæſtine*, eſpecially ſuch as lay between the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean* Sea; and ſo both *Greece* and *Italy* come under the name of the *Iſles of the Gentiles*. Among the Sons of *Japhet* none is conceiv'd ſo probable to have firſt peopled *Greece*, as he whoſe name was preſerv'd among the Inhabitants of *Greece* with very little alteration. And ſo as the *Medes* from *Madai*, the *Aſſyrians* from *Aſſur*, the *Thracians* from *Thiras*, by the like Analogy the *Ionians* from

Javan. From which it is obſervable, that altho' among the *Greeks* themſelves, the *Ionians* were but as one diviſion of that People which inhabited *Greece*, yet other Nations comprehended all under the name of *Ionians*. For which we have ſufficient evidence from *Heſychius*, and the Scholiaſt on *Ariſtophanes*. Οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἴωνας λέγουσιν, ſaith *Heſychius*; and more to this purpoſe the Scholiaſt ſpeaks. Πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἰάονας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκάλουν. For Ἰάονες with the Inſertion of the *Æolic Digamma* (which is always done when two Vowels meet) is Ἰάφονες i. e. *Javones*; and *Stephanus Byzantius* tells us, that from Ἰάων comes Ἰὼν, and ſo *Homer*,

Heſych. v. Ἴαυνι.
Acharnen. Schol. in Ariſtoph.
Stephanus de Urb. v. Ἰών.

Ἔνθα δὲ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Ἰάονες ἑλκεχίτωνες.

Hom. Il. v.

And *Dionyſius Periegetes* reckons up Ἰάων as one of the Rivers of *Arcadia*,

Ἔνθα μέλας ὅθι Κρᾶθις ἵνα ῥέει ὑγρὸς Ἰάων.

Dionyſ. v. 516.

And which much confirms this opinion, the *Hebrew* word for *Javan* before the points added by the *Maſorites*, *viz.* יון bears a perfect Analogy with the *Greek* Ἰὼν· and ארץ יון in Scripture is taken for *Greece*; and ſo *Dan.* 8. 21. *Alexander* is call'd מלך יון, which the LXX. render Βασιλεὺς Ἑλλήνων· and *Joel* 3. 6. *You have ſold my Sons,* לבני היונים *to the Sons of Javan*, i. e. to the *Greeks*, as it is generally underſtood. But as *Javan* cannot be ſuppos'd to have come into theſe parts without his Family, ſo it is generally preſum'd that there are no obſcure foot-ſteps left of *Javan*'s eldeſt Son, *Eliſha*'s ſeating himſelf in *Greece*. For from him *Joſephus* derives the name Αἰωλεῖς, with whom the *Jeruſalem* Paraphraſt concurs. *Montanus* from thence derives the name *Elis*, from whence he ſuppoſeth the *Greeks* are call'd Ἕλληνες. *Bochartus* finds the cleareſt remainders of *Eliſha* in *Elis*, the ſame with *Peloponneſus*, one part of which by *Homer* is call'd *Aliſium*; thence *Ezeck.* 27. 7. we read of the *purple and ſcarlet from the Iſſes of* Eliſha, which makes it moſt probable to be that part of *Greece* which lay upon the *Ionian* Sea, where the beſt Purple next to the *Tyrian* was found, as the Learned *Bochartus* hath demonſtrated from ſeveral Authors. This is now the ſubſtance of the generally-receiv'd account concerning the plantation of *Greece* from the Poſterity of *Noah*. Which if it be taken as to that People which did at length poſſeſs *Greece*, I ſee no reaſon to diſapprove it; but if it be extended to the firſt plantation of *Greece*, I ſee as little to embrace it. That we may therefore judg more freely of the firſt Inhabitants of *Greece*, it is requiſite we take an account of it from thoſe who profeſs themſelves moſt verſ'd in their own Antiquities, who may in a matter of this nature, which is atteſted by the common conſent of the moſt learned Antiquaries of *Greece*, be the more credited, in that what they thus deliver, may be ſuppos'd to come from an ancient and undoubted Tradition.

Ar. Mont. Phaleg. p. 24.
Bochart. Phaleg. l. 3. *cap.* 10.

219: 2: 5.

XI. It is evident therefore, from the judgment of the moſt learned and judicious, even of the *Greeks* themſelves, that *Greece* was firſt inhabited by a People by them call'd *Barbarous*, i. e. a People different from them in Language and Manners. So *Ephorus*, whom *Polybius* commends as the beſt Writer of the *Greek Antiquities*, ſaith that *Greece* was inhabited by a barbarous People before the *Hellens* came into it. And *Hecatæus Mileſius* cited by *Strabo* concerning *Peloponneſus*, ὅτι πρὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ᾤκησαν αὐτὴν βάρβαροι, which *Strabo* himſelf not only believes of *Peloponneſus*, but of all *Greece*, that it was κατοικία βαρβάρων τὸ παλαιὸν, *anciently a Plantation of Barbarians*; the ſame is affirm'd by *Ariſtotle* writing of the Common-wealth of the *Tegeates* concerning *Arcadia*, that before its being poſſeſs'd by the *Arcadians*, it was inhabited by a barbarous People, who becauſe they were expulſed their Country before Moon-riſing, the *Arcadians* call'd themſelves προσέληνοι. Whether that be the ground of that vain-glorious boaſt (of which many reaſons are given by learned Men) I here diſpute not; it is ſufficient that we find the *Grecians* were not the firſt who peopled any of theſe ſeveral places; which is likewiſe atteſted by *Herodotus*, *Thucydides*, and others, whoſe teſtimonies we ſhall afterwards produce. It being then evident that the *Grecians* were not the firſt who inhabited that Country after from them called *Greece*, it follows to be inquir'd what this barbarous People was, and from whence they came. *Strabo* hath given us in a large Catalogue of the names of many of them, as the *Dryopes*, *Caucones*, *Leleges*, beſides the *Aones*, *Tembices*, *Hyantes*, and many others; but theſe ſeem not to have been that ancient People, but rather ſome latter Caſtlings of the *Carians*, who, as *Thucydides* tells us, did very often make inroads upon the quarters of *Greece*. That People which had the largeſt ſpread, and greateſt Antiquity, was the *Pelaſgi*: thence *Peloponneſus* was anciently called Πελασγία. *Stephanus Byzantius* Πελοποννήσου τρεῖς ἐπωνυμίαι, Ἀπία Πελασγία and Ἄργος· and *Apollodorus* ſaith, that the *Peloponneſians* were anciently called *Pelaſgi*; and *Euripides*,

Strab, l. 7. V. Scholiaſt. in Appollon. l. 4. v. 262.

> Πελασγιῶτας ὠνομασμένους τὸ πρὶν
> Δαναούς.

And elſewhere,

> Πρῶτον Πελασγοὶ, Δαναΐδαι τὸ δεύτερον.

These *Pelaſgi* were not only in *Peloponneſus*, but in *Attica* too, as appears by *Strabo*, where he ſaith the Nation of the *Pelaſgi* did inhabit, and by the *Athenians* (that is after their mixture) they were called πελαργοὶ, *Storks*, διὰ τὴν πλάνην, for their frequent removals from place to place: And *Pauſanias* mentions their being under the *Acronoli* at *Athens*: that they were in *Theſſaly*, is evident from *Heſychius*. Πελασγοὶ οἱ Θεσσαλοί καὶ ἔνιον τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ γένος ἀπὸ Πελασγοῦ τοῦ Ἀρκάδος γενόμενον πολυπλάνητον· *Arcadia* ſeems to have the firſt or chief place of their reſidence, for the *Arcadians* who were accounted παλαιότατα ἔθνη τῶν Ἑλλήνων, do vindicate the Founder of this Nation, whom they call *Pelaſgus*, to themſelves, and ſay he was an αὐτόχθων among them, that is, the firſt who came into that Country; for all thoſe, whoſe Original they knew not, they called *Terræ filios*, and *Genuinos terræ*. *Pauſanias* rightly conjectures that he was the firſt Man among them, not as tho' he was alone, but becauſe the Chief Ruler and Commander among them, and that brought them into the Country; but tho' they might fix themſelves about *Arcadia*, it is evident they ſpread farther; for *Menecrates Eleates* in his Book of the Founders of Cities, affirms that all the Sea-coaſts of *Greece* called *Ionica*, beginning from *Mycale*, were firſt inhabited by the *Pelaſgi*; nay we find them yet much higher in *Epirus*, who were, as *Strabo* tells us, the firſt Founders of that famous Oracle of *Dodona*; for

Strabo, l. 9.

Pauſan. in Arcad.

Strab. l. 13.

Idem, l. 7.

ſo *Ephorus* in him ſaith it was Πελασγῶν ἵδρυμα, and that theſe were τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑλλάδα δυναςευόντων ἀρχαιότατοι: Thence the Poet,

Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε Πελασγικέ:

And *Heſiod*,

Δωδώνην φηγόν τε Πελασγῶν ἕδρανον ἦεν.

Strabo farther makes it evident, that they were a barbarous People which liv'd about *Dodona*, from the deſcription *Homer* gives of them,

Ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοὶ
Σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται, ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῦναι.

Philoſtr. in Imag.

Which *Philoſtratus* beſt interprets, when he ſaith they were αὐτοσχέδιοί τινες καὶ οὔτε κατεσκευασμένοι τὸν βίον, *ſuch that thought the Gods were beſt pleaſed with their ſimplicity and ſeverity of Life*, and therein far different from the *Grecian* humour. *Suidas* in *Theſſalicis* (cited likewiſe by *Strabo*) ſaith, that the Temple of *Dodona* was remov'd from *Scotuſa* in *Pelaſgia* to *Theſſala*, which is confirm'd by *Herodotus* in *Euterpe*, where he largely ſpeaks of the *Temple* and *Oracle* at *Dodona*. Theſe *Pelaſgi* confin'd not themſelves to *Greece* neither, but were diſpers'd into the neighbour Iſlands, as *Chios*, *Crete*, *Leſbos*, *Lemnos*, *Imbro*, *Samos*, as will appear afterwards; and at laſt came into *Italy*, as is well known, and are thought to be the ſame with the *Tyrrhenians*, and by ſome conceiv'd to be the firſt Founders of *Rome*. We ſee what a large ſpread the *Pelaſgi* had over *Greece*, which was divided after the *Hellens* began to appear, into τὸ πελασγικὸν and τὸ ἑλληνικόν, as *Herodotus* witneſſeth; and ſo theſe two appear to be a very different People from one another, and not the ſame under different names, as is commonly thought.

XII. Which ſufficiently appears from their Language, which was quite different from one another. So *Herodotus*, Ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες, *they us'd a barbarous Language*; *i. e.* a Language not underſtood by the *Hellens*; who at firſt had their chief Reſidence in *Theſſaly*, from whence by degrees they came forwards into *Greece*, as *Thucydides* ſhews. For altho' the name of *Hellens* at laſt ſpread it ſelf over all the People of *Greece*, yet it was at firſt peculiar to that part of *Theſſaly* called *Pthiotis*, and thence *Homer* calls them properly *Hellens*, which followed *Achilles* from thence: And it appears by *Homer*, that there was a City there called Ἕλλας, which as *Stephanus de Urbibus* tells us, was there built by Ἕλλην, altho' he will not have him to be *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, but the Son of *Pthius*, wherein he is miſtaken: For *Thucydides* plainly ſhews, that it was from *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, that the name Ἕλληνες came, and this *Hellen* liv'd in *Pthiotis*. But altho' they were firſt in *Pthiotis*, yet they daily increaſing in numbers and power, by degrees they got all *Theſſaly* into their hands, of which one part was called Πελασγιῶτις; afterwards under *Dorus* the Son of *Hellen* they conquer'd *Heſtiæotis*, that part of *Theſſaly* which lies under the Mountains *Oſſa* and *Olympus*; from thence they were beaten back by the *Cadmeans* into *Pindus*, where the *Greeks* were firſt called Μακεδνοὶ, as *Herodotus* tells us; from hence they went into *Dryopis*, and thence into *Peloponneſus*, and there had the name *Dorians*: But before their coming hither, they had firſt ſecured themſelves of the *Hellens*, lying between *Theſſaly* and *Peloponneſus*, and there they diſpoſſeſt the *Pelaſgi* in all the *Attic* Region; who were now forc'd to ſubmit or to fly; they who ſubmitted, as moſt of them did, were incorporated into the *Greeks*, and became one People with them, and ſo by degrees loſt that former Language which was peculiar to themſelves and wholly diſtinct from the *Greek* Tongue. That the *Hellens* did thus gradually come into *Peloponneſus*, is evident from the names of People and Places common to *Theſſaly* and *Peloponneſus*; which came from hence, that tho' the *Greeks* left the Cities behind them, yet they carried moſt of the names along with them. Thus the *Achæi*, *Ionians*, and *Æolians*, and *Dorians* in *Peloponneſus* came from thoſe of the ſame names in *Theſſaly*; and ſo likewiſe the names of theſe following Regions and Cities were common to both, as *Ellopia*, *Eſtiæa*, *Eretria*, and *Oropos*, *Graia*, *Lariſſa*, *Pſophis*, *Iton*, *Œchalia*, and very many others. *Salmaſius* ſeems to be of opinion, that the *Pelaſgi* never us'd any Language diſtinct from the *Hellens*; but beſides that it is directly contrary to the Teſtimony of *Herodotus*, the Arguments he produceth for it are very weak. The firſt is, becauſe the *Pelaſgi* that went into *Italy*, did uſe the *Greek* Tongue, from their calling *Agylla Cære*, from χαῖρε, a word pronounc'd from one on the Walls: And becauſe the *Arcades* us'd only the *Greek* Language in the *Æolian* Dialect, which *Evander* carried with him into *Italy*, and from which moſt of the old *Roman* Language was deriv'd. But doth not *Herodotus* expreſly ſay, that after the mixture between the *Greeks* and *Pelaſgi* theſe by degrees loſt their own proper Language, and made uſe of the common *Greek* Tongue? Yet afterwards too, it is evident from *Herodotus* in ſome places, as at *Crotona*, they did uſe a Language different from the *Greek*. His other Argument is, *That the names of the eldeſt Perſons mention'd were originally* Greek; but this is expreſly deny'd by *Strabo*, who makes the contrary, one of his ſtrongeſt Arguments, that the *Barbarians* did anciently inhabit *Greece*; and inſtanceth in *Cecrops*, *Codrus*, *Æolus*, *Cothus*, *Drymas*, *Crimanus*. Thus we have abundantly prov'd againſt the common opinion, that *Greece* was not firſt peopl'd by the *Hellens*, or the Poſterity of *Eliſa*, altho' theſe did afterwards come to the full poſſeſſion of *Greece*.

Salmaſ. de Hellen. p. 315.

XIII. It remains that we ſhew whence theſe *Pelaſgi* came, and of whoſe Poſterity they were, and what the Language was which was us'd by them. He that gave the name to this People according to the *Grecian* Fables, was one *Pelaſgus*, which none will wonder at among them, whoſe conſtant cuſtom it was, (partly by reaſon of their Ignorance of the true account of their Names, and partly by their Pride, that they might not ſeem ignorant of any thing) when they meet with any Names of People, to find out ſome Perſon near it who was the Founder of them. Thus *Attica* from *Actæus*, it being anciently called Ἀκτικὴ, and *Cranae* from *Cranaus*, *Ægialea* from *Ægialeus*, *Mauritania* from *Maurus*, *Scythia* from one *Scythes*, *Galatæa* from *Galates*, and thus in multitudes of other Names. But from the name *Pelaſgi*, we may probably find out the true Founder of the People, allowing that variation which is uſually cauſ'd thro' the *Greeks* melting the harſher words of the *Eaſtern* Languages into a ſound fit for their more delicate Palates; as is evident in the comparing the Names of the Prophets in *Hebrew*, with what they are in the *Greek* Verſion. Thus the *Pelaſgi* may with great probability be deriv'd from פלג, *Phaleg*; for which we have the concurrent Teſti-

Grot. not. in lib. 1. *de jure bel.&c. c.* 3. *Sal. de Hellen.* mony of two Learned Perſons, *Grotius* and *Salmaſius*, who are contented to mention it, without bringing much evidence of Reaſon for it. What they only touch at, we ſhall endeavour to make out more at large; which we ſhall do by removing the great preſumptions againſt it, and laying down the probabilities for it. The great preſumptions lying againſt it are; for that the Iſles of the Nations fell to the Poſterity of *Jepheth*, and that *Phaleg* liv'd with *Eber* in *Chaldæa*. For the firſt, it muſt be acknowledg'd that the greateſt part of the Countries lying upon the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean*, were in the time when *Moſes* wrote ſo inhabited; not that the Habitations of the Sons of *Noah* had their bounds and limits ſet them either by God or *Noah*, but that the Poſterity of *Japhet* did chiefly addreſs themſelves to thoſe parts which lay towards *Europe*; but yet not ſo, as to exclude any of the Poſterity of *Sem*, if their neceſſities for farther room made it neceſſary for them to ſeek for Habitations farther abroad. For we can have no reaſon to think, that becauſe the chief of *Sem*'s Poſterity did live together, therefore none of them went farther off, which neceſſity would put them upon becauſe of their great increaſe; for we read of *Phaleg* and others, Gen. 11. 19, 21. that beſides thoſe in direct Line to *Abraham*, (whoſe Genealogy it was *Moſes* his great deſign to recount) they begat many other Sons and Daughters, which would make it neceſſary for them, to ſeek their Habitations farther abroad. And that *Phaleg* and *Ragau* did ſo, we have *Epiph. de Scythis l. ep. ad Acu. & Paulum.* the expreſs Teſtimony of *Epiphanius*, Φαλὲγ καὶ Ῥαγαῦ οἵτινες ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης κλίμα νενευκότες τῷ τῆς Σκυθίας μέρει καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἔθνεσι προσεκληρώθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Θάῤῥας ἡλικίας καὶ ἐπέκεινα, ἐξ ὧνπερ οἱ Θρᾷκες γεγόνασι. *That from the Age of* Therah *and thence forward*, Phaleg *and* Ragau *diverted towards the clime of* Europe, *to part of* Scythia, *and were joyn'd with thoſe Nations from which the* Thracians *aroſe*. Several things make this not ſo improbable as ſome have imagin'd it to be; for firſt, it is the conſtant acknowledgment of all ſober Inquirers into the Original of the *Greeks*, that *Greece* was firſt peopled from *Scythia*; and indeed almoſt all the Nations in *Europe* have come out of that Country: Beſides, there is evidence of it, even in the Grecian Fables; for *Prometheus* (from whom the *Greeks* deriv'd themſelves) is fancy'd by them to lie bound in Mount *Caucaſus*, which muſt be ſuppos'd to be the Country from whence he came. Again, it is evident already that the *Hellens* came not into *Greece* before it was peopled by the *Pelaſgi*, and that theſe had different Language and Cuſtoms from one another; now then in all probability, altho' the Poſterity of *Eliſa* might come firſt down from *Scythia* into thoſe parts, and ſeat themſelves in *Macedonia* and *Theſſaly*, where they had in probability more than room enough at firſt, and a Country to their deſire; they might be willing to permit the Poſterity of *Phaleg* to paſs on farther; for in thoſe firſt Plantations we cannot otherwiſe conceive, but that the laſt comers muſt be the fartheſt goers; unleſs they had ſtrength enough to drive the former Inhabitants out of their Seats whereof they were already poſſeſs'd, as the *Scythians* did afterwards, and ſo the *Hellens:* So then the Poſterity of *Phaleg* being forced to quit their own Country, becauſe of the multitude of Inhabitants, muſt be ſuppoſed to take that courſe, where in probability they might find an empty Seat fit for them to dwell in; thence they come towards *Europe*; for they ſaw how the Poſterity of *Sem* did ſpread it ſelf Eaſtwards already, and *Cham* Southwards, and coming to part of that vaſt Country of *Scythia*, which was both already taken up, and not ſo convenient an Habitation for them, they draw downwards towards *Thracia*; and there the Poſterity of *Thiras*, from whom the *Thracians* came, had already poſſeſſed themſelves: Paſſing farther into *Theſſaly*, they find that already planted by ſome of the Poſterity of *Eliſa*, but as yet but ſcant and thin of Inhabitants; therefore they diſperſe themſelves up and down through ſome part of *Epirus*, moſt part of *Ellas*, and ſome paſs into *Peloponneſus*, where they fix themſelves chiefly upon *Arcadia*, and thence ſpread up and down by degrees towards the Sea-ſide; for we cannot but think that the Maritime parts were the laſt peopled, partly for fear of another Deluge, partly for want of conveniency of Navigation, moſt of their Travels being by Land; and partly when Navigation grew more in uſe for fear of Pirates, who drove a great Trade upon the Coaſts of *Greece* in elder times, as is moſt evident from *Thucydides* in the beginning of his Hiſtory. Thus we have a reaſonable account given of the *Pelaſgi* their firſt coming into *Greece*, and how by degrees the *Hellens* came to poſſeſs their Country, and what a fair pretence the *Arcadians* had to boaſt of the greateſt Antiquity, their Country being probably firſt peopled by the *Pelaſgi* of any part of the whole *Cherſoneſe*, and the Seat of the Leader of the whole Company whom they call *Pelaſgus*, and the Scriptures *Phaleg*.

XIV. Having thus far clear'd the Antiquities of *Greece* as to the firſt Planters of it, whom we have evidenc'd to have been the *Pelaſgi*, and theſe deriv'd from *Peleg*, it will be no great difficulty to reſolve what Language they brought along with them, which muſt be ſuppos'd to be the ſame with that us'd in the Family from whence *Peleg* or *Phaleg* came, as to the ſubſtance of it, altho' it might admit as great variation of Dialect from it as the *Chaldee* or *Syriac* doth. But this I will not only ſuppoſe, but offer theſe probabilities for the proof of it: The firſt is, the agreement of the ancient *Greek* Language with the *Hebrew* in many of its primitive words; and here we have a moſt rational and probable account given of it; which is, the *Greeks* mixing with the *Pelaſgi*, and both coming to be one People, they muſt needs retain many of the old words us'd by the *Pelaſgi* in their *Greek* Language; which are evidently of an Eaſtern Extraction, the ground of which cannot with ſuch probability be fetch'd from *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians*, becauſe it is not ſo eaſy admiſſion of a foreign Language after the perfection of their own, unleſs by long tract of Time, or great numbers over-running the former People, neither of which can be ſo truly affirm'd of *Cadmus* and his Company; for they were ſoon driven out of *Greece*, he himſelf ending his days in *Illyricum*; neither was their Spread ſo large as that of the *Pelaſgi*, who were before poſſeſſors of the Country; and it is continually ſeen, how impoſſible it is for any Conquerors, as the *Greeks* were, to bring their own Language ſo into a place, where ſome of the former People are ſuffered to live, and not to retain many of their old words among them, and ſo make the Language mixt of both, as it is in all Nations conquer'd by the *Romans*; the *Roman* not being purely ſpoken by any, but corrupted with a mixture of the former Language in uſe among them. The ſecond Argument is, from the different Pronunciation and Dialects in uſe in the *Greek* Language; of which no account ſo likely can be given, as the mixture with different Languages. This is moſt evident in the *Doric* Dialect; for the *Dorians* inhabiting probably where moſt of the *Pelaſgi* had been, their Pronunciation and Dialect comes the neareſt to the Eaſtern of any of the *Greeks*: For in the *Doric* Dialect the Πλατειασμὸς or *broad pronunciation*, is moſt taken notice of: So he in *Theocritus* upbraids the *Dorians*, ὅτι πλατειάσδουσιν ἅπαντα, they ſpeak every thing *very broad*; which anſwers to the pronunciation of the Eaſtern Languages; beſides, the *Doric* Dialect delights much in adding *a* to the end of words, which beſides that it is the Cuſtom of Eaſtern Tongues, eſpecially the *Syriac*, it doth much widen the Pronunciation. The third Argument is from the remainders of the Eaſtern Tongues in thoſe places, eſpecially where the *Pelaſgi* had been. The *Pelaſgi* are much taken notice of for their frequent removes and travelling from one place to another; which I ſuppoſe was chiefly after the *Hellens* had conquer'd the Country where they dwelt, then they were forc'd to go ſeek better *Strabo. l. 5.* Habitations abroad: Thence *Strabo* calls the Nations of the *Pelaſgi* πολύπλανον καὶ ταχὺ τὸ ἔθνος πρὸς ἐπαναστάσεις· And elſewhere, that they *Id. lib. 12.* were πολλαχοῦ τῆς Εὐρώπης τὸ παλαιὸν πλανώμενοι, they went up and down to a great part of *Europe:* But we may ſuppoſe them to have made their firſt and chief reſort to the neighbour Iſlands to *Greece*; where we ſhall ſee *Id. lib. 5.* what evidence they left of their Language there. The firſt Iſland we meet with them in, is *Crete:* So *Strabo* ſpeaking of them, Καὶ γὰρ τῆς Κρήτης ἔποικοι γεγόνασιν, ὡς φησὶν Ὅμηρος; that a Colony of them liv'd in *Crete*, for which he voucheth *Homer*'s Authority:

Hom. Odyſſ. τ. 175.

Ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμιγμένη, ἐν μὲν Ἀχαιοί,
Ἐν δ' Ἐτεόκρητες μεγαλήτορες, ἐν δὲ κυδῶνες,
Δωριέες τὲ τριχάϊκες, δῖοί τε Πελασγοί.

It is evident then that the *Pelaſgi* were in *Crete*. Now moſt of the *Cretan* words are of an Eaſtern extraction, if we believe the Learned *Bochartus*, who hath promis'd a Diſcourſe on that ſubject: Beſides *Crete*, *Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. c. 15.* we find the *Pelaſgi* in *Chios*, καὶ Χῖοι δὲ οἰκιστὰς ἑαυτῶν Πελασγοὺς φασι τοὺς ἐκ Θετταλίας, ſaith *Strabo*, the Inhabitants of *Chios* ſay, that the *Pelaſgi* of *Theſſaly* were their firſt Inhabitants; and here the forenamed Learned Perſon hath deriv'd the name *Chios*, the Mountain *Pelinæus*, and the Wine *Arviſium*, all from the Eaſtern Languages. The next we find *Strabo l. 1. c. 9.* them in, is *Leſbos*, καὶ γὰρ τὴν Λέσβον Πελασγίαν εἰρήκασι, which from them was called *Pelaſgia*, ſaith *Strabo*, whoſe name is likewiſe fetched out of *Bochart. Geor. p. 2. l. 1. c. 12.* the Eaſt. By *Bochartus* farther, we find them in *Lemnos* and *Imbros:* So *Anticlides* in *Strabo*, πρώτους φησὶ Πελασγοὺς τὰ περὶ Λέμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον κτίσαι; concerning whoſe names, ſee *Bochartus* 82. I know that Learned Author makes the *Phœnicians* the Authors of all theſe Names, from no other ground generally, but becauſe they are of an Eaſtern derivation; but according to what we have laid down, we may yield to the thing it ſelf, and upon clearer grounds; for of ſome of theſe Iſlands he ingenuouſly confeſſeth he can find no evidence of the *Phœnicians* being in *Id. lib. 1. c. 9.* them. *Phœnices in his Inſulis habitaſſe nuſquam legimus:* But we find it very plain, that in thoſe very Iſlands the *Pelaſgi* inhabited; and whether account then be more probable, let the Reader judge. One thing more I ſhall inſiſt on, which is the Original of the *Samothracian Myſteries:* That theſe were as to their Names from the Eaſtern Languages, is now acknowledg'd by all Learned Men, the *Cabiri* being ſo evidently deriv'd from כביר, which ſignifies *ſtrength* and *power*, i. e. the *Dii potes*; *Tertull. de ſpect. c. 8.* ſo *Cabiri* is explain'd by *Varro* and *Tertullian*, and the particular Names *Bochart. ibid. l. 1. c. 12.* of the ſeveral *Cabiri*, mention'd by the Scholiaſt on *Apollonius*, Ἀξίερος, Ἀξιόκερσα, Ἀξιόκερσος, and Κάδμιλος are very handſomly explain'd by that Learned and Excellent *Bochartus* from the Eaſtern Languages; only he will needs have them deriv'd from the *Phœnicians*, whereas *Herodotus* expreſly tells us that they were from the *Pelaſgi*, whoſe words are theſe; ὅστις δὲ τὰ Καβείρων ὄργια μεμύηται τὰ Σαμοθρήϊκες ἐπιτελέουσι λαβόντες παρὰ Πελασγῶν. And again, τὴν γὰρ Σαμοθρηΐκην οἴκεον πρότερον Πελασγοὶ οὗτοι τοὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίοισι συνοικοὶ ἐγίνοντο, καὶ παρὰ τούτων Σαμοθρήϊκες τὰ ὄργια παραλαμβάνουσι. We ſee evidently by this, that the *Samothracians* deriv'd their Myſteries from the *Pelaſgi*; and without all queſtion they had their names from thence, whence they deriv'd their Myſteries: And to this purpoſe it is farther obſervable, that as the old *Hetrurians* were certainly a Colony of the *Pelaſgi*, upon their removal out of *Greece*; ſo *Voſſius* obſerves that the old *Hetruſcan* language (*fere a Syris habet cuncta ſacrorum nomina*) hath almoſt all the ſacred Appellations from the Eaſtern tongues. For which purpoſe it is farther obſervable, which *Grotius* takes notice of, that the *jus pontificum Romanorum* was taken a great part from the *Hetruſci*, and the *Hetrurians* had it *ab Hebræis* out of the Eaſtern parts. 219:2:H.

Herod. l. 2.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 2. c. 57.

Grot. Annot. in Mat. 12. 1.

XV.

5. By all which I cannot conceive but this opinion, notwithſtanding its novelty, is advanc'd to as high a degree of probability, as any that ſtands on the like foundations; and not only ſo, but it is an excellent clue to direct us to the Labyrinth of Antiquities, and give us a fair account whence the *Eaſtern* Tongues came to be ſo much us'd among both the ancient *Greeks* and *Hetrurians*. One thing more this will help us to underſtand far better than any *ſalvo* hath been yet us'd for it; which is the affinity ſpoken of by *Arius* King of *Lacedæmon* in his Letters to *Onias*, between the *Jews* and *Lacedæmonians*: εὑρέθη ἐν γραφῇ περί τε τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν καὶ Ἰουδαίων ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀδελφοὶ, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐκ γένους Ἀβραάμ· which is explain'd by *Joſephus* thus: ἐντυχόντες γραφῇ τινι, εὕρομεν ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶεν γένους Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀβραὰμ οἰκειότητος· *They had found in a book that the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians *were of the ſame ſtock, from their mutual relation to* Abraham. *Voſſius* thinks the original of this was from thoſe of the poſterity of *Anak*, who came into *Greece*, and Peopled *Sparta*, and would ſeem to have been of the poſterity of *Abraham*; or that they were partly of the Poſterity of *Abraham* by *Agar* or *Ceturah*, and partly of the *Canaanites*, driven out by *Joſhua*: But how unlikely a thing is it (ſuppoſing *Sparta* Peopled by the *Canaanites*, which yet is not evident) that they ſhould give out themſelves to be of that ſtock which they had been expell'd their Country by? And for the true poſterity of *Abraham* coming thither, as we have no ground for it but the bare aſſertion, ſo we have this ſtrong evidence againſt it, that all that came from *Abraham* were Circumcis'd, as the *Iſhmaelites*, *Hagarens*, &c. which we never read of among the *Lacedæmonians*. *H. Grotius* differs not much from the opinion of *Voſſius* concerning the ground of this kindred between the *Jews* and *Spartans*: For in his Notes on that place in the *Maccabees*, where it is ſpoken of, he gives this account of it. The *Dorians*, of whom the *Spartans* were a part, came from the *Pelaſgi*; the language of the *Pelaſgi* was different from that of the *Greeks*, as appears by *Herodotus* in his *Clio*: ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες. Now the *Pelaſgi* (ſaith he) are פלגי *diſperſi*, a *ſcatter'd Nation*; thence he ſuppoſeth theſe *Pelaſgi* or baniſh'd People, to have come from the Confines of *Arabia* and *Syria*, in which the poſterity of *Abraham* and *Ceturah* had plac'd themſelves. But, 1. it is uncertain whether the poſterity of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* were plac'd ſo near *Canaan* or no. I know *Junius*

1 Maccab. 12. 21.

Joſeph. Antiq. l. 13. c. 9.

Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1. c. 13.

endeavours to find the ſeat of all the Sons of *Ceturah* in *Arabia*; but *Mercer* gives ſeveral not improbable reaſons why he conceives them plac'd not in the Eaſt of *Canaan*, but in the Eaſtern parts of the World. 2. We have no evidence at all of any remove of theſe Sons of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* out of the parts of *Arabia*, ſuppoſing them plac'd there; nor any reaſon why they ſhould be baniſh'd thence. 3. That which was the badg of *Abraham*'s poſterity, was never that we read of in uſe among the *Spartans*, which was Circumciſion. Indeed in much later Ages than this we ſpeak of, we read of a People among the *Thracians* who were circumcis'd, whom the *Greeks* themſelves judg'd to be *Jews*. So *Ariſtoph. Acharnen. Act. 1. ſc. 4.* *Ariſtophanes* brings the *Odomantes* in. Τίς τῶν Ὀδομάντων τὸ πέος ἀποτέθρακεν; ἀντὶ ἀποτέθρακεν (ſaith the Scholiaſt) i. e. ἀνέτιλλον, ἐλεαίνοντο δὲ καὶ ἀπέτιλλοντο οἱ Θρᾶκες τὰ αἰδοῖα καὶ ἀποσεσυρμένα εἶχον αὐτά. Whereby it is plain that Circumciſion was in uſe among the *Thracians*; for theſe *Odomantes* were (ſaith the Scholiaſt) a People of *Thrace*. Φασὶ δὲ αὐτοὺς Ἰουδαίους εἶναι. It ſeems it was a Tradition among them that they were *Jews*. If ſo, it ſeems moſt probable that they were ſome of the ten Tribes, who were plac'd about *Colchis*, and the adjacent places: For *Herodotus* in *Euterpe* ſaith, that the *Syrians* that liv'd about the Rivers *Thermodoon* and *Parthenius*, learn'd Circumciſion from the *Colchi*, of whom he ſaith, Μοῦνοι πάντων Κόλχοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες περιτέμνονται ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὰ αἰδοῖα. *Only the* Colchi, *and* Ægyptians, *and* Ethiopians *had originally the cuſtom of Circumciſion.* Or elſe the *Odomantes* might be ſome of the diſpers'd *Strabo l. 11.* *Jews* in *Armenia*, where *Strabo* mentions a Region call'd *Odomantis*, and ſo they retain'd the name of the place from whence they came, after their removal into *Thrace*. But whatever theſe *Odomantes* were, they were far enough from the *Spartans*, who never were thus ſuſpected of *Judaiſm*, nor laught at for Circumciſion. So that this opinion *Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. 1. c. 22.* of *Grotius* on that account ſeems not very probable. *Bochartus*, who hath been ſo happy in many other Conjectures, yet here gives out, unleſs it may depend upon the Teſtimony of *Claudius Iolaus* in *Stephanus Bizantius*, who fabulouſly derives the *Jews* from one *Judæus Sparton*, who went from *Thebes* along with *Bacchus* into the Wars; which *Sparton* they might confound with another *Sparton*, the Son of *Phonoreus*, the Founder of *Sparta*; which yet is rejected as a Fable by *Pauſanias* in *Laconicis*. Surely the *Lacedæmonians* were very ambitious of Kindred with the *Jews*, that would claim it upon ſuch grounds as theſe, eſpecially at ſuch a time when the People of the *Jews* were under diſtreſs, and their Kindred might be like to coſt them ſo dear; and if they had never ſuch a mind to have claim'd Kindred with the *Jews*, they would certainly have done it upon a more plauſible Teſtimony than the Fable of one *Claudius Iolaus*, that had neither Senſe nor Reaſon in it; and yet ſuppoſing his Fable true, it had been nothing to the purpoſe, without the linking another Fable to it, which was ſo groſs, that even the *Greeks* themſelves were aſham'd of it, who were always the moſt daring Forgers of Fables in the World. But let us ſee farther what the Divine (as *Scalig. Canon. Iſag. p. 332.* ſome have lov'd to call him) *Joſ. Scaliger* ſaith to it: All that he ſaith, is only a wonder or two at it: *Quid magis mirum quam Lacedæmonios ab Abraham prognatos eſſe*, &c. and a refutation of an abſurd opinion, that *Œbalus* the Father of *Tyndareus*, and Grandfather of *Caſtor*, *Pollux*, and *Helena*, was the ſame with *Ebal*, mention'd *Gen.* 10. 28. which there can be no reaſon for, ſince *Ebal* was the Son of *Joktan*, and ſo of another Race from *Abraham*; and *Joktan*'s Sons were plac'd Eaſtward, but chiefly *Œbalus* was within an hundred years before the deſtruction of *Troy*; but *Phaleg* Unkle to *Ebal*, died 664 years before *Œbalus* in *A. M.* 1993. Thus far then we cannot find any plauſible account of this claim of Kindred: but tho' it be an endleſs task to make good all the claims of Kindred in the World, eſpecially to Perſons of Power and Authority, yet there being no viſible intereſt or deſign which the *Spartans* could have in ſuch a claim, eſpecially at that time with a Nation generally hated and maligned by Heathen Idolaters, we cannot ſuppoſe but there muſt be ſome at leaſt plauſible ground for ſuch a perſuaſion among them. What if we ſhould conjecture that the *Spartans* might find in the *Greek* Verſion of the *Pentateuch*, which was much ſpread abroad at that time among the Sons of *Iſhmael*, one whoſe name makes the neareſt approach to their *Cadmus*, from whom they ſuppoſe themſelves deriv'd; for the youngeſt of *Iſhmael*'s Sons was call'd *Kedemah*, Gen. 25. 15. which the *Syriac* renders *Kedem*, the very name of *Cadmus* in the Eaſtern Tongues. But this being a light conjecture, I paſs it by, and return to the ſubject of our diſcourſe, which gives a plauſible account of the ground of this Kindred. We have already ſhew'd that the *Pelaſgi* were the firſt who Peopled *Greece*, (καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ἐπεπόλασε, is *Strabo's* expreſſion of that Nation, that it ſpread over all *Greece*) and withal it appears that the chief Seat of the *Pelaſgi* was in *Arcadia*, to which next adjoyns *Laconia*; and therefore in all probability was Peopled by them; and beſides, the *Dorians* ſprang from the *Pelaſgi*, and the *Spartans* were a part of the *Dorians*, as appears already out of *Grotius*; ſo that what Kindred the *Pelaſgi* had, was deriv'd down to the *Spartans*; and we have manifeſted that theſe *Pelaſgi* were from *Phaleg*, and the Scripture tells us that *Phaleg* was the Son of *Eber*, from whom *Abraham* came in a direct and lineal ſucceſſion. And thus the *Jews* coming from *Abraham* and the *Spartans* by the *Pelaſgi* from *Phaleg*, they both came out of the ſame ſtock: For ſo *Joſephus* expreſſeth it, not that the *Lacedæmonians* came from *Abraham*, but that the *Jews* and they were both ἐξ ἑνὸς γένους, *out of the ſame ſtock, and both had relation to* Abraham; the *Jews* as coming in a direct line, the *Spartans* as deriving from *Phaleg*, from whom *Abraham* came. And thus much may now ſuffice to clear the firſt Plantation of *Greece*, and to ſhew how conſonant it is to ſacred Scripture; which I have taken the more pains in, becauſe of the ſerviceableneſs of this diſcourſe to that end, and to ſhew what uſe may be made of this kind of Learning, for vindicating the honor of the Sacred Scriptures.

V. Manaſſ. Ben. Iſrael. Spes Iſrael. & Spizel. de Iſrael. American.

Gen. 11. 17, 28.

The only thing remaining as to the origin of Nations, is the Peopling of that vaſt Continent of *America*, which I cannot think we have yet ſufficient information, either concerning the paſſages thither, eſpecially Eaſt and North, or concerning any Records the *Indians* have among themſelves abſolutely to determin any thing in it. It ſeems moſt probable that the ſeveral parts of it were Peopled at ſeveral times, and from ſeveral parts, eſpecially North and Eaſt; but to go about abſolutely to determin from what Nation, in what Age, by what means they were firſt Peopled, were a piece of as great confidence as ignorance, till we have more certain diſcoveries of it. I chuſe therefore rather to refer the Reader to the bandyings of this Controverſy in the many Writers about it, than to undertake any thing as to the deciſion of it. Only in the general it appears from the remaining Tradition of the Flood, and many Rites and Cuſtoms us'd among them, that they had the ſame original

V. Grot. Joh. de Laet. Horn. de Orig. Gent. American.

original with us, and that there can be no Argument brought againſt it from themſelves, ſince ſome Authors tell us that the eldeſt Accounts and Memoirs they have, do not exceed 800 years backward; and therefore their Teſtimony can be of no validity in a matter of ſo great Antiquity, as the origin of Nations is.

V. Manaſſe Ben. Iſrael. ſpes Iſrael. Et Spizzel. de Iſrael. American.

B.H

221.1.A

CHAP. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

I. *That there were ſome remainders of the ancient Hiſtory of the World preſerv'd in the ſeveral Nations after the diſperſion.* II. *How it came to be corrupted: by decay of Knowledg, increaſe of Idolatry, confuſion of Languages.* III. *An inquiry into the cauſe of that. Difficulties againſt the common opinion that languages were confounded at* Babel. IV. *Thoſe difficulties clear'd.* V. *Of the fabulouſneſs of Poets. The particular ways whereby the Heathen Mythology aroſe. Attributing the general Hiſtory of the World to their own Nation. The corruption of* Hebraiſms. *Alteration of names. Ambiguity of Senſe in the Oriental languages.* VI. *Attributing the actions of many to one perſon, as in* Jupiter, Bacchus, *&c.* VII. *The remainders of Scripture-hiſtory among the Heathens. The names of* GOD, Chaos, *formation of Man among the* Phœnicians. *Of* Adam *among the* Germans, Ægyptians, Cilicians. Adam *under* Saturn. Cain *among the* Phœnicians. Tubal-Cain *and* Jubal *under* Vulcan *and* Apollo. Naamah *under* Minerva. VIII. Noah *under* Saturn, Janus, Prometheus *and* Bacchus. IX. Noah'*s three Sons under* Jupiter, Neptune *and* Pluto. Canaan *under* Mercury, Nimrod *under* Bacchus, Magog *under* Prometheus. *Of* Abraham *and* Iſaac *among the* Phœnicians. X. Jacob'*s ſervice under* Apollo'*s. The* βαιτύλια *from* Bethel. Joſeph *under* Apis. Moſes *under* Bacchus. Joſhua *under* Hercules. Balaam *under the old* Silenus.

1. THE main particulars contain'd in the Scriptures concerning the Hiſtory of ancient Times being thus far clear'd, there remains only that Evidence which there is of the truth of the Hiſtorical part of thoſe eldeſt times, in thoſe foot-ſteps of it which are contain'd in the Heathen Mythology. For we cannot conceive, that ſince we have manifeſted that all Mankind did come from the Poſterity of *Noah*, that all thoſe paſſages which concern'd the Hiſtory of the World, ſhould be preſently obliterated and extinguiſhed among them, but ſome kind of

Tradition would be preſerv'd, altho' by degrees it would be ſo much alter'd for want of certain Records to preſerve it in, that it would be a hard matter to diſcover its original, without an exact comparing it with the true Hiſtory it ſelf from whence it was firſt taken. For it far'd with this Tradition of the firſt Ages of the World, as with a Perſon who hath a long time travell'd in foreign Parts, who by the variety of Climes and Countries may be ſo far alter'd from what he was, that his own Relations may not know him upon his return, but only by ſome certain Marks which he hath in his Body, by which they are aſſur'd, that however his Complexion and Viſage may be alter'd, yet the Perſon is the ſame ſtill. Thus it was in this original Tradition of the World; thro' its continual paſſing from one Age to another, and the various humours, tempers, and deſigns of Men, it receiv'd ſtrange diſguiſes and alterations, as to its outward favour and complexion; but yet there are ſome ſuch certain Marks remaining on it, by which we find out its true original. Two things then will be the main ſubject of our inquiry here. 1. *By what means the original Tradition came to be alter'd and corrupted.* 2. *By what marks we may diſcern its true original,* or what Evidences we have of the remainders of Scripture-hiſtory in the Heathen Mythology.

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II. 1. Concerning the means whereby the Tradition by degrees came to be corrupted. There may be ſome more general, and others more particular. The general cauſes of it were;

1. The gradual decay of Knowledg and increaſe of Barbariſm in the World, occaſion'd by the want of certain Records to preſerve the ancient Hiſtory of the World in: Which we at large diſcours'd of in our entrance on this ſubject. Now in the decay of Knowledg, there muſt needs follow a ſudden and ſtrange alteration of the Memory of former times, which hath then nothing to preſerve it, but the moſt uncertain report of Fame, which alters and diſguiſeth things according to the Humours, and Inclinations, and Judgments of thoſe whoſe hands it paſſeth thro'.

Book 1. c. 1. *ſect.* 16.

2. The gradual increaſe of Idolatry in the World: Which began ſoon after the diſperſion of Nations, and in whoſe Age, we cannot at ſo great a diſtance, and in ſo great obſcurity, preciſely determine; but as ſoon as Idolatry came in, all the ancient Tradition was made ſubſervient in order to that end; and thoſe Perſons whoſe Memories were preſerv'd in ſeveral Nations, by degrees came to be worſhipped under diverſities of Names; and ſuch things were annexed to the former Traditions as would tend moſt to advance the greateſt Superſtition in the World.

3. The Confuſion of Languages at *Babel*, was one great reaſon of corrupting the ancient Tradition of the World. For in ſo great variety (as ſuddenly happen'd) of Languages in the World, it cannot be conceiv'd but ſuch things which might be preſerv'd in ſome uniform manner, had all Nations us'd the ſame Language, would through the diverſity of Idioms and Properties of ſeveral Tongues be ſtrangely alter'd and diſguis'd, as will appear afterwards. This alteration of Languages in the World upon the confuſion of Tongues at *Babel*, brought as great a confuſion into the original Tradition, as it did among thoſe who were the deſigners of that work.

III. And becauſe this ſubject of the original and cauſe of this diverſity of Languages among Men, doth both tend to explain the preſent ſubject, and to clear the truth of Scripture-hiſtory, I ſhall a little farther inquire into it. Chiefly on this account, becauſe it is pretended that ſuch a confuſion is needleſs which is deliver'd in Scripture, for the producing ſuch diverſities of Languages, which would ariſe thro' mere length of time, and the varieties of Climes and Cuſtoms in the World. But if we only ſpeak concerning the ſenſe of *Moſes* about it, the inquiry is of greater difficulty than at firſt view it ſeems to be. For it is pretended, that *Moſes* no where ſpeaks of a diverſity of Languages, as we underſtand it, but only of a confuſion of their Speech who were at *Babel*, which might well be, altho' they all us'd the ſame Language; that is, there might be a confuſion rais'd in their Minds, that they could not underſtand one another; their Notions of things being diſturb'd, ſo that tho' they heard one word, they had different apprehenſions of it; ſome thinking it ſignify'd one thing, and ſome another. As *Julius Scaliger* tells us, that the *Jews* he had convers'd with, did not underſtand by it a multiplication of Tongues; but only by that confuſion their former Notions of things, by the ſame words, were alter'd. As if one call'd for אבן a Stone, one by that word underſtands Lime, another Water, another Sand, *&c.* this muſt needs produce a ſtrange confuſion among them, and enough to make them deſiſt from their work. But ſuppoſing no ſuch diviſion of Languages there, yet after their diſperſion, which might be caus'd by the former confuſion, by the different Laws, Rites, and Cuſtoms, Commerce, and Trading, and tract of Time, there would have riſen a diviſion of their ſeveral Tongues. But if there were ſuch a diviſion of Tongues miraculouſly caus'd there (that as it is commonly ſaid, all thoſe who were of the ſame Language, went together in their ſeveral Companies) whence comes it to paſs, that in their diſperſion we read of ſeveral Families diſperſed, which uſed the ſame Language after their diſperſion; as all the Sons of *Canaan*, mentioned *Gen.* 10. 15, 16, 17, 18. uſed the *Canaanitiſh* Tongue: In *Greece*, *Javan* and *Eliſa* had the ſame Language: In *Ægypt*, *Miſraim* and *Pathruſim*: In *Arabia* the Sons of *Joktan* and *Chus*: In *Chaldæa*, *Aram* and *Uz*, the Inhabitants of *Syria*, *Maſh* of *Meſopotamia*, *Nimrod* of *Babylon*, *Aſſur* of *Aſſyria*: Whence comes it to paſs if their ſeveral Tongues were the cauſe of their diſperſion, that theſe ſeveral Heads of Families ſhould uſe the ſame Tongue? Another reaſon againſt the common opinion, is this, which ſeems to have a great deal of force in it. If Tongues were divided at *Babel* as it is imagin'd; whence was it, that the nearer any Nation lay to thoſe who had the primitive Language the *Hebrew*, they did participate more of that Tongue than thoſe who were more remote, as is plain in the *Chaldeans*, *Canaanites*, *Greeks*, and others? Whereas if their Language were divided at *Babel*, they would have retain'd their own Languages as well as others. This very Argument prevail'd ſo far with the Learned *Iſ. Caſaubon*, as appears by his *Adverſaria* on this ſubject (publiſh'd by the Learned Doctor his Son) as to make him leave the common opinion, and to conclude the ſeveral Tongues to be only ſome variations from the *Hebrew*, but yet ſo as many new words were invented too. Hence he obſerves, that the *Aſiatic Greeks* came nearer to the *Hebrew* than the *European*. And if this opinion hold true, it is the beſt foundation for deriving other Languages from the *Hebrew*; a thing attempted by the ſame Learned Perſon, as you may ſee in the Book fore-cited, and endeavour'd by *Guichardus*, *Avenarius*, and others. Thus we ſee there is no agreement in Mens minds concerning the diviſion of Tongues at *Babel*.

V. Mer. Caſaub. de 4 linguis p. 3, &c.

Scal. Exercit. in Cardan. 259. ſect. 1.

Caſaub. Diatrib. de L. Heb. p. 17, 18.

P. 47.

IV. But having ſet down this Opinion with its Reaſons, I ſhall not ſo leave the receiv'd Opinion, but ſhall firſt ſee what may be ſaid for that, and leave the judgment concerning the probability of either to the underſtanding Reader. And it ſeems to be grounded on theſe Reaſons. 1. That had it been left to Mens own choice, there cannot be a ſufficient reaſon aſſign'd of Languages in the World. For there being one Language originally in the World, whereby Men did repreſent their conceptions to one another; we cannot imagine that Men ſhould of themſelves introduce ſo great an alteration, as whereby to take off that neceſſary ſociety and converſe with each other, which even Nature itſelf did put Men upon. Hence *Calvin*, and others conclude, That *prodigii loco habenda eſt linguarum diverſitas*; becauſe there having been that freedom of converſe among Men, it is not to be ſuppoſed they ſhould of themſelves cut it off to their mutual diſadvantage. But to this it is ſaid, *That the long tract of Time and diverſity of Cuſtoms might alter the Language.* I grant it much, but not wholly; and they would only therein differ in their Languages, wherein their Cuſtoms differ'd: So that there would remain ſtill ſuch an agreement as whereby they might underſtand each other; which it will be hard to find in many of the eldeſt Languages. As for the length of Time, tho' that doth alter much in reference to Words and Phraſes, in which that of *Horace* holds true, *Multa renaſcentur quæ jam cecidêre, &c.* yet it will be more difficult to find where mere length of Time hath brought a whole Language out of uſe, and another in the room of it. But that which I think deſerves well to be conſider'd, is this, that the greateſt alteration of Languages in the World hath riſen from Colonies of Nations that uſ'd another Language; and ſo by the mixture of both together the Language might be much alter'd: As the *Hebrew* by the *Chaldees* in *Babylon*; the *Spaniſh*, *Italian* and others by the *Latin*, as *Breerwood* ſhews, our own by the *Normans* and others. So that were there not a diverſity of Languages ſuppos'd, this interfering of People would bring no conſiderable alteration along with it, no more than a Colony from *New-England* would alter our Language here. And as for another cauſe aſſign'd of the change of Languages, the difference of Climates, which *Bodin* gives as the reaſon why the *Northern* People uſe Conſonants and Aſpirates ſo much, eſpecially the *Saxons*, and thoſe that live by the *Baltic* Sea who pronounce thus, *Per theum ferum pibimus penum finum.* And ſo *R. D. Kimchi* obſerves of the *Ephraimites*, Judg. 12. 6. that it was the Air that was the cauſe of their liſping, and calling it *Sibboleth*, as he there obſerves the Men of *Sarphath*, that is, the *French*, that they could not pronounce *Schin*, but pronounc'd it like *Thau Raphe*. But by theſe examples we ſee, that this would cauſe only an alteration as to ſome Letters and Syllables, and rather as to the Pronunciation, than any variety of the Language. So that we ſee that, ſetting aſide the confuſion of Languages at *Babel*, there can be no reaſon ſufficient aſſign'd for the variety of Languages in the World. 2. Tho' it be granted, that a confuſion in their Minds without diſtinct Languages, were enough to make them deſiſt from their work, yet the Context in that place, *Gen.* 11. doth infer a diverſity of Tongues, as will appear from the antecedents and conſequents; as from the firſt Verſe, where it is not conceivable why it ſhould be there taken notice of as ſuch a remarkable circumſtance, that then they had but one Language before they ſet upon this work, if there was not a diverſity of Tongues cauſed by the work they

Calvin. Annot. in Gen. 11. 1, 2.

Breerwood's Inquiries, *c.* 5, 6.

Bodin Method. Hiſt. c. 9.

Mayer. Prodr. Chaldaiſm c. 1.

went about; but eſpecially *ver.* 6. where God takes ſuch notice of this very thing, that they had but one Language, wherein they were ſo confident to carry on their work: Therefore, *ver.* 7. when he would deſtroy their work by confounding their Language, it muſt be by multiplying that Language into many more; for it muſt be taken in oppoſition to what is ſaid in the other Verſe. And what is there added, *their not underſtanding one anothers ſpeech*, ſeems to refer not to their inward Conceptions, as tho' they did not underſtand one anothers Minds, but to the outward expreſſions, as שפה doth apparently relate to them: Farther in *ver.* 8. this is ſet down as the cauſe of their diſperſion, which had the Tongue been the ſame afterwards as it was before, could have been no reaſon for it. Again, ſome argue from the name *Babel* given to the place, from בלל, which ſignifies to *confound* and mingle things of ſeveral kinds together. So us'd *Judg.* 19. 21. *Eſay* 30. 24. *Job* 6. 5. &c. thence the name בבל for בלבל the middle ל left out, as in *Golgotha* for *Golgoltha*, *Kigultha* for *Kilkaltha*, and others of a like nature. Beſides, there ſeems to be ſomewhat in what is ſaid, *That the Families were divided according to their tongues*, Gen. 10. 5, 20, 31. which doth at leaſt imply a diverſity of Tongues among them, the cauſe of which muſt be aſſigned by them who will not allow of the confuſion and diviſion of Languages at *Babel*. Farther, this ſeems moſt agreeable to God's end in making of them thus leave off their work, that there might be not only a preſent judgment upon them, but that which might remain to Poſterity as a note of the folly of their Anceſtors. Thoſe who recede from the common opinion, leſt they ſhould give advantage to Infidels by attributing that to a Miracle, which might be done without, ſeem to be more wary than wiſe in it. For beſides that, it is certain that Miracles may be in thoſe things which might be effected otherwiſe by natural Cauſes, when they are produced without the help of thoſe Cauſes, and in a ſpace of time impoſſible to nature; and that it hath not been as yet prov'd, how ſuch diverſity of Tongues as is in the World would have been effected without ſuch a Miracle; it muſt be granted by them that there was a Miracle in it; and what greater difficulty there ſhould be in the variety of Languages, than in the ſignification of the ſame words, I underſtand not. But I ſee no neceſſity of aſſerting, that every one of the Families had a diſtinct Language; and the common opinion of 70 or 72, as the Gr. Families and as many Languages, is now taken for a groundleſs fancy by Learned Men: As is eaſily prov'd from the dividing Father and Children, whoſe Families could not certainly be without them: and ſome ſuppos'd to be unborn then, as *Joktan*'s 13 Children; eſpecially if we ſay, as many do, that the confuſion was at the birth of *Phaleg*, and *Joktan* was his younger Brother, as the *Jews* generally do. To the laſt Objection it may be reply'd, That the Agreement of Languages in ſome radical words, doth not infer the derivation of the one from the other, as is plain in the *Perſian* and *German*, in which Learned Men have obſerv'd ſo many words alike. And ſo by *Buſbequius*, of the Inhabitants about *Tauric Cherſoneſe*; and ſo in moſt of our modern Tongues there may be ſome words alike, without any ſuch dependence or derivation. Again, tho' it be granted that the Languages of them who were at *Babel* were confounded, yet it is not neceſſary we ſhould ſay that all *Noah*'s Poſterity were there. It is thought by ſome, that they were chiefly *Cham* and his Company; if ſo, then *Sem* and his Poſterity might retain the Lan-

Bochart. Geog. l. 1. c. 15.
Buxt. diatr. ſect. 54.
Ibid. ſect. 68.

Lipſ. cent. 3. *ep.* 44.
Busbeq. ep. 24.

Mayer. Philol. ſacr. p. 2. *c.* 6.

guage they had before, only with ſome variations. But this is very uncertain, unleſs we take it for *Heber* and *Phaleg*, from whoſe vicinity other bordering Nations might make uſe of many of their primitive words: And for the *Greeks*, it will be granted, that many of their words, eſpecially the old *Bœotic*, had affinity with the *Hebrew*; but it was from the *Pelaſgi* at firſt, and *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* afterwards: The old *Canaanitiſh* Language being, if not the pure *Hebrew*, yet a dialect of that Tongue, as is prov'd by many Learned Men. But however theſe things be, it is not neceſſary to ſay that all Mother Tongues ſo call'd, were then exiſtent at that confuſion; but the preſent Curſe did divide their Languages who were there, and that all diviſion of Languages ſince, is to be look'd upon as the effect of that Curſe. 221. 2. A.

V. 4. It being thus manifeſted what a ſtrange confuſion of Languages was caus'd in the World, we may thereby eaſily underſtand how the ancient Tradition came to be corrupted and alter'd in the World.

Another reaſon of the alteration of the ancient Traditions, was the fabulouſneſs of the Poets; for theſe made it their deſign to diſguiſe all their ancient Stories under Fables, in which they were ſo loſt, that they could never recover them afterwards. For the elder Poets of *Greece* being Men of greater learning than generally the People were of, and being converſant in *Ægypt* and other parts, did bring in new reports of the ancient times which they receiv'd from the Nations they went to; and by mixing their own Traditions and others together, and by ſuiting what was remaining of the ancient Tradition to theſe, they muſt needs make a ſtrange confuſion of things together, and leave them much more obſcure and fabulous than they found them. And herein all their cunning and ſubtilty lay, in putting a new face on whatever they borrow'd from other Nations, and making them appear among themſelves in a *Greek* Habit, that the former owners of thoſe Traditions could ſcarce challenge them as theirs under ſo ſtrange a *Metamorphoſis*. For thoſe things which were moſt plain and hiſtorical in the Fountains whence they deriv'd them, they did ſo παρῳδεῖν, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſpeaks, (or as *Origen*, ὠγκώσαντες ἀνέπλασαν) wrapt them up under ſo great *Mythology*, that the original Truths can hardly be diſcerned, becauſe of that multitude of prodigious Fables, with which they have inlaid them. But as great as their Artifice was in the doing this, we may yet diſcern apparently many of thoſe particular courſes which were taken by them to diſguiſe and alter the primitive Tradition.

Clemens Strom. 6. c. Orig. contr. Celſ. l. 4.

1. Attributing what was done by the great Anceſtors of Mankind to ſome Perſons of their own Nations. Thus the *Theſſalians* make *Deucalion* to be the Perſon who eſcap'd the Flood, and from whom the World was peopled after it. And whoever compares the relation of the Flood of *Deucalion* in *Apollodorus* with that in the Scripture, might eaſily render *Apollodorus* his *Greek* in the Language of the Scriptures, only changing *Greece* into the whole Earth, and *Deucalion* into *Noah*, *Parnaſſus* into *Ararat*, and *Jupiter* into *Jehovah*. On the ſame account the *Athenians* attribute the Flood to *Ogyges*, not that the Flood of *Ogyges* and *Deucalion* were particular and diſtinct Deluges, which many have taken a great deal of needleſs pains to place in their ſeveral Ages: But as *Deucalion* was of the eldeſt memory in *Theſſaly*, ſo was *Ogyges* at *Athens*, and ſo the Flood as being a matter of remoteſt Antiquity, was on the ſame account in both places attributed to both theſe. Becauſe as Mankind was ſuppos'd to begin again after the Flood, ſo they had among them

Apollod. biblioth. l. 1. p. 19.

them no memory extant of any elder than theſe two, from whom on that account they ſuppos'd Mankind deriv'd. And on the ſame reaſon it may be ſuppos'd that the *Aſſyrians* attribute the Flood to *Xiſuthrus*, whom they ſuppos'd to be a King of *Aſſyria*; but the circumſtances of *Apud Cyr. c. Julian. lib.* 21. the Story as deliver'd by *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, and *Abydenus*, are ſuch as make it clear to be only a remainder of the univerſal Flood which happened in the time of *Noah*. So the *Theſſalians* make *Prometheus* to be the *Protoplaſt*; the *Peloponneſians Phoroneus*, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* *Clemens Strom. l.* 1. tells us, whom *Phoronides* the Poet calls πατέρα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *The Father of Mankind*. This may be now the firſt way of corrupting the ancient Tradition, by ſuppoſing all that was convey'd by it to have been acted among themſelves; which may be imputed partly to their Ignorance of the ſtate of their ancient times, and partly to their Pride, leſt they ſhould ſeem to be behind others in matters of Antiquity.

2. Another fountain of *Heathen Mythology*, was the taking the *Idiom* of the Oriental Languages in a proper Senſe. For whether we ſuppoſe the ancient Traditions were convey'd to them in the ancient *Hebrew* by the *Pelaſgi*, or were deliver'd to them by the *Phœnicians*, or were fetch'd out of the Scriptures themſelves (as ſome ſuppoſe, tho' improbably, of *Homer* and ſome ancient Poets) yet all theſe ſeveral ways agreeing in this, That the Traditions were Oriental, we thereby underſtand how much of their *Mythology* came by taking the *Hebrew* in a proper and literal ſenſe without attending to the *Idiom* of the Tongue. From hence *Bochartus* hath ingeniouſly fetch'd many Heathen Fables. Thus when *Noah* is ſaid to be איש הארמה *Gen.* 9. 20. which in the *Idiom* of the *Hebrew* only ſignifies a *huſbandman*, they took it in a proper ſenſe for ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς γῆς, and thence *Saturn* who was the ſame with *Noah* (as will appear afterwards) is made by *Mythologiſts* the huſband of *Rhea*, which was the ſame with the *Earth*. So the Gyants making war againſt Heaven, was only a Poetical adumbration of the deſign at the building of *Gen.* 11. 4. *Babel*, whoſe top in the Scripture is ſaid to reach בשמים, which in the *Hebrew* ſignifies only a *great height*; but to aggrandize the Story, was taken in the literal Interpretation, that they attempted *Heaven*. So when they are ſaid to fight againſt the Gods, *Bochartus* thinks it might be taken from that phraſe of *Nimrod*, that he was a *mighty hunter*, לפני יהוה *before the Lord* we render it, but it ſometimes ſignifies *againſt* *Ap. Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l.* 9. *the Lord*. So what *Abydenus* ſaith of the Gyants, that they were ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀνασχόντες, *thoſe that came out of the earth*, is ſuppos'd to be taken from that phraſe, *Gen.* 10. 11. מן הארץ יצא, *è terra ipſa exiit*. But far more likely and probable is that which Learned Men are generally agreed in concerning *Bacchus* his being born of *Jupiter*'s *Thigh*, which is only an *Gen.* 46. 26. Expreſſion of that *Hebraiſm* ירכו יצאי, wherein *coming out of the thigh* is a phraſe for ordinary Procreation.

3. A third way obſervable, is, the alteration of the Names in the ancient Tradition, and putting Names of like importance to them in their own Language. Thus *Jupiter* who was the ſame with *Cham*, was called Ζεὺς παρὰ τὸ ζέειν, as חם, from חמם *fervere, incaleſcere*. Ἀμμοῦν γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι καλέουσι τὸν Δία, ſaith *Herodotus*; him whom the *Greeks* call Ζεὺς, the *Ægyptians* call *Cham*. So *Japheth*, whoſe memory was preſerv'd under *Neptune*, to whoſe portion the Iſlands in the Sea fell, was called by the *Greeks* Ποσειδῶν, which comes ſaith *Bochartus*) from the *Punic* פשיטן, *Bochart. Phaleg. l.* 1. *c.* 1. which ſignifies *large* and *broad*, which is the very importance of the *Hebrew* יפת; thence in alluſion to the Name, it is ſaid, *Gen.* 9. 27.

יפת אלהים ליפת *God ſhall enlarge Japhet.* Thence the *Epithets* of *Neptune* are Εὐρύστερνος, Εὐρύοψ, Εὐρυκρείων, all equally alluding to the Name *Japhet.* So Ἀπόλλων, in the *Greek* is of the ſame importance with the *Heb.* שד, *Dæmon,* from שדד *to deſtroy.* Thence we read, *Deut.* 32. 17. *they ſacrificed* לשדים, *to Devils.* *Canaan* in the *Hebrew* ſignifies a Merchant; thence *Mercury,* under whom the memory of *Canaan* the Son of *Cham* was preſerv'd is deriv'd, by many from מכר, *to ſell.* *Ceres* which was the Inventreſs of *Agriculture,* from גרש which imports *Bread-corn.* Theſe and many others are produc'd by *Voſſius, Heinſius, Bochartus* and other Learned Men, which I inſiſt not on, becauſe my deſign is only *digitos ad fontes intendere,* and to make theſe handſom and probable conjectures, argumentative to our purpoſe, and to bind up thoſe looſe and ſcattering obſervations into ſome order and method, in which they have not yet appear'd, nor been improv'd to that end which I make uſe of them for.

When the Oriental phraſes were ambiguous and equivocal, they omitted that ſenſe which was plain and obvious, and took that which was more ſtrange and fabulous. From hence the Learned *Bochartus* hath fetch'd the Fable of the *Golden Fleece,* which was nothing elſe but robbing the Treaſury of the King of *Colchis*; but it was diſguis'd under the name of the *Golden Fleece,* becauſe the *Syriac* word גזא, ſignifies both a *Fleece* and a *Treaſury.* So the *Bulls* and *Dragons* that kept it, were nothing but the *Walls* and *Brazen-gates*; for שור, ſignifies both a *Bull* and a *Wall,* and נחש *Braſs,* and a *Dragon.* And ſo the Fable of the *Braſs-Bull* in the Mountain of *Tabyrus* which foretold Calamities, aroſe from the Equivocation of the *Phœnician* or *Hebrew* words אלוף מנחש, which ſignify either *Doctor, Augur,* or *Bos ex ære,* a *Foreteller* of *events* or a *Brazen-Bull.* From the like Ambiguity of the word אלפא aroſe the Fable of *Jupiter* ſtealing *Europa* in the form of a *Bull,* becauſe the word either ſignifies a *Ship* in which he convey'd her away, or a *Bull*; or it may be the Ship had παράσημον *bovis,* as the Ship St. *Paul* ſailed in had *Caſtor* and *Pollux,* it being uſual to call their Ships by the names of the Signs they carry'd. From the like Equivocation in the *Phœnician* Language doth *Bochartus* fetch many other Heathen Fables, in his Excellent Piece *De Phœnicum Coloniis,* as particularly that of *Arethuſa* coming from *Alpheus,* which was from אלפי a *Ship,* becauſe it was not far from an *Excellent Haven.* And ſo he makes the *Chimæra* to be no more than a mere *ens rationis*; for he takes the *Chimæra* which *Bellerophon* conquered, to be only the People of *Solymi* under the three Generals, *Aryus, Troſibis,* and *Arſalus*; ארי that ſignifies a *Lion*; *Troſibis* was ראש חויא *the head of a Serpent*: *Arſalus* was אזר זיל a *young Kid,* and ſo the *Chimæra* conſiſted of *the form of a Lion, a Goat, and a Serpent.* Thus we ſee how eaſy a matter it was to advance the *Heathen Mythology* from the Equivocation of the Oriental Languages, in which their Traditions were convey'd to them. 4.

Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. cap. 28.

Ibid. l. 1. c. 6.

But yet a more prolific Principle of *Mythology* was by attributing the Actions of ſeveral Perſons to one who was the firſt or the chief of them. Thus it was in the Stories of *Jupiter, Neptune, Mars, Mercury, Minerva, Juno, Bacchus* and *Hercules,* which were a collection of the Actions done by a multitude of Perſons, which were all attributed to one Perſon. So *Voſſius* tells us before the time of the *Trojan* Wars, moſt of their Kings, who were renowned and powerful, were called *Joves.* VI. 5.

Voſſ. de Idol. l. 1.

Now when the Actions of all theſe were attributed to one *Jupiter* of *Creet*, they muſt needs ſwell his Story up with abundance of Fables. *Voſſius* hath taken a great deal of pains to digeſt in an Hiſtorical manner the Stories of the ſeveral *Jupiters*, whereof he reckons two *Argives*, a third the Father of *Hercules*, a fourth a King of *Phrygia*, and two more of *Creet*; to one of which, without any Diſtinction, the Actions of all the reſt were aſcribed, and who was worſhipped under the name of *Jupiter*. And ſo beſides the ancient *Neptune*, who was the ſame with *Japhet*, they ſometimes underſtood any Inſular Prince, or one that had great power at Sea; but beſides theſe, there were two Famous *Neptunes* among the *Greeks*, the one of *Athens*, the other the Builder of the Walls of *Troy*: Now the Stories of all theſe being mixed together, muſt needs make a ſtrange confuſion. So for *Mars*, beſides that ancient one they had by the Oriental Tradition, they had a *Spartan*, *Thracian*, and *Arcadian Mars*. What abundance of *Mercuries* are we told of by ** Tully*? and of no leſs than five *Minervas*? Every angry, ſcornful, jealous Queen would fill up the Fables of *Juno*, who was equally claim'd by the *Argives* and *Samians*. What conteſts were there between the *Greeks* and *Ægyptians*, concerning the Country of *Bacchus*, or *Liber Pater*, whoſe Story was made up of many patches of the Oriental Story, as will appear afterwards. The ſame may be ſaid of *Hercules*. Now what a ſtrange way was this to increaſe the number of Fables? when they had one whoſe memory was anciently preſerved among them, they attributed the Actions of all ſuch to him, who came near him in that which his Memory was moſt remarkable for: And in thoſe things which they did retain of the Eaſtern Tradition, it was an uſual thing to confound Perſons Places and Actions together. So the Story of *Enoch* and *Methuſelah* is joined together by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, under the Name of Ἄννακος, who is there ſaid to live above 300 years (which agrees with *Enoch* as the Name doth) and that at his death the World ſhould be deſtroy'd by a Flood; which agrees with *Methuſelah*. So *Abraham* by *Orpheus* is called Μονογενὴς, which belongs to *Iſaac* his Son; ſo the Actions of *Nimrod*, *Ninus* and *Cham*, are confounded together in their *Mythology*. By theſe ſeveral ways now we underſtand how the Original Tradition was by degrees corrupted and altered in the Heathen *Mythology*.

* *Cicero l. 3. de Nat. Deor.*

Steph. V. Ἄννακος

I come now to the footſteps of Scripture-hiſtory, which notwithſtanding theſe corruptions, may be diſcern'd in the Heathen *Mythology*, which I ſhall methodically inquire after according to the ſeries of Scripture-hiſtory. That the Names given to God in Scripture were preſerv'd among the *Phœnicians*, appears ſufficiently by the remainders of the *Phœnician Theology*, tranſlated by *Philo Byblius* out of *Sanchoniathon*; wherein we read of the God Ἰεύω, which hath the ſame Letters with יהוה, beſides which there we meet with Ἐλιοῦν, the ſame with עליון, *The moſt High*, and Ἶλος, which is אל *The ſtrong* God; *Beelſaman*, which is, שמין בעל *The God of Heaven*: and Ἐλωείμ, the very Name of God us'd in the beginning of *Geneſis* ſo often. Beſides in thoſe Fragments we have expreſs mention of the *Chaos*, and the *Evening* following it, or *the Darkneſs on the face of the Deep*; the *Creation of Angels* under the Ζοφασημὶν צפה שמים thoſe *Beings* which contemplate the Heavens: and the *Creation of Mankind*, Ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου ἀνέμου, i. e. קול פי יה, ſaith *Bochartus*, *The voice of the mouth of* God, which is by God's Word and Inſpiration, when it is expreſs'd that God ſaid, *Let us make Man*, and

V. Scaliger. Not. in Frag. Græc. Selden. de Diis Syr. Bochart. Cana. l. 2. c. 2.

that he *breathed into him the breath of life.* After we read of γηΐνος and αὐτόχθων, which properly agree to *Adam*, who was made out of the *Earth*. *Voſſius* conceives that the memory of *Adam* was preſerv'd among the old *Germans*, of whom *Tacitus* ſpeaks, *Celebrant antiquis carminibus Tuiſtonem Deum terra editum, & filium Mannum, originem gentis, conditoreſque.* Either by *Tuiſto Adam* is underſtood, who was form'd of the Earth, and by *Mannus*, *Noah*: or by *Tuiſto* God may be underſtood, and by *Mannus*, *Adam*; to which conjecture may be added further that the ſame Author reports that ſome of the *Germans* ſacrificed to *Iſis*, which *Voſſius* likewiſe conceives to be a remainder of the *Hebrew Iſcha*. And ſo among the *Ægyptians* it is with like probability conceiv'd that *Adam* and *Iſcha* were preſerv'd under *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, as they were hiſtorically taken. In *Cilicia*, the City *Adana* is thought to have ſome remainder of the Name of *Adam*; for the *Greeks* had no termination in *M*, therefore for *Adam* they pronounced it *Adan*, and that from Ἀδανὸς, and ſo the City *Adana*: Now that Ἀδανὸς, by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, is ſaid to be the *Son of Heaven and Earth*. Ἔστι δὲ ὁ Ἀδανὸς γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ παῖς. This *Adanus*, he tells us, was otherwiſe called Κρόνος, or *Saturn*, under whom the *Greeks* preſerv'd the memory of *Adam*; for *Diodorus*, *Thallus*, *Caſſius*, *Severus*, and *Cornelius Nepos*, do all (as *Tertullian* ſaith) confeſs *Saturn* to have been a Man; and according to their Fables he muſt have been the firſt of Men. *Saturn* was the Son of *Heaven* and *Earth*, and ſo was *Adam*: he taught Men Huſbandry; and was not *Adam* the firſt that tilled the ground? Beſides, that Power which *Saturn* had, and was depoſed from, doth fitly ſet out the Dominion Man had in the *Golden Age* of Innocency, which he loſt by his own folly. And *Adam*'s hiding himſelf from the preſence of the Lord, gave occaſion to the Name of *Saturn*, from *Satar* to hide. We find ſomething of *Cain* preſerv'd in the *Phœnician* Antiquities, under the Name of Ἀγρουῆρος, or Ἀγρότης, the firſt Countryman or Huſbandman, who with his Brother Ἀγρὸς built Houſes, and the firſt foundation of a City is attributed to *Cain*: And on that account *Voſſius* conjectures that the memory of *Cain*'s Wife was preſerv'd under *Veſta*, both becauſe ſhe was the Daughter of *Saturn*, i. e. of *Adam*, and that ſhe is ſaid τὴν οἰκιῶν κατασκευὴν εὑρεῖν, *to find out firſt the way of building Houſes.* That *Tubal-Cain* gave firſt occaſion to the Name and Worſhip of *Vulcan*, hath been very probably conceiv'd, both from the very great affinity of the Names, and that *Tubal-Cain* is expreſly mention'd *to be an Inſtructer of every Artificer in braſs and iron*; and as near relation as *Apollo* had to *Vulcan*, *Jubal* had to *Tubal-Cain*, who was the *Inventer of Muſic, or the Father of all ſuch as handle the Harp and Organ*; which the *Greeks* attribute to *Apollo*. And if that be true which *Genebrard* and others aſcribe to *Naamah*, the Siſter of *Jubal* and *Tubal-Cain*, *viz.* that ſhe was the Inventer of Spinning and Weaving; then may ſhe come in for *Minerva*. Thus we ſee there were ſome, tho' but obſcure foot-ſteps preſerved, even of that part of Scripture-hiſtory which preceded the Flood.

Voſſ. de Idololat. l. 1. *cap.* 38.

Tacit. de moribus German.

Stephan. V. Ἄδανα.

Tertull. Apolog. c. 10.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1, *c.* 17.

Gen. 4. 22.

4. 21.

VIII. The memory of the Deluge it ſelf we have already found to be preſerved in the Heathen *Mythology*; we come therefore to *Noah* and his Poſterity. Many parcels of *Noah*'s memory were preſerved in the ſcattered fragments of many Fables, under *Saturn*, *Janus*, *Prometheus*, and *Bacchus*. *Bochartus* inſiſts on no fewer than 14 Parallels between *Noah* and the Heathen *Saturn*, which he ſaith are ſo plain, that there is no doubt but under *Saturn*, *Noah* was underſtood in the Heathen *Mythology*. *Saturn* was ſaid to be the common Parent of Mankind, ſo was *Noah*; *Saturn* was a juſt

Bochart. Phal. l. c. 1.

a juſt King, *Noah* not only righteous himſelf, but a preacher of Righteouſneſs; The Golden Age of *Saturn* was between *Noah* and the diſperſion of Nations. In *Noah*'s time all Mankind had but one Language, which the Heathens extend under *Saturn*, both to Men and Beaſts: The Plantation of Vines attributed to *Saturn* by the Heathens, as to *Noah* by the Scriptures: The Law of *Saturn* mentioned by the Poets, that none ſhould ſee the nakedneſs of the Gods without puniſhment, ſeems to reſpect the Fact and Curſe of *Cham*, in reference to *Noah*. *Saturn* and *Rhea*, and thoſe with them are ſaid to be born of *Thetis*, or the *Ocean*, which plainly alludes to *Noah* and his companies eſcaping the Flood; thence a Ship was the ſymbol of *Saturn*; and that *Saturn* devoured all his Children, ſeems to be nothing elſe but the Deſtruction of the old World by *Noah*'s Flood. And not only under *Saturn*, but under *Prometheus* too, was *Noah*'s memory preſerved. *Diodorus* ſpeaks of the great Flood under *Prometheus*; and *Prometheus* implies one that hath Forecaſt and Wiſdom, ſuch as *Noah* had, whereby he foretold the Flood, and was ſaved in it, when others were *Epimetheus*'s, that had not Wit to prevent their own deſtruction. Diod. l. 1.

And no wonder if *Prometheus* were *Noah*, that the forming Mankind was attributed to him, when the World was peopled from him. *Herodotus* his ſaying, that *Aſia* was *Prometheus* his Wife, might relate to the Country *Noah* lived in, and our propagation from thence. Another part of *Noah*'s memory was preſerv'd under *Janus*; the Name of *Janus* is moſt probably derived from יין, becauſe of *Noah*'s plainting a Vine, and *Janus* was called *Conſivius*, ſaith *Macrobius*, *à conſerendo, hoc eſt, à propagine generis humani, quæ Jano autore conſeritur*: Now to whom can this be ſo properly apply'd as to *Noah*, from whom Mankind was propagated? And *Janus* his being *bifrons*, or looking πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω, *forward and backward*, is not ſo fit an Emblem of any thing as of *Noah*'s ſeeing thoſe two Ages before and after the Flood. And it is farther obſervable, which *Plutarch* ſpeaks of in his *Roman Queſtions*, that the ancient Coins had on one ſide the Image of *Janus* with his two Faces, on the other πλοίου πρύμναν ἢ πρῷραν ἐγκεχαραγμένην, *the fore or hinder part of the Ship*, by which the memory of the *Ark* of *Noah* ſeems to have been preſerv'd. Thus we ſee what *Analogy* there is in the Story of *Janus* to that of *Noah*: Not that I give credit to thoſe fooleries which tell us of *Noah*'s coming from *Palæſtine* with his Son *Japhet* into *Italy*, and planting Colonies there, for which we are beholding to the ſpurious *Ethruſcan* Antiquities; but all that I aſſert is, that the Story of *Noah* might be preſerv'd in the eldeſt Colonies, tho' diſguiſed under other Names, as here in the caſe of *Janus*. And on the ſame account that the Name of *Janus* is attributed to *Noah*, ſome likewiſe believe him to have been the moſt ancient *Bacchus*, who was according to *Diodorus*, Εὑρετὴς τῆς ἀμπέλου, *the firſt planter of Vines and inſtructer of Men in making Wines*: And beſides *Bacchus* his being twice born, ſeems only an adumbration of *Noah*'s preſervation after the Flood, which might be accounted a ſecond Nativity, when the reſt of the World was deſtroy'd; and withal, *Philoſtratus* in the Life of *Apollonius* relates, that the ancient *Indian Bacchus* came thither out of *Aſſyria*, which yet more fully agrees with *Noah*. So that from theſe ſcatter'd Members of *Hippolytus*, theſe broken Fragments of Traditions, we may gather almoſt an intire Hiſtory of all the paſſages concerning *Noah*.

V. Mayer. Philol. ſacr. p. 2. c. 5.

Philoſtr. vit. Apoll. c. 4.

IX. As the Story of Saturn and Noah do much agree, ſo the three Sons of *Noah* and thoſe of *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, have their peculiar reſemblances to each other. Of which *Voſſius* and *Bochartus* have largely ſpoken, and we have touched on already. Beſides which, this latter Author hath carry'd the Parallel lower, and finds *Canaan* the Son of *Cham*, the ſame with *Mercury* the Son of *Jupiter*; as it was the curſe of *Canaan* to be a Servant of Servants, ſo *Mercury* is always deſcribed under ſervile employments; his Wings ſeem to be the Ships of the *Phœnicians* who were derived from *Canaan*; and his being the God of Trade, noting the great Merchandize of the *Phœnicians*, and *Mercury's* Thievery noting the Pyracies, or at leaſt the ſubtilty and craft of the *Phœnicians*; he was the Father of *Eloquence* and *Aſtronomy*, as *Letters* and *Aſtronomy* came from the *Phœnicians* into *Greece*. The ſame Author parallels *Nimrod* and *Bacchus*, and *Magog* and *Prometheus* together. The Name of *Bacchus* is but a light variation of בר כוש, *Bar-chus*, as *Nimrod* was the Son of *Chus*, and *Bacchus* is called *Nebrodes* by the *Greeks*, which is the very Name of *Nimrod* among them, and *Bacchus* is called Ζωγρεὺς, which excellently interprets *Nimrod*'s being a *mighty hunter*. *Bacchus* his Expeditions into *India* were the attempts of *Nimrod*, and the *Aſſyrian* Emperors. On which account *Voſſius* makes *Nimrod* or *Belus* the moſt antient *Mars*; for *Heſtiæus Mileſius* ſpeaks of *Enyalius*, which is *Mars*, his being in *Sennaar* of *Babylonia*. That the memory of *Magog* was preſerved under *Prometheus*, theſe things make it probable, that *Magog* was the Son of *Japhet*, as *Prometheus* of *Iapetus*, and that the Poſterity of *Magog* was placed about *Caucaſus*, where *Prometheus* is feigned to lie: and the eating of *Prometheus* his Heart, is only an Interpretation of מוג, which apply'd to the Heart ſignifies to *waſte away* and *be conſum'd*. Thus far *Bochartus*.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.
Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1. cap. 2.
Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 16.

The *Phœnician* Antiquities ſeem to have preſerved the memory of *Abraham*'s ſacrificing his Son *Iſaac*, by that place which *Euſebius* produceth out of *Porphyry*'s Book concerning the *Jews*; where he relates, *How* Saturn *whom the* Phœnicians *call* Iſrael, *when he reigned in thoſe parts and had an only ſon called* Jeoud, *of a Nymph called* Anobret, *being under ſome great calamity, did ſacrifice that ſon of his, being clothed with a royal habit*. Here we have a Royal Perſon called *Iſrael*; and that *Abraham* ſhould be accounted a King in thoſe elder times, is nothing ſtrange conſidering his wealth, and what petty Royalties there were in thoſe times. But *Grotius*, and from him *Voſſius*, do not think that *Abraham* was here called *Iſrael*, but that the Tranſcriber of *Euſebius* meeting with ἶλ, ſuppoſed it to be a contraction of Ἰσραὴλ, and ſo writ at length: it muſt be acknowledg'd that ἶλ is uſed in the *Phœnician Theology* for *Saturn*, but yet the circumſtances of the Story make the ordinary reading not improbable; neither is it ſtrange, that *Abraham* ſhould be called by the name of the People which he was the Progenitor of. That *Iſaac* ſhould be meant by his only Son called *Jeoud* is moſt likely; for when God bids *Abraham* go ſacrifice him, he ſaith, *Take thy ſon*, יחיד, *thy only ſon*; *Jehid* is the ſame with the *Phœnician Jeoud*. That *Sara* is meant by *Anobret*, the original of the Name implies, which is as *Bochartus* derives it חןעוברת, *Annoberet*, that is, *ex gratia concipiens*, which the Apoſtle explains, *Through faith* Sara *her ſelf receiv'd ſtrength to conceive ſeed*. Now all the difference is, that which was only deſigned and intended by *Abraham*, was believ'd by the *Phœnicians* as really done, that it might be as a precedent to them for their Ἀνθρωποθυσίαι, *ſacrificing* of Men, a thing

V. Scaliger. ad Frag. Græc.
Grot. in Deut. c. 18. v. 10.
Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.
Gen. 22. 1.
Bochart. de Phœnic. col. l. 2. c. 2.
Heb. 11. 11.

ſo much in uſe among the *Phœnicians*, and all the Colonies derived from them, as many Learned Men have at large ſhew'd. But beſides this, there are particular teſtimonies concerning *Abraham*, his age, wiſdom and knowledg, his coming out of *Chaldæa*, and the Propagation of Knowledg from him among the *Chaldæans*, *Phœnicians*, and *Ægyptians*, are extant out of *Beroſus*, *Eupolemus*, and others in ** Joſephus* and *Euſebius*, and from thence tranſcribed by many Learned Men, which on that account I forbear tranſcribing, as being common and obvious.

* *Joſeph. Antiq. l.* 1. *c.* 7. *Euſ. Præp. Evang. l.* 9. *c.* 16.

X. Some have not improbably conjectured, that the memory of *Jacob's* long peregrination, and ſervice with his Uncle *Laban*, was preſerved under the Story of *Apollo* his baniſhment and being a Shepherd under *Admetus*. For *Callimachus* reports that *Love* was the cauſe of *Apollo's* travels, as it was of *Jacob's*; and withal mentions a ſtrange increaſe of Cattel under *Apollo's* care, anſwerable to what the Scripture reports concerning *Jacob*. But it is more certain, that the memory of *Jacob's* ſetting up the *Stone* he had reſted on for a Pillar, and pouring *Oyl* upon it, and calling the place *Bethel*, was preſerved under the Anointed Stones, which the *Phœnicians* from *Bethel* called Βαιτύλια, as hath been frequently obſerv'd by Learned Men, from whence came the cuſtom of *Anointing ſtones* among the Heathens, of which ſo very many have largely diſcourſed. Thence the Proverb of a ſuperſtitious Man, πάντα λίθον λιπαρὸν ϖροσκυνεῖ, which *Arnobius* calls *lubricatum lapidem, & ex olivi unguine ſordidatum*. It ſeems the anointing the ſtones with oyl, was then the ſymbol of the conſecration of them. The Name Βαίτυλος for ſuch a ſtone occurs in *Heſychius*, the *Greek Etymologiſts*, *Damaſcius* in *Phocius*, and others. That the memory of *Joſeph* in *Ægypt* was preſerved under the *Ægyptian Apis*, hath been ſhew'd with a great deal of probability by the Learned *Voſſius*, in his often-cited piece of *Idolatry*, from the teſtimonies of *Julius Maternus*, *Rufinus*, and *Suidas*; and from theſe three Arguments: 1. The greatneſs of the Benefit which the *Ægyptians* received by *Joſeph*; which was of that nature that it could not eaſily be forgot, and that no ſymbol was ſo proper to ſet it out as the *Ægyptian Apis*; becauſe the famine was portended by lean Kine, and the plenty by fat; and *Minucius* at *Rome*, for relieving the people in a time of famine, had a Statue of a golden Bull erected to his memory. 2. The *Ægyptians* were not backward to teſtify their reſpect to *Joſeph*, as appears by *Pharaoh's* rewarding him. Now it was the cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* to preſerve the memories of their great Benefactors by ſome ſymbols to poſterity; which were at firſt intended only for a Civil uſe, altho' they were after abus'd to Superſtition and *Idolatry*. 3. From the Names of *Apis* and *Serapis*. *Apis* he conceives to be the ſacred Name of *Joſeph* among the *Ægyptians*, and is as much as אב, *Father*; ſo *Joſeph* himſelf ſaith, he was a *Father* to *Pharaoh*. And *Serapis*, as *Rufinus* and *Suidas* both tell us, had a *Buſhel* upon his *Head*, and *Serapis* is probably derived from שור, *Sor*, which ſignifies a *Bull*, and *Apis*. So that by this means the Story of *Joſeph* is atteſted by the *Ægyptian* ſuperſtitions, of which they can give no account ſo likely as this is.

Callimach. Hymn. in Apoll.

Gen. 28. 18.

Scalig. not. in Frag. Gr. Bochart. Can. l. 2. *c.* 2. *Seld. de Diis Syris. V. Heinſ. in Clem. Al. Strom.* 7. *Caſaubon ad Theoph. p.* 295. *Herald. ad Arnob. l.* 1. *Colvium ad Apul. Florid. Ouzel. & Elmenhorſt. ad Minuc. de Idol. l.* 1. *c.* 29.

Gen. 45. 8.

XI. Many things concerning *Moſes* are preſerv'd in the Story of *Bacchus*; not that from thence we are to conclude that *Moſes* was the *Bacchus* of the *Greeks*, as *Voſſius* thinks, but they took ſeveral parts of the Eaſtern Traditions concerning him, which they might have from the *Phœnicians* who came with *Cadmus* into *Greece*, while the memory of *Moſes* was yet freſh among the *Canaanites*. In the Story of *Bacchus*, as *Voſſius* obſerves,

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. *c.* 30.

ſerves, it is expreſly ſaid, that he was born in *Ægypt*, and that ſoon after his birth he was put in an Ark, and expos'd to the River; which Tradition was preſerv'd among the *Braſiatæ* of *Laconica*: and *Bacchus* in *Orpheus* is called Μίσης, and by *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, *Palæſtinus*: and he is called Βιμάτωρ, which agrees to *Moſes*, who, beſides his own Mother, was adopted by *Pharaoh*'s Daughter: *Bacchus* was likewiſe commended for his Beauty as *Moſes* was, and was ſaid to be educated in a Mount of *Arabia* called *Nyſa*, which agrees with *Moſes* his reſidence in *Arabia* forty years; ſo *Plutarch* mentions Φυγὰς Διονύσȣ, the *baniſhments* of *Bacchus*; and *Nonnus* mentions *Bacchus* his flight into the *Red-ſea*: who likewiſe mentions his Battles in *Arabia*, and with the neighbouring Princes there. *Diodorus* ſaith, that *Bacchus* his Army had not only Men but Women in it, which is moſt true of the company which *Moſes* led. *Orpheus* calls *Bacchus* Θεσμοφόρον, and attributes to him Δίπλακα Θεσμὸν, whereby we underſtand *Moſes* his being a *Legiſlator*, and that he deliver'd the *Laws* in two Tables. *Moſes* his fetching Water out of a Rock with his Rod, is preſerv'd in the *Orgia* of *Bacchus*, in which *Euripides* relates that *Agave* and the reſt of the *Bacchæ* celebrating the *Orgia*, one of them touched a Rock, and the Water came out; and in the ſame *Orgia Euripides* reports how they were wont to crown their Heads with Serpents, probably in memory of the cure of the fiery Serpents in the Wilderneſs. A Dog is made the companion of *Bacchus*; which is the ſignification of *Caleb*, who ſo faithfully adhered to *Moſes*. To theſe and ſome other circumſtances inſiſted on by *Voſſius*, *Bochartus* adds two more very conſiderable ones; which are, that *Nonnus* reports of *Bacchus* that he touched the two Rivers *Orontes* and *Hydaſpes* with his *Thyrſus*, or *Rod*, and that the Rivers dried, and he paſs'd thro' them: and that his *Ivy-ſtaff* being thrown upon the ground, crept up and down like a *Serpent*, and that the *Indians* were in darkneſs while the *Bacchæ* enjoy'd light; which circumſtances conſider'd will make every one that hath judgment ſay as *Bochartus* doth; *Ex mirabili illo conſenſu vel cœcis apparebit priſcos fabularum architectos à ſcriptoribus ſacris multa eſſe mutuatos.* From this wonderful agreement of *Heathen Mythology* with the Scriptures, it cannot but appear that one is a corruption of the other. That the memory of *Joſhua* and *Sampſon* was preſerved under *Hercules Tyrius*, is made likewiſe very probable from ſeveral circumſtances of the Stories. Others have deduced the many Rites of *Heathen Worſhip* from thoſe us'd in the *Tabernacle* among the *Jews*. Several other might be inſiſted on, as the Parallel between *Og* and *Typho*, and between the old *Silenus* and *Balaam*, both noted for their ſkill in *Divination*, both taken by *Water*, *Num.* 22. 5. both noted for *riding* on an *Aſs*: ἐπὶ ὄνȣ τὰ πολλὰ ὀχούμενος, ſaith *Lucian* of the old *Silenus*; and that which makes it more probable, is that of *Pauſanias*, Ἐν γὰρ τῇ Ἑβραίων χώρᾳ Σιληνȣ̃ μνῆμα, which ſome Learned Men have been much puzled to find out the truth of; and this conjecture which I here propound, may paſs at leaſt for a probable account of it. But I ſhall no longer inſiſt on theſe things, having, I ſuppoſe, done what is ſufficient to our purpoſe, which is, to make it appear what footſteps there are of the truth of Scripture-hiſtory amidſt all the corruptions of *Heathen Mythology*.

Nonn. Dion. l. 20.

Diod. l. 4.

Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. *c.* 18.

Voſſius de Idol. l. 1. *c.* 26. *p.* 118. *p.* 169.

Lucian. de Deor. Con.

Pauſan. Eliacῶn. 2. *p.* 203.

A.

CHAP. VI.

6.2.0

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

I. *Concerning matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contain'd therein.* II. *The ground of the diſeſteem of the Scripture is tacite Unbelief.* III. *The Excellency of the Scriptures manifeſted as to the matters which* GOD *hath reveal'd therein.* IV. *The Excellency of the diſcoveries of* GOD*'s Nature which are in Scripture.* V. *Of the Goodneſs and Love of* GOD *in* CHRIST. *The ſutableneſs of thoſe diſcoveries of* GOD *to our Natural Notions of a* DEITY. *The neceſſity of* GOD*'s making known Himſelf to us in order to the regulating our Conceptions of him.* VI. *The Scriptures give the fulleſt account of the ſtate of Mens Souls, and the corruptions which are in them. The only way of pleaſing* GOD *diſcover'd in Scriptures.* VII. *The Scriptures contain matters of greateſt Myſterionſneſs, and moſt univerſal ſatiſfaction to Mens Minds.* VIII. *The Excellency of the manner wherein things are reveal'd in Scriptures, in regard of Clearneſs, Authority, Purity.* IX. *Uniformity, and Perſuaſiveneſs.* X. *The Excellency of the Scriptures as a Rule of life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion, and the Reaſonableneſs of them. The Greatneſs of the Encouragements to Religion contained in the Scriptures.* XI. *The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace in order to Man's Salvation.*

I. HAving thus largely prov'd the truth of all thoſe paſſages of ſacred Scripture which concern the Hiſtory of the firſt Ages of the World, by all thoſe Arguments which a ſubject of that nature is capable of, the only thing left in order to our full proving the Divinity of the Scriptures, is, the conſideration of thoſe matters contain'd in it, which are in an eſpecial manner ſaid to be of Divine Revelation. For thoſe hiſtorical paſſages, tho' we believe them as contain'd in the Scripture, to have been divinely inſpir'd as well as others: yet they are ſuch things as ſuppoſing no Divine Revelation, might have been known ſufficiently to the World, had not Men been wanting to themſelves as to the care and means of preſerving them; but thoſe matters which I now come to diſcourſe of, are of a more ſublime and tranſcendent nature, ſuch as it had been impoſſible for the Minds of Men to reach, had they not been immediately diſcover'd by GOD himſelf. And thoſe are the Terms and Conditions on which the Soul of Man may upon good grounds expect an eternal Happineſs, which we aſſert the Book of Scriptures to be the only authentic and infallible records of. Men might by the improvements of

Reaſon and the ſagacity of their Minds diſcover much; not only of the lapſed condition of their Souls, and the neceſſity of a purgation of them, in order to their Felicity; but might in the general know what things are pleaſing and acceptable to the Divine Nature, from thoſe differences of Good and Evil which are unalterably fix'd in the things themſelves: but which way to obtain any certainty of the Remiſſion of Sins, to recover the Grace and Favor of God, to enjoy perfect Tranquillity and Peace of Conſcience, to be able to pleaſe God in things agreeable to his Will, and by theſe to be aſſur'd of eternal Bliſs, had been impoſſible for Men to have ever found, had not God himſelf been graciouſly pleas'd to reveal them to us. Men might ſtill have bewildred themſelves in following the *Ignes fatui* of their own imaginations, and hunting up and down the World for a Path which leads to Heaven, but could have found none, unleſs God himſelf taking pity of the wandrings of Men had been pleas'd to hang out a Light from Heaven to direct them in their way thither, and by this *Pharos* of Divine Revelation to direct them ſo to ſteer their courſe, as to eſcape ſplitting themſelves on the Rocks of open Impieties, or being ſwallow'd up in the Quickſands of terrene delights. Neither doth he ſhew them only what Shelves and Rocks they muſt eſcape, but what particular courſe they muſt ſteer, what Star they muſt have in their Eye, what Compaſs they muſt obſerve, what Winds and Gales they muſt expect and pray for, if they would arrive at laſt at eternal Bliſs. Eternal Bliſs! What more could a God of infinite Goodneſs promiſe, or the Soul of Man wiſh for? A Reward to ſuch who are ſo far from deſerving, that they are ſtill provoking; Glory to ſuch who are more apt to be aſham'd of their Duties, than of their Offences; but that it ſhould not only be a Glorious Reward, but Eternal too, is that which tho' it infinitely tranſcend the Deſerts of the Receivers, yet it highly diſcovers the infinite Goodneſs of the Giver. But when we not only know that there is ſo rich a Mine of ineſtimable Treaſures, but if the Owner of it undertakes to ſhew us the way to it, and gives us certain and infallible directions how to come to the full poſſeſſion of it; how much are we in love with Miſery, and do we court our own Ruin, if we neglect to hearken to his Directions, and obſerve his Commands!

II. This is that we are now undertaking to make good concerning the *Scriptures*, that theſe alone contain thoſe ſacred diſcoveries, by which the Souls of Men may come at laſt to enjoy a compleat and eternal Happineſs. One would think there could be nothing more needleſs in the World than to bid Men regard their own welfare, and to ſeek to be happy; yet whoever caſts his Eye into the World, will find no counſel ſo little hearkened to as this, nor any thing which is more generally look'd on as a matter trivial and impertinent. Which cannot ariſe but from one of theſe two grounds, that either they think it no great wiſdom to let go their preſent hold as to the good things of this World, for that which they ſecretly queſtion whether they ſhall ever live to ſee or no; or elſe that their Minds are in ſuſpenſe, whether they be not ſent on a *Guiana Voyage* to *Heaven*, whether the certainty of it be yet fully diſcover'd, or the inſtructions which are given be ſuch as may infallibly conduct them thither. The firſt, tho' it hath the advantage of ſenſe, fruition, delight, and further expectation; yet to a rational Perſon who ſeriouſly reflects on himſelf, and ſums up what (after all his troubles and diſquietments in the procuring, his cares in keeping, his diſappointments in his expectations, his fears of loſing what he doth enjoy, and that vexation of Spirit which attends all theſe) he hath gain'd of true contentment to his Mind, can never certainly believe that ever theſe things were intended for his Happineſs. For is it poſſible that the Soul of Man ſhould ever enjoy its full and complete Happineſs in this World, when nothing is able to make it happy, but what is moſt ſutable to its Nature, able to fill up its large Capacity, and commenſurate with its Duration? but in this Life the matter of Mens greateſt delight is ſtrangely unſutable to the nature of our rational Beings, the meaſure of them too ſhort for our vaſt Deſires to ſtretch themſelves upon, the Proportion too ſcant and narrow to run parallel with Immortality. It muſt be then only a Supreme, Infinite and Eternal Being, which by the free communications of his Bounty and Goodneſs can fix and ſatiate the Soul's Deſires, and by the conſtant flowings forth of his own uninterrupted ſtreams of Favor will always keep up Deſire, and yet always ſatisfy it: One whoſe Goodneſs can only be felt by ſome tranſient touches here, whoſe Love can be ſeen but as thro' a lattice, whoſe conſtant preſence may be rather wiſh'd for than enjoy'd, who hath reſerv'd the full ſight and fruition of himſelf to that future ſtate, when all theſe dark veils ſhall be done away, and the Soul ſhall be continually ſunning her ſelf under immediate beams of Light and Love. But how or in what way the Soul of Man in this degenerate condition ſhould come to be partaker of ſo great a Happineſs, by the enjoyment of that God our Natures are now at ſuch a diſtance from, is the greateſt and moſt important inquiry of Human Nature; and we continually ſee how ſucceſleſs and unſatisfactory the endeavors of thoſe have been to themſelves at laſt, who have ſought for this Happineſs in a way of their own finding out: The large volume of the Creation, wherein God hath deſcrib'd ſo much of his Wiſdom and Power, is yet too dark and obſcure, too ſhort and imperfect to ſet forth to us the way which leads to eternal Happineſs. Unleſs then the ſame God who made Mens Souls at firſt, do ſhew them the way for their recovery; as they are in a degenerate, ſo they will be in a deſperate condition: but the ſame Bounty and Goodneſs of God, which did at firſt diſplay it ſelf in giving Being to Mens Souls, hath in a higher manner enlarged the Diſcovery of it ſelf, by making known the way whereby we may be taken into his Grace and Favor again.

III. Which it now concerns us particularly to diſcover, thereby to make it appear that this way is of that peculiar excellency, that we may have from thence the greateſt evidence, it could come from no other Author but God himſelf, and doth tend to no other end but our eternal Happineſs. Now that incomparable excellency which is in the ſacred Scriptures, will fully appear, if we conſider the Matters contain'd in them under this threefold capacity. 1. As *Matters of Divine Revelation.* 2. As *a Rule of Life.* 3. As containing *that Covenant of Grace which relates to Man's eternal Happineſs.*

1. Conſider the Scripture generally, as containing in it Matters of Divine Revelation, and therein the excellency of the Scriptures appears in two things. 1. *The Matters which are revealed.* 2. *The Manner wherein they are revealed.*

1. *The matters which are revealed* in Scripture, may be conſider'd theſe three ways. 1. *As they are matters of the greateſt weight and moment.* 2. *As matters of the greateſt depth and myſteriouſneſs.* 3. *As matters of the moſt univerſal ſatisfaction to the Minds of Men.*

1. *They are matters of the greateſt moment and importance for Men to know.* The Wiſdom of Men is moſt known by the weight of the things they ſpeak; and therefore that wherein the Wiſdom of God is diſcover'd, cannot contain any thing that is mean and trivial; they muſt be matters of the higheſt importance, which the ſupreme Ruler of the World vouchſafes to ſpeak to Men concerning: And ſuch we ſhall find the matters which God hath revealed in his Word to be, which either concern the rectifying our apprehenſions of his Nature, or making known to Men their ſtate and condition, or diſcovering the way whereby to avoid eternal Miſery. Now which is there of theſe three, which ſuppoſing God to diſcover his Mind to the World, it doth not highly become him to ſpeak to Men of?

IV. 1. What is there which doth more highly concern Men to know than God himſelf? or what more glorious and excellent object could he diſcover than himſelf to the World? There is nothing certainly which ſhould more commend the Scriptures to us, than that thereby we may grow more acquainted with God; that we may know more of his Nature, and all his Perfections, and many of the great Reaſons of his actings in the World. We may by them underſtand with ſafety what the eternal purpoſes of God were as to the way of Man's Recovery by the death of his Son; we may there ſee and underſtand the great Wiſdom of God; not only in the contrivance of the World, and ordering of it, but in the gradual Revelations of himſelf to his People, by what ſteps he train'd up his Church till the *fulneſs of time was come*; what his Aim was in laying ſuch a load of Ceremonies on his People of the *Jews*; by what ſteps and degrees he made way for the full revelation of his Will to the World by ſpeaking in theſe laſt days by his Son, after he had ſpoke *at ſundry times and in divers manners by the Prophets*, &c. *unto the Fathers*. In the Scriptures we read the moſt rich and admirable diſcoveries of Divine Goodneſs, and all the ways and methods he uſeth in alluring Sinners to himſelf; with what Majeſty he commands, with what Condeſcention he intreats, with what importunity he wooes Mens Souls to be reconciled to him, with what Favour he imbraceth, with what Tenderneſs he chaſtiſeth, with what Bowels he pitieth thoſe who have choſen him to be their God! With what Power he ſupporteth, with what Wiſdom he directeth, with what Cordials he refreſheth the Souls of ſuch who are dejected under the ſenſe of his diſpleaſure, and yet their love is ſincere towards him! With what profound humility, what holy boldneſs, what becoming diſtance, and yet what reſtleſs importunity do we therein find the Souls of God's People addreſſing themſelves to him in Prayer! With what cheerfulneſs do they ſerve him, with what confidence do they truſt him, with what reſolution do they adhere to him in all ſtreights and difficulties, with what patience do they ſubmit to his Will in their greateſt Extremities! How fearful are they of ſinning againſt God, how careful to pleaſe him, how regardleſs of ſuffering, when they muſt chooſe either that or ſinning, how little apprehenſive of Mens diſpleaſure, while they enjoy the favor of God! Now all theſe things which are ſo fully and pathetically expreſs'd in Scripture, do abundantly ſet forth to us the exuberancy and *Pleonaſm* of God's Grace and Goodneſs towards his People, which makes them delight ſo much in him, and be ſo ſenſible of his diſpleaſure. But above all other diſcoveries of God's Goodneſs, his ſending his Son into the World to die for Sinners, is that which the Scripture ſets forth with the greateſt Life and

Eloquence. By Eloquence, I mean not an artificial compoſure of Words, but the gravity, weight, and perſuaſiveneſs of the matter contain'd in them. And what can tend more to melt our frozen Hearts into a current of thankful obedience to God, than the vigorous reflection of the beams of God's Love thro' *Jeſus Chriſt* upon us! Was there ever ſo great an expreſſion of love heard of! nay, was it poſſible to be imagin'd, that that God who perfectly hates ſin, ſhould himſelf offer the pardon of it, and ſend his Son into the World to ſecure it to the Sinner, who doth ſo heartily repent of his Sins, as to deny himſelf, and take up his Croſs and follow *Chriſt!* Well might the Apoſtle ſay, *This is a faithful ſaying, and wor-*
1 Tim. 1. 15. *thy of all acceptation, that Jeſus Chriſt came into the world to ſave ſinners.* How dry and ſapleſs are all the voluminous diſcourſes of Philoſophers, compar'd with this Sentence! How jejune and unſatisfactory are all the Diſcoveries they had of God and his Goodneſs, in compariſon of what we have by the Goſpel of *Chriſt!* Well might St. *Paul* then ſay,
1 Cor. 2. 2. *That he determined to know nothing but Chriſt, and him crucified. Chriſt crucified* is the Library which triumphant Souls will be ſtudying in to all eternity. This is the only Library which is the true Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς, that which cures the Soul of all its Maladies and Diſtempers: other Knowledg makes Mens Minds giddy and flatulent; this ſettles and compoſes them: other Knowledg is apt to ſwell Men into high Conceits and Opinions of themſelves; this brings them to the trueſt view of themſelves, and thereby to humility and ſobriety: other Knowledge leaves Mens Hearts as it found them; this alters them and makes them better. So tranſcendent an excellency is there in the Knowledg of *Chriſt crucified* above the ſublimeſt ſpeculations in the World.

V. And is not this an ineſtimable Benefit we enjoy by the Scripture, that therein we can read and converſe with all theſe expreſſions of God's Love and Goodneſs, and that in his own Language? Shall we admire and praiſe what we meet with in *Heathen Philoſophers*, which is generous and handſom; and ſhall we not adore the infinite fulneſs of the Scriptures, which run over with continued expreſſions of that and a higher nature? What folly is it to magnifie thoſe *Lean Kine*, the Notions of Philoſophers, and contemn the Fat, the Plenty and Fulneſs of the Scriptures? If there be not far more valuable and excellent diſcoveries of the Divine Nature and Perfections; if there be not far more excellent Directions and Rules of Practice in the ſacred Scriptures, than in the ſublimeſt of all the Philoſophers: then let us leave our *full ears*, and feed upon the *thin*. But certainly no ſober and rational Spirit that puts any value upon the Knowledg of God, but on the ſame account that he doth praiſe the Diſcourſes of any Philoſophers concerning God, he cannot but ſet a value of a far higher nature on the Word of God. And as the Goodneſs of God is thus diſcover'd in Scripture, ſo is his Juſtice and Holineſs: we have therein recorded the moſt remarkable judgments of God upon contumacious Sinners, the ſevereſt denunciations of a Judgment to come againſt all that live in Sin, the exacteſt Precepts of Holineſs in the World; and what can be deſir'd more to diſcover the Holineſs of God, than we find in Scripture concerning Him? If therefore acquaintance with the Nature, Perfections, Deſigns of ſo excellent a Being as God is, be a thing deſirable to Human Nature; we have the greateſt cauſe to admire the excellency, and adore the fulneſs of the Scriptures, which give us ſo large, rational and complete account of the Being and Attributes of God. And which tends yet more to commend the Scriptures to us, thoſe things which the Scripture doth moſt fully diſcover concerning God, do not at all contradict thoſe prime and common Notions which are in our Natures concerning him, but do exceedingly advance and improve them, and tend the moſt to regulate our Conceptions and Apprehenſions of God, that we may not miſcarry therein, as otherwiſe Men are apt to do. For it being natural to Men ſo far to love themſelves, as to ſet the greateſt value upon thoſe excellencies which they think themſelves moſt maſters of: thence Men came to be exceedingly miſtaken in their Apprehenſions of a *Deity*, ſome attributing one thing as a Perfection, another a different thing, according to their humors and inclinations. Thus imperious ſelf-willed Men are apt to cry up God's abſolute Power and Dominion as his greateſt Perfection; eaſy and ſoft-ſpirited Men his Patience and Goodneſs; ſevere and rigid Men his Juſtice and Severity: every one according to his humor and temper, making his God of his own Complection: and not only ſo, but in things remote enough from being Perfections at all; yet becauſe they are ſuch things as they prize and value, they ſuppoſe of neceſſity they muſt be in God, as is evident in the *Epicureans* 'Αταραξία, by which they excluded *Providence*, as hath been already obſerv'd. And withal conſidering how very difficult it is for one who really believes that God is of a pure, juſt, and holy Nature, and that he hath grievouſly offended him by his ſins, to believe that this God will pardon him upon true repentance: It is thence neceſſary that God ſhould make known himſelf to the World, to prevent our miſ-conceptions of his Nature, and to aſſure a ſuſpicious, becauſe guilty Creature, how ready he is to pardon iniquity, tranſgreſſion, and ſin, to ſuch as unfeignedly repent of their follies, and return unto himſelf. Tho' the light of Nature may dictate much to us of the Benignity and Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, yet it is hard to conceive that that ſhould diſcover further than God's general Goodneſs to ſuch as pleaſe him: but no foundation can be gathered thence of his readineſs to pardon offenders, which being an act of Grace, muſt alone be diſcovered by his Will. I cannot think the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, are ſuch itinerant Preachers, as to unfold unto us the whole Counſel and Will of God in reference to Man's acceptance with God upon repentance. It is not every *Star* in the Firmament can do that which the *Star* once did to the *Wiſe-men*, lead them unto *Chriſt*. The *Sun* in the *Heavens* is no *Parelius* to the *Sun of Righteouſneſs*. The beſt *Aſtronomer* will never find the *Day-ſtar from on high* in the reſt of his number. What St. *Auſtin* ſaid of *Tully*'s Works, is true of the whole Volume of the Creation: There are admirable things to be found in them: but the Name of *Chriſt* is not legible there. The work of *Redemption* is not engraven on the works of *Providence*; if it had, a particular Divine Revelation had been unneceſſary, and the *Apoſtles* were ſent on a needleſs errand, which the World had underſtood without their Preaching, *viz. That God was in Chriſt reconciling the World unto himſelf, not imputing to Men their treſpaſſes, and hath committed to them the Miniſtry of Reconciliation.* How was the word of *Reconciliation* committed to them, if it were common to them with the whole frame of the World? and the *Apoſtle*'s *Quære* elſewhere might have been eaſily anſwer'd, *How can Men hear without a Preacher?* For then they might have known the way of *Salvation*, without any ſpecial Meſſengers ſent to deliver it unto them. I grant that *God's long-ſuffering* and *patience* is intended to lead Men to Repentance, and that ſome general collections might be made from *Providence* of the placa-

2 Cor. 5. 18, 19.

Rom. 10. 14.

Act.14.14 Luke 6. 35. 36. placability of God's Nature, and that *God never left himſelf without a witneſs of his Goodneſs* in the World, being *kind to the unthankful, and doing good, in giving rain and fruitful ſeaſons.* But tho' theſe things might ſufficiently diſcover to ſuch who were apprehenſive of the guilt of ſin, that God did not act according to his greateſt ſeverity, and thereby did give Men encouragement to hearken out and inquire after the true way of being reconcil'd to God; yet all this amounts not to a firm Foundation for Faith, as to the remiſſion of ſin, which doth ſuppoſe God himſelf publiſhing an Act of Grace and Indemnity to the World, wherein he aſſures the Pardon of ſin to ſuch as truly repent and unfeignedly believe his holy Goſpel. Now is not this an ineſtimable advantage we enjoy by the Scriptures, that therein we underſtand what God himſelf hath diſcover'd of his own Nature and Perfections, and of his readineſs to pardon Sin upon thoſe gracious terms of *Faith* and *Repentance*, and that which neceſſarily follows from theſe two, hearty and ſincere Obedience?

VI. 2. *The Scripture gives the moſt faithful repreſentation of the ſtate and condition of the Soul of Man.* The World was almoſt loſt in Diſputes concerning the Nature, Condition, and Immortality of the Soul, before *Divine Revelation* was made known to Mankind by the *Goſpel* of *Chriſt*; but *Life and Immortality* was *brought to light by the Goſpel*, and the future ſtate of the Soul of Man, not diſcover'd in an uncertain *Platonical* way, but with the greateſt light and evidence from that God who hath the ſupreme diſpoſal of Souls, and therefore beſt knows and underſtands them. The Scriptures plainly and fully reveal a Judgment to come, in which *God will judg the ſecrets of all Hearts*, when *every one muſt give an account of himſelf unto God*, and God will call Men to give *an account of their ſtewardſhip* here, of all the Receipts they have had from him, and the Expences they have been at, and the Improvements they have made of the Talents he put into their hands. So that the *Goſpel* of *Chriſt* is the fulleſt Inſtrument of diſcovery of the certainty of the future ſtate of the Soul, and the conditions which abide it, upon its being diſlodg'd from the Body. But this is not all which the Scripture diſcovers as to the ſtate of the Soul; for it is not only a Proſpective-glaſs, reaching to its future ſtate, but it is the moſt faithful Looking-glaſs, to diſcover all the ſpots and deformities of the Soul: And not only ſhews where they are, but whence they came, what their nature is, and whither they tend. The true Original of all that diſorder and diſcompoſure which is in the Soul of Man, is only fully and ſatisfactorily given us in the Word of God, as hath been already prov'd. The nature and working of this corruption in Man, had never been ſo clearly manifeſted, had not the Law and Will of God been diſcover'd to the World: that is the Glaſs whereby we ſee the ſecret workings of thoſe Bees in our Hearts, the corruptions of our Natures; that ſets forth the folly of our Imaginations, the unrulineſs of our Paſſions, the diſtempers of our Wills, and the abundant deceitfulneſs of our Hearts. And it is hard for the Elephantin ſinner (one of the greateſt magnitude) ſo to trouble theſe Waters, as not therein to diſcover the greatneſs of his own deformities. But that which tends moſt to awaken the drowſie, ſenſleſs Spirits of Men, the Scripture doth moſt fully deſcribe the tendency of Corruption, that the wages of *ſin* is *death*, and the iſſue of continuance in ſin will be the everlaſting miſery of the Soul, in a perpetual ſeparation from the preſence of God, and undergoing the laſhes and ſeverities of Conſcience to all eternity.

nity. What a great diſcovery is this of the faithfulneſs of God to the World, that he ſuffers not Men to undo themſelves without letting them know of it beforehand, that they might avoid it! God ſeeks not to entrap Mens Souls, nor doth he rejoice in the miſery and ruin of his Creatures; but ~~fully declares to~~ them what the conſequence and iſſue of their practices will be, aſſures them of a Judgment to come, declares his own future ſeverity againſt contumacious Sinners, that they might not think themſelves ſurpriz'd, and that if they had known there had been ſo great danger in ſin, they would never have been ſuch fools, as for the ſake of it to run into eternal miſery. Now God, to prevent this, with the greateſt plainneſs and faithfulneſs hath ſhew'd Men the nature and danger of all their ſins, and aſks them beforehand what they will do in the end thereof; whether they are able to bear his Wrath, and wreſtle with everlaſting burnings? if not, he bids them bethink themſelves of what they have done already, and repent, and amend their Lives, leſt *iniquity prove their ruin*, and *deſtruction overtake them, and that without remedy.* Now if Men have cauſe to prize and value a faithful Monitor, one that tenders their good, and would prevent their ruin; we have cauſe exceedingly to prize and value the Scriptures, which give us the trueſt repreſentation of the ſtate and condition of our Souls.

3. *The Scripture diſcovers to us the only way of pleaſing God, and enjoying his favor.* That clearly reveals the way (which Man might have ſought for to all eternity without particular Revelation) whereby Sins may be pardoned, and whatever we do may be acceptable unto God. It ſhews us that the ground of our acceptance with God, is thro' *Chriſt*, whom he hath made a *propitiation for the ſins of the World*, and who alone is the *true and living way*, whereby we may *draw near to God with a true heart, in full aſſurance of Faith, having our hearts ſprinkled from an evil conſcience.* Thro' *Chriſt* we underſtand the terms on which God will ſhew Favor and Grace to the World, and by him we have ground of a Παῤῥησία, *acceſs with freedom and boldneſs unto God.* On his account we may hope not only for Grace to ſubdue our ſins, reſiſt temptations, conquer the Devil and the World; but having *fought this good fight and finiſhed our courſe, by patient continuance in well-doing*, we may juſtly *look for glory, honor, and immortality*, and that *crown of righteouſneſs which is laid up for thoſe who wait* in faith, holineſs, and humility, *for the appearance of Chriſt from Heaven.* Now what things can there be of greater moment and importance for Men to know, or God to reveal, than the Nature of God, and our ſelves, the ſtate and condition of our Souls, the only way to avoid eternal Miſery, and enjoy everlaſting Bliſs?

The Scriptures diſcover not only matters of importance, but of the greateſt depth and myſteriouſneſs. There are many *wonderful things in the Law of God*, things we may admire, but are never able to comprehend. Such are the eternal Purpoſes and Decrees of God, the Doctrin of the *Trinity*, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the manner of the Operation of the Spirit of God on the Souls of Men, which are all things of great weight and moment for us to underſtand and believe that they are; and yet may be unſearchable to our Reaſon, as to the particular manner of them. What certain ground our Faith ſtands on as to theſe things hath been already ſhew'd, and therefore I forbear inſiſting on them. VII. 2. Book II. Ch. 8. Sect. 5, 6, 7.

3. The Scripture comprehends matters of the moſt univerſal ſatisfaction to the Minds of Men; tho' many things do much exceed our Apprehenſions, yet others are moſt ſutable to the Dictates of our Nature.

As

Orig. contra Celſ. l. 3. p. 135. As *Origen* bid *Celſus* ſee, Εἰ μὴ τὰ τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις ἐξ ἀρχῆθεν συναγορεύοντα, μετατίθησι τοὺς εὐγνωμόνως ἀκούοντας τῶν λεγομένων, *Whether it was not the agreeableneſs of the Principles of Faith with the common Notions of Human Nature, which prevail'd moſt upon all candid and ingenuous auditors of them.* And therefore as *Socrates* ſaid of *Heraclitus* his Books, What he underſtood was excellent, and therefore he ſuppos'd that which he did not underſtand was ſo too: ſo ought we to ſay of the Scriptures, If thoſe things which are within our capacity be ſo ſutable to our Natures and Reaſons, thoſe cannot contradict our Reaſon which yet are above them. There are many things which the Minds of Men were ſufficiently aſſur'd that they were, yet were to ſeek for ſatisfaction concerning them, which they could never have had without Divine Revelation. As the Nature of true Happineſs, wherein it lay, and how to be obtain'd, which the Philoſophers were ſo puzl'd with, the Scripture gives us full ſatisfaction concerning it. True contentment under the troubles of Life, which the Scripture only acquaints us with the true grounds of; and all the preſcriptions of Heathen *Moraliſts* fall as much ſhort of, as the directions of an *Empyric* do of a wiſe and ſkilful *Phyſician. Avoiding the fears of Death*, which can alone be thro' a grounded Expectation of a ſtate of Happineſs which Death leads Men to, which cannot be had but thro' the right underſtanding of the Word of God. Thus we ſee the excellency of the matters themſelves contain'd in this Revelation of the Mind of God to the World.

VIII. As the Matters themſelves are of an excellent Nature, ſo is the manner wherein they are reveal'd in the Scriptures, and that,

2. 1. *In a clear and perſpicuous manner.* Not but there may be ſtill ſome paſſages which are hard to be underſtood, as being either prophetical, or conſiſting of ambiguous Phraſes, or containing matters above our comprehenſion; but all thoſe things which concern the terms of Man's Salvation are deliver'd with the greateſt evidence and perſpicuity. Who cannot underſtand what theſe things mean, *What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do juſtly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God*; that *without Faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God*; that *without Holineſs none ſhall ſee the Lord*; that *unleſs we be born again, we can never enter into the Kingdom of Heaven?* Theſe and ſuch like things are ſo plain and clear, that it is nothing but Mens ſhutting their Eyes againſt the Light can keep them from underſtanding them: God intended theſe things as Directions to Men; and is not he able to ſpeak intelligibly when he pleaſe? He that made the Tongue, ſhall he not ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood without an infallible Interpreter? eſpecially when it is his deſign to make known to Men the terms of their eternal Happineſs. Will God judg Men at the great day for not believing thoſe things which they could not underſtand? Strange! that ever Men ſhould judg the Scriptures obſcure in matters neceſſary, when the Scripture accounts it ſo great a judgment for Men not to underſtand them. 2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. *If our Goſpel be hid, it is hid to them that are loſt; in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, leſt the light of the glorious Goſpel of Chriſt ſhould ſhine unto them.* Sure *Lot*'s door was viſible enough, if it were a judgment for the Men of *Sodom* not to ſee it; and the Scriptures then are plain and intelligible enough, if it be ſo great a judgment not to underſtand them.

2. *In a powerful and authoritative manner*; as the things contain'd in Scripture do not ſo much beg acceptance as command it; in that the

expreſſions wherein our duty is concern'd are ſuch as awe Mens Conſciences, and pierce to their Hearts and to their ſecret thoughts; *All things are open and naked before this Word of God; every ſecret of the mind and thought of the heart lies open to its ſtroke and force; it is quick and powerful, ſharper than a two-edged ſword, piercing to the dividing aſunder of ſoul and ſpirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a diſcerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.* The *Word* is a *Teleſcope* to diſcover the great Luminaries of the World, the Truths of higheſt concernment to the Souls of Men; and it is ſuch a *Microſcope* as diſcovers to us the ſmalleſt *Atom* of our Thoughts, and diſcerns the moſt ſecret intent of the Heart. And, as far as this Light reacheth, it comes with Power and Authority, as it comes arm'd with the Majeſty of that God who reveals it, whoſe Authority extends over the Soul and Conſcience of Man in its moſt ſecret and hidden receſſes. Heb. 4. 12, 13.

3. *In a pure and unmix'd manner.* In all other Writings how good ſoever, we ſee a great mixture of Droſs and Gold together: Here is nothing but pure Gold, Diamonds without flaws, Suns without ſpots. The moſt current Coins of the World have their Alloys of baſer Metals, there is no ſuch mixture in Divine Truths; as they all come from the ſame Author, ſo they all have the ſame purity. There is a *Urim* and *Thummim* upon the whole Scripture, Light and Perfection in every part of it. In the Philoſophers we may meet, it may be, with ſome ſcattered fragments of purer Metal, amidſt abundance of Droſs and impure Oar; here we have whole wedges of Gold, the ſame vein of purity and holineſs running thro' the whole Book of Scriptures. Hence it is call'd the *form of ſound words:* Here have been no Huckſters to corrupt and mix their own Inventions with Divine Truths. 2 Tim. 1. 13.

IX.

4. *In an uniform and agreeable manner.* This I grant is not ſufficient of it ſelf to prove the Scriptures to be Divine, becauſe all Men do not contradict themſelves in their Writings; but yet there are ſome peculiar circumſtances to be conſider'd in the agreeableneſs of the parts of Scripture to each other, which are not to be found in mere human Writings. 1. That this *Doctrine was delivered by perſons who lived in different Ages and Times from each other.* Uſually one Age corrects another's faults, and we are apt to pity the Ignorance of our Predeceſſors, when it may be our Poſterity may think us as ignorant as we do them. But in the ſacred Scripture we read not one Age condemning another; we find Light ſtill increaſing in the ſeries of times in Scripture, but no reflexions in any time upon the Ignorance or Weakneſs of the precedent; the dimmeſt Light was ſufficient for its Age, and was a ſtep to further diſcovery. *Quintilian* gives it as the reaſon of the great uncertainty of *Grammar* Rules, *Quia non analogia dimiſſa cœlo formam loquendi dedit*; that which he wanted as to *Grammar*, we have as to Divine Truths; they are deliver'd from Heaven, and therefore are always uniform and agreeable to each other. *Quint. l. 1. cap. 6.*

2. *By Perſons of different intereſts in the World.* God made choice of Men of all ranks to be Inditers of his *Oracles*, to make it appear it was no matter of State-policy or particular intereſt which was contain'd in his Word, which Perſons of ſuch different intereſts could not have agreed in as they do. We have *Moſes*, *David*, *Solomon*, Perſons of Royal Rank and Quality; and can it be any mean thing, which theſe think it their glory to be Penners of? We have *Iſaiah*, *Daniel*, and other Perſons of the higheſt Education and Accompliſhments; and can it be

any trivial thing which theſe imploy themſelves in? We have *Amos*, and other Prophets in the Old Teſtament, and the Apoſtles in the New, of the meaner ſort of Men in the World, yet all theſe join in conſort together; when God tunes the Spirits, all agree in the ſame ſtrain of Divine Truths, and give light and harmony to each other.

3. *By perſons in different places and conditions:* Some in proſperity in their own Country, ſome under baniſhment and adverſity, yet all agreeing in the ſame ſubſtance of Doctrine; of which no alteration we ſee was made either for the flattery of thoſe in power, or for avoiding miſeries and calamities. And under all the different diſpenſations before, under and after the Law, tho' the management of things was different, yet the Doctrine and Deſign was for Subſtance the ſame in all. All the different Diſpenſations agree in the ſame common Principles of Religion; the ſame ground of acceptance with God, and obligation to duty, was common to all, tho' the peculiar inſtances wherein God was ſerv'd might be different, according to the Ages of growth in the Church of God. So that this great uniformity conſider'd in theſe circumſtances, is an Argument that theſe things came originally from the ſame Spirit, tho' convey'd thro' different Inſtruments to the knowledg of the World.

5. *In a perſuaſive and convincing manner:* and that theſe ways.
1. *Bringing Divine Truths down to our capacity*, clothing ſpiritual matter
in familiar expreſſions and ſimilitudes, that ſo they might have the eaſier
admiſſion into our Minds. 2. *Propounding things as our intereſt which
are our duty.* Thence God ſo frequently in Scripture recommends our
Duties to us under all thoſe motives which are wont to have the greateſt
force on the Minds of Men; and annexeth gracious Promiſes to our Performance
of them; and thoſe of the moſt weighty and concerning things.
Of *Grace*, *Favor*, *Protection*, *Deliverance*, *Audience of Prayers*, and *Eternal
Happineſs:* and if theſe will not prevail with Men, what Motives
will? 3. *Courting us to Obedience, when he might not only command us
to obey, but puniſh preſently for diſobedience.* Hence are all thoſe moſt
pathetical and affectionate ſtrains we read in Scripture. *O that there was*
Deut. 5. 29. *ſuch a heart within them, that they would fear me and keep all my commandments
always, that it might go well with them, and with their children*
Jer. 13. 27. *after them. Wo unto thee, O Jeruſalem, wilt thou not be made*
Ezek. 33. 11. *clean? when ſhall it once be? Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways,*
for why will ye die, O houſe of Iſrael? How ſhall I give thee up,
Hoſ. 11. 8. *Ephraim? how ſhall I deliver thee, Iſrael? how ſhall I make thee as Admah?
how ſhall I ſet thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me,*
Matth. 23. 37. *my repentings are kindled together. O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, how often*
*would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens
under her wings, and ye would not.* What Majeſty, and yet what
ſweetneſs and condeſcenſion is there in theſe expreſſions? What obſtinacy
and rebellion is it in Men for them to ſtand out againſt God, when
he thus comes down from his Throne of Majeſty, and wooes rebellious
Sinners to return unto him that they may be pardoned? Such a matchleſs
and unparallel'd ſtrain of *Rhetoric* is there in the Scripture, far above
the Art and Inſinuations of the moſt admired *Orators*. Thus we
ſee the peculiar excellency of the manner wherein the matters contain'd
in Scripture are reveal'd to us. Thus we have conſider'd the Excellency
of the Scripture, as it is a Diſcovery of God's Mind to the World.

X. 2. The Scriptures may be conſidered as a *Rule of Life*, or as a *Law of God*, which is given for the Government of the Lives of Men, and therein the Excellency of it lies in the Nature of the Duties, and the Encouragements to the Practice of them.

1. In the Nature of the Duties requir'd, which are *moſt becoming* God *to require*, moſt reaſonable for us to perform.

1. *Moſt becoming* God *to require*, as they are moſt ſutable and agreeable to the Divine Nature, the imitation of which in our Actions, is the ſubſtance of our Religion. Imitation of him in his Goodneſs and Holineſs, by our conſtant Endeavours of mortifying Sin, and growing in Grace and Piety. In his Grace and Mercy, by our kindneſs to all Men; forgiving the injuries Men do unto us, *doing good to our greateſt enemies*: In his Juſtice and Equity, by *doing as we would be done by, and keeping a conſcience void of offence towards* God *and towards Men*. The firſt takes in the Duties of the firſt, the other the Duties of the ſecond Table. *All acts of piety towards* God, are a part of Juſtice; for, as *Tully* ſaith, *Quid aliud eſt pietas, niſi juſtitia adverſus Deos?* and ſo *our loving* God *with our whole hearts, our intire and ſincere obedience to his Will*, is a part of Natural Juſtice; for thereby we do but render unto God that which is his due from us as we are his Creatures. We ſee then the whole Duty of Man, *the fearing* God *and keeping his Commandments*, is as neceſſary a part of Juſtice, as the rendring to every Man his own is.

2. They are moſt reaſonable for us to perform, in that, 1. *Religion* is not only a ſervice of the reaſonable Faculties which are imploy'd the moſt in it, the commands of the Scripture reaching the heart moſt in it, and the ſervice requir'd being a ſpiritual Service, not lying in Meats and Drinks, or any outward Obſervations, but in a ſanctify'd temper of Heart and Mind, which diſcovers it ſelf in the courſe of a *Chriſtian*'s Life: But, 2. The Service it ſelf of Religion is reaſonable; the Commands of the *Goſpel* are ſuch as no Man's Reaſon which conſiders them can doubt of the excellency of them. All Natural Worſhip is founded on the Dictates of Nature, all inſtituted Worſhip on God's revealed Will; and it is one of the prime Dictates of Nature, that God muſt be univerſally obey'd. Beſides, God requires nothing but what is apparently Man's intereſt to do; God prohibits nothing but what will deſtroy him if he doth it; ſo that the Commands of the Scriptures are very juſt and reaſonable.

2. The Encouragements are more than proportionable to the difficulty of Obedience. God's Commands are in themſelves eaſie, and moſt ſutable to our Natures. What more rational for a Creature than to obey his Maker? All the difficulty of Religion ariſeth from the corruption of Nature. Now God, to encourage Men to conquer the difficulties ariſing thence, hath propounded the ſtrongeſt Motives and moſt prevailing Arguments to Obedience. Such are the conſiderations of God's Love and Goodneſs manifeſted to the World, by ſending his Son into it, to die for Sinners, and to give them an example which they are to follow, and by his readineſs thro' him to pardon the ſins, and accept the Perſons of ſuch who *ſo receive him as to walk in him*, and by his Promiſes of Grace to aſſiſt them in the wreſtling with the enemies of their Salvation. And to all theſe add that glorious and unconceivable reward which God hath promis'd to all thoſe who ſincerely obey him; and by theſe things we ſee how much the encouragements over-weigh the difficulties, and that none can make the leaſt pretence that there is not motive ſufficient to down-weigh the troubles which attend the exerciſe of Obedience to the Will of God. Thus we ſee what a peculiar excellency there is in the

Scriptures as a Rule of Life, above all the Precepts of mere *Moraliſts*; the foundation of Obedience being laid deeper in Man's Obligation to ſerve his Maker, the practice of Obedience being carry'd higher in thoſe moſt holy Precepts which are in Scripture, the reward of Obedience being incomparably greater than what Men are able to conceive, much leſs to promiſe or beſtow.

3. The Excellency of the Scriptures appears, as they contain in them a Covenant of Grace, or the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs. The more memorable any Tranſactions are, the more valuable are any authentic Records of them. The Scriptures contain in them the *Magna Charta* of Heaven, an Act of Pardon with the Royal Aſſent of Heaven, a Proclamation of Good-will from God towards Men; and can we then ſet too great a value on that which contains all the remarkable paſſages between God and the Souls of Men, in order to their Felicity, from the beginning of the World? Can we think, ſince there is a God in the World of infinite Goodneſs, that he ſhould ſuffer all Mankind to periſh inevitably, without his propounding any means for eſcaping of eternal Miſery? Is God ſo good to Men as to this preſent Life; and can we think if Man's Soul be immortal, as we have prov'd it is, that he ſhould wholly neglect any offer of Good to Men as to their eternal Welfare? Or is it poſſible to imagine that Man ſhould be happy in another World without God's promiſing it, and preſcribing conditions in order to it? If ſo, then this Happineſs is no free gift of God, unleſs he hath the beſtowing and promiſing of it; and Man is no rational Agent, unleſs a Reward ſuppoſe conditions to be perform'd in order to the obtaining it; or Man may be bound to conditions which were never requir'd of him; or if they muſt be requir'd, then there muſt be a Revelation of God's Will, whereby he doth require them: And if ſo, then there are ſome Records extant of the Tranſactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happineſs: For what reaſon can we have to imagine that ſuch Records, if once extant, ſhould not continue ſtill, eſpecially ſince the ſame Goodneſs of God is engag'd to preſerve ſuch Records, which at firſt did cauſe them to be indited? Suppoſing then ſuch Records, extant ſomewhere in the World of theſe grand Tranſactions between God and Mens Souls, our buſineſs is brought to a Period; for what other Records are there in the World that can in the leaſt vye with the Scriptures, as to the giving ſo juſt an account of all the Tranſactions between God and Men from the foundation of the World, which gives us all the ſteps, methods and ways whereby God hath made known his Mind and Will to the World, in order to Man's eternal Salvation. It remains only then that we adore and magnifie the Goodneſs of God in making known his Will to us, and that we ſet a value and eſteem on the Scriptures, as on the only authentick Inſtruments of that *Grand Charter of Peace*, which God hath reveal'd in order to Man's eternal Happineſs.

FINIS.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR, A

RATIONAL ACCOUNT

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RELIGION:

WHEREIN

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of the Scriptures, are Aſſerted and Clear'd.

WITH

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OF

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EDWARD late Lord Biſhop of Worcester.

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ORIGINES SACRÆ.

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BOOK I.

DISCOURSE I.

CHAP. I.

The General Prejudices againſt Religion in our Age examin'd; and the old Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *conſider'd.*

BEFORE I come to the particular Vindication of the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *Holy Scriptures*, which is my chief Deſign, it will be neceſſary to remove, if poſſible, the common and general Prejudices againſt Religion in this Age, as if it were only a cunning Artifice of ſome crafty Perſons to ſupport their own intereſt by deceiving the reſt of Mankind. If this were the truth of the caſe, none ought to be blam'd for their Contempt of Religion; nor for their endeavors to ſet the Minds of Men free from the uneaſineſs and ſlavery of a ſuperſtitious and groundleſs Fear. For this muſt be all that is imply'd in Religion, if it were at firſt begun, and is ſtill carry'd on by the Craft of ſome Men, and the Folly of the reſt. But ſuch an imputation as this ought to be very well grounded, becauſe it reflects on all Mankind (a very few excepted) and ought in common juſtice to be prov'd by the moſt clear and convincing Evidence; becauſe no Men have any reaſon to preſume ſo far upon their own Wit and Capacity above all others, as to take it for granted, that the reſt of Mankind are either *Fools* or *Knaves*. For this is the meaning of thoſe who go about to perſuade others, that Religion is nothing but *an Impoſture*, that hath appear'd under ſeveral ſhapes and diſguiſes; but ſtill the *Machine* is the ſame, and the ſame Deſign carry'd on by the different Actors, according to the Humor and Inclination of ſeveral Ages.

I could be glad, that all this might juſtly be look'd on as a feign'd caſe, only for a better Introduction to the following Diſcourſes; but none that live in our Age, and underſtand the too great prevalency of Scepticiſm and Infidelity in it, can apprehend it to be ſo. And therefore I ſhall lay down the true ſtate of the preſent Caſe, with reſpect to Religion in general. It cannot be deny'd by the greateſt Enemies to it, that there is ſtill a general Belief of the truth of it among Mankind, however they differ in their particular Notions about it. For this cannot be look'd on as a new Thing, or an Invention of the preſent Age, ſince it is maniſeſt by the undoubted Hiſtory of former Times, that the ſame foundations of Religion have been generally receiv'd by Mankind; by which I underſtand the Being of GOD and Providence, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a future State; but yet not ſo, but that there have been in ſeveral Ages ſuch as have gone about to unſettle Mens Minds about them, and to repreſent them as an invention of *Politicians* to keep the World in greater Awe. But they have not met with ſuch ſucceſs as they expected in their Diſcoveries; for they have been oppos'd by the wiſeſt and moſt thoughtful Men in the ſeveral Ages they appear'd in; and the generality of Mankind continu'd in the ſame Belief which they had before. And yet they had then the ſame inclinations to Eaſe and Pleaſure, as they now have, and would have been as willing to be rid of the terrible apprehenſions of God and another World; they had the ſame value and eſteem for themſelves and their own intereſts, and hated all ſuch as deſign'd to cheat them; they fell into warm Diſputes and violent Heats about ſome particular Parts and Modes of Religion, which are apt to make them call all the reſt into queſtion: Yet under all theſe diſadvantages, the Foundations of Religion have been preſerv'd among them; and Mankind cannot be brought to look on them as *an Impoſture*. But thoſe who think ſo, are forc'd in great meaſure to conceal their thoughts, and to put on diſguiſes to the World, that they may appear to be of another Mind than really they are.

Whence then comes it to paſs, that thoſe who are averſe to the Practice of Religion, yet cannot be brought to ſhake off the Principles of it? That thoſe who are otherwiſe ſo fond of their own eaſe and intereſt, ſhould abhor thoſe Atheiſtical Principles, which are ſaid to be very much for the advantage of both? That thoſe Nations which have had no communication with each other, and differ ſo much from one another in Languages, Cuſtoms, and Modes of Religion, yet agree in the ſame common ſenſe of God, and a future ſtate?

It is a ridiculous thing for any to pretend to make our Religion to be *an Impoſture*, unleſs they can firſt give a juſt and ſatisfactory account of theſe things.

All that I can meet with to that purpoſe may be reduc'd to theſe three Heads; which contain the great *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age.

I. That the Notions of Religion were firſt ſtarted among rude and barbarous People by *Politicians*, to keep the People in better awe; and that the *Prieſts* found it their intereſt to ſupport them, becauſe they were ſupported by them.

II. That there are ſome *Peculiar Qualities in Mankind*, which join'd with their *Ignorance* and *Fear*, tend to preſerve *that ſeed of Religion which is in Man, and no other living Creature.*

III. That the Conſent of Mankind is not ſo great, as is pretended, there being ſeveral Nations now known by the late diſcoveries, which have no ſenſe or notion of God, or a future ſtate.

Theſe are the things, which I ſhall now make it my buſineſs to inquire into; and thereby ſhew the vanity and folly of theſe general Prejudices againſt Religion.

I begin with the firſt, That Religion was firſt invented and carry'd on by *Politicians* and *Prieſts*, who aim'd only at keeping the World in better awe, and Themſelves in a better condition. This hath been ſuggeſted by Atheiſtical Perſons in all Ages, where they have dar'd to appear; and was thought the moſt plauſible Artifice to draw in the People to their party; for no Men love to be impos'd upon, eſpecially in what concerns their eaſe and intereſt: But they were not able to make out the Perſons, Times, or Places, when the Notions of Religion were firſt ſpread among Mankind. For they could never produce any inſtances of Perſons who deſign'd to impoſe upon Mankind in matters of Religion, but they found the general Principles of Religion were entertain'd among them before; as will appear by the following Examples of the *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, which are moſt inſiſted upon.

The *Egyptians* are ſaid by *Lucian* to have been the firſt who ſet up *Religious Worſhip*; and *Herodotus* ſeems to be of the ſame opinion. *Plutarch* ſaith it was done by *Oſiris*, and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith *it was directed by* Hermes, *who was a great Politician*, and *chief Counſellor to* Oſiris. But all that *Diodorus* ſaith, is, *that he brought the Honors and Services of the Gods into Order*; which ſuppoſes that there was Religion among them before, but he methodiz'd it. And if we believe *Sanchoniathon*, who makes him firſt Counſellor to *Cronus* Father to *Miſor* or *Oſiris*, he began *the Symbolical Images of the Gods*, which caus'd ſuch confuſion in their Worſhip afterwards. *Diodorus* ſaith *that* Oſiris *built* Thebes *or* Dioſpolis, where there was a Temple to *the Immortal God that made the World*, as appears by the Teſtimonies both of *Plutarch* and *Porphyry*. And the former obſerves, *That the moſt ancient, and univerſal and moſt credible Tradition, both of Law-givers and others, Philoſophers, as well as Poets and Divines, was, that the World was not made by chance, without a Mind and Reaſon to order and govern it.* From whence it follows, That before ſuch *Politicians* took upon them to order matters of Religion, there was a generally receiv'd Tradition of a Divine Being, which made and govern'd the World, and was the true foundation on which religious Worſhip was built. And the ſame *Plutarch* in that Diſcourſe affirms it to be *an Impious and Atheiſtical Opinion to attribute the Name of* God *to inſenſible Matter*; and adds, *that there is one univerſal Reaſon which governs the World.* *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſaith, *that the firſt beginnings of Religion were in* Egypt *long before they were in other parts.* Here therefore we muſt ſearch out for the firſt laying this deſign by *Politicians*; and here we find it fix'd upon *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*, who by the accounts given of him, was a very great Man, and that in the beginning of the *Egyptian Monarchy*. *Philo Byblius* ſaith, he was call'd by the *Egyptians Thoth*, by the *Phœnicians Taautus*, by the *Greeks Hermes*: He flouriſh'd, he ſaith, *with great reputation for Wiſdom among the* Phœnicians; who it ſeems at that time were under the Government of *Cronus* Father to *Oſiris* (or *Miſor*, as they call'd him from *Miſraim*, the Son of *Ham*, who firſt peopled thoſe Countries.) And ſo far there is nothing improbable in the Story: For the ſame Perſon being of an extraordinary Capacity, might be in favor both with *Cronus* in *Phœnicia*, and with *Oſiris* afterwards in *Egypt*. But he goeth on, and ſaith, That *Taautus* was *the firſt who took the matters of religious Worſhip out of the hands of unſkilful Men, and brought them into due Method and Order.* So that we find plainly there was Religion among the People before: But this wiſe Politician thought he could manage it better, if he appointed the Rites of publick Worſhip, ſo as to be moſt ſerviceable to Government; and for that end he ſet up the worſhip of Princes after their Death (eſpecially of *Oſiris*, after his being cut in pieces by his Brother, and joyn'd their Names with thoſe of the Stars, as viſible Deities; and of ſome Animals, as ſo many living Images of their Gods. And herein, as far as we can find, lay the politick invention of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*; not in the firſt planting the principles of Religion, but in turning them that way, as he thought would ſerve beſt to the ends of Government, by raiſing a high veneration for deceas'd Monarchs, and deifying ſuch things as they thought moſt uſeful

Lucian. de Deâ Syriâ.
Herodot. 2. 4.
Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſiride.
Diod. Sicul. l. 1.
Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 10.
Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſirid.
Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 11.
Plutarch. ib. p. 369.
Ammian. Marc. l. 22.
Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l. 1. c. 10. p. 40.
Πρῶτος τὰ κατὰ τὴν Θεοσέβειαν ἐκ τῆς τῶν χυδαίων ἀπειρίας, εἰς ἐπιστημονικὴν ἐμπειρίαν διέταξεν.

to Mankind. This was indeed playing the *Politician* with Religion. But that there was a ſenſe of Religion before among the People, not only appears by the former Saying of *Philo Byblius*, but by another in his *Proem* to *Sanchoniathon*; where he ſaith, *That the* Phœnicians *and* Egyptians *agreed (from whom other Nations took it up) to worſhip* thoſe *as their chief Gods, which were moſt uſeful to Mankind; and to this purpoſe they turn'd the Temples already ſtanding, and erected Pillars and Statues to their Memories, and made Feſtivals to them.* From whence it appears that there were Rites of publick Worſhip among them before; but that *Hermes* cauſ'd them to be imploy'd this way, joining the Worſhip of the Stars and their Kings together.

Καὶ εἰς τὸ χρεὼν καταστάντας ναοὺς μετασκευασάμενοι.

But there are two very different accounts concerning that Religion which was firſt ſetled by *Hermes* in *Egypt*. The one is of thoſe who believe there are ſome remainders of the old *Egyptian* Doctrine in the *Triſmegiſtick Books*, tho' with many additions and interpolations. And their Opinion is, that under all the popular Diſguiſes and ſuperſtitious Ceremonies for amuſing the Common People, he did cover the true Principles of Natural Religion, aſſerting the Being and Providence of God, and the Immortality of Souls. And for this, they produce not only divers paſſages in thoſe Books of *Hermes*, which were known in the *Egyptian* times, while their Prieſts were yet in being to have contradicted them, if they had publiſh'd Falſhoods under ſo great a Name; but from the Teſtimonies of *Plutarch* and *Iamblicus*, which cannot be ſuſpected: To which the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who ſojourn'd ſo long among the *Egyptian* Prieſts to learn their Doctrine, may be added. But it is not pretended that in thoſe times this was the common and profeſs'd Religion among the People; but that it was kept up *as a Secret*, not to be communicated but only to ſuch who were prepar'd for it. According to this opinion, the deſign of *Hermes* was not to eſtabliſh any true Religion among the People, but to entertain them with Pomp, and Sacrifices, and Ceremonies; and (as ſome in *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* think) to keep up a difference among them about the ſacred Animals, to ſecure them from an univerſal Conſpiracy againſt the Monarchy. But if the true Notions of God, and Providence, and another World, were preſerv'd among the Prieſts, eſpecially at *Dioſpolis*, or the famous *Thebes*, where the chief of their reſidence was; then it appears, that theſe were not ſcatter'd among the Common People, by *Prieſts* and *Politicians*; but were kept ſecret, as not ſo fit for their capacities, which would go no further than viſible Deities, and a pompous Worſhip. So that the True Principles of Religion were not ſow'd by them to ſerve their ends, but the Corruptions of it, in order to the pleaſing and entertaining the ſenſes and devotions of the Common People, who they knew were moſt affected with what was moſt agreeable to their ſuperſtitious fancies. And there was much more of *Policy* than *Religion*, in keeping the Beſt parts of it from the knowledg of the People: but the *Politicians* knew very well, thoſe would not ſerve their turn ſo well as the fopperies of their Superſtition.

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 380. *Diod. Sic. l.* 1.

But there is another opinion which depends moſt upon the credit of *Philo Byblius*, who liv'd about *Hadrian*'s time. This Man being learned, had a mind to make ſome noiſe in the World with the *Antiquities* of his own Country (for *Byblus* was a *Phœnician* Town.) He found the *Jewiſh* Antiquities aſſerted by *Joſephus* and others, and the *Egyptian* by *Apion*; and now he thought was a fit time to vie with them both. To that end, he produces Nine Books of the *Phœnician Antiquities*, written, as he pretended, long ſince by *Sanchoniathon*, and tranſlated by him into *Greek*; which he pretends *to have found after a moſt diligent ſearch into the* Phœnician *Monuments*. And to make it appear how credible this account of *Sanchoniathon* was, he ſaith, *He took it out of the Records of Cities, and the Monuments of Temples; which were kept up in the ſacred Ammonian Letters.* And this Man is very much commended by *Porphyry* writing againſt the *Chriſtians* for his *Antiquity* and *Veracity*. What ground there is for theſe Pretences may be examin'd afterwards; I am now only to conſider the Scheme of Religion, which is produc'd with ſo much pomp; and yet the Author of it, whoever he was, was neither Divine, Philoſopher, nor Politician, for it is one of the rankeſt and moſt inſipid pieces of Atheiſm that is to be found in Antiquity. And *Porphyry* could not but deteſt it, unleſs he had produc'd it in ſpite to the *Chriſtians*. For he doth on all occaſions declare not only his belief of God and Providence, but that he was the Maker of the World; as *Holſtenius* hath made it appear in his Life, *cap.* 9. and it is well known that he was a profeſs'd *Platoniſt*. But let us now ſee what an account we have from this *Phœnician Scheme*, about the making of the World. "At firſt there was a dark, confus'd, reſtleſs Chaos, which was agitated for a long time, and nothing came of it. At length a mixture happened, and this was the firſt principle of making the Univerſe: but it was ignorant of its own making. From this Mixture came *Môt*, or a ſlimy kind of ſubſtance, out of which iſſued the Generation of all things. There were ſome Animals which had no Senſe, out of which came thoſe which had Underſtanding, and were called *Zophaſemin*, i. e. Beholders of the Heavens, and were made in the figure of an Egg: and the *Môt* ſhined forth, and the Sun and Moon and great Stars appear'd. But it ſeems thoſe living Creatures were faſt aſleep, till they were awaked by dreadful Thunders, and then they began to beſtir themſelves. This is the ſhort account of this matter, which depends not, we are told, on *Sanchoniathon*'s Authority; *but he took it out of the Records of* Taautus *himſelf.* And ſo we have the Original of the World according to this ancient *Hermes*. And if this were his true Doctrine, it is one of the moſt abſurd and ſenſleſs pieces of Atheiſm, and tends directly to overthrow all Religion in the World. For can any thing do it more effectually, than to ſuppoſe that there was nothing originally in the World but ſtupid Matter; which by its own motion, without a God to give and direct it, ſhould produce the Heavens and Earth, and all living Creatures; and that Senſleſs Creatures ſhould beget thoſe that had Underſtanding; and theſe not capable of acting, till they were thoroughly awaked by cracks of Thunder? Can we imagin this *Taautus* to have been any deep Philoſopher or Politician, by ſetting down ſuch extravagant and unreaſonable ſuppoſitions as theſe? But let us ſee how it was poſſible for him to advance any thing like Religion upon theſe grounds: He muſt be a Politician indeed that could do it. The firſt Men, he ſaith, conſecrated the Fruits of the Earth, by which they liv'd, and worſhip'd them, and made oblations to them. This was a very notable beginning of Religion, according to this admirable Politician, for Mankind to worſhip what they devour'd. But *Cotta* in *Cicero* thought * *No Man could be ſo mad to worſhip what he did eat.* But he ſaith, *That theſe notions of Worſhip were ſutable to their weakneſs and puſillanimity.* This doth not give any account how they came to have any notions of Divine Worſhip at all. What was there

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. *c.* 9.

Euſeb. l. 10. *c.* 9.

* *Ecquem tam amentem eſſe putas, ut illud quo veſcatur credat Deum eſſe?* Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3. c. 16.

there in the Plants, which made them give ſuch Reverence and Devotion to them? They ſaw how they grew out of the Earth, and had no power to help themſelves, when they made uſe of them for food. And how was it poſſible then to give Divine Worſhip to them? which muſt ſuppoſe Power at leaſt in what is worſhip'd, or elſe it is a moſt ridiculous folly in Mankind to ſtoop to things ſo much below them. Now this original inclination to give Divine Worſhip to ſomething or other, is that which argues that there is that which ſome call a Natural Seed of Religion in Human Nature; and muſt come from ſome antecedent Cauſe, ſince there could be nothing in theſe Objects of Worſhip, which ſhould move them to it; if it had been ſo, as *Sanchoniathon* repreſents it from the ancient Records of *Taautus*.

The two firſt Mortals, he ſaith, *were* Æon *and* Protogonus; *and their Children were* Genus *and* Genea, *who inhabited* Phœnicia; *and when they were ſcorched with the heat, they lift up their hands to the Sun, whom they believ'd to be the Lord of Heaven, and called him* Beel-ſamen, *the ſame*, ſaith he, *whom the Greeks call* Ζεὺς. But how came they to imagin any Lord of Heaven, if they knew that the Sun was made out of ſenſleſs Matter, as well as themſelves? It may be ſaid, *That they being weak and ignorant, did not know it*. But how then came their poſterity to know it, if the very firſt Race of Mankind were ignorant of it? By what means came *Taautus* to be ſo well inform'd? Revelation cannot be pretended, for that ſuppoſes what they deny, *viz.* a Supreme Being, above Matter, which hath Underſtanding, and gives it to Mankind. But here Mankind come to be underſtanding Creatures, by being born of Animals that had no Senſe: which is a moſt unreaſonable Suppoſition. They could not have it by original Tradition; for that fails in the Fountain-head, if the firſt pair of Mortals knew nothing of it. Then they muſt find it out by Reaſon: and how was that poſſible, if there was no Maker of the World, that there ſhould be *a Lord of Heaven*? It is a remarkable Saying of *Ariſtotle* obſerv'd by *Cicero*, (who ſaw ſeveral of his pieces which we have not, after they were brought to *Rome* by *Sylla*, and put into order by *Andronicus Rhodius*) That if there were Men bred under ground, and had there all conveniencies of Life, without coming upon the ſurface of the Earth; but ſhould only hear that there was a God and a Divine Power; and afterwards theſe Perſons ſhould come out of their Caves, and behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Clouds, the force of the Wind, the bulk, and beauty, and influence of the Sun, with the orderly motions and courſes of the heavenly Bodies: they could not but think, not only that there was a Divine Power, but that theſe things were the effects of it. And why ſhould there not have been the ſame thoughts in this firſt Race of Mankind, unleſs we can ſuppoſe that they had never heard of any ſuch thing as God, or a Divine Power in the World? But then I ask, How they ſhould come to think of worſhipping this *Beel-ſamen* or Lord of the Heavens? for ſo he confeſſes they did, and *lift up their hands to the Sun.* What could the lifting up their hands ſignify to a ſenſleſs maſs of Fire, which lately happened to be united together by chance in one body? If he had made Mankind wholly devoid of Religion, till they had been inſtructed in it by ſome crafty Politician, it had been much more agreeable to this *Hypotheſis*; but to ſuppoſe them to pray to the Heavenly Bodies ſo early, and without any Inſtructor, muſt imply ſome natural apprehenſion of a Deity, altho' they were ſo much miſtaken in the Object of

De Nat. Deor. l. 2. 37.

Divine Worſhip. But it is not reaſonable to believe this ſhould have been ſo early and ſo univerſal, but that they preſum'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars to have been the viſible Deities appointed to govern the viſible World; and that the Supreme Mind was to be worſhip'd in a way ſutable to his own Excellency, by acts of the Mind; which was the opinion of many Nations, and ſome of the greateſt Philoſophers.

Then he proceeds to relate, how after ſome of their poſterity had found out ſome uſeful Inventions as to the conveniences of Life; after their death their Children erected Statues and Pillars to their Memories, and worſhip'd and kept annual Feſtivals at them: and that after the death of *Uranus*, and *Cronus*, and *Dagon*, and the reſt, *Taautus* made Symbolical Images of them, being made King of *Egypt* by *Cronus*; and theſe things he ſaith, the *Cabiri*, by *Taautus* his own command, enter'd into Records, from whence we are to believe that *Sanchoniathon* took them, and *Philo Byblius* tranſlated them out of the *Phœnician* Language. And *Euſebius* ſeems not to queſtion the antiquity of them, but prefers this plain and ſimple Story far before the Inventions of Poets, or the Allegories of the Philoſophers. If theſe things were recorded by the *Cabiri*, the Sons of *Sydyc*, Brother to *Miſor*, the Father of *Taautus*, they do not ſeem to have conſulted the honour of *Taautus*; for they make him not barely to be chief Counſellor to *Cronus*, in the deſign againſt his Father *Uranus*, but that he made uſe of Magical Arts againſt him, (but they do not tell us who invented them, nor upon what principles they could be founded, if there were nothing but Matter in the World) and beſides this, he adviſ'd *Cronus*, having a ſuſpicion of his Brother, to bury him alive in the Earth. And one would think ſo great a Politician as *Hermes*, would never have commanded the *Cabiri* to have preſerv'd theſe Stories of himſelf and his Anceſtors.

However, this is the account given by *Philo Byblius*, out of *Sanchoniathon*, about the firſt planting Religion by *Hermes*, who was after worſhipped himſelf as a God by the *Egyptians*. And now let any one conſider, whether this be a reaſonable or tolerable account of the firſt *ſowing the ſeeds of Religion among Mankind*. And yet this was the foundation of that ſort of Religion which came out of *Phœnicia* and *Egypt* into *Greece*: For they pretend to give an account of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, or *Saturn* and his Sons, and of *Minerva* at *Athens*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* ſaith, *Saturn gave the dominion of it*; but the *Greeks*, as *Philo Byblius* complains, *confounded all with their Fables and Allegories*: but this, he ſaith, is the true foundation which they rais'd their *Mythology* upon.

It is evident by what is ſaid by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus Siculus* and others, that there were ſeveral Colonies that went out of *Egypt* into *Greece*, in the times of *Cecrops*, *Cadmus*, *Danaus*, and *Ereſtheus*; and it is very probable that they carry'd the *Egyptian* Superſtitions along with them: but the Perſon who is pretended to have ſetled Religion among the *Greeks*, was *Orpheus*, who is ſaid to have reduc'd them firſt from Barbariſm, and then to have model'd Religion among them, and to have brought out of *Egypt* the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of a Future State.

This muſt therefore be more particularly inquired into. *Orpheus* is reported to have been a Man of Quality in his own Country of *Thrace*, his Father having a Command over a ſmall Territory there, called *Sithonia*, *ſaith *Pliny*, near the Mountain *Rhodope*, whence he had his Title *Rhodopeius Orpheus*. But †*Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *That when he had accompliſhed*

* Plin. l. 4. c. 11.

† Diod. Sic. l. 1. & 4. Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 1.

compliſhed himſelf at home, he went into Egypt; *and from thence brought the greateſt part of the* Egyptian *Myſteries into* Greece, *only changing the Names from* Oſiris *and* Iſis, *to* Bacchus *and* Ceres; and ſo he did, *as to* L. 10. c. 8. *the ſtate of the Good and Bad after death.* For, ſaith he, *The* Elyſian *Fields for the Good, and the Torments of* Hades *for the Bad, were both of* Egyptian *original.* I do not queſtion but the *Egyptian* Superſtition was in great meaſure the foundation of the *Greek*; but it is hard to determin any thing concerning *Orpheus*, ſince *Ariſtotle*, who was born in *Macedonia*, De Nat. Deor. l. 1. *knew nothing of him*, as *Cicero* informs us, and *that the Verſes under his Name were written by a* Pythagorean. Which is not at all improbable. But not only *Diodorus* ſpeaks poſitively about him, but *Strabo* and *Pauſanias* ſeem not at all to queſtion him; and *Diogenes Laertius* mentions an Epitaph upon him at *Dios* in *Macedonia*: But I lay no weight on the Verſes under his Name; for *Suidas* mentions ſeveral antient Poets of that Name; and it is allow'd on all hands, that there have been at leaſt great Additions and Interpolations in the Verſes that bear the Name of *Orpheus*. The *Argonautics*, *Suidas* ſaith, were written by one *Orpheus* of *Crotone*, one well acquainted with *Piſiſtratus*: Others ſay, the true Author of the *Orphic Poems* was *Onomacritus*, who liv'd about that time; and the *Deſcent into Hades* was written by one *Orpheus* of *Camarine*, ſaith *Suidas*. The moſt probable Opinion is that of *Ariſtotle*, that his Sacred Poems were written by a *Pythagorean*; and therefore the *Platoniſts Syrianus* and *Proclus* might well boaſt of the agreement of the *Orphic* and *Pythagorean* Doctrines. It is no Objection, that there is no ſuch thing now to be found in *Ariſtotle*; for I think *Cicero* may be truſted, who ſaw more of *Ariſtotle* than we now have. But I confeſs if *Diodorus* were not deceiv'd by the *Egyptian* Prieſts, their mentioning him with *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Eudoxus*, and *Democritus*, who were certainly in *Egypt*, makes it very credible, that *Orpheus* had been there too, and carry'd many of the *Egyptian* ſuperſtitions with him: and he might the eaſier ſettle them in *Greece*, becauſe, as *Diodorus Siculus* obſerves, he had a particular intereſt in the Colony which *Cadmus* brought, and was much eſteem'd by them; and *Cadmus* himſelf was originally of *Thebes* or *Dioſpolis*; altho' *Cadmus* himſelf might call it after his own Name; or at leaſt the Caſtle, which long continued it, when the City was called *Thebes*.

But that *Orpheus* did not find thoſe parts ſo barbarous, as to be deſtitute of all Religion before, will appear from the account *Diodorus Siculus* Καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς Θεολογίας μυθολογούμενα μαθὼν, ἀπεδήμησε μὲν εἰς Αἴγυπτον. l. 4. p. 232. himſelf gives of him, *viz. That he was very well inſtructed in the Theology of his Country before he went into* Egypt. How could this be, if they were a wild and barbarous People, without any ſenſe of God and Religion, till he return'd and planted it among them? It's true, he calls it a *Mythology*; and what elſe were the *Egyptian* Doctrines about *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, or about *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, as *Orpheus* chang'd them? But whether it were a *Mythology* or not, he calls it a *Theology*; ſuch as was then known and thought to be true Doctrine, and I am apt to think, more decent and agreeable to their natural notions of Religion, than the Myſteries which *Orpheus* brought among them from the *Egyptians*. Some have obſerv'd, that the very Name of Religion among the *Greeks* was deriv'd from the *Thracians* (Θρησκεία) and ſuch Religion they had among them, before *Orpheus* was born, as *Diodorus* himſelf confeſſes. Whether *Zamolxis* had inſtructed them in Religion before the time of *Orpheus*, we cannot determin, unleſs his time had been better fix'd: The *Greeks*, who write *Pythagoras* his Life in favor to themſelves, make *Zamolxis* his

Servant; and that he went from them to inſtruct the *Getæ*, among whom he was honor'd as a God. But *Herodotus*, who extols them *as* *Herodot.* *the moſt valiant and juſt of the* Thracians, after he had told the *Greek* *l. 9. c. 95.* Story about *Zamolxis* being *Servant to* Pythagoras, he concludes, *That he thought him long before* Pythagoras. And he ſaith, *that the* Thracians *had that opinion of his Doctrine, that they deſpis'd Death, ſaying, they only went to* Zamolxis. From whence it is plain, that the *Thracians* then believed the Immortality of the Soul: and *Pomponius Mela* ſaith, *that Belief continu'd among them to his time*. But whereas *Mela l. 2. c. 2.* *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that Orpheus *brought all the Mythology about* *Diod. Sic.* Hades, *and the ſtate of the Dead, out of* Egypt, *and the cuſtoms of Burial* *l. 1. p. 58, 61.* *there; for the Body was to be convey'd over the Lake* Acheron *by* Charon, *where on one ſide were pleaſant Fields, and not far off the Temple of* Hecate, *and* Cocytus, *and* Lethe: I do not deny that *Orpheus* might add particular circumſtances from what he had obſerv'd in *Egypt*; but that the whole Tradition concerning a Future State came from thence, is ſo ſo far from being true, that the *Thracians*, the *Getæ*, and *Hyperborei* had the like Tradition among them; as appears by the *Gothic Edda*'s, where *Edda Mythol. c. 3.* we read *of the Judgment* of another World, and that the Good ſhall dwell with *Odin* in a happy ſtate, and the Bad go to *Hellen* and *Thiſſulheim*: and a large account is given of the manner of Judicature in the other World, from the Braſs Tables of the *Hyperborei* in the Iſland of *Delos*, which are mention'd in the Dialogue *Axiochus* in *Plato*'s Works. And however it be not genuine, it is ſufficient to our purpoſe that all this Tradition came not out of *Egypt*. One would think, by the account given by *Diodorus*, that neither *Orpheus*, nor the *Egyptians*, believ'd any thing at all concerning a Future State: but that only ſome Ceremonies were us'd about Burials, wherein the Lives of Men were enquir'd into, and Judgment paſs'd upon them; which the Hiſtorian thinks more effectual for reforming Mankind, than the *Greek* or Poetical Fables. But that the *Egyptians* had a real Belief of another State, appears from *Diodorus* himſelf. For if any Perſon were accus'd before the ſolemn Judicature, which ſat upon him; if the matter were not prov'd, the Accuſer was ſeverely puniſh'd; if it were, the Body was depriv'd of Burial: If there were no Accuſation, then the Perſon's Virtues were remembred, his Piety, Juſtice, Chaſtity, *&c.* and they concluded with a Prayer, that he might be admitted to the bleſſed Society of the Good; and the People applauded his Happineſs in that reſpect. But *Porphyry*, who cannot be *Porphyr.* ſuſpected of Forgery in this matter, gives a more particular account of *de Abſtin. l. 1. c. 10.* this Prayer, which he ſaith *Euphantus* tranſlated out of the *Egyptian* Language; and the ſubſtance of it is this: They firſt take out the Bowels, and put them into a Cheſt on purpoſe, and then lift it up towards Heaven; and the Perſon to whom it belongs, makes a Prayer in the name of the Deceaſed, to the Sun and all the Gods, which give Life to Men, that they would receive him into the Society of the immortal Gods. For he had piouſly worſhip'd the Gods his Parents had taught him, as long as he liv'd; he had honor'd thoſe from whom he came into the World; he had not kill'd, nor injur'd or defrauded any one, nor had committed any horrible Wickedneſs; but if he had offended in eating and drinking, it was for the ſake of that which was in that Cheſt; and ſo they took that, and threw it into the River, and intombed the reſt of the Body. By this we ſee a diſtinction is to be made between the general ſenſe of another Life, and ſome particular Superſtitions, ſuch as thoſe

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Orpheus carry'd into *Greece*, where they had a notion of another World before, as well as in *Egypt*. For it is not reaſonable to preſume that the *Greeks* ſhould be worſe in this reſpect than the moſt barbarous Northern People. For, beſides thoſe already mention'd, *Cæſar*, and *Strabo*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſay, *that the* Druids *aſſerted the Immortality of Souls*; and neither *Orpheus*, nor any out of *Egypt* ever converſ'd among them.

Cæſ. l. 6. Strabo l. 4. Ammian. Marcellin. l. 15.

But ſome in our Age are ſo fond of the *Egyptians*, that they will by all means make the Immortality of Souls to be *a Noble Invention of theirs*. What is the meaning of this *Noble Invention?* Is it that none ever thought of it before them, and all others deriv'd it from them? That appears already to be otherwiſe, and that very diſtant and remote Nations, who had no communication with theſe Noble Inventors, held the ſame Opinions; as might, if it were needful, be prov'd by undoubted Teſtimonies, both of the *Eaſt* and *Weſt Indies*, where neither *Orpheus* nor the *Egyptian* Prieſts were ever heard of. And *Pauſanias* long ſince obſerv'd, *That the* Chaldeans *and* Indians *held the ſame*, and before the *Egyptians*; for he *makes them the firſt*. But *Herodotus* ſaith, *That the* Egyptians *were the firſt who aſſerted the Immortality of Souls*. Not abſolutely; *but ſo as to paſs from one Body to another, till at laſt it came into a human Body*. And of this *Noble Invention* let the *Egyptians* have the due honor; and not thoſe *Greeks*, who, as he ſaith, *would deprive them of it*. It is great pity they ſhould loſe it, ſince *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *The Soul of* Oſiris *paſt into a Bull, and that is the reaſon why they give ſo much honor to it*. It cannot be deny'd, that ſome *Greek* Philoſophers of great reputation did aſſert the *Tranſmigration of Souls*, if their Doctrine be not miſrepreſented: but neither *Pythagoreans* nor *Platoniſts* did hold it univerſally, nor in ſuch a manner as is commonly underſtood. For, they held no Tranſmigration of the Souls of Good Men, which were fit for Happineſs; but aſſerted that they went immediately to Heaven, or a ſtate of Bliſs, as may be prov'd by the teſtimonies of *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Plato*, and many others: but the difficulty lay about Impure Souls; the *Pythagoreans* utterly rejected the poetical Fables about the ſtate of the Dead; and therefore they were forc'd to think of ſome way of purifying them after Death. They had no Light to direct them, but their own Imagination; and they thought it beſt for the ſame Soul to come into another Human Body, to try if it would behave it ſelf better, that it might be happy: But for profligate and very wicked Perſons, they told them of going into ſuch Beaſts, as were moſt remarkable for thoſe Vices they were moſt addicted to; as the Cruel into Tygers and Beaſts of Prey; the Voluptuous into Swine; the Proud and Vain into Birds; the Idle and Soft into Fiſhes. This is the account given, ſaith *Beſſarion*, by *Timæus* in his Book *de Mundo & Animâ*. And when *Trapezuntius* charg'd *Plato* with aſſerting that *Brutes were informed by Human Souls*; Cardinal *Beſſarion*, a very learned *Greek*, utterly denies it, and ſaith, *That* Plato *doth not make the Soul of a Man to become the Soul of a Brute*; *but only that it is confined to it as a Priſon for a certain time, but it is not capable of acting there for want of proper Organs*. So that theſe Philoſophers Opinion was very different from the *Egyptians*. But whence came the moſt antient Philoſophers to hold the Immortality of Souls? Had they it from the *Egyptians?* **Plutarch* ſaith, That Thales *was the firſt*; not that held the Soul to be immortal; for ſo many did before him; but that maintained it as a Philoſopher by Reaſon; that is, becauſe it had the Principle

Nobiliſſimum autem eorum inventum fuit Immortalitas Animæ. Canon. Chron. p. 217.

Pauſan. in Meſſ.

Herodot. l. 2. c. 123.

Diod. Sic. l. p. 54.

Epicharm. apud Grot. Excerpt. p. 481. Clement. Alex. Str. 5. Poëſis Philoſ. p. 28.

Beſſar. cont. Calumn. l. 2. c. 7.

* Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον, *Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 4. c. 2.*

Principle of Motion within it ſelf, and ſo could not be ſuppoſed to forſake it ſelf, or to ceaſe moving by the death of the Body. For, as *Cicero* obſerves, a Body is moved by impulſe from another Body; but the Soul finds it hath this power wholly within and from it ſelf, and therefore is immortal.

Cicero Tuſc. 1. 23.

But *Pythagoras* is ſaid *to have learnt this Doctrine in* Egypt: He called the Soul *a ſelf-moving Number*, ſaith *Plutarch* in the ſame place, *i. e.* as he well explains it, he puts *Number* after his myſtical way for *a Mind:* and it ſeems very ſtrange to me that ſo great a Man as *Ariſtotle* ſhould think *Pythagoras* ſpake literally of *Numbers*, as tho' any Number could move it ſelf. But *Plutarch* rightly interpreted him, and the latter *Pythagoreans* from *Moderatus Gadetanus* made no ſcruple of ſaying that Pythagoras *expreſſed his ſenſe about immaterial Beings by Numbers and Figures, as having nothing of Matter in them.* And it is very probable, he learnt this way from the *Symbols* and *Hieroglyphicks* of the *Egyptians*. But *Cicero* ſaith, *That he had learnt the Immortality of the Soul from his Maſter* Pherecydes, *which he confirmed very much.* And it is obſervable, that he firſt ſuppoſes *a general conſent of Mankind as to the Immortality of Souls, from a very antient Tradition*; and then proceeds to the *Philoſophers*, who offer'd to give Reaſons for aſſerting it, of which he gives an account. And if there were ſuch a general conſent *from all Antiquity*, as he affirms, then this Doctrine could not originally come out of *Egypt* by *Orpheus* into *Greece*.

Porphyr. in vit. Pythag.
Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir. p. 354.
Cicero Tuſc. 1. 16.
Cap. 13.
Cap. 12.

Let us now conſider the ſenſe of Religion or Divine Worſhip among the *Greeks* before *Orpheus* his time; whether they were ſuch Strangers to it, as they muſt be ſuppoſed, if he brought it firſt among them. *Plato* was a very competent Witneſs as to the *Old Greeks*; and he affirms *that the firſt Inhabitants of* Greece *ſeem'd to him to have worſhip'd no other Gods, but the Sun, Moon, and Earth, and Stars, and the Heavens, as moſt barbarous Nations ſtill do.* So that here we have the ſame *Religion* in *Greece*, that was then common to the reſt of the World; *i. e.* the Worſhip of *Viſible Deities*, and ſuch as they apprehended to have the greateſt influence upon their Affairs. The heavenly Bodies did ſtrike them with aſtoniſhment at their Vaſtneſs, and Beauty, and orderly Motion, and the Benefits they continually receiv'd from them; and theſe they were moſt ready to pay their Devotions to, as to thoſe which appear'd moſt to them; but that which did not appear, was to them, that were ſo much govern'd by Senſe, as if it were not. As if we ſuppoſe a Prince travelling with his Chariot in the Country, with the Curtains drawn up on all ſides, and a great Retinue about him; the People are much ſurprized with ſo great an Appearance, and flock about them to ſee to whom they muſt pay their Reſpects; and ſeeing no body in the Chariot, they turn their eyes to the Attendants, and eſpecially to him that ſits ſo high in the Coach-box and manages the Horſes; and immediately give him that profound Reverence which was only due to the Prince himſelf, if he had appear'd. Much after this manner it was with the Barbarous People, both in *Greece* and other parts of the World. There was ſomething ſo great, as to require Devotion from them; and they looked about them, and could ſee nothing which they thought could deſerve it better than the Sun, Moon, and Stars, which were placed very high, and were the great Movers which kept all things in their order, and made them ſo ſerviceable to them. But this is far from being an argument that they had no Religion; it being rather a ſign they had

Plato in Cratyl. p. 397.

too much, but knew not how to govern it. But this was a far more reaſonable Worſhip than that which *Orpheus* or the *Old Poets* brought in among the *Greeks*, whoſe Stories and Ceremonies were ſo filthy and indecent, as were enough to have turn'd the ſtomachs of modeſt and virtuous Men from any kind of Worſhip, which had the tincture of ſo much Obſcenity going along with it. And it is really to be wonder'd at, that the *Orphick Myſteries* and *poetical Fables* receiv'd among the *Greeks*, did not quite overthrow all Religion among them. For, as *Plutarch* well ſaith, *Abſurd Notions of* God *have very bad conſequences both ways; for ſome are plung'd into the depth of Superſtition, and others, to avoid that, run themſelves into Atheiſm.* And if there had not been ſome very great reaſon in Nature, to have kept the Notion of a Deity in Mens Minds; it is hardly conceivable, that under all the horrible Superſtitions of *Greece*, there ſhould be any ſuch thing as a ſenſe of Religion left among them. But the evidence of that was ſo great, as made all Men of Underſtanding to put any tolerable ſenſe upon thoſe *vile Superſtitions*, which were ſo prevailing in *Greece*, after the *Egyptian Fopperies* were brought in among them. The Rule they went by was this, That Religion muſt be preſerv'd in the World, not to ſerve Politick Ends, but to ſatisfy the Reaſon and common Senſe of Mankind; and that ſince ſuch a way of Worſhip was ſo generally receiv'd, they were willing to put the beſt conſtructions upon it, and to make it ſome way or other ſerve to keep up the ſenſe of a Divine Power in the management of the World. And of this we have a remarkable inſtance in *Plutarch*, with reſpect to the *Egyptian Myſteries*, in his Treatiſe of *Iſis* and *Oſiris*. He profeſſes at firſt *a great deſire to find out the truth of theſe things that concern the knowledg of* God, *it being the greateſt Bleſſing* God *can give, and Mankind can receive; and that without it Immortality is not Life, but Duration. And the end of all*, he ſaith, *is the knowledg of the firſt and principal and intellectual Being.* But he can make nothing at all of the *Matters of fact* with relation to *Oſiris* and *Iſis*, which he looks on as very abſurd, and ſo overthrows all the *Phœnician Scheme* of *Philo Byblius*, who lived much about the ſame time under *Trajan:* But *Plutarch* ſaith, *To underſtand thoſe things of a Divine Being literally, is ſo abſurd and impious, that they deſerve to be ſpit at who offer them.* And for thoſe, *who interpret theſe things of great Princes in former times, who had Divine Honor given them, this*, he ſaith, *is the way to overthrow the natural ſenſe of a Divine Being, and ſo open the way to Atheiſm, by confounding Gods and Men together;* as he ſaith, *Euhemerus Meſſenius* had done. And therefore he was fain to turn all into *Allegory*, to avoid the miſchief of abſurd and impious Opinions concerning that Divine Power, which he owned to be in the World; and not only ſo, but he adds (as is already obſerved) that *there was a very antient Tradition in the World, among all ſorts of Men; and which had obtained a firm and unſhaken Belief in the World, not only in common talk, but in their greateſt Myſteries, and that both among Greeks and Barbarians, that the Univerſe was not made by chance, or without reaſon, but that it was made and governed by it.* From whence it follows, that there was ſuch a Tradition among the *old Greeks*, which did not loſe its Authority, when thoſe Myſteries were brought in; and that made the moſt intelligent Perſons to apply them that way. For it ſeems, by the account he gives of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*, that Atheiſtical Perſons took great advantages

Plutarch. de Iſid. & Oſir.

Ὧν τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυρίου καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις. P. 352.

P. 358.

Διὰ τ̃ παμπάλαιος αὕτη ἐκ Θεολόγων τ̃ νομοθετῶν εἴς τε ποιητὰς, τ̃ φιλοσόφους δόξα τ̃ ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τ̃ δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἔν τε τελεταῖς, ἔν τε θυσίαις, τ̃ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένη, ὡς οὔτ' ἄνουν τ̃ ἄλογον τ̃ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ Πᾶν. P. 369.

from theſe Stories of their Gods, to prove that there were none at all; but only that Great Men in former Ages, that had found out ſome uſeful Inventions, were deify'd after their deaths. *Plutarch* makes that a fabulous Story, which he tells of his *Golden Inſcriptions* in *Panchæa*, to prove the truth of his aſſertion, *which none ever ſaw beſides himſelf*; and he affirms, That there were no ſuch Perſons as the *Panchæi*: but others have ſhew'd that there was ſuch a place as *Panchæa* about *Arabia Fœlix*. And *Diodorus Siculus* mentions it as a conſiderable Iſland in the *Arabian* Sea, and that the Inhabitants are called *Panchæi*; and that near the City *Panara* there is a Temple to *Jupiter Triphyllius*, which was in great veneration for its Antiquity and Magnificence, which he deſcribes at large; and upon the Mountain there it is ſaid that *Uranus* of old inhabited; and the People were called *Triphyllii*, from three different Tribes which join'd there, and were afterwards driven out by *Ammon*. And to make the Story of *Euhemerus* more probable, he ſaith, the Inhabitants came firſt out of *Crete* in *Jupiter*'s time. So that *Plutarch* was very much to ſeek, when he deny'd that there was any ſuch Place as *Panchæa*, or ſuch a Perſon as *Jupiter Triphyllius*. And *Diodorus* further ſaith, there was in it a golden Pillar in the old *Egyptian* Letters, wherein there were Inſcriptions containing the Acts of *Uranus* and *Jupiter*, and of *Diana* and *Apollo* written by *Hermes*. Which is a very different account of this matter, from what *Plutarch* gives. Some are willing to excuſe *Euhemerus*, as tho' he intended nothing more, but to let the *Greeks* know, that they worſhip'd ſuch for Gods which had been Men; which was true enough. But this did not reach his deſign, according to *Plutarch*; which was to prove, *that there were no other Gods but theſe*: ſo *Plutarch* ranks him with *Diagoras Melius* and *Theodorus*, who ſaid *there were no Gods*. And the *Epicurean* in *Tully* ſaid, *that* Euhemerus *deſtroy'd all Religion*; which could not be true, if he had left any Divinity to be worſhip'd. *Sextus Empiricus* reckons him among the *Atheiſts*, and ſaith, he was *a conceited Man*; but he charges him only with ſaying, *That ſome great Men in former Ages had been made Gods.* Which was ſo evident a thing, that one would think none could have been called an *Atheiſt* merely upon that account. But *Jupiter* of *Crete* had been advanc'd a long time to the higheſt Divine Honor; and conſequently thoſe who went about to diſprove his Worſhip, were thought to deſtroy the Worſhip which belongs to the Supreme God. But *Diodorus Siculus*, in a Fragment of his ſixth Book preſerv'd by *Euſebius*, gives a very different account of him; and that from *Euhemerus* his own words, *viz.* That the Antients had deliver'd to their Poſterity two different Notions of Gods; one of thoſe that were Eternal and Immortal, as the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and other parts of the Univerſe; but others were Terreſtrial Gods, that were ſo made, becauſe they were Benefactors to Mankind, as *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, and others. And as to *Euhemerus*, he ſaith, *that he was a Favorite of* Caſſander *King of* Macedonia, *by whoſe command he made a Voyage into thoſe parts*, where he found the things before mention'd. But ſome learned Men are ſtill of *Plutarch*'s opinion, that *Euhemerus* his *Panchæa* is a mere figment of his; for which I do not ſee any reaſon ſufficient; eſpecially when the ſame Perſons do allow *Sanchoniathon*'s *Phœnician* Antiquities; and methinks *Euhemerus* his account of the Inſcriptions on Pillars of the Acts of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, and *Jupiter* and *Ammon*, and *the Sacred Letters* by *Hermes*, comes ſo near to *Philo Byblius*, that one would think he had compar'd Notes with *Euhemerus* and *Diodorus Siculus*.

Diod. Sicul. l. 5. p. 220.

Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſ. l. 7.
Cicer. de N. D. l. 1.
Sext. Emp. ad Mathe. p. 317.

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 2. c. 2.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. 2. c. 8.

But their deſign was different in this reſpect, that *Sanchoniathon* juſtify'd the making Men to be Gods; but *Euhemerus* went about to prove they were *not Gods*, becauſe they had *been Men*. It is poſſible that the common People might account him an Atheiſt for denying *Jupiter* of *Crete* to be God, or for ſaying, that his Sepulchre was to be found. But why ſhould *Plutarch* charge him on this account, when he himſelf ſo much finds fault with theſe who made Men to be Gods? He endeavour'd, he ſaith, to avoid the extremes both of *Superſtition* and *Atheiſm*; but he could but *endeavour* it, when he allow'd the Practices of the *Greeks* and *Egyptians*, and only offer'd at ſome forced Interpretations of them, againſt the general ſenſe of the *Egyptian* Myſteries.

Plato de LL. l. 10.

Marmor. Arundell.

Pauſan. in Atticis.

But however it appears from him, that the *old Greeks* did preſerve the antient Tradition of *the World not being made by chance*, which is the foundation of all Religion. And *Plato*, when he enters upon the Diſcourſe againſt *Atheiſm*, begins with two things, *viz. That the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and the order of Seaſons ſhew'd there was a* God *and Providence; and the conſent of all Mankind, Greeks and Barbarians*. Now, how could *Plato* have ſaid this of the *old Greeks*, if they had been without any Religion till *Orpheus* came out of *Egypt?* And we have an evident proof of the practice of Divine Worſhip among them, from the *Parian Chronicle*, where it is ſaid, *That* Deucalion *after he had eſcaped the Flood went to* Athens, *and there offered a ſolemn Sacrifice for his Deliverance*; and *Pauſanias* ſaith, *he there built a magnificent Temple*. Which are ſufficient Evidences of the Religion of the *old Greeks*, even before they had the Name of *Hellens* from the Son of *Deucalion*. But I have not yet done with *Diodorus Siculus*, who lets fall ſeveral Inſinuations, as tho' he were of the mind of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*; and that the old Religion, both in *Egypt* and elſewhere, was nothing but a *Politick Contrivance*. For in the beginning of his Hiſtory, he pretends to give an account of the beginning of all things: but it is ſuch a one as plainly ſhews he was no friend to Religion; for he takes away the very foundation of it, by ſuppoſing the World to be produc'd without any Intellectual Cauſe. He ſaith at firſt there were two Opinions among the Philoſophers and Hiſtorians: One was, that the World had been always juſt as it is; the other, that there was a beginning of Mankind, and of other things. But how? This he undertakes to explain after this manner. At firſt there was a Chaos, or a confus'd mixture of Heaven and Earth and all together; then follow'd a Separation of Bodies from each other, and thence came the preſent Frame of the World. The lighter Bodies mov'd forward, as the Air and Fire, by which Motion came the Sun, Moon and Stars: But the groſſer and more heavy parts ſubſided together; the moiſter made the Sea, and the dry the Earth, which was very moiſt; but being quicken'd by the heat of the Sun, ſwell'd up in ſeveral Tumors with thin Skins containing the Materials of living Creatures, which having ſtrength brake thro' thoſe Skins, and thence came all ſorts of Animals. But the heat of the Sun and the Winds hardening the Surface of the Earth, no more of ſuch Swellings appear'd; and ſo the Animals are ſince continued by Propagation. But the Men which were thus born were very wild at firſt, but by degrees they came to underſtand one another, and to find out the conveniencies of Living. This is the ſhort Abſtract of the Account he gives, which is juſt the *Epicurean Hypotheſis* in other Terms, which was much in vogue in the time of *Diodorus Siculus*, (which, ſaith *Suidas*, was that of *Auguſtus*) eſpecially after

Lucretius his Poem was in ſuch reputation: For, he ſaith, he very well underſtood the *Latin* Tongue, and had great helps to his Hiſtory from *Rome*; and whoſoever compares this with *Lucretius*, will ſcarce find any difference. And *Euſebius* obſerves, that he does not ſo much as once mention the Name of God in it, but leaves all to Chance and a fortuitous concourſe; and as it is expreſs'd in *Plutarch*, where the *Epicurean Opinion* is deliver'd much to the ſame purpoſe, the World is ſaid to have come together at firſt by a Motion of Atoms without Providence. Where there muſt be ſomething defective in the beginning, to ſhew this to have been the *Epicurean Hypotheſis*; for as it ſtands, it ſeems to be *Plutarch*'s own opinion, which is directly contrary to what he had ſaid before in the foregoing Chapter, where he blames *Anaximander* for leaving out the efficient Cauſe; for, ſaith he, Matter alone can do nothing without it. And the ſame he repeats againſt *Anaximenes*, and ſaith plainly, *That it is impoſſible that Matter alone ſhould be the Cauſe of Things, as it is for Metals to form themſelves into Pots and Cups without an Artiſt. So that *Plutarch* muſt be clear'd from that Opinion, which he ſo juſtly oppoſes; and he commends *Anaxagoras* in a particular manner, for adding Mind as the Efficient Cauſe to Matter, which brought it out of confuſion into that order that appears in the World. *Pliny* ſaith of *Diodorus*, *Apud Græcos deſiit nugari*; but he only applies it to the Title of his Book, and it is not true of the Beginning of it. *Pliny* himſelf took the World to be an Eternal Being, which he calls *God*, and ſo was againſt *Diodorus* his Making of the World. But *Diodorus* quotes *Euripides* the Scholar of *Anaxagoras* for his Chaos: but that is not the point, whether there were ſuch Confuſion at firſt, but how the World came out of it. It's certain that *Anaxagoras* did not only hold a *Chaos* at firſt, but an *Eternal Mind*, which order'd the World, and brought things into that Beauty and Uſefulneſs which they have. *Diogenes Laertius* ſaith, that *Anaxagoras* follow'd *Linus*, and he was before *Orpheus*: If it were only in that of *the Chaos*, there was nothing extraordinary in that; for all that ſuppoſed the World to be made, aſſerted it; but if it were of the Mind as the Efficient Cauſe, that is a conſiderable teſtimony of the antiquity of that Opinion among the *old Greeks*. And *Orpheus*, as *Suidas* gives an account of his Doctrine, ſaith, *That he held a Chaos, and before that an Æther of* God*'s making, which was the great Inſtrument in framing the World.*

Euſeb. Pr. Evang. l. 1. c. 7.

Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. 1. c. 4.

* Ἀδυνάτον γὰρ ἀρχὴν μίαν τὴν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων, ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑποστῆναι· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι.

Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3.

Plin. N. H. l. 1. c. 1.

Lib. 2. c. 1.

Laert. in Proëm.

But *Euſebius* charges *the moſt part of the* Greek *Philoſophers with being of* Diodorus *his mind in this matter*: but I hope to make it appear otherwiſe in the progreſs of this Diſcourſe, being now only to conſider this Aſſertion as we find it in him. And I cannot but take notice of the unfairneſs of it; for he repreſents it, as if there had been but two Opinions among the Philoſophers, that *of the Eternity of the World*, and its *being made by Chance*; as if he had never heard of an *Eternal Mind* among them: which it is impoſſible ſo inquiſitive and learned a Man ſhould be ignorant of. But he offers no kind of proof of the truth of what he lays down; not ſo much as the Inſcriptions of *Hermes*, or the *Commentaries* of *Taautus*, which *Sanchoniathon* and *Philo Byblius* pretended to. He gave no manner of Reaſon how the confus'd Matter was put into motion, or how the ſeparation of the lighter and heavier Bodies was effected; how the heavenly Bodies came to have diſtinct *Vortices*, without interfering with each other; how the moiſter and heavier parts came to be divided, ſo as to make two ſuch great Bodies, as the Earth and

Euſeb. de Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 8.

and Sea to be ſo diſtinguiſh'd and parted from one another: which are conſiderable Difficulties, and ought to have been clear'd. It may be ſaid, *That he writes not like a Philoſopher, but as an Hiſtorian, and only in general lays down the Principles that had been receiv'd by Philoſophers.* But this doth not vindicate him: For then he ſhould have ſet down all their Opinions, which he doth not; but purpoſely avoids that which would have reſolv'd theſe Difficulties. For if an Eternal Mind be ſuppos'd to give and direct the Motion of Matter, then we may eaſily conceive, not only whence Motion it ſelf came; but whence Gravitation, or the tendency of Bodies towards their Center; whence the ſeveral great Bodies of the Heavens came to have their diſtinct circumvolations; and whence the Earth and Sea came to be ſo divided, and parted from one another.

But *Diodorus* was ſenſible that there would be great Objections made againſt *the production of Animals out of the Earth,* without any other Cauſe than *the heat of the Sun, and moiſture and putrefaction of the ſlimy ſubſtance of the Earth.* And therefore to anſwer them, *the* Egyptians, he ſaith, *produce this Experiment among them, that about* Thebes, *when the Earth is moiſtened by the* Nile, *by the intenſe Heat of the Sun falling upon it, an innumerable multitude of Mice do ſpring out; which being done after the Earth was ſo much hardened, and the firſt Influences abated, much more might all kind of Animals come out of the Earth at firſt.*

I. But in the firſt place, we have nothing but the teſtimony of theſe *Egyptians* for the original truth of this, who brought it as an Argument to juſtify their own *Hypotheſis.* And from them other Writers have taken it, without examining the truth of it, as *Ovid, Mela, Pliny,* &c. *Ælian* goes farther (who liv'd in *Hadrian*'s time) for he ſaith, *in his way between* Naples *and* Puteoli, *he ſaw ſuch imperfect Animals, half Mud, and half living Creatures;*

Ovid. Metamorph. l. 15. Plin. l. 9. 58.

Altera pars vivit, rudis eſt pars altera tellus;

As *Ovid* deſcribes them. But this is very far from making any tolerable proof; for they might be perfect Animals, and only one part appear out of the Mud or Dirt, and the other be cover'd over with it. And this in all probability was the caſe in *Egypt.* For theſe were ſeen only *in the Mud,* after the *Nile* was return'd into its Channel, as *Mela* affirms, *Ubi ſedavit diluvia & ſe ſibi reddidit, per humentes campos quædam non perfecta animalia,* &c. Now this was a very ill time for any Perſons to go farther than as to what appear'd to them at a diſtance: and becauſe they ſaw but ſome Parts, they concluded the reſt to be nothing but Slime. But this is a very ſlight and imperfect way of making *Experiments.* Did any of the *Egyptians* take and diſſect any of theſe *Imperfect Animals,* and ſhew how it was poſſible in the formation of them, for one part of them to be nothing but Mud, when the reſt had all the proper Organs belonging to ſuch Animals? If the internal and vital parts be firſt form'd (as no doubt they are) and the Blood paſſing thro' the Heart into the outward Parts, be the great Inſtrument of perfecting the *Organs* of Senſe and Motion; how is it poſſible to conceive that where the inward Parts are perfect in their kind, one main part of an Animal ſhould have nothing like Organs, but merely be a Maſs of Dirt? And by what means could that afterwards be join'd with the other to make up one perfect Animal? It is agreed among the beſt Obſervers and moſt curious

Inquirers into theſe things, that the Heart is the firſt of the ſolid parts, and the Blood of the Fluid; but whether it be by a dilatation of the *Punctum ſaliens*, or red beating ſpeck into ſeveral parts, whereof one is for the upper, and the other for the lower and remoter parts; or it be by extention of the ſeveral parts in little, as an *Embryo*, (as it is in Plants) or by a fermentation raiſed in the fluid matter by an active fluid conveyed into it, upon the conjunction of male and female; (which are the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* of the moſt inquiſitive Perſons in this Philoſophical Age) which way ſoever we take it, this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* of *Imperfect Animals*, is repugnant to the moſt accurate Obſervations, which have been made about the Generations of Animals. And however ſuch things might then paſs among ſuch who take all upon truſt from the *Egyptians* or others who never examin'd them; yet it would be the only proof of *Imperfect Animals*, to find any in our Age to defend thoſe crude and abſurd Opinions. As tho' any thing were to be believed rather than the moſt reaſonable things in the World, *viz.* God and Providence; which appear moſt conſpicuouſly in the production of Animals. Inſomuch that our ſagacious Dr. * *Harvey* after all his diligent and exact Inquiries, confeſſes *that the power and preſence of the* Deity *is no where more obſervable than in the formation of Animals.* And he could find no ſatisfaction in any *Hypotheſes* of the greateſt Naturaliſts, without taking in *the immediate Power and Providence of* God. And even Mr. *Hobbes* himſelf, who was as unwilling to call in the help of Providence as another; yet is forc'd to give up the Cauſe in this matter; and freely confeſſes, † *That if Men examin the ſeveral Machines in order to Generation and Nutrition, and think they were not ordered by an intelligent Being to their ſeveral offices, muſt be ſaid to be without Underſtanding themſelves.* And yet he ſets down the words of *Diodorus Siculus* in the beginning of that Chapter; and thinks *that is as far as Men can go by Phyloſophy, without Revelation.* How can theſe things conſiſt? For Men *without Revelation* may find out all the *Machines in the Body*; and therefore may be convinc'd that there was an Eternal Mind which gave a Being to theſe things; which is more than *Diodorus Siculus* or *his Philoſophers* could find: For they affirm'd, *That Animals were form'd by Chance, out of Mud and Putrefaction without any Mind*; and therefore according to him they had none themſelves. And ſome of our moſt experienc'd and ſkilful *Anatomiſts*, after all their debates about the ſeveral *Mechanical Hypotheſes* concerning the Production of Animals, have concluded that ‖ *it is impoſſible that mere Matter and Motion, of whatſoever figure the particles of Matter be, ſhould make up the Body of an Animal; but that we muſt have recourſe to a moſt Wiſe and Omnipotent Agent, which alone is able to do it.*

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* Neq; ſane uſpiam alibi, quam in Animalis fabrica, Omnipotens Creator in operibus ſuis aut manifeſtius conſpicitur, aut præſentius ejus Numen adeſt. *Exercitat.* 49. Quapropter rem recte pieq; (mea quidem ſententia) reputaverit, qui rerum omnium Generationes, ab eodem illo æterno atq; omnipotente Numine deduxerit, à cujus nutu rerum ipſarum Univerſitas dependet. *Exercitat.* 50. Quod ubique præſens, ſingulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adſit; quam toti Univerſo, quod Numine ſuo ſive providentia, arte ac mente Divina cuncta animalia procreet. *ibid.*

† Qui ſi machinas omnes, tum Generationis tum Nutritionis ſatis perſpexerint, nec tamen eas a mente aliqua conditas ordinataſque ſua quaſque officia viderint, ipſi profecto ſine mente eſſe cenſendi ſunt. *Hobb. de Homine, l.* 1. *c.* 1. *ad fin.*

‖ Interea ratum maneat juxta normam optimæ Philoſophiæ fieri non poſſe, ut Particulæ ſive Corpuſcula quomodocunque figurata ſolo motu fortuito in corpus humanum aut belluinum ſponte coaleſcant: Sed neceſſario ad hoc opus omnino ſapientiſſimum potentiſſimumque Architectam requiri, qui Animalium Machinas tam affabre & artificioſe componat. Adeoque Deum ſolum formare cuncta animalia, & fœcunditatem ovis addere. *Exercit. Anatomica & Medica Peieri & Hardeci, p.* 126.

And thoſe who plead moſt for the Motion of the Particles of Matter in forming the Body, yet confeſs, That it is hardly poſſible to conceive how the kinds of Animals can be preſerv'd, unleſs there be ſomething beyond that, to regulate and determin that Motion; but what that is, they are not able to explain. Let now any Perſons that have the uſe of Underſtanding, conſider whether this *Egyptian Hypotheſis* have the leaſt credibility in it; ſince it is grounded on ſo little Authority.

Etmulleri Inſtit. Medicæ, c. 23.

II. But that is not all. For we ſhall prove it to be repugnant to the moſt certain accounts we have of the *Nature*, as well as the *Production of Animals*; both which are impoſſible to be conceiv'd to be the mere reſult of a fortuitous Motion of Matter, by the heat of the Sun upon the ſlime of the Earth. As will appear by conſidering the moſt neceſſary and vital parts of Animals themſelves, and what relates to the ſeveral kinds and the Preſervation of them: For the *Egyptians* argued from their Mice to all other Animals. The moſt neceſſary and vital parts of *Animals*, are ſuch as the *courſe of the Blood* and *Reſpiration* depend upon, without which it is impoſſible for them *to live*. The *Courſe of the Blood* ſuppoſes *the Heart*, as the great Machine in the Body; and the ſeveral Arteries are as ſo many veſſels to convey the Blood into the ſeveral parts. But here is ſo much wiſdom and contrivance in this, that unleſs the Heart had been fram'd in ſuch a manner, and the Blood put into ſuch a Motion as it is, the preſervation of Life had been impoſſible. And Life it ſelf is ſomething beyond the mere Coalition of the Particles of Matter: For if that were ſufficient, then there muſt be Life in all parts of Matter united together; (but neither Stones nor Plants are *Animals*) and they become *Animals* by that which makes the difference between them and inanimated things; which are the conſtant courſe of the Blood, and the diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the ſeveral parts of the Body in order to their ſupport; and when theſe are at an end, the Life of an Animal is gone. Now in order to this courſe of the Blood, the Heart hath its peculiar and wonderful frame and motion; for therein is the chief ſeat of that which is called *the Flame of Life*; which is nothing elſe but that briſk and vigorous motion of the Blood, which actuates and enlivens the whole Body. But both the natural heat and motion of the Blood are unaccountable in the Mechanical way. To ſay the natural heat is caus'd by Fermentation, can give no manner of ſatisfaction; for from whence comes this fermentation, but from heat? And ſo heat muſt be ſuppos'd in order to the producing heat; and there can be no end in ſuch kind of Suppoſitions. And if the particles did of themſelves give it, then it muſt be diſcern'd as much at firſt as afterwards; but the contrary is obſerv'd in Animals: For the Blood is more fixed at firſt, and its heat riſes by degrees, as the parts are forming. If it be ſaid, *There is a Spiritus Genitalis which cauſes all that heat and motion*; I aſk, Whence that ariſes? Not from mere matter and motion. But it muſt be ſomething of a higher nature, and from a ſuperior cauſe. But if Heat and Mud can produce Animals, there is no need of any ſuch *Spiritus Genitalis* in Nature, but all muſt ariſe from mere motion, and the continuation of Animals might as well have been without any diſtinction of ſexes. But how came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a diſtinction, with parts ſutable to ſuch a deſign? How come the Inſtincts of Nature in *Animals* to be ſo violent to ſuch an end; when if there be nothing but *Matter*, there can be no ſuch end deſign'd? How come ſome *Animals* (as *Mules*) not capable of propagating their kind, when upon

Unde autem aliter calor hic perennis enaſcatur, haud facilè dixerim, ſiquidem ad fermentationis operam recurrere inane auxilium eſt, quoniam ipſamet ſine calore nihil egerit. *Ent. Apologia*, p. 204.

upon Anatomical ſearches no kind of defect hath been found in them as ſome imagined? How come the *Species* of *Animals* to be ſo determined and limited, that in the revolution of ſo many Ages no new *Species* have appeared, altho' they are ſo different in ſome Countries from others? How comes the number of ſome *Animals* ſo very much to exceed others? i. e. How come the *Beaſts of Prey* to fall ſo much ſhort of the moſt tractable and *uſeful Animals* to Mankind, as *Sheep* and *Oxen*? And thoſe are obſerved to be moſt fruitful, which afford the beſt Food for them. Can we ſuppoſe *the heat of the Sun and ſlime of the Earth* ſhould regard ſo much the benefit of Mankind? How comes the difference of *Animals* as to the manner of their production? i. e. How come ſome to hatch their young ones within their own Bodies, and others to bring forth eggs, and ſo to bring them to maturity by incubation? And how comes this difference to have always continu'd without alteration? Whence comes that difference in Animals, that ſome do *Ruminate*, and others do not? Did mud quickened by the Sun deſign to ſupply the want of teeth for *Maſtication* by thoſe ſeveral ventricles, and the muſcles belonging to them? How come ſome Animals to have their ſenſes more exquiſite than others, according to the nature of their food; as ſight in ſome, and ſmelling in others? How come Birds and Fiſhes ſo very much to exceed Mankind in the frame of thoſe nerves, which ſerve for ſmelling? Whence comes that wonderful ſagacity in ſome Animals to purſue others meerly from the ſcent left upon the ground at ſome diſtance of time, and to diſtinguiſh it from all others of the ſame kind? Whence comes that wonderful care and tenderneſs of their young ones in the moſt cruel and fierceſt Animals? If heat and mud could produce the Beaſts themſelves, yet what influence could they have upon their Brood? How comes the change of the paſſage between the lungs and the heart, when a young Animal is come into the open Air, from what it had in the Womb? What particles of matter cloſe up the *Foramen Ovale*, and direct the paſſage of the Blood another way? What makes the milk to come into the proper Veſſels of the breeding Animal juſt at ſuch a time, and to decay when there is no farther Occaſion for it? Whence came the wonderful contrivance of Birds in making their neſts; and feeding and preſerving their young? What particles of Matter diſpos'd them to find out their proper food and Phyſick? How come the ſeaſons of bringing forth to be ſo ſetled, that there is a ſufficient proviſion to ſupport the young Animals when they come into the World, by the Milk ready prepar'd for them, and ſuch conveniences for the young to ſuck it? How come they to run ſo naturally to their dams without any director, and to avoid ſuch as would deſtroy them? What had the particles of Matter to do in all this? If we go to *Inſects*; How came the Silk-worms to hatch their eggs when the Mulberry-trees are ready for their food? The Bees to come forth in *May*, when there is moſt plenty of dew? The Waſps near Autumn, when the fruit is grown ripe to ſupport them? How come the ſeveral Inſects by that ſagacity to find out the moſt proper places to lay their eggs in? It being obſerv'd of them, by thoſe who have moſt curiouſly inquir'd about theſe matters, *That all the ſeveral ſorts of Inſects lay their eggs in places moſt ſafe and agreeable to them, where they are ſeldom loſt or miſcarry, and where they have a ſupply of nouriſhment for their young, ſo ſoon as they are hatched and need it.*

Cicer. de N. Deor. l. 2.

Neque alia parte ingenia avium magis admiranda ſunt. *Plin. N. H. l. 10. c. 33.*

Mr. Ray *of the Creation, p. 115.*

But there are ſome things yet further to be conſider'd in the neceſſary vital parts of Animals, which ſhew that they could not be the reſult of a fortuitous motion of Matter. The main vitals of Animals are the ſame; and where there is any obſervable difference, theſe two things are remarkable: 1. That they are alike in the ſame kind. 2. That it is for the greater conveniency of thoſe kinds. As the poſition of the heart is higher in Mankind, than in creatures that put their heads down to eat; becauſe if the Heart of Mankind were in the center of the Body, and not in the upper part, there could not be ſo eaſy a paſſage of the Blood from the heart to the head, which is ſo neceſſary for the ſupport of life; but in thoſe creatures which hold their heads downwards, altho' the paſſage may be longer in ſuch which have long necks, yet no inconvenience comes by it, becauſe of the eaſineſs of the deſcent in holding down their heads. But how comes a fortuitous production of Animals to cauſe ſuch an agreement in the ſeveral parts of living Creatures? That all have the ſame vitals, *Inſects* excepted (in which the heart is the whole Body) none wanting the heart with its arteries carrying out the Blood, and the veins returning it; nor the lungs for reſpiration, nor the brain for ſenſe and motion (to name no more;) How comes a blind motion of Matter to hit ſo exactly on all theſe, and to put them into ſuch a convenient ſituation for the preſervation of Life? How comes the heart to be endued with ſuch ſtrong fibres, unleſs it were intended not merely to receive the Blood in its paſſage, but to diſperſe it again by its contraction of it ſelf? How come the coats of the arteries about the Heart to be ſo much ſtronger than in the outward parts, but that there is the greateſt neceſſity of their being ſo, to receive the Blood in its firſt heat and quickeſt motion? How come the veins to be ſo diſpers'd in all parts of the Body, but to receive the Blood in its return; and ſo to keep up the life and warmth of all parts? What motion of Matter could frame the *Valves* in the *Veins*, ſo as to give free paſſage of the Blood towards the heart, but oppoſe the paſſage of the Venal-blood the other way? (which gave the firſt occaſion to the diſcovery of the Circulation of the Blood, as Mr. *Boyle* tells us from Dr. *Harvey* himſelf.) What is it which keeps the Blood in its conſtant courſe for ſo many years, as ſome Animals live to? And what makes the very different periods of their lives, when we can ſee no reaſon from their mechanical frame, why one ſhould in an ordinary courſe ſurvive another, for ſo great a compaſs of years? What is there in the texture and coalition of the parts of a Stag, to make it outlive an Ox or a Horſe ſo many years; when *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *They ſeem to be leſs made for long life than other Animals, as far as he could judge by their bearing and growth:* but *Pliny* ſo long after him ſaith, *Vita Cervis in confeſſo longa eſt; it was a thing taken for granted that they lived long.* But I meddle not with any improbable Stories about it; for my argument depends not upon any thing but what all grant to be true, *viz.* That there is a great diverſity in the Lives of *Animals*; of which I ſay no account can be given from mere Matter and Motion.

Tota Cor ſunt. *Harv.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 157.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. *c.* 29.
Plin. N. H. l. 8. *c.* 32.

III. There is no probability of any kind of *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, which the *Egyptians* and *Diodorus Siculus* make their foundation. *After the inundation of the* Nile, *a ſudden heat of the Sun falling on the ſlime, cauſes a putrefaction, and from thence an innumerable company of Mice came.* But *Theophraſtus*, a very great Philoſopher, in a

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 8.

Fragment preſerv'd in *Photius*, ſaith, *That the great number of Mice is to be found in dry Soils, and not in moiſt; for Water is a great Enemy to them, and they are certainly deſtroy'd by it.* How comes *Theophraſtus* to differ ſo much herein from *Diodorus Siculus* and the *Egyptians*? Or muſt we ſuppoſe that the Water of *Nile* was quite of a different nature from all other Waters to them? *Proventus eorum in ſiccitatibus*, ſaith *Pliny*; where he ſpeaks of the great Increaſe of them. How then came they to multiply in ſuch moiſt places, where the *Nile* hath overflow'd? *Rain-water kills them*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*; how then comes the *Nile* to produce them? If it be ſaid, *that* Ariſtotle *ſpeaks of great Showers which drown them*; it is eaſily anſwer'd, That at their going off, upon theſe Principles, they produce more, and ſo the greateſt numbers would be after great Rains. But what *Theophraſtus* ſaith before of *ſmall Frogs* will hold of theſe *Mice* too; *they do not come from the Water, but that diſcovers them, and brings them out of the places where they were before.* And *Pliny*'s words are remarkable, when he ſpeaks of this matter, *Detegente eo* (Nilo) *muſculi reperiuntur*, &c. And ſo the late Editor confeſſes it was in the beſt MSS. So that the going off of the *Nile* is that only which brings them to light. And before, *Pliny* ſaith, the *Gyrini* (the Name given to theſe ſmall Frogs) do come from other Frogs, and not from *Putrefaction*: *Pariunt minimas carnes nigras, quas Gyrinos vocant, oculis tantum & cauda inſignes; mox pedes figurantur*, &c. Theſe are called *Tadpoles*, and ſeem imperfect at firſt, but by degrees do come to all their Parts. But as to *Animals* ariſing from *Putrefaction*, learned and inquiſitive Perſons of our Age have taken great pains to diſcover the truth of it in ſeveral Countries, but with no ſucceſs. In *Italy*, *Franc. Redi* undertook the Diſcovery of this matter with incredible diligence, and great variety of Experiments; but after all, could not find *that any putrified Fleſh would produce Animals*, much leſs putrified Water or Slime; *but that leſſer Animals hide themſelves under Dirt and Slime, and therefore have been ſuſpected to have come out of it; and if thoſe who firſt broached this Opinion had examined this matter more ſtrictly, they would have found them only covered over, or at leaſt ſome part of them, with that Earth which they thought had brought them forth.* And *for the little Frogs*, he ſaith, *that they are ſo much of the colour of the Earth, that they might eaſily be miſtaken for parts of it; but upon opening of them, their Stomachs and Inteſtines are full of Food and Excrements.* Which is a plain demonſtration againſt their original from the Earth; and he concludes it a thing *impoſſible for any ſuch Creatures that are part Mud and part Animals, to be produced by the inundation of the* Nile. There is a remarkable Paſſage in *Olaus Wormius* concerning the *Norway* Mice, which ſeem to come out of the Clouds; *that aſſoon as they are fallen, they have found green Herbs in their Bowels*; (and I do not think any Graſs grows in the Clouds:) But he thinks *Scaliger*'s Opinion not improbable, *that they come from putrefied Water in the Clouds*; and he ſaith, *The Seamen have found them fallen into their Veſſels, and that the Clouds ſtink and hinder their breathing*; but at laſt he thinks *they may be only carried by ſome violent Storms from the Mountains and Iſlands where they breed in great abundance.* And *Etmullerus*, a *German* Phyſician, concludes all *Æquivocal Generation to be impoſſible.* Some of our own moſt diligent Inquirers, after all their Searches, declare that they can find no ſuch thing as a *Spontaneous Generation of Animals*; and I remember I have formerly read a Diſcourſe in MS. of Mr. *Boyle*'s to that purpoſe. Our ingenious and learned Mr. *Ray* poſitively

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 278.

Plin. N. H. l. 10. c. 65.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 6. c. 29.

Plin. N. H. l. 9. c. 58.

Cap. 51.

Fr. Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 195, &c.

P. 208.

P. 209.

Muſeum Wormian. l. 3. c. 23. p. 326.

Exercit. 192. 3.

Etmuller. Inſtit. Med. c. 23.

Liſter in Goedart de Inſect. p. 47.

Ray of the Creation, part. 2. p. 71.

tively affirms, *That there is no ſuch thing in nature, as Æquivocal* or *Spontaneous Generation, but that all Animals, as well ſmall as great, are generated by animal Parents of the ſame ſpecies with themſelves.* And becauſe ſome were offended at it, he goes about to juſtify his Aſſertion, not only *from Reaſon*, but from the *Authority* of *Malpighius*, as well as *Redi*, *Swammerdam*, and *Lewenhoek*, and many others, who have examin'd this matter *carefully and circumſpectly*; *and therefore their Authority ſways more with him than the concurrent ſuffrages of a thouſand others*, as he ſaith.

Microgra. p. 189.

Piſo Hiſt. Nat. Braſil. l. 4. c. 2.

Microgra. c. 43.

Redi p. 19.

Ent. Apol. c. 17. p. 379.

P. 245.

But there are ſome things not yet ſufficiently clear'd as to this matter, eſpecially as to Animals breeding in Human Bodies, of particular Times, and in ſome Diſeaſes: but as to Plants and ſome Inſects about them, in which *Redi* himſelf gives up the cauſe, *Malpighius* contradicts him, and ſo do *Swammerdam* and others; particularly Mr. *Hook* ſaith, *He obſerv'd little Eggs in the Protuberancies of Plants, which became Worms with Legs, which eat through the Womb which incloſ'd them: And in all Galls*, he ſaith, *there be either holes where the Worm hath eat out its paſſage, or a place where it had been.* All which he attributes to the particular deſign of Providence, in taking care for the conveniencies of the meaneſt Animals. But there ſeems to be more difficulty in the *Apiarium marinum* mention'd by *Piſo*; for it is hard to underſtand how *thoſe blue Worms* came to the bottom of the Sea, *which coming up with a ſpungy ſort of ſhrub growing upon the Rocks, and being expoſ'd to the heat, turn'd to little Animals like Bees.* But this matter is not deliver'd diſtinctly enough to form any Argument upon, as Mr. *Hook* hath well obſerv'd. I ſee no difficulty in the *Ephemeron* or *Hemerobion*, as it is deſcrib'd by the Authors at the end of *Goedart*, who give the beſt account of it; for it ſeems to be of the nature of other Inſects: and the only difficulty is, why ſo much pains for ſo ſhort a life? for it is produc'd by ſuch Changes as other Inſects are. But it cannot be deny'd, that there have been among us two very learned Men, who have aſſerted a kind of Spontaneous Generation of Animals; I mean Dr. *Harvey* and his *Apologiſt*. For Dr. *Harvey*, *Redi* obſerves, *That altho' he aſſerts every Animal to come of an Egg proper to its kind, yet he was of opinion that theſe Eggs are not always contain'd in the Bodies of Animals, but are diſpers'd up and down by the Air, and after become Animals in an equivocal manner:* but he ſaith, *he hath not clear'd the grounds of his Opinion*, ſave only *that it comes from the Omnipotent Hand of God.* So that Dr. *Harvey* held a true Spontaneous Generation from mere Matter and Motion to have been impoſſible, as appears by what is ſaid of him before. And ſo his *Apologiſt* ſuppoſes *a ſaline Spirit to be diſpers'd in Nature, which meeting with proper Matter and a moderate Heat, may produce Inſects, and ſuch kind of Animals:* but he was very far from thinking this could be done without a Power far above Matter and Motion, which at firſt order'd the World, and all things in it. But he thinks *ſuch Inſects come nearer to the nature of Plants than Animals, and live chiefly by the Heat of the Sun; and therefore in the Winter they are torpid and without Motion, and are reviv'd at Spring when the Heat increaſes.*

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 1.

IV. Suppoſing it to be granted that there were ſuch an Æquivocal Generation of Mice and Frogs on the Bank of the *Nile*, how doth it from thence follow that Mankind had the ſame kind of Original? It is a ſaying of *Pliny*, which hath been carry'd too far, *Quam Natura rerum nuſquam magis quam in minimis tota ſit*; where he compares Inſects with the greater Animals, and ſeems to admire the Workmanſhip of one far beyond the other: His words are, *Nuſquam alibi ſpectatiore naturæ rerum Artificio.* And ſo he falls into admiration of the perfections of ſome Inſects, as to the quickneſs of Senſe and Motion, and of others as to their peculiar Properties. I think *Ariſtotle* was very much in the right when he held, *they were to be blam'd who deſpiſed the leaſt things in Nature; for in all of them* ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστὸν, *there is ſomething which deſerves admiration:* And particularly in *Inſects*, the Contexture of their Parts, the manner of their Transformations, the difference of their Kinds, the variety of their Food, and their time of taking it, have ſomething in them, which cannot be accounted for by mere Matter and Motion: But yet there is a great difference in the inward make of theſe Creatures from more perfect Animals. For *Redi* affirms, that *Steno* and he opening ſome Inſects together, they could find no other inward Parts, *but one long Channel thro' the whole Body, about which there were Filaments in a confus'd ſeries, which they thought might be inſtead of Veins and Arteries.* When all their inward Parts were taken out, and the Head taken off, *they ſtill lived and moved as other Inſects do, and laid their Eggs.* By which we ſee what a vaſt difference there is between the principles of Life in Mankind from thoſe in theſe admirable Inſects. *Jul. Scaliger* extremely deſpiſes *Cardan*'s way of reaſoning, *Mus è putredine poteſt naſci, ergo & homo poteſt:* and ſaith, *That the Woman in* Eſop's *Fables, who was aſked by her Huſband how the Child came without him, and ſhe anſwered, Out of the Snow; might have made a better anſwer from* Cardan's *Philoſophy*, viz. *out of the Mud.* And it is wittily ſaid by *Scaliger* of him in another place, *They who ſtick in the dirt, while they lift up one Foot to get out, ſet the other faſter, and therefore it is beſt to keep out of it altogether.* But *Cardan* ſeem'd to be ſo little concern'd to get out of it, that he aſſerts *that every Putrefaction produces ſome Animal or other; and that all Animals come out of it:* which, ſaith *Scaliger*, *is a wicked and profane Speech.* And yet *Andr. Cæſalpinus* undertakes to defend *Cardan*, chiefly from the Generation of Inſects; without regarding the difference between them and more perfect Animals, if his ſuppoſiton had been true. *Ariſtotle*, who had all poſſible advantages for writing his *Books of Animals*, by the bounty of *Philip* or *Alexander*, or both, coming to ſpeak of ſuch *as had no Blood*, (among which are all Inſects) he ſaith, *They have no Veins, nor Bladder, nor Reſpiration; but ſomething that ſerves inſtead of a Heart, without which they could have no Life; but they have the Parts which ſerve for Nutrition:* and therefore their Life differs little, according to *Pliny* himſelf, from that of *Plants* and *Fruits*; but he would have them *ſpirare ſine Viſceribus*, breathe without Lungs; and he grants they have neither them, *nor Heart, nor Liver.* And altho' there be ſome higher degree of Life in ſuch *Animals* as *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaks of, yet thoſe fall ſo far ſhort of Mankind, that it is a wonder Men of ſenſe could imagin the Production of one could be an Argument for the other. For, if we go no farther than *Nutrition*, *Mice* and *Frogs* are eaſily provided for; but how ſhould Mankind live that were produc'd out of Slime and Mud? But nothing can be more abſurd and ridiculous than the accounts given of the ſeveral ways of producing Mankind by a Spontaneous Generation, as will appear by a particular examination of them.

Ariſt. de par. Anim. l. 1. *c.* 1.

Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 218. Nihil intus, niſi admodum paucis Inteſtinum implicatum. *Plin. l.* 11. *c.* 4.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 4. *c.* 6.

Scaliger. Exercit. 193.

Exercit. 180. 2.

Exercit. 190, 193.

Andr. Cæſalpin. Qu. Peripat. l. 5. *c.* 1.

De partib. Anim. l. 4. *c.* 5.

Franc. Redi hath reckon'd up the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* to our hands: The firſt is, that of *Democritus*, *That Mankind came into the World like*

Redi de Gen. Inſect. p. 14.

Worms, which by degrees grew up to the figure and ſhape of Men. I wiſh we had more of *Democritus* his own Writings left, that we might better judg what his true Opinion was; but by what remains it doth not appear that herein he differ'd from *Epicurus.* It's certain he did, as to the firſt Principles of all things being made of Atoms; but whether he did, as to the immediate Production of Animals, is not ſo clear. For they did not imagin that Animals were form'd immediately by Atoms, which was too general and indefinite a Principle; but that the Atoms firſt came together in one form, and then another, till they came to the perfection of Animals. And ſo 'tis ſaid, that *Democritus* held Mankind to have appear'd firſt in the faſhion of Worms. *Petronius Arbiter* ſaith, that *Democritus* ſpent his days in making Experiments, *Ætatem inter Experimenta conſumpſit*; and *Columella* particularly takes notice of his Experiments *about Inſects*; and it is not improbable that from his Obſervations about their Transformations he might form his *Hypotheſis* about Mankind. His original Notion was, as appears by *Plutarch, That there were infinite Atoms diſpers'd in a void ſpace, which had no kind of Qualities inherent in them; but as they caſually hit upon each other, they produc'd Water, and Fire, and Plants, and Men; which were nothing but a congeries of Atoms*; which, ſaith *Plutarch*, he calleth *Ideas.* And it appears by another place in him, that *Democritus* only held Bulk and Figure in his Atoms; but *Epicurus* added *Gravity,* without which he found *his Atoms could not move.* And altho' *Epicurus* deriv'd the main of his Principles from *Democritus*; yet it is plain by *Plutarch*, that his Followers ſet themſelves to leſſen the credit of *Democritus*, as one that overthrew the certainty of our Senſes, and reſolv'd all into Reaſon. To which purpoſe there are ſeveral Paſſages, in *Sextus Empiricus*, of *Democritus* himſelf. Wherein he affirms, *That the things we call Qualities, are only Names impos'd upon Opinions* (which he calls Law) *and ſo Bitter and Sweet, and Hot and Cold, are only Fancies and no Realities; and that there is nothing real but what is not ſeen but only apprehended by the Mind*, as *Atoms and Vacuity*; and in ſeveral other places, that there is no *Certain Knowledg*, but *only Opinion by our Senſes.* And he quotes *Democritus* his own words to prove, *that the Knowledg we have by our Senſes is dark and obſcure, but that which is genuine depends only upon Reaſon.* The *Epicureans*, who follow'd their Maſter, as to the certainty of Senſe, could by no means brook this Doctrine of *Democritus*, who ſaw far beyond *Epicurus*, and knew what Blunders he muſt fall into by the judgment of Senſe, as about the bigneſs of the Sun, which he poſitively ſaid, was *no greater than appear'd to our Senſes*, i. e. *two Foot over*, ſaith *Cicero*, or *a little more or leſs*; which was ſo notorious a Blunder, that *Democritus*, he ſaith, *could not fall into, being ſkill'd in Geometry; but* Epicurus *not only deſpis'd it, but perſuaded* Polyænus *it was falſe.* And his late great Defender hath little to ſay for him, but that *Socrates* underſtood as little *Geometry* as he; but *Socrates* was far enough from aſſerting ſuch ſtupid *Paradoxes*, and making *Geometry* nothing but a piece of *Sophiſtry*, as *Epicurus* did, and made a Mathematician think ſo too. Which ſhew'd his Authority ſway'd more than his Reaſon. But the *Epicurean* in *Plutarch* rejects *Democritus* his Doctrine, for that which *Plutarch* ſaith, *doth as well follow from that of* Epicurus; for if there be nothing but Atoms, then Qualities are only Appearances; and when we judg by our Senſes, we cannot judg truly of things, but of what they appear to us. But if nothing, ſaith he, can be produc'd out of nothing, and no Generation

Columel. l. 11. *ult.*

Plutarch. adv. Col.

De Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. *c.* 3.

Sext. Emp. p. 163.

P. 164.

Cicero de Fin. l. 1. *c.* 6.

Acad. Qu. l. 4. *c.* 33.

can be of that which already is; how can indiviſible Atoms, which cannot be chang'd, produce Plants or Animals? Either therefore *Democritus* ſhould not have aſſerted ſuch immutable Principles, or he ſhould not have overlook'd the Conſequence, *i. e.* that there can be no Generation. But *Epicurus* impudently holds the ſame Principles, and yet would deny the Conſequence, and aſſert true Generation; juſt as he deny'd Providence, and yet aſſerted Piety; held Friendſhip to be only for Pleaſure, and yet that a Man muſt undergo any hardſhip for his Friends; made an Infinite Space, and yet placed an upper and lower Region in it. But he declares he can by no means underſtand, how Bodies indu'd with Qualities, ſhould be produc'd by Atoms that have none. There can be no Generation without Heat; how comes there to be Heat, when the Atoms themſelves have no Heat in them, nor become hot when they are join'd together? for if they are capable of Heat, then they are not impaſſible, nor without Qualities. So that according to the general Principles of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, there can be no ſuch thing as a Generation of Animals.

But Democritus *obſerv'd ſtrange alterations in the Bodies of Inſects from Worms to flying Animals; and why might not Mankind have come into the World after the ſame manner?* If this were his Opinion, it is one of the wildeſt and moſt extravagant Opinions that could have enter'd into the head of ſuch a Man, and would make one think that the People of *Abdera* were not out in their judgment of him, if thoſe *Epiſtles* about him were genuine between *Hippocrates* and them.

There are wonderful alterations in the Bodies of *Inſects*, as appear beyond all contradiction by the many Experiments of thoſe who have apply'd themſelves for many years to obſerve them. But what then? Do not all theſe *Inſects* come out of Eggs, which have been laid by other *Inſects* before them? and therefore Mankind could not be *Worms* firſt, but there muſt have been Eggs before. And how ſhould theſe Eggs be transform'd into the Worms? What force was there in Nature to make ſo ſtrange a Transformation as is continually obſerv'd in them? And the very ſame Perſons, who have obſerv'd their *Transformations*, have as well obſerv'd the incredible number of Eggs that are laid by them, and the great and ſudden increaſe of them from thoſe Eggs. Even in the *Ephemeron*, which was ſo great a rarity taken notice of by *Ariſtotle* upon the River *Hypanon*, (but is ſo frequent upon ſome Rivers in *France* and the *Low Countries*, as is obſerv'd by *Scaliger*, *Auger. Clutius*, and others) it is agreed, *That they come out of ſuch a Transformation as other Inſects do, with four Wings and ſix Feet, and are very careful where they lay their Eggs, to keep them from the Water, in which they die, after they have ſpent their ſhort life in flying in great numbers together, at Sun-ſetting*; ſaith one from his own Obſervation. *Scaliger* ſaith, thoſe he obſerv'd *began to live at night, and dy'd by morning.*

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 5. c. 19.
Scaliger. Exercit. 194. 5.
Aug. Clut. de Hemerobio.
Joh. de Mey Append. ad Goedart.
Swammerdam Anatom. de Ephem. apud Thevenot. Amer. Sept.

But there are ſome things which deſerve a particular obſervation about Inſects, which plainly ſhew that they were not form'd by a caſual Coalition of Atoms, but by a wiſe Providence. As, that thoſe that have Wings have them ſtronger or weaker, more or leſs, according to their buſineſs and occaſion for uſing them; thoſe that have Feet, have an equal number on both ſides, altho' the numbers differ ſo much according to their kinds; thoſe which have neither Wings nor Feet, have Repoſitories made for them with proper Food in the Leaves of Trees or Plants. Concerning which there are ſeveral things very obſervable. (1.) Their great niceneſs as to their Food. *Goedart*, who made it his buſineſs to obſerve them 40 years, (as *Ariſtomachus Solenſis* did *Bees* for 58 years, ſaith *Pliny*) found it very difficult ſometimes to find the proper Food for them; for they would eat no other, and expreſs'd their joy when they had it. Dr. *Liſter* adds, *That Inſects would rather die than eat any thing elſe, not from want of Organs, but from a natural accuracy of Taſt.* And he ingeniouſly obſerves, that from hence may be found the beſt way of keeping Ships from Worms, by finding out that ſort of Wood which thoſe Worms will not touch. (2.) The different ſorts of Food in their different ſtates. While they are mere *Erucæ*, they eat a hard ſort of Food, as the Leaves of Plants; but when they come to have their Wings and to fly abroad, they live only on Honey and liquid things: which is very different from ſuch Animals as have Blood; for when they are *Embryo's* they live on Liquids, but as they grow up they like harder Food. (3.) That thoſe which feed on Leaves of Plants growing, will not touch them when they are taken off or decaying: which *Goedart* ſaith he obſerv'd both as to Garden-herbs and Graſs. (4.) That thoſe flying Inſects which have very ſhort Feet, take their Food out of Flowers by the help of their Tongues as they fly. (5.) That thoſe which are moſt afraid of Birds, eat only in the night, when they are moſt ſecure from them; which argued a wonderful care of their own Safety. There are many other Obſervations to be made uſe of concerning the manner of their Transformations, the change made by them in the very Bodies of theſe Inſects, and the different times of continuance under them, and the ways to ſecure themſelves from Injuries of the Weather in cold Seaſons: but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, which was to ſhew that *Democritus* made a very ill choice of Worms, as the inſtance of a fortuitous Production. But if they had been ſo, it was a very extravagant Fancy to think that Mankind ſhould undergo ſuch Transformations as Worms do, before they come to their perfection. For theſe Changes are evident to Senſe to all that obſerve no more than Silk-worms; but Mankind continue in one uniform ſtate, from an Embryo to a perfect Man, and while he is an Embryo hath one ſort of nouriſhment from the Mother, which is wholly different from what all ſorts of Worms do live upon; and the parts of Mankind are extremely remote from the ſhape, number and uſe of all ſorts of Worms. Inſomuch that *Democritus* might much better have fanſy'd, that Mankind were at firſt a ſort of Trees ſet with their Roots upwards: for the Head to Man is what the Root is to the Tree; and Trees come from an Embryo in the Seed, and are preſerv'd in the Womb of the Earth, and are fed with a Dew from above, and have Paſſages like *Lymphæducts* in their ſeveral parts; only they happen to want the Inſtruments of Senſe and Motion, which are needleſs to them, ſince their Food is brought home to them, and they grow up in the ſame uniform manner without Transformations, as Mankind do.

Plin. N. H. l. 11. c. 9.
Goedart de Inſectis. N. 5. Ed. Liſter. p. 13. 33.
N. 14.
N. 14.
N. 15.

The next *Hypotheſis* was that of *Anaximander*; and he makes them *to be bred up as Embryo's in the Bowels of other Creatures.* Of which *Plutarch* gives the fulleſt account: In one place he only ſaith, *That the firſt Animals were produc'd in moiſture, cover'd over with a certain Bark,* like the rind of a Cheſnut, ſaith *Redi*; *and when it grew dry it crackt, and the Animals ſtarted out, but liv'd not long.* Was not this a hopeful Beginning in the early days of Philoſophy? For *Anaximander* ſucceeded *Thales*, who was the firſt Philoſopher of *Greece*, and a much wiſer Man than his Scholar, as will afterwards appear. But we muſt now purſue

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 5. c. 19.

Anaximander: and *Plutarch* in another place tells us, *That he was of opinion that Mankind were firſt bred in the Bellies of Fiſhes; and when they were ſtrong enough to help themſelves, they very fairly caſt them upon dry ground and left them to ſhift for themſelves.* Is not this a very good philoſophical account of this matter? And he was in the right, when upon this ground *he diſſuaded Men from eating of Fiſh,* leſt they ſhould be like *Cannibals.* It is a known ſaying, *That there is nothing ſo abſurd, but it was ſaid by one Philoſopher or other.* I think *Anaximander* may put in for the firſt, who broach'd his own dreams and idle fancies under the name of Philoſophy. And yet *Empedocles* in this matter, rather outwent him. For he ſaith, *Animals were not intire at firſt; but came into the world by pieces;* and ſo arms and legs, and all other parts happening to joyn together, made up one perfect Animal. *Hæc non ſunt Philoſophorum judicia, ſed delirantium ſomnia,* may be much better apply'd here, than it is by the *Epicurean* in *Cicero* to their opinions of the Gods. But I rather think *Empedocles* his opinion is miſ-repreſented; ſince the Author of the Book *De Mundo* (which is very ancient, if not *Ariſtotle*'s) gives another account of him; and ſaith, *He deriv'd the forming of Animals from* GOD; and his *Verſes,* as they are in *Simplicius,* do not deny it; but only ſhew, *that all things except* GOD, *came from different principles.*

Plutarch. Sympoſ. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutarch. de Placit. l. 5. c. 19.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

But we are not deceiv'd in the third *Hypotheſis* of *Epicurus* and his followers; which as *Redi* repreſents it is, *That Mankind and other Animals were inclos'd in certain Coats and Membranes in the womb of the Earth, which being broken in due time, they were all expos'd naked, without any ſenſe of heat or cold, and ſucked the Earth for nouriſhment, but the Earth grew too old for ſuch births; and therefore was contented ever ſince to bring forth nothing but Inſects.* This is ſo well known to be the *Epicurean Hypotheſis* from *Lucretius, Cenſorinus,* &c. that there needs no farther proof of it. But whether it can be thought reaſonable, is the thing now to be conſider'd. And herein theſe two things are ſuppos'd: (1.) That there was a fit diſpoſition of the Earth to produce them; and a capacity in it to form Wombs and Bags to preſerve them till they were able to take nouriſhment; and that the Earth did afford a ſort of Milk to ſupport them. (2.) That the uſe of all the parts of human Bodies came only by chance, and were not form'd with any deſign. Both which are very unreaſonable ſuppoſitions.

(1.) How can they make it appear that there ever was any ſuch diſpoſition of the Heavens and Earth to produce Animals more than there is ſtill? When they were told *that if the Earth could at firſt produce Animals, why not ſtill?* Their anſwer was, *The Seaſons are changed, the Heavens were more benign, and the Earth more fruitful than they have been ſince.*

> *At novitas Mundi nec frigora dura ciebat,*
> *Nec nimios æſtus, nec magnis viribus auras;*
> *Omnia enim pariter creſcunt & robora ſumunt.*
>
> Lucret. l. 5.

And *Lactantius* ſets down their opinion more diſtinctly, *That certain motions of the Heavens are neceſſary to this production of Animals, as well as the freſhneſs of the Earth; and that then there was no Winter nor Summer, but a perpetual Spring.* But how came ſuch a *Proper Seaſon* for this purpoſe at that time; and never ſince? *Animals,* ſay they, *can never ſince propagate*

Lactant. l. 2. c. 12.

gate themſelves: But what is this to the *Seaſon?* Do the *Seaſons* alter, as there is occaſion? Then there is a Superior Mind to direct them. If there be a natural courſe of the Heavens, which caus'd the Earth to be then prolifical; that muſt return and put a new vigor into the Earth, and make it young again. And this our modern Atheiſtical Philoſophers in *Italy*, ſuch as *Cardan*, *Pomponatius* and others, ſaw very well; and therefore aſſerted *that upon certain Conjunctions of the Heavens, the ſame effects would follow.* So *Berigardus*; who ſaith, that *Cardan* and *Pomponatius* laid much weight on this Story in *Diodorus Siculus* about *Animals produc'd by the Nile*; and he adds another very ridiculous, as he pretends out of *Camerarius*, *of ſeveral parts of human Bodies, which are ſeen to appear every year riſing out of the Earth about* Grand Cairo: and he thinks *they were like the Egyptian Mice, part Earth and part Animals.* What will not ſuch Men be inclin'd to believe rather than the truth! As when he adds, *of the two Green Boys in* England, *which came out of a Wolf's den* 500 *years ſince; and the Blew and Red Men out of the Mountains of* Armenia. Which are ſuch incredible Fictions, that it is a wonder any one that pretends to common ſenſe could repeat them. But as to the Egyptian Story in *Camerarius*, it relates not at all to the firſt making of Bodies; but *to the Reſurrection from the dead.* *Camerarius* neither pretends to have ſeen it himſelf, nor that his Friend did; but that his Friend heard one that had been a great Traveller ſay, *That in a certain place not far from the Pyramids, at a certain time of the year, a great multitude met to ſee the Reſurrection of the Dead, as they call'd it; and then he ſaid ſome part of the Body ſeem'd to come out of the Earth, ſometimes the Head, ſometimes the Feet, and ſometime the greater part of the Body; which were afterwards hid under the Earth again.* And another Friend of his ſhew'd him an old *Itinerary* to the ſame purpoſe; *and that the place was two Miles from the* Nile, *in an old Burying place; and that it laſted three days, and then no more were ſeen that year.* But he added, That *they were not ſeen riſing up or walking*; and he ſaith, *That he ſaw it not himſelf.* But *Camerarius* himſelf cenſures it as a *ſuperſtitious folly.* *Martinus à Baumgarten*, ſaith, *That at* Cairo *it was believ'd in his time, that at a certain Moſque near the* Nile, *the Bodies of the dead do ariſe out of their Graves at the time of Prayers, and there ſtand, and diſappear when they are over*; which he calls a *Diabolical Illuſion.* But when our Ingenious Mr. *Sandys* was in *Egypt*, the ſtory was chang'd; for then it was affirm'd, *That not far from the* Nilus, *upon Good-Friday, the Arms and Legs of a Number of Men did appear ſtretch'd forth of the Earth, to the aſtoniſhment of the multitude.* Which he not improbably conjectures *to have been taken out of the Mummies not far off by the Watermen, (who gain very much by it) and plac'd conveniently in the Sand to be ſeen,* as they thought would raiſe the greateſt admiration. Since his time Monſ. *Thevenot*, who was upon the place ſaith, *That at* Grand Cairo *it is generally believ'd that on three days in Paſſion-week, ſome part of the dead Bodies lie out of the graves, and then return into the Earth. He had the curioſity to go and ſee, and there found ſome ſkulls and bones, which they ſay confidently came out of the Earth; but he looked on it as a contrivance of the Santons.* But if this prove any thing, it is not what *Berigardus* brings it for, that Mankind came firſt out of the Earth, but that there ſhall be a Reſurrection of the Dead: for he ſaith, *It was in a place where many dead Bodies did lie buried*; and not far from the *Mummies*; which was the moſt famous place for Burials in all *Egypt*: an account whereof is given

Berigard. Circul. 10. *p.* 636. *part.* 5.

Camerar. Operæ ſubciſ. Cent. 1. *c.* 73.

Martin. à Baumgart. Peregrin. l. 1. *c.* 18.

Sandys's *Travels, p.* 99.

Thevenot Voyage de Levant, part 2. *ch.* 12.

Bellon. l. 2. *c.* 47.
Pietr. della Valle Vol. 1. *Lett.* 11. §. 8.

given by *Bellonius*, *Peter della Valle*, *Buratine* in *Thevenot's Collection*, Prince *Radzivil* and ſeveral others: Prince *Radzivil* obſerv'd, *That there were vaſt numbers of ſkulls and bones ſcatter'd up and down, where the fleſh had been taken off, and ſold away for Mummy.* But beſides theſe *Mummies* (as they are call'd) there was continu'd a place of ſolemn Burial near to *Grand Cairo* by the *Turks*; ſo that there were always Bodies ready that were not proper *Mummies*, to make this annual ſhew with, to deceive the ſimple. But *Berigardus* is aware of the difficulty *of aſſigning the manner how Animals come out of the Earth*; and therefore he thinks it ſufficient to ſhew that the Earth can produce them one way or other, and afford them *Nouriſhment* when they are produc'd; this he thinks *abſolutely neceſſary*, and he ſuſpects that *Lucretius* his *Folliculi* will not do the buſineſs; *becauſe it is impoſſible for Children to ſubſiſt, if they did break the bags they were inclos'd in, which were faſtened to the Earth:* But if there were ſuch a *Milky Subſtance* in the Earth for new born Children to ſuck, is that all that is neceſſary for their ſupport, when they are ſo unable to help themſelves? Of all things one would not expect to find Milk in the breaſts of the Earth; and it muſt be ſome very happy Conjunction of the Planets to make the Earth to give ſuck. How much would thoſe who are friends to Religion have been deſpis'd and laugh'd at, if they had made ſuch abſurd and ridiculous *Hypotheſis* as theſe? If ſuch a thing did ariſe from natural and neceſſary Cauſes, it muſt continue; and ſince we are certain it hath never been ſince, we have no reaſon to think it ever was. If it were by chance; what hinders the ſame effect, unleſs Chance were ty'd up to one certain time? and by what Laws can Chance be bounded? If it were by particular deſign at that time for the ſupport of new born Animals, then there muſt be a Providence owned; and yet all this was invented on purpoſe to exclude Providence: which ſhews how weak and inconſiſtent this *Hypotheſis* is.

Thevenot Relat. part. 1. ad fin. Peregrin. Principis Radzivil, p. 187.

We account it a wonderful work of Providence, that at the ſame time the Child is form'd in the womb of its Mother, there ſhould be ſo ample and ſutable proviſion made for its nouriſhment in the Mother's breaſts againſt its coming into the World. Whether it be by turning the Blood into Milk, as was generally thought, or by a paſſage of the Chyle from the Ventricle thither, as ſome of late think; it cannot but be look'd on as a work of Deſign, to turn the nouriſhment another way on purpoſe to ſerve the neceſſities of the new born Child. But this is not all; but continual care and watchfulneſs of the Nurſe is neceſſary to preſerve it, otherways, as well as by feeding it. But theſe unadvis'd and fanciful makers of Mankind think they have done their buſineſs, if they can but imagin the Earth to afford ſome *Milky Subſtance*, to ſupport the poor helpleſs Infants to a little ſuck from the Earth: why did they not as eaſily find out all other conveniencies for them? But there is ſo much abſurdity in the whole Suppoſition, that *Berigardus* concludes, *That Mankind muſt come full grown out of the Earth, and able to ſhift for themſelves; or elſe that ſome other Animals muſt come out before them to afford Milk for them, as the Wolf did to* Romulus *and* Remus. Such miſerable ſhifts muſt thoſe run into, who will not allow a wiſe Providence to have brought Mankind into the World.

II. But how came Mankind, if they came into the World ſo by chance, to be ſo admirably provided in all parts of their Bodies of ſuch inſtruments of ſenſe and motion, that look as like a deſign as any thing can poſſibly do? The Bodies of Men are not like meer lumps of dirt and water put together, for there is not the leaſt part about them, but is made up of ſuch a *Wonderful Mechaniſm*, that there cannot be a diſcompoſure in it without a diſorder in the whole. But, ſuppoſe the fleſhly and bony parts could be made by the mixing and tempering ſeveral particles of Matter together; yet what can be imagin'd as to the *Muſcles* and *Nerves* and *Fibres*, which are ſo conveniently diſpers'd over the Body? The Heart it ſelf is found to be a very ſtrong Muſcle, conſiſting of abundance of Nerves, and all kind of Fibres complicated within each other, and a ſtrong Tendon at the Baſis of it; by virtue whereof it is able to contract it ſelf, and ſo makes the Blood to paſs into the Arteries, which convey it to all parts of the Body. Now let any one think with himſelf how it is poſſible for a meer Lump of Earth made in ſuch a form as the Heart is, to have ſuch a force and power to contract it ſelf to ſuch a degree as to ſend out ſo much Blood continually, and to receive it in again by the relaxation of it ſelf. How comes this Motion to begin in ſuch a piece of Clay made with a Baſis and a Cone? How came the inward cavities to be form'd, and kept ſo diſtinct from each other? For, if there were any ſtop of the paſſage, Life is at an end. How comes ſuch a Motion to continue ſo long and ſo uniform? Thoſe who have moſt narrowly ſearch'd into it, have found that no other account can be given of it, but that the Wiſe Creator that form'd the Heart, doth both give and continue its motion. And as to all the other Muſcles of the Body, if we conſider their number, their poſition, the contexture of their parts, and their continual uſefulneſs; we can never imagin that all theſe things could be the reſult of Heat and Mud, or a caſual conflux of the dull particles of Matter. Every Muſcle hath its proper Fibres laid upon one another, and its oppoſite Tendons, with an inward cavity, and the Artery, Veins and Nerves belonging to it, and a Membrane to cover all; and all parts capable of motion have ſeveral Muſcles peculiar to themſelves, for diſtinct uſes and different ſort of motions; as may be ſeen at large in all that treat of theſe matters. Who tell us generally that the Eyes have ſix, the Noſe four pair, the Cheeks two pair, the Lips four Muſcles, the nether Mandible five, the Ears ſix, the Tongue ſeven, &c. I need go no farther: and altho' there be ſome difference in the way of numbring them, yet they all agree, there are ſo many as are impoſſible to be made out by heat and mud, or any force of the Sun or Earth. And what is it which makes all theſe Muſcles ſo ſerviceable to Mankind, that upon the leaſt command they move the parts they ſerve in what manner we direct them? The Reaſon of *Muſcular Motion* is a thing as much out of our reach as that of the *Heart*: Some talk of *Elaſtick Spirits*; others of *the weight of the Blood*; others of *a nervous liquor diſtending the carnous Fibres*; others of *a Succus nutritius from the Nerves meeting with the Animal Spirits, and fermenting together, which being thruſt into the carnous Fibres, ſwells and dilates them ſo as to make them contract themſelves*; *from whence*, they ſay, *Local Motion proceeds.* But all theſe are but mere conjectures, and hardly anſwer to the moſt common appearances of Muſcular motion. And the Mechaniſm of our own Bodies, both as to Senſe and Motion, baffles all the attempts of the moſt ingenious and ſubtle Philoſophers; who may eaſier teach us the ways to talk about it, than to underſtand it. But there is one thing yet farther fit to be obſerv'd in this place concerning the Muſcles; which is the different Figure of them, according to the uſe they ſerve for; as

Lower *de Corde. p.* 85.

the Muſcle called *Deltoides* on the Shoulder, the Circular Muſcles, where their uſe is to open and ſhut; if ſuch things do not argue contrivance and deſign, it is not eaſy to imagin what doth. What can thoſe who follow *Diodorus Siculus* make of the whole *Syſtem of Nerves*, which are in the Body of Man? Did theſe come out of ſlime with *the heat of the Sun?* How came the different Riſe of the *Nerves*, ſome within and others without the Brain? What reaſon is there in the bulk, and figure, and texture of that ſame Subſtance, that it comes to be ſo divided, ſo as part of it to continue within the Brain, and the other to be continued down to the loweſt part of the Back, by ſeveral diſtinct *Vertebræ?* How came Matter of it ſelf to form ſuch a paſſage down from the Brain, and to ſecure it in ſuch a manner; and to compact the ſeveral parts together, ſo firmly as if they were but one bone, and yet ſo flexibly as to ſerve beſt for motion? What made the *Perforation* for the *Spinal Marrow* to paſs in the middle and on the ſides, for the ſeveral *Nerves* to go from thence to the ſeveral parts of the Body? Whence came that *Ligament*, which joyns the *Vertebræ* of the Back together, and covers the other Membranes of the *Spina Dorſi?* There is a wonderful curioſity obſerved by our greateſt *Anatomiſts*, in the order and placing of the *Nerves*, the *Arteries*, the *Veins* and the *hollow places* belonging to it: which they found by opening the *Vertebræ* in *Embryos*, and taking out the ſpinal Marrow, and injecting liquors into the ſeveral veſſels. And ſtill the farther any have gone in theſe ſearches, the more reaſon they have ſeen to admire the wiſdom of Providence: and ſo it hath been in other parts. *Ariſtotle* mentions a ſtrange ſaying of *Empedocles*, *That the reaſon why the Backbone appears as if it were made up of ſeveral pieces, was that it was at firſt broken, and then put together; and ever ſince it hath ſo continued.* But how came the *Vertebræ* then to be ſo well faſtened together, and to be ſo much more convenient for motion than an intire bone would have been? Beſides in an *Embryo* that which is properly the *Spina*, doth not then appear, as being inconvenient for its poſture in the womb; which ſhews both the intention of Nature, and the deſign of Providence. How came the *Vertebræ* to be in other Animals as well as Mankind? And even *Ariſtotle* himſelf was therein miſtaken, for he affirms, *That a Lion hath no* Vertebræ *in his Neck-bone, but that it is all one continued bone*: But *Borrichius* in his Anatomy of one, declares *that he found the ſeveral* Vertebræ *in the Neck plain and diſtinct.* And the ſame learned Perſon obſerves, *That in a Crocodile, which he diſſected, he found in four foot length of the Back ſixty* Vertebræ; *which were of a ſpongy nature, fit to receive nouriſhment*; and from *the different formation of ſome parts of them*, he concludes it moſt probable that they grow ſo much longer than other Animals. But *Ariſtotle*'s miſtakes, about *the Lion's having no* Vertebræ *in his Neck*, had been diſcover'd by *Scaliger*, and confirm'd by ſeveral Diſſections ſince: So that the *Vertebræ* are of the original deſign of Nature. But to proceed: What made the ſeveral paſſages out of the Skull, for the Nerves which ſerve for the ſeveral Senſes of *Smelling*, *Seeing*, *Hearing* and *Taſting?* How come the ſeveral branches of the *Par Vagum* to be ſo diſpers'd, and to make ſuch knots with the *Intercoſtal Nerves?* Theſe, and many more ſuch Queſtions might be aſked relating to the wonderful *Syſtem of Nerves*, but theſe are ſufficient to my purpoſe, to ſhew that theſe wonderful contrivances for Senſe and Motion, could not come from meer fortuitous and unthinking Cauſes. But let us look now upon the moſt obvious parts of the Body, which lie to the

Willis de Cerebro, c. 29.

Ariſt. de Partib. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Ariſt. Hiſt. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Hermet. Sapient. vindic. c. 10. p. 245. p. 272.

Exercit. 208.

view of all Men, the *Eye*, the *Ear*, the *Mouth*, and the *Hand*; one would think it hardly poſſible for any Men pretending to Reaſon, to think theſe to be the reſult of Chance. Let us well conſider the ſtructure of *the Eye*, and we may well think *Lucretius* had no lucid interval when he wrote,

Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer & iſtam
Effugere errorem, vitareque præmeditator,
Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Proſpicere ut poſſimus. Lucret. l. 4.

That we muſt have a great care to avoid the miſtake of thoſe that ſay, that Eyes were made for Seeing. For could any Man in his right Senſes think the Eye could be form'd for any other uſe but to ſee with? *But the uſe is after the thing is form'd.* What then? May it not be deſign'd for ſuch a uſe by him that form'd it? *But that which is form'd for a particular uſe, muſt be later than that for whoſe uſe it is form'd, as a Bed for a Man to ſleep on, a Cup to drink out of, Armour to defend himſelf; but a Man might ſleep, and drink, and defend himſelf, before thoſe things were found out.* What is the meaning of all this? No one is ſo ſenſleſs to queſtion, Whether Men be not before they find ſome conveniencies for their particular uſes; but the Queſtion here is, Whether when a thing is ſo form'd as to ſerve only for ſuch a uſe, it be not reaſonable to conclude that it was made on purpoſe for that uſe? But ſaith *Lucretius*,

Nil ideo quoniam natum'ſt in corpore ut uti
Poſſemus, ſed, quod natum'ſt id procreat uſum.

Nothing is made in the Body that we might uſe it, but when it is made we find out the uſe of it. As tho' it had been poſſible for Mankind to have found ſuch an uſe of the Eye, unleſs it had been purpoſely made for it, The Act of Seeing is no doubt ſubſequent to the making of the Eye; for we cannot ſee without Eyes; but if we could make no other uſe of Eyes; but to ſee with, is not this a plain evidence they were made for us to that end? This is not like a uſe we make of things which we alter the faſhion of for our conveniences. For, we do not make our own Eyes; they are very early form'd in the Body, and therefore were within the primary intention of Nature; and aſſoon as we come into the World, we do not deliberate whether we ſhould uſe Eyes or not, for we preſently ſee with them. And how can the Eye being made teach us the uſe of it, when we preſently make uſe of our Eyes without any previous deliberation? We may hinder the uſe of them, if we pleaſe, by blinding our ſelves, but we cannot turn them to any other uſe. If *Lucretius* in the extravagancy of his imagination, might fancy the uſe was arbitrary, then Men might have heard with their Eyes or have ſeen with their Ears, or have taſted with their Noſes, or ſmelt with their Tongues: But this I ſuppoſe none can think that he meant. What was it then? that Men could not uſe them till they were made? We grant it. But doth it follow thence that they were not made deſignedly for ſuch a uſe? How can we judge of that, but by examining the ſeveral parts? and if they were fitted for ſuch a uſe and no other, we have reaſon to conclude they were ſo intended. Now what could the *Muſcles* and *Tunicles*, and *ſeveral Humours* of the Eye be made for, but for Sight? How came that *Cavity* to be form'd in the Forehead in which the Eyes are plac'd? What motion of the particles of Matter made two ſuch hollow places in the Skull? How came one not to be ſufficient? How come the *Eye-lids* to be ſo plac'd? Could they be deſign'd for any other uſe? How come the *Glands* to be fix'd in the corners of the Eyes, and with the *Lymphatick Veſſels* belonging to them? Could they have ſerv'd for other uſes? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be continued to the three Tunicles of the Eyes? and that which partakes moſt of the ſubſtance of the Brain to be the chief organ of Sight, as fitteſt to tranſmit the images to the Brain? What was the *Chriſtallin Humour* deſign'd for, but to receive the impreſſions of outward objects? How comes the *Optick Nerve* to be ſo inſerted into the Eye, not directly behind, but on one ſide, but only for the more intire tranſmitting the Images receiv'd by the Eye? Can now any one think that the Eye could be ever made for any other uſe, but for ſight? And we do not therefore uſe it, becauſe we find it ready prepar'd? but it was therefore ſo prepar'd, that we might uſe it to ſuch a purpoſe. And as to his general ſaying, *That nothing in the Body is made for uſe, but that the uſe follows the making of it*; let us apply it to other Animals, and it will appear ridiculous. What could any Man anſwer ſeriouſly to one that ſhould ſay, that four-footed Animals had not Feet given them to go with; but that finding ſo many Feet, they did go with them? And ſo for the Wings of Birds, and the Fins of Fiſhes; and the particular ſhapes of ſome Animals for their particular uſe: As, the long Neck of the Swan, for going deeper in the water for his food; will any one ſay, that the Swan finding his Neck ſo long, us'd it for that purpoſe? Or that *Shell-fiſh* finding their hard Shells ready made as a defence againſt the Rocks, crept into them for that end? Whereas all the Muſcles they move by, are cover'd over with a hard bony Subſtance; and ſo they are the neceſſary parts belonging to them. What can be ſaid to the thick horny ſubſtance of an Eagle's Eye, which makes it bear the ſtrongeſt beams of the Sun; was this only us'd for that purpoſe, but not intended by Nature? Whence came that outward covering of the Eye, not only in Eagles but in other greater Birds, which they can draw over it as they pleaſe, and is ſo ſtrong a defence againſt light, that Anatomiſts tell us, by the help of it put to their open Eyes, they could look on the Sun without trouble, as *Borrichius* informs us? *Steno*, upon the obſervation of the wonderful Mechaniſm of the Eye both in Mankind, and Beaſts, and Birds, ſaith, *That if a Man firſt underſtands Mechanicks, and then curiouſly examins the fabrick of Animals, he muſt either put off his Reaſon, or he muſt admire the wiſdom and contrivance of Providence.* And he underſtood the frame of theſe things far beyond what either *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* did.

Borrich. Hermet. ſap. p. 259. *Act. Dan. l.* 2. *Obſ.* 127.

And ſo for the Ear *that was made*, ſaith *Lucretius*, *long before any Sound was heard.*

Multoque creatæ ſunt prius Aures,
Quam ſonus eſt auditus.

No doubt of it. For how ſhould we hear without Ears? But can any Man imagin they could be made for any other uſe but to hear with? How came they to be plac'd in the Head and not in any other part of the Body? Were there any form'd before with Ears in other parts, which did not do ſo well? In other caſes they ſay, *Nature was put to try divers Experiments, becauſe the imperfect Animals could not ſubſiſt*; But this cannot hold here: For Mankind might have lived without Ears in other places, but the Head is certainly the beſt for Sounds, being received and tranſmitted to the Brain. How comes the outward part of the Ear to be ſo framed as it is, but for the better gathering and more diſtinct conveyance of the Sounds, as appears by the confus'd noiſe which thoſe have who have loſt that part? What made the inward paſſage ſo winding, and ſuch an exquiſite Membrane at the end of it, and a Cord behind it, but for the advantage of the Sound? How come the three cavities behind, the firſt with little Bones of an extraordinary figure, whereof one triangular, the better to give paſſage to the Air; the ſecond called *the Labyrinth*, and the third with *Spiral Windings* and *an Internal Air*, and all particularly ſerving the purpoſe of Hearing, by the Sound paſſing from one to another? Whence came all theſe ſubtle and intricate paſſages, if our Bodies were made by chance? And yet, if any of them be not in their due order, our ſenſe of Hearing is prejudiced; which ſhews that this contrivance was neceſſary in order to it. And which is again obſervable, the greater diſcoveries have been made in theſe matters, the more reaſon we have to admire the contrivance of them. As in this ſenſe of Hearing, the lateſt diſcoveries about the ſmall bones of the firſt cavity, call'd *the Hammer*, *the Anvil*, and *the Stirrup*, and another in the joyning the two laſt, acquaint us with more than what the Ancients knew; ſince there are two things remarkable about them. 1. *That they do move each other*; the Drum moves the Hammer, the Hammer the Anvil, that the Stirrup, which opens the paſſage into the ſecond cavity. 2. *That theſe bones are as big in an Infant, as in grown Perſons.* Now how comes this to paſs in a way of *Mechaniſm?* How come theſe Bones not to increaſe as the other parts of the Body do; ſince the moſt ſolid of them, *the Hammer* and *Anvil*, as well as the *Stirrup*, have manifeſt Pores in them to receive nouriſhment? But not only theſe, but the other ſmall bones in the inner cavities, the *Semicircular paſſages* and the *Cochlea* only receive a greater *firmneſs* and *hardneſs* by Age. Theſe things I can only mention, and refer the Reader to Mr. *Du Verney* and others, who have treated moſt exactly of them.

The frame of the Mouth as it is, is neceſſary for *Reſpiration*, and *Nouriſhment*, and *Speech*. For *Reſpiration*, the Mouth opened affords a Paſſage to the Air, and there are inward Veſſels fitted to convey it to the Lungs, and without breathing it is impoſſible to live. But how came the two different Paſſages for the *Air* and *Food?* How came the *Valve* to ſecure the Paſſage to the Lungs from ſuch things which may prejudice it, and paſs the other way? As to *Nouriſhment*, the Mouth not only takes in the Food, but the Teeth are conveniently plac'd for the preparing it for its farther paſſage and alteration in the Stomach, in order to Nutrition; for which end there are Veſſels prepar'd with wonderful variety and contrivance. How come thoſe *Channels* into thoſe hard Bones in the Mouth, which we call *Teeth*, by which an Artery, a Vein and a Nerve ſpread themſelves in branches to each particular Tooth? How come the figures of them to vary according to their uſe, and to have ſtronger Roots where the work is harder? And becauſe *Speech* is one of the peculiar excellencies of Mankind, there is an Inſtrument fram'd on purpoſe for it in the Mouth (which ſerves for *Taſting* likewiſe) and without this, all the communication of Mankind with each other by words had been loſt. And I cannot ſee how mere Matter and Motion could help Mankind either to frame words, or to utter them to others without a *Tongue*; nor, how it could be fram'd by it.

The *Hand* is ſo provided with *Joints*, *Muſcles*, and *Tendons*, for the great variety of neceſſary uſes it ſerves Mankind for, that he that can think it could be ſo contriv'd by chance, doth thereby ſhew that ſome can think only by Chance without any Reaſon; and it is a vain thing to hope to convince them. I ſhall not need to inſiſt on the curioſity of the contrivance of all the Muſcles of the Hand; but it is impoſſible for any Man to give an account of the *Perforation* of thoſe Muſcles, which ſerve for the uſe of ſome of the Fingers and Toes, from mere Matter and Motion; or the Ligaments about the Tendons of thoſe Muſcles, for the greater eaſineſs of their motion. *Ariſtotle* hath a Diſcourſe about the great uſe of a Hand to Mankind: *Anaxagoras*, he ſaith, *ſaid that Man was the wiſeſt Animal, becauſe he alone had Hands*; but, ſaith he, *therefore Man had Hands, becauſe he was the wiſeſt, being beſt able to make uſe of ſuch an excellent Inſtrument. For that is the Wiſdom of Nature to do as a wiſe Man would do,* i. e. *to give the beſt Inſtruments to the beſt Workman. Now,* ſaith he, *the Hand is the moſt uſeful Inſtrument to him that is capable of making a good uſe of it.* And therefore he blames thoſe that ſaid, *Man was the worſt provided for of any Animals; for they have but one help afforded them by Nature, but the Hand is inſtead of all, for it can make uſe of all.* And for that reaſon he ſhews how very convenient the make and faſhion of the Hand is, and the diviſion of it into five parts, on which he inſiſts at large. So that *Ariſtotle* was fully ſatisfy'd that the production of Mankind was no caſual or ſpontaneous thing, but the effect of Wiſdom and Underſtanding.

Riolan. Anatom. l. 5. *c.* 28.

Ariſtot. de Part. Anim. l. 4. *c.* 10.

Theſe things I have here laid together at firſt, becauſe this *Hypotheſis* of *Diodorus Siculus* hath been thought by ſome in our Age to be *the natural ſenſe of Mankind without Revelation*; whereas in truth it is the foundation of Irreligion, and the reproach of Mankind; but not the ſenſe of the wiſeſt part of them. And to make out this more effectually, I ſhall now proceed to conſider and compare the ſenſe of the moſt *antient Philoſophers* on both ſides as to this point, whether the World was the effect of Chance, or of a wiſe Providence. For if the World were made by a wiſe and intelligent Being, it can never be ſuſpected that Religion is an Impoſture, or a contrivance of Politicians; for then it will appear to be built upon the trueſt Reaſon. And I ſhall the more carefully inquire into the Opinions of the eldeſt Philoſophers, becauſe they were neither *Prieſts* nor *Politicians*, having no Intereſt to carry on by the practice of Religion. And ſome of them were born in a very good condition, and quitted their Eſtates, or neglected other buſineſs, the more freely to attend on their philoſophical Inquiries. And therefore we have the more reaſon to ſearch into their Opinions, ſo far as relates to theſe matters.

It cannot be deny'd that after Men began to be inquiſitive into the philoſophical Reaſons of Things, there were ſome who ſet up for material Cauſes only, without an Efficient. And there were two different ſorts of theſe, and the other Schemes may be well reduced to them.

The firſt was of thoſe who were the immediate Succeſſors of *Thales*. For I ſee no reaſon to put him in the head of them, if what *Cicero*, *Diogenes Laertius* and *Plutarch* report of him be true. For it is ſaid in

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. 25. *Cicero, That* Thales *made* God *to be the Mind that form'd all things.* And to what purpoſe ſhould *Velleius* ſay this, if this had not been then known to have been his Opinion? For it had been better for his deſign to have made ſo great a Man as *Thales* was eſteem'd, to have excluded God and Providence. *Diogenes Laertius* ſaith, *That he not only made* God *an Eternal Being, but that the World was of his making.* And he was no more partial in this caſe, than the *Epicurean* in *Tully.* It is obſervable, that when *Plutarch* blames *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* for *leaving out the Efficient Cauſe,* he takes no notice of *Thales* on that account; which he
Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3. ought to have done, as being the Head of that Sect of Philoſophers called the *Ionick,* as himſelf acknowledges in that place. And *Stobæus* ſaith,
Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 1. *That* Thales *own'd a Divine Power, which paſs'd thro' and gave motion to the fluid Matter, out of which he ſuppos'd all things to be made.* The great Objection againſt this, is, that ſeveral of the antient Writers ſay, *That* Anaxagoras *was the firſt Philoſopher, who attributed the making of the World to an Infinite Mind;* and that *Plutarch* himſelf, in the Life of *Pericles,* ſaith the ſame. But the true anſwer to this, is, that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt who own'd this in writing, whoſe words are produc'd by ſo many; but *Thales* wrote nothing about it that appear'd, and therefore his Scholars going another way, there might be ſome preſumption againſt him. For it is too evident that *Anaximander,* his Diſciple, did never mention a God in the making of the World; *but he mentions ſeveral Gods made out of the World,* Dii nativi; a ſort of *Phœnician Gods,* which roſe out of Matter; and ſuch as the *Poets* had poſſeſs'd the People with among the *Greeks.* I have already obſerv'd from *Plato, That the old* Greeks *worſhip'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars,* &c. *as other barbarous Nations did.* Now herein lay the artifice of *Anaximander,* that he took care to aſſert the *Popular Deities,* and ſo avoided the imputation of *Atheiſm* among the People, who look'd no farther, than whether Men own'd the Religion in vogue: But whether there were an Infinite Mind ſuperior to thoſe Gods they worſhip'd, they look'd on as a Speculation too deep for them; and therefore they let thoſe alone, who ſpake nothing againſt the Gods they ſolemnly worſhip'd. And this was the true reaſon of the different uſage of *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras.* The former aſſerted the Beginning of all things to have been from Infinite Matter, without an Efficient Cauſe: The latter ſaid this was impoſſible; but there muſt be an Eternal Mind to give motion to Matter, and to direct it. Now one would have thought that *Anaxagoras* ſhould have been in favor with the People, who hated *Atheiſm,* and *Anaximander* puniſhed: But on the contrary *Anaximander* kept up his Intereſt among the People where he liv'd, at *Miletus* in *Aſia,* and at laſt carry'd a Colony along
Ælian. l. 3. c. 17. Strab. l. 14. with him to *Apollonia.* The reaſon was, the People of *Miletus* had a wonderful veneration for the *Sun* and *Moon,* under the names of *Apollo* and *Diana;* and as long as *Anaximander* comply'd with them, as to theſe *Dii nativi,* they let him alone in his Philoſophy. But *Anaxagoras* coming to *Athens,* and being there in favor with *Pericles,* a leading Man in the City, but oppos'd violently by a different Faction of *Thucydides Mileſius,* who took all advantages they could againſt *Pericles* his Party: They finding that *Anaxagoras* had ſhew'd too much of his Philoſophy, when he call'd the Sun a *Maſs of Fire;* this ſet them all in a flame, and made ſuch a diſturbance about it, that *Anaxagoras* was accus'd of *Atheiſm;* and *Pericles* with all his Intereſt and Eloquence could not ſave him from Baniſhment, in which he died, as appears by *Laertius* and *Ælian.* *Anaxagoras*

xagoras was very clear as to the main point of *Atheiſm*, for he aſſerted an Eternal Mind which made the World; this *Anaximander* deny'd, but he aſſerted the Common Deities: and altho' the *Epicurean* in *Tully* argues well againſt *Anaximander*'s Opinion, *Sed nos Deum niſi ſempiternum intelligere qui poſſumus?* We can have no true Notion of God not eternal; yet ſuch philoſophical Reaſons ſignified little; he allow'd the ſame Worſhip which they practis'd, and this was enough to ſatisfy them.

I am not ignorant, that ſome have gone about to excuſe *Anaximander*, as tho' he were ſo intent upon the Material Cauſes, that thro' *Incogitancy* only *he left out the Efficient.* A ſtrange piece of *Incogitancy* in a Philoſopher to leave out the main point. For the juſt fault which *Anaxagoras* found, was that he went about to make a World without an Eternal Mind before Matter; and he knew very well what the ſenſe of *Anaximander*, and his Scholar *Anaximenes* were, by whom he was inſtructed. And why ſhould *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Theophraſtus*, &c. look on it as ſo extraordinary a thing in *Anaxagoras* to aſſert an Eternal Mind, as the firſt Cauſe, if his Predeceſſors meant the ſame thing? But there is a paſſage in *Ariſtotle* which ſeems moſt to favour *Anaximander*, viz. *That he own'd an infinite firſt Principle, which did contain and govern all things, and was Immortal and Incorruptible.* And this *Aug. Steuchus Eugubinus* in his learned Book *De perenni Philoſophia*, inſiſts much upon. (A Book written with ſo good a deſign, and bating ſome ſuppoſititious Authorities, ſo well manag'd, that the Elder *Scaliger*, as his Son tells us, commended it particularly to a great Friend of his, too inclinable to *Atheiſm* (as was too much the faſhion then as well as ſince, among ſome who would ſeem to have more Wit than others) and it had ſo great ſucceſs therein, that he utterly renounc'd all Principles tending that way.) The Paſſage which he produces is certainly in *Ariſtotle*, and it ſeems ſo capable of a good meaning, that *Clemens Alexandrinus join'd him with* Anaxagoras *in ſuppoſing an Infinite Being above the Elements:* And it cannot be deny'd that the Author of the Book *de Mundo* (who, as I before obſerv'd, was very antient, if not *Ariſtotle*) doth uſe the ſame Expreſſion concerning God, *that he doth contain and govern all things:* but yet laying the Paſſages in *Ariſtotle* together, there is too great reaſon to ſuſpect that *Anaximander* did not aſſert an Eternal Mind, as *Anaxagoras* did. He is there giving an account of the different Notions Philoſophers had concerning *the firſt Principle: Some aſſerted it to be Infinite, as* Anaxagoras *and* Democritus; *the former held things to be made out of one another, and that there was one firſt Principle of all, which he called Mind; the latter held no Generation of things out of another, but that one Common Matter or Body was the only Principle of all things, and that the parts differ'd only by bulk and figure.* Thus far *Ariſtotle* is clear; then he goes on to ſhew, *that the firſt Principle muſt be Ingenite and Incorruptible*; and then it *muſt contain and govern all things; as all do hold, who do not aſſert* other Cauſes, *as Mind* (as *Anaxagoras*) *or Friendſhip* (as *Empedocles.*) *And this is the* Τὸ Θεῖον *the Divine Being, which is immortal and incorruptible,* as was aſſerted by *Anaximander* and *the moſt of thoſe* he calls *Phyſiologiſts*, *i. e.* who went no farther than the bare Nature of things. Now here it is plain, that he doth diſtinguiſh *Anaximander* and his Followers from *Anaxagoras*, who aſſerted an Eternal Mind: and he diſtinguiſhes his Opinion both from that of *Democritus* and *Anaximander*. It may be ſaid, *that it is plain from hence, that* Anaximander *did aſſert a Divine Being*; but at laſt it came to nothing but *Infinite Matter*, which was the Ori-

De Perenni Philoſ. l. 11. 5.

Joſ. Scalig. de vit. Julii Scaligeri p. 50.

Clem. Alexandr. Protrept. p. 43.

Nat. Auſ. l. 3. c. 4.

ginal and Mother-God to his *Dii Geniti*, as he called them. In another place he ſpeaks yet more plainly, viz. *that thoſe Philoſophers before* Anaxagoras *went no farther than Matter, and made all things to come out of it, and to be diſſolv'd into it again, being it ſelf one and immutable under all the variety of changes.* He ſaith, *They differ'd about the firſt Material Principle:* *Thales*, and one *Hippon* called *the Atheiſt* (the firſt of that Order that we read of) *held it to be Water*; but *Ariſtotle* beſtows a very ſevere character upon him, viz. *that he did not deſerve to be mention'd for the meanneſs of his capacity.* (It ſeems Wit and Atheiſm did not begin together.) *Anaximander* would go no farther than Infinite Matter in general; but *Anaximenes* was for *Air*, and ſo was *Diogenes Apolloniates*, who liv'd in the time of *Anaxagoras*; but it ſeems by *Demetrius Phalereus* his Apology for *Socrates* (now loſt) *that he fell into ſome danger at* Athens (poſſibly for being againſt the Worſhip of Fire, as *Anaxagoras* was?) But upon the whole matter, I do not ſee how *Anaximander* can be excus'd, altho' he left the *Popular Gods*, and beſtow'd the name of *Divinity* upon his *Infinite Matter*.

Metaphyſ. l. 1. *c.* 3.

Διὰ τὴν ἀτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας.

But there was another *Succeſſion of Philoſophers* deriv'd from *Xenophanes*, who liv'd in *Sicily*, ſaith *Laertius*, and was Contemporary with *Anaximander*: and he was neither a Follower of *Thales* nor of *Pythagoras*; but from a Town near the Sea in *Italy*, whence his chief Followers came, it was called the *Eleatick Sect*. He was a great Enemy to *the poetical Fictions about the Gods*, as he had reaſon; for they ſtrangely corrupted the Minds of the People, and took away all inward Reverence towards the Deity. And altho' *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks with ſome contempt of him; yet others have ſhew'd that he miſunderſtood him, and that he aſſerted *One Infinite and Eternal Mind*; and the ſame *Simplicius* ſaith of *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*: But ſince the learned Author of the *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, hath very well clear'd that matter, I intend not to tranſcribe him, but to refer my Reader to him, and proceed to thoſe who changed the firſt Notions of the *Eleatick Sect*, and ſet up for the making a World without a Deity. And thoſe were *Lucippus* and *Democritus*; and yet *Stobæus* ſaith, *that* Leucippus *wrote a Book about Mind*, wherein he hath this Saying, *That nothing is done in vain, but all things are done from Reaſon and Neceſſity.* How theſe two things came to be ſo put together is hard for us now to conjecture, unleſs that Book of his had been preſerv'd. *Plutarch* ſaith, That *Democritus* held that God *was an Intellectual Fire, and the Soul of the World.* But it appears by *Cicero*, that *Democritus* did not ſtick at making ſome very ſubtle *Effluvia* of his Atoms to be Gods, both thoſe without us, and thoſe within us, *viz.* thoſe which make up our intellectual Faculties. It is very hard to ſay what his true Notion of *Divinity* was, unleſs we could have ſeen his Books about *Mind* and *Providence*, which *Laertius* ſaith *that he wrote.* But whatever he might write for the amuſing the World, (as *Epicurus* did afterwards) if he made the Origin of all things to have been *without Mind or Providence*, no Titles of Books will be a ſufficient Excuſe for him.

Beſſario c. Calumnia. Plat. lib. 2. *c.* 10, 11.

Stob. Eclog. Phyſ. c. 8.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. *c.* 7.

Cicero de N. Deor. l. 1.

And I confeſs it is all one to me, whether thoſe who fram'd the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* proceeded in the way of *Forms* and *Qualities*, or of *Atoms* and *Vacuity*; becauſe I think the one way as impoſſible as the other. For as *Ariſtotle* hath well obſerved, the great difficulties as to the firſt Principles lay in two things, *The beginning of Motion, and the Order of the World*: and in both theſe the different *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus* were equally defective. But whether the World were made by *the Circumvolution of Infinite Matter, endued with contrary Qualities*; or *by the motion of Atoms, which had nothing but Bulk and Figure*, ſignifies nothing as to the main point. I do not deny but one *Hypotheſis* may in ſome reſpects be more intelligible than the other, and tend more to explain the difference of Body and Mind. But there are ſtill difficulties on both ſides: Some things may be taken for *Real Qualities*, which are not; and the many Experiments of this Age have fully prov'd it: but then there are other things, eſpecially relating to *Animals*, which can never be explain'd in the Mechanical way, to the ſatisfaction of any reaſonable Man.

But altho' *Anaximander* and *Democritus* ſtarted theſe two different *Hypotheſes* about the Origin of the World; yet thoſe who aſſerted an Eternal Mind to be the firſt Cauſe, had in common Reaſon very much the advantage of either; ſince it was impoſſible for them to give an account how the motion of Matter began, or how it fell into that Order, and Beauty, and Uſefulneſs, which we find in thoſe parts which make up the viſible World. All that we can learn of *Anaximander's Hypotheſis* is, *That the Heavens and Infinite Worlds* (for why ſhould they ſtop, when they could make Worlds ſo eaſily) *were produced by an infinite circumvolution of all things; that theſe had in them very different Qualities from each other, ſome hot ſome cold, ſome dry ſome moiſt, &c. that theſe being in continual motion, a mixture of them happened, and according to the different mixtures of Qualities, the ſeveral ſorts of things did ariſe.* This, as far as I can apprehend, was his Scheme of the Production of things.

Plutarch. apud Euſ. Præp. Ev. l. 1. 8.

There is little difference between the two *Hypotheſes* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, but only in the point of Mixture, which one attributes to Qualities, and the other to the Bulk and Figure of Atoms. They both aſſert the Production of things by the circumvolution of the parts of Matter; both held infinite Worlds, and that the things of this World came together of themſelves, without any ſuperior Cauſe.

But were not all the Philoſophers of their Mind? No; ſo far from it, that the beſt and greateſt of them utterly rejected this Doctrine, as unſatiſfactory to Human Reaſon. Of which we have an evident proof from *Ariſtotle*, who cannot be ſuſpected of any partiality in this matter. In the beginning of his *Metaphyſicks* he gives an account of the Opinions of *Philoſophers before him about the firſt Principles of things.* I know that he is hardly thought of by many for miſrepreſenting the Opinions of thoſe before him, and that he endeavour'd to leſſen their Reputation to advance his own; but I can ſee no manner of reaſon for it in this caſe. 'Tis poſſible, as to the *Pythagorean* and *Eleatick Sect*, he might not repreſent their Opinions ſo fairly as they were capable of: but as to theſe *Phyſiologiſts*, as he calls them, he charges nothing upon them, but what they own'd; only he makes *Thales the Head of them*, for which I have offer'd Reaſons to the contrary. But in general he ſaith, *That thoſe who began firſt to philoſophize, look'd upon Matter as the only Principle, out of which all things came, and to which they did return; the Subſtance remaining the ſame, and the Affections only chang'd: As* Socrates *is the ſame Man, altho' his inward Habits were chang'd.* But what this Material Principle was, they were not agreed. Thales, *the firſt of them, thought it to be Water;* Anaximenes *and* Diogenes *Air;* Hippaſus *and* Heraclitus *Fire;* Empedocles *to them added Earth.* Hitherto, ſaith he, we find nothing but the Material Cauſe; but, ſaith he, when they had gone

Metaphyſ. 1. §. 3.

Προϊόντων δ' οὕτως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν.

gone ſo far, the very Nature of things carried them farther in their Inquiries. For whatever change he made in Generation and Corruption, there muſt be ſome Cauſe why it ſo happened. For mere Matter doth not change it ſelf. As Wood doth not make it ſelf into a Bed, nor Braſs into a Statue; but ſome Artificer doth it. *But the ſeeking this, is looking after another Principle*, which he calls *the Principle of Motion. Which thoſe who aſſerted from the beginning, ran themſelves into difficulties, altho' they aſſerted Matter to be one; but thoſe who went no farther than Matter, whether Water, or Fire, or Earth, were never able to clear the Production of things; and therefore were forc'd by Truth it ſelf*, (ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας) *to ſeek for another Principle.* Where it is very conſiderable that *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That there were ſome from the beginning who aſſerted both Principles; and that thoſe who aſſerted only a Material Principle, ran themſelves into ſuch difficulties which they could never ſee their way through; but were forc'd at laſt by the mere power of Truth to ſeek for another Principle. Which not only ſhews his own Opinion, but that others, upon conſideration, were fain to ſet up a new *Hypotheſis* againſt theſe Materialiſts, not wholly new, as he ſhews, but new in oppoſition to them, who thought at firſt, by pretending to ſkill in Philoſophy, to have run down the antient Opinion of Mankind, founded on ſuch a Tradition, of which none could trace the Original. Of which I have already produc'd the teſtimonies of *Plato* and *Plutarch*. But now the humor of philoſophizing coming among the *Greeks*, the firſt ſetters up of this were very apt to contemn any thing that was built on Tradition; for that gave no Reaſon of things, which it was their buſineſs to do. In ſome things then unknown as to the natural Cauſes of them, they wonderfully ſurpriſed the common ſort, who thereupon admired them as Men that could do any thing. Being thus puffed up with a vain opinion of their own ſkill, they attempted to give an account of the very beginning of the World; and finding out what they thought the main Principle of which things were compoſed, they had no more to do, but to ſuppoſe them all reduced to a Maſs or Chaos; and then they fancied that by the motion of theſe ſeveral parts of Matter, things would fall into that ſtate we now ſee them in the World. But as much as they pleas'd themſelves with theſe Speculations, thoſe who came after them found them extremely defective, both in the beginning of this Motion, and the Order of it. For they found Matter to be a dull unactive thing of it ſelf, and that no Matter could form it ſelf without an Agent; and therefore they ſaw it neceſſary to add a Supreme Efficient Cauſe, which ſhould both put the parts of Matter, however qualified, into motion, and direct and regulate the courſe of it. For otherwiſe it was impoſſible to conceive, that there ſhould be ſuch diſtinct Syſtems or Bodies of Matter, as there are in the World. For how come the ſeveral *Vortices* not to interfere with each other? What made the Centers of them to be diſtinct from one another, ſo as that the Matter within ſuch circumference ſhould move about that alone? And without this it is impoſſible to conceive there ſhould be ſuch Bodies as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are; ſo great, and yet ſo diſtinct from each other. But what Cauſe then was found ſo neceſſary to be ſuperadded? *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That the Order and Fitneſs of things, which he calls Εὖ καὶ Καλῶς, muſt proceed from an Intelligent Cauſe; for theſe things could never come either from mere Material Cauſes, as Fire, Earth, *&c.* or only by Chance. And therefore he ſaith, *Anaxagoras* wrote like a Man in his ſenſes, in compariſon of thoſe before him; which ſhews that he look'd on the others Speculations as Dreams and idle Fancies. And he will not allow *Anaxagoras* to have been the firſt that aſſerted this; but he did it φανερῶς, openly and plainly, in oppoſition to ſuch as had ſet up another *Hypotheſis*. For before him, he ſaith, *Hermotinus Clazomenius* had ſaid the ſame thing, as to a ſuperior Cauſe: And ſo no doubt had many others; but he mentions him as a Philoſopher of the ſame City from whence *Anaxagoras* came. But it ſeems the reputation of *Thales* and his Scholars had obtain'd ſo much in the *Greek* Colonies where they inhabited, that they buried the name of others, altho' *Clazomenæ* were a City of *Ionia* too.

But that *Anaxagoras* was a Perſon of a juſt eſteem, appears by the great value which *Pericles* ſet upon him; who not only had him for his Counſellor, but ventur'd his intereſt to preſerve him: and altho' he was over-rul'd by the contrary Faction, as to his Baniſhment; yet he took care of him in it. And as *Plutarch* ſaith, he obtain'd the name of Νοῦς; he cannot tell, whether it was for his Opinion, or the reputation of his Wiſdom. And after he was buried at *Lamſacus*, a City of *Aſia Minor* near the *Helleſpont*, there were two Inſcriptions on the Altar erected to his Memory, which teſtify'd the very great Eſteem of him in two words, the one was Νοῦς, and the other Ἀλήθεια. And what can be ſaid greater of a Philoſopher, than that *Underſtanding* and *Truth* belong'd to him? *Timon*, who was not very civil to the memories of moſt Philoſophers, gives him a high character in *Laertius*: who ſaith likewiſe, *That he was born to a conſiderable Eſtate; but he had a Mind above Riches.* And *Sextus Empiricus* ſaith, *he was the moſt ſkilful in Natural Philoſophy*; and he was blam'd both by *Socrates* and *Ariſtotle*, for running too far into Natural Cauſes, as tho' he made uſe of his Supreme Mind only to help him out, when nothing elſe would. But therein he ſhew'd that it was not for want of underſtanding Natural Cauſes, that he aſſerted *an Eternal Mind, pure and unmix'd*, which was the firſt Cauſe of things; but it was his true ſkill in Philoſophy, which brought him to it. For he fix'd on the Principle of *Gravitation*, as the main foundation of Union and Compoſition; but the other *Hypotheſes* of *Vortices*, or *Circumlations* without it, he look'd on as weak and inſufficient. So vain is that Saying of *Lucretius* and a modern Philoſopher, that *Ignorance of Cauſes inclin'd Men to Religion*; eſpecially as to the Heavenly Bodies:

Τοῦτον ὑπερφυῶς τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσας ὁ Περικλῆς. *Plutarch. in Pericle.*

Ælian. l. 8. c. 19.

Sext. Empir. p. 153. Plato in Phædr. Ariſt. Metaph. l. 4. Plutarch. in Pericle.

Leviathan. ch. 12.

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti,
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoſcere cauſis;
Ergo perfugium ſibi habebant omnia Divis
Tradere, & illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Lucret. l. 5.

For the trueſt and exacteſt ſearcher into Natural Cauſes, we ſee, was the moſt firm and ſteddy aſſerter of a God. *Lucretius* magnifies his Heroe, *that neither the common Fame, nor the Thunder and Lightning had frighted him into any ſenſe of Religion; but that he had gone beyond the Clouds by the ſtrength of his Wit, and had ſetled all the bounds of Nature.*

Quem nec fama Deûm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compreſſit cœlum, &c.

Which was all becoming the more than Poetick fury of *Lucretius* to ſay. But *Plutarch* in the Life of *Pericles* ſaith, That *Anaxagoras* explain'd to him the Natural Cauſes of thoſe Meteors which are ſo apt to terrify Mankind, and thereby took away an ignorant Superſtition; but inſtead of that he ſettled in his Mind τ̃ ἀσφαλῆ μετ' ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εὐσέβειαν, *a firm Devotion accompanied with good Hopes.* And is not this far beyond the utmoſt *Lucretius* attributes to his *Hero?* ſuppoſing he had ſuch ſucceſs, as he imagin'd; which we have only the Poet's word for.

> *Quare Relligio pedibus ſubjecto viciſſim*
> *Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.*

But we can find no ſuch victory that he ever obtain'd over Religion, by his fooliſh and precarious *Hypotheſis*, which the more learned pretenders to *Atheiſm* in our Age are aſham'd of, becauſe of its vanity and inconſiſtency; and therefore there is now leſs need of inſiſting upon it. But what reaſon had *Lucretius* to make ſuch extravagant boaſting of *Epicurus* his ſucceſs againſt the Principles of Religion; when *Cicero* of the ſame age and time, and a friend to *Lucretius*, had ſo very mean an opinion of it, and hath expos'd it ſo much to contempt in more places than one? But poſſibly he may mean, *it had ſo at Athens:* nothing like it. For it was obſerv'd, that none were more forward to comply with the *popular ſuperſtitions*, none more reſerv'd as to their real opinions about the *Deity* than *Epicurus* and his followers. What need all this mean complyance, this caution and reſerve, if they were ſuch Conquerors, as he repreſents them? They never oppos'd the common ſentiments, as *Anaxagoras* did, and ſuffer'd for it; but inſtead of it, they induſtriouſly labour'd to perſuade the People, that they were *for Piety and Veneration of the Gods*; *and Epicurus* wrote about it: whether in earneſt or not, I diſpute not; but he was in earneſt concern'd for his own ſecurity. Are theſe the marks of a *Conqueror?* And yet in his time the *fear of the Areopagus*, after the time of *Ephialtes* was in great meaſure remov'd. It is obſerved by *Joſephus, That by the Laws of* Athens, *it was death without mercy, to ſpeak againſt the eſtabliſhed Religion*; and we find with what difficulty *Anaxagoras* eſcaped: But in *Epicurus* his time the Government was ſunk, and the *Macedonian* Empire was continually growing upon them; and all People took greater liberty to ſpeak their Minds, and without any ſuch oppoſition as the Philoſophers before him met with, when their Laws were obſerved more ſtrictly; as when *Protagoras* and *Diagoras* were forced to abſcond for fear of their lives; and *Ariſtotle* upon a ſuſpicion of a profane *Hymn* to withdraw to *Calcis.* But in the time of *Epicurus*, the ſtate of the City was altered, and the Government was in the hands of *Alexander*'s Succeſſors; for *Epicurus* lived with his Scholars in *Athens*, when it was ſo cloſely beſieged by *Demetrius*, as *Plutarch* informs us, who ſoon after had the poſſeſſion of it delivered to him. Now in buſy and diſorder'd times, ſuch as *Epicurus* might be far more ſecure than at another time; and yet even then he was afraid of giving any diſtaſt, as to his opinions about Religion; and ſtill aſſerted his owning *the Anticipation of a Deity*, altho' not conſiſtent with his own grounds of certainty. But where was *the victory the mean while over Religion*, which *Lucretius* boaſts of? His Defenders ſay, *It was over the ill effects of Superſtition*; but we find nothing like that effected by him. The World was not made one jot

Plut. adv. Colot.

Joſ. contr. Apion. l. 2.

Plut. vit. Demetrii.

the better, but a great deal the worſe for his Principles; for the very name of a Philoſopher went a great way with Perſons of bad inclinations: and they do not govern themſelves by any Reaſon; but when they can bring an Authority of a Perſon of any reputation, they inquire no farther, but go on with greater confidence in their former practices; and then they charge *Ignorance* and *Superſtition* on thoſe that contradict them. I do not deny but ſome of the Defenders of *Epicurus* in our Age, have been Perſons of Wit and Learning, and they have utterly diſown'd his irreligious Principles: but yet the very undertaking to defend the Author of ſo much impiety, hath done unſpeakable miſchief to the Age we live in; and all the diſcoveries of Natural Philoſophy can never make amends for it. We are now comparing the Notions of *Epicurus* and *Anaxagoras* as to religion; and that method which *Plutarch* tells us *Anaxagoras* took, as to the freeing the Mind of *Pericles* from *Superſtition*, was far better than that of *Epicurus*. For *Anaxagoras* ſatisfy'd him, that there were natural cauſes of Thunder and Lightning, but theſe were the effects of a Divine Providence, which order'd the affairs of Mankind for the beſt, as well as the Meteors in the Air; and therefore there was no reaſon why any wiſe and good Man ſhould not entertain a comfortable Hope of Divine Protection: but in the way of *Epicurus* there is a bare account of Natural Cauſes, which whether true or falſe, can give no ſatisfaction to a thinking Man. For the utmoſt comes to this; Such and ſuch Effects do naturally follow ſuch Cauſes. And what then? *Then if ſuch things happen, we cannot help it.* And what follows? Nothing more. And is this all the comfort of *Epicurus* his Inquiry into Cauſes? To underſtand this better, I will put a Caſe, which lately happened in the place where I live at preſent, to a Man working in his Garden near a great River: while he was there buſy, a violent ſhower of Rain fell of a ſudden; and the Man thinking to divert it, the Rain beat down a great heap of earth above him, and carried it through his Garden, and took away the Man with its force into a precipice hard by, and with great violence hurried him down into the River, which made him ſtupid and ſenſleſs; but it pleas'd GOD he was taken up, and recover'd. Now let us conſider what would tend moſt to the ſatisfaction of this Man's Mind, when he was in that deplorable ſtate, if he had been then ſenſible of his caſe: What comfort would it have been to him to have been told, that as things were, the earth above him falling down, and there being ſuch a precipice below him, there was no help for him, and he muſt be contented to ſuffer? But would it not be far greater ſatisfaction to be told, there were thoſe above who ſaw him fall, and pitied his caſe, and would be ſure to help him out, and give him what was neceſſary for his relief and remedy? Now this is the caſe of *Neceſſity* and *Providence*: the one gives only that heavy comfort, *Things muſt be ſo, and we cannot help it*; the other ſtill keeps up reaſonable hope, and the expectation of ſomething better. So that no one can deny, that upon mere principles of Natural Reaſon, this is the more deſirable *Hypotheſis*; and nothing but invincible arguments ſhould remove Mankind from it: but neither *Democritus* nor *Epicurus* could offer any thing but a very precarious *Hypotheſis* againſt it.

From *Anaxagoras* I now come to *Socrates* (for *Acheloüs* purſued his Principles at *Athens*, where *Socrates* was his Diſciple.) He was a Perſon of great vogue at *Athens*, for the *Natural ſharpneſs of his Wit*, and *the freedom he uſ'd in converſation with all ſorts*, without regard to his own intereſt. And for this he appealed to his Judges, and to the whole City, that he was far from any deſign to enrich himſelf, as they all knew: he did not deny but that he had great preſents offer'd him; but he took no more than to keep him from poverty, as in the caſes of the King of *Macedonia* and *Alcibiades*: and none could blame him for being refractory to their Laws about Religion; for he declar'd that to be his Principle, *That* God *ought to be worſhip'd according to the Laws of the City where a Man liv'd.* And for this, *Xenophon* ſaith, *he truſted to the* Pythian *Oracle*; which was thought of good Authority among them: however ſome in our time have repreſented it as *ſo groſs an Impoſture*, that it is hardly credible any Men of common ſenſe could be deceived by it, much leſs the *Athenians*; who for all that we can perceive had as good an opinion of it, as the *Bœotians* themſelves.

Plato in Apol. Socr.

Xenoph. Mem. l. I. c. 3. Van. Dalen Diſſert. de Orac. Ethn.

This was a very hard point at that time among Men of better underſtanding, and who had a true ſenſe of God and Providence, how they ſhould behave themſelves with reſpect to the Popular Superſtitions. There was no difficulty, as to ſuch as had no Religion at all; for their Principle was to keep fair and to ſecure themſelves; and they look'd on ſuch as *Protagoras* and *Diagoras*, as Perſons who deſerved to be puniſh'd for their folly. But for Men who truly believ'd a wiſe God to govern the World, as *Socrates* and his two excellent Scholars *Plato* and *Xenophon* did, the caſe was very difficult: For, if they did not comply, they were ſure to be proſecuted as guilty of impiety; if they did, this ſeem'd to juſtify all their Superſtition.

The way which *Socrates* took was this: He avoided giving any offence as to the contempt of their publick worſhip. Nay, *Xenophon* ſaith, he was ſo far from any Impiety that way, that he was rather more remarkable for his diligence therein; and that no Man ever heard him ſay or do any thing that tended to the diſhonor of Religion; ſo that from the whole courſe of his life, he might be well concluded to be Εὐσεβέστατος, *a very devout Man.* *Cicero* had a very particular eſteem of *Socrates* not only for *the greatneſs of his Wit, but for his Wiſdom and Goodneſs*; and from him we learn what the grounds were which ſuch Men went upon. They found the World horribly corrupted with Superſtition, which was to be remov'd in the beſt way they could; but there was great danger, leſt under that pretence, all Religion ſhould be deſtroy'd. And they ſaw an abſolute neceſſity of keeping up that, ſince *the Beauty and Order of the World, was ſufficient to convince Mankind that there was an Excellent and Eternal Being, which was to be adored and worſhip'd by Mankind.* This was their fundamental Principle; and they rather choſe to comply with the follies of their Superſtitions, than not keep the ſolemn worſhip of the *Deity*. And to ſatisfy themſelves, they put ſuch interpretations upon the publick Rites, as made them ſerve to ſome part or other of natural worſhip, with reſpect to the benefits God beſtows on the World; and thus, even the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries were underſtood by them.

Propter ejus magnitudinem Ingenii. *De Orat.* I. 54. Qui quum omnium ſapientiſſimus eſſet, ſanctiſſimeq; vixiſſet. *Ib.*

Eſſe præſtantem aliquam æternamque Naturam, & eam ſuſpiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo Mundi, ordoque rerum cœleſtium cogit confiteri. *Cic. de Div. l.* 2. *c.* 72.

But how then came *Socrates* to be ſo ſeverely proſecuted at *Athens*? 'Tis true, that his enemies charg'd him with *Impiety* and *Atheiſm*, as appears both by *Plato* and *Xenophon*. In *Plato*'s *Apology* we find that

Melitus downright accus'd him *that he thought there were no Gods. Socrates* being much ſurpriz'd at this charge, aſk'd him what ground he had for it; and all the proof he offer'd was, that he was of *Anaxagoras*'s Opinion that the Sun and Moon were not Gods: which *Socrates* deny'd; and ſaid his charge was inconſiſtent, for he both accus'd him of bringing in new *Deities*, and aſſerting that there were none at all. But in the concluſion of his Apology, he fully own'd *a Divine Providence taking care of good Men living or dying; but whether of the two were better for a Man, he thought* GOD *alone knew.*

But to ſhew more plainly what *Socrates* his judgment was as to the Production of the World: *Xenophon* gives this account of it. *That he look'd on it as a great piece of folly in Mankind to attempt it from Material Cauſes; and he wonder'd that they did not find out, that theſe things were above their reach.* And he thinks thoſe * *Philoſophers argued like mad Men; neither agreeing with one another, nor with the nature of things: for ſome ſaid, that it conſiſted of One thing; others, of Infinite: ſome ſaid, all things were in motion; others ſaid, there was no motion at all: ſome ſaid, that all things were generated and corrupted; and others, that nothing at all was.* Plato in his *Phædo* lets us know how he came to be unſatisfy'd even with *Anaxagoras* himſelf, altho' he mightily approv'd his fundamental Notion of *all things being produc'd by an Eternal Mind.* When he was a young Man, he ſaith, he was a great admirer of Natural Philoſophy, and endeavoured to find out the Cauſes of things; but at laſt *he found they were too hard for him*, and ſo fell into a kind of *Scepticiſm:* but he had heard of a Book of *Anaxagoras*, wherein he aſſerted that *Mind* order'd all things; this pleas'd him well: but he expected that from hence he would have ſhew'd how that Eternal Mind did frame every thing for the beſt, τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον· but finding him to falter there, and to run to mere Natural Cauſes as others had done, he gave over his purſuit of Natural Philoſophy, and applied himſelf to matters of Morality; as more certainly known, and of greater uſe to Mankind.

Ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν. *Xenoph. Mem. l.* 1. *c.* 1.

* Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. *Ibid.*

But as to Providence, *Xenophon* is very particular in it, *That it extended to all things ſaid or done, altho' in never ſo great ſilence; and that* GOD *was preſent in all places.* To the ſame purpoſe *Diogenes Laertius* mentions a ſaying of *Thales*; *Being aſked, whether a man could do an unjuſt action without* GOD'*s knowing it: No,* ſaith he, *not if he only thinks to do it.* Which ſaith *Valerius Maximus*, was intended to keep Mens Minds clean and pure, as well as their hands. But the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens* in *Socrates* his time turn'd this another way. For they ſaid, *This was only a contrivance of ſome cunning man, to keep Mankind more in awe.* And that this was their ſenſe, appears by the Verſes ſtill preſerv'd in *Sextus Empiricus*; and part in *Plutarch* and others; but by the former they are attributed to *Critias*, and by the latter to *Euripides*, both of *Socrates* his time. But there ſeems to be far greater probability as to the former, becauſe ſuch a ſaying was very agreeable to the Character of the Man. For *Critias* was one of the *thirty Tyrants* ſet up by *Lyſander* at *Athens*; a Man of Wit, and addicted to Poetry; as *Socrates* himſelf owns in *Plato*'s *Charmides*, that he deriv'd it from *Solon:* He and *Alcibiades* had been both under *Socrates* his care, as *Xenophon* tells us, but they both forſook him, and changed their Manners upon it. *Critias* went into *Theſſaly*, and there fell into lew'd and

Xenoph. l. 1. *c.* 1. *ad fin. & c.* 4. *ad fin.*

Valer. Max. l. 7. 2. §. 8.

Sext. Emp. p. 310. *Poeſis Phil. p.* 75.

and debauch'd company; and from thence came to hate *Socrates*, whom he had admir'd before: and when he was one of the *thirty Tyrants*, he and *Charicles* ſhew'd a particular diſpleaſure againſt him; for *Socrates* had ſpoken too freely againſt their Government. He was the head of the number, as appeared by *Theramenes* drinking a health to *Critias*, when he took off his Poiſon; and when *Thraſybulus* came to deliver *Athens*, upon his being kill'd, the whole Faction ſunk. Nothing can be more agreeable to the Character of ſuch a Man, than to make him look on all Religion as an impoſture and contrivance of ſome crafty Politician. But nothing of it agrees with that of *Euripides*, who was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, a friend to *Socrates*; and on all occaſions wrote decently with reſpect to Piety and Vertue. But *Plutarch* ſaith, *he wrote the Verſes in the Name of* Siſyphus *for fear of the* Areopagus. It cannot *P. Petit. Miſcell. l. 1. c. 1.* be deny'd, that Author (whether *Plutarch* or not, for ſome queſtion it) doth ſay ſo. But if *Plutarch* had ſaid it on good ground, how came *Sextus* after him, ſo poſitively to give them to *Critias*? And which is more to the purpoſe, the ſame Author had but a little before quoted a paſſage of *Euripides* very agreeable to a Scholar of *Anaxagoras*, *That the Heavens were* Καλὸν ϖοίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφȣ͂, *The beautiful Workmanſhip of a wiſe Architect*; and from thence we come to the Notion of God. *Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. l. 1. c. 6.* How different is this from the ſenſe of thoſe Atheiſtical Verſes! But it is no eaſy matter to judg what the true ſenſe of a Poet is, when it is his deſign to perſonate others. And ſo *Euripides* might introduce *Siſyphus* as ſpeaking agreeable to his own Character, who is repreſented as *an ill Man, and given to fraud*; and therefore it is no wonder ſuch a Man ſhould look on Religion as ſuch a contrivance. For either *Siſyphus* or *Critias* might be well ſuppos'd to utter ſuch things, but the queſtion is, how far *Euripides* is to be charg'd with them; and whether he ſpoke his own ſenſe under the name of *Siſyphus*, for fear of the *Areopagus*. This ought certainly to be prov'd ſome other way: and if not, it ſeems to be a very unjuſt imputation; eſpecially ſince *Socrates* expreſs'd ſuch an eſteem for *Euripides*; which he would never have done, if he *Ælian. l. 2. c. 13.* had ſuſpected that under the Perſon of *Siſyphus* he had overthrown the foundations of Religion.

But what the true ſenſe of *Socrates* was, may be ſeen by his Diſcourſe with *Ariſtodemus*, of which *Xenophon* hath preſerv'd the remembrance. *Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 4.* This *Ariſtodemus* was one of thoſe that not only neglected Religion himſelf, but deſpiſed and laugh'd at thoſe that regarded it. *Socrates* finding what ſort of man he was, takes him to taſk after his dry manner. And are there no Perſons, *Ariſtodemus*, ſaid he, that you have any eſteem of for being wiſer than others? Yes, ſaid he briſkly and like a Man of Wit, *I admire* Homer *for an Epick Poem*, Melanippides *in Dithyrambics*, Sophocles *in Tragedy*, Polycletus *in the Art of making Statues, and* Phidias *in Painting*. The Man we ſee was a kind of *Virtuoſo* in other things, but without any ſenſe of God or Religion. Well! ſaid *Socrates*, *and would you not admire thoſe more who make living and moving Statues, than ſuch only as have neither ſenſe nor motion?* No doubt the former, *Ariſtodemus* reply'd, if they are made by Deſign, and not by Chance. Of that, ſaid *Socrates*, we may beſt judg by the uſe, they are intended for. For thoſe things which are for a manifeſt uſe are moſt agreeable to Deſign. As for inſtance, the Senſes of Men are ſo plainly given them for particular uſes, that we cannot reaſonably think, but that he that made Mankind at firſt, gave them them for that purpoſe; as he particularly inſtances in the Fabrick of the Eye, and the care of Nature to preſerve it, (which he calls a work of Providence) and ſo for the Ears, Noſe and Mouth, which are ſo fram'd, as to be προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα, done by a wiſe Deſign, and not by Chance. And I cannot, ſaith *Socrates*, look upon them otherwiſe than as the Workmanſhip Σοφοῦ τινὸς δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου, of a wiſe contriver, and a lover of his own Workmanſhip. The ſame he ſhews in the propagation of Animals, and the love and care of their Young, *&c.* but as to Mankind, he ſaith, there is φρόνιμόν τι, a reach beyond other Animals; and they have not only a Body made out of Earth, but a Mind which we perceive within our ſelves. And can theſe great and wonderful things come to paſs δι' ἀφροσύνην τινά, without Mind or Underſtanding? To which our *Virtuoſo* had nothing to ſay, *but that he could not ſee the Artificer here, as he did in other caſes.* Well! and do not you contrive and deſign things in your own Mind? And yet you can no more ſee that, than the wiſe contriver of theſe things. All that *Ariſtodemus* had to ſay, was, that he did not diſown or deſpiſe a Divine Being; but he thought it too great to regard his Service. Hold a little, ſaid *Socrates*; for the greater he is, the more he ought to be honor'd by Mankind. Then he queſtion'd, whether there were ſuch a thing as Providence, with reſpect to human affairs. For that, *Socrates* again bad him look to the frame of Human Nature, and the ſeveral parts of Man's Body, and he could not but ſee a Providence in the contrivance of the ſeveral parts of the Body; but eſpecially the Mind, which he hath inſpir'd into Men. Τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε, Not *blowing ſome ſubtile Air into Man*, as ſome modern Philoſophers would tranſlate it; or giving *a mere Vital Motion.* But *Socrates* was far from thinking *an Incorporeal Subſtance* within us to be *a Contradiction*; nor that it was any abſurdity to take a Metaphor from *Air*, to expreſs the infuſion of an Immaterial Soul. And he ſhews the excellency of the human Soul above others, becauſe it alone apprehends the Being of God, who made and contriv'd the greateſt beſt things, and alone is capable of doing him ſervice. Beſides, that it hath Prudence and Memory above all others. So that Mankind are as ſo many Gods among inferior Creatures. If a Man had the Body of an Ox and the Mind of Man together, he could not do what he would; nor if Brutes had Hands and wanted Minds, could they do much with them. But you, ſaid he to *Ariſtodemus*, have both, and can you think there is no care of Providence about you? Can you think, ſaid he, that the Gods (as he ſpeaks) ſhould plant in Mens Minds an opinion that they are able both to reward and puniſh, if it were not ſo? And that Mankind ſhould be always deceiv'd in this matter, and not be ſenſible of it? *Do not you ſee*, ſaith *Socrates*, *that the moſt antient and wiſeſt Cities, and Nations, and Ages, have always ſhew'd the greateſt regard to Religion?* This is a very remarkable teſtimony of *Socrates* concerning the ſenſe of former Ages about the foundations of Religion; and that the Atheiſtical temper ſome were then fallen into, was a late Innovation, and in probability occaſion'd by that ſmattering in Philoſophy, which was crept in among the *Greeks* from the Principles of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*. But *Socrates* aſſures us *the beſt and wiſeſt Ages* had a very different ſenſe of theſe matters. And this *Xenophon* tells us he had from *Socrates his own Mouth, and that he heard this Diſcourſe between them.*

And what now is to be ſaid to ſuch a Teſtimony as this, concerning the ſenſe of Mankind about Religion? Have we any reaſon to miſtruſt ſuch a Teſtimony as that of *Socrates*, who was ſo much valu'd for his Integrity, and loſt his Life, becauſe he could not flatter nor diſſemble? For any one that will carefully examin the circumſtances of his Trial, will find the true reaſon of his proſecution was, that he had diſobliged ſo many ſorts of People by his Plain-dealing: For, as he told his Judges, his way was when he heard any Man had a great opinion for his own Wiſdom and Skill above other Men, to talk with him on purpoſe, to ſee whether there were any ſufficient ground for ſuch an Opinion: which was one of the moſt diſobliging courſes in the world; conſidering how fond Men are apt to be of themſelves, and to think themſelves wiſer than others; at leaſt in that which they moſt pretend to. By which means he diſobliged the *Politicians*, who hate any Man that would pretend to find them out; the Sophiſts, whom on all occaſions he expos'd, and in the moſt publick manner: and the Men of Wit and the Poets were enrag'd againſt him, becauſe he ſlighted their way, as tending only to entertain the Fancy, and not to make Men wiſer; and in their happieſt ſtrains, there was only a *Natural Enthuſiaſm*; and altho' they ſaid many fine things, yet they were not one jot the wiſer Men. The Artificers he found had many pretty knacks; but becauſe of their Skill in ſuch little things, they preſum'd wonderfully at *Athens* upon their Underſtandings, and would never bear long any Great Men among them, when things went by majority of Votes: As *Socrates* found, when Sentence came to be paſt; for altho' he had many good Friends, yet when it came to the numbring of Votes, he was caſt by a great Majority. But as the People of *Athens* were ſo opinionated of themſelves, that they could not bear any Man, whoſe Reputation leſſen'd theirs; ſo when they had done ſuch things which made them ill ſpoken of abroad, then they were for redeeming their own honor; either by recalling them from Baniſhment, if living; or if dead, by puniſhing the inſtruments made uſe of in the Proſecution. So it happened in the caſe of *Socrates*: when they found his Death brought an *Odium* upon the City, one of his Accuſers was *put to death*, another *baniſhed*; and *Plutarch* ſaith, *ſome of the reſt were ſo weary of their lives, that they put an end to them by hanging themſelves*. And to ſhew their great eſteem of him, they caus'd a Statue made by *Lyſippus*, to be ſet up in a publick place in the City, as a perpetual Monument of his Wiſdom, and their own Folly. And his carriage at his death was with ſo much courage, and conſtancy, and evenneſs of Mind, that they were all ſatisfy'd as to his integrity and freedom from any ill deſign. What reaſon can there be then to ſuſpect his Teſtimony in this point of Religion, when there was not the leaſt conſtraint or biaſs upon him, and this atteſted by ſo unexceptionable a witneſs as *Xenophon*; a Perſon of great honor and judgment, and whoſe Writings are ſuch, as could hardly be counterfeited by any ſince him, by reaſon of their *unaffected ſweetneſs*, for which the antient Criticks ſo much admired him; even *Cicero*, as well as *Dionyſius Halycarnaſſeus*, and *Quintilian*?

Platon. Apolog. Socr.

Plutarch. de Odio & Invid.

From *Socrates* I go on to *Plato*, who in *Cicero*'s opinion (and he was a very good judg) was *Princeps Ingenii & Doctrinæ*, the *Top of antient Wit and Learning*; and to the ſame purpoſe *Quintilian*, whom *Valla* eſteem'd above all other Criticks. But I need not go about to ſet up the Reputation of *Plato*: He was deſcended from *Solon* by his Mother, and by his Father from *Codrus*; he was nearly related to *Critias*, the firſt of the *thirty Tyrants*, and head of the Atheiſtical Club at *Athens*; and there-

Cicero de Orat. l. 2. Dionyſ. Halycarn. ad Pomp. Quint. X. Cicero ad Quint. l. 1.

fore it will be worth our while to find out his true ſenſe and opinion about theſe matters; to which I ſhall confine my Diſcourſe concerning him. And in his *tenth Book of Laws* he gives an account of three Opinions then in vogue among the looſer ſort of People at *Athens*. *One was, that there was no* GOD *at all: The 2d, that tho' there was a* GOD, *yet there was no Providence: The 3d, that if both were allow'd, yet that* GOD *would accept of Gifts and Sacrifices, as a compenſation for their faults.*

As to the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſis* it is obſervable, what character he gives of the Perſons who were for it, *that they were the looſer and more diſſolute ſort of Men among them; and eſpecially in the heat of their Youth. And that he never knew any Man who continued in it from his Youth to his Old Age*; and he calls it *the plague of young Men.* The *Hypotheſis*, as he lays it down, is much the ſame with *Anaximander*'s, viz. *That Nature and Chance produced all things out of a ſtrange Chaos, wherein were all ſorts of Qualities jumbled and confounded together, and at laſt by mixture came to that we call the World. But that Religion and the differences of juſt and unjuſt depended upon human Laws and Contrivances, for the better Government of Mankind.*

This is the ſubſtance of their *Hypotheſis*, which *Plato* in a long Diſcourſe ſets himſelf to refute, by ſhewing that theſe things could not come together by mere Nature and Chance; but were according to *right Reaſon, the product of a Superior Mind.* And whatever they pretended, as to ſkill in Natural Cauſes, this opinion did proceed from *great Ignorance about them*, and that their Reaſonings were both *Impious and Incoherent.* That their fundamental Miſtake lay in ſuppoſing ſuch Motion and Mixtures in Matter, before any Principle to begin or to direct it. For the firſt Motion muſt be from that which hath a power to move it ſelf, as well as other things; and therefore there muſt be a Mind antecedent to Matter, in order to the Production of things. This is the force of his Reaſoning. Then he ſhews how unreaſonable it is to ſuppoſe a GOD without Providence; becauſe it muſt argue either *Weakneſs* or *Neglect*, which were both inconſiſtent with *the Divine Perfections:* and ſo he proves was the laſt Opinion, and that it tended to overthrow *the practice of Virtue.*

In his *Epinomis* (which I ſee no reaſon to miſtruſt) he undertakes to prove *Religion to be the trueſt Wiſdom of Mankind*, the firſt Principle whereof is, *that there is an Eternal Mind before all Matter*; and then ſaith, *That there is no greater Virtue belonging to Mankind than Piety, or* *Epinom.*
a due regard to the Divine Being. So far was he from looking on Reli- *p.* 989.
gion as an Impoſture, or Trick put upon Mankind in order to their better Government.

But *Ariſtotle* may be more ſuſpected for this, who wanted no Wit, but is generally thought to have been of no Religion; and he was by no means fond of *Plato*'s *Notions*, eſpecially thoſe he took from the *Pythagoric School:* but yet I hope to ſhew, that in the main foundation of all, as to the Being of GOD, and the Happineſs of Mankind, he agreed with him at laſt: I do not mean at his death, according to the ſtory in *Cælius*
Rhodiginus, that then he ſaid, *Cauſa Cauſarum miſerere mei*; and which *Cæl. Rhod.*
Suarez quotes *Laertius* for; but there is nothing like it in him, and *l.* 17. *c.* 34.
Cælius had it out of a trifling Book *De Pomo:* But I go upon the Principles deliver'd by him in his beſt conſider'd Books. In his *Politicks* in-
deed he recommends Religion to a Prince, *in order to his eſteem among the* *Ariſt. Polit.*
People, that they may look on him as under the particular care of Providence. *l.* 5. *c.* 11.

Now this *Ariſtotle* is charg'd to have utterly deny'd himſelf; and *Atticus* the *Platoniſt* in *Euſebius* makes him worſe than *Epicurus*, *becauſe he put his Gods quite out of the World, which* Ariſtotle *did not*; *but*, ſaid he, *he overthrew all Religion by denying Providence.* And *Lactantius* is very ſharp upon him, and makes him *a contemner of* God *and Religion*: but to do him right, he ſaith at other times, *That he plac'd one Mind over the World*; and *that* Ariſtotle *and his Followers were of the ſame mind with* Antiſthenes, *that there was but One* God *in Nature, and many popular Gods. But was not* Ariſtotle *charg'd with Impiety at* Athens, *and forc'd on that account to withdraw to* Chalcis, *where he died*; *or as ſome ſay, was poiſoned?* So *Eumelus*, and the anonymous Author of his Life, publiſh'd by *Menagius*. It cannot be deny'd that there was a proſecution againſt him by *Eurymedon* and *Demophylus*; but ſo there was againſt *Anaxagoras* and *Socrates*: but the pretence againſt *Ariſtotle* was not for *Impiety in his Doctrine*, but for a *profane Hymn* which he was ſaid to have made on his Friend *Hermias*, ſuch as were wont to be made to *Apollo*. This *Athenæus* denies, and *Ariſtotle* ſent an Apology for himſelf to *Athens*, but it was not receiv'd. The truth was, *Ariſtotle* found it was time for him to be gone; leſt, as he told his Friends, *that City ſhould offend twice againſt Philoſophy*: For, as he ſaid in his Letter to *Antipater*, *He found the City abounded with Sycophants*; and he was fallen under *Alexander's* diſpleaſure, on the account of *Caliſthenes* his Kinſman; and in a Letter of his to *Antipater* he had ſaid, *he would be reveng'd on the Sophiſter*; and he publickly affronted him by the great Preſent he ſent to *Xenocrates*, and none to him: which was ſufficient intimation to his Enemies, which he never wanted, ſaith *Ariſtocles*, *becauſe of the intereſt he had in Princes*. And if *Pliny*'s Story be true, (which *Plutarch* and *Appian* intimate too) as to *Antipater*'s deſign, *Alexander* had cauſe for his diſpleaſure. But *Ariſtocles* ſaith, *That* Apellicon *(to whom his Books came) wrote ſo full a Vindication of him, that thoſe who read that need no more.* But they are his Principles which we enquire after, and not his Practices. *Alexander Aphrodiſienſis*, who is thought to have underſtood *Ariſtotle's* Mind as well as any Commentator, owns *that* Ariſtotle *without doubt aſſerted, that there was one Eternal Mind, which gave the firſt motion to Matter, and that thereby things were put into ſuch an order, not by Chance, but from the firſt Mover, ſo as to produce the variety of Species in the World, and to make them uſeful to each other, and for the good of the whole*; *and ſuch an univerſal Providence*, he ſaith, Ariſtotle *did hold.* So much then is confeſs'd by one who was thought his moſt judicious Interpreter. But let us ſee, whether *Ariſtotle* may not be reaſonably preſum'd to go beyond this: For (1.) he blam'd *Anaxagoras* for making *no more uſe of his Eternal Mind, than merely to ſet things in order at firſt.* Then it follows, that according to him, God muſt be more than a mere *Firſt Mover*. (2.) He makes this famous concluſion of his *Metaphyſicks*, *That things are beſt govern'd by one Head*; which ſignified nothing, if there be no Providence. *Clauſulam hanc tam inſignem amplector & laudo*, ſaid one of his moſt bitter Enemies; and it cannot be denied, that he there compares *the Government of the World* with *that of an Army or Family, wherein are there ſeveral Ranks and Orders of Men for different purpoſes*; *which muſt ſuppoſe a particular inſpection and care.* (3.) He makes the complete Happineſs of Mankind to be Θεῖόν τι, *a Divine thing*; and muſt ſuppoſe *Providence*, as I ſhall now make it to appear. He affirms that a Man's complete Happineſs depends *upon ſomething Divine in him, in*

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 5.

Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. 19.

De falſ. Rel. l. 5.

De Ira Dei c. 11.

Beſſario c. Calumn.

Athen. l. 15.

Suid. in Ariſt.

Ælian. 3. 36.

Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 15. c. 2.

Plin. N. H. l. 30. c. 16.

Alexand. Aphrodiſ. in Ariſt. Phyſic. l. 2. c. 8.

Met. 1. 4.

Metaphyſ. l. 14. ult.

P. Rami Schol. Metaphyſ. l. 12. c. 10.

Eth. l. 1. c. 10.

Eth. l. 10. c. 7.

the exerciſe whereof his happineſs conſiſts. And therefore he adviſes thoſe that ſtudy to be happy Ἀναθανατίζειν, *to draw themſelves off from mortal things, and to live according to that which is the beſt thing in us,* viz. *our Minds; which altho' they do not ſo appear in bulk, yet in reality are far greater and of more value than other things.* By which he plainly owns ſuch a Principle in Mankind as is capable of a greater Happineſs than the things of this World can give him, becauſe his Mind is of a higher Nature than they. But then the Queſtion ariſes, whether Mankind can make themſelves happy by this Divine Principle within them? He grants in one place, *That if there be any gift from* God, *it is moſt reaſonable it ſhould be that which is beſt for them;* but he avoids *the diſpute there,* becauſe his buſineſs was to put Men upon uſing their own endeavors to be happy: But in his laſt Book, where he ſpeaks of this Divine Happineſs, he ſaith, *That he that acts according to his Mind, and is diſpos'd to do the beſt things, is the moſt likely to be beloved of* God: *for, if there be any care above of Human Affairs, as there ſeems to be, it is moſt reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the Gods love what is beſt and neareſt to them; which is our Mind.* But doth he not ſeem to ſpeak very doubtfully in this matter? It is obſerv'd by his Commentator, that his manner of expreſſion is ſuch as he uſes when there is no manner of doubt. But we muſt take *Ariſtotle* as a Philoſopher, and conſider on what grounds he went. He had no Revelation to direct him, and ſo was to judg according to what he thought *moſt reaſonable;* and this he declares he took to be ſo. And in his following words he ſaith, *That thoſe who did moſt eſteem and value their own Minds, the Gods did regard as their friends, and ſuch as did the beſt actions.* That word Ἀντευποιεῖν is very emphatical in this caſe; for it implies a *Retribution of a Reward* for doing good. So that here we have the complacency, which God takes in thoſe that are good, and do good; and the reaſonableneſs of expecting a Recompenſe for it. *Ariſtotle* was no Fool, but was eſpecially admired by very great Men, particularly by *Cicero,* and *Quintilian,* and *Pliny,* for *the greatneſs of his Wit and Subtilty:* and ſuch a Perſon would never have been guilty of ſo great impertinency to ſet down ſuch Expreſſions as theſe, if he had not thought them fit to be believ'd; but he would have ſet ſome mark upon them, that they were the Opinions of other Men, and not his own. And in this caſe he had more particular reaſon to have done it. For any one that compares theſe expreſſions with thoſe in *Plato,* 10 *de Rep.* would think that *Ariſtotle* had taken them from thence. For *Plato* there ſaith the ſame thing, *That a good Man is* Θεοφιλὴς, *one in favor with* God; *and whoſoever is ſo, ſhall receive the beſt things from him. And we cannot ſuppoſe, that he that deſigns to be good, and minds the practice of Virtue, will be neglected above, when he makes it his buſineſs to be as like* God *as he can.* And *Plato,* who was far from being uncertain as to Providence, makes uſe of the ſame kind of expreſſion. *It is not probable that he ſhould be neglected of one ſo like him.* And *Ariſtotle* in the foregoing Chapter ſaith, *The Gods are in a ſtate of perpetual Bliſs, and Mankind are capable of Happineſs, as they come nearer to reſemblance of them.* Can any Expreſſions come nearer than theſe do?

Eth. l. 1. c. 10.

Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα, καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι. Εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ· τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ Νοῦς. *Eth. l.* 10. *c.* 9.

Καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας.

Ariſtoteles vir ſummo ingenio, ſcientiæ copia. *Tuſc.* 1. 4. 10. *Acad.* 1. 4. Singulari vir ingenio Ariſtoteles, & pene Divino. *De Div.* 1. 25. *Quint.* X. 1. *Plin. N. H. l.* 8. 16, 18, 34.

Εἰκός γ' ἔφη τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

Ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει.

We find *Ariſtotle* on other occaſions not very ſhy of expreſſing his diſſent from *Plato*, even in theſe Books of Morals. How warmly doth he diſpute againſt *Plato*'s notion of *Ideas?* He ſaith, *there are three kinds of Men pretend to Happineſs; the ſenſual and voluptuous,* which he ſaith, *is the Happineſs of Slaves and Brutes: The buſy and active Men place it in Honor, which is not in their power.* But beſides theſe, *there are thoſe who place it in Contemplation, which is moſt agreeable to the moſt perfect faculty we have.* But then he ſaith, *Some Friends of his had introduced Ideas to this purpoſe; however he was reſolved to prefer truth before them.* Here we ſee he ſticks not at contradicting *Plato, as to his Ideas*; but is ſo far from doing it in the preſent caſe, that he takes his very Expreſſions as his own; which he would never have done, if he had not thought them agreeable to Truth and Reaſon. He did not like *Plato*'s *Ideas*, nor his *Poetical Fictions* about a Future State, which made him more reſerved in diſcourſing about it; but he was ſatisfy'd in theſe three things: 1. That the Mind of Man was capable of a real Happineſs diſtinct from the Body. 2. That this Happineſs lies in a ſimilitude to GOD, as the moſt perfect Being. 3. That it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe GOD ſhould make the beſt to be moſt happy.

Ethic. 1. 34.

Mag. Mor. 1. 5. In his *Great Morals*, he declares it *not to be Courage but Madneſs not to be afraid of the Gods.* And if there be no Providence, what reaſon can there be for Fear?

Eudem. l. 7. c. 15. In the concluſion of his *Eudemian Morals*, he makes it *the beſt end of a Man to contemplate* GOD, *and ſaid; that it argues a very ill mind to hinder his Worſhip and Service, and the beſt temper of mind to be little affected with ſenſual Inclinations; and this,* ſaith he, *is the great end of Virtue and Goodneſs.*

Theſe are not the Expreſſions of a Man that deſpis'd GOD and Providence; and we are certain theſe were his, as we are, that we have any Books of his. For even *Fr. Patritius* himſelf makes very ſlight Objections againſt them; and the Author of the antient *Paraphraſe* upon his *Ethicks ad Nichomachum* (ſuppos'd to be *Andronicus Rhodius*) is a far better evidence for them, who is ſaid to have *paraphraſed upon* Ariſtotle*'s Writings*, and not upon any other Man's. And he puts this matter out of doubt; for he thus *paraphraſes* his words, *If* GOD *doth take care of Mankind*, καθάπερ πᾶσι δοκεῖ ϗ ἄν γε, *as it ſeems to all and is true.* And not only *Plutarch* in the Life of *Sylla*, but *Porphyry* in that of *Plotinus*, ſay, *that* Andronicus Rhodius *took great care in digeſting and explaining* Ariſtotle*'s Works.*

Diſcuſſ. Peripatet. To. 1. l. 3.

Paraphr. Ethic. l. 10. c. 10.

Let us now compare theſe Sayings with the Objections taken out of him againſt Providence. *Alex. Aphrodiſienſis* is of opinion that *Ariſtotle* meant no more by *Providence*, but *an univerſal care to preſerve the Species of things, and the Order of the World; but he doth not deny that ſo far it extends even to ſublunary things.* But if he did allow ſuch an univerſal Providence as to the good of the World; I ask then, Whether GOD did know and intend this Good and Order that is in the World? If he did, then his great Argument againſt particular Providence is taken off; which was, *That it was below the Divine Perfections to take notice of ſuch mean things.* For if it were not below it at firſt to appoint and order theſe things, then it cannot be below it to mind or regard them. And ſince they cannot deny ſuch an *Univerſal Providence*, they cannot for this reaſon reject a Particular; for it is no more unbecoming GOD to regard the good of his Creatures, than it was at firſt to make them. But *Ariſtotle* utterly rejects their Opinion, that attributed the making of things, or the order that appears in them, to blind Neceſſity or Chance; and then God muſt have a Power and Will to make and order theſe things as they are, and with a deſign for the good of the whole. Then it follows, that a Providence that regards the good of the whole, as agreeable to the Divine Nature; and why not then a Particular Providence for the ſame end? If the ſame Power and Wiſdom can manage the whole for that end, with regard to Particular Events, why ſhould that be rejected, and the other allowed?

All that is pleaded from *Ariſtotle* is this, *That the knowledg and care of particular things is troubleſom and uneaſy; that the Eternal Being is happy in it ſelf; and it's better not to ſee and know ſome things, than to ſee and know them.* But I urge from *Ariſtotle* himſelf, that he yields, that the Divine Happineſs doth not lie in *an Unactive ſtate*, or ſuch *a perpetual ſleep, as they fancied of* Endymion. And what can be more agreeable to infinite Goodneſs, than ſuch an Activity as imploys it ſelf in the care of his Creatures?

Metaphyſ. l. 14. c. 6.

Moral. l. 10. c. 8.

But, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *How can* God *underſtand any thing below himſelf? He is a perfect object, and fit for his own contemplation, and all other things are infinitely below him.* If any made the Divine Happineſs to conſiſt in the knowledg of his Creatures, they were extremely miſtaken; but I do not find that *Socrates* or *Plato*, who were hearty Aſſertors of Providence, ſay any thing like it; All that they ſay, is, That God being infinitely good and wiſe, takes care of the good of the whole, and eſpecially of thoſe that are good; and if he did not, it muſt be either from want of Power or Will, neither of which can be ſuppos'd in the Divine Nature. And if he wants neither of theſe, why is it not done? It cannot be ſaid, *That* Ariſtotle *abſolutely denied* God's *knowledg of all things*; for in one place he ſaith, *It is the Character of a bad man to ſuppoſe any thing hidden from* God; and in another, *That we attribute to* God *the knowledg of all things.* But 'tis poſſible he might be to ſeek as to the manner of God's knowing all things, as who is not? But if he could not comprehend it, it doth not therefore follow, that he denied it. *If* God, ſaith he, *underſtands nothing, then he is like one that ſleeps, which is not conſiſtent with that veneration which we owe to* God. *If he doth underſtand, and the principal object be without himſelf, then he is not the beſt Subſtance himſelf.* But none ever thought, that if there were a God, the principal object of his Underſtanding could be without himſelf. But what repugnancy is there for Infinite Knowledg to comprehend all things? And ſo if there be things without himſelf, he muſt know them, or his Knowledg cannot be infinite. Could *Ariſtotle* imagin that the World and the order of it were of his making and contriving; and yet he know nothing beyond himſelf? Are the ſeveral *ſpecies of things* of his ordering and appointing, and yet he not know them? This is impoſſible. But *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *That his Eſſence, as moſt perfect, is the moſt proper object of Divine Contemplation; and his Underſtanding is nothing but the underſtanding of himſelf:* and ſo, as he expreſſes it, *his Underſtanding is the underſtanding of his Underſtanding.* Wherein, as *Scaliger* ſaith, he did apprehend things *ſupra humanum captum*; and I am apt to think ſo too. But our buſineſs is not to unfold the Myſtery of Divine Knowledg with reſpect to it ſelf, but to conſider whether it be repugnant to it to know other things? *If ſo*, ſaith *Ariſtotle, there muſt be a change and motion, but the Divine Eſſence is always*

Metaphyſ. l. 13. c. 5.

Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18.
De Poet. c. 15.

Scaliger.
Exercit. 365. n. 5.

the ſame. As tho' an Infinite Mind could not comprehend all things, without a change in it ſelf, or ſuch trouble as we find in our gradual perceptions of things, which ariſes from our Weakneſs and Imperfection. The Objection from *the meaneſs of things* is very inconſiderable. For, if they were fit to make up a part of the Order of the World, why are they below Divine Knowledg and Providence? If God thought fit to make them, why not to preſerve them?

Yes, ſay they, *as to the ſpecies he doth, but not as to all the little accidents about them,* The Schoolmen diſtinguiſh in Providence the *Ratio Ordinis* from the *Executio Ordinis*; the firſt they ſay, is wholly immediate, the other is by ſubordinate Cauſes, which we call the Courſe of Nature; which is no more than the common Order which God hath appointed in the World; which generally obtains, but yet ſo as that there muſt be a due ſubordination to the firſt Agent; if he ſees cauſe for particular ends to order things otherwiſe. And I cannot ſee any kind of incongruity or repugnancy in ſuch a Suppoſition, becauſe it anſwers the ſame ends, which the original intention and deſign of Univerſal Providence doth. As that in the ordinary courſe of Nature, Fire burns, *i. e.* diſſolves that contexture of Bodies which it meets with; and this it doth by virtue of that order of Cauſes and Effects, which is eſtabliſhed by Univerſal Providence: but ſuppoſe that there be a ſtop put to this method by an extraordinary act for great and wiſe ends becoming the ſupreme Governor of the World, why ſhould not this be as agreeable to the Deſign of Providence, as the firſt appointment of things in the common order was? Why not as well to work miraculous cures at ſome times, as to leave things to the ordinary methods at other times; But we muſt ſtill ſuppoſe the ends to be wiſe, and great, and good; for otherwiſe they do not reach the general deſign of Providence; and we mean no other particular Providence, but ſuch as anſwers the ſame general ends which an Univerſal Providence is deſigned for.

Magn. Moral. l. 2. c. 4.

But, ſaith *Ariſtotle, If we ſuppoſe a particular Providence with reſpect to Mankind, then he muſt give to Men here according to their deſerts; which cannot be, ſince bad men often meet with good fortune; and therefore* God *being Lord over theſe things would deal unjuſtly as a Judg, which is not becoming him to do.* Here it cannot be deny'd that *Ariſtotle* doth exclude a *Judicial Diſpoſal* of theſe things; for if it were ſuch, his Argument muſt hold; but we diſtinguiſh between that and a *Providential management*, in order to the real good of Mankind. And I need no other than *Ariſtotle*'s own Arguments in this caſe: for if a Man's real happineſs lies in *a ſimilitude of the mind to* God, how can that be inconſiſtent with Divine Juſtice to exerciſe good Men here in ſuch a manner, as tends moſt to draw off their Minds from theſe tranſitory and decaying pleaſures? And if theſe things cannot make a Man really happy without virtue, which is the great deſign of his *Morals* to prove; how is it inconſiſtent with his Juſtice to let bad Men meet with good fortune? For theſe things can be no demonſtrations of the favor or diſpleaſure of God, which himſelf grants relates moſt to the inward temper of Mens Minds. But the real difficulty in this caſe, is a ſuppoſition that there is no future ſtate. I confeſs that *Plato* clears this matter

Plato de Rep. l. 10.

eaſily and plainly; *A good man,* ſaith he, *if he be under poverty, diſeaſes, or other difficulties here, will find theſe things end in good to him, living or dying; and he makes no queſtion of ſuch a one's happineſs in another ſtate.* But *Ariſtotle* is upon a great reſerve, as to a future ſtate;

and altho' he aſſerts the poſſibility of it ſufficiently, from what he ſaith of the Nature of the Mind of Man, as diſtinct from the principle of Life; yet I am afraid *Plato*'s giving too much way to ſuch *Poetical Fictions*, as that of *Herus Pamphilius*, made *Ariſtotle* more cautious as to what he ſaid concerning it, unleſs he could go upon ſurer grounds. He grants, That *the Mind is of a nature diſtinct from the Body, and ſeparable from it*, that *it comes from without*; that *it is capable of pleaſures more Divine* than the Body can enjoy or apprehend: But when he had gone thus far, the mere light of Reaſon would carry him no farther; and therefore he rather forbore to ſay any thing than affirm what he could not prove. As *Socrates* ſaid in the caſe of Prayer, in the ſecond *Alcibiades*, *they muſt ſtay till they were better inform'd*. Which is a mighty advantage in behalf of Divine Revelation. But of that afterwards.

Ariſtot. de Anim. l. 1. *c.* 5.
L. 3. *c.* 5.
De Part. Anim. l. 1. *c.* 1.
De Gen. Anim. l. 2. *c.* 3.
De Part. Anim. l. 4. *c.* 10.
Eth. l. 10. *c.* 7, 8, 9.

Thus far I have conſider'd the Perſons of greateſt Reputation in *Greece*, and compar'd their Opinions and the grounds they went upon; and I ſhall proceed no farther there, becauſe the following Sects were deriv'd from theſe, and they fell into quarrels and contentions with one another, which I have no occaſion at preſent to conſider. And therefore I ſhall now give an Account of another ſet of Philoſophers, who ſettled in that part of *Italy*, which lay towards *Sicily*, and was call'd *Magna Græcia*; and this was called the *Pythagorean Sect*: which I ſhall inquire into, with reſpect to the preſent Subject. *Pythagoras* was a Man of wonderful eſteem for his wiſdom, not only in thoſe parts, but at *Rome* too. For *Pliny* and *Plutarch* tell us, *That the Roman Senate erected a Statue to him, as to the wiſeſt Man*: but *Pliny* wonders that *Socrates was not preferr'd before him*. But the *Romans* had a particular veneration for *Pythagoras*; from the Tradition that *Numa* the wiſeſt of their Kings was inſtructed by him. It's true that this is contradicted by *Cicero* and *Livy*, (two great Men) but *Plutarch* thinks, *that they had no certain meaſure of times to direct them to judg by*; as he ſhews from *Clodius his Index*: And there are other odd circumſtances, as to *Numa*, which favor the correſpondence; as his Laws about *Worſhip* and *Sacrifices*, mention'd by *Plutarch*; and eſpecially the *Greek Books* found in his Tomb, diſtinct from thoſe of the *Pontifical Rites*; for which *Pliny* produces unexceptionable Authorities. Even *Livy* himſelf, who thought it a miſtake about *Pythagoras*, yet confeſſes, *the Books contain'd the wiſdom of the* Greeks *at that time*. If *Pythagoras* was contemporary with *Thales* (as we are told he took his advice about going into *Egypt*) what *Wiſdom of the* Greeks was there before *Thales*? But *Varro*'s teſtimony is plain as well as the reſt, *that theſe Books contain'd the Greek Philoſophy*. And what *Greek Philoſophy* could come to *Numa*, but that of *Pythagoras*? And therefore *Ovid* makes no ſcruple of ſaying, *That* Numa *did conſult him*. But if *Pythagoras* was in ſuch eſteem at *Rome*, *how came theſe Books to be ſo ſolemnly burnt by the order of the Senate, after they were diſcover'd? Livy* ſaith, *becauſe they tended to diſſolve their Religion*: which *Lactantius* carries too far, when he ſaith, *That they tended to overthrow all Religion*. A moſt improbable ſtory! That *Numa* ſhould take ſuch care that Poſterity ſhould believe him to have been a notorious Impoſtor. Do Men that deceive the World, write Books on purpoſe to let others ſee they have deceiv'd Mankind? No; they take all poſſible care to prevent any ſuſpicion of that kind. But *Numa* could not think otherwiſe, but theſe Books would in time come to light? And it is a wonder

that

Plin. N. H. l. 34. *c.* 6.
Plutarch. in Numâ.
Tuſc. l. 1. 16. *IV.* 1.
Plut. Num.
Plin. N. H. l. 13. *c.* 13.
Liv. l. 40.
Ovid. Met. l. 15.
Lact. 1. 22.

that they were ſo long concealed ; and ſo *Pliny* ſaith ; for they lay there 535 years : *Plutarch* ſaith, *but about* 400 years, which others ſay is a great miſtake. However, it was a long time before they were diſcover'd ; *by a great ſhower*, ſaith *Plutarch* ; by *plowing*, ſaith *Pliny* and others.

But ſtill, why were theſe Books burnt ? The true account I take to be this. *Numa*'s Religion was very different from what then obtain'd among them. And *Q. Petilius* the *Prætor*, having got a ſight of them, ſaith *Livy*, *from his Kinſman* L. Petilius, *in whoſe Ground they were found*, very officiouſly inform'd the Senate that they were Books of dangerous conſequence to their Religion ; and upon his Oath, they order'd the burning of them. Now *Numa*, as *Plutarch* ſaith, had expreſly forbidden any Images in Divine worſhip, which he ſaith continued for 160 years among the *Romans* ; and the reaſon he gives was, *that the firſt or ſupreme Being according to* Numa, *was not ſenſible or viſible, but was inviſible, pure, and only to be apprehended by the Mind* ; which ſaith he, was very agreeable to the Doctrine of *Pythagoras :* and the Sacrifices he appointed were unbloody, *of meal and wine, and other eaſy things.* But theſe things were ſoon chang'd ; for *Plutarch* ſaith that *Tullus Hoſtilius*, his immediate Succeſſor, *chang'd the Devotion which* Numa *had ſet up into great Superſtition* ; which daily increaſing, it was no wonder that they ſhould then order *Numa*'s *Books* to be burnt, which upbraided them with their ſuperſtitious folly. But by this we ſee what *Pythagoras* his notion of GOD and his worſhip was. *Ovid* admires him *for his ſkill in Divinity and Philoſophy* ; *for his giving an account of the beginning and nature of things.*

——Iſque licet cœli regione remotos
Mente Deos adiit, & quæ natura negabat
Viſibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hauſit.

So that, if we may truſt a Poet (and ſurely his Authority is as good as that of *Lucretius*) *Pythagoras* aſſerted *the being of* GOD, *and the beginning of the World.*

———Magni primordia Mundi,
Et rerum cauſas, & quid natura docebat ;
Quid Deus, unde Nives, quæ fulminis eſſet origo.

Cyrill. contra Jul. l. 1. There is a large deſcription of GOD extant in St. *Cyril* againſt *Julian*, according to *Pythagoras* ; wherein GOD is ſaid to be *intimately preſent in the World, the beginning of all things, the mind aud ſoul, and motion of the Univerſe.* Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 27. And ſo *Velleius* in *Cicero*, ſaith that according to *Pythagoras*, GOD *was a Mind diffus'd thro' the World.* Which is likewiſe expreſs'd by *Virgil* in his known Verſes, *Mens agitat molem*, &c. *Philoaus*, a noted Scholar of *Pythagoras*, (whoſe Books brought the *Pythagorean Learning* into eſteem in *Greece*) gives this deſcription of GOD, * *That he is the eternal Governor and Ruler over all, being one and the ſame always, and different from all others.* Which we find in *Philo*, and have no reaſon to miſtruſt his Teſtimony ; conſidering what the other *Pythagoreans* ſaid concerning the Divine Nature. They made GOD to be *one Eternal, perfect Being, and that the happineſs of Mankind lay in a*

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* Ἐςὶ γὰρ φησὶν, Ἡγεμὼν κὴ Ἄρχων ἁπάντων Θεὸς, εἷς ἐςὶν ὢν μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. *Philo de Mundi Opific. p.* 23.

ſimilitude to him; as appears by the *Pythagorean Fragments* in *Stobæus*, and elſewhere, which I need not repeat; but I ſhall only ſet down the paſſages of *Zaleucas* and *Charondas*, who were known *Pythagoreans* as appears by *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Laertius*, &c. in the excellent Prefaces to their Laws. *Zaleucus* ſaith, *That in the firſt place all perſons ought* Stob. Serm. 42. p. 279. *to own and acknowledge the Gods*; *which*, ſaith he, *is manifeſt by ſeeing the Heaven and the World, and the order that is therein*; *for theſe are not the work of Fortune, or of Mens hands*; *and they ought to be worſhip'd and honour'd as the Author of all good things to us. And to that end they ought to keep their Souls pure from evil*; *for* GOD *is not honour'd by bad men, nor by coſtly ſacrifices, but by virtue, and the choice of good and juſt actions.* *Charondas* ſaith, *That Men ought to begin their actions with pi-* p. 289. *ety. For* GOD *is the cauſe of all: and they muſt abſtain from evil actions, for the ſake of their reſpect to* GOD. *For* GOD *hath no regard to wicked perſons.* Theſe were Men of great and juſt eſteem in their Cities, and their memory is preſerv'd by all that ſpeak of them with great veneration.

I might purſue this matter much farther; but if this be not ſufficient to my purpoſe, more will be leſs regarded: for Mankind are better pleas'd with *Choice* than *a Heap*; and I have only pitch'd upon Perſons of great eſteem in the World. Only *Pythagoras* did not go down well with ſome of the *Greeks*, becauſe of his *Myſtical* and *Symbolical ways* of Inſtruction; which the *Greeks* were by no means fond of; as appears by *Xenophon*'s Epiſtle to *Æſchines* (if it be genuine, and I ſee little reaſon to queſtion it) for he upbraids *Plato* with mixing *the Pythagorick Extravagancies* with the plain Doctrine of *Socrates*, which *Xenophon* kept ſtrictly to. But as to *Pythagoras* himſelf, *Cicero* extols him *for his wiſdom* and *Quality*; and he ſaith, *The Pythagoreans for a great while were* Tuſc. 4. 1. *accounted the only Learned men.* De Leg. 2. 9. *Pliny* admires him for *his ſagacity*; *Apuleius* for *the greatneſs of his Wit*; and the People of *Crotone* aud *Me-* Tuſc. I. 16. *tapontum, as more than a Man.* Plin. N. H. 2. 21. His greateſt fault was that he was too wiſe; Apul. Flor. for he lock'd up his Secrets ſo cloſe, that the greateſt part of Mankind were not much the better for them; Iambl. vit. Pyth. c. 6. 10. only the Cities of *Magna Grecia* were wonderfully reform'd by his means (if the *Pythagoreans* may be believ'd) but at laſt the prevalent Faction of *Cylon* and his brutiſh Party at *Crotone* deſtroy'd many of the Diſciples of *Pythagoras*, and diſperſed the reſt. And *Pythagoras* himſelf ended his days either by violence, or the diſcontent he had to find his good deſigns diſappointed in ſuch a manner. The reputation of his School was for ſome time kept up by *Archytas* and *Philolaus*; and ſome that eſcaped the common danger, as *Lyſis* (who went to *Epaminondas* in *Greece*, and is ſuppos'd to have publiſhed the *Golden Verſes*) and ſeveral others are mention'd by *Porphyry* and *Iamblichus*. But *Porphyry* obſerves, That *they only preſerv'd ſome dark and obſcure notions of the* Pythagorick *Doctrine, and made wonderful ſecrets of them*; which he thinks did not contain the true Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; but only *ſome ſparks of it*, which were far from being clear. And the decay of the *Pythagorean Doctrine*, he doth not only impute to the violence of the Faction rais'd againſt the *Pythagorean Society* in thoſe Cities of *Italy* where they flouriſh'd; but to their *Enigmatical* way of expreſſing their minds by *Numbers* and *Figures*; and to the *Dorick Dialect*; which was almoſt ſacred among them: and after their Books were come into *Greece*, he ſaith, Plato *and others took out the beſt, and put it into ſmoother Language*, which made the reſt be ſlighted. And he thinks ſome *invented things on purpoſe in their names to expoſe them the more.* So that it is no eaſy matter to judg now what was the genuine *Pythagorean Doctrine*, except what we find mix'd with *Plato*; who had the beſt opportunities of underſtanding their Doctrine by going among them himſelf, and afterwards getting the Books of *Philolaus* into his hands. And *Porphyry* in the Life of *Plotinus* doth particularly commend him, for *joining the Doctrines of* Pythagoras *and* Plato *together, beyond any that had gone before him.* From whence it appears, that there was no difference between them, as to the firſt Cauſe and the Production of things.

But what ſhall we ſay to *Ocellus Lucanus*, who is mention'd as a Diſciple of *Pythagoras* by *Iamblichus*; and *Architas* in his Epiſtle to *Plato* mentions a Book of his of *the Generation of things*; which hath been often publiſh'd out of MSS. and doth plainly aſſert the *World's Eternity, and Being from it ſelf*; and ſo overthrows the *Pythagorean Doctrine* of God's being the Beginning of all;

In anſwer. That there is ſomething genuine of *Ocellus* extant, I do not queſtion. For *Stobæus* produces a Fragment out of his *Book of Law*, written in the *Dorick Dialect*, according to their cuſtom, and the precept of *Pythagoras*; wherein he doth poſitively aſſert, *That* God *was the cauſe of the World* αὐτᾶς δὲ αἴτιος ὁ Θεός· but that is not all; for he ſaith, *The Worla conſiſts of two parts, of that which governs, and is the principle of motion; and that which is called paſſive, and is governed*; the *firſt* he ſaith, *is Active and Divine, having Reaſon and Underſtanding; the other is made, unreaſonable, and liable to changes.* How can this be reconciled to the Principles of the other Book? And yet *Vizzanius* who compared it with ſeveral MSS. and publiſhed it, hath printed this Fragment at the end of the other. As to *the different Dialect*, he ſuppoſes *it was firſt written in* Dorick, *but after turn'd into the* Attick: but of this he offers no proof; only he ſaith, *It was done as words are tranſlated out of* Portugueſe *into* Caſtilian; or which anſwers more to the *Doric*, out of *Scotch* into *Engliſh*. No one queſtions but ſuch things have been done, and may be ſo again. But how doth it appear that the whole Book was ſo? For there are ſome Fragments of this very piece in *Stobæus* in the *Dorick Dialect*, which is the concluſion of the firſt Chapter, and ſome parts of the ſecond and third; which I ſuppoſe to have been genuine, and the groundwork of the reſt; which ſome unknown Philoſopher built more upon, and turn'd theſe Fragments into the *Attick Greek*, to make them all of a piece. The *Pythagoreans* did aſſert, that the World was incorruptible, as appears by the Fragments of *Philolaus* and others in *Stobæus*; but that which is aſſerted in this Piece is, That the World was ſelf-originated, which was contrary to their Doctrine, and of *Ocellus Lucanus* himſelf. There can be no diſpute about the Fragment of the Book of Law, where his opinion is plain and clear, *That* God *is the cauſe of all*, and that *the firſt Cauſe is a wiſe and intelligent Being*: let us now compare this with the Doctrine of this Book, wherein he aſſerts, * *That the World is the cauſe of perfection to other things, and therefore is perfect from it ſelf. Vizzanius* would have it believ'd that this was *the Peripatetic Doctrine*: If he means that *of Ariſtotle* I have already ſhew'd how falſe it is; ſince he ſo plainly derives the being and perfection of the World *from* God, and not *from it ſelf.* But that which will give the greateſt light into this matter is, that *Nogarola*, who publiſh'd *Ocellus* in *Italy* with Notes, obſerves, that *Critolaus* the

Stob. Eclog. *Phyſ. c.* 16. *p.* 32.

Stob. Eclog. *Phyſ. c.* 24. *p.* 44.

* Οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον γινόμενον τῆς αὐτοτελείας αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτοτελές. *Ocell. Lucan. c.* 1.

the *Peripatetick* in *Philo*, us'd the ſame Argument, *That the World muſt be eternal, becauſe it is the cauſe of its own Being, and of other things in it.* Now this *Critolaus* ſucceeded in the *Peripatetick* School at *Athens*, after the Doctrine of it about the beginning of things had been alter'd by *Strato Lampſacenus*, who as *Cicero* tells us, *attributed all to Nature, and nothing to* GOD; *ſuppoſing that Nature had all Cauſes within it ſelf.* And ſo *Plutarch* ſaith, that *Strato* the *Peripatetick ſuppoſed Nature alone to give a Being to all things from it ſelf.* Here we have found the very Principle of this Book, which goes under the name of *Ocellus Lucanus*, which is repugnant to what himſelf had expreſly declar'd; but ſome one of theſe *Atheiſtick Peripateticks* at *Athens* finding that *Ocellus Lucanus* had ſaid ſomething that might be turn'd to their purpoſe, takes what was antient of *Ocellus*, and puts it out of the *Dorick* into the *Attick Dialect*, and makes a ſhort *Syſtem of the Univerſe*, which they thought would better paſs in the World under the name of antient *Pythagorean*. And this ſeems to me the trueſt account of this matter. As for the Arguments themſelves, ſuch as they are, I ſhall conſider them in a more proper place.

Phil. Oper. p. 946.

Acad Qu. l. 4. *c.* 38.

Cicer. de N. D. l. 1.

Plut. adv. Colot.

Thus I have gone thro' the Opinions of the eldeſt Philoſophers of greateſt eſteem about GOD *and Providence, and the production of the World.* But before I proceed farther, it will be neceſſary to make ſome Reflections on the foregoing Diſcourſe, which may be very ſerviceable to my following Deſigns.

1. That thoſe Philoſophers who aſſerted *the Being of* GOD *and Providence*, were Perſons of the greateſt reputation for Wiſdom and Knowledg, and did not hold theſe things merely from Tradition, but from the ſtrongeſt evidence of Reaſon: which appear'd by this, that after the Atheiſtical Hypotheſes of *Anaximander* and *Democritus* were ſtarted, they were not in the leaſt mov'd by them; but ſaw an abſolute neceſſity in point of Reaſon of holding a Firſt Cauſe, which not only gave a beginning to the World, but continued to govern it. Even *Ariſtotle* owning an Univerſal Providence from ſuch Reaſons as will hold much farther.

2. That theſe Philoſophers who follow'd their Natural Reaſon, were very far from looking on *the Univerſe* as made up *only of Bodies*, or that *an Incorporeal Subſtance imply'd a Contradiction.* Theſe were Perſons who underſtood very well what a *Contradiction* meant; and if there had been any ſuch Repugnancy in the notion of *Mind* or *Spirit* as diſtinct from Body, they would have found it out. But *Anaxagoras* aſſerted a *Superior Mind* antecedent to Matter or Body; ſo did *Socrates* and *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle* too, who expreſly aſſerts GOD to be *an Eſſence without bulk and indiviſible, or without any Parts*; but this can never agree to a Body, altho' never ſo *fine and ſubtle.* And *Cicero* tells us, That *they could have no other notion of* GOD, *but as a free Mind, remote from any compoſition, knowing and perceiving, and moving all things.* Even the *Stoicks*, who blunder'd moſt in this matter, yet yielded GOD to be *Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis*, as *Balbus* in * *Tully* calls him; and † *Zeno* in *Laertius* deſcribes GOD *to be an Immortal, Rational and moſt happy Being, uncapable of evil, and taking care of the World.* || *Seneca* ſaith, *the World was framed by* GOD, *or by Incorporeal Reaſon.* If at other times they ſeem to contradict this, we are not here concern'd to clear or vindicate them; becauſe my Inquiry is confin'd to thoſe who were elder, and not ſo given to Paradoxes and Innovation in Terms, as the *Stoicks* were.

Metaphyſ. l. 14. *c.* 7.

Nec verò Deus ipſe qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi poteſt, niſi mens ſoluta quædam & libera, ſegregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia ſentiens & movens, ipſaque prædicta motu ſempiterno. *Tuſc. l.* 26.

* *Cicero de Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

† *Laert. vit. Zenon.*

|| *Seneca Conſol. ad Hel. c.* 8.

3. That the true and complete Happineſs of Mankind lay in a ſimilitude to God. Herein *Socrates* and *Pythagoras*, and their Scholars agreed, as abundantly appears in the *Pythagorean Fragments*; and that the way to be like God, is to be *virtuous, and good, and wiſe*; and that all other things, which Mankind are apt to value ſo much, fall infinitely ſhort of this. And I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* himſelf came to this at laſt, for which I have produc'd unqueſtionable Authorities from his Works.

4. That Religion and Piety are very great and commendable Virtues in Mankind. *Plato* ſaid, *the greateſt*. *Pythagoras* gave very good Rules about Divine Worſhip, that it ſhould be perform'd *ſeriouſly and with great attention of Mind*, and not by *the By, and by Chance*. That *our Minds were moſt affected with Religion and Piety in the due Worſhip of* God; *that we ſhould undertake nothing without Prayer*; wherein *Socrates* and *Plato* agree with him. And *Ariſtotle* look'd on it as *Madneſs to deſpiſe God and Religion*.

Plut. in Numa. Cicero de Leg. l. 2.

Aur. Carm. 49.

5. That good Men are to bear the troubles of this World as well as they can, and to look for Happineſs in a Future State. This appear'd by the carriage of *Socrates* at his death, and his Diſcourſes then; and the Courage and Conſtancy of *Pythagoras* and his *Diſciples*, when they were ſo miſerably handled by their inveterate Enemies; ſetting fire in the Houſe where they met, baniſhing ſome, and famiſhing others, and diſperſing the reſt.

6. That there was a common conſent of Mankind, as to the Being of God, and Immortality of Souls. Which appears not only by expreſs teſtimonies of Philoſophers, but by their appeals to the ſenſe of former Ages and diſtant Nations about them.

7. That, notwithſtanding that Light of Reaſon, which they had, yet they found it ſo defective in many things, that they thought nothing more deſirable than a clear Revelation about ſuch things, which were of great importance to Mankind, but they found to be out of their reach to recover; as appear'd by the Confeſſion of *Socrates*, and the Silence of *Ariſtotle* about a Future State, when his Reaſon could only go to the poſſibility, and not to the undoubted certainty of it. For I have ſhew'd that *Ariſtotle* hath aſſerted ſo much concerning the Nature and Properties of the Soul, or rather the Mind of Man, that it cannot be deſtroy'd by Death; but yet he was ſo far to ſeek concerning a Future State after Death, by reaſon of the Poetical Fictions about it, that he rather choſe to ſay nothing, than what might be thought fabulous or uncertain.

And now, I hope, I have ſufficiently clear'd the firſt thing which I undertook, which was to ſhew, That it was a moſt unreaſonable prejudice againſt Religion, *that it was only a contrivance of Prieſts and Politicians for their own ends*.

II. I come now to conſider in the next place, what account is given by ſuch Men of that impreſſion of Religion, which hath been upon the Minds of Men in all Ages. And the Cauſe muſt be as general as the Effect: Since then we find this Effect of Religion in all kinds of Men, ſome univerſal and common Reaſon muſt be aſſign'd for it: which is the thing I am now to conſider. And ſince no Perſon hath undertaken this Matter in ſuch a manner, as Mr. *Hobbes* hath done, I ſhall particularly examin what he hath ſaid concerning it. *Seeing there are no ſigns, nor fruit of Religion but in Man only, there is no cauſe to doubt, but that the Seed of Religion is alſo only in Man, and conſiſteth in ſome peculiar Quality, or at leaſt in ſome eminent degree thereof not to be found in other living Creatures.*

Leviathan, ch. 12.

But what is this *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* For therein the difficulty lies. How come Men of all ſorts to be poſſeſs'd with it? Not merely the unthinking Multitude, but Men of the deepeſt Senſe and greateſt Capacity, and who have taken the moſt pains to inquire into theſe matters.

And firſt, ſaith he, *It is peculiar to the Nature of Man to be inquiſitive into Cauſes of the Events they ſee, ſome more ſome leſs; but all Men ſo much as to be curious in the ſearch of the Cauſes of their own good and evil Fortune. To be inquiſitive into the Cauſes of Events* is very proper for Rational Beings; but we do not mean ſuch as relate merely *to their own good or evil Fortune*, which is no commendable curioſity; but into the nature and reaſon of things, which they ſee in the World; and this we ſay leads Men to a firſt Cauſe, which is GOD. This he mentions in the next words.

Secondly, Upon the ſight of any thing that hath a beginning to think alſo it had a Cauſe, to determin the ſame to begin when it did, rather than ſooner or later.

And was not this a very reaſonable thought? For *what hath a Beginning* muſt certainly *have a Cauſe* which produced it, which determined its Being at that time. And if this be ſuch a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*, then there is ſomething in Reaſon which carries them to the owning a GOD, which gave a Being to the World, and to the things in it.

Thirdly, Man obſerveth how one Event hath been produced by another, and remembreth in them Antecedence and Conſequence; and if he cannot find out the true Cauſes of things, he ſuppoſes Cauſes of them rather from his own fancy, or Authority of others whom he eſteems.

But how come Mankind not *to find out the true Cauſes of things?* For this is here very ſlily ſuppos'd, without giving the leaſt reaſon for it; and withal the things that Men ſearch for *the Cauſes* of, are ſuppos'd to be *only* ſuch as relate *to their good and evil Fortune* (which are ſaid to be *for the moſt part inviſible*;) but is it not poſſible for Men to inquire into the Cauſes of other things, which we plainly ſee? Do we not ſee our own Bodies, and thoſe of other Animals, as well as the Heavens and Earth? and is it not as proper and reaſonable for Mankind to inquire into the Cauſes of theſe, as well as into their *good and evil Fortune?* What ſtrange ſtuff is this to ſuppoſe all Mankind only to run after *Fortune-tellers*, and never to concern themſelves about the Cauſes of the viſible World? Could any one that in the leaſt pretended to *Philoſophy*, ever think ſo meanly of the reſt of Mankind? But theſe are *the Cauſes* which we ſearch for, and we hope Natural Reaſon will conduct Men in this inquiry to their ſatisfaction; ſo that they need not to have recourſe to *Fancy* or *Authority*.

But he goes on: *The two firſt make Anxiety*, i. e. a Man's *Inquiſitiveneſs into Cauſes* in general, and *thinking that what had a Beginning muſt have a Cauſe. For being aſſur'd that there be Cauſes of all things, this fills him with ſolicitude for the time to come; and ſo his Heart is gnaw'd on perpetually by fear of Death, Poverty, or other Calamity; and hath no repoſe or pauſe of his Anxiety but in Sleep.* What? Do Men think of nothing but what Calamities may befal them? And muſt they needs perpetually perplex themſelves with the fear of future Evils? Thoſe who were called *Philoſophers* in former times, thought it poſſible for ſuch who believed GOD and Providence, not to live under ſuch *perpetual anxiety*. But what follows? *This perpetual Fear always accompanying Mankind*

kind in the ignorance of Cauſes, as it were in the dark, muſt needs have for object ſomething; and therefore when there is nothing to be ſeen, there is nothing to accuſe, either of their good or evil Fortune, but ſome Power or Agent inviſible. Thence the Poets ſaid, that the Gods were firſt created by human Fear; which being ſpoken of the many Gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But how come we from the *Qualities* of Human Nature to fall upon *the Gods of the Gentiles?* The Queſtion was, What it is in Mankind which inclines them to believe a God? The Anſwer is, *That Fear made the Gods of the Gentiles.* What is that to *all Mankind?* Suppoſe there had been no ſuch Saying among the *Poets*, nor ſuch *Gods among the Gentiles*, the Queſtion ſtill remains, whence comes Mankind to apprehend a *Deity?* Doth it all come from a vain ſuperſtitious Fear, ſuch as Men have in the dark of they know not what; and becauſe they ſee nothing, they imagin ſome *Inviſible Power?* Is this the true ground of the Seed of Religion in Mens Minds? If ſo, then there is no ground in Reaſon to believe a God, but only an ignorant ſuperſtitious Fear.

Not ſo, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes. But the acknowledgment of One God, Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more eaſily be derived from the deſire Men have to know the Cauſes of Natural Bodies, and their ſeveral Virtues and Operations, than from the fear of what was to befal them in time to come.* What is the meaning of this? *The acknowledgment of One God may be more eaſily derived,* &c. If he had meant ſincerely, he would not have ſaid, *That it may be more eaſily derived*, but that no tolerable account can be given of thoſe things any other way. But we are to obſerve, That he makes *Ignorance* and *Fear* to be *the general Seeds of Religion in Mankind:* ſo that this *Acknowledgment of One* God doth not come from *the Seed of Religion*, but only from Mens being puzzled about a ſeries of Cauſes. *For*, as he goes on, *he that from any Effect he ſees come to paſs, ſhould reaſon to the next and immediate Cauſe thereof, and from thence to the Cauſe of that Cauſe, and plunge himſelf profoundly in the purſuit of Cauſes, ſhall at laſt come to this (even as the Heathen Philoſophers confeſs'd) one firſt Mover; that is, a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things, which is that which Men mean by the name of* God. This ſeems a plain confeſſion that *Reaſon* muſt carry Men to the owning *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things.* And is not Reaſon a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind?* How then comes *the Seeds of Religion* not to be plac'd therein, but *in Ignorance and Fear?* And he after ſaith, *That the Natural Seed of Religion lies in theſe four things; Opinion of Ghoſts, Ignorance of ſecond Cauſes, Devotion towards what Men fear, and taking things caſual for Prognoſticks.* How comes the *Natural Reaſon* of Mankind to be left out? If by that Men may be convinc'd of a *Firſt and Eternal Cauſe of things*, doth not that diſpoſe Men to a fear and reverence towards a Divine Majeſty? And is not that *Religion?* Then the beſt and trueſt Seed of Religion lies in that which moſt diſpoſeth the Mind to fear God. What is the meaning then, that *the Seed of Religion* is plac'd by him in things without Reaſon? If Men by Reaſon are brought to own or *acknowledg One* God *Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent;* doth not the ſame Reaſon oblige them to pay him that Reverence, and Fear, and Duty, which is owing to him? Therefore by this *Seed of Religion*, he really can mean nothing but an inclination to *Superſtition:* And to this purpoſe he ſpeaks in the concluſion of the foregoing Chapter. *And this Fear of things inviſible, is the Natural Seed of that which every one in himſelf calleth Religion; and in them that fear or worſhip that Power otherwiſe than they do, Superſtition.*

Here is a notable diſtinction found out between *Religion* and *Superſtition*; the former is the good word a Man gives to himſelf, the other the Nickname he beſtows on thoſe who differ from him. But in general, *Religion* and *Superſtition* are the ſame thing to him; unleſs a difference be found out from the *allowance* of one, and not of the other. So he ſaith in another place: *Fear of Power inviſible feign'd by the Mind, or imagin'd from tales publickly allow'd, is Religion; not allow'd, Superſtition.* So that what is feign'd and allow'd is *Religion*, and what is not allow'd is *Superſtition.* So that the Worſhip of the Heathen Gods, being from *Tales publickly allow'd*, was *Religion*, and not *Superſtition:* and the *Chriſtian Worſhip* under the Perſecution, was *Superſtition* and not *Religion.* No, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes: When the Power imagin'd is ſuch as we imagin, that is true Religion.* How can it be *true Religion*, if Religion be *a fear of a power imagined by the Mind, or from Tales publickly allow'd?* For if this be Religion in general, *true Religion* muſt be a *true Fiction*, a real *Chimara*, an allow'd piece of Nonſenſe. *But when the Power is ſuch as we imagin it, then*, ſaith he, *it is true Religion.* But if it were *a Power imagined to be ſuch as the Law makes it*, is not that *true Religion?* And if it contradicts what is ſo eſtabliſh'd, can this be according to Mr. *Hobbes's true Religion?* Then it follows, that the diſtinction doth not ariſe from the *Publick Allowance* or *Diſallowance.* For if it be poſſible for the Civil Power to *diſallow* the Worſhip of the true GOD, (as we know it hath too frequently happen'd) is ſuch Worſhip being diſallow'd *true Religion?* If it be, then it is impoſſible the other ſhould be true, that *Religion* is taken from the *Publick Allowance*, and *Superſtition* from the *Diſallowance.* But they who put in ſome Expreſſions only for a diſguiſe and concealment, know well enough that they contradict themſelves; and they know their Friends will allow them in it, as long as the true meaning may be underſtood by them: and the ſafeſt way of inſtilling Atheiſm is by writing Contradictions, *i. e.* by ſeeming at ſome times to own a GOD, but by the whole ſeries of the Diſcourſe to overthrow his Being, as a mere fancy of an inviſible Power rais'd by a predominant Fear. But hereby we ſee that *Fear* prevails ſo much on ſuch Men, that they dare not ſpeak conſiſtently; which is very unbecoming *Philoſophers.* As the groſs *Hypocriſy* of *Vaninus* before his diſcovery, and the moſt ſervile *Flatteries* and *Importunities* of *Theophile* in *France*, did ſhew how much the power of Fear may ſway in thoſe who have no Religion, (which may be allow'd in them.) But how comes Fear to be made out to be *the ſeed of Religion in Mankind?* This a true Diſciple to the *Leviathan*, in the Preface to his Book, hath undertaken to make out more fully than Mr. *Hobbes* had done; and therefore ought to be conſider'd in this place. *When Men*, ſaith he, *are under any great diſtreſs, and ſee not the way out of it, their Anxiety and Fear makes them act like Men diſtracted, and aſk any one's help, which at another time they would deſpiſe: ſo we find it as to Religion; when they are in great trouble, they run to their Prayers, and when they are over, their Devotion is ſoon cool'd, as he inſtances in* Alexander, *and might have done in many others.* But what is all this to the proof of the main Point? That Men are too prone to *Superſtition*, eſpecially under Calamities, there is no queſtion. But it is a moſt unreaſonable ſuppoſition, that all *Religion* is nothing elſe but *Superſtition*, which Men take up only when they are at their wits end. But if there be a GOD and Providence, as we find both the beſt *Philoſophers* aſſerted, and the

ſtrongeſt

Leviathan, ch. 6. p. 26.

Leſcaloper. in Cicer. de N. D. I. p. 127.

Tract. Theolog. Polit.

ſtrongeſt Reaſons prove it; then whatever Mens condition be as to this World, there is the ſame ground in Reaſon for a due Reverence and Worſhip to be paid to him. But it is a very bad way of arguing againſt all Religion, becauſe of ſome Mens extravagant Superſtition. *Some Men have run mad with Superſtition.* What follows? Therefore all *Religion* is *Madneſs.* Where lies any colour in the Argument? Some have been mad through an exceſs of Love; therefore all Love is Madneſs. No; but we muſt enquire into the proper objects and degrees of Love, whereof ſome are allowable, and ſome not. So here in the Paſſion of Fear, there is a violent, fooliſh, ungovernable Fear; but may there not be a prudent, wiſe and reaſonable Fear? It is madneſs and folly in great diſtreſſes to run to what cannot help us; but is it ſo to make our addreſſes to a Being infinitely wiſe and powerful, who alone can do it? Here lies the fundamental miſtake of theſe Men, they would have it taken for granted, that there is no GOD nor Providence, and then they cry out upon the fooliſh Fear and Superſtition of Mankind: but they cannot deny that if our foundations be true, Religion is a wiſe and reaſonable thing in Mankind; as it is an owning our Creator by a ſolemn ſubmiſſion to him, and invocation of his help, and dependence upon his Providence. Let any Man in his wits (let his condition as to this World be what it will) deny that it is reaſonable for him to be govern'd by one infinitely wiſer and better than himſelf. If his condition be proſperous, he hath more reaſon to be thankful; if it be troubleſome, he hath more reaſon to be patient, becauſe GOD knows beſt both how to ſupport him under it, and to deliver him out of it. But if there be no GOD nor Providence, he hath nothing but the miſerable comfort of neceſſity. *But, did not the multitude of Gods in the Gentile World come from their ignorant and ſuperſtitious Fear, as Mr.* Hobbes *hath at large ſhew'd?* Truly he needed not to have taken ſo much pains to prove a thing which no body denies. But what then? The Gentiles feign'd a great many Gods from their ſuperſtitious Fear; therefore there is no GOD but what is the effect of Fear. Is this good arguing? *But they fancied Powers inviſible, which were only in their own Imaginations.* Therefore there is *no Inviſible Power* but what depends upon Imagination. Can ſuch Men pretend to Reaſon, who talk at this rate? *But thoſe inviſible Powers they took to be Spirits, and that they were incorporeal, or immaterial, which are words of a contradictory ſignification.* This is news, and ought to have been prov'd in ſome meaſure, ſince the beſt Philoſophers who underſtood contradictions never thought ſo, as I have ſhew'd already. *But thoſe who by their meditation arrive to the acknowledgment of One Infinite, Omnipotent, Eternal* GOD, *choſe rather to confeſs he is incomprehenſible and above their Underſtanding, than to define his Nature by Spirit incorporeal, and then confeſs their definition to be unintelligible.* Do any that believe GOD to be *an Immaterial Subſtance*, confeſs this to be *unintelligible?* I rather believe that they think a *Material God* to be *unintelligible*, as being inconſiſtent with the Divine Perfections. And altho' they acknowledg that what is *Infinite*, is ſo far incomprehenſible; yet they may have clear and diſtinct conceptions of *a Firſt and Eternal Cauſe*, which is endued with Infinite Perfections. And this is not only attributed to him *as a Title of Honor with a pious intention*; but from the true ſenſe of their Minds, as to ſuch Attributes which are proper to GOD.

When Mr. *Hobbes* was charg'd with introducing *Atheiſm by denying Immaterial or Incorporeal Subſtances*, he undertook to defend himſelf; not only becauſe we ſay God *is incomprehenſible, but becauſe the notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance came from* Plato *and* Ariſtotle, *who miſtook thoſe thin Inhabitants of the Brain they ſee in ſleep for ſo many incorporeal Men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things Corporeal.* Before he ſeem'd only to ſay, That the ignorant ſuperſtitious People entertain'd this notion of *Spirits or inviſible powers being only Creatures of the Brain like the images in ſleep:* but now it ſeems *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* were no wiſer, and that we receive it from them. But I have made it appear that the difference of Mind and Matter was before them; and that not by mere fancy, but by invincible Reaſon: becauſe otherwiſe there could be no ſuch thing as the Motion and Diſpoſition of Matter in ſuch a manner, as we ſee it in the World. And this was the ground which thoſe Philoſophers went upon; who were as little given to be impos'd upon by their dreams, as any before or ſince their time. And it is a ſtrange confidence in any Man to think to bear down the general ſenſe of the moſt Philoſophical part of Mankind, with bare ſaying, that an Immaterial Subſtance implies a contradiction. But he offers to prove it, after an extraordinary manner; *For,* ſaith he, *it is in* Engliſh, *ſomething that without a Body ſtands under — Stands under what? Will you ſay, under Accidents?* Ridiculous! did *Plato* or *Ariſtotle* uſe the word Subſtance? And when it came to be us'd, the word ſignify'd the ſame with *Being*; and ſo the jeſt is quite loſt. Such pitiful things as theſe muſt paſs for Wit and Philoſophy with ſome Men.

Mr. Hobbes *conſider'd,* &c. p. 30.
p. 32.
p. 33.

But to proceed with Mr. *Hobbes*; After he hath reckon'd up the many follies which the Gentiles fell into by their ſuperſtitious Fear, he concludes in this manner. *So eaſy are Men to be drawn to believe any thing from ſuch as have got credit with them, and can with gentleneſs and dexterity take hold of their Ignorance and Fear.* Still we meet with nothing but the reſult of *Ignorance* and *Fear* in the *Gentile World.* We do not deny that Religion was exceedingly corrupted among them; but we affirm, that the true foundations of Religion were kept up among Men of Underſtanding; as fully appears by the Diſcourſes of *Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Ariſtotle, Cicero,* &c. Why are their Reaſons never ſo much as mention'd, and nothing thought worth inſiſting upon, but only the groſs ſuperſtitions and follies of the People? This doth not look like fair dealing with Mankind; to repreſent only the meaneſt and moſt deform'd parts, and to conceal what any ways tended to the honor of them, and of Religion. *Cicero* dealt with Mankind in this matter in a much more ingenuous and candid manner. He doth not conceal the follies either of the *People* or of the *Philoſophers* about their Gods; but then he ſets down all the Arguments for God and Providence, and urges them with all his force. And in other places he owns the *general conſent of Mankind*, as to the eſteem and worſhip of a Divine Nature: which he is far from imputing to *Mens Ignorance and Fear*; but he ſaith, *it is the voice of Nature it ſelf.* Nay he goes ſo far as to ſay, [*] *that there is nothing more evident to any one that looks up to the Heavens, than that there is a moſt excellent Mind, by which theſe things are govern'd,* [†] *And he queſti-*

Cicero de Nat. Deor.
Cic. de Leg. I. 8. *Tuſc. I.* 13. 15.

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[*] Quid enim poteſt eſſe tam apertum, tamq; perſpicuum, cum cœlum ſuſpeximus, cœleſtiaque contemplati ſumus, quam eſſe aliquod Numen præſtantiſſimæ mentis quo hæc regantur. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

[†] Quod qui dubitet, haud ſane intelligo, cur non idem Sol ſit an nullus ſit dubitare poſſit. Quid enim eſt hoc illo evidentius? *Ibid.*

ſtions, whether it be more evident that the Sun ſhines. At what another rate doth that excellent Orator ſpeak of *Human Nature*, with reſpect to Religion, than our modern pretenders to Philoſophy? Nay || *Sextus Empiricus* himſelf ſets down the Arguments fairly which prove the Being of God: *viz. The Conſent of Mankind; the Order of the World; the abſurdities of Atheiſm, and the weakneſs of the Arguments for it.* Which he doth largely inſiſt upon; and diſtinguiſhes between the *common errors of the people*, and the *Natural Arguments of Mankind*, with the conſent of the wiſeſt and ſharpeſt Men among them; as *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, the *Ionic Philoſophers* (from *Anaxagoras*) *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoics*. And, ſaith he, *if we enquired after an object of ſight, we would rely moſt on thoſe who ſaw beſt; or after a ſound, on thoſe of the quickeſt hearing: ſo in matters of ſpeculation, the opinion of Philoſophers ought moſt to be regarded.* Which he never anſwers when he ſets down the Arguments on the other ſide; which are chiefly thoſe of *Carneades* againſt the *Stoics*, who laid themſelves open by ſome *Hypotheſes* of their own.

|| *Sextus Empir. ad Mathem. p.* 139.

But Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, *That the firſt Founders and Legiſlators of Common-wealths among the Gentiles took great care to keep the People in obedience and peace; and to that end pretended to Revelation for their Laws: and preſcrib'd Ceremonies, and Supplications, and Sacrifices, &c. by which they were to believe the anger of the Gods might be appeas'd. And thus the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.* Who goes about to deny this? or to juſtify the vain pretences to Revelation among ſome of the ancient Legiſlators, beſides *Numa Pompilius*, whom *Diodorus Siculus* takes care to preſerve the memory of; as of *Mnenis*, as he calls him, the firſt Legiſlator in *Egypt*; who pretended to have his Laws from the God *Hermes:* but this ſeems to have been a miſtake for *Menes*, whoſe Counſellor *Hermes* was: his others are, *Minos* of *Creet*, *Lycurgus* at *Sparta*, *Zathanuſtes* (as he calls him) among the *Arimaſpi*, *Zamolxis* among the *Getæ*; and among the reſt he reckons *Moſes*, who had his Laws from the God *Iäo*. No queſtion *Diodorus Siculus* believ'd all alike; but I hope to ſhew the mighty difference between *Moſes* and the reſt in the following Diſcourſes. But here I am only to conſider the force of the Argument. *Theſe Gentile Legiſlators did pretend Revelation when they had it not, only with a deſign to deceive the People.* Doth it hence follow, that there is no ſuch thing as *Religion*; but that it is only a Trick made uſe of by cunning Legiſlators to draw the People the better to Obedience? Now I think the Argument holds the other way. For, if the People were not before well perſuaded of the truth of *Religion* in general, this Argument would have no force at all upon them. For, let us ſuppoſe a People altogether unacquainted with Religion, or uncertain of the truth of it, to be dealt with, by ſome cunning Legiſlator; and he comes and tells them, he had brought them an excellent Body of Laws, which he had by Revelation from God; what would this ſignify to a People that were poſſeſs'd with Mr. *Hobbe*'s Notion of *Inviſible Powers* that were only *Fancies, ſuch as appear in a Dream or a Glaſs*; would they be at all perſuaded by ſuch an Argument to obedience? No; but they would rather look on him as an Impoſtor, that went about to deceive them in the groſſeſt manner; which would raiſe an invincible prejudice againſt them. But, ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *they had the Original ſeeds of Religion, viz. Ignorance and Fear, and upon theſe ſuch Legiſlators did work.* But he can never make it out, that ever there was a People poſſeſs'd

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 59.

poſſeſs'd with ſuch *Ignorance and Fear*, but they had a notion of a Deity among them before ſuch Legiſlators appearing; and all the advantage they had, was from ſuch an antecedent Belief of a God; then indeed it was no hard matter for ſuch Legiſlators to impoſe upon them; but without it, the ſuppoſition is unreaſonable. But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, *that Men in the dark are afraid of Inviſible Powers.* As tho' there were no more to be ſaid for the Being of God and Providence, than for ſtories of *Hobgoblings*, and this lies at the bottom of all his Diſcourſe. Wherein he contradicts the common Senſe and Reaſon of Mankind, who have agreed in the Notion and Belief of a Deity, and that as I have ſhew'd from *Socrates* and *Xenophon*, as well as others in *the eldeſt and beſt Ages*, even of the *Gentile World.* But Mr. *Hobbes* ſaith, where he ſpeaks his Mind more freely, *that there is no Argument from Natural Reaſon doth prove that the World had its beginning from* God; and yet he ſaith, *there is no Argument to prove a Deity but from the Creation.* So that all proof of a God in point of Reaſon, muſt be deſtroy'd by him. This he knew was objected againſt him; and the Anſwer he gives is, *That there are no Arguments from Natural Reaſon, except the Creation, that have not made it more doubtful to many than it was before:* and therefore his opinion is, *that this matter is to be left to the Law to determin.* A very philoſophical Anſwer! But why doth not the Argument from the Creation hold, when himſelf had ſaid, *that from the ſeries of Cauſes there muſt be one firſt Mover*, i. e. *a Firſt and an Eternal Cauſe of all things?* But that came in by the by, to avoid *odium* in a Book for all Perſons reading; but in his *Philoſophical Diſcourſes*, he doth not allow this Argument to hold. For what reaſon? *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *it only proves, that a Man's Mind cannot go on* in infinitum, *but he muſt ſtop ſomewhere; and at laſt he grows weary, and knows not whether he ſhould go on farther or not.* And is this all the force of the Argument from the Creation? What becomes now of the Argument from the *Mechanical Contrivance of the Human Body, which*, he ſaid, *was ſo clear a proof of a wiſe Maker, that he muſt be ſaid to be without a Mind, that did not aſſert that it was made by one?* And this is in one of his *Philoſophical Treatiſes*, publiſhed after the other; but in his Vindication of himſelf, he juſtifies the former paſſage; only he ſaith, *except the Creation.* So that he knew not well what to ſay in this matter, but only to keep himſelf out of danger, he was reſolv'd to ſubmit to the Law. But that is not our Point: and why did he not go about to take off the Argument from *the wiſe Contrivance of things*, which ought to go along with the other? But he knew it was far eaſier to darken an Argument, wherein *Eternity* and *Infinity* is concern'd; and ſo from thence would infer that in the ſeries of Cauſes Men's-Mind are only puzzled and not convinced. But why, I pray, muſt a Man's Mind *give over in the ſearch of Cauſes, as not knowing whether he may go on or not?* Can any thing be plainer in common reaſon, than that in the order of Cauſes a Man muſt go on till he arrive at a firſt Cauſe? What ſhould make a Man to ſtop here; for he ſees he muſt go on till he comes at a firſt? No; ſaith Mr. *Hobbes*, *A firſt Cauſe is infinite, and whatever is infinite is above our conception, and ſo we are loſt.* But that is running from the order of Cauſes to the nature of the object, which is a thing of another conſideration.

Phyſ. c. 26. n. 1.

Mr. Hobbes *conſider'd, p. 34.*

But he ſaith yet farther, *That the Argument from motion doth only prove an eternity of motion, and not an eternal firſt Mover*; becauſe as nothing can be mov'd from it ſelf, ſo whatſoever gives motion muſt be firſt mov'd. But all this depends upon the ſuppoſition that there is nothing in the Univerſe but Body; and if that be granted, his Argument holds: but if there be Mind diſtinct from Body, and can give motion to it, there is not ſo much as the color of reaſon in this Argument. And ſo much in anſwer to the Second Atheiſtical Pretence.

The Third *Atheiſtical Pretence* to be conſider'd, is, *That there is no ſuch common conſent of Mankind, as to God and Providence, as was aſſerted by the Ancients, and is ſtill by the defenders of Religion; for upon the late Diſcoveries whole Nations have been found without any ſenſe of* God *or Religion.* This is a thing very fit to be inquir'd into, with more care than hath been yet us'd about it: for, altho' we do not ground the truth of Religion merely upon ſuch a general conſent; but upon thoſe Arguments which the wiſer part of Mankind hath inſiſted upon; of which I have given ſome account in the foregoing Diſcourſe: yet ſuch an univerſal conſent doth manifeſtly ſhew that there is nothing repugnant to the common ſenſe of Mankind in it; nothing that looks like a Trick or Impoſture, which could never ſo univerſally prevail as this hath done; eſpecially among the more ſenſible and civiliz'd part of Mankind.

But for our better underſtanding this Matter, it will be neceſſary to lay down ſome general Obſervations.

That we have reaſon to diſtinguiſh the more *Brutiſh* and *Savage* People, from the more *Tractable* and *Reaſonable*; becauſe it is poſſible for Mankind by an affected and univerſal neglect of all kind of Inſtruction, to degenerate almoſt to the nature of Brutes. But ſurely ſuch are not fit to be brought in for the inſtances of what naturally belongs to Mankind: which we ought to judge of by a due meaſure, *i. e.* by ſuch as neither want natural capacity, nor are profeſs'd Savages, nor have the improvements of the moſt civilized People. There are two ſorts of brutiſh People in the World, whoſe ſenſe in theſe matters is not much to be regarded. (1.) Such as have very little of common Humanity left among them; ſuch as *Acoſta* deſcribes the *Uros*, who were ſuch *dull and brutiſh People that they did not think themſelves Men*; and ſuch are the *Caffres* or *Hottentots*, at the *Cape of Good-hope*, who by the laſt Account we have of them remain as *Beſtial* and *Sordid* as ever; inſomuch that the Author who was among them, ſaith, *That if there be any medium between Men and Beaſts, they lay in the faireſt claim to that ſpecies.* And ſuch are the *Caiguæ* of *Paraguaria* (of whom afterwards.) (2.) Such as expreſs open contempt and defiance of *Laws* as well as *Religion*, as the *Chichimecæ* in the Northern part of *America*, who are ſaid *to have lived without any Government as well as Religion*; (*unleſs that they offer the firſt wild Beaſt they catch to the Sun*) and ſo *Acoſta* deſcribes ſome other *Savages* among them; viz. *without King, Law,* God, *or Reaſon:* Thoſe of *Braſil* are ſaid to be *without Faith, without Law, without a King*; and the Savages of *Canada* are deſcrib'd after the ſame manner. So that if any Argument can be drawn from ſuch againſt Religion, it will as well hold againſt *Law* and *Civil Government*.

Acoſta *of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 6.

Voyage to Surat, *An.* 1689. *p.* 489.

De Laet *Deſcript. Ind. Occid. l.* 5. *c.* 25.

De Orig. Gent. Am. p. 27.

Acoſta *of the Weſt-Indies, l.* 7. *ch.* 3.

Du Val *Obſervations ſur le Voyage de* Pirard, *p.*132.

De Laet *Ind. Occid. l.* 2. *c.* 12.

2. We muſt not judg by light informations of mere Strangers, and Perſons look'd on as Enemies; which is the caſe of the Inhabitants of the *Southern Iſlands*, which we have only from *Seamen* who landed upon them, and were ſuppos'd to come with an ill deſign; whoſe Accounts muſt be very imperfect and partial. But in *Le Mair*'s Account we only read, *that they could obſerve no Offices of Religion among them:* And *Schouten* to the ſame purpoſe of the Inhabitants of *Horn Iſland* (as they call it) not

Deſcript. Navig. Jac. Le Mair, 31. *Maii.*

Diarium Schouten. *p.* 47.

not far from *New Guinea*; *but they ſeem'd*, he ſaith, *to live like the Birds of the Air, without any care, upon the fruits of the Earth.* But no certainty can be grounded upon ſuch Obſervations. Nor can we build any thing upon the *Want of Religion* in places not yet fully diſcover'd; as what is ſaid by ſome of the People of *Tedſo* or *Jeſſo:* For the firſt Account given of it was from the Jeſuit *Fronius*, who liv'd long in *Japan*; and he deſcribes it as a Country of Savages; and he ſaith, *that they have no other Religion but the worſhip of the Heavens.* And ſo *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith, *the ſight of the Heavens was that which brought Men firſt to Divine Worſhip*; and he doth not attribute it to *Ignorance and Fear*, but *to Admiration*; and therefore fix'd *on the Sun and Moon as their chief Gods*; which was the the moſt prevailing Idolatry in the World. But from hence we are not to infer that they believ'd no God above them; but they thought he that was above them was above their ſervice: but their viſible Worſhip they thought ought to be paid to theſe viſible Gods, as hath been already obſerv'd of the old *Greeks*; and *Diodorus Siculus* ſaith the ſame of the *Egyptians*. But as to theſe People of *Tedſo* we find the firſt Account of them was, that they were a very *Savage People*, but had ſuch kind of Religion as moſt antient Idolaters had: Since that time there hath been no exact Account given of them; the beſt we have is from the *Dutch*. *Caron*, who was Reſident in *Japan*, ſaith only, *that this People are brutiſh; and that the* Japoneſe *could never make a full diſcovery of the Country, which is parted from* Japan *by an Arm of the Sea, where it bounds on vaſt Mountains and Deſerts, ſo that the common Paſſage is by ferrying over.* If this be true, there is a Paſſage by Land beyond that Arm of the Sea, and ſo *Japan* is one *Continent* with it, which extends in probability to the Northern parts of *America:* For in the Account of the *Dutch Embaſſy* to *Japan*, *A. D.* 1641. we are told, That in the Treaty between the *Japoneſe* Agent *Syvoan* and the *Dutch*, he produc'd a *Map* of thoſe Parts agreeable to what *Caron* had ſaid; and they obſerve *that* Jeſſo *was in it of a vaſt extent, and reach'd to* North America, *without any Streight of* Anian. *Martinius* makes no doubt, that Japan *was inhabited from* Eaſt Tartary, *as well as by a Colony from* China; which he proves from their *Cuſtoms* and *Language*; but he thinks *they came over the Water, or at leaſt over the Ice; for he ſaith, there are ſevere Winters there.* But he ſaith withal, *that the* Chineſe *do make* Jeſſo *a part of* Tartary, *and that it is join'd with the Province of* Niuthan *and* Yupi. *F. Couplet* agrees with *Martinius*, that *Japan* was peopled from *Tartary*; and he ſaith, they have a Chronology of their Kings for 660 Years before *Chriſt*, and long before that the Northern *Tartars* took poſſeſſion of *Japan*. So that the People of *Teſſo* and *Japan* are of the ſame Original. In the *Dutch* Account of *Tedſo* printed by *Thevenot*, in the ſecond Part of his Collections (which was taken from a Ship which went upon the Coaſts of that Country and People) we have a more favourable Deſcription both of the *Country* and *People*; only it is ſaid, *that they do not love to take pains, have little Government or Religion*; but they obſerv'd ſome *Superſtitious Practices* among them. And what exact Account could be expected from ſuch, who went not thither to acquaint themſelves either with the Country or their Religion, but to find a paſſage farther that way?

Maff. Epiſt. l. 4. Apr. 28. 1565.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. *p.* 7.

Ambaſſade Memorable, &c. p. 27.

Martin. Atlas Extrem. Aſiæ, p. 170.

Martin. Atlas, p. 21.

Couplet *Diſſert. Proœm. ad* Confuc. *Oper. p.* 81.

3. That it is no certain rule that the People have no Religion, becauſe Strangers cannot find any ſet Times and Places of Worſhip among them. For this was a Principle among many Nations, that the *Supreme* God was

to be worſhip'd only by acts of the Mind; and that external Worſhip was only for leſſer Deities. And *Trigautius* (or rather *Riccius*, who lived a long time in *China*) gives this account of the Religion of that antient and famous Kingdom, *That at firſt they own'd the Supreme* God, *Lord of Heaven; but afterwards they came to worſhip inferior Deities*; and this, he ſaith, *he took out of their moſt antient Annals and Books of Wiſdom, which,* he ſaith, *did not, in reſpect to Religion and Morality, come ſhort of the beſt Philoſophers of* Greece. He affirms, *that the Sect of the Learned,* as he calls them, *did ſtill worſhip one* God, *becauſe all inferior things are preſerved and governed by him; but that they gave an inferior Worſhip to Spirits under him. They are ſilent about the Beginning of things, as out of their knowledg; but there are ſome of no ſuch reputation, that talk their own vain Dreams, to which little regard is given.* But *Martinius* hath given ſome account of theſe Notions among them; *ſome would have all by chance, others held the eternity of the World.* He ſaith, *that their antient Books ſpeak of the ſupreme Governor of Heaven and Earth*; and altho' they have not *a proper name for* God, yet he confeſſes *they have ſuch as expreſs his Authority and Government of the World. Bartoli* ſaith, they are extremely miſtaken who charge this Learned Sect with *Atheiſm, becauſe they have no Temples, nor publick Ceremonies of Worſhip for him; becauſe they apprehend that the ſupreme* God *is to be ſolemnly worſhip'd only by him that is ſupreme among them.* And *Magaillans*, who was well acquainted with the Court of *China*, and died there about 20 years ſince, gives this account of Divine Worſhip, *that at* Pekim *there is a Temple, called the Temple of Heaven, wherein there is a very large Cupolo ſupported by 82 Pillars, wherein the Emperor himſelf offers Sacrifice on the day of the Winter Solſtice, with great ſolemnity and humility; and another wherein he doth the ſame at the Summer Solſtice: Before which,* he ſaith, *they obſerve a ſtrict Faſt for three days. He enquired of one of their learned Men, what they meant by this ſolemn Worſhip of Heaven; whether it was directed to the material Heaven? He anſwer'd that they took Heaven not only for the viſible Heaven, but for the Creator and Governor of all things; and that at the four Seaſons of the Year their Emperor did offer ſacrifice in Temples on purpoſe, not to the Creatures, but to the ſpiritual Heaven. F. Couplet* ſaith, *That by the antient Cuſtom of* China, *the Emperor only ſacrificed to the King of Heaven, as often as there was great occaſion for it. And that if he were in a progreſs, he did it upon the Hills and Mountains.* And by the laſt account we have from *China*, we find *the ſame Cuſtom is kept up at* Pekim *by the preſent Emperors, ſince the Conqueſt of* China. Now it were very unreaſonable to infer, that there is no Religion or Worſhip of the Supreme Being in *China*, becauſe it is not commonly practis'd; ſince according to their Notion of Ceremonies, wherein they are the niceſt People in the World, they think none ought to perform Worſhip to the Supreme in Heaven, but he who is their Supreme upon Earth.

Trigaut. *de Chriſtian. Exped. ap. Sinas*, c. 10.

Martin. *Hiſt. Sinic. init.*

Bartoli *Hiſt. Aſiat. part.* 3. *l.* 1. *p.* 73.

Magaillans *Novel. Rel. de la China, ch.* 21.

Couplet *Decl. Proœm ad* Confuc. *p.* 83.

Le Compte *part.* 2. *Lett.* 2.

4. Another thing we are to obſerve in paſſing our judgment, whether Nations have any Religion among them, is to have a care of truſting too much to the Sayings of known and profeſs'd Enemies; but as much as may be we ought to take the Opinion of the moſt free and diſintereſs'd Perſons, who have convers'd among them on the account of Religion. This I intend chiefly with reſpect to the *Spaniards* accounts of the *Weſt-Indies*, when their deſign was to enſlave the poor *Indians*; for then they made it their buſineſs to blacken them as much as poſſible, by repre-

ſenting them as a People without any *ſenſe of* God *or Religion, or any Virtues belonging to Human Nature.* But the contrary appears from the firſt, the moſt impartial and the lateſt Accounts we have of them, from ſuch as have been converſant among them, upon the account of Religion.

In the firſt Account we have of the Diſcoveries of the *Weſt-Indies*, we find that when *Columbus* came to the Iſlands of *Hiſpaniola* and *Cuba*, he ſoon found *that they worſhip'd the Sun and Moon, and the Heavens, but could not then diſcover what other Deities they worſhip'd:* which *Peter Martyr Anglerius* underſtands both of *the Natives* and of the *Caribbians*, who were *Savages*, and very troubleſom to them. And he tells a remarkable Story of one of the Natives coming to *Columbus* at *Cuba*, being a Man of 80 years of age, and deſir'd to diſcourſe with him by an Interpreter. The ſubſtance of it was, That he underſtood *that he with his Ship had given a great diſturbance to the Natives, and bad him to conſider, that after death there were two Paſſages for Souls; the one dark and dreadful for thoſe who were troubleſom to Mankind, the other pleaſant and delightful for thoſe who promote the peace and welfare of People; and if he conſider'd that every Man was to receive according to his Actions after death, he would give over being ſo uneaſy to them.* *Columbus* took the Advice very well, and pretended that they only came to aſſiſt them againſt the *Savages* and *Cannibals, and would hurt none of them*; which the old Man was ſo pleas'd with, that as old as he was, he ſaid he was ready to go with him in ſo good a deſign. Was there any thing that ſavor'd of *Barbariſm* or *Irreligion* in this Diſcourſe, or what would not become a good *Chriſtian* to ſay? Beſides, the ſame Author commends their way of living far beyond what the *Spaniards* brought among them (as appear'd by *Columbus* his own ſuffering for checking their Enormities.) *They enjoy'd the Profits of the Earth in common, without any diviſion or property, having enough for every Family; and none ſuffer'd but ſuch as injur'd others; and without Laws and Judges they did what was right.* This was a great Character from one who was particularly intruſted in the Affairs and Council of the *Indies*, and had all the Accounts ſent to him, out of which he fram'd his *Decades*. *They thought*, as he ſaith, *that Contentment lay in a little compaſs; and they had more than they knew what to do with.* To the ſame purpoſe *Lerius* gives an account of a Conference he had with a *Braſilian* old Man about Trade. *I pray*, ſaid he, *why do your Countrymen take ſo much pains to come hither for our Wood? Have they not enough for Fuel? Yes*, ſaid *Lerius*, *but your* Braſil-wood *is of great advantage to them in Trade, by which they grow very rich. Very well*, ſaith he, *and when they are ſo rich, do they not die as other Men do? And whither then go all theſe Riches? To their Children or Relations.* Then ſaid the poor *Braſilian*, *Your Countrymen are a company of great Fools* (inſigniter Fatui.) *For why ſhould they undergo ſo much toil and danger by Sea and Land, to get that which they muſt part with when they die; and for the ſake of thoſe Children, who might live as contentedly without thoſe Riches? Do not you think that we love our Children as well as you? But we are contented that the ſame Earth which nouriſh'd us, will do as much for them? Theſe barbarous* Braſilians, ſaith *Lerius*, *will riſe up in judgment againſt too many Chriſtians.* To the ſame purpoſe, he ſaith, one of the Natives of *Peru* diſcours'd the *Spaniards*, who took ſo much pains to get their Gold; and ſaid, *they were the Froth of the Sea, reſtleſs and uneaſy, who might with far leſs trouble get a ſubſiſtence at home.* Theſe things I mention to ſhew, that theſe People were far enough from wanting Senſe and Capacity when

Columbi *Navigat.* c. 5.

Pet. Mart. *Dec. I. c.* 1.

Ler. *Hiſt. Navig. in Braſil.* c. 53.

the *Spaniards* came among them; and ſeem'd to have a much truer notion of the Happineſs of Human Life than they had.

But to ſhew how far they were from being *without Religion* at that time, we have an Account by *Benzo* (who liv'd a great while in the *Weſt-Indies*, upon their firſt Diſcovery) of an *Oracle* among them, which foretold the *Spaniards* a conſiderable time before. For the *Cachiqui* and *Bohitii*, (*i.e.* their *Great Men and Prieſts*) told *Columbus*, *That in the time of the Father of their preſent King, he and another King had a great mind to underſtand what would happen after their time, and to that end reſolv'd to apply themſelves to their Zemes* (the Gods they worſhip'd) *in an extraordinary manner, by faſting five days together in a moſt ſad and mournful condition.* And then they receiv'd that *Oracle*, upon which they made a *moſt doleful Song*, which they repeated at certain times; but now they found things happen'd to them juſt as they were foretold. The ſame *Benzo* informs us, that after *Columbus* diſcover'd the Continent, the Iſlands were ſoon left by the *Spaniards* in hopes of greater gains; and finding they could not manage the Nations as they deſired, they ſent Perſons on purpoſe to make the worſt repreſentation poſſible of them, that they might have *an Edict* to condemn them to *perpetual Slavery:* And therein they charge them with all manner of vices; but as to Religion, they only accuſe them of *Idolatry*. But, if they had found any ſuch thing as *Atheiſm* and *Irreligion* among them, they would have been ſure not to have conceal'd that.

Benzo *Hiſt. Novi Orbis l.* 1. *c.* 8.

Cap. 17.

Joh. de Laet, in his Deſcription of the Iſle of *Cuba*, ſaith, *That the Inhabitants there had no Temple, no Sacrifices, no Religion.* Which I could not but wonder at, the account being ſo different from that of the firſt Diſcoverers, who muſt certainly know beſt what Religion they had among them: but in probability he followed the later *Spaniards*, who give the worſt accounts of them, to juſtify the moſt inhuman Cruelties which were us'd againſt them. For *Benzo* ſaith, *That of two millions of Natives in* Hiſpaniola, *there were left not above* 150 *in his time*; and the like Deſolation was made in *Cuba*, *Jamaica*, *Port-Rico*, and other places; and *de Laet* confeſſes *that they were all long ſince deſtroy'd.* But if we take the Account given of theſe People upon the firſt Diſcovery, we ſhall find it was very different. For *Peter Martyr*, who was imployed by the King of *Spain*, as himſelf tells us, to take the beſt intelligence he could meet with from the *Indies*, ſaith, *That at firſt they could find no other Worſhip among them but that of the Sun, and Moon, and the Heavens; but upon further acquaintance with them, they found out a great deal more, which related to their Religion*; which he ſaid, *he receiv'd from one who was imploy'd by* Columbus *himſelf in inſtructing them. They had little Images, which they call'd* Zemes, which they ſuppos'd to be inhabited by Spirits, which gave Anſwers to them; but which is conſiderable, he ſaith, *That they look'd on them only as a kind of Meſſengers between them and the Only, Eternal, Omnipotent, Inviſible* GOD. This was extant long before *De Laet* wrote his pompous Deſcription of the *Weſt-Indies:* Was *Peter Martyr* unknown to him? So far from it, that he mentions and commends him for his diligence: How then comes he to differ ſo much from him in his Account of their Religion? And he there mentions the ſame *Oracle* which *Benzo* had done, and adds, *That the Natives underſtood it at firſt of the* Caribbians *or* Cannibals; *but at laſt found it too true of the* Spaniards. In another place he gives an account of *Hiſpaniola* from *Andreas Morales* his own Mouth, who was imploy'd by the Governor

Deſcript. Ind. Occid. l. 1. *c.* 10.

Benzo *l.* 1. *c.* 25.

Pet. Mart. *Dec.* 1. *c.* 9.

Decad. 3. *c.* 9.

vernor to ſearch out what he could find concerning the Iſland and the Natives. *And he found that they came from another Iſland, and built a Houſe at the place of their landing, which they after conſecrated and enriched, and reverenced to the time of the* Spaniards *coming: and he makes it to have been in as much eſteem among them, as* Jeruſalem *to the* Chriſtians, Mecca *to the* Mahumetans, *and* Tyrena *in the Grand* Canaries; which he ſaith, *was in ſuch eſteem among the Natives, that Perſons would with ſinging leap off from that Holy Rock, in hopes their Souls ſhould be made happy by it.* But altho' this were a great Argument of *ſuperſtitious Folly* in them, yet it ſhews the falſeneſs of that Saying in the firſt Relation of *Columbus* his Voyage, *That there was no ſuch thing as Religion in the* Canaries: but thoſe who pretend to give a more exact Account, ſay, *That the Natives did believe one* God, *who puniſhed the Evil, and rewarded the Good.*

Columbi *Navigat.* c. 2.
Conqueſt de Canaries; *par. II.* p. 208.

The next we are to conſider, are the *Savages* which diſturbed the Natives, before the *Spaniards*; who were called the *Caribbians*, or the Inhabitants of the *Caribbe Iſlands*. Theſe were a wild ſort of People, and a great terror to their Neighbours, whom they were wont to eat in triumph, after they had taken them; which was not the general practice of the *Indians*, but only of the moſt *Brutiſh* and *Savage* People among them, as the *Caribbians* and thoſe of *Braſil*; but the other Natives both of the Iſlands and Continent abhorr'd it, as is found by the lateſt Diſcoveries. This appears by *Chriſt. de Acunna*, who was imploy'd *A.D.* 1659. to diſcover the People about the River of *Amazons*; and there he found a conſiderable People call'd *Aguæ* (the *Spaniards* call them *Omaguæ*) and they were repreſented to be *Eaters of the fleſh of their Enemies*; but he ſaith it was very falſe, and only a malicious calumny of the *Portugueſe*; and there he ſaith, *It was a particular Cuſtom of the* Caribbes, *and not us'd by other* Indians. And *Dampier* ſaith, *That in all his Adventures among the* Indians, *both Eaſt and Weſt, he never met with any ſuch People as eat Man's Fleſh, and that he knew ſome of the Cannibal ſtories to be falſe.* But on the other ſide, it cannot be deny'd that there had been ſuch a barbarous Practice, not only among the *Caribbians*, but the Savages of *Braſil* and elſewhere; as appears by the particular Accounts of ſuch as liv'd among them, and ſaw their manner of doing it; as in *Joh. Lerius*, *Pet. Carder*, *Ant. Knivet*; but eſpecially in *Claud. d'Abbeville* his Relation of *Maragnan*, who is moſt particular in it; and he ſaith, that it aroſe from the Hatred and Revenge they expreſs thereby to their greateſt Enemies; and he adds, that their Stomachs cannot bear or digeſt it; but notwithſtanding it had been continu'd among them, becauſe their Enemies did ſo by them; but they confeſs'd it to be cruel and barbarous, but having been long us'd, they could not lay it aſide, without a general conſent. Some ſay, that the *Tapuiæ* eat the Bodies of their Friends; but thoſe who have liv'd among them, ſay nothing about it: which they would not have omitted; and they are moſt to be rely'd upon. The *Caribbe Iſlands* were diſcover'd by *Columbus* in his ſecond Voyage: but the *Caribbians* would have no communication with them, *flying into their Woods*. *De Laet* ſaith only, *that they are a very brutiſh ſort of People, of no ſhame or fidelity.* Not a word of their *Religion*; and it was not to be expected among them, who had very little regard to any thing but the ſatisfying their brutiſh Paſſions of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*, which are the only things they were then remarkable for. Since that time, they have liv'd more quietly, being ſo much over-power'd by the Plantations upon the

Relation de la Riviere des Amazons, c. 52.
Dampier's *Voyage,* p. 485.
Ler. *Hiſt. Navig. in* Braſil, c. 15.
Pilgrims, *part.* 4. *p.* 1188. 1217.
Hiſt. de la Miſſion en l'Iſle de Maragnan, *ch.* 49.
Barlæ. *Hiſt.* Braſil.
Piſo *Hiſt.* Braſil.
L. 1. c. 17.

Caribbe

Rochefort *Hiſtoire de* Caribb. *l.* 4. *c.* 13.
Du Tertre *Hiſt. Nat. de* Antilles *par.* 7. §. 3.

Caribbe Iſlands; by which means they have been brought to ſome kind of Humanity and Converſation. And there have been two underſtanding Perſons converſant among them, who have given the beſt Account we have of them; and thoſe are *Monſ. Rochefort* and *F. Du Tertre*; who both agree, that they have ſome knowledge of One Supreme God in Heaven, who is of infinite Goodneſs, and hurts no body; but as *Du Tertre*, who liv'd longer among them, ſaith, they account the ſervice of him a needleſs thing, being ſo far above them; but they are mightily afraid of the *Mabogas* or evil Spirits, which they think deſign to do them miſchief: and to appeaſe them they have their *Boyez*, who are a kind of Sorcerers among them. They both agree, that they believe the immortality of the Soul; and that the principal Soul, which is that in the Heart, goes to Heaven. And *Rochefort* from hence concludes the truth of *Cicero*'s ſaying, *That the knowledge of Divinity is planted in the Hearts of Men.*

Laet. *Deſc. l.* 2. *c.* 2. 12. 16.
L. 3. *c.* 18.
Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain, *l.* 3. *ch.* 5.
Purchas *To.* 4. *l.* 10. *ch.* 5.
Acoſta *Hiſt. of the* Indies, *l.* 5. *c.* 2.

But *De Laet* repreſents the Northern *Indians* to have been as much without Religion, as the Natives of *Cuba* and *Hiſpaniola*; and from no good grounds, altho' herein he did not rely upon the *Spaniſh* Reports. So he ſaith of the Natives of *New-found Land*, of *New-France*, of the *Souriquoſii*, and other People of *Canada*, and the parts thereabouts, and of *Virginia*, &c. But I ſhall make it appear, that he took up with very ſlight Informations in this matter; which are contradicted by thoſe who liv'd longer among them, and underſtood their Senſe and Language better. 'Tis true, which I ſuppoſe gave occaſion to the miſtake, that the Savages had no ſet and conſtant ways of Devotion; but at certain Seaſons of the year, or in time of War and Calamities they had; or however, to Perſons that diſcourſed with them, they did by no means deny a God, but thought it was no great matter whether they ſerv'd him or not in ſuch a manner; ſo that their chief fault lay in a groſs neglect of Religion, and not in any ſetled Principles of Irreligion. So the *Sieur de Champlain* ſaith, He diſcours'd with the Savages of *Canada*, and found they wanted no Capacity; and he aſked one of them, why they did not pray to God; he anſwer'd, that every one was left to pray as he thought fit in his own Mind. So, ſaith he, for want of a Law for Divine Worſhip, they liv'd like Brutes: and he imputes a great deal to their Savage way of living upon Hunting; whereas if the Land were cultivated, it might be much eaſier to reduce them to Civility and Religion. Mr. *Winſlow* one of the firſt Planters in *New-England*, had ſome diſcourſe with the *Indian Savages* about Religion, and God's being the Author of all our Bleſſings, which they agreed to, and ſaid, *That they own'd* God, *and call'd him* Kirtitan: upon which I obſerve, that he ingenuouſly retracts the Accounts he had given before of the Natives; *viz. That they had no Religion or Knowledge of* God; for, ſaith he, *we find that they do own one ſupreme Being, who was creator of Heaven and Earth; but they likewiſe own'd many Divine Powers under him.* Therefore *Acoſta*, ſpeaking of the *Indian Savages*, ſaith, *It is no hard matter to perſuade them of a ſupreme* God, *be they never ſo barbarous and brutiſh.*

Jo. de Laet *de Origin. Gent. A-merican. p.* 187.
Le Grand *Voyage du Pays de* Hurons, *c.* 18.

But I muſt do that right to *Joh. de Laet*, as to ſhew that after he had receiv'd better Information, he did ſpeak more favourably of the *Religion* of the *Indians*: For in his Book againſt *Grotius*, ten years after the other, he hath an *Obſervation* on purpoſe to clear this matter. Father *Sagard* had publiſh'd an Account of his Voyage to the *Hurons*, a People of *New-France*, or *Canada*, near the Lake call'd *Mare dulce*, where he learnt their Language, and ſo was better able to judg of their Opinions; and he ſaith, Their general Senſe was, that there was one Creator, who made the World; and that in their Language he was call'd *Ataouacan*. Which is ſince confirm'd by the Account of the *French Miſſions* into thoſe parts; eſpecially of *Paulus Juvenæus*, who ſpent a Winter among them, to converſe with them in their own Language. *Hiſt. Canada, l. 1. p. 78.* And when he preach'd to them about God, they all aſked him, what he meant by it; he told them he meant ſuch a Being who had infinite Power, and made Heaven and Earth: upon which they looked upon one another, and cried out *Ataouacan*. *Sagard* ſaith, *They believe the Immortality of the Soul*; P. 87. and the latter Accounts ſay, *That he was told that the* Souriquoſii *did truly believe one* God *that created all things*. Which is very different from *de Laet*'s former Account of them. But *de Laet* goes on, that he underſtood by *Davis* and *Baffin*, that *the Natives of thoſe parts where they had been, i. e.* (about *Fretum Davis* and *Groen-land*) were *Idolaters, and worſhip'd the Sun*. *Davis* in the Account of his Voyage ſaith, Hackluit. To. 3. p. 100. *That they were a very tractable People, void of craft or double dealings, and eaſy to be brought to any Civility or good Order; but they judg'd them to be Idolaters and to worſhip the Sun*. This is quite another thing from being mere *Savages, and having no Religion among them*. Farther he owns *Hariot*'s Account of the People of *Virginia, that they believ'd many Gods of different degrees, but one ſupreme* God *who was from eternity*. But he had publiſh'd to the World in his *Deſcription, that their only Religion was to worſhip every thing they were afraid of, as Fire, Water, Thunder, Guns, Horſes*, &c. *and the Devil, whom they called* Okie. *Hariot*, who converſed among them, ſaith no ſuch thing; Hariot *of* Virginia, 25, 26. but he ſaith expreſly, *That they own'd that* God *made the World, and that Souls are immortal, and that they ſhall receive in another World according to their actions in this*. What a different Account is this concerning the ſame People? And if *Lederer* may be believ'd, who went among the *Indian Natives*, not far from *Virginia*, he ſaith, Lederer's *Diſcovery*, p. 4. Okæe *was the name of the Creatour of all things among them; to him the high Prieſt alone offers ſacrifice; but their ordinary Devotion is perform'd to leſſer Deities, to whom they ſuppoſe ſublunary affairs are committed*. *Denton*, who liv'd among the *Indian Savages* about *New-York*, Denton of New York p. 8. ſaith, *That their ſolemn worſhip was not above once or twice a year; unleſs upon extraordinary occaſions, as making War*, &c.

I ſhall not need to purſue this matter any farther; ſince he owns the Religion that was practis'd not only in *Peru* and *Mexico*, but in other parts of the *Weſt-Indies*. Only as to *Chili* he ſaith, *that we have no certainty, but only that they have ſolemn Oaths by one they call* Enonamon. But *Marcgravius* in the account he gives of *Chili*, ſaith at firſt, G. Marcgravius *de Regione* Chili. c. 3. *That they know not* God, *nor his worſhip*, &c. but this muſt be underſtood of a clear and diſtinct knowledge of him; for he ſaith afterwards, *That they have ſome knowledge of a ſupreme Being, by whom all earthly things and human affairs are governed; whom they call* Pillan.

The only difficulty then remaining as to the *Weſt-Indies*, is as to the People of *Paraquaria* and *Braſil*. For it is affirm'd, *That there are whole Nations there who know nothing of* God, *or Religion*. Which muſt be more ſtrictly inquir'd into.

As to *Paraquaria*, it is ſaid, that *Nicholas del Techo in his Letters from thence, ſaith that the Caiguæ*, (a People of that Country) *had no name for* God, *or the Soul of Man; and no publick worſhip, nor Idols*. But the ſame *Nicholas del Techo* hath publiſh'd a full Relation of all the Proceedings in *Paraquaria* and thereabouts, on the account of Religion, and therein he hath acquainted the World with the ſeveral Nations that inhabit thoſe parts between *Braſil* and *Peru*, &c. which were ſcarce heard of before. The *Diaigritæ*, (who rather belong to *Tucumania*, between *Paraquaria* and *Chili*) he ſaith, *were worſhipers of the Sun, after a particular manner; and they believ'd the immortality of Souls, and that the Souls of their great Men went into the greater Stars, and of ordinary People into the leſſer.* The *Guaicuræi worſhipped the Moon and* Bootes. The *Guarani* were *a very ſuperſtitious People, but they could not tell what* God *they worſhiped; but they were mightily addicted to Sorcery.* The *Calchaquini worſhiped the Sun, and Thunder, and Lightning.* In the Plains between *Rio del Plata* and *Tucumania*, he ſaith, *are a very large People, who have little regard to Religion; but they believe that after death, their Souls return to their Creator.* In *Chili*, he ſaith, *when one* God *the Creator was preach'd to them, one of their* Caſiques *(or great Men) ſtood up and ſaid, that they would not bear that the power of creating ſhould belong to any but their God* Pillan; *and that he plac'd the Souls of their great Men after death about the Sun.* After all theſe he mentions the *Caaiguæ, as the ſmalleſt and moſt inconſiderable and brutiſh People among them:* They were a moſt ſavage ſort of Creatures, that could hardly ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood; he ſaith, *They were much more like to Apes than Men, and liv'd upon Mice, and Ants, and Vipers,* &c. *utrique ſexui,* ſaith he, *tenuiſſimus rationis uſus eſt:* they are harder to be tamed than wild Beaſts; and if they are put in chains, they ſtarve themſelves. And this is all the account he there gives of them, and ſaith not a word of their Religion; and it were very unreaſonable to expect any from them. It is not improbable that others could not find a word for God or the Soul among them; for they were not able to ſpeak ſenſe, at leaſt ſo as to be underſtood by Strangers.

Hiſt. Prov. Paraquar. *Auth.* Nicolao del Techo, *Leodii* 1673.
L. 2. c. 18.
L. 4. c. 16.
L. 5. c. 7.
Chap. 23.
L. 3. c. 12.
L. 2. c. 26.
L. 9. c. 24.

Come we now to the People of *Braſil, who are ſaid to be without any notion of* God. But thoſe who have been beſt acquainted among them aſſure us, that they believe the immortality of Souls, and rewards and puniſhments after death. And from hence *Lerius* himſelf argues againſt the Atheiſtical Perſons of his time; and that altho' they will not in words own God, yet he ſaith, they ſhew the inward conviction they have of him; eſpecially when it thunders; which *de Laet* confeſſes they call *Tupâ cunanga*, a noiſe made by the Supreme Excellence: for *Tupâ* he ſaith ſignifies ſo much in their Language. And he adds, *That they are very apprehenſive of evil Spirits; that they do own a God of the Mountains, and of the Highways; and altho' they differ in their idolatry and ſuperſtition, yet* he confeſſes *it generally prevails among them, and the other innumerable People who live on both ſides the vaſt River* de la Plata. *Marcgravius*, a Learned Man, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and underſtood their Language ſo far as to write a Grammar of it, ſaith expreſly, *That they call* God *Tupa* and *Tupana*; and in the ſhort Dictionary of *Emmanuel Moraes*, *Tupana* is rendred *Deus*. But the great Argument to *Lerius* was, *that they had no public exerciſe of Religion*; which was the common caſe of the *Savages* in all parts, who liv'd under no Laws; not that they believ'd no God, but they would not be at the trouble to ſerve him. *Ludolphus* ſaith of the *Gallani*, a ſavage People who had almoſt overrun *Abyſſinia*, that they had no publick worſhip, but if any asked them about a Supreme God, they would anſwer, *Heaven*. So *Dellon* ſaith of

Hiſt. Navi. in Braſil, *c.*16.*p.*223, 224.
Laet. *de Orig. Gen.* Americ. *p.* 193.
Marcgrav. *de* Braſil. *Reg. c.* 9.
Ludolph. *Hiſt.* Æthiopiæ, *l.* 1.

the Inhabitants of *Madagaſcar, that they did not queſtion a Supreme Being that governs all; but with a ſtrange obſtinacy denied that there was any neceſſity of praying to him.* *Francis Cauche*, who ſojourned a long time among them, ſaith, *he could obſerve no publick exerciſe of Religion among them; but they did not deny a* God *to be the Creator of all, and aſſerted the Immortality of the Soul; but Good and Bad went to Heaven.* *Flacurt* liv'd five Years among them, and he agrees in the ſame, as to *no publick exerciſe of Religion*; but he ſaith, *They believe One* God, *of whom they ſpeak with honor and reſpect.* *P. Gillet* in the Account of his Voyage to *Goyane* 1674, ſaith, That the *Nouragues*, and *Acoquas*, and *Galibis*, *all agree in owning One* God *in Heaven, but they give no Worſhip to him.*

Dellon *Relation d'un Voyage*, *To.* 1. *c.* 8.
Relation du Voyage de F. Cauche, p. 119.
Hiſtoire de l'Iſle de Madagaſcar, *ch.* 17.
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Hiſtoire de l'Ethiopie Orientale, *ch.* 7.
Purchas *To. II. p.* 1639.
Voyage de Siam, *l.* 2. *p.* 84.
Thevenot, Roe, *p.* 2.
Purchas, *To. I. l.* 3. *ch.* 3. §. 1.

And ſo **Pliny* mentions a People of *Africa*, who *made a noiſe without any articulate Pronunciation*; who were ſurely the Anceſtors of thoſe *Hotentots*, concerning whom it is hard to affirm any thing, unleſs they have learnt lately to expreſs themſelves better: As it ſeems they have done by Monſ. *de la Loubere*'s Account of them; for he ſaith, *That they have ſome kind of Worſhip at new and full Moons; and he thinks they own a good* God, *to whom they need not to pray; but that there is a bad one, to whom they pray not to hurt them.* And in the Journal of Monſ. *de Chaumont*, we read, *That they have no great regard to Religion; but when they want Rain, they pray to a certain Being whom they know not, but that lives above; and offer Milk, the beſt thing they have; and that the* Dutch *Secretary had ſeen them at this Sacrifice with Eyes lifted up to Heaven, and in a profound ſilence.*

Du Royaume de Siam, *To.*2. *p.* 112.
Journal du Voyage de Siam, *p.*78.

Thus I have gone thro' all the Nations I have met with, who have been ſaid to be *without any Notion of* God *or Religion*; there remains only one Objection to be taken off, which relates to a Sect in the *Eaſt-Indies*, which is ſaid to be *Atheiſtical* in their *Principles*, having an *External Doctrine* for the People, and an *Internal*, which they keep from them.

To give the beſt Account I can of this matter; all the late Writers of *China* do agree, that beſides the original Doctrine of the Country, there was brought in long ſince, (they generally ſay 65 *Years after* Chriſt) a new *Sect* from *Indoſthan*, which they call *Xekiao*. The Author is ſuppos'd to be one *Xekia*, or *Xaca* (as the *Japoneſe* call him) who liv'd long before. *Matt. Riccius*, (or *Trigautius*) ſaith, *This Sect was at firſt receiv'd with great applauſe, because it ſet forth the Immortality of the*

Trigaut. *l.* 1. *c.* 10.

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Hiſtoire de l'Ethiopie Orientale, ch. 7.
Purchas *To. II. p.* 1639.
Voyage de Siam, *l.* 2. *p.* 84.
Thevenot, Roe, *p.* 2.
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Journal du Voyage de Siam, *p.*78.

* Stridorque non vox; adeo ſermonis commercio carent. *Plin. N. H. l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Thus I have gone thro' all the Nations I have met with, who have been ſaid to be *without any Notion of* God *or Religion*; there remains only one Objection to be taken off, which relates to a Sect in the *Eaſt-Indies*, which is ſaid to be *Atheiſtical* in their *Principles*, having an *External Doctrine* for the People, and an *Internal*, which they keep from them.

To give the beſt Account I can of this matter; all the late Writers of *China* do agree, that beſides the original Doctrine of the Country, there was brought in long ſince, (they generally ſay 65 *Years after* Chriſt) a new *Sect* from *Indoſthan*, which they call *Xekiao.* The Author is ſuppos'd to be one *Xekia*, or *Xaca* (as the *Japoneſe* call him) who liv'd long before. *Matt. Riccius*, (or *Trigautius*) ſaith, *This Sect was at firſt receiv'd with great applauſe, becauſe it ſet forth the Immortality of the*

Trigaut. *l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Soul, and the Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life; *but not eternal*, becauſe it introduc'd the Doctrine of *Tranſmigration of Souls*. In order to the Happineſs after Death, it requir'd *Particular Devotions to Idols*, which by that means ſpread over all *China* and *Japan*, as well as other parts of the *Indies*, and *Abſtinence from Fleſh*, as well as *from Murder*, *Stealing*, &c. and Auſterities, Celibate, Retirement from the World, and great Liberalities to the *Tapoins* and *Bonzes*. Wherein *Bertoli*, *Marini*, and the reſt agree. But there was a Secret under all this, viz. *That this was but an external Doctrine for the People, but the internal Doctrine was another thing, that the ſupreme Felicity lay in Eternal Nothing*; or as they rather called it, *an Eternal Quiet, and that Souls are to paſs from Body to Body*, ſaith *Martinius*, *till they are fit for it*. *F. Couplet*, who hath given the fulleſt Account of this matter, ſaith, *That when* Xaca *came to die, he ſent for ſome of his choiceſt Diſciples, and told them, that the Doctrine he had hitherto declared to them was only a ſhew, and not the truth*; *and that all things came out of nothing, and would end in nothing*, as the late Author *Le Compte* expreſſes it; *and that is the Abyſs where all our hopes muſt end*. But *Couplet* ſaith, *That his Diſciples take great care, that this come not among the People*; *and only thoſe*, he ſaith, *even among the* Bonzes *and others are admitted to it, who are thought capable of ſuch a Secret. The Eternal Doctrine they look on*, as he ſaith, *as the wooden Account which is raiſed to ſupport the other*; *but they are by all means for keeping that up among the People*. But it is not clear what they underſtand by *Returning to Nothing*; for Monſ. *De la Loubere* ſaith, *They do not underſtand proper Annihilation by it, but in a myſtical ſenſe*; and two things are imply'd by it, 1. *That ſuch Souls as arrive to it, are paſt all Fears of returning to the Body*. 2. *That they live in perfect eaſe and quiet, without any kind of action*. And ſo *Couplet* explains it, *by Acting, Underſtanding, and deſiring nothing*; ſo that this is the higheſt degree of *Quietiſm*: And ſo Monſ. *Gervaiſe*, who was among thoſe of *Siam*, and endeavour'd to underſtand their Doctrine, ſaith, *That Annihilation is to be myſtically underſtood, and not in a phyſical ſenſe*. As appears by what *Couplet* ſaith, *That one of* Xaca's *poſterity ſpent nine years with his Face to the Wall, thinking of nothing, and ſo became perfect*. But from hence he ſadly laments the ſpreading of *Atheiſm* among the *Chineſe*, who were willing to underſtand it in the groſſeſt ſenſe.

Martin. *Atlas*, p. 7.

Couplet. *Proœm. Declar. ad* Confuc. *paragr.* 4.

Le Compte *Memoires Part. II. Let.* 2.

Loubere *du Royaume* de Siam, *To. I. c.* 22.

Hiſt. Nat. & Polit. du Siam, *Part.* 3. *c. p.*162.

And ſuppoſe it be ſo taken, what imaginable ground can it be for Men of ſenſe, (as the *Chineſe* would be thought above others) to take this for granted, becauſe ſuch an Impoſtor ſaid it; concerning whom ſo many incredible things are ſaid by them, that ſome have queſtion'd whether there ever was ſuch a Perſon or not: and *Loubere* ſeems to think this Story *a Fiction of the* Chineſe; for he can find nothing of him among the *Talapoins* of *Siam*, with whoſe Traditions he was very converſant. But what reaſon or demonſtration did he offer? What ground could they have to believe one who had been an Impoſtor all his days ſhould ſpeak truth at laſt?

But all this ſignifies nothing to the conſent of Mankind: *For this was to be kept up as a Secret*, and only to be communicated to ſuch as were thought capable of it. If they thought this to be the truth, why was it not to be diſcover'd? Was it becauſe the People were ſtill to be kept up in the common perſuaſion about Religion? And was this for the ſake of the *Bonzes*, of whom the wiſe People of *China* had a very mean opinion, as they all agree? Therefore it could not be for their ſakes. *But the People might grow more unruly, if this were known.* If the *Bonzes* were ſo bad as they make them, they might rather think the People would be better without them; and the beſt ſervice they could do, was to lay open the fraud and impoſture of theſe Men, as thoſe who preach'd *Chriſtianity* in *China* and *Japan* after they underſtood their Languages, did very freely. And yet they did aſſert God *and Providence*, and the *Rewards and Puniſhments of another Life*, againſt all the Doctrines of *Xaca*, both as to the *External* and *Internal part*. *Matth. Riccius* having attain'd to good ſkill in the Language of *China*, publiſh'd an account of the *Chriſtian Doctrine* at *Pekim, A.D.* 1603. wherein he aſſerted the Being of God, not only from Natural Reaſon, but from their own *moſt antient Books*, of which *Couplet* gives a large account, and how the Interpreters of latter times had perverted the Senſe of them. We have in *Kircher* a *Summary of the* Chriſtian *Faith*, as it was publiſh'd in *China*; and therein we find on what grounds they aſſerted the Being of God, againſt the *Atheiſtical ſenſe* of *Xaca*'s Doctrine, *That all things came out of nothing:* For, *if nothing were firſt, how came things into Being? therefore to bring them into Being, there muſt be a Creator before them; and this Creator is he whom we call* God. This was plain and true Reaſoning, and impoſſible to be anſwer'd by the ſubtileſt of thoſe *Atheiſtical* Wits of *China*. For nothing can produce *Nothing*. So that if *Xaca*'s interior Doctrine were true, *That all things came out of Nothing*, it muſt neceſſary follow, that there muſt be *Nothing* before *any thing*; and what poſſible imagination can any Man of ſenſe have, how any thing ſhould by it ſelf come out of Nothing? There is no repugnancy at all in conceiving that an Infinite Power ſhould give a Being to that which had it not before; for altho' the difference between *not being and being* be ſo great, yet where we ſuppoſe a Power Infinite in the Cauſe, that may command the terms of that diſtance, by giving a Being to that which had it not before. To ſay that *Nothing can be produced out of nothing*, implies that nothing can of it ſelf reſult out of nothing, where there is no ſuperior Cauſe; but to ſay that by no Cauſe whatſoever any thing can be put into Being which had it not before, is to take away all poſſibility of an Infinite Power, without any reaſon, when the very Being of things is an impregnable reaſon for it. For ſince we are certain things are, we muſt be certain that they came into Being; and that muſt be either out of nothing by themſelves, which is impoſſible; or it muſt be from ſuch a Power which can give Being where it was not, which muſt be infinite.

Couplet. *Declar. Proœm.*
Kircher. China *illuſtrata, Part.* 2. c. 10.

Thus far I have conſidered the General Prejudices againſt Religion, and the *Atheiſtical* Pretences of this Age, and have ſhew'd how very little they ſignify to any Perſons that will take the pains to examin them.

Discourse II.

3:1:U

The Modern Atheiſtical Hypotheſes *examin'd, and the Unreaſonableneſs of them ſhew'd.*

I Now come to conſider the *Atheiſtical Hypotheſes* of this Age, which I ſhall rank under theſe two Heads:

1. Such as have a *Tendency* towards *Atheiſm*.
2. Such as are *plainly Atheiſtical*.

As to the former, I ſhall inſiſt upon theſe two:

(1.) Such as weaken the known and generally receiv'd Proofs of God and Providence.

(2.) Such as attribute too much to the *Mechanical Powers* of *Matter* and *Motion*.

I begin with thoſe who have gone about to weaken the known and generally received Arguments for God and Providence; which I have at large ſhew'd, were thoſe taken from the manifeſt effects of Wiſdom and Deſign in the parts of Animals, and in the frame of the World. I am far from intending to lay the *charge* of *Atheiſm* on any who have weakned ſome Arguments to prove a God, when they have induſtriouſly ſet themſelves to do it from any other, altho' not ſo firm, nor ſo generally receiv'd. For I conſider the fondneſs Men have for their own Inventions, and how apt therefore they are to ſlight other Arguments in compariſon with them. And this I take to have been the caſe of a Modern Philoſopher of great and deſerved Reputation: For he deſigning to do ſomething beyond other Men, thought he did nothing unleſs he produced Arguments which he thought had not been purſued by others. To this end he ſet aſide the Argument from *Final Cauſes*, for two Reaſons. 1. *Becauſe in Phyſical Inquiries we ought to make uſe of none but the ſtrongeſt Reaſons.* 2. *Becauſe all* God*'s ends are unſearchable by us, being kept cloſe in the Abyſs of his infinite Wiſdom.* But when he was ſmartly urged by his learned Adverſary, That altho' upon another occaſion he might ſet aſide Final Cauſes, yet he ought not when the Honor of God, as the Maker of the Soul, is concerned; for by theſe means the Argument from the light of Nature, as to the Wiſdom, Providence, Power, and Exiſtence of God would be caſt off; which he looks on as the chief Argument (which is taken from the parts of the viſible World, the Heavens, Earth, Plants, Animals, and eſpecially Mankind;) He had no other anſwer to make, but *that what was brought for a Final Cauſe, ought to be referred to the Efficient*; i. e. *that from thoſe things we ought to know and honor* God, *as the Maker, but not to gueſs for what end he made them.* Which is a ſtrange anſwer to be made by one of ſo much ſagacity. For, as *Gaſſendus* well urges, how can we honor God for the excellent uſe of theſe things, and not know for what end they were made? Wherein lies the difference between *the Uſe* and *the End* in this caſe? For he that adores God for the Uſe, muſt do it for the End he deſigned thoſe things for.

Des Cartes *Medit.* 4. *Princip. Phil. Part.* 1. *p.* 22.

Reſp. ad 5. *Object.*

But, ſaith *Des Cartes*, *In Moral Conſiderations, wherein it is a pious thing to make uſe of Conjectures, we may conſider* GOD's *End*; *but not in Phyſical Speculations, wherein we muſt only make uſe of the ſtrongeſt Reaſons.*

To which *Gaſſendus* very well anſwers, That if he takes away the Final Cauſe, he weakens the Argument for the Efficient: for that leads us to him. And it is not the bare ſight of the viſible World which makes us own GOD to be the Maker of it; becauſe it is poſſible for Men to think that theſe things were ſo from Eternity, or came by Chance: but when we obſerve the Wiſdom of GOD in the deſign and contrivance, then we come upon good grounds to own the Efficient Cauſe, and to adore him for the Workmanſhip of his hands. As, ſaith he, if a Man ſees a Paſſage for Water, between Stones on each ſide with an Arch over, that doth not preſently convince him that it is a *Bridge*; becauſe pieces of Rocks might happen ſo, as to afford ſuch a Paſſage: but when he comes to conſider the Order in which they are framed and hold together, and the conveniency of Mankind for paſſing over, he cannot then but acknowledg there was a ſkilful Artificer who managed it, and that it could not be done by Chance.

To the other Argument, *That* GOD's *ends are unſearchable*, he anſwers, That it is not to be denied that GOD may have ends above our reach; but on the other ſide, there are ends which lie open to our view; as ſaith he, particularly in the Body of Man, as the frame of the Mouth for reſpiration and nouriſhment, and all other Paſſages ſo exactly fitted for thoſe ends; and ſo the Bones, Muſcles, Nerves, and other parts of the Body: but there are three eſpecially which ſtrike him with admiration. 1. The Umbilical Veſſels, the fitneſs of them for diſtribution of Nouriſhment to the *Embryo*, and the alteration after the Child is born. 2. The Valves of the Heart, and the ſeveral Veſſels for receiving and diſtributing the Blood. 3. The Perforation of the Tendons which ſerve to draw the Fingers into the Hollow of the Hand. Theſe were cloſe and preſſing Inſtances, of which *Gaſſendus* profeſſeth, *that neither himſelf nor any of his acquaintance, who had made it their buſineſs to ſearch into the Cauſes of things, were able to give any other Account of them, but from the Wiſdom and Power of* GOD. And he challenges *Des Cartes* to ſhew him, *what Mechanical Cauſe could produce ſuch Valves about the Heart*; *out of what matter, and in what manner they were made*; *how they came to have ſuch a Temper, Conſiſtence, Flexibility, Bigneſs, Figure, Situation*, &c. But I do not find that he ever undertook to give any anſwer to it; but by a Letter to *Merſennus*, it ſeems he was of opinion, *that he could give an account of the formation of the ſeveral parts of Animals in a Mechanical way, ſuppoſing* GOD *to have eſtabliſhed thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm, which he ſuppoſes in the ſame manner as he had explained the grains of Salt, and figures of Snow in his Meteors.* **Epiſt. Part. 2. ep. 98.** But however he might pleaſe himſelf in his Opinion, he hath given the World no manner of ſatisfaction about it; inſomuch that his poſthumous piece to that purpoſe is charged with great and fundamental Miſtakes. However his Diſciples run on upon the ſame ground, that *Final Cauſes are to be conſidered only in Morals*; and they muſt overthrow the Argument to prove a Deity, from the Wiſdom and Contrivance in the works of Creation, which, according to them are only occaſion of our Meditation and Praiſe. **Regis Metaphyſ. l. 2. Part. 1. Nittich. in Meditat. Metaph. 4. p. 97.** But how can Men of ſenſe ſatisfy themſelves with this Anſwer? For can we give thanks to GOD for the uſe of our Senſes, without knowing that GOD

gave us Eyes to ſee with, with ſuch admirable contrivance for that purpoſe? and ſo for all the variety of Organs for our Hearing, unleſs we are ſatisfied that God did really give them for thoſe ends? Otherwiſe all that we have to do, is to thank God for putting Matter into Motion, and for eſtabliſhing thoſe Laws of Mechaniſm from whence theſe Organs reſulted. With what Devotion can we praiſe God for the Benefits we have from the Influences of Heaven and the Fruits of the Earth, if theſe things were not intended for our good; but it fell out by the Laws of Mechaniſm, that we have theſe advantages by them? So that all Natural Religion, according to this *Hypotheſis*, comes to no more than an acknowledgment of God to be the Efficient Cauſe of the World, altho' we have no reaſon from his Works to conclude him to be ſo. *Yes*, ſay they, *from them as the effects of a Firſt Cauſe, which put Matter into motion, we may; but not from the ends which* God *intended by them, which are above our capacity.* But this falls ſhort of *Ariſtotle*'s *Divinity*; for he aſſerted, that not only the firſt Motion was from God, but the Order of the Univerſe; and that God did deſign the mutual Benefits which one part of it hath from others: but according to theſe Laws of Mechaniſm, God only put the Matter into motion with ſuch Laws, and then every thing came into the order it is in, without any deſign of Providence. Which takes away all *Life* and *Spirit and Religion*, which depends upon God's managing the affairs of the World; and without that Men may own a *Firſt Mover*, and yet live as *without God in the World.* What reaſon can we imagin, why we ought to give God thanks for *fruitful Seaſons*, or to pray to him in time of Drought and Scarcity, if he hath left all theſe things to the natural courſe, which he hath eſtabliſhed in the World? But it is not denied by *Des Cartes*, *That* God *may reveal to us his own Ends, and then we are to believe them, and to ſerve him accordingly; but that without ſuch Revelation, we cannot find them out.* Now this I ſay is contrary to the general ſenſe of Mankind, where there hath been the moſt confuſed Notion of a God. For I have already obſerved, that even the *Caffres* of *Soldania* (or at the *Cape of Good Hope*) do pray ſolemnly to God in their diſtreſſes for want of Rain; and the *Savages* of the Northern parts of *America* do the ſame at ſome Seaſons of the Year above others; ſo that if the conſent of Mankind ſignify any thing as to the Being of God, it will do as much as to his Providential care of the World. And if ſuch a confuſed Idea did carry along with it the Notion of his Providence, much more the clear and diſtinct *Idea* of him. For *Des Cartes* proves the Being of God from the *Idea* of him in our Minds. Now what is there in that *Idea*, which doth not equally imply *Providence*, as well as his *Exiſtence*? For, why ſhould not a *Being abſolutely perfect* as well regard the *Well-being* as the
Medit. 3. *Being* of his Creatures? *By the name of* God *in this Idea*, he ſaith he underſtands *a certain Subſtance, infinite, independent, moſt intelligent and moſt powerful; by which himſelf and all other things were created.* But
Princip. P. I. n. 21. this is not all; for he acknowledges ſoon after, and in other places, *that becauſe there is no neceſſary connexion between the ſeveral moments of Exiſtence in a contingent Being, we moſt evidently know our dependence on this ſuperior Being for our conſervation*; which he therefore owns to be *a continued Creation.* From hence I infer, that *Des Cartes* his own Idea of God doth imply a particular Providence. For, if we depend upon him for every moment of our Subſiſtence, and Conſervation differ only by an act of our Mind from Creation, as he affirms; then there is as immediate

an act of Providence in our daily Subſiſtence, as in our firſt Being. But how is this conſiſtent with leaving all to the Mechanical Laws of Motion? If it be ſaid, *That this is only a general act of Providence in preſerving things in that ſtate he hath put them into*; I demand farther, Whether thoſe very Laws of Motion be not the Effect of a wiſe Providence? And whether we cannot from them infer, that theſe Laws were directed for very good ends? I do not think this can be denied. And if it cannot, then I am ſure it certainly follows, that we may know ſome ends which God hath; whereas *Des Cartes* ſaid, *That all* God's *ends are unknown to us, being kept ſecret in the Abyſs of his infinite Wiſdom.* But the ends of appointing the Laws of Motion may be known; and if theſe, why not as well the particular ends of thoſe works of his which we find ſo uſeful to Mankind? Eſpecially when his Providence is imply'd in that very Idea from whence he infers his Exiſtence.

I can by no means ſuſpect that *Des Cartes* deſigned to take away the force of other Arguments for a Deity, that he might ſecretly undermine the belief of a God, by introducing his Argument from the Idea, which he knew would not hold; (as ſome have ſuggeſted) for I am ſatisfy'd, that he thought this Argument beyond any other: For, in a Letter to a Friend, he ſaith, *He had found out ſuch an Argument as gave him full ſatisfaction; and by which he more certainly knew that there was a* God, *than the truth of any Geometrical Propoſition; but he doubted, whether he could make others underſtand it ſo well as he himſelf did.* To the ſame purpoſe he ſpeaks in a Letter to *Merſennus*. And in another Letter to *Merſennus*, he ſaith, *That he thought himſelf bound in conſcience to publiſh his Arguments to prove the Exiſtence of* God. Which being written to his intimate Friends, ſhew ſufficiently his own apprehenſion of the ſtrength of them. But what opinion ſoever he had of it himſelf, they have not met with ſuch a reception among thinking Men, as a Geometrical Demonſtration would have done; altho' he hath endeavor'd to put them into that form. For, after all, they cannot conceive how an objective reality of an Idea in the Mind, can prove the real exiſtence of that object out of the Mind. He grants, That it doth not hold in other Ideas; but that there is ſome thing ſo peculiar to this Idea that the Mind could not frame it, if it had not a real Exiſtence: now here lies the main difficulty, what that is in this Idea, diſtinct from all others, which ſo exceeds the capacity of human Underſtanding, that we could not have ſuch an Idea, unleſs the object were in being.

Ren. Des Cartes, *Ep. Part.* 2. Ep. 103.

Ep. 104.
Epiſt. P. II. Ep. 37.

Poſt Reſp. ad duas Object. p. 85.

The force of his Argument, as himſelf hath put it in the Mathematical way, Prop. 2. lies here.

The objective reality in our Ideas muſt have ſome Cauſe in which it is either formally, or eminently: but we have ſuch an Idea within us, which is not within us either of thoſe ways; and therefore there muſt be ſome other Cauſe of it, which can be none but God; *and therefore he is.* Now here the difficulty returns, *viz.* to ſhew what neceſſary Connexion there is between the *Objective Reality* in the *Idea*, and the real Exiſtence of the thing out of the *Idea*. For that he ſaith, by *Axiom* 5. *That this is the true Principle of Knowledg; for,* ſaith he, *we do not know that there is ſuch a thing as the viſible Heaven, barely becauſe we ſee it; for that goes no farther than our ſenſe: but our knowledge is an act of the Mind from the Idea, which ariſes from hence that the Objective Reality of the Idea in our Minds doth come from the thing it ſelf as the true Cauſe; and the more of Objective Reality there is, by* Axiom 6. *in Subſtance than Accident, and* *in an Infinite Subſtance than a Finite, ſo much more doth it prove the Exiſtence of the thing repreſented by the Idea.*

But the caſe ſtill ſeems different between an Idea raiſed in our Minds from an object of Senſe; and that which the Mind raiſes within it ſelf about an infinite Subſtance. For, altho' it be impoſſible for the Mind to make an Objective Reality, which is infinite, by its own power; yet it doth not appear, but that it may frame an Idea within it ſelf to which it ſets no bounds, and ſo is infinite to it. And here lies the main ground of the Miſtake: If our Idea were infinitely perfect as God himſelf is, no doubt it were wholly out of our power to make it; but then it would follow, that Idea with its Objective Reality muſt be God: if it be not God, it muſt be finite; and if it be finite, it is within the power of our Minds to frame it. For, altho' our conceptions of God be not *merely Negative*, yet whatſoever conceptions we have, they are not adequate; and if not, they are imperfect; and ſo come within the reach of our capacities.

Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 4. § 3. *Réponſe à la Cenſure de Monſ.* Huet, *p.* 192.

P. 198.

When the Learned Monſ. *Huet* urged this Argument againſt *Des Cartes, That the Idea in us muſt be finite; becauſe it wants ſomething to make it perfect, being not adequate:* Monſ. *Regis*, who undertook to defend *Des Cartes*, anſwers, *That if the Idea be taken formally as it is in us, ſo it is finite; but if we take it with its objective Reality, ſo it is infinite, and above our power: And as to its not being adequate, he ſaith, it doth not follow that it is finite objectively, but only formally;* becauſe *it repreſents an infinite object, and it is ſufficient to make it infinite becauſe it repreſents as much as we can apprehend.* I grant, that if it reaches as far as our capacity will go, it may be ſaid to be infinite in regard of its object, altho' it be finite as to our manner of apprehending it; but ſtill the main difficulty returns, *viz.* how a finite Idea in us can prove the Exiſtence of an infinite Object. For the Queſtion is not barely about our manner of conception of an infinite Being, which muſt be according to our capacities; but whether ſuch a finite Idea, as we are capable of, can prove an infinite Being: for our Idea can repreſent to us an object to which we can ſet no bounds; but how doth it hence appear that it muſt be an infinite object really exiſting, and that ſuch an Idea muſt proceed from an infinite Cauſe? Altho' theſe things be not ſo clear as were to be wiſh'd, yet we muſt not diſſemble the force of this Argument ſo far as it goes, *viz.* That we cannot form an Idea of Nothing; and that we have no Ideas in our Minds, but what have a proper Cauſe for them; either from without us by *Senſe*, or from within by the acts of our own Minds. As if a Man hath an *Idea* of a rare piece of workmanſhip, either he hath ſeen it, or elſe hath been told it, or was able to invent it. But here can be no evidence from Senſe, and no Man can find within himſelf a power to frame ſuch an object as God; therefore either he muſt have it from others, or elſe God himſelf hath imprinted it in our Minds. Now if the *Idea* of God had been alike in all, *viz.* of a Being infinitely wiſe, powerful and good, there might have been great reaſon to have believ'd it to have been planted in our Minds; but the general Idea of God among Mankind was too dark and confus'd to form any Argument from it; and it related chiefly to his power, and ſome kind of goodneſs; but not ſo as to exclude any other Beings from being honored as Gods. So that the force of it cannot be taken from the conſent of Mankind in this Idea; but if it be only ſaid, *That this is a true and juſt Idea of him*; and that there are other Arguments to prove it from his Works; ſo far it may and ought to be allow'd. But the *Metaphyſical Subtilty* of this Argument, as it was managed by *Des Cartes*, was ſo great, that not merely Perſons of common Capacities could not comprehend it; but he complains himſelf, *That the Mathematicians would not be convinced of the demonſtrative force of it.* Upon which he makes a ſharp Reflection, *That the Mathematicks did rather hinder than farther Men in Metaphyſical Speculations.* Des Cartes Epiſt. To. 2. Ep. 33.

But my buſineſs is not to lay open the weakneſs of theſe Arguments, but only to ſhew, that there is no cauſe to lay aſide thoſe which have been always uſed, and approved by the moſt ſincere and intelligent Perſons in all Ages. And this I ſhall make appear from his ſecond Argument in his *Meditations*, but the firſt in his *Principles*, where he briefly lays it down after this manner. That among the ſeveral Ideas of our Minds, we find one of a Being infinitely perfect in Wiſdom and Power, which hath not a contingent, but a neceſſary exiſtence; which being contained in the Idea, it follows that ſuch a Being actually exiſts. *Princip. Part. I. n.* 14. *Des Cartes* in his 5th Meditation confeſſes, That at firſt appearance this looks like a piece of *Sophiſtry*; but he ſaith, that upon conſideration, neceſſary Exiſtence doth as much belong to an infinite perfect Being, as three Angles do to a Triangle. But he objects againſt his own Argument, that our thoughts put no neceſſity upon things; as if I conceive a Mountain, I muſt likewiſe conceive a Valley, but it doth not follow that there is a Mountain exiſting: But, ſaith he, the difference is, that in this caſe there is no neceſſity of a Mountain's exiſting, but only that a Mountain and Valley cannot be ſeparated; but in the other, it is not our Thought makes neceſſary exiſtence to belong to God, but the nature of the thing makes that Thought neceſſary. For, ſaith he, I can frame no other Idea that hath neceſſary exiſtence beſides, nor can I make more than one God who hath it; which ſhews that it is no arbitrary or fictitious Idea. But *Gaſſendus* and others ſay, That all this *is a Paralogiſm*; becauſe it ſuppoſes that which it ſhould prove, *viz.* that God exiſts, which was the thing in queſtion; and withal they ſay, It is a piece of *Sophiſtry* to argue from the Idea in the Mind to the exiſtence of the thing out of the Mind. And this is the main thing which Monſ. *Huet* inſiſts upon; for he ſaith, *This Argument proves no more, than that a moſt perfect Being muſt neceſſarily exiſt in that way in which it doth exiſt; if it relates to the Idea, then it neceſſarily exiſts only in the Mind; if it relates to the thing, then it really exiſts out of the Mind; but the Argument doth not hold from one to the other.* *Cenſur. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c.* 4. *n.* 8. To this Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, That thoſe things which are ſaid only to exiſt in the Mind, have their foundation out of the Mind; as a Syren, from the Ideas of a Fiſh and a Woman joyn'd together: and ſo other *Chimeras* are form'd from joyning things in the Mind, which nature hath not joyn'd; for a Man cannot have an Idea of nothing. *Réponſe à la Cenſ. ch.* 4. *p.* 333, &c. But in the Idea of a perfect Being he cannot diſtinguiſh that which is in the Mind, and that which is out of the Mind. And that here is no taking that for granted which ought to be proved; but it is only arguing from the nature of the thing; and not firſt ſuppoſing it to be, and thence proving that it is. For it is as much of the nature of a perfect Being to have neceſſary exiſtence, as of the nature of a Triangle to have three Angles.

And thus the matter ſtands as to this Argument, ſo that whatſoever force there is in it, we plainly ſee that Perſons of great Sagacity and Judgment, ſuſpect that there is ſomething in it of the nature of a *Para-*

logiſm. And therefore there can be no reaſon why we ſhould quit the former Arguments, which were plain and obvious to all capacities, for ſuch a *Metaphiſical Demonſtration*, which thoſe who are moſt verſed in *Demonſtrations* will not allow. Let the followers of *Des Cartes* magnify and defend this Argument as well as they can; but let them not deſpiſe and reject all others, which have had the approbation of all Ages, and the wiſeſt Perſons in them; and that upon ſuch frivolous pretences, *that we cannot comprehend all the ends of Divine Wiſdom.*

Boyle *of Final Cauſes, p.* 36.

But *Des Cartes* in an Epiſtle mentioned by Mr. *Boyle*, ſaith, *That it is a childiſh and abſurd thing to affirm in* Metaphyſicks, *that* God *like a proud Man, had no other end in building the World but to be praiſed by Men; or in making the Sun, which is ſo much bigger than the Earth, but only to give light to Mankind, who take up ſo ſmall a part of it.* Which is an Expreſſion not at all becoming the reverence due to the great Creator of the World, from any one that doth acknowledg him truly to be ſo. For the objection, if it be any, lies againſt his making the World at all: ſince it may as well be ſaid, to be *like a proud Prince, only to ſhew the greatneſs of his Power and Wiſdom.* But what is it which ſuch Men would have? Can they imagin the World ſhould be made without *any ends* at all? Is that becoming the wiſdom of the Maker? Or would they not have theſe ends to be known? To what purpoſe are great and noble ends deſign'd, if they are not to be underſtood? And by whom can they be underſtood, but by rational and intelligent Beings? It is a great preſumption in Mankind to pretend to know all the ends which the wiſe Creator had in the vaſt Fabric of the Univerſe; for ſome of the great parts of it are almoſt wholly unknown to us; I mean as to the fix'd Stars, every one of which of the firſt magnitude, is ſaid to be above a hundred times in bigneſs beyond the Globe of the Earth; and yet how ſmall do they appear to us? And in thoſe other Celeſtial Bodies, which we can hardly diſcern without the help of Glaſſes of a late invention: and we are told by ſkilful *Aſtronomers*, that there are many Stars not viſible, even with the help of Teleſcopes; and that they rather leſſen than add to the greatneſs of the fix'd Stars. But if they had given us a fuller view of them, we cannot imagin, that God's great ends could depend upon ſuch way of diſcovery: If all his deſign had been to be admir'd by Mankind for the greatneſs of his work, it would have been plac'd more within our reach; and the Earth we live upon would have born ſome bigger proportion to the Celeſtial Bodies, which is concluded to be but a Point in compariſon of the Starry Heaven; and the very Orb of the Sun is thought to be no more in reſpect of the whole Firmament. So that the main parts of the Univerſe cannot be ſaid to be made for our view. We grant therefore that the infinitely wiſe and powerful Creator hath great and glorious ends, which are above our reach; but how doth it follow from hence, that he hath no ends which we can judg of? For even in thoſe things which we diſcern at ſo great a diſtance, we ſee enough to admire the infinite Majeſty of him that made them; and conſequently to adore, and fear him: And whatever other ends he may have which we cannot ſee into; yet this is the beſt and moſt proper end for us with reſpect to him. Other ends might ſatisfy our curioſity more, but this tends moſt to promote our true happineſs. As I have ſhew'd in the precedent Diſcourſe that the wiſeſt Philoſophers, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Pythagoreans* all agreed upon Principles of Natural Reaſon, that the true happineſs of Mankind lay in being made like to God, not in an affectation of greatneſs and power, but in goodneſs and true wiſdom; which lay in the knowledg of God, and a temper of Mind ſutable to our appprehenſions of him. Now if thoſe ends be attainable by ſuch Diſcoveries, which God hath made of himſelf in the works of Creation, it is to little purpoſe for any to pretend that we cannot know the particular ends which he had in making ſuch a number of vaſt Bodies of Light in the Heavens, nor why they are placed in ſuch a manner, and at ſo great a diſtance from us; nor whether the ſpace between be wholly void, or filled up with an Ethereal Matter, nor of what uſe thoſe ſeveral Bodies of the Stars are with reſpect to themſelves, or the reſt of the Univerſe. Suppoſing that we are to ſeek as to theſe, and many other things relating to the viſible Frame of the World, muſt we therefore ceaſe to admire and praiſe the great God, the Maker of all, leaſt we ſhould ſeem to flatter him for his Greatneſs and Power? There is doubtleſs a juſt veneration due to an infinite Majeſty, in what way ſoever he ſhews himſelf; but it is too mean a thing to imagin that theſe things were done by him only to be admir'd and prais'd by his own Creatures: But if ſuch an Admiration tends to beget in them a greater and deeper ſence of his Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs; and that be the beſt and moſt effectual means to bring Mankind to a conſtant fear and love of him, and thereby to fit them for a future happineſs; can any Man of ſenſe think this to be an end unbecoming the Creator of the World?

But theſe are ſaid *to be good Moral ends, but not proper for Phyſical Speculations.* I anſwer, That thoſe are truly the moſt *Philoſophical Contemplations*, which lead us to the beſt and moſt noble ends of our Beings; for this was of old look'd on as the trueſt end of *Philoſophy*, and the firſt occaſion of it. For, it is agreed on all hands, that it had its name from *Pythagoras:* And it is very well obſerv'd by S. *Auguſtin, that the Doctrine of the Soul's immortality gave the firſt occaſion to the Greeks to apply themſelves to Philoſophy; and from hence* Pythagoras *began it:* Who was inſtructed therein by his Maſters *Thales* and *Pherecydes*; and after long Travels into ſeveral Countries for his own ſatisfaction, he at laſt fix'd at *Crotone* in *Italy*, and there took upon him to inſtruct others in the way to *Immortality:* but finding great reaſon to miſtruſt many who came to be his Scholars, he ſet up a very ſevere Diſcipline in his School (which prov'd his ruin at laſt) and would admit none but ſuch as he had ſufficiently tried. But when he was aſk'd by one of the Great Men of thoſe parts, *What it was he profeſs'd*, he ſaid nothing but *Philoſophy*, or a *Love of Wiſdom*; which he made to conſiſt in two things, *A ſearch after Truth, and a purſuit of Virtue.* But by *Truth* he did not underſtand the *Phyſical Cauſes* of things, but *Abſtracted and Metaphyſical Speculations*; for his Notion was, that there was no certainty to be had from mere ſenſible things, which rather perplexed and confounded Mens Minds, which were apt to judg by the impreſſions of Senſe; (and his opinion was that the Senſe only tranſmitted the Objects, but *it was the Mind which ſaw and heard*, &c.) therefore to prevent falſe judgments, he thought it neceſſary to draw off their Minds from ſenſible Objects; to this end he bethought himſelf of the way of reaſoning by *Figures* and *Numbers* as is before obſerv'd, which were ſo ſoon and ſo groſly miſunderſtood. *He had learnt*, ſaith *Porphyry*, *from the Eaſtern Magi, that* God *was Light and Truth*; and therefore he look'd on a ſearch after Truth as one way of aſſimilation to God. But the main thing was

Aug. ad Voluſ. Ep. 3.

in the practice of Virtue; of which there is a ſhort Abſtract in the *Golden Verſes*, and *Hierocles* declares in the beginning, *The deſign of* Stob. Eclog. c. 3. *them all was to bring Mankind to a likeneſs to the Divine Nature.* And in this, ſaith *Eudorus* in *Stobæus*, *Socrates* and *Plato agreed with Pythagoras, That this was the chief end of Philoſophy*; but *Plato* added Κατὰ τὸ Alcin. c. 27. δυνατὸν, *as far as Mankind could attain to it.* And ſo *Alcinous* expreſſes the ſenſe of *Plato:* but he tells us, *That* Plato *ſometimes ſet it forth by being Wiſe, and Juſt, and Holy*; *ſometimes by following* God; *becauſe according to the ancient Saying* God *is the beginning and end of all things.* *This*, ſaith *Hierocles*, *is the end of the Pythagorean Philoſophy, to give wings to our Souls, that when death comes, we may leave a mortal Body behind us, and fly to the immortal Manſions above, and partake of a Di-* Simplic. in Categor. *vine Nature, as far as we are capable of it.* And *Simplicius* in the beginning of his Commentaries on *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *The end of Philoſophy is to attain to our moſt perfect Happineſs*; *and if a Man arriv'd to the top of Philoſophy, he might be a God, and not a Man.* Theſe things I mention to ſhew, that *Philoſophy* as it was underſtood by the Ancients was far from excluding *Final Cauſes*, or *Moral Conſiderations* of things; ſince its great end was to bring Men to a likeneſs to God.

This being then the true original end of *Philoſophy*, to improve Mens Minds in order to their Happineſs, how came the conſideration of the great ends of God in the World, to be thought unbecoming Philoſophical Speculations? The reaſon was, that the immortality of the Soul hath been excluded too. For, altho' according to the Doctrin of *Des Cartes* its diſtinction from the Body be aſſerted and proved, yet its immortality is paſs'd over; under this pretence, *that* God *may fix its duration by his Will*; and therefore unleſs we know the Will of God in it, we can determin nothing in *Philoſophy* about it. But the Ancient *Philoſophers* made the immortality of the Soul the foundation of all their Inquiries, and therefore took in all ſuch conſiderations as tended to improve, and refine, and purify the Minds of Men. For which end *Moral Conſiderations* are moſt proper. And therefore it cannot but ſeem ſtrange to any thinking Man, to obſerve theſe to be ſo induſtriouſly ſet aſide, on pretence *that we cannot find out the ends that* God *had in framing the World, and the ſeveral parts of it:* and yet at the ſame time they pretend to have found all the Mechanical Powers of Matter, which is much more difficult to comprehend. But of that afterwards: we now conſider Final Cauſes. And have we not reaſon to conclude from the preſent Frame of the World with reſpect to mankind, that the Maker of it intended to diſpoſe things for their advantage? Let Men conſider the Faculties of their Minds together with the Materials about them, and the Organs God hath given them to make uſe of them; and can they think otherwiſe, but that God hath abundantly made up to them, what other Creatures ſeem to exceed them in? Their Underſtanding, and Contrivance, and artificial Inventions go far beyond the natural ſtrength and ſagacity of Brutes, as to the comfortable way of ſubſiſtence. They can make the Brutes to be very ſerviceable to them, as to Diet, Clothing, Journeying, Habitations, *&c.* They can find out ways to communicate their Thoughts to each other at a great diſtance, and entertain commerce in the remoteſt parts, by the help of their own Inventions as to Navigation. So that if one Country be not ſufficiently furniſhed, they can bring home the products of others. And ſo, all the benefit of Trading (which in theſe later Ages is grown to ſo mighty a reputation above what it had in elder Ages) is owing to the happy Invention of the uſe of the *Magnet*. But ſet aſide theſe modern Improvements, and conſider Mankind as mere Natives of their ſeveral Countries, take all together, and the Inhabitants of the Earth have no cauſe to complain of Providence; which makes up what is wanting in one thing by ſuch advantages another way, that moſt Nations are fond of their own Countries, and would not change them. The ancient Geographers indeed mention People *who curſed the riſing and ſetting Sun, becauſe his heat was intolerable to them*; and the *Philoſophers* thought they had great reaſon to conclude the *Torrid Zone* uninhabitable. But the experience of theſe latter times have found it quite otherwiſe, and that the places there were fully peopled, and their condition tolerable enough, and in ſome reſpects pleaſant to them: as to the fruitfulneſs of Land, and numbers of Rivers and plenty of commodities. And as to Heat, that is very much qualify'd, by the conſtant breezes in the Day-time, and coolneſs of the Nights; and the particular ſituation of ſome places, at a very little diſtance have Winter and Summer; which ſhews that the Seaſons do not merely depend upon the Sun, but upon the motion of the Air; for where that is ſtopt by the height of Mountains, there is Winter on one ſide, and Summer on the other; as *Iſ. Voſſius* obſerves on the coaſt of *Malabar*; and about the *Mountains* of *Arabia*, *Congo* and *Bengala*, and other places: And *Ludolphus* confirms it concerning the Mountains of *Malabar*; inſomuch, that he ſaith, *the King there may keep a perpetual Summer, only by croſſing the Mountains.* Others have given a more particular account of it, and tell us, That the *Cherſoneſe* between the Rivers of *Indus* and *Ganges*, is divided in the middle by a ridge of *High Hills*, which they call the *Gate*; on the one ſide is *Malabar*, and on the other *Coromandel*: and that it is Winter on one ſide from *April* to *September*, and Summer on the other; and that not above 20 Leagues diſtance in croſſing the Mountains. And the ſame is ſaid to be at Cape *Razalgate* in *Arabia*, and in *Jamaica*; which is imputed to the Mountains ſtopping the current of Vapours wherein the particles of them are driven together, and fall down into drops of Rain; and ſo the Seaſons depend upon the *Monſons* or fix'd Winds in thoſe parts; the North-eaſt blowing on one ſide from *November* to *April*, and the Southerly on the other from *April* to *November*. Sir *H. Middleton* ſpeaks of *ſo great cold on the Mountains of* Arabia, *that he could not have believ'd it, unleſs he had felt it himſelf*; for he deſpis'd their information at *Mecca*, who knew the Country far better. But he thought he went according to *Reaſon*, as the Ancients did; but *Experience* hath plainly diſcover'd their miſtakes. For Heat and Cold are found not to depend merely upon the nearneſs or diſtance of the Sun; for other things we find may not only qualify that heat, but produce cold where it was leaſt expected. *Acoſta* tells us that the old Philoſophers went upon Principles of Common Reaſon, when they ſuppoſed *the Torrid Zone was uninhabitable*, but notwithſtanding he found it ſo far from being ſo, that *he thought it pleaſant and agreeable, and ſaw it full of People:* and he ſaith, *that the Air is cleareſt when the Sun is fartheſt off, and fulleſt of Clouds and Rain when the Sun is neareſt.* As he ſhews at large from the experience himſelf had in thoſe parts. Some places of the *Torrid Zone* he obſerves to be *Temperate*, as in *Quitto*, and *the Plains of Peru*; ſome very cold, as at *Potoſi*; ſome very hot, as in ſome parts of *Æthiopia*, *Braſil* and the *Moluccas*. The temperateneſs of it he imputes to the

Herod. l. 1. *Mela l.* 1. *c.* 8. *Plin. l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Iſ. Voſſ. de Nilo, c. 12. *Ludolph. Comment. ad Hiſt. Æthiop. p.* 101. *Philoſoph. Tranſactions, n.* 179.

Purchas Pil. To. I. *p.* 255.

Acoſta *of the* Indies, *l.* 2. *c.* 23.

C. 9.

C. 10.

Rains, to the ſhortneſs of the Days, the nearneſs to the Ocean, the height of Lands and Mountains, but eſpecially to the Winds. For he C. 13. ſaith, *The Providence of* GOD *hath ſo order'd it, that the freſh and cool Winds do qualify the exceſſive heat of the Sun.* But he obſerves, *that be-* L. 3. c. 8. *ſides the Breezes from the Sea by day, there are Land-winds by night, which ſerve very much to temper the heat of the Air.*

It look'd like an Objection againſt Providence, when Men concluded that by the nearneſs of the Sun within the Tropics, ſo great a part of the Earth as the *Torrid Zone* ſhould be ſcorch'd by the Sun, as not to be capable of habitation by Mankind: but when the contrary is now found moſt certainly true, and ſuch reaſons are given for it, which Mankind could not have thought of, have we not ground to infer that Providence had certainly ſuch an end as the good of Mankind, to order things ſo, as by ſeveral means to make thoſe habitations not only tolerable, but in many places delightful? By this we ſee how vain thoſe old Arguments againſt Providence were, which were grounded on this ſuppoſition, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind by the intolerable heat of the Sun. Yet how confidently doth *Lucretius* argue upon this ſuppoſition, as tho' he could demonſtrate againſt Providence from Heaven and Earth?

> *Hoc tamen ex ipſis cœli rationibus auſim*
> *Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,*
> *Nequaquam nobis divinitus eſſe paratam*
> *Naturam rerum, tanta ſtat prædita culpa.*
> *Principio quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens,*
> *Inde avidam partem montes, ſylvæque ferarum*
> *Poſſedere, tenent rupes, vaſtæque paludes,*
> *Et mare, quod late terrarum diſtinet oras.*
> *Inde duas porro prope parteis fervidus ardor,*
> *Aſſiduuſque geli caſus mortalibus aufert.* Lucret. l. 5.

So much room taken up by the Heavens, ſo much by Mountains, Woods, Rocks, Marſhes and Seas; and two parts of the Earth uſeleſs for Mankind by intolerable Heat and Cold; that he could never imagin this Earth was fram'd with deſign for the good of Mankind. And yet at the ſame time there were *Philoſophers*, who thought the conveniencies for Mankind were ſo great in this World, that from thence they infer'd that there was a Providence, which had a particular regard to the advantages which they enjoy; and this without any Revelation from GOD of thoſe ends which he deſign'd. The *Stoics* knew, as well as *Epicurus*, the compaſs of the Heavens, the greatneſs of the Mountains, Woods, Rocks and Seas; and they believ'd as much that ſome parts of the Earth were not to be inhabited; and yet they concluded, that there was a deſign of Providence in all with reſpect to Mankind. For they took notice, not merely of the ſpace which the Heavens took up, but of the great Beauty, and order, and uſefulneſs of the *Celeſtial Bodies*; and particularly the convenient diſtance of the Sun to make the Earth fruitful and pleaſant; and to diſtinguiſh Days and Nights for Works and Reſt; and that the Mountains were large ſtore-houſes for Metals and Rivers, which could not otherwiſe be ſupply'd; and that the Seas afforded plenty of Fiſh, and large conveniencies for Commerce; and the Woods were furniſh'd with Timber to make Veſſels out of, to paſs over thoſe Seas, and ſo preſerve a correſpondence among Mankind at the greateſt diſtance for their mutual advantage; and if there were uncultivated parts of the Earth, that only ſhew'd that God did not give theſe things to make Mankind lazy and idle, but to exerciſe thoſe abilities both of Body and Mind, which he had given them.

But as to the two parts of the Earth being wholly unſerviceable to Mankind, by reaſon of exceſſive Heat or Cold, that is found by experience of later Ages to have been a great miſtake. But *Ariſtotle* is poſitive in it, *That the places near the Sun have no Waters nor Paſtures; and that the remote Northern parts are not to be inhabited for the Cold.* But both theſe Aſſertions are found to be falſe; however his Authority was follow'd. Inſomuch, that *Pliny* ſaith, *Of five Zones two are uſeleſs by extremity of Cold; and that there is nothing but a perpetual Miſt, and a ſhining Froſt; and that within the Tropicks all is burnt up by the heat of the Sun, which is ſo intenſe, that,* he ſaith, *there is no paſſage from one Temperate Zone to the other.* This is a ſtrange Account to us now, and given by a Man who had read all Authors then extant about theſe matters; and it is the ſtranger, becauſe in the Chapter before he ſaith, *That* Hanno *paſſed from* Cadiz *to the end of* Arabia, (which is much doubted) *and that* Eudoxus *came to* Cadiz *from the* Arabian *Gulph; and that another went from* Spain *to* Æthiopia *on the account of Trade; and that ſome* Indians *trading abroad were caſt by ſtorms on the Northern Coaſts, who were preſented to the Proconſul of* Gaul. How could theſe things be, and yet they ſuch ſtrangers to the *Torrid Zone*, thro' which they muſt paſs? But he ſeem'd to take it for granted, *That thoſe Regions were unpaſſable, and uninhabitable,* altho' himſelf mentions ſeveral Nations which liv'd within *the Torrid Zone*; as the *Negroes* on both ſides the River *Niger*, the *Garamantes*, *Troglodytæ* (whom *Ludolphus* makes to be ſame with the *Hotentots*) and ſeveral others. Now if all theſe Countries were burnt up, how come ſo many People to be then known to live here; and ſo they were from the time of *Herodotus*, who mentions them? But how different are the beſt Accounts we now have of theſe Places from what the Antients imagin'd? The Country of the *Negroes*, thro' which the *Niger* runs (which is ſuppos'd to be of the ſame *Nature* (if not *Original*) with the *Nile*, and overflows the Country of the *Negroes*, in the ſame manner and at the ſame time that the *Nile* doth *Egypt*) is, according to a late Author, *a populous and fertile Country*, who ſaith, *that the Natives endure the Heat with eaſe, and are healthful and vigorous.* Another, who ſpent ſome time in that Country, ſaith, *That the Heat is more ſupportable by the cool Wind which blows; and that for 6 Months it is as pleaſant as* France. *Andrew Battel*, who liv'd about 18 Years in *Angola* and thereabouts, ſpeaks enough of the *Populouſneſs* of thoſe parts; and *Lopez* who was at *Congo*, commends the *Temperature of the Air* there. *Ludolphus*, in his Account of *Ethiopia*, which he had chiefly from a Native, ſaith, *that it is as temperate as* Portugal. The ſame we have already produc'd from *Acoſta* of *Peru*. Many more ſuch Inſtances might be produc'd, but theſe are ſufficient to ſhew what a wonderful Miſtake the Antients were under as to the *Torrid Zone*, and how very weak *Lucretius* his Argument againſt Providence from thence is. But the Argument for it is much ſtronger from theſe Diſcoveries, becauſe, according to the ordinary effects of the Heat of the Sun, they reaſon'd truly; but there is a concurrence of ſeveral other things which temper the Air, which they could not underſtand. It is true, there are ſome things that abate the

Ariſt. *Meteor. l.* 2. *c.* 5.

Plin. *l.* 2. *c.* 68.

L. 5. *c.* 8.

Herodot. l. 4. *c.* 183. *Plin. l.* 5. 8. *Solin. c.* 43.

Voyage to Surat, *p.* 61. *p.* 71.

Relation de la Nigritie, 1689. *p.* 85.

Purchas *II. l.* 7. *c.* 3. *Id. c.* 4.

Ludolph. Comment. l. 1. *c.* 5. *n.* 36.

Heat which ariſes from the Sun's nearneſs; as the equality of Nights to Days, and the abundance of Rains which fall at that time, of which the moſt probable account is, that altho' in our parts the diſtance of the Sun cauſes Cold and Rain, and the nearneſs Heat and Drought; yet it is quite otherwiſe there, for the Sun raiſes up the Vapors more there by rarifying the Air, and that to a great height; which joining together, and falling down with greater force, doth thereby produce a Wind as well as Water, both which cool and refreſh the Air; and where the Vapors do not produce Rain, yet they make a Dew, as in ſome parts of *Peru*, which falling on the ground makes it fruitful. But theſe things are not ſufficient; for were all the Country in the *Torrid Zone* a flat, with thoſe advantages, it would not be habitable; and therefore the height of the Mountains was neceſſary for this purpoſe. Which ſhews, that theſe are ſo far from being *Botches* or *Ruins*, that they are great inſtances of Divine Providence, if they can be made out to be ſerviceable to this purpoſe. *Scaliger* ſaith, that thoſe do *piè delirare, who impute the Mountains to the fractures made in the Earth by the Flood; and that it is impoſſible that the Earth which fell in, ſhould ever make a ſurface equal with the height of the Mountains:* but he aſſerts them to be a work of Providence in the original frame of the World, and chiefly intended to be a receptacle for Water: and he obſerves that the higheſt Mountains are under the Torrid Zone, where they ſerve likewiſe for tempering the Air. For, *Acoſta* gives that reaſon of the temper of the Air in the *Weſt Indies*, that *it is a high Country, having many Mountains, which afford a great refreſhment to the neighbour Countries:* and he obſerves, *that the Sea-coaſt in* Peru *and* New Spain *is very hot, being low and flat; but it is otherwiſe in the higher parts.* *Piſo*, a learned Phyſician, who liv'd in *Braſil*, and hath given a *Natural Hiſtory* of that Country, imputes the *Healthfulneſs* of the *Maritime Coaſts* there, which he thinks compares with *Europe*, to two things: 1. *The conſtant breeze from the Sea lying on the Eaſt of it, which* he ſaith, *very much defends them from the exceſſive Heat of the Sun.* 2. *A Ridg of Mountains between that and* Peru, *which keep off the noiſom Vapors of the Mooriſh Grounds on the other ſide of them. In the Night*, he ſaith, *the Cold is ſo great* (even in the *Torrid Zone) that they are forc'd to keep Fires to prevent the ill effects of it. Nichol. de Techo*, who was in *Tucumania*, ſaith, *That the part of it which is within the Torrid Zone is very cold, by reaſon of the Mountains there; which*, he ſaith, *evidently confutes the Antients opinion concerning it. An*drew Battel mentions *the high Mountains* about *Angola*, *over which he march'd, and found the Air very cold. Ludolphus* ſaith, *The Providence of* God *is much to be admir'd in the Mountains of* Ethiopia; *for the height of their Mountains makes that Country habitable, and their Air more temperate, and affords them Rivers, which the flat in the Torrid Zone do want,* unleſs they be ſuch as come out of the mountainous part. And, which ſeems very ſtrange, he affirms from *Tellez*, *That the Heats in ſome parts of* Ethiopia *are more tolerable than in* Portugal, *which lies ſo many degrees more to the North.*

Scaliger. Exerc. 43.
Exerc. 42.
Acoſta *Hiſt. of the Indies, l.* 2. *c.* 12.
Piſon. Hiſt. Nat. & Medic. Braſiliæ, l. 1. *c.* 1.
Hiſt. Paraquar. l. 1. *c.* 19.
Purchas *To. II. l.* 7. *c.* 3. §. 3.
Ludolph. Hiſt. Æthiop. l. 1. *c.* 6.
C. 5.

The force of what I have ſaid comes to this. It was ſuppos'd to be an Argument againſt Providence, that ſo great a part of the Earth was uſeleſs to Mankind: Which is ſo far from being true, that undoubted Experience hath convinc'd the World, that they have been fully inhabited; and that to the comfortable ſubſiſtence of Mankind, there hath been concurrence of ſeveral things, which could not be the reſult of

Chance, or of the Mechanical Laws of the motion of Matter: and therefore we ought to conclude theſe things to be ordered by Divine Providence, for the uſe and benefit of Mankind.

There is yet one thing to be obſerv'd before I end this part of my Diſcourſe, which is to ſhew the pernicious uſe that hath been made of *Des Cartes* his laying aſide the conſideration of *Final Cauſes.* For there was lately a Perſon too well known in the World, (and whom I intend to conſider at large afterwards) who at firſt profeſs'd himſelf a ſtrict Follower of *Des Cartes* his *Notions* in his *Metaphyſical Meditations.* But he made uſe of the Argument from the *Idea* to prove *the World to be* God: And *Des Cartes* cannot be excus'd from giving too great advantage to *Spinoza*, by ſuppoſing *the Idea of extended Matter to be infinite and neceſſary*; which overthrows the force of his own Argument from the *Idea*, for if it agrees to Matter, it cannot prove the Being of a Subſtance diſtinct from Matter, and gave occaſion to the other to think, that nothing but *Infinite Matter* was imply'd in this *Idea:* and to carry on his deſign the better, he kept cloſe to *Des Cartes* in excluding the *conſideration of Final Cauſes.* For in his *Mathematical Ethicks* (as he calls them) he hath an *Appendix* to his firſt Part, where he doth purpoſely ſet himſelf to overthrow all *Final Cauſes, as meer Fictions of Mens Brains.* But the comfort is, that they are no late *Fictions*, but the wiſeſt Men in all Ages, as I have already ſhew'd, did aſſert them: And it is not a mere *Mathematical Appearance* will fright Men now out of the Principles of Reaſon. But let us examin what the grounds are on which *Final Cauſes* are thus peremptorily condemned. He ſaith, *That they ariſe from the common prejudice of Mankind, who have ſo much fondneſs for themſelves as to think that all things are done for their ſakes: that* God *made all things for Man, and Mankind to ſerve him.* But this is not a juſt and fair repreſentation of the matter. We do not ſay, that God had no other end in the frame of the Univerſe, but merely for the ſake of the Inhabitants of the Earth; for we do not pretend to give an account of the great ends which the Almighty had in thoſe vaſt and numerous Bodies of the fix'd Stars, which are ſo very remote from us; but that which we ſay, is, that God hath plac'd Mankind in ſuch a ſtation here upon Earth, that they cannot but look about them; and when they do ſo, they cannot but admire to find ſo great and ſo wiſe a Being order all things ſo, as to ſee not only the Wiſdom but the Goodneſs of their Maker. And how doth this appear to be *a mere Fiction of Mens Brains?* Are there not ſuch juſt cauſes for our admiration? Are there not ſuch conveniences for human Life? Do not all Men ſee the wonderful contrivance and uſefulneſs of the parts of their Bodies? And are there not great diſcoveries of the like Wiſdom in Plants and Animals, and the Earth and Sea? Are all theſe mere Phantaſms and Fictions of Mens Brains? Why are not the miſtakes about theſe things diſcover'd in a Mathematical manner? This might have ſignify'd ſomething: But to go about to confute Mankind by telling them, *That Final Cauſes are mere Fictions of their Brains*, is far from being a Geometrical way of Demonſtration. Let us examin, however, the method he takes to make it out. (1.) In the firſt place, he undertakes to ſhew how Mankind came to think ſo much of *Final Cauſes*; and then, (2.) How repugnant they are to the nature of things: (3.) How Men came to take up the Notions of Good and Evil, and of Rewards and Puniſhments, from this Opinion about *Final Cauſes.* All which I ſhall briefly conſider. As to the firſt, he ſuppoſes *that all Men are born ignorant*

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n. 21.*

B. D. Spinoſ. Opera Poſth. p. 36.

rant of Cauſes, and look after their own advantage, which they are conſcious to themſelves of. And what follows? *Firſt, that they ſuppoſe themſelves free, becauſe they know their own Deſires.* And why ſhould they not, as well as know that they think? For they have the like inward Perception as to both. *But they are ignorant of the Cauſes which determine their Deſires.* How doth it appear, that there are ſuch *Cauſes*, which they are thus ignorant of? If any Man undertakes to aſſign Cauſes which Mankind are not at all ſenſible of, he ought not to take it for granted, that there are ſuch Cauſes, but to prove it in ſuch a manner, as to overballance the evidence of their inward Perceptions. For Mankind are conſcious to themſelves of no ſuch Cauſes; if therefore any one will prove, that however they are not free, certainly that Evidence ought to be clearer than the Argument from our own Perception to the contrary. I think I move my Eye freely to this or that Object, and am fully ſatiſfy'd from that inward Perception I have of the voluntary motion of the Muſcles belonging to the Eye. Now if any one goes about to tell me that I am deceiv'd herein, and that there were other Cauſes, which determin'd the motion of my Eye; is it not reaſon I ſhould have Evidence greater than what I have from my own Senſation? But here we have no Cauſes at all aſſign'd; therefore we muſt go on. *Secondly*, ſaith he, *Mankind do all things for ſome End*, viz. *for their own Profit; and therefore deſire only to know Final Cauſes, and if they find theſe they are ſatiſfy'd.* Is not this well ſaid by a Man that pretends to *Demonſtration*, and that in a *Geometrical manner?* Could no other *Ends* be thought of but *Profit?* I begin to be of *Des Cartes* his mind, *That Geometry ſpoils Mens Reaſonings in other matters.* For, how was it poſſible for a Man of common ſenſe to argue in ſuch a manner; *Men aim at their own Profit, therefore they deſire only to know Final Cauſes?* What *Profit* was it which this Author aim'd at in making this Work of his. He had without doubt ſome end in it; for I hardly think he could take ſo much pains for no end at all. Was it a *Good* or a *Bad end?* (For Mankind are ſtill apt to be inquiſitive into *Final Cauſes.*) *A Good End*, no doubt his Friends will ſay. What was this *Good End?* was it *mere Profit?* No certainly, they will ſay, his Mind was above it; *for he devoted himſelf wholly* (as they tell us in the Preface to his Works) *to Philoſophy*; and *retired on purpoſe for the proſecution of his Studies.* It is then more than poſſible for a Man to aim at ſome other end, than mere *Profit*. And what was the End he propos'd in Philoſophy? Still we enquire after *the End*, altho' *Profit* be ſet aſide; and we cannot have a better account of it than from himſelf. *De Intell. Emend. P. 357.* He tells us, *His Mind was ſet upon finding out the true Good of Mankind.* This was a noble End indeed, and fit for a Perſon that deſign'd to improve his Underſtanding. But was this *true Good* nothing but *Profit?* So far from it, that he ſaith, *He was ſoon ſatiſfy'd, that what things Mankind generally purſued, were a hindrance to the End he aim'd at: and therefore he ſaw it neceſſary to give over the purſuit of Riches, Honors and ſenſual Pleaſures; and to fix upon an eternal and infinite Good, which alone can give ſatiſfaction to the Mind, and therefore ought to be purſued with all our might.* This, one would think, were ſpoken like a true Chriſtian Philoſopher; but his way is, to uſe our Expreſſions, and to couch his own meaning under very plauſible Terms: but he ſpeaks his Mind more afterwards, when he ſaith, *This chief Good of Man is to underſtand the union between the Mind and Nature.* What that is, will appear more afterwards; *P. 361.* but here he ſaith, *That this is the End to which* *our Studies and Endeavors are to be directed.* Which is ſufficient to my preſent purpoſe. For here it is confeſs'd, that they are only vulgar Minds that aim at *mere Profit* as their End; but that there is a higher, and more certain, and agreeable End for the Minds of Men to ſearch after; and that their Happineſs lies in the attaining of that End. Which being allow'd, if we ſuppoſe a wiſe and intelligent Being to have created Mankind, there is no incongruity at all in Man's making that infinite and eternal Good to be his chief End, nor in purſuing after it with all his Endeavors; nor can there be any in ſuppoſing that this GOD ſhould order things in this World with that deſign, that they ſhould be ſerviceable to him here as to his preſent ſubſiſtence, in order to his main End. For he allows his *Philoſopher* to do many things with that deſign to ſerve his End, viz. *To ſpeak as other Men do, whatever he thinks: To uſe ſenſual Pleaſures, as they ſerve for Health: To get as much Wealth as will make his Condition eaſy.* Thus far then we find that Mankind may propoſe Ends to themſelves; and that there are things which have a tendency to them; and that it is very becoming to them to uſe thoſe Means in order to their Ends. Why then may not the wiſe Creator of the World appoint proper Ends and Means to Mankind, as to their conveniencies and future Happineſs? What repugnancy is there in this, more than in the former caſe? All that he can ſay is, *That Mankind finding ſomething very uſeful to them, as Eyes for ſeeing, Teeth for eating, Herbs and Animals for nouriſhment, the Sun to give Light, the Sea to breed Fiſh,* &c. *and becauſe they are ſo uſeful to them, conclude that there was a Being above them, which prepar'd all theſe things for them.* And what abſurdity is there in ſo doing? What *Geometrical Demonſtration* is there, that theſe things all came together ſo of themſelves without any intelligent Agent? All that he ſaith is, *That they conſidering them as Means, could not believe that they made themſelves; but becauſe they were wont to provide things for their own uſe, they ſuppoſed or believed ſome free Agent which ordered all theſe things for them. And from hence they judging all by themſelves, concluded that* GOD *ordered all theſe things for their uſe; to oblige Mankind to him, that they might honor and ſerve him; and ſo under a pretence of doing honor to* GOD, *they fell into Superſtition, and were ſo bent upon Final Cauſes, till at laſt they made* GOD *no wiſer than themſelves.* Is not all this *Demonſtration?* They muſt think very meanly indeed of the Underſtandings of Men, that can think they will be ſatisfy'd with ſuch Accounts as theſe. We find he grants *Eyes fitted for Sight, Teeth for Eating,* &c. And why, I pray, may we not in reaſon conclude, that they were deſign'd for that uſe? He finds ſome things to cavil at, about *Unſeaſonable Weather, Earthquakes, Diſeaſes,* &c. (which are conſiſtent with the general Ends of Providence) but he hath nothing to ſay as to his former Inſtances, why we ſhould not believe *we had Eyes to ſee with, or Ears to hear with, or Teeth to eat with:* But if theſe things were given for thoſe uſes and no other, doth not this prove particular Ends of Providence with reſpect to Mankind? What, *if Men do provide Means for their Ends?* Is it an Argument of *Folly,* or *Wiſdom* ſo to do? If it be *Wiſdom* to act for an End, and *Folly* to act for none, why may we not ſuppoſe an infinitely wiſe Being to act for Ends agreeable to himſelf? Not for mean, fooliſh, ſordid Ends, but ſuch as become the great Creator and wiſe Governor, and bountiful Benefactor to Mankind. And what is there unbecoming our *Idea* of GOD in theſe relations? Is it then unfit for a wiſe Creator, and Governor, and Benefactor, to beſtow on Mankind

Ethic. P. 1. p. 34.

kind ſuch things as tend to the uſe and good of his Creatures, or to take care of their welfare, ſo as to furniſh us with ſuch Organs of our Senſes, ſuch Faculties of our Minds, as may make uſe of the many conveniences which we have about us for our comfortable ſubſiſtence, and our cheerful ſervice of ſo Great, and ſo Good, and ſo Liberal a Benefactor? Can this be call'd *Superſtition*, to ſerve and adore him? Is this *making* GOD *like to our ſelves*, when we acknowledg the infinite diſtance between him and us, and ſerve him with devout Reverence and godly Fear? Far be it from us to think ſo meanly of him, as to attribute the leaſt degree of our Paſſions and Weakneſſes to him. We know he could not be GOD, if he were not infinitely above our Thoughts as well as our Services: but if he pleaſe to be ſo kind to us, to give us ſo many reaſons to love and ſerve him, is it fit for his Creatures to deſpiſe his Service, on pretence that he is above it? *Superſtition* is a fooliſh thing, becauſe it comes from mean apprehenſions of GOD; but *true Religion* is a wiſe and agreeable thing, becauſe it flows from a due ſenſe of a Divine Majeſty, and a tender regard to his Honor. And whatever Men pretend as to *Philoſophy* and *Demonſtration*, there are none that really want Senſe and Underſtanding ſo much, as thoſe who deſpiſe *Religion*, under the name of *Superſtition*. We cannot deny that there is too much of it in the World: but as GOD remains the ſame notwithſtanding the Follies of Mankind, ſo *Religion* is as juſt and reaſonable a thing as ever, altho' *Superſtition* hath brought ſo much diſhonor upon it.

The next thing is to ſhew, *That Final Cauſes are repugnant to the Nature of things*. This is to the purpoſe indeed, if he can make it out. As to his Argument *from the neceſſity of all things*, that muſt be referr'd to its due time; becauſe it is not prov'd but ſuppos'd: But here we are to conſider how *Final Cauſes* do ſo lamentably pervert the Order of Nature. *They make*, ſaith he, *the Cauſe to be the Effect, and the Effect to be the Cauſe*; *and that which was firſt in Nature to be the laſt*; *and make the moſt perfect Being to be the moſt imperfect*. Theſe are ſad Conſequences, if they hold: The two former he paſſes over, as he had reaſon, and fixes on the laſt, *That they overthrow the Divine Perfection*; and he needs no more, if he can make this out. But how? *If* GOD *works for an End, then he muſt want that which he works for*. Is this the *Demonſtrating Ethicks in a Geometrical way?* A Father out of kindneſs to his Son deſigns to advance him in the World, and furniſhes him with all neceſſary means to that end: Doth this argue weakneſs and indigency, or only kindneſs and good-will to his Son? If there may be a deſign of doing good to others, with regard to their welfare, and many means us'd to that end, what want doth this argue? But rather it flows from *abundant Goodneſs*; and the more perfect any Being is, the greater is the beneficence and readineſs to do good to others: and one would think Men did not want Geometry to know this. *But*, ſaith he, GOD *did not do this for their ſakes, but his own*; *his own Glory is the end of all*. But if the *Glory of* GOD be moſt advanced by the good of his Creatures, how can theſe two be ſeparated from each other? Men may make a diſtinction by Metaphyſical Speculation: but if his Glory be advanced by their good, there can be no real diſtinction between them; for both are carried on by the ſame thing.

After theſe faint Attempts, our *Geometrician* falls to *Ignorance of Cauſes*, (of which I have ſaid ſo much already) and from thence, he ſaith *comes Mens admiration of the Fabrick of Man's Body, becauſe they know not the*

the Cauſes of it. And did our Philoſopher know the *Mechanical Cauſes* of all the parts of it? What pity it is we had not ſeen them, inſtead of theſe looſe and idle Diſcourſes; for I can call them no other, when there is ſo much bluſtering talk about *Geometry*, and ſo very little appearance of true Reaſon. But, ſaith he very ſenſibly, *The World looks upon a Man ~~as a very~~ dangerous Heretick, and impious Perſon, if he gives an account of Natural Cauſes, and takes away their ignorance.* I ſee no ſuch great danger from his *Knowledg*, whatever there be from his *Impiety*; for he hath ſhew'd much more cauſe for us to wonder at one, than at the other. But the *Impiety* of his *Syſtem* muſt be conſider'd in its proper place.

The laſt thing he ſaith, as to Cauſes, is, *That Mankind being perſuaded that all things were made for them, they ſet an eſteem upon ſuch things as they found moſt uſeful, and meaſur'd the value of things by their agreeableneſs to themſelves. From hence came the difference of Good and Evil, Orderly and Confus'd, Hot and Cold, Beautiful and Deform'd; and becauſe they imagin'd themſelves free, thence came Praiſe and Diſhonor, Fault and Merit. And what tended to Health or the Worſhip of* God, *they called Good, and the contrary Evil; what ſuted to their Imagination, they called Order, what did not, Confuſion. What was agreeable to their Senſes they called Beautiful, Sweet, Pleaſant, and the contrary to what was not, and attributed their Modes of Senſation to the things themſelves: and Men judg of things by their different Imaginations; and from thence come ſuch great differences among Mankind about Good and Evil, Order and Confuſion; all which come from Mens following Imagination, and not Reaſon.* This is the ſubſtance of what he ſaith; which in ſhort takes away all the real difference between Good and Evil, and makes *Good* to be a mere effect of Mens Imaginations, from reſpect to their own Conveniency, or what they call *the Honour of God*; and *Evil* what is repugnant to them. But how comes this to follow from *Final Cauſes?* Yes, ſaith he, *ſince all things are made for them, therefore Good and Evil are to be taken with reſpect to them.* This is a very weak foundation to build this Doctrin upon. For things are not therefore ſaid to be *Morally Good*, becauſe they are uſeful to Mankind; but that implies only a *Natural Fitneſs* for ſuch purpoſes, which is quite another thing from Moral Goodneſs; and it is ſtrange our Philoſophers ſhould not diſcern the difference. For, is there no meaſure of Good and Evil among Mankind with reſpect to one another? If the Good and Evil of things did depend upon Final Cauſes, with reſpect to Mankind in general, then there could be no ſuch thing in regard to each other; for theſe Final Cauſes do not reach to one individual more than another, for they reſpect the whole kind. But we ſay upon good grounds, that there are things which are good and evil between Man and Man. *Yes*, it may be ſaid, *with reſpect to Society, and the common good of the whole.* If it be ſo, then it follows that it doth not depend upon mere Imagination, but that there is a true and juſt meaſure in things; for if Human Society cannot be preſerv'd without Juſtice, and keeping Faith and Obedience to Government, Conjugal Fidelity, *&c.* then there is a real tendency in theſe things to that end, and a repugnancy in the contrary; and if ſo, then their being good or evil doth not depend upon Mens Fancies or Humors, any more than the taking away Fuel doth for leſſening a Fire, or the adding it doth to the increaſe of it. For Mens indulging their own Paſſions againſt Reaſon and a common Intereſt, doth as much tend to a Civil Combuſtion, as the other

ther to a Natural; and Mens due government of themſelves and actions doth as naturally tend to Peace and Tranquillity, as withdrawing Fuel or caſting Water doth to quench the violence of Fire. From whence it appears, that there real are ends as to Mankind, which are the meaſures of Good and Evil, with reſpect to Society. But beſides this, Mankind cannot be ſuppos'd to ſubſiſt without the Relations of Parents and Children: and can any Man in his right Senſes imagin that the Duties of theſe to each other depend only upon Fancy? Is there no natural regard due from Children to Parents, no natural affection and tenderneſs in Parents to Children? Is all this only the product of Imagination? So as to the difference of Sexes; Chaſtity, Modeſty, and a decent regard to each other are things founded in Nature, and do not ariſe from Cuſtom or Fancy. But in all theſe things, altho' there be a juſt regulation of them by Laws, yet the foundation of them is laid in the nature and reſpects of things to one another. As to our own Bodies, Health is not the only meaſure of Good and Evil; for it is ſo uncertain, that thoſe Exceſſes do little prejudice to ſome, which are miſchievous to others: but there is a juſt proportion of things to be obſerv'd with reſpect to their uſe; and ſo *Intemperance* may be conſiſtent with a healthful Body. As to the condition of others, who by reaſon of Poverty or Sickneſs ſtand in need of our help, it is a thing in it ſelf good to afford them our aſſiſtance; and ſo Liberality, Charity, and doing good, are ſo far from being good only from Imagination, that no Man can imagin them to be otherwiſe than good. But beſides all theſe, there are Duties which are owing to that infinite Being, from whom we derive all that we enjoy or hope for; and can it be any other than good for us to fear, and ſerve, and love, and honor him? He confeſſes Mankind allow *that to be good which reſpects the honor of* God; but he means *that it is becauſe we ſuppoſe that he made all things for Men.* But altho' his Goodneſs and Providence be very great reaſons for our ſerving him; yet if he had been leſs bountiful to Mankind, they had been bound to ſerve him as their Creator. And it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that he ſhould diſcharge his Creatures from ſo neceſſary a duty, and to make the contrary not to be a Fault. For, it would imply ingratitude and contempt of the beſt Being in the World not to be evil; and that he who is infinitely good, ſhould require what is in it ſelf evil. From all which it appears, that the nature of Good and Evil doth not depend upon the arbitrary Fancies and Opinions of Men; but upon the Nature of things, the Reaſon of Mankind, and the Reſpects they ſtand in to one another.

And it is a great confirmation of this, that our Philoſopher himſelf makes it the ſame caſe as *to Good and Evil,* as it is with reſpect to *Order* and *Confuſion*, and *Beauty* and *Deformity*, and *Harmony* and *Diſcord.* For altho' there may be a *Variety* of *Fancies*, as to ſome *Degrees* of theſe things, and that may pleaſe ſome which doth not others; yet in the main they all agree in a real difference between them: and none can have ſo little judgment, as to think that there is nothing but Fancy which puts a difference between a well digeſted Diſcourſe, and a confus'd heap of Thoughts; or between an exact Beauty, and the Picture of Deformity; or the moſt raviſhing Muſick, and the noiſe of a pair of Tongs. So that the Extremes muſt be allow'd to be really different from one another, what difference ſoever there be in Perſons Fancies, as to what lies between; and yet as to them, when the Idea of the thing it ſelf is agreed upon, then the nearer any approach to it, the more it hath of reality, and the farther off, it doth ſo much more depend upon Fancy.

But, ſaith he, *in our Objects of Senſe we imagin the Qualities to be real things without us, whereas they are only the different impreſſions made upon our Senſes, and ſo convey'd to our Imaginations.* And is this an Argument that there is no real difference between *Bitter and Sweet, Savory and Unſavory*, or *that all Sounds are alike?* Or that becauſe ſome have fancied the Muſick of the Spheres, therefore there is no ſuch thing as Harmony? But ſuch kind of arguing deſerves no farther conſideration.

I now come to the ſecond *Hypotheſis*, which tends towards *Atheiſm*, and that is of thoſe who *attribute too much to the Mechanical Powers of matter and motion.* It cannot be denied by any ingenuous Man, that in our Age a great improvement hath been made in *Natural* and *Experimental Philoſophy.* But there is a great difference to be made between thoſe who have proceeded in the way of *Experiments*, which do great ſervice as they go, and ſuch as have form'd *Mechanical Theories* of the Syſtem of the Univerſe; and have undertaken to give an Account how the World was fram'd, and what the immediate Cauſes are of thoſe things which appear in the World. I do not go about to diſpute, whether many things are not better reſolv'd by the *New* than by the *Old Philoſophy*; I am not concern'd in the Doctrines of *Antiperiſtaſis, Fuga vacui, Occult Qualities, Intentional Species*, and ſuch like: And I confeſs, that the *Particular Hiſtories* and *Experiments* relating to things of Nature, as to the *Bodies* of *Animals*, the *Vegetation* of *Plants*, and *Particular Qualities*, tend much more to the true knowledg of Nature, than the mere nice and dry general Speculations about *Forms* and *Qualities*: which have been handled in ſuch a manner, that they have been like ſome of *Ariſtotle*'s *Books, ſet forth, but not to be underſtood.* If therefore ſeveral *Qualities* of Bodies be explain'd *mechanically, i. e.* by virtue of the known Affections of Matter, *viz. Size, Figure, Motion,* &c. and that new ones can be produc'd by changing the *Texture* or *Motion*, or ſome other *Mechanical Affection* of Matter; it is far from my deſign to oppoſe them, or any ſuch Diſcourſes, which tend only to give us more light into the *Occult Nature* (tho' not *Qualities*) *of things.* For to ſay, that Things proceed from *Occult Qualities*, is in other words to ſay, that they come from we know not what; and none can take that for a good Anſwer from one that pretends to give the reaſon of a thing.

Mr. Boyle *of the Origin of Forms and Qualities.*

But to proceed more diſtinctly, I make no difficulty of allowing theſe following Principles, as to the *Nature* and *Qualities* of Natural Bodies; which are moſt inſiſted upon by a late Excellent Philoſopher, and a truly *Chriſtian Virtuoſo* among us. (1.) That there is One Univerſal Matter of Bodies, that is, a Subſtance extended, diviſible, and impenetrable. (2.) That there is a diverſity of Motion in ſeveral parts of Matter; ſo it be not ſaid to be in Matter from it ſelf as eſſential to it; for then it muſt always move, and there could be no Reſt, and ſo no Compoſition. (3.) That by virtue of this Motion, Matter is divided into greater and leſſer parts, which have their Determination, Size and Figure. (4.) That beſides theſe, their Situation is to be conſider'd; that is, their Poſture and order, with reſpect to one another: and when the ſeveral parts join together to make up one Body, that is called the *Texture* of them. (5.) That there is a different *Texture* both in our *Organs* of Senſe, and in the *Objects* which make impreſſions upon them, with a different Motion,

tion, Figure and Size; from whence ariſe our different Senſations, and our Apprehenſions of different ſenſible Qualities in things. (6.) That by a Coalition of the ſmaller Particles of Matter into one Body, there are different Subſtances in the World of diſtinct Denominations; but by a change of Texture or Motion, or other Properties of Matter, that compound Body may be put into a different ſtate, which may be called its Alteration or Corruption; and if the change be ſo made as to offend our Senſes, it is then called *Putrefaction.* (7.) That there may be an incomprehenſible variety in the Coalition and Texture of the minute Particles of Matter, which may be ſo different from each other, as to be thought to be endued with diſtinct Qualities. As the 24 Letters make up an inconceivable number of words by the different placing of them.

But when I have allow'd theſe, I can by no means agree, 1. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but what relate to our Senſes. It's true we could not be ſenſible of Heat and Cold, but from the impreſſions made on our Senſes: but ſuppoſing we were not ſenſible of the different agitation of Particles without us; it doth not at all follow, that there is not a real Alteration in the objects themſelves, as that the Fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that diſpoſition in Matter, which is apt to produce ſuch a ſenſe in us, may not be called an inherent Quality, is not ſo eaſy to apprehend. But if there be ſuch a real difference in Bodies, as that one will make ſuch an impreſſion on our Senſes, and another will not, we cannot in reaſon ſay that there is no Quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our Apprehenſion. It is granted, *That Snow hath a greater diſpoſition to reflect light outwards, than a Coal or Soot, when the Sun ſhines upon all three.* Now why this diſpoſition ſhould be called a diſtinct Quality from what is in the other two, ſeems to me a Diſpute of no conſequence. So, if an Eccho be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is diſpos'd to reflect the ſound back to the place from whence it came, altho' it muſt not be called the Quality of the place which makes the Eccho; yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar Figure and Diſpoſition of the parts which make it. So that, if Men will allow ſuch inherent Diſpoſitions in things to produce what we call *Qualities* in us, the difference will not be found worth the diſputing. And I have wonder'd Perſons of Judgment and ſkill in theſe matters lay ſo much weight upon it, as tho' the Quality muſt be ſaid to be only in us, when it is confeſs'd to ariſe from a different Diſpoſition in the parts without us.

2. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but ſuch as an account may be given of by the foregoing Principles: For I do not find it poſſible for any Perſon by virtue of theſe Principles to give an account either of the make or compoſition of the Bodies of Animals, or of the diſpoſition and relation of the inward Parts, or of the inſtruments of Nature for preſervation of the Individual or Species; or of the Diſeaſes they are ſubject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any Perſon ſearches into all the Mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unſatisfy'd he will find himſelf about them; and will ſee reaſon to conclude, as a Learned Phyſician hath done, *That we may know enough for our general direction what to do, but that the ſecret Cauſes are ſo hidden from us, as we have reaſon to admire the Supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.*

Sydenham *de Hydrope* p. 160.

Theſe things being premis'd, I come to the main point, which is, Whether Matter being put into motion, can in a Mechanical manner produce that frame of the Univerſe which we ſee, and the ſeveral things which are in the Heavens, and in this Globe of Earth and Sea.

To make this Matter as clear as we can, we muſt firſt conſider the *General Principles*; and then proceed to the Account given of the ſeveral *Phænomena*, as they are commonly called.

I begin with the *General Principles*, which are theſe;

I. That the Matter of the Univerſe is one and the ſame extended Subſtance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is diviſible and capable of motion in its parts. *Princip. l.* II. *n.* 23.

II. That this matter is without bounds, and that the Idea of Extenſion is the ſame with that of Corporeal Subſtance. *N.* 21.

III. That it is capable of diviſion into ſo many parts, as we cannot comprehend the utmoſt bounds of its diviſibility. *N.* 34.

IV. That GOD alone is the firſt and univerſal Cauſe of the motion of matter, which continues the ſame in the whole, altho' it vary in the ſeveral parts. *N.* 36.

V. That there are certain Laws of motion, whereof theſe are the chief:

1. That every part continues in the ſtate it was in, unleſs mov'd by an External Cauſe. *N.* 37.

2. That all motion of it ſelf is in a right Line, but by other Bodies it becomes oblique, and all matter being in motion it becomes circular. *N.* 39.

3. That when two Bodies meet, the weaker loſes not its motion, but changes its tendency, and the ſtronger loſes ſo much as it gives to the weaker. *N.* 40.

VI. That the parts of matter were at firſt divided into many parcels of an equal and indifferent ſize, and had among them all that motion which is now in the World. *Princip. Part.* 3. *n.* 46.

VII. That theſe Particles of matter could not at firſt be ſpherical, becauſe then there muſt be a void ſpace between them, but by force of motion and natural attrition they became ſo. *N.* 48.

VIII. That thoſe leſſer Particles which came off from the Angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty ſpaces between them, and have a quicker motion. *N.* 49, &c.

IX. That beſides theſe, there are ſome Particles which are large and ſlower than the reſt, being full of Angles, and ſo more apt to ſtick to one another, which by reaſon of their paſſage thro' the triangular ſpaces between the globular Particles become wreathed. *N.* 88.

And theſe are the three Elements out of which he ſuppoſes all Bodies to be made; and accordingly the Ingenious Author hath framed *a Syſtem of the Univerſe* with great Art and appearance of Reaſon; but at ſometimes he is content to let it paſs as a bare *Hypotheſis, agreeing with the Phænomena of the World*; *Part. III. n.* 44. but withal he ſaith, *That he makes uſe of no Principles but ſuch as are moſt evident, and deduces nothing from them but by Mathematical Conſequences.* *N.* 43, 44. And in an *Epiſtle* to *Merſennus*, to whom he opened his Mind more freely, he ſaith, *That he ſhould think he knew nothing in Phyſicks, if he could only tell how things might be, if he could not demonſtrate that they could be no otherwiſe.* *Ep. To.* II. *Ep.* 37. But to another Perſon he calls it his *Romance of the World*; *which* he confeſſes *he was very well pleas'd with.* *Ep.* 103.

But ſo have not others been, who have taken great pains both in *Philoſophy* and *Mathematicks*; and altho' they cannot deny this *Hypotheſis* to be very conſiſtent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and ſatisfactory account of the *Nature* and *Formation* of the World. But it is not my buſineſs to lay together the Objections of others againſt the *Carteſian Hypotheſis*, but to ſhew the tendency of it to *Atheiſm* in theſe two Points.

1. In ſetting up a Notion of *Matter*, or *Corporeal Subſtance* independent upon the Power of God.

2. In undertaking to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe from the Mechanical Laws of motion without a particular Providence.*

Princip. Part. 2. n. 23.

As to the former; His firſt Principle is, *That Matter is one and the ſame thro' the Univerſe; and is every where known by its eſſential property, which is Extenſion:* and therein he places *the Eſſence of a Corporeal Subſtance*; (as will preſently appear.) If then the very Eſſence of Matter be independent upon God's Power, ſo that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the Creation of the World according to this *Hypotheſis*?

Du Hamel *de conſenſu vet. & nov. Philoſoph.* l.1.c.9.n.9. P. Petiti *Diſſert. de Principiis* Cart. p. 28. Huet. *Cenſ. Philoſoph.* Carteſ. c. 8. *n.* 4.

Part. II. n. 9.

Part. 3. *n.* 46.

Part. II. n. 64.

Some object againſt his *Notion* of *Matter*, and ſay, that he hath confounded *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Bodies* with one another. For, ſay they, the ſtrength of his whole *Hypotheſis* depends upon the ſuppoſition *that Matter is nothing but Extenſion, and therefore there can be no Vacuity, becauſe all Space is extended, and therefore Matter is Infinite*, or as he calls it *Indefinite*; but ſo, as he poſitively ſaith, *that the Idea of Space is the ſame with that of Corporeal Subſtance, and that we can conceive nothing in it but Extenſion.* Which they ſay, is true, if we ſpeak of *Mathematical Quantity*, but not of *Real and Phyſical.* But, ſaith *Des Cartes, Men may pretend to diſtinguiſh Corporeal Subſtance from Quantity; but they utter that in words, which they cannot comprehend in their Minds; for either they mean nothing by Subſtance, or attribute a confus'd notion of an Incorporeal Subſtance to a Corporeal, and leave the true Idea of Corporeal Subſtance to Extenſion.* But this is very far from clearing this matter. For himſelf lays it as a fundamental Principle, *That it is capable of Diviſion into Parts, and was actually divided by* God *himſelf.* Now I deſire to know what that was which was ſo divided? It muſt be *Something*; and that not *an Incorporeal, but a Corporeal Subſtance:* not *pure Extenſion*, but *a Body that was extended*; and of which the Subſtantial parts of the Univerſe are compos'd. Nay, his whole *Hypotheſis* depends upon *the actual Diviſion of Matter into Parts that are equal, or very* near it; without which his three Elements could not be made; which ariſe from the Motion and mutual attrition of thoſe Particles; and yet he affirms in the Concluſion of the 2d Part of his Principles, *That he owns no other Corporeal Matter, but ſuch as Geometricians call Quantity, and is the thing which their Demonſtrations are converſant about.* But is there no difference between *Geometrical* and *Phyſical Quantity*? It's true that in Mathematical Quantity there is nothing but Extenſion; but doth it therefore follow, that there is nothing more in a Real and Phyſical Body? How can we imagin that God ſhould create mere Extenſion in the World; and that out of that all the Bodies in the Univerſe are fram'd? Nay, upon *Des Cartes* his *Principles* it is impoſſible that Matter ſhould either be *created* or *annihilated*. For according to him, *the Idea of Matter and Extenſion are the ſame*; but he ſaith poſitively, *that the Idea of Extenſion and Space are the ſame*; therefore if *Space* can neither be *created* nor *annihilated*, neither can *Matter*. And it ſeem'd ſtrange to me, that a Perſon ſo ſagacious, ſhould not lay theſe things better together; but his *Mathematical Notions* ran ſo much in his Mind, that his endeavor to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into ſuch inextricable difficulties. It is well obſerv'd by Monſ. *Du Hamel*, that the great miſtakes in *Natural Philoſophy* have riſen from Mens applying their *former Notions to it*; *thus*, ſaith he, *the common Philoſophers confounded Natural things with Metaphyſical ſpeculations: on the other ſide*, Des Cartes *being a great Mathematician, endeavor'd to reduce Nature to Geometry, and ſo conſider'd nothing in Body but Extenſion. Extenſion*, ſaith he, *which conſtitutes Space, is the ſame which conſtitutes Bodies; but we conſider it more particularly in Bodies, and more generally in Space, which is not chang'd, as the other is.* But is there then nothing to make a *Body*, but mere *Extenſion?* I mean not *a Mathematical*, but *a real Phyſical Body*. No, ſaith he, *in the Idea of a Body, we may caſt off other Qualities, as Hardneſs, Color, Gravity, Heat and Cold, and yet a Body remains; to which then nothing belongs but Extenſion, which is common to Body and Space.* This is not ſo deep reaſoning, as might have been expected from ſo great a Maſter of it. For altho' the particular Qualities may be caſt off, yet the Capacity of them can no more than *Extenſion*; as is plain in *Figure* and *Size*, as well as *Hardneſs*, &c. any one particular *Figure* and *Size* may be abſtracted from Body, but it is impoſſible to conceive a Body, but it muſt be capable of one or other. Beſides, all this proves no more but that *Extenſion* is the *Inſeparable Property of Body*. And what then? Muſt the whole Eſſence of a Body conſiſt in one inſeparable Property? *But this is all the Idea we have of Body.* Then I ſay, our Ideas of things are ſhort and imperfect, and there is no forming Worlds upon ſuch Ideas. And this was the fundamental miſtake of *Des Cartes*. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; *or that we cannot take falſhood for truth, if we only give aſſent to ſuch things as we clearly and diſtinctly perceive.* Then he goes on, *that the things which fall under our perception, are either things and their Properties, or eternal Truths. Of things, the moſt general are Subſtance, Duration, Order, Number and ſuch like, which extend to all kinds of things.* And he ſaith, *they may all be comprehended under thoſe two: Of Intellectual or Thinking Subſtances; or of Material, i. e. of Bodily and Extended Subſtances.* Thus far all is clear and diſtinct. Then, as to the Notion of *Subſtance*, he ſaith, *By that we can underſtand nothing but a thing which ſo exiſts, as to need nothing elſe to ſupport it. There is but one Subſtance in the World which needs no ſupport, and that is* GOD. *All created Subſtances needs his ſupport, and the Notion of them is, that they are things which only ſtand in need of* GOD's *concourſe to ſupport them.* Hitherto we find nothing to ſtick at. *But how come we to have an Idea of created Subſtances? Not from the bare Exiſtence, for that doth not affect us: but it muſt be from ſome Properties, Attributes or Qualities; becauſe Nothing can be attributed to Nothing. From whence we conclude from any Real Attribute, that there muſt be a thing or Subſtance to which it belongs.* All this appears very well ſtill; only we muſt take notice, that all Properties do aſſure us of a *Real Subſtance* under them: Which is very true, relating to *Phyſical Bodies*. But it is poſſible he may from hence aim at proving, *That there muſt be a Corporeal Subſtance in Imaginary Space, becauſe there is an Extenſion there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing; therefore there muſt*

De Conſenſu vet. & nov. Philoſoph. l. I. c. 9. n. 8.

Part. 2. n. 10.

N. 11.

Princip. P. I. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

N. 52.

be a Real Body there. But I think it may be truly anſwer'd, That the Extenſion is no more real than the Space is, and implies no more but a Capacity of having Bodies which it had not; that is, that God might create Bodies beyond this World; and if he did ſo, then there would be a real Extenſion; but as we conceive it, the Imaginary Space is no more but a Poſſibility for Bodies exiſting out of the compaſs of this Univerſe. And therefore I deny this to be any real Extenſion; and that it can be no *Real Subſtance*, becauſe *Des Cartes* himſelf, but juſt before, owned *that a created Subſtance was that which ſtood in need of* God *to ſupport it.* Now is it poſſible to imagin that *Space* needs *a Divine Concourſe?* Therefore he muſt diſtinguiſh it from *Subſtance:* or elſe he muſt affirm it to be an uncreated Subſtance; which overthrows his diſtinction here between *Created and Uncreated Subſtances.* As to his Maxim, that *nothing can have no properties*, it certainly relates to *Subſtance*, and not to a *mere Space*; which by the common ſenſe of Mankind muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from *Bodily Subſtance*; and there can be no greater prejudice to Philoſophy, than to go againſt that. Now let us N. 53. proceed. *From every Attribute a Subſtance is known; but there is one chief Property which conſtitutes the Eſſence and Nature, to which the reſt are referr'd. So*, ſaith he, *Extenſion makes the Nature of a Corporeal Subſtance, and Cogitation of a Thinking Subſtance. For every thing which we attribute to Body, ſuppoſes Extenſion, which is only the Mode of the thing extended; as all things attributed to our Minds, are different Modes* N. 54. *of thinking. And thus we come to two clear and diſtinct Notions or Ideas; one of a Thinking Subſtance, and the other of a Corporeal; if we diſtinguiſh between the Attributes of thinking and Extenſion.* After this he N. 63. ſaith, *That Cogitation and Extenſion may be conſider'd, as conſtituting the Natures of a Thinking and Corporeal Subſtance; and ſo their clear Ideas are, a Subſtance which thinks, and a Subſtance which is extended: but then theſe Properties*, he ſaith, *may be conſider'd likewiſe only as Modes* N. 64. *belonging to thoſe Subſtances; and ſo they make a diſtinct Idea of themſelves, not without the Subſtances, but as Modes belonging to them.*

Thus I have carefully laid down his own Notions about theſe matters. And now ariſes the main difficulty; *viz.* how upon theſe grounds *the Idea of Space, and of Corporeal Subſtance ſhould be the ſame?* All Part. 2. N. 9. that I can can find is, that Extenſion is really *Corporeal Nature, altho' it be call'd an Accident.* But did not himſelf diſtinguiſh it as *a Mode of Matter*, and as *a Subſtance extended?* And was not this look'd on *as ſuch a Property of Matter, as Thinking is of a Mind?* But can any Man ſay, that *Thinking* by it ſelf is *an Intellectual Subſtance*; how then can *Extenſion* by it ſelf be *a Corporeal Subſtance?* And yet, if it be not, as I can ſee no reaſon from his own grounds why it ſhould be; then his Suppoſition of the *Infiniteneſs of Matter*, of *the Plenarty of the World*, and *the circular motion of his Particles of Matter*, on which his whole *Hypotheſis* depends, comes to nothing. And what a ſtrange foundation is *Des Cartes* his World built upon? I could hardly believe that ſo thinking a Man ſhould not diſcern the Weakneſs of his own Grounds. But inſtead of that, it is plain that he laid great weight upon it: For when a learned Man of our own, and then a great admirer of him, objected Epiſt. Des Cartes To. I. Ep. 87. Ep. 88. to him, *that he extended the notion of Corporeal matter too far; but he thought it of no great conſequence to the main of his Principles; Des Cartes* takes him up ſmartly for it, for he ſaith, *he look'd on it, as one of the chief and moſt certain Principles of his Philoſophy.* And in the

Fragment of his laſt Anſwer, which he liv'd not to finiſh, he perſiſted in his Opinion, *That the empty Space was a real Body, becauſe nothing can have no properties.* But there is a difference between *Real Properties* and *Imaginary*; if there be any Bodies in that Space, there will be *Extenſion, Diſtance,* &c. but it is a very unconceivable thing that one of his judgment ſhould ſo much contend to the laſt, *That there was a difference of parts in ſuch a ſpace, where there was nothing but ſpace. i. e.* That there muſt be ſomething, where there is nothing. And therefore *Bernier* obſerves, *That thoſe who confound Space and Body, run themſelves into ſtrange abſurdities by a Corporeal Subſtance to fill all poſſible ſpace, or rather to be ſpace it ſelf; and that* God *cannot annihilate the leaſt part of it.* And he concludes it to be *neither Subſtance nor Accident, but a mere Capacity.* And it was not an improbable Conjecture of that Learned Perſon who wrote to *Des Cartes* upon this Argument, that this Doctrine of his, as he explain'd it, laid the foundation of *Spinoza*'s opinion of the *Infinite extent* and *power of matter*; but I cannot think that *Des Cartes* himſelf intended it ſo, however the other underſtood it. And it is great pity one of ſo clear a Capacity in other things, ſhould ſo ſtifly adhere to ſo unreaſonable an Opinion. And yet we find his Diſciples go on to defend him in this Matter. For when Monſ. *Huet* had objected, *That* Des Cartes *had made Extenſion, which was an Accident, to be a Subſtance*; Monſ. *Regis* anſwers, *That he confounded Extenſion which was of the eſſence of Body, with the Extenſion which belonged to Quantity; whereof the one is conſidered in it ſelf, and the other with reſpect to Magnitude.* But let it be conſider'd how he pleaſes, it is ſtill but a Mode belonging to a Subſtance, and not the Subſtance it ſelf. However, he refers us to his Book of *Phyſics* for the clearing of this Matter. And there we find indeed, that he diſtinguiſhes three ſorts of Bodies, *Phyſical, Mechanical,* and *Mathematical. A Phyſical Body is one compos'd of many inſenſible parts in its due order and figure, from whence reſult the Phyſical properties. A Mechanical Body is one compos'd of groſs and ſenſible parts, which by their figure and ſituation are proper for particular motions. A Mathematical Body is a Body conſider'd with its proper extenſion under a regular figure, as a Cube or a Cylinder.* But this doth not ſhew that *Des Cartes* did not confound a *Mathematical* and *Phyſical Body:* For it is an eaſy thing to find out diſtinctions to avoid a difficulty; but then they ought to be agreeable to the general ſenſe of thoſe Terms. But here a *Mathematical Body* is confin'd to *Regular Figures*; whereas the general notion of it is ſuch a Body as *Des Cartes* himſelf means, when he calls it, *Geometrical Quantity, ſuch as is the object of Mathematical Demonſtrations: i. e.* of any kind of Figures abſtract from Phyſical Bodies; and *this,* he ſaith, *is that matter he treated of.* And to ſuch a *Body* Extenſion alone belongs, and to none elſe, either *Phyſical* or *Mechanical.*

Ep. 93.

Bernier Abregé de Gaſſend. To. I. p. 25.

H. Mori Oper. Phil. To. 2. p. 242.

Cenſur. Carteſ. *l.* 5. *n.* 1.

Regis *Réponſe à la Cenſure, ch. V. Art. I.* p. 255.

La Phyſiq. Regis *To. I. p.* 273.

Here then lies the difficulty as to *Des Cartes* his Principles: he conſiders Matter *Geometrically*, i. e. *Abſtractedly*, with reſpect to bare *Extenſion*, and yet ſuppoſes the effects of *Phyſical Bodies*; ſuch as *Diviſion of parts of matter one from another*, and *a motion of thoſe parts* in order to the compoſition of things. But *Mathematical Extenſion* is capable of no Diviſion but in the Mind; for no Man imagins the Earth really divided by the *Parallels* and *Meridians*, &c. and the Diviſion of the parts of an empty ſpace is nothing but a Mathematical Diviſion, which implies nothing really in that ſpace, but a mere act of the Mind in conceiving the diſtance between the ſeveral parts of it.

*Prin. Part. II. n.*16. But *Des Cartes* proves it impoſſible *there ſhould be a vacuum in Nature, becauſe the extenſion of Space and Body are all one.* But may not God *annihilate* that Air which is between the ſides of a Veſſel, and *N.* 18. would there not be a *Vacuum* between? No; he ſaith, *It is impoſſible to conceive ſuch a Cavity without Extenſion, or ſuch an Extenſion without Matter; and if the middle ſubſtance were annihilated, the ſides muſt come together, becauſe there would be nothing between.* By which we ſee, that this Notion of the Identity of *Extenſion* and *Corporeal Subſtance* had ſunk ſo deep into his Mind, that he makes *Annihilation* of the Subſtance of Matter impoſſible to Divine Power: for there can be no ſuch Vacuity, but there muſt remain *Extenſion*, and conſequently *a Corporeal Subſtance.* This hath been objected to the followers of *Des Cartes*, and *Réponſe aux Reflex. de M.* Du Hamel, *Part.* 2. *ch.* 4. lately by *Du Hamel*, in his Cenſure of *Regis* his *Carteſian Philoſophy*; and it is worth the while to ſee what anſwer he makes to it. He ſaith, *That his objection about the Annihilation of the Air between the Heaven and Earth, can be of no force to prove a Vacuum; becauſe if there be no ſpace, they muſt touch one another; and if they do not, there muſt be ſpace, and conſequently a Corporeal Subſtance.* But ſaith *Du Hamel*, may not God by the ſame power by which he preſerves the Bodies between Heaven and Earth, deſtroy them, and then there muſt be a Vacuum? He anſwers plainly, *That an Annihilation of the ſubſtance of matter is impoſſible, even to the power of* God; *becauſe his Will is immutable. He grants that* God *may deſtroy the Air, and all other Bodies as to their Form, or preſent Modification; but he cannot deſtroy their Matter,* i. e. *their Extenſion, which is a true ſubſtance, and ſubſtances are indefectible.* Where we plainly ſee that the *Carteſians* aſſert the neceſſary Exiſtence of Matter, and that it is not in the power of God to deſtroy it; and whatever they may talk of the Will of God, they deny any power to exerciſe it with reſpect to Matter.

But *Du Hamel* proceeds. How can thoſe Bodies touch one another, when God can create another Body between? No, ſaith *Regis*, *That ſtill ſuppoſes a ſpace between; and if there be a ſpace, there muſt be a body, and ſo a vacuum is a repugnancy in it ſelf.* But this Space, ſaith *Du Hamel*, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the Mind, and there is no arguing from thence to the Nature of things. *Regis* replies, *that their Ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the Idea of ſpace or extenſion is one of their primitive Ideas; and that it repreſents ſubſtance, and all ſubſtance is incorruptible.* Still we ſee the neceſſary exiſtence of Matter is look'd on by them as a fundamental Principle, and depending on primitive Ideas.

Abregé To. I. p. 13. Monſ. *Bernier* puts the caſe of Air being annihilated between two walls; and he deſires to know of the *Carteſians*, whether theſe two walls will come together or not? They ſay, *They muſt, if there be nothing between.* True, ſaith he, there is nothing Corporeal, or that touches our Senſes, no Subſtance or Accidents; but there is a true diſtance remaining. Suppoſe a Chamber 20 foot long, 15 foot broad, and 10 foot high; and theſe dimenſions to be meaſured, and one wall 20 foot diſtant from the other: it cannot be ſaid that it is the Air that makes the diſtance between them; how then comes this diſtance to be quite loſt, if the Air be deſtroy'd? They have no anſwer, he ſaith, but to ſay, It is an impoſſible Suppoſition; and they will rather deny God's Omnipotency in annihilating the Air, than let go their Opinion. Monſ. *Regis* in his *Phyſicks* takes notice of *Bernier*'s Doubts, and in anſwer to them he reſolves it at laſt into this, *That it is impoſſible there ſhould be an Annihilation, ſo as to make a Vacuum; becauſe Subſtances cannot ceaſe: not from the Nature of things, but from the immutable Will of* God. And after all poſſible Objections, here they ſtick, and ſeem reſolv'd to maintain, that *Extenſion* and *Matter* are the ſame.

Reg. *Phyſ.* *Part.* I. *ch.* 3. *n.* 3.

Even Monſ. *Robault* himſelf, altho' in ſome things he ſaw it neceſceſſary to leave *Des Cartes*, yet in this he perſiſts, *That the Eſſence of Matter conſiſts in Extenſion, and that Space and Matter are the ſame; and therefore a Vacuum is impoſſible.* And to the Objection about the Walls of a Chamber ſtanding, when the Air is annihilated, he avoids anſwering *as to God's Omnipotency*; but, he ſaith, *according to our Underſtanding the Walls muſt come together.* And to that about the Wall's diſtance not depending on the Air, he anſwers, *That the Being of the Walls does not depend upon the Air within, but the ſtate or diſpoſition of them doth upon the Extenſion between them.* Which he ſuppoſes impoſſible to be taken away, and that the Subſtance of Matter hath a neceſſary Exiſtence.

Robault, *Tr. Phyſ.* *l.* 1. *c.* 7. *n.* 9.

c. 8. 1, 2, 3.

The ſubſtance of this Argument comes to this. *Des Cartes* makes *all the matter of the World to be one and the ſame:* but he aſſerts *the Eſſence of Matter to be Extenſion*; and that Extenſion can neither be created nor annihilated: and therefore it is impoſſible upon his Principles, to make out the dependence of Matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be ſaid, that *Des Cartes* expreſly ſaith, *That it ſeemed manifeſt to him that there is no other General Cauſe which created Matter with Motion and Reſt but God*; and that in the *Fragment* of his laſt Anſwer to Dr. *H. M.* he ſaith, *That if Matter were left to it ſelf, it would not move; but that it was firſt moved by* God: I anſwer, That according to his *Principles* the Subſtance of Matter muſt be before, becauſe there muſt be *Space*; and *Space and Matter are the ſame.* And I can ſee no poſſible way of clearing him, but by ſaying, that he held two ſorts of *Matter*; one part is *Phyſical Matter*, which God gave motion to at firſt when he created it, and out of which the World was fram'd; and the other *Mathematical*, which conſiſts in mere *Extenſion:* but how to reconcile theſe two to his aſſerting *One and the ſame matter in the World*, is a thing above my Underſtanding.

Prin. P. II. n. 36.

Epiſt. To. I. ep. 93.

II. The next thing to be conſider'd, is *Des Cartes* his undertaking to give an account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe* from the *Mechanical Laws of Motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by ſome, who have been very converſant with the Atheiſtical Perſons of our Age, That *they deſpiſe the Epicurean Hypotheſis of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think* Moſes *his Account more probable than that*; (which is a great Favor indeed.) So that it is to little purpoſe now to ſpend time in ſhewing how *precarious* and *unſatisfactory* the *Principles* of *Epicurus* were, who ſuppos'd Motion in Matter, without the leaſt ground for it; but *Des Cartes* was a Man of too great ſenſe and judgment to commit ſuch Blunders as *Epicurus* was guilty of (whom one of his ſharpeſt Adverſaries allows to have been *of a great and ſearching Wit, well ſkilled in Geometry, to which he endeavor'd to reduce Natural Philoſophy, (altho' he fail'd in his Attempt;) That he had a faculty of expreſſing his Mind clearly in few words above any*

Fr. Cuperi *Arcan. Atheiſm, l.* 2. *c.* 3.

Huet. *Cenſ. Phil.* Cart. *c.* 8. *n.* 4.

nothing really in that ſpace, but a mere act of the Mind in conceiving the diſtance between the ſeveral parts of it.

Prin. Part. II. n. 16.

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N. 18.

Réponſe aux Reflex. de M. Du Hamel, Part. 2. ch. 4.

But *Du Hamel* proceeds. How can thoſe Bodies touch one another, when God can create another Body between? No, ſaith *Regis*, *That ſtill ſuppoſes a ſpace between; and if there be a ſpace, there muſt be a body, and ſo a vacuum is a repugnancy in it ſelf.* But this Space, ſaith *Du Hamel*, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the Mind, and there is no arguing from thence to the Nature of things. *Regis* replies, *that their Ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the Idea of ſpace or extenſion is one of their primitive Ideas; and that it repreſents ſubſtance, and all ſubſtance is incorruptible.* Still we ſee the neceſſary exiſtence of Matter is look'd on by them as a fundamental Principle, and depending on primitive Ideas.

Abregé To. I. p. 13.

Monſ. *Bernier* puts the caſe of Air being annihilated between two walls; and he deſires to know of the *Carteſians*, whether theſe two walls will come together or not? They ſay, *They muſt, if there be nothing between.* True, ſaith he, there is nothing Corporeal, or that touches our Senſes, no Subſtance or Accidents; but there is a true diſtance remaining. Suppoſe a Chamber 20 foot long, 15 foot broad, and 10 foot high; and theſe dimenſions to be meaſured, and one wall 20 foot diſtant from the other: it cannot be ſaid that it is the Air that makes the diſtance between them; how then comes this diſtance to be quite loſt, if the Air be deſtroy'd? They have no anſwer, he ſaith, but to ſay, It is an impoſſible Suppoſition; and they will rather deny God's Omnipotency in annihilating the Air, than let go their Opinion. Monſ. *Regis* in his *Phyſicks* takes notice of *Bernier*'s Doubts, and in anſwer to them he reſolves it at laſt into this, *That it is impoſſible there ſhould be an Annihilation, ſo as to make a Vacuum; becauſe Subſtances cannot ceaſe: not from the Nature of things, but from the immutable Will of* God. And after all poſſible Objections, here they ſtick, and ſeem reſolv'd to maintain, that *Extenſion* and *Matter* are the ſame.

Reg. *Phyſ. Part. I. ch.* 3. *n.* 3.

Even Monſ. *Rohault* himſelf, altho' in ſome things he ſaw it neceſſary to leave *Des Cartes*, yet in this he perſiſts, *That the Eſſence of Matter conſiſts in Extenſion, and that Space and Matter are the ſame; and therefore a Vacuum is impoſſible.* And to the Objection about the Walls of a Chamber ſtanding, when the Air is annihilated, he avoids anſwering *as to God's Omnipotency*; but, he ſaith, *according to our Underſtanding the Walls muſt come together.* And to that about the Wall's diſtance not depending on the Air, he anſwers, *That the Being of the Walls does not depend upon the Air within, but the ſtate or diſpoſition of them doth upon the Extenſion between them.* Which he ſuppoſes impoſſible to be taken away, and that the Subſtance of Matter hath a neceſſary Exiſtence.

Rohault, *Tr. Phyſ. l.* 1. *c.* 7. *n.* 9.

c. 8. 1, 2, 3.

The ſubſtance of this Argument comes to this. *Des Cartes* makes *all the matter of the World to be one and the ſame:* but he aſſerts *the Eſſence of Matter to be Extenſion*; and that Extenſion can neither be created nor annihilated: and therefore it is impoſſible upon his Principles, to make out the dependence of Matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be ſaid, that *Des Cartes* expreſly ſaith, *That it ſeemed manifeſt to him that there is no other General Cauſe which created Matter with Motion and Reſt but God*; and that in the *Fragment* of his laſt Anſwer to Dr. *H. M.* he ſaith, *That if Matter were left to it ſelf, it would not move; but that it was firſt moved by* God: I anſwer, That according to his *Principles* the Subſtance of Matter muſt be before, becauſe there muſt be *Space*; and *Space and Matter are the ſame.* And I can ſee no poſſible way of clearing him, but by ſaying, that he held two ſorts of *Matter*; one part is *Phyſical Matter*, which God gave motion to at firſt when he created it, and out of which the World was fram'd; and the other *Mathematical*, which conſiſts in mere *Extenſion:* but how to reconcile theſe two to his aſſerting *One and the ſame matter in the World*, is a thing above my Underſtanding.

Prin. *P. II. n.* 36.

Epiſt. *To. I. ep.* 93.

II. The next thing to be conſider'd, is *Des Cartes* his undertaking to give an account of the *Phænomena* of the *Univerſe* from the *Mechanical Laws of Motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by ſome, who have been very converſant with the Atheiſtical Perſons of our Age, That *they deſpiſe the Epicurean Hypotheſis of the World's being made by a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think* Moſes *his Account more probable than that*; (which is a great Favor indeed.) So that it is to little purpoſe now to ſpend time in ſhewing how *precarious* and *unſatisfactory* the *Principles* of *Epicurus* were, who ſuppos'd Motion in Matter, without the leaſt ground for it; but *Des Cartes* was a Man of too great ſenſe and judgment to commit ſuch Blunders as *Epicurus* was guilty of (whom one of his ſharpeſt Adverſaries allows to have been *of a great and ſearching Wit, well ſkilled in Geometry, to which he endeavor'd to reduce Natural Philoſophy, (altho' he fail'd in his Attempt;) That he had a faculty of expreſſing his Mind clearly in few words above any*

Fr. Cuperi *Arcan. Atheiſm, l.* 2. *c.* 3.

Huet. Cenſ. *Phil. Cart. c.* 8. *n.* 4.

either antient or modern Writer.) Therefore it will be neceſſary to conſider what *Des Cartes* yields, that we may not miſtake or miſrepreſent his deſign.

1. He grants, that God did at firſt create Matter, which was capable of Reſt or Motion.

2. That Matter left to it ſelf would be without any motion; and therefore the firſt Motion was from God.

3. That God by his ordinary Providence doth preſerve as much Motion in the World, as was given at firſt.

4. That we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe any other alteration in the ordinary courſe of things, according to the Laws of Motion, than what we are certain of by Experience or Revelation.

And now the main point is, Whether Matter being thus put into motion, can produce the *Phænomena* of the World, without any farther interpoſition of Providence, than only to preſerve the motion of matter? For which we muſt conſider, That he doth not give a ſatisfactory account, 1. of the *Nature* and *Laws of Motion*; nor 2. of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe*.

(I.) As to the former, I ſhall inquire into his *Notion* of *Motion*, and then of the *Laws* of it.

(1.) He aſſerts, That Motion, according to his Principles, is barely *Mode of Matter*, without any inward Principle of Motion. For *Motion*, he ſaith, is the change of the ſituation of Bodies, with reſpect to one another, or *a removing a Body from the vicinity of ſome Bodies to the neighbourhood of others*; and he places it in ſuch *a Tranſlation* on purpoſe, that it may be underſtood to be only *a Mode of the Matter moved, as Figure is of a thing figured.* But it is not ſo eaſy to underſtand that *Motion*, which imports an Action, ſhould be only *a Mode of the Matter moved*, as it is that Figure belongs only to the thing figured. For it is not poſſible for the Figure to be any where elſe, but in that Body which hath it; but it is poſſible to apprehend Motion to come either from an external Agent, or an internal Principle; and ſo it is not a mere mode of the thing moved. But when the whole weight is laid upon the Nature of *Motion* in this caſe, ſome greater evidence ought to have been given how Motion being once given to Matter, as a Mode of it, muſt always continue, when the reſiſtence of Bodies doth certainly weaken it ſo as to need a new force to repair it. For either all motion of matter muſt be by a violent impulſe, without regard to the different force or magnitude of things (which is to overthrow the due Laws of Motion;) or elſe there muſt be a proportion in the force of the mover to the reſiſtence of the Body moved: and if there be a regard to that proportion (or elſe the ſmalleſt Body might move the greateſt) then there muſt be a reſiſtence in that Body which is moved: But every reſiſtence gives a check to the motion of that Body which moved it, and every check leſſens the impulſe; and ſo from a gradual reſiſtence there muſt come a gradual decay, till at laſt all motion muſt ceaſe; as it is in all Machines, whoſe motion depends upon external force. *Des Cartes* indeed ſaith, *That whatever Motion is loſt by one Body is communicated to the next, and ſo the firſt motion is ſtill preſerved.* But it is hardly poſſible to make it appear, that Motion is not ſo much weakned by reſiſtence, but that it can preſerve it ſelf in a degree of motion proportionable to that which is not communicated to another. For the frequency of impulſe leſſens the power of reflection; and it appears in Light, and Sounds, and other things, that

Princ. Part. II. n. 25.

whatever is reflected grows weaker. So that reſiſtence muſt gradually weaken motion. And in the *Motion of Projected Bodies*, *Des Cartes* himſelf grants, *That the Motion continues till it be hinder'd by the reſiſtence it meets with*; and he ſaith, *It is manifeſt that the Motion is retarded by the Air, and other ambient Fluids, and ſo it cannot continue long.* But is that an Argument *that Bodies do continue motion till they be hinder'd, and that Motion is only a Mode of the Body mov'd?* Whatever *Mode* it is, it comes from the force of the immediate Agent, and not from the motion at firſt given to Matter; and here we ſee the reſiſtence it meets with, ſoon gives a ſtop to it. Therefore it ſeems unconceivable that all the Motion in the World, conſidering the continual reſiſtence of Bodies, ſhould be the ſame mode of Matter, which was at firſt given to it. And as to his definition of *Motion*, ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate it to be falſe, by ſhewing how one Body may come nearer to another, without changing the ſituation of the parts next adjoining to it; and that there is no ſuch reciprocal motion as he aſſerts, altho' there be a reciprocal change of ſituation, which is unavoidable. But Monſ. *Rohault* ſaith, *That Motion is to be taken with reſpect to the next, and not to any remote Bodies.* However Monſ. *Regis* thought fit to quit that definition of *Des Cartes* for another, which *Du Hamel* ſaith is not at all better; but he thought it neceſſary to take in *the efficient Cauſe of Motion*, which makes it not to be a mere mode of the matter moved. And but for the Authority of *Mathematicians* and *Philoſophers*, it would be thought ridiculous for a thing not to be ſaid *to be moved, becauſe it doth not change the ſituation as to the next Bodies about it*; as that the Kernel of a Nut is not moved, becauſe it is thrown with the Shell upon it; or that the Wine is not moved in a Ship at Sea, becauſe it keeps within the Veſſel. So, if the Earth be carry'd about with the force of the *Vortex* wherein it is, 'tis as certainly moved as a Pendulum is with the motion of the Ship, altho' it hath a proper motion of its own.

Part. II. n. 38.

H. Mori Enchirid. Metaphyſ. Part. I. c. 7.

Rohault. *Tr. Phyſic. c.* 10. *n.* 1.

Regis *Réponſe aux Reflections Critique de M.* Du Hamel, *ch.* 7.

But *Des Cartes* undertakes to give an account of the Proportion of the increaſe and leſſening of motion, upon the meeting of two hard Bodies, and he lays down *ſeven Rules* to determin it; but it falls out very unhappily, that *ſix of them* are deny'd *to be true, and that the firſt doth not anſwer the end it was brought for.* This was a bold charge on ſo great a Mathematician; but all that *Regis* ſaith in anſwer to it is, *That he did not undertake to defend all* Des Cartes *his Rules of motion, becauſe they did not appear to him exact enough.* But if the Particular Rules of motion be no better fix'd nor underſtood, how come they to be ſo certain, that the ſame quantity of motion is ſtill preſerv'd in the World? For that *Des Cartes* hath recourſe *to the immutable Will of* God *which hath determin'd it.* No doubt if God hath determin'd it, ſo it muſt be. But from whence comes *Des Cartes* to know this to be the *immutable Will of* God? What antecedent Reaſon is there to ſatisfy any Man's Mind, that God *by his immutable Will* muſt keep up the ſame proportion of motion in the World? Why may not God alter or ſuſpend the Laws of motion, as to the parts of matter, in what way or manner he thinks good? What repugnancy is there to the *Divine Nature* in ſo doing? So that theſe Arguments *à priori* (as they call them) have no kind of Evidence as to ſuch matters, which may be or not be, as God pleaſes. Beſides, what neceſſity was there that *Motion* muſt be only a *Mode of Matter*? And that Mode to be preſerv'd by ſuch *Laws of Motion*, which are ſo very uncertain? A very Skilful and Ingenious Philoſopher of our own

Des Cartes *Prin. Part. II. n.* 45, &c.

Réponſe, &c. *Part.* 2. *ch.* 12.

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

Mr. Boyle *of the high Veneration of Man's Intellect towards God,* p. 41, 42.

ſaith, *That this Rule, which he ſaith is the moſt uſeful of all* Des Cartes's, *is very metaphyſical, and not very cogent to him: And he doth not ſee how it can be demonſtrated; and he queſtions whether it be agreeable to Experience.* And he was a Perſon very favorable to *Des Cartes*, as far as he could, as appears on all occaſions in his Writings; but here we ſee he gives up his Fundamental Rule. *Du Hamel* ſaith, *The Argument from* God's *Immutability is no force, becauſe it holds not as to Extrinſecal Actions. Regis*, to defend this, runs into that Abſurdity to make God a neceſſary Agent, becauſe God's Will and his Eſſence are the ſame; which overthrows all Religion in the Conſequence of it.

Réponſe aux Reflections, part. 2. *c.* 13.

Prin. Part. II. n. 36.

But *Des Cartes* himſelf excepts *ſuch Mutations as are made in Matter, by evident Experience, or Divine Revelation.* What is the meaning of this? Can that be *an Immutable Will of* God, which is contradicted by *Evident Experience*, and *Divine Revelation?* Or were theſe words only put in to avoid Cenſure? As the World was ſaid to be *Indefinite*, leſt he ſhould be charg'd with making the World *Infinite*; and the Definition of *Motion* was altered, to avoid *Galileo*'s fate: But there is no diſſembling in this matter; if it be contradicted by *Evident Experience*, it can be no fix'd and *Immutable Rule*; if it can be alter'd in caſe of Miracles, the Argument from God's Immutability ſignifies nothing. For if it be no repugnancy to the Divine Nature to alter, or ſuſpend the Laws of Motion, as he ſees cauſe; then we can have no aſſurance as to God's Will any farther than himſelf hath declar'd it; and conſequently they muſt prove that God hath manifeſted this to be his Will. But ſaith *Rohault*, *It is unbecoming Philoſophers on all occaſions to run to Miracles and Divine Power.* Who puts them upon it? We may certainly allow an ordinary courſe of Providence, as to Cauſes and Effects, without aſſerting theſe Notions of *Des Cartes*; but this is a pleaſant way of taking it for granted, that none but his Principles are fit for *Philoſophers.*

Rohault. *part. I. c.* 10. *n.* 13.

(II.) Come we now to examin his *Catholick Laws of Motion:* and of all things, thoſe ought to be very clear and certain, becauſe ſo much depends upon them; and yet I am afraid we ſhall hardly find one of them to be ſo.

II. The firſt of them is, *That every thing remains in the ſame ſtate it was in, unleſs it be changed by External Cauſes.* From whence he concludes, *That which is moved always continues to be moved; and that nothing tends to Reſt, which is contrary to the Laws of Nature, becauſe Reſt is contrary to Motion: and nothing tends to its contrary, for that would be to tend to its own deſtruction.* The main thing intended by this, is to aſſert the continuance of Motion in the parts of the Univerſe, upon their being once put into it; ſo that Reſt is a ſtate of violence to a Body once moved, becauſe Reſt and Motion are contrary to each other. But this is a very weak Foundation to build ſo much upon: For, we are not to conſider Reſt and Motion Abſtractly, but Phyſically, together with the Bodies in which they are: And I think it will be very hard to perſuade any Body endued with Senſe and Motion, that after weariſome Motion, he doth aim at his own deſtruction by ſeeking for Reſt. This is a ſort of Reaſoning would not be expected from *Philoſophers*; that becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary Motions, therefore no Body in motion can tend to Reſt. *But every thing continues in the ſtate it was in, till it be put out of it; therefore every thing in motion muſt continue to move.* This is not clearly expreſs'd. For if it be meant, that every thing from it ſelf continues in its original ſtate, then it is not true. For Matter, he confeſſes,

Princip. Part. II. n. 37.

would reſt, if God did not give motion to it; and ſo it muſt continue to reſt, and there could be no Motion at all: If it be meant, that every thing continues in the ſtate God put it into, unleſs he appointed ſeveral Cauſes to alter it, then it is true; but it doth not ſerve his purpoſe. For if God hath appointed both Motion and Reſt for ſome Bodies, it can never be ſaid that ſuch tend to their own deſtruction, when they tend to that Reſt which God and Nature appointed for them. If God hath appointed them for continual Motion, as the great Bodies of the Univerſe, then they muſt continue in it, not by virtue of any inherent Law of Motion, but by the immutable Will of God. *Des Cartes* ſaw it neceſſary for God to put Matter into motion, but he would have the framing of the Laws of this motion himſelf; whereas he had acted more reſpectfully towards his Maker, and more like a Philoſopher, *i.e.* more conſonantly to his own Principles to have left God that made the World and gave motion to Matter, to have ſetled thoſe Laws of Motion, which were agreeable to his Infinite Wiſdom. For theſe Notions are unbecoming *Philoſophers*, to make *Motion* a mere *Mode of Matter*; and this *Mode* to be ſupported by *Divine Concourſe*; but ſo, that *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, whatever is in *Motion* muſt continue in it; becauſe *Motion* and *Reſt* being contraries, nothing can tend to its own deſtruction.

Beſides, I know not how to reconcile this with another Law of Nature, as he calls it, *That all Bodies in a circular motion endeavor what in them lies to recede from the center of their motion.* Is not a Body put into a *Circular Motion* in a ſtate belonging to it? How comes it then not to continue in that ſtate, but to endeavor all it can to get out of it? And yet all the *Phænomena* of *Light* depends upon this Law: *That the round particles of the ſecond Element endeavor to recede from their centers; not from any cogitation,* (no doubt of it) *but becauſe they are ſo plac'd and incited to that Motion.* Is that poſſible, and yet *all Bodies continue in the ſtate they are in,* when they endeavor what they can to get out of it? Are not theſe more contrary than *Motion* and *Reſt*? I do not meddle with *External Hindrances*, but the *Natural Endeavors* of Bodies. But it may be ſaid, *That* Des Cartes *intends his Rule only of Primary and Simple Motions, and not of Circular, which are violent and unnatural.* So indeed his words ſeem to run at firſt, that this Rule relates to *ſimple and undivided Bodies*; but then I ſay, it is of no uſe, as to the preſent *Phænomena*; and he ſpeaks of *the Laws of ſuch Motion as we may obſerve in Bodies:* which words ſignify nothing, unleſs his Law reaches to the Bodies now in being; and I ſee no reaſon for him to ſuppoſe Circular Motion to be any more repugnant to the Nature of Matter, than any other. *Regis* to avoid this, ſaith, *That Circular Motion is not Unnatural, but Accidental; and the ſtate of the Body is to be taken from what it would be, if External Cauſes were removed;* i. e. *in a right Line.* But he doth not attend to the Conſequences of this; for then the Circular Motion of the Heavens muſt be *Accidental*, and not under the care of Providence, or the immutable Will of God. For God's *Will*, he ſaith, is, *that every Body be preſerved in its own ſtate; now,* ſaith he, *the ſtate of a Body in motion is in a right line, and the endeavor of Nature is to keep to that.* Then ſay I, whatever Motion is againſt the ſtate wherein Nature deſigns it, muſt be not only *Accidental* but *Violent*, becauſe it is againſt the courſe of Nature. And if it be violent, it cannot be ſuppos'd to be under God's immutable Will; but if it be not *Violent*, then a Body in

Part. 2. *n.* 39.

Part. 3. *n.* 55.

N. 56.

Réponſe, &c. part. 2. *ch.* 10.

circular motion muſt endeavor to preſerve it ſelf in that ſtate, and not to recede from it, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes.

Monſ. *Du Hamel* objects againſt this Law, that Permanent Beings do indeed endeavor to preſerve themſelves in the ſtate they are in; but it doth not hold in Beings that are ſucceſſive; becauſe the former are in their full ſtate at firſt, but it is otherwiſe in ſucceſſive. But ſaith *Regis*, *This doth not hinder them from not doing any thing to their deſtruction.* So that it is a plain caſe, no Body in *motion* can tend to *Reſt*, *becauſe Motion and Reſt are contrary*; and this is a Fundamental Law of Nature for this weighty Reaſon.

Réponſe aux Reflex. part. 2. c. 9.

The ſecond Law is, *That all Motion, according to Nature, is in a right Line, and that oblique and circular Motion ariſes from the motion and interpoſition of other Bodies; and whatever Body is moved circularly, hath a perpetual tendency to recede from the center of the circle it deſcribes.*

Now if this Rule had that evidence which is neceſſary to make it a fundamental Law of Motion, it muſt be proved either from the Nature of Matter and Motion, or from the immutable Will of God: The latter is not pretended to be proved, but only *from the immutability and ſimplicity of the operation whereby* God *doth preſerve Motion in Matter; which only regards that very moment, without regard to what was before.* But how from hence it follows that *Motion*, which extends to more moments, ſhould be determined one way rather than another, I cannot apprehend. For if the Motion be in a right line, it muſt be in more moments than one, as well as in a circle; and if it prove any thing, it is *that* God *preſerves Motion* only in a point: but *Des Cartes* owns *That it cannot be conceived in an inſtant, altho' in a right line.* How then comes *Motion* in a *Right Line* to come from God's *Immutability*, and not *in a Circle? Becauſe it is determined in every inſtant towards a right line.* This ought to have been made more evident, than from the inſtance of the *Sling:* For the falling down of the Stone to the Earth, is certainly from another cauſe, *viz.* from the Principle of *Gravitation*, and not from the Inclination of matter to move in a right line. Neither can it be ſaid to come from the *Nature* of *Matter*, or *Motion:* For a Circular Motion, hath as much the Nature and Definition of *Motion*, according to *Des Cartes*, as the other: and *Matter* is of it ſelf indifferent, which way it moves; and ſome have thought *Circular Motion* more perfect, becauſe they obſerv'd the motion of the Heavens to be ſo. But if it ariſes from the impediments of other Bodies, they muſt ſhew, that Matter was firſt put into motion in a ſtreight line; and if God put all the parts of Matter at firſt into motion in a right line, how came the impediments to make it circular? For God preſerves motion as he gave it; he firſt gave it in *right lines*, and *his Will is immutable*, therefore it muſt always ſo continue; and ſo *Circular Motion* will be impoſſible.

But let us ſuppoſe *Circular Motion*, how comes it to be ſo evident as to be made a Law of Nature, *That a Body in that motion always endeavors to recede from the Center?* How is this conſiſtent with the Principle of *Gravitation and Attraction*, which depends upon Mathematical Demonſtrations? Can it be in the Nature of Bodies to tend to the center, and to recede from it at the ſame time? And it is a very improbable thing, that *Gravity* ſhould be nothing elſe, but ſome Particles being not ſo quick in their motion from the center as others are, theſe being left in the lurch, and preſs'd by the motion of the other, do ſink under them;

and ſo come nearer to the center, which is all that *Des Cartes* means by *Gravity*. But of this afterwards.

The laſt Fundamental Law of Motion is, *That when a Body meets another, if it hath not a greater power to proceed in a right line than the other hath to hinder it, then it turns aſide, but loſeth not its motion; if it hath a greater force than the other, then it communicates its motion to the other, and loſeth it ſelf as much as it gives.* The reaſon given of this is, *Becauſe it is the immutable Will of* God, *that the ſame quantity of motion ſhall be always preſerved:* Of which I have ſpoken already. And as to the whole matter of theſe Laws of Motion, Mr. *Boyle* ſaith, *That they have been received by Learned Men, rather upon the Authority of ſo famous a* Mathematician, *than upon any convictive evidence which accompanies the Rules themſelves.* N. 40. Mr. Boyle of Veneration, &c. p. 41.

The next thing we are to do is, to ſee whether from theſe *Laws of Motion*, he gives a ſatisfactory Account of the making of the Univerſe.

And here we muſt conſider the *Elements* out of which he ſuppoſeth it made, and the account of the things made out of them.

As to the *Elements*, this, in ſhort, is his account of them, *The Particles of matter into which it was firſt divided, could not at firſt be round, becauſe then there muſt be a vacuum between them; but they muſt by ſucceſſion of time become round, becauſe they had various circular motions* (altho' the *Natural Motion* be in *a Right Line*, and *God's immutable Will* be *that every thing ſhould be preſerved in its Natural ſtate.*) *But that force which put them into theſe Notions, was great enough to wear off their Angles, and ſo they become round. Which being join'd together muſt leave ſome intervals, which were filled up by the filings off from the Angles; which were very ſmall and of a figure fit to fill up all interſtices, and were carried about with a very quick motion. So that here we have two Elements, one of the round Particles, and another of the ſubtile Æthereal matter, which came by the attrition of the firſt Particles. But beſides theſe, there are others more groſs and unapt for motion by their figure; and which make the third Element, and out of theſe, all the Bodies of the viſible World are compos'd; the Sun and fixed Stars out of the firſt; the Heavens out of the ſecond; and the Earth, with Comets and Planets out of the laſt.* Princip. Part. 3. n. 48. N. 49. N. 52.

The main thing which makes this *Hypotheſis* unſatisfactory to me is, that it is as precarious and groundleſs as the *Epicurean*, and they differ only as to the beginning of Motion, which the *Epicureans* ſuppoſe to belong to Matter, and *Des Cartes* ſaith, it comes from an infinite Agent diſtinct from it; becauſe he ſuppoſes that it would not move of it ſelf, unleſs it were put into motion. Which being ſet aſide, there is no more of the Wiſdom or Providence of God to be found in His making of the World than the others, nor any more evidence as to the Production of his Elements. For he firſt ſuppoſes, that there can be no *Vacuum* in Nature, which he proves only from his Mathematical Notion of Body conſiſting only in Extenſion; and from hence he undertakes to give an account, not of God's creating the matter of the World at once, nor of his Production of things within ſix days; but how in proceſs of time Particles of matter being divided would come to make up his ſeveral Elements. And for this, he makes uſe of ſeveral Suppoſitions without any ground of reaſon why it muſt be ſo and no otherwiſe, which was the thing which he undertook to *Merſennus* to do. For what reaſon doth he give that Matter muſt be divided at firſt, in order to the production of the Elements? When there can be no *Diviſion*, but there muſt be Intervals between the Parts; and if all Matter be *One and the ſame*, and the Space of the Intervals be neceſſarily fill'd up with *Extended Matter*, what diviſion of Parts could there be? And how can that Extenſion be divided into ſolid Bodies? *Part. 3. n. 46.* *Des Cartes* grants, *That by reaſon we cannot find out how big the parts of Matter were at firſt, how quick their motion, nor what kind of Circles they deſcribed.* Then it is impoſſible to find out by Reaſon how the World was made. For, *if God*, as he confeſſes, *might uſe innumerable ways of doing it, and we cannot tell which he pitched upon*; what a vain thing is it in any Man to undertake to give an Account how the World came to be form'd? And therefore *Tract. Phyſic. c. 21. n. 6.* *Rohault* with great Judgment, pretends not to give an Account how Matter was form'd by God at the firſt Creation; but only to ſhew a poſſibility how it might be fram'd, ſo as to ſolve the Appearances of the World. But neither he nor *Des Cartes* can reconcile this primitive diviſion of Matter into parts, with their original notion of Matter, which is nothing but *Extenſion*. *But if Matter be ſo divided*, as *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes, *may we not reaſonably conclude, that there were three ſuch Elements as he ſpeaks of?* The Queſtion is not, Whether there be not a Diſtinction of the Particles of Matter anſwerable to theſe three Elements, *viz.* a more ſubtle and ethereal Subſtance, as in Fire; a leſs ſubtle and globular, as in Air; a groſſer, as in Earth; which are moſt made according to theſe Principles, out of ſuch different Particles: but the point is, Whether theſe Elements can be produc'd in ſuch a manner by the mere Motion of Matter? And *Des Cartes* will by no means allow them to be made round, for fear of his *Vacuum*, which would ſpoil all, but *N. 48.* *that by length of time they would become round; nay they muſt become round: Eas non potuiſſe ſucceſſu temporis non fieri rotundas*, are his words. Now here lies the difficulty, to ſhew how theſe muſt become round by his own Laws of Motion, *i. e.* by a motion in a right line; for he ſaith, *It is done by various circular motions.* But how comes the Original Matter of it ſelf to deviate from the fundamental Law of Motion? That is, from whence came theſe Circular motions, without which the Elements could not be form'd? And if the firſt Particles were ſo ſolid, as is ſuppos'd, how came the Angles to be worn off? For when two ſolid Bodies meet, according to his own Laws of Motion, the one communicates motion to the other, and loſes of its own, which implies nothing but a mutual contact and rebounding upon the colliſion; but this doth by no means ſhew how theſe Bodies come to wear off each others Angles. And therefore this is only a product of fancy, but very neceſſary to his purpoſe. But let us ſuppoſe that by frequent colliſions ſome alterations would be made in the figure of theſe Bodies; what a long time muſt it be before they become ſpherical? Too long to be conſiſtent with ſuch a thing as *Creation*, which at the ſame time is pretended to be believ'd. But the only agreeable Suppoſition to this is, the exiſtence of matter from eternity, which having we know not how many Ages ſince been put into motion, then by a caſual concourſe (for it was not by the Laws of Motion) theſe Particles juſtling one againſt another, at laſt rubb'd off the uneven Particles, ſo as to make them round. But what quantity was there of ſuch Particles in proportion to what was left? For it may eaſily be too great, and ſo the firſt Element be too powerful for the ſecond, as ſome have undertaken to demonſtrate that it muſt be, upon *Des Cartes* his own grounds. And the Anſwer given is inſufficient; becauſe the Proportion of the firſt Element will ſtill be too great, notwithſtanding all the uſes found out for it;

Enchirid. Metaphyſ. c. 16. Huet *Cenſ. Philoſoph. Carteſ. c. 6.* Regis *Reponſe ch. 6. Art. 2.*

and therefore *Rohault* more wiſely avoided theſe attempts of forming the World out of the firſt *Chaos* of confus'd matter, which he found could give no ſatisfaction.

Let us now in the laſt place come to the Account he gives of the *Phænomena of the Univerſe* according to theſe Principles. And becauſe it would be too large a taſk to run thro' all, I ſhall confine my ſelf to theſe following: (1.) The formation of the Sun and Stars. (2.) The motion of the Air. (3.) The placing of the Earth. (4.) The Mechaniſm of Animals.

As to the formation of the Sun and Stars: which *Des Cartes* ſaith was in this manner; *That the matter of the firſt Element increas'd by the attrition of the particles of the ſecond, and there being greater quantity of it than was neceſſary to fill up the interſtices between the round particles of the ſecond Element, the remainder went to the centers of the ſeveral Vortices.* But here ariſes a difficulty, which takes away any appearance of ſatisfaction in this matter; which is, That *Des Cartes* owns *that in this matter of the firſt Element there are ſome parcels which are leſs divided and ſlower moved, having many Angles, and therefore unfit for motion.* Now why ſhould not theſe take up the *Center* of the *Vortex*, and not thoſe which have a quicker Motion, and endeavor to recede from it? For we muſt obſerve, that *Des Cartes* ſuppoſes *that theſe bigger fragments are mix'd with the leſſer, and that they transfer their motion to them: according to the Laws of Nature* (which ſerve his turn as he pleaſes) *greater Bodies do eaſier transfer their motion to leſſer, than receive motion from them.* So that here we have theſe bigger fragments of the firſt Element mix'd with the leſſer, and communicating their motion to them. Now, who could expect any other than theſe ſhould have fix'd in the centre of the *Vortex?* But if this be ſuppos'd, his whole *Hypotheſis* is loſt; for then the Sun and Stars muſt be *Opaque*, and not *Luminous Bodies.* But *Des Cartes* hath found out a notable Invention to ſend them far enough from the centre; which is, *That they move in the way between the Poles, towards the middle of the Heaven in a right line, and there are gathered into little maſſes, ſome from the North, and others from the South. But when they are in the Body of the Sun or a Star, then they make thoſe ſpots which hinder their Light, and are thrown off like a thick ſcum from heated Liquors.* But when he aſſigns the reaſon of Gravity, he ſaith, *It comes from hence, that thoſe particles which have a quicker motion preſs down thoſe which are not ſo fit for it, and by that means they get nearer to the centre.* How comes it then to be ſo much otherwiſe in theſe parts of the third Element; how come they not to be preſs'd down in the ſame *Vortex* towards the center? Eſpecially when himſelf there ſaith, *That the particles of the firſt Element have more power to depreſs the earthy particles than of the ſecond, becauſe they have more agitation*; and here he ſpeaks of the motion within the *Vortex:* So that according to his Principles, the matter of the third Element ought to ſubſide and be near the center, being leaſt apt for motion. But this would overthrow his whole Theory about the Sun and Stars; and about Light, and the ſpots of the Sun, and of Magnetic Particles, &c. ſo that theſe Particles of the third Element muſt be diſpos'd of as he thinks fit, leſt they put all out of order. And it is ſtrange he ſhould parallel the Scum made by the fermenting of Liquors, with the natural Motion of the Matter of his Elements. And if this Principle were true, that the Matter of the third Element might get above,

I. Princip. Part. 3. N. 54.

N. 88.

N. 89.

N. 91.

N. 94.

Princip. Part. 4. N. 23.

N. 25.

and leave the thinner and more ſubtle Matter neareſt the center, I do not ſee how the Earth could be habitable; for then we could breath nothing but thin and ethereal Air, which we could not bear. As appears by the famous inſtance of *Acoſta*, who ſpeaks by his own ſad experience, as well as of others, that he was in great danger of his Life, by going over one of the higheſt Mountains of *Peru*. From whence it is obſerv'd, that the moſt ſubtle Air is too thin for Reſpiration. But how comes it to paſs, according to theſe Principles, that the heavier part of the Air is moſt towards the center, and the lighter aſcends higheſt? For Air, according to *Des Cartes*, is *a Congeries of the Particles of the third Element very thin and diſ-joyn'd*; and yet we find this comes nearer the center according to its Gravity; and the lighter Air goes higher, and hath very different effects on Mens Bodies, tho' the motion of it be not ſtrong nor violent. For *Acoſta* ſaith, That Air which is ſo fatal to Paſſengers on thoſe Mountains of *Peru* (which are ſo high, that he ſaith, the *Alps* and *Pyrenees* were but as ordinary Houſes to lofty Towers) is ſo ſtill, that it is but *as a ſmall Breath, neither ſtrong nor violent*; and yet it pierces ſo that it often kills Men without feeling, and makes their Hands and Toes drop off; as he affirms from his own knowledg.

Acoſta *of the Indies, l.* 3. *c.* 9. Boyle's *Experiments of Air, p.* 182.

Princip. Part. 4. *N.* 45.

From whence it appears to be a mere fetch in *Des Cartes* to keep theſe Particles of his third Element from being nearer to the center, altho' they are more weighty and indiſpos'd to motion than others are.

But his whole *Hypotheſis* is overturn'd concerning the Celeſtial Bodies, if there be a Principle of *Gravitation* in *Matter*; which makes a Natural tendency towards the *Center*, according to the *Quantity* and *Diſtance* of it. The opinion of *Des Cartes* his great ſkill in *Geometry*, hath gone much farther towards perſuading the World of the truth of his Theory, than any evidences that appear'd in his Principles themſelves: For Men who are not deeply ſkill'd in thoſe matters, are very apt to be ſway'd by the Authority of thoſe that are. But as it falls out in this caſe, we have this *Theory* of *Gravitation* fully demonſtrated by a very Learned and Judicious Mathematician of our own, to whom I refer the Reader, who hath given a *Mathematical Account* of the *Cœleſtial Bodies*; not only of *the Sun and Stars, but of Comets, and the Moon, from the Principle of Gravitation*; not inherent and eſſential to Matter, but by a force given and directed by Divine Power and Wiſdom. Which being granted, we have no reaſon to be diſpleas'd with the cleareſt Account can be given, in a Mathematical manner, of the chief *Phænomena* of the Univerſe. And the ſame Perſon ſaith, *He hath many Reaſons to ſuſpect that the reſt may depend upon ſome ſecret Powers, by which the Particles of matter do either cohere or fly from each other; for want of the knowledg whereof, Philoſophers have hitherto blunder'd in Natural Philoſophy.* But we proceed in *Des Cartes* his Account of his *Cœleſtial Vortices*. *U*

Iſ. Newton *Philoſoph. Natural. Principia Mathem.*

Præfat.

FINIS.

A LETTER TO A DEIST,

In Anſwer to ſeveral

OBJECTIONS

AGAINST THE

TRUTH and AUTHORITY

OF THE

SCRIPTURES.

THE PREFACE.

THIS *following Diſcourſe was written for the ſatisfaction of a particular Perſon, who owned the* Being *and* Providence *of* God, *but expreſſed a mean Eſteem of the* Scriptures, *and the* Chriſtian Religion. *Which is become ſo common a* Theme *among the* Scepticks *of this* Age, *that the Author of this Diſcourſe thought it worth his time and care, to conſider the force of the Objections that were made againſt them. Eſpecially being written in a grave and ſerious manner, and not with that* Raillery *and* Buffonry, *which the rude Perſons of this Age commonly beſtow upon Religion. It might be juſtly expected from ſuch who pretend to* Breeding *and* Civility, *that they would at leaſt ſhew*

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Tractat. Theol. politic.

more reſpect to a thing, which hath prevailed ſo much among Men of the beſt Underſtanding and Education, and who have had no Intereſt to carry on by it. For it is againſt the ordinary Rules of Converſation, to affront that which others think they have great reaſon to eſteem and love; and they would not endure that ſcorn and contempt of their meaneſt Servant, which they too often ſhew towards Religion, and the things belonging to it. If they are not in earneſt *when they ſcoff and mock at ſacred things, their own Conſciences will tell them it is an horrible Impiety; if they are in* earneſt, *let them debate theſe things calmly and ſeriouſly, and let the ſtronger* Reaſon *prevail. Men may ſpeak ſharply and wittily againſt the cleareſt things in the World, as the* Scepticks *of old did againſt all Certainty of Senſe and Reaſon; but we ſhould think that Man out of his Senſes, that would now diſpute the Being of the Sun, or the Colour of the Snow. We do not ſay, the Matters of Religion are capable of the ſame evidence with that of Senſe; but it is a great part of Judgment and Underſtanding, to know the proportion and fitneſs of evidence to the Nature of the thing to be proved. They would not have the Eye to judge of Taſts, nor the Noſe of* Metaphyſicks; *and yet theſe would be as proper, as to have the Senſes judge of Immaterial Beings. If we do not give as good Reaſon for the Principles of our Religion, as, the Nature of Religion conſidered, can be given for it, let us then be blamed for our Weakneſs in defending it; but let not Religion ſuffer, till they are ſure nothing more can be ſaid for it.*

There is a late Author, *I hear is mightily in vogue among many, who cry up any thing on the* Atheiſtical ſide, *tho' never ſo weak and trifling. It were no difficult Task to lay open the falſe Reaſonings, and inconſiſtent* Hypotheſes *of his Book; which hath been ſufficiently done already in that Language wherein it was written. But if for the* Advancement *of* Irreligion *among us, that* Book *be, as it is talked, tranſlated into our Tongue, there will not, I hope, want thoſe who will be as ready to defend* Religion *and* Morality, *as others are to decry and deſpiſe them.*

A LET-

612:A.

A LETTER *of Reſolution to a Perſon unſatisfied about the* Truth *and* Authority *of the* Scriptures.

S I R,

ALthough I do not pretend to any Skill in the *Depths of Theology*, yet I am heartily concerned for the *Truth* and *Honour* of the *Chriſtian Religion*; which it is the deſign of your Papers to undermine. When I firſt looked them over, I could not think them ſo conſiderable, as to deſerve a particular Anſwer; eſpecially from one in my Circumſtances, who have ſo much other Buſineſs lying upon me, and ſo little Leiſure and Health to perform it; but I found at the concluſion of your Papers, ſo earneſt and vehement a deſire expreſſed by you, that I would return an Anſwer, in order to the ſettlement of your Mind, that I could not refuſe an Office of ſo great Charity, as you repreſent it to be. I confeſs, when I conſidered the nature of your Objections, and the manner of managing them, I could hardly believe that they proceeded from a doubtful Mind, that was deſirous of any ſatisfaction; but ſince you tell me ſo, I will firſt ſhew my Charity in believing it, and then in endeavouring to give you my poor Aſſiſtance, and impartial Advice, in order to your ſatisfaction. And in truth, I think impartial Advice will contribute more to that end, than ſpending Time and Paper in running through all the Difficulties, which it is poſſible for a cavilling Mind to raiſe againſt the plaineſt *Truths* in the World. For there is nothing ſo clear and evident, but a *Sophiſtical Wit* will always find ſomething to ſay againſt it; and if you be the *Perſon* I take you for, you very well know, that there have been ſome, who wanted neither Wit, nor Eloquence, who have gone about to prove, *That there was Nothing in the World; and that if there were any thing, it could not be underſtood by Men; that if it were underſtood by one Man, it could not be expreſſed to another:* And beſides ſuch extravagant Undertakers as theſe, how many have there been, who with plauſible and ſubtle Arguments, have endeavoured to overthrow all manner of *Certainty*, either by *Senſe* or *Reaſon?* Muſt we therefore quit all Pretences to *Certainty*, becauſe we cannot, it may be, anſwer all the Subtilties of the *Scepticks?* And therefore I am by no means ſatisfied with your manner of proceeding, *deſiring all particular Difficulties to be anſwer'd, before we conſider the main Evidences of the Chriſtian Faith:* For the only reaſonable way of proceeding in this matter, is to conſider, firſt, whether there be ſufficient *Motives* to perſuade you to embrace the *Chriſtian Faith*; and then to weigh the Difficulties, and to compare them with the *Reaſons* and *Arguments* for believing; and if thoſe do not appear great enough to overthrow the force of the other, you may reſt ſatisfied in the *Chriſtian Faith*, although you cannot anſwer every Difficulty that may be raiſed againſt the *Books* wherein our Religion is contained. I pray, Sir, conſider with your ſelf; do not you think it poſſible for any Man to have Faith enough to ſave him, unleſs he can ſolve all the Difficulties in *Chronologie* that are in the *Bible*, unleſs he can give an account of every particular *Law* and *Cuſtom* among the *Jews*, unleſs he can make out all the *Prophetick Schemes*, and can tell what the *Number* of the *Beaſt* in the *Apocalypſe* means? If a Man may believe and be ſaved, without theſe things, to what purpoſe are they objected for the overthrow of the *Chriſtian Faith*? Do you think a Man hath not reaſon enough to believe there is *extended Matter* in the World, unleſs he can ſolve all the Difficulties that ariſe from the *Extenſion*, or *Diviſibility* of *Matter*? Or that he hath a *Soul*, unleſs he can make it clear how an immaterial and material Subſtance can be ſo united as our *Soul* and *Body* are? Or that the *Sun* ſhines, unleſs he can demonſtrate whether the *Sun* or the *Earth* moves? Or that we have any *certainty* of things, unleſs he can aſſign the undoubted *Criterion* of *Truth* and *Falſehood* in all things? Theſe things I mention on purpoſe, to let you ſee, that the moſt certain things have Difficulties about them, which no one thinks it neceſſary for him to anſwer, in order to his aſſurance of the *Truth* of the *things*; but as long as the evidence for them is much more conſiderable than the Objections againſt them, we may ſafely acquieſce in our Aſſent to them, and leave the unfolding theſe Difficulties to *the Diſputers of this World*, or the *Knowledge* of another. Is it not far more reaſonable for us to think, that in *Books* of ſo great *Antiquity*, as thoſe of *Moſes* are, written in a Language whoſe *Idiotiſms* are ſo different from ours, there may be ſome difficulty in the *Phraſes*, or Computation of Times or Cuſtoms of the People, that we cannot well underſtand, than that all the Miracles wrought by *Moſes* ſhould have been Impoſtures; and that Law which was preſerved ſo conſtantly, maintained with that reſolution, by the wiſeſt of the People of the *Jews*, who choſe to die rather than diſown it, ſhould be all a Cheat? Is it not more reaſonable for us to ſuſpect our own Underſtandings, as to the *Speeches* and *Actions* of ſome of the *Prophets*, than to think that Men who deſigned ſo much the advancing Virtue, and diſcouraging Vice, ſhould be a Pack of Hypocrites and Deceivers? Can any Man of common Senſe ſuſpect the *Chriſtian Religion* to be a *Fourb*, or an Impoſture, becauſe he cannot underſtand the Number of the *Beaſt*, or interpret the *Apocalyptic Viſions*? I could hardly have believed any Man pretending to *Reaſon*, could object theſe things, unleſs I ſaw them, and were called upon to anſwer them.

Therefore, Sir, my ſerious and impartial Advice to you is, in the firſt place, to conſider and debate the main Point, *i. e.* the Proofs of the *Chriſtian Doctrine*, and not to hunt up and down the *Scriptures* for every thing that ſeems a difficulty to you, and then by heaping all theſe together, to make the *Scriptures* ſeem a confuſed heap of indigeſted ſtuff, which being taken in pieces and conſidered, with that Modeſty, Diligence, and Care, that doth become us, will appear to contain nothing unbecoming that *Sacred* and *Venerable* Name, which the *Scriptures* do bear among us.

If therefore you deſign not cavilling but ſatisfaction, you will join iſſue with me upon the moſt material Point, *viz. Whether the Chriſtian Religion were from God, or from Men?* For if this be proved to have been from *God*, all the other things will eaſily fall off of themſelves, or be removed with a little Induſtry.

In the Debate of this, I ſhall conſider, firſt, what things are agreed upon between us, and then, wherein the Difference lies.

1. *You grant an abſolutely perfect and independent Being, whom we call God.*

2. *That the World was at firſt Created, and is ſtill Governed by Him.*

3. *That He is ſo Holy, as to be the Author of no Sin, although he doth not hinder Men from ſinning.*

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ficulties in *Chronologie* that are in the *Bible*, unleſs he can give an account of every particular *Law* and *Cuſtom* among the *Jews*, unleſs he can make out all the *Prophetick Schemes*, and can tell what the *Number* of the *Beaſt* in the *Apocalypſe* means? If a Man may believe and be ſaved, without theſe things, to what purpoſe are they objected for the overthrow of the *Chriſtian Faith*? Do you think a Man hath not reaſon enough to believe there is *extended Matter* in the World, unleſs he can ſolve all the Difficulties that ariſe from the *Extenſion*, or *Diviſibility* of *Matter*? Or that he hath a *Soul*, unleſs he can make it clear how an immaterial and material Subſtance can be ſo united as our *Soul* and *Body* are? Or that the *Sun* ſhines, unleſs he can demonſtrate whether the *Sun* or the *Earth* moves? Or that we have any *certainty* of things, unleſs he can aſſign the undoubted *Criterion* of *Truth* and *Falſehood* in all things? Theſe things I mention on purpoſe, to let you ſee, that the moſt certain things have Difficulties about them, which no one thinks it neceſſary for him to anſwer, in order to his aſſurance of the *Truth* of the *things*; but as long as the evidence for them is much more conſiderable than the Objections againſt them, we may ſafely acquieſce in our Aſſent to them, and leave the unfolding theſe Difficulties to *the Diſputers of this World*, or the *Knowledge* of another. Is it not far more reaſonable for us to think, that in *Books* of ſo great *Antiquity*, as thoſe of *Moſes* are, written in a Language whoſe *Idiotiſms* are ſo different from ours, there may be ſome difficulty in the *Phraſes*, or Computation of Times or Cuſtoms of the People, that we cannot well underſtand, than that all the Miracles wrought by *Moſes* ſhould have been Impoſtures; and that Law which was preſerved ſo conſtantly, maintained with that reſolution, by the wiſeſt of the People of the *Jews*, who choſe to die rather than diſown it, ſhould be all a Cheat? Is it not more reaſonable for us to ſuſpect our own Underſtandings, as to the *Speeches* and *Actions* of ſome of the *Prophets*, than to think that Men who deſigned ſo much the advancing Virtue, and diſcouraging Vice, ſhould be a Pack of Hypocrites and Deceivers? Can any Man of common Senſe ſuſpect the *Chriſtian Religion* to be a *Fourb*, or an Impoſture, becauſe he cannot underſtand the Number of the *Beaſt*, or interpret the *Apocalyptic Viſions*? I could hardly have believed any Man pretending to *Reaſon*, could object theſe things, unleſs I ſaw them, and were called upon to anſwer them.

Therefore, Sir, my ſerious and impartial Advice to you is, in the firſt place, to conſider and debate the main Point, *i. e.* the Proofs of the *Chriſtian Doctrine*, and not to hunt up and down the *Scriptures* for every thing that ſeems a difficulty to you, and then by heaping all theſe together, to make the *Scriptures* ſeem a confuſed heap of indigeſted ſtuff, which being taken in pieces and conſidered, with that Modeſty, Diligence, and Care, that doth become us, will appear to contain nothing unbecoming that *Sacred* and *Venerable* Name, which the *Scriptures* do bear among us.

If therefore you deſign not cavilling but ſatisfaction, you will join iſſue with me upon the moſt material Point, *viz. Whether the Chriſtian Religion were from God, or from Men?* For if this be proved to have been from *God*, all the other things will eaſily fall off of themſelves, or be removed with a little Induſtry.

In the Debate of this, I ſhall conſider, firſt, what things are agreed upon between us, and then, wherein the Difference lies.

1. *You grant an abſolutely perfect and independent Being, whom we call God.*

2. *That the World was at firſt Created, and is ſtill Governed by Him.*

3. *That He is ſo Holy, as to be the Author of no Sin, although he doth not hinder Men from ſinning.*

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This is the force of all I can find out, in the ſeveral Parts of your Papers, towards the invalidating the Teſtimony concerning the *Matters* of *Fact* reported in the Writings of the New Teſtament.

In anſwer to all theſe things, I ſhall ſhew: 1. That Matters of Fact, done at ſuch a diſtance of Time, may have ſufficient evidence to oblige Men to believe them. 2. That there is no reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of thoſe Matters of Fact which are contained in the Hiſtory of the New Teſtament. 3. That the *Apoſtles* gave the greateſt Teſtimonies of their Sincerity, that could be expected from them; and that no Matters of Fact were ever better atteſted than thoſe which are reported by them; from whence it will follow, That it is not reaſon but unreaſonable *Suſpicion* and *Scepticiſm*, if not Willfulneſs and Obſtinacy, which makes Men to continue to doubt after ſo great evidence.

1. That we may have ſuch evidence of *Matters* of *Fact* done at ſuch a *diſtance* of Time as may oblige us to believe the Truth of them. This we are firſt to make out, becauſe ſeveral of your Objections ſeem to imply, *That we can have no certainty of ſuch things, becauſe we cannot know what Tricks may have been plaid in former Times, when it was far more eaſie to deceive; and that it is confeſſed, there have been ſeveral Frauds of this kind, which have a long time prevailed in the World.* But have not the very ſame Arguments been uſed againſt all *Religion*, by *Atheiſts?* And if the *Cheats* that have been in *Religion*, have no force againſt the *Being* of *God*, why ſhould they have any againſt the *Chriſtian Religion?* And if the common Conſent of Mankind ſignifie any thing as to the acknowledgment of a *Deity*, why ſhould not the *Teſtimony* of the *Chriſtian Church*, ſo circumſtantiated as it is, be of ſufficient ſtrength to receive the Matters of Fact delivered by it? which is all I at preſent deſire. Do we queſtion any of the Stories delivered by the common Conſent of *Greek* or *Latin Hiſtorians*, although we have only the bare Teſtimony of thoſe Hiſtorians for them? And yet your *Objections* would lie againſt every one of them: How do we know the great prevalency of the *Roman Empire*, was it not delivered by thoſe who belonged to it, and were concerned to make the beſt of it? What know we, but *thouſands* of *Hiſtories* have been loſt, that confuted all that we now have concerning the Greatneſs of *Rome?* What know we, but that *Rome* was deſtroyed by *Carthage*, or that *Hannibal* quite overthrew the *Roman Empire*; or that *Cataline* was one of the beſt Men in the World, becauſe all our preſent Hiſtories were written by Men of the other ſide? How can we tell but that the *Perſians* deſtroyed the *Macedonians*, becauſe all our *Accounts* of *Alexander*'s Expedition are originally from the *Greeks?* And why might not we ſuſpect greater Partiality in all theſe Caſes, when the Writers did not give a thouſand part of that evidence for their Fidelity, that the Firſt *Chriſtians* did? And yet, what ſhould we think of ſuch a Perſon who ſhould call in queſtion the beſt Hiſtories of all Nations, becauſe they are written by thoſe of the ſame *Country?* By which, it ſeems, you will never allow any competent Teſtimony at all; for if ſuch things be written by Enemies and Strangers, we have reaſon to ſuſpect both their Knowledge and Integrity; if written by *Friends*, then though they might know the *Truth*, yet they would write partially of their own ſide: So that upon this Principle, no Hiſtory at all, ancient or modern is to be believed; for they are all reported either by Friends or Enemies; and ſo not only Divine, but all Humane Faith will be deſtroyed. I am by no means a Friend to unreaſonable Credu-

lity; but I am as little to unreaſonable Diſtruſt and Suſpicion; if the one be Folly, the other is Madneſs. No prudent Man believes any thing, becauſe it is poſſible to be true, nor rejects any thing, merely becauſe it is poſſible to be falſe; but it is the prudence of every Man to weigh and conſider all Circumſtances, and according to them, to aſſent or diſſent. We all know it is poſſible for Men to deceive, or to be deceived, but we know there is no neceſſity of either; and that there is ſuch a Thing as Truth in the World; and though Men may deceive, yet they do not always ſo; and that Men may know they are not deceived. For elſe there could be no ſuch thing as *Society* among Mankind; no *Friendſhip*, or *Truſt*, or *Confidence* in the Word of another Perſon; becauſe it is poſſible that the beſt Friend I have may deceive me; and the World is full of Diſſimulation, muſt I therefore believe no body? This is the juſt conſequence of this way of Arguing, *That we have reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of theſe Matters of Fact, becauſe there have been many Frauds in the World, and might have been many more than we can now diſcover*; for if this Principle be purſued, it will deſtroy all Society among Men; which is built on the Suppoſition of mutual Truſt and Confidence that Men have in each other: And although it be poſſible for all Men to deceive, becauſe we cannot know one another's Hearts, yet there are ſuch Characters of Honeſty and Fidelity in ſome Perſons, that others dare venture their Lives and Fortunes upon their Words. And is any Man thought a Fool for doing ſo? Nay, have not the moſt prudent and ſagacious Men repoſed a mighty Confidence in the Integrity of others? And without this, no great Affairs can be carried on in the World; for ſince the greateſt Perſons need the help of others to manage their Buſineſs, they muſt truſt other Men continually; and every Man puts his Life into the Hands of others, to whom he gives any Freedom of acceſs, and eſpecially his Servants: Muſt a Man therefore live in continual Suſpicion and Jealouſie, becauſe it is poſſible he may be deceived? But if this be thought unreaſonable, then we gain thus much, that notwithſtanding the poſſibility of Deception, Men may be truſted in ſome Caſes, and their Fidelity ſafely relied upon: This being granted, we are to enquire what that Aſſurance is which makes us truſt any one; and where ever we find a Concurrence of the ſame Circumſtances, or equal evidence of Fidelity, we may repoſe the ſame Truſt or Confidence in them. And we may ſoon find that it is not any one's bare Word that makes us truſt him; but either the reputation of his Integrity among diſcerning Men, or our long experience and obſervation of him: This latter is only confined to our own tryal; but the former is more general, and reaches beyond our own Age, ſince we may have the *Teſtimony* of diſcerning Perſons convey'd down to us in as certain a manner, as we can know the Mind of a *Friend* at a hundred Miles diſtance, *viz.* by writing. And in this Caſe, we deſire no more than to be ſatisfied that thoſe things were written by them; and that they deſerved to be believed in what they writ; thus, if any one would be ſatisfied about the Paſſages of the *Peloponneſian War*, and hath heard that *Thucydides* hath accurately written it, he hath no more to do, than to enquire whether this *Thucydides* were capable of giving a good Account of it, and for that, he hears that he was a great and inquiſitive Perſon, that lived in that Age, and knew all the Occurrences of it; and when he is ſatisfied of that, his next enquiry is, whether he may be truſted or no; and for this, he can expect no better ſatisfaction, than that his Hiſtory hath been in great reputation for its Integrity among the moſt knowing Perſons; but how ſhall he be ſure this was the Hiſtory, written by *Thucydides*, ſince there have been many counterfeit Writings obtruded upon the World? Beſides the Conſent of learned Men in all Ages ſince, we may compare the *Teſtimonies* cited out of it with the Hiſtory we have, and the Style, with the Character given of *Thucydides*, and the Narrations, with other credible Hiſtories of thoſe *Times*; and if all theſe agree, what reaſon can there be not to rely upon the Hiſtory of *Thucydides?* All learned Men do acknowledge, that there have been multitudes of fictitious Writings, but do they therefore queſtion, whether there are any genuine? Or whether we have not the true *Herodotus*, *Strabo*, or *Pauſanias*, becauſe there is a counterfeit *Beroſus*, *Manetho*, and *Philo*, ſet forth by *Annius* of *Viterbo?* Do any ſuſpect whether we have any of the genuin Works of *Cicero*, becauſe an *Italian* counterfeited a Book, *De Conſolatione* in his Name? Or whether *Cæſar*'s *Commentaries* were his own; becauſe it is uncertian who writ the *Alexandrian War* that is joined with them? By which we ſee, that we may not only be certain of the Fidelity of Perſons we converſe with, but of all things neceſſary to our belief of what was done at a great diſtance of Time from the *Teſtimony* of Writers, notwithſtanding the many ſuppoſititious Writings that have been in the World.

But it may be ſaid, *That all this only relates to meer Matters of Hiſtory, wherein a Man is not much concerned whether they be true or falſe; but the things we are about are Matters that Mens Salvation or Damnation are ſaid to depend upon, and therefore greater Evidence ſhould be given of theſe, to oblige Men to believe them.*

To this I anſwer. 1. That my deſign herein, was to prove, that notwithſtanding the poſſibility of Deception, there may be ſufficient ground for a prudent and firm aſſent to the Truth of Things done at as great a diſtance of Time, and convey'd after the ſame manner, that the Matters of Fact reported in the *New Teſtament are*; and hereby thoſe general Prejudices are ſhewed to be unreaſonable: And all that I deſire from this Diſcourſe is, that you would give an aſſent of the ſame Nature to the Hiſtory of the *Goſpel*, that you do to *Cæſar*, or *Livy*, or *Tacitus*, or any other ancient Hiſtorian. 2. As to the greater Obligation to aſſent, I ſay it depends upon the Evidence of Divine Revelation, which is given by the Matters of Fact which are deliver'd to us. And here give me leave to aſk you; 1. Whether it be any ways repugnant to any conception you have of God, for him to make uſe of fallible Men to make known his Will to the World? 2. Whether thoſe Men, though ſuppoſed to be in themſelves fallible, can either deceive, or be deceived, when God makes known his Mind to them? 3. Whether on ſuppoſition, that God hath made uſe of ſuch Perſons for this end, thoſe are not obliged to believe them, who do not live in the ſame *Age* with them? If not, then *God* muſt either make no *Revelation* at all, or he muſt make a New one every Age: If they are, then the Obligation lies as much on us now to believe, as if we had lived and converſed with thoſe inſpired Perſons.

2. That there is no reaſon to ſuſpect the Truth of thoſe Matters of Fact which are reported in the *New Teſtament*; For ſince it is univerſally agreed among Men, that Humane *Teſtimony* is a ſufficient ground for aſſent, where there is no poſitive ground for ſuſpicion; becauſe deceiving and being deceived, is not the common Intereſt of Mankind;

therefore we are to conſider what the general grounds of *ſuſpicion* are; and whether any of them do reach the *Apoſtles Teſtimony*, concerning the Matters of Fact reported by them. And the juſt grounds of ſuſpicion are theſe; 1. If the *Perſons* be otherwiſe known to be Men of Artifice and Cunning, full of Tricks and Diſſimulation, and that make no Conſcience of ſpeaking Truth, ſo a Lye tends to their greateſt Advantage; which is too much the *Papiſts* caſe in their *Legends*, and *Stories* of *Miracles.* 2. If they temper and ſuit their Story and Doctrine to the *Humour* and *Genius* of the People, they hope to prevail upon, as *Mahomet* did, in encouraging *War* and *Laſciviouſneſs.* 3. If they lay the Scene of their Story at a mighty diſtance from themſelves, at ſuch an Age, wherein it is impoſſible to prove, or diſprove; which is the caſe of the *Brachmans*, as to their *Brahmà*, and their *Veda*; and was of the *Heathens* as to their Fabulous Deities. 4. If there be any thing contained in the Story, which is repugnant to the moſt authentick Hiſtories of thoſe Times; by which means the Impoſtures of *Annius* have been diſcovered. 5. If there be evident contradiction in the Story it ſelf; or any thing repugnant to, or unbecoming the Majeſty, Holineſs, Sincerity, and Conſiſtency of a Divine Revelation; on which account we reject *Fanatick* pretences to *Revelations.* If there were any thing of this nature in the *Writings* of the *New Teſtament*, we might then allow there were ſome ground to ſuſpect the *Truth* of what is contained therein: But I ſhall undertake, by the Grace of God, to defend that there is not any Foundation for Suſpicion as to any one of theſe.

1. As to the *Perſons*, ſuch who go about to deceive others, muſt be Men that are verſed in buſineſs, and know how to deal with Men; and that have ſome Intereſt already that they have gained by other Means, before they can carry on ſuch a Deſign as to abuſe Mankind, by Lies and Impoſtures in *Religion:* Therefore the *Atheiſts* lay the deceiving the World by *Religion*, to the Charge of *Politicians* and *Law-givers*, to Men verſed in the practice of Fraud, ſuch as *Numa*, or *Lycurgus*, or *Xaca*, or *Mahomet*, ſuch as underſtood the ways of cajoling the People; or to *ſubtle Prieſts*, that know how to ſuit the hopes and fears of the ſuperſtitious Multitude; whence came the multitude of Frauds in the *Heathen Temples* and *Oracles.* But would any Man in the World have pitched upon a few *Fiſhermen*, and illiterate Perſons, to carry on ſuch an intrigue as this? Men that were rude and unexperienced in the World, and uncapable of dealing in the way of Artifice with one of the common Citizens of *Hieruſalem.* When was it ever heard that ſuch Men made ſuch an alteration in the *Religion* of the World, as the Primitive *Chriſtians* did, againſt the moſt violent Perſecutions? And when they prevailed ſo much, the common Charge ſtill againſt them was, that they were a Company of *rude, mean, obſcure, illiterate, ſimple Men:* And yet in ſpight of all the Cunning, and Malice, and Learning, and Strength of their Adverſaries, they gained ground upon them, and prevailed over the *Obſtinacy* of the *Jews*, and *Wiſdom* of the *Greeks.* If the *Chriſtian Religion* had been a meer deſign of the *Apoſtles* to make themſelves *Heads* of a new *Sect*, what had this been but to have ſet the Cunning of twelve, or thirteen Men, of no Intereſt, or Reputation, againſt the *Wiſdom* and *Power* of the whole World? If they had any *Wiſdom*, they would never have undertaken ſuch an impoſſible deſign as this muſt appear to them at firſt View: And if they had none, how could they ever hope to manage it? If their aim were only at Reputation, they might have

thought of thouſands of Ways more probable, and more advantageous than this: If we ſuppoſe Men ſhould be willing to hazard their Lives for their Reputations, we may ſuppoſe withal ſuch Men to have ſo much cunning as not to do it till they cannot help it; but if they can have Reputation and Eaſe together, they had rather have it. I will therefore put the Caſe concerning the only Perſon that had the Advantage of a learned Education among the *Apoſtles*; *viz.* St. *Paul*, and whom you ſeem to ſtrike at more than the reſt: Is it reaſonable to believe, that when he was in favour with the *Sanhedrin*, and was likely to advance himſelf by his oppoſition to *Chriſtianity*, and had a fair proſpect of Eaſe and Honour together; he ſhould quit all this, to join with ſuch an inconſiderable and hated Company, as the *Chriſtians* were, only to be one of the *Heads* of a very ſmall Number of Men, and to purchaſe it at ſo dear a rate as the loſs of his Friends and Intereſt, and running on continual Troubles and Perſecutions, to the hazard of his Life? Is it poſſible for Men that are deceived and mean honeſtly to do this; but it is ſcarce ſuppoſable of a Man in his Senſes that ſhould know and believe all this to be a *Cheat*, and yet own and embrace it, to ſo great diſadvantage to himſelf: When he could not make himſelf ſo conſiderable by it, as he might have been without it. Men muſt love *cheating* the World at a ſtrange rate, that will let go fair hopes of Preferment and Eaſe, and lead a Life of perpetual Trouble, and expoſe themſelves to the utmoſt Hazards, only for the ſake of deluding others. If the *Apoſtles* knew all they ſaid to be falſe, and made it ſo neceſſary for all Men to believe what they ſaid to be true; they were ſome of the greateſt Deceivers which the World had ever known: But Men that take pleaſure in deceiving, make uſe of many Artifices on purpoſe to catch the ſilly Multitude; they have all the Arts of Inſinuation and fawning Speeches, fit to draw in the weakeſt, and ſuch as love to be flatter'd; but what is there tending this way in all the Apoſtles Writings? How ſharply do they ſpeak to the *Jewiſh Sanhedrin*, upon the Murder of Chriſt? With what plainneſs and ſimplicity do they go about to perſuade Men to be *Chriſtians?* They barely tell the Matters of Fact concerning the *Reſurrection* of *Chriſt*, and ſay *they were Eye-witneſſes of it*, and upon the Credit of this *Teſtimony* of theirs, they preach *Faith* and *Repentance* to *Jews* and *Gentiles:* Was ever any thing farther from the appearance of Artifice than this was? So that if they were deceivers, they were ſome of the ſubtileſt that ever were in the World, becauſe there ſeems to be ſo little ground for any ſuſpicion of Fraud; and we cannot eaſily imagin Perſons of their Education, capable of ſo profound Diſſimulation and ſo artificial a Cheat. Beſides all this, we are to conſider how far ſuch Perſons do allow the liberty of *Diſſimulation* and *artificial Juglings*, eſpecially in *Religion*; we ſee the *Papiſts* could not practiſe theſe things, without being forced to defend them, by ſhewing how convenient it is for the People to be told ſtrange Stories of *Saints*, on purpoſe *to nouriſh Devotion* in them: To which end, they ſay, *it ſignifies not much, whether they were true or no:* And withal they aſſert the *Lawfulneſs of Equivocations, and Mental Reſervations, and doing things, not otherwiſe juſtifiable, for the Honour of their Church and Religion*; And I ſhall freely confeſs to you, if I found any countenance to ſuch things as theſe, from the Doctrine or Practice of the *Apoſtles*, it would give me too juſt a ground for ſuſpicion as to what they deliver'd. For if they allowed *Equivocations* or *Mental Reſervations*, how could I poſſibly know what they meant by any thing they ſaid? For that which was neceſſary to make the Propoſition true, lay without my reach in the Mind of another; and while they ſo firmly atteſted that *Chriſt was riſen from the Dead*, they might underſtand it of a *Spiritual* or *Myſtical Reſurrection*; but if they ſhould be found to allow *Lying or Cheating for the Cauſe of Religion*, their Credit would be gone with me; for how could I be any longer ſure of the *Truth* of one Word they ſaid? I ſhould be ſo far from thinking them *Infallible*, that I could not but ſuſpect them to have a deſign to deceive me. The firſt thing therefore we are to look at in Perſons who require our belief, is the ſtricteſt Veracity; if they falter in this, they expoſe themſelves to the ſuſpicion of all but credulous Fools. But we no where find greater plainneſs and ſincerity required, no where more ſtrict and ſevere Prohibitions of Diſſimulation in *Religion*, nor more general Precepts about *ſpeaking Truth*, than in the Writings of the *New Teſtament*. *But might not all this be done with the greater Artifice to prevent ſuſpicion?* Suſpicion is a thing, which *he that ſet Bounds to the Sea*, can ſet no Bounds to; if Men will give way to it, without Reaſon, there can be no end of it. For the moſt effectual ways to prevent it, will ſtill afford new matter and occaſion for it. If Men do uſe the utmoſt Means that are poſſible, to aſſure others of their ſincerity, and they will not believe them, but ſtill ſuſpect the deſign to be ſo much deeper laid; there is no way left poſſible to ſatisfy ſuch Men; their ſuſpicion is a Diſeaſe incurable by rational Means, and ſuch Perſons deſerve to be given over as paſt all Remedy. If Men act like prudent Men, they will judge according to the *Reaſon of Things*; but if they entertain a jealouſie of all Mankind, and the moſt of thoſe who give them the greateſt aſſurance they have no Intention to deceive them, it is to no purpoſe to go about to ſatisfie ſuch Perſons, for that very Undertaking makes them more ſuſpicious. If the *Apoſtles* therefore gave as much ground as ever any *Perſons* did, or could do, that they had no deſign to impoſe upon the World, but proceeding with all the fairneſs and openneſs, with the greateſt Evidence of their Sincerity, there can be no reaſon to faſten upon them the Imputation of cunning Men who made it their buſineſs to deceive others.

2. This will more appear if we conſider the *Matters* deliver'd by them, and the nature of their Doctrine. For if the *Chriſtian Religion* were only a contrivance of the firſt Preachers of it, it muſt by the event be ſuppoſed that they were very ſubtle Men, who in ſo little time, and againſt ſo great oppoſition could prevail over both *Jews* and *Gentiles*; but if we reflect on the *nature* of their *Doctrine*, we can never imagine that theſe Men did proceed by the ſame Methods that Men of ſubtilty do make uſe of. If it were their own Contrivance, it was in their Power to have framed it as they thought fit themſelves; and in all probability, they would have done it in a way moſt likely to be ſucceſsful; but the *Chriſtian Religion* was ſo far from it, as though they had induſtriouſly deſigned to advance a *Religion* againſt the *Genius* and *Inclination* of all Mankind. For it neither gratifies the voluptuous in their Pleaſures, nor the Ambitious in their deſires of External Pomp and Greatneſs, nor the Covetous in their Thirſt after Riches; but lays a ſevere reſtraint on all thoſe common and prevailing Paſſions of Mankind; which *Mahomet* well underſtood, when he ſuited his *Religion* to them. *Chriſtianity* was neither accommodated to the Temper and Genius either of *Jews* or *Gentiles*: The *Jews* were in great expectation of a Tempo-

ral *Prince* at that Time to deliver them from the *Roman* Slavery; and every one that would have ſet up for ſuch a *Meſſias*, might have had Followers enough among them, as we find afterwards by the Attempts of *Barchocebas* and others. But the *Meſſias* of the *Chriſtians* was ſo directly contrary to their Hopes and Expectations, being a *poor* and *ſuffering Prince*, that this ſet them the more againſt his Followers, becauſe they were hereby fruſtrated of their greateſt Hopes, and defeated in their moſt pleaſing Expectations: But beſides, if they would have taken in the *Moſaick Law*, it might in probability have ſuceeded better; but this St. *Paul* would by no means hear of. *But if they rejected* Jews, *methinks, they ſhould have been willing to have had ſome Aſſiſtance from the* Gentiles. No, they charged them with *Idolatry* wherever they came; and would not join in any parts of their Worſhip with them, nor ſo much as Eat of the *remainder* of their *Sacrifices*. But ſuppoſing they had a mind to ſet up wholly a new *Sect* of their own; yet we ſhould think they ſhould have framed it after the moſt plauſible manner, and left out all things that were moſt liable to Reproach and Infamy: But this they were ſo far from, that the moſt contemptible part of the *Chriſtian Religion*, viz. *A crucified Saviour*, they inſiſt the moſt upon, and preach it on all Occaſions, and in compariſon of it, ſtrangely deſpiſe all the *Wiſdom* and *Philoſophy* of the *Greeks*. What did theſe Men mean, if *Chriſtianity* had been only a *Contrivance* of theirs? If they had but left out this one Circumſtance, in all human probability, the excellent moral Precepts in *Chriſtianity* would have been highly magnified among all thoſe who had been bred up under the Inſtructions of *Philoſophers*. Nay, they would not make uſe of the moſt commendable Methods of Human Wiſdom; nor do as the *Jeſuits* have done in *China*, make Men have a better Opinion of the *Religion* they brought, for their Skill in *Mathematicks* and *Aſtronomy*; but as much as it was poſſible, to let the World ſee it was no contrivance of Humane Wiſdom, they ſhunned all the Ways of ſhewing it in the manner of its Propagation. Nay, when the People would have given the *Apoſtles* Divine Worſhip, never were vain Men more concerned to have it, than they to oppoſe it; And do theſe things look like the Actions of Men that deſigned only to make themſelves great, by being the *Heads* of a new *Sect* of *Religion*?

3. Men that made it their deſign to deceive the World, if they had thought it neceſſary to bring in any matter of *Story* concerning the *Author* of their *Religion* would have placed it at ſuch *a diſtance of Time*, that it was not capable of being diſproved: As it is apparent in the *Heathen Mythologie*; for the Stories were ſuch, as no Perſon could ever pretend to confute them otherwiſe than by the inconſiſtency of them with the common Principles of *Religion*. But if we ſuppoſe *Chriſtianity* to have been a meer Device, would the *Apoſtles* have been ſo ſenſeleſs to have laid the main Proof of their *Religion* on a thing which was but newly acted, and which they were very capable of enquiring into all the Circumſtances that related to it, *viz.* The *Reſurrection of Chriſt from the Dead*. We may ſee by the whole deſign of the *New Teſtament*, the great Streſs of *Chriſtianity* was laid upon the Truth of this; to this *Chriſt* himſelf appealed before-hand; to this all the *Apoſtles* refer as the mighty confirmation of their Religion; and this they deliver as a thing which themſelves had ſeen, and had converſed with him for Forty Days together, with all the demonſtrations imaginable of a *true*

and *real Body*: And that not to one or two credulous Perſons, but ſo many of them who were hard to be ſatisfied, and one, not without the moſt ſenſible Evidence; but beſides theſe, they tell us of 500 *at once who ſaw him, whereof many were then living* when thoſe things were written. Now I pray tell me what *Religion* in the World ever put it ſelf upon ſo fair a Trial as this? Of a plain Matter of Fact as capable of being atteſted as any could be. Why did not *Amida*, or *Brahma*, or *Xaca*, or any other of the Authors of the preſent *Religions* of the *Eaſt-Indies*? Why did not *Orpheus*, or *Numa*, or any other introducers of *Religious* Cuſtoms among the *Greeks* or *Romans*? Or *Mahomet* among the *Arabians* put the iſſue of the Truth of their *Religion* on ſuch a plain and eaſie *tryal* as this? If you ſay, *That Chriſt appeared only to his Friends, who were ready to believe ſuch things, and not among his Enemies*: I anſwer, That though they were his *Friends*, yet they were very hard to be perſuaded of the *Truth* of it at firſt; and afterwards gave larger Teſtimonies of their Fidelity than the Teſtimony of the greateſt *Enemies* would have been; for we ſhould have had only their *bare Words* for it, (if they would have given that, which is very queſtionable, conſidering their dealing with the other *Miracles* of *Chriſt*:) But the *Apoſtles* manifeſted their *ſincerity* by all real Proofs that could be thought ſufficient to ſatisfie Mankind; appealing to the very Perſons who were concerned the moſt in it, having a hand in the Death of *Chriſt*, declaring their greateſt readineſs to ſuffer any thing rather than deny the Truth of it, and laying down their Lives at laſt for it. If all this had been a mere Fiction, how unlikely is it, that among ſo many as were conſcious of it, no one Perſon by Hopes or Fears, by Flatteries or Threatnings, could ever be prevailed upon to deny the Truth of it. If there had been any ſuch thing, what triumphing had there been among the *Jews*; and no doubt his Name had been recorded to Poſterity among the Writers both of *Jews* and *Gentiles* that were profeſſed Enemies of *Chriſtianity*. But they are all wonderfully ſilent in this matter; and inſtead of ſaying enough to overthrow the *Truth of Chriſtianity*, as you ſeem to ſuggeſt, I do aſſure you, I am mightily confirmed in the Belief of the Truth of it, by carefully obſerving the ſlightneſs of the Objections that were made againſt it, by its moſt profeſſed Enemies.

But you ſeem to imply, *That all this Story concerning Chriſt was invented long after the pretended Time of his being in the World*, Why may not you as well ſuſpect, that *Julius Cæſar* lived before *Romulus*; or that *Auguſtus* lived at the Siege of *Troy*? For you might as well reject all Hiſtory upon ſuch grounds as thoſe you aſſign; and think *Mahomet* as right in his *Chronology*, as the *Bible*. It is time for us to burn all our *Books*, if we have lived in ſuch a Cheat all this while. Methinks you might as well aſk, whether *Lucretia* were not *Pope Joan*? Or *Alexander* the *Sixth*, one of the *Roman Emperors*? Or whether *Luther* were not the *Emperor* of *Turkey*? For there is no greater evidence of any Hiſtory in the World, than there is, that all the Things reported in the *New Teſtament* were done at that time, when they are pretended to be.

4. Therefore we offer this Story of the *New Teſtament* to be compared with all the *Circumſtances of that Age*, delivered by any other *Hiſtorians*, to try if any *inconſiſtencies* can be found therein: Which is the moſt reaſonable way can be taken to diſprove any Hiſtory. If it could be proved, that there could be no ſuch *Taxation* of the *Empire* as is men-

tion'd in the Time of *Auguſtus*, that *Herod* did not live in that *Age*, or that the *Jews* were not under the *Roman Government*, or that there were no *High-Prieſts* at that time, nor the *Sects* of *Phariſees* and *Saducees*, or that there were any other remarkable *Characters* of Time ſet down in the *Hiſtory* of the *New Teſtament*, which could be manifeſtly diſproved; there were ſome pretence to call in Queſtion the Truth of the Story; but there is not the leaſt Foundation for any ſcruple on this account; all things agreeing ſo well with the trueſt Accounts we have of that *Age*, both from *Joſephus* and the *Roman Hiſtory*. I ſhall not inſiſt on the particular *Teſtimony* of *Joſephus* concerning *Chriſt*, becauſe we need it not; and if thoſe who queſtion it, would proceed with the ſame ſeverity againſt many other particular Paſſages in good *Authors*, they might as well call them in queſtion as they do that; ſince it is confeſſed, that all the ancient *Manuſcripts* have it in them, and ſuppoſing that it doth not come in well, muſt we ſuppoſe it impoſſible for *Joſephus* to write incoherently? Yet this is the main Argument that ever I have ſeen urged againſt this *Teſtimony* of *Joſephus*. But I ſay, we need it not; all other things concurring in ſo high a degree to prove the *Truth* of the *Hiſtory* of *Chriſt*. Yet ſince you ſeem to expreſs ſo much doubtfulneſs concerning it, *as though it were framed when there was no one living capable of diſproving it*; give me leave to ſhew you the great abſurdity of ſuch a Suppoſition. 1. Becauſe we have the plain Teſtimonies of the greateſt Enemies of *Chriſtianity*, that there was ſuch a Perſon as *Chriſt* was, who ſuffered according to the *Scripture Story*. For *Tacitus* not only mentions the *Chriſtians* as ſuffering at *Rome* for their *Religion* in the Time of *Nero*, (*Annal.* 15.) but ſaith, *That the Author of this Religion was one Chriſt, who ſuffered under* Pontius Pilate, *Procurator of* Judea, *in the Time of* Tiberius; which is an irrefragable Teſtimony of the *Truth* of the Story concerning *Chriſt*, in an *Age*, when if it had been falſe, nothing could have been more eaſily detected than ſuch a Fiction, by the number of *Jews* which were continually at *Rome*: And neither *Julian*, nor *Celſus*, nor *Porphyry*, nor *Lucian* did ever queſtion the *Truth* of the Story it ſelf; but only upbraided the *Chriſtians* for attributing too much to *Chriſt*. 2. If there were really ſuch a Perſon as Chriſt was, who ſuffered as *Tacitus* ſaith, then the whole Story could not be a Fiction, but only ſome part of it; and theſe additional parts muſt either be contrived by the *Apoſtles*, or after their Time: Not after their Time, for then they muſt be added after *Chriſtianity* was received in the World, for that, as appears by *Tacitus*, was ſpread in the *Apoſtles* Times as far as *Rome*; and if theſe parts were not received with it; the Cheat would preſently have been diſcover'd as ſoon as broached, by thoſe who had embraced *Chriſtianity* before: And beſides, *Tertullian* in his Time appeals to the *authentick Writings* of the *Apoſtles* themſelves, which were then extant, wherein the ſame things were contained that we now believe: If theſe things then were forged, it muſt be by the *Apoſtles* themſelves; and I dare now appeal to you, whether ever any Story was better capable of being diſproved than this was, if it had not been true, ſince it was publiſhed in that very Time and Place where the *Perſons* were living, who were moſt concerned to diſprove it: As appears by the hatred of the *Jews* to the *Chriſtians*, both then and ever ſince: which is a very obſervable Circumſtance for proving the *Truth* of *Chriſtian Religion*; for the *Jews* and *Chriſtians* agreed in the *Divine Revelations* of old, the *Chriſtians* believed moreover, that *Chriſt* was the

Meſſias promiſed; this *Chriſt* lived and died among the *Jews* his Enemies; his *Apoſtles* preached, and wrought Miracles among their moſt inveterate Enemies, which Men that go about to deceive never care to do: And to this Day the *Jews* do not deny the *Matters* of *Fact*, but look on them as inſufficient to prove *Jeſus* of *Nazareth* to have been the *Meſſias:* Nay, *Mahomet* himſelf, who in all probability would have overthrown the whole Story of the *New Teſtament*, if he could have done it with any colour, yet ſpeaks very honourably of *Chriſt* and of the great Things which were ſaid and done by him.

5. That there is nothing in the *Chriſtian Religion*, unbecoming the *Majeſty*, or *Holineſs*, or *Truth* of a *Divine Revelation.* As to the Precepts, *you acknowledge their excellency*; and the *Promiſes* chiefly refer either to *Divine Grace*, or *future Glory*; And what is there herein unbecoming *God?* And as to what concerns the *Truth* of it, we have as great Characters of that throughout, as it is poſſible for us to expect; there appearing ſo much Simplicity, Sincerity, Candour, and Agreement in all the parts of it. Some Men would have been better pleaſed, it may be, if it had been all written by one *Perſon*, and digeſted into a more exact Method, and ſet forth with all the Lights and Ornaments of Speech. This would have better become an Invention of Men, but not a *Revelation* of *God:* Plainneſs and Simplicity have a natural greatneſs above Art and Subtilty; and therefore *God* made choice of many to write, and at ſeveral times, that by comparing them we may ſee how far they were from contriving together, and yet how exactly they agree in all things which Men are concerned to believe. But you ſay, *We have many Infirmities of the* Apoſtles *diſcovered therein, their Heats and Animoſities one againſt another.* But I pray conſider; 1. How came you to know theſe things; Is it not by their own Writings? And if they had been ſuch, who minded only their Applauſe, had it not been as eaſie to have concealed theſe things, and would they not as certainly have done it, if that had been their aim? If *St.* Paul *ſeems to boaſt*, doth he not do it with that conſtraint to himſelf, as a Man that is forced to do it for his own vindication againſt malicious Enemies? And who ever denied a Man of a generous Mind the liberty of ſpeaking for himſelf? 2. But ſuppoſe *they had Infirmities and Heats among them*, doth this prove that *God* could not make uſe of them as his Inſtruments to declare his *Truth* to the World? Then it will follow, that *God* muſt never reveal his Will by *Men*, but by *Voices* from *Heaven*, or *Angels*, or the *aſſumption* of the *Humane Nature by the Divine.* But, if *God* be not denied the liberty of imploying meer Men, we cannot find ſo great evidences of Piety and Zeal, of Humility and Self-denial, of Patience and Magnanimity, of Innocency and univerſal Charity in any Men as were in the *Apoſtles*; And therefore did appear with the moſt proper *Characters* of *Embaſſadors* from Heaven. And I dare venture the compariſon of them with the beſt *Philoſophers*, as to the greateſt and moſt excellent *Virtues*, for which they were the moſt admired; notwithſtanding the mighty difference as to their Education; allowing but the ſame Truth as to the Story of the *New Teſtament*, which we yield to *Xenophon*, or *Diogenes Laertius*, or any other Writers concerning them.

But what is it then which you object againſt the Writings of the *New Teſtament*, to make them inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God? I find but two things in the Papers you ſent me. 1. *Want of the continuance of the Power of Miracles, which you ſay is promiſed.* Mark 16. 17.

2. *The number of the Beaſt in the Revelations.* But, Good Sir, conſider what it is to call in queſtion a Divine Revelation for ſuch Objections as theſe are? Muſt there be no Revelation, unleſs you underſtand every Prophecy, or the extent of every Promiſe? Be not ſo injurious to your own Soul, for the ſake of ſuch Objections, to caſt away the great Aſſurance which the *Chriſtian Religion* gives us, as to the pardon of Sin upon Repentance here, and eternal Happineſs in another World. Would you reject all the Writings of *Plato*, becauſe you do no more underſtand ſome part of his *Timæus* than the number of 666? You muſt have a very nice Faith, that can bear with no Difficulties at all, ſo that if there be but one or two hard things that you cannot digeſt, you muſt throw up all the beſt Food you have taken; at this rate you muſt ſtarve your Body, as well as ruin your Soul. But of theſe places afterwards.

3. I have hitherto removed the Grounds of Suſpicion, I now come to ſhew the poſitive Teſtimonies of their *Sincerity* which the *Apoſtles* ſhewed, which were greater than were ever given to any other Matter of Fact in the *World*. I will then ſuppoſe the whole *Truth* of the *Chriſtian Doctrine* to be reduced to this one Matter of Fact, Whether *Chriſt did riſe from the dead or no?* for (as I have ſaid already) it is plain, the *Apoſtles* put the main force of all that they ſaid upon the *Truth* of this; and often declared, that they were appointed to be the *Witneſſes* of this thing. Now let us conſider how it is poſſible for Men to give the higheſt aſſurance of their *Sincerity* to others; and that muſt be either by giving the utmoſt Teſtimony that Men can give; or by giving ſome Teſtimony above that of Men, which cannot deceive, which is the *Teſtimony of God*.

1. They gave the *utmoſt Teſtimony* that meer Men could give of their *Fidelity*. I know no better way we have for a full Aſſurance, as to any humane Teſtimony, than to conſider what thoſe Circumſtances are, which are generally allowed to accompany Truth, and if we have the Concurrence of all theſe, we have as much as can be expected: For nothing that depends on *Teſtimony* can be proved by *Mathematical Demonſtration*. But notwithſtanding the want of this, either we may have ſufficient ground to aſſent to *Truth* upon *Teſtimony*, or there can be no difference known between *Truth* and *Falſhood* by Humane *Teſtimony*; which overthrows all Judicial Proceedings among Men; the *Juſtice* whereof doth ſuppoſe not only the *Veracity* of *Humane Teſtimony*: But that it may be ſo diſcerned by others, that they may ſafely rely upon it. Now the main things to be regarded as to the *Truth* of *Humane Teſtimony*, are theſe: 1. If Men teſtifie nothing but what they ſaw. 2. If they teſtifie it at no long diſtance of time from the thing done. 3. If they teſtifie it plainly, and without doubtful Expreſſions. 4. If a great number agree in the ſame Teſtimony. 5. If they part with all that is valuable to Mankind, rather than deny the Truth of what they have teſtified! And where all theſe concur, it is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe greater evidence to be given of the *Truth* of a *Thing*; and now I ſhall ſhew that all theſe do exactly agree to the *Apoſtle's Teſtimony* concerning the *Reſurrection* of *Chriſt*.

1. They teſtified nothing but what they ſaw themſelves. The *Laws* of *Nations* do ſuppoſe that greater credit is to be given to *Eye-witneſſes* than to any others, thence the Rule in the Civil Law, *Teſtimonium de auditu regulariter non valet:* Becauſe, ſay the *Civilians* and *Canoniſts*, *Witneſſes are to teſtifie the Truth, and not barely the Poſſibility of things.*

That which Men ſee, they can teſtifie whether they are or not: That which Men only hear, may be, or not be; and their *Teſtimony* is not of the *Fact*, but is looked on as more uncertain, and ought to have greater Allowances given it; but the Apoſtles teſtified only *what they ſaw and handled*; and that after the moſt ſcrupulous enquiry into the *Truth* of *Chriſt's Body*, and after many *Doubts* and *Suſpicions* among themſelves about it; ſo that they did not ſeem haſtily and raſhly to believe what they afterwards declared to the World. Now a *Body* was a proper Object of Senſe, and no Tryal could be greater, or more accurate than theirs was; nor any ſatisfaction fuller than putting their *Fingers* into the very *Wounds* of the *pierced Side*.

2. They did not ſtay till the *circumſtances* might have ſlipt out of their Memories, before they teſtified theſe things; but very ſoon after, while the impreſſion of them was freſh upon them: If they had let theſe Matters alone for any long time, the *Jews* would have aſked them preſently, if theſe things were true, why did we not hear of them as ſoon as they were done? Therefore we ſee the Apoſtles, on the very Day of *Pentecoſt*, a little after *Chriſt's Aſcenſion* to Heaven, openly and boldly declare the *Truth* of theſe things, not in private Corners among a few *Friends*, but in the moſt ſolemn Meeting of their Nation from all Parts, which was the worſt time could have been choſen, if they had any intention to deceive.

3. They teſtifie it in as *plain a manner* as is poſſible, on purpoſe to prevent all Miſtakes of their meaning, *This Jeſus hath God raiſed up, whereof we all are witneſſes*; *Therefore let all the Houſe of* Iſrael *know aſſuredly, that God hath made that ſame Jeſus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Chriſt*. Men that had a mind to deceive, would have uſed ſome more general and doubtful Words, than theſe were. *Acts* 2. 32. 36.

4. If this had been teſtified by one ſingle Witneſs, the World would have ſuſpected the Truth of his Teſtimony; for according to the Rule in the *Civil Law*, in the Caſe of *Teſtimony*, *Vox unius, vox nullius eſt*: But this was teſtified by very many, not merely by the Twelve Apoſtles, but by Five hundred at once; among whom ſome might be ſuppoſed to have ſo much Honeſty, or at leaſt capable of being perſuaded to have diſcovered the Impoſture, if they had in the leaſt ſuſpected any.

5. But that which adds the greateſt weight to all this, is, that there was not one of all the Apoſtles, and ſcarce any one of the reſt, but expoſed themſelves to the utmoſt *Hazards* and *Dangers*, rather than deny or retract the *Truth* of what they had witneſſed. If the *People* had been careleſs and indifferent about *Religion*, it is poſſible Men might have gone on in a Lie ſo long, till they had gotten *Intereſt* enough to maintain it; but no ſooner did the Apoſtles appear, witneſſing theſe things, but they met with an early and vigorous oppoſition, and that from the chiefeſt Men in *Power*, who made it their buſineſs to ſuppreſs them. Now in this Caſe they were put to this Choice, if they would renounce or conceal the *Truth* of what they teſtified, they might preſently enjoy Eaſe, and it may be Rewards too; but if they went on, they muſt look for nothing but the ſharpeſt Perſecution; and this they met with almoſt in all Places; and is it conceivable, that Men ſhould be ſo *fond* of a *Lie*, to forſake all and follow it, and at laſt to take up their Croſs for it? If *Credit* and *Intereſt* in the Hearts of People, might carry a Man on a great way in the Deluſion, yet he would be loth to die for it; and yet there was never a one of the Apoſtles, but ventured his

Life for the *Truth* of this; and all but one, they tell us, did ſuffer Martyrdom for it. I pray, Sir, conſider, where you ever meet with any thing like this, that ſo many Men ſhould ſo reſolutely die, for what themſelves, at the ſame time, knew to be a Lie; and that they muſt certainly do, if it were all a Contrivance of their own Heads.

2. But although in theſe things they went as high as it was poſſible for *humane Teſtimony* to go, yet they had ſomething beyond all this, which was a *concurrence* of a *Divine Teſtimony*, in the *miraculous Gifts* and *Operations* of the *Holy Ghoſt*. And this we aſſert to be the higheſt Teſtimony can be given in the World, of the *Truth* of any thing, becauſe *God* will not employ his *Power* to deceive the World. And as all other *Truth* hath a *Criterion* proper to it; ſo this ſeems to be the proper *Criterion* of a *Divine Teſtimony*, that it hath the *power of Miracles* going along with it. For if we do ſuppoſe God to make known his Mind to the World, it is very reaſonable to believe there ſhould be ſome *diſtinguiſhing note* of what is immediately from God, and what comes only from the *Inventions* of *Men*; and what can be more proper to diſtinguiſh what comes from *God*, and what from *Men*, than to ſee thoſe things done, which none but *God* can do? But againſt this you object ſeveral things, which I ſhall eaſily and briefly anſwer.

1. *You cannot tell what it is that Miracles do atteſt*; *not all their Doctrine, ſince* Paul *ſaid, ſome was not from the Lord.* Anſw. *Miracles* do atteſt the *Veracity* of the *Speaker*, and by conſequence, the *Truth* of the *Doctrine*; *not that you ſhould believe that to be from the Lord, which he ſaid was not*; but that which he ſaid, was from the Lord. But when he makes ſuch a diſtinction himſelf, it is very unreaſonable to urge that as an Argument, that he had *nothing from the Lord*; it is much rather an Argument of his Candor and Ingenuity, that he would not pretend to *Divine Revelation*, when he had it not.

2. *You would have it ſignified, what Doctrine it is which is atteſted by Miracles, ſince the Doctrines of Scripture lie in heaps and confuſion. Anſw.* To what purpoſe ſhould any Doctrines be ſingled out to have the *Seal* of *Miracles* ſet to them, ſince it is their *Divine Commiſſion* to teach and declare the *Will* of *God*, which is *ſealed* by it? And what they did ſo teach and declare, is eaſily known by their Writings.

3. *But why do not Miracles ſtill continue? Anſw.* Becauſe there are no Perſons employ'd to teach any *new Doctrines*, and no Promiſe of *Scripture* doth imply any more: For the *Signs* which were to follow them that believe, were ſuch as tended to the firſt confirmation of the *Chriſtian Faith*; which being effected, their uſe ceaſed; and ſo to aſk why God doth not continue a Gift of *Miracles* to convince Men that the former were true, is to the ſame purpoſe as to aſk why *God* doth not make a *New Sun*, to ſatisfie *Atheiſts* that he made the *Old*?

4. *But doth not the Scriptures ſay, that Wonders are not always to be taken as Confirmations of the Truth of Doctrine, ſince falſe Prophets may work Wonders*, Deut. 13. 1. *Anſw.* That ſignifies no more, than that *Wonders* are not to be believed againſt the Principles of *Natural Religion*; or *Revealed Religion* already confirmed by *greater Miracles:* And that thoſe who would value ſuch a particular *Sign* above all the *Series* of *Miracles* their *Religion* was firſt eſtabliſhed by, may be juſtly left to their own *Deluſions*. You might as well object the lying Wonders of the *Man of Sin*, againſt all the *Miracles* of *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles*. If God hath once done enough to convince Men, he may afterwards juſtly

leave them to the tryal of their Ingenuity; as a Father that hath uſed great care to make his Son underſtand *true Coyn*, may afterwards ſuffer *falſe* to be laid before him, to try whether he will mind his being cheated or no?

5. But you may yet farther demand, *What the Teſtimony of Miracles doth ſignifie to the Writings of the New Teſtament? Anſw.* 1. The Miracles do ſufficiently prove the *Authority* of that Doctrine, which was delivered by thoſe who wrought *Miracles*, as *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles*. 2. If there had been the leaſt ground to queſtion the *Truth* and *Authority* of theſe *Writings*, they had never been ſo univerſally received in thoſe *Ages*, when ſo many were concerned to enquire into the *Truth* of theſe things; for we ſee ſeveral of the *Books* were a long time examined, and at laſt, when no ſufficient reaſon could be brought againſt them, they were received by thoſe *Churches*, which at firſt ſcrupled the receiving them: And I am ſo far from thinking the *Doubts* of the firſt *Ages* any Argument againſt the *Authority* of a *Book*, that by the Objections of ſome againſt ſome of them, I am thereby aſſured, that they did not preſently receive any *Book*, becauſe it went under the Name of an *Apoſtolical Writing*: As I am the more confirmed in the belief of the *Reſurrection* of *Chriſt*, becauſe ſome of the *Diſciples* were at firſt very *doubtful* about it.

6. You may yet aſk, *What doth all this ſignifie to the Writings of the Old Teſtament, which were written at a longer diſtance of Time from us, and in a more ignorant Age of the World? Anſw.* There cannot be a *more* evident Proof of the *Old Teſtament*, than by the *New*: For if the *New* be *true*, the *Old* muſt be ſo, which was confirmed ſo plainly and evidently by it; our *Saviour*, and his *Apoſtles* appealing to *Moſes* and the *Prophets* on all occaſions. So that the ſame *Miracles* which prove their *Teſtimony* true, do at the ſame time prove the *Divine Authority* of the *Old Teſtament*, ſince it is ſo expreſly ſaid in the *New*, *That Holy Men of God did ſpeak as they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt.*

But after all this, you urge, That you have diſcover'd ſuch things in theſe Writings, as could not come from God, as

1. *Contradictions in them.* 2. *Some things inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom of God.* 3. *Promiſes made that were never fulfilled.* 4. *Things ſo obſcure as no one can tell the meaning of them.* Under theſe Four Heads I ſhall examine the particular Allegations you bring againſt the *Scriptures*.

1. Under the Head of *Contradictions*, you inſiſt on the *Prophecy*, Gen. 15. 13, 14, 15, 16. *made to* Abraham, *concerning his Poſterity; compared with the Accompliſhment mentioned*, Exod. 12. 40, 41. And the force of your Argument lies in this, *That the Prophecy in* Geneſis *doth imply that the Servitude of the Children of* Iſrael *in* Egypt *was to be* 40 *Years; or* 430 *ſaith* Exod. *but both theſe are repugnant to other places of Scripture, which make their abode in* Egypt *not to exceed* 215 *Years; or at the higheſt, by the number of Generations could not exceed* 350 *Years, ſtretching them to the utmoſt advantage.* To this which you lay ſo much weight upon, I anſwer diſtinctly,

1. By your own Confeſſion, ſuppoſing the 430 Years to begin from the *Covenant* made with *Abraham*, the accompliſhment mentioned, *Exod.* 12. 40. doth fall out exactly in the time of the *Children* of *Iſraels* going out of *Egypt*, for you have proved from *Scripture*, that from the *Covenant* with *Abraham* to *Jacob*'s being in *Egypt*, were 215 Years; to which you add, *that* Coath *being ſuppoſed* 5 *Years old at the going into*

Egypt; *and that at* 70 *Years he begat* Amram, *and that* Amram *at* 70 *begat* Moſes, *to which* Moſes *his* 80 *Years being added, makes up the other* 215 *Years, whereby we have the full* 430 *Years, by your own Computation.* Now, Sir, I pray conſider what reaſon you have to charge the *Scripture* with Contradiction in a matter your ſelf acknowledges, ſo exactly accompliſhed in this way of *Computation?*

2. But you ſay, *the Words will not bear this; becauſe they ſpeak of the* 400 *Years to expire in their ſervitude in* Egypt. *Anſw.* For this we muſt conſider the importance of the Words both in *Geneſis* and *Exodus*. There is not a Word of *Egypt* mentioned in *Geneſis*, but only in general it is ſaid, *Thy Seed ſhall be a Stranger in the Land that is not theirs, and ſhall ſerve them, and they ſhall afflict them* 400 *Years*; and it will conduce very much to the right underſtanding this *Prophecy*, to conſider the main ſcope and deſign of it, which was not to tell *Abraham* how long they ſhould be in *ſervitude* to the *Egyptians*, but how long it would be before his Seed would come to the *poſſeſſion* of the promiſed *Land:* And it ſeems *Abraham*, by the *Queſtion*, Gen. 15. 7, 8. did expect to have the *Inheritance* of this Land *in his own time:* To this therefore *God* anſwers, by telling him, he meant no ſuch thing, but it was intended for *his Seed*, and that not ſuddenly neither, for they were to tarry *till the iniquity of the* Amorites *ſhould be full*, which would not be till the *fourth Generation*; and then *his Seed ſhould after* 400 *Years, come to the Poſſeſſion of the promiſed Land; but in the mean time they were to ſojourn in a Land that was not theirs, and to meet with many hardſhips and difficulties.* This is plainly the ſcope of this *Prophecy*, and by attending to it, the great Objections preſently appear without force; for the *Land* of *Canaan*, notwithſtanding the Promiſe, was by the *Patriarchs* themſelves looked on as a *Land* wherein they were *Strangers*. So *Abraham* ſaith, *Gen.* 23. 4, *I am a Stranger and a Sojourner with you*; and which is more remarkable in the Bleſſing of *Jacob* by *Iſaac*, to whom the *Promiſe* was made, it is ſaid, *And give thee the Bleſſing of* Abraham *to thee, and to thy Seed, that thou mayeſt inherit the Land wherein thou art a Stranger, which God gave unto* Abraham, *Gen.* 28. 4. Where the very ſame Word is uſed concerning *Jacob*, that is expreſſed in the Prophecy, *Gen.* 15. 13. So that the *Patriarchs* looked on themſelves as *Strangers in the Land of* Canaan, ſo long after the *Promiſe* made, and after the *increaſe* of the *Seed* of *Abraham:* And therefore the *Land* of *Canaan* was called *Terra Peregrinationum*, the *Land* wherein they were *Strangers*; Gen. 36. 7.— 37. 1. And when *God* was calling the People of *Iſrael* together out of *Egypt*, yet then the *Land* of *Canaan* was called by the very ſame Title, the *Land of their Pilgrimage, wherein they were Strangers: Exod.* 6. 4. And *Pſ.* 105. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. where we have a full account of the *Promiſe* made to *Abraham*, *Iſaac* and *Jacob*, concerning the *Inheritance* of that *Land*, it is ſaid, *that they were few, and Strangers in it, when they went from one Nation to another, from one Kingdom to another People.* Which doth fully explain the meaning of the *Prophecy* in *Geneſis*, and that it is not to be reſtrained to the *Servitude* of the *People* of *Iſrael* in *Egypt*, but to be underſtood of their *State* of *Pilgrimage* for 400 Years, wherein they were to ſuffer great Hardſhips, before they ſhould come to the Inheritance of *Canaan*. *This is no forced or unnatural Expoſition of the Words*, as you ſeem to ſuggeſt; but to my Apprehenſion, very plain and eaſie, if we attend to the main ſcope and deſign of them, which was to acquaint *Abraham* how long it would be before

the *Prophecy* were accompliſhed, and what the Condition of his Seed ſhould be the mean time, *viz. That they ſhould have no Land which they ſhould call their own by Inheritance all that time, but they ſhould be expoſed to great Hardſhips, yea even to Servitude; but that Nation whom they ſhould ſerve, ſhould at laſt ſuffer for their ill uſage of them, and they ſhould come out of that Captivity with great Subſtance; and all this to be done in the Fourth Generation of the* Amorites, *when their Iniquities ſhould be arrived at the full height.* All which Particulars were ſo remarkably accompliſhed at ſuch a diſtance of Time, and under ſuch improbable Circumſtances, that this very *Prophecy* were enough to convince an unprejudiced Mind, that it came from Divine Inſpiration. For where do we meet with any thing like this in the Hiſtories of other Nations? *viz.* A Prophecy to be accompliſhed 400 Years after, and the very manner foretold, which no humane Conjecture could reach to, ſince the manner of Deliverance of the *People* of *Iſrael* out of their Captivity in *Egypt*, was to all humane appearance ſo impoſſible a thing, eſpecially at ſuch a time when the *Spirits* of the People were ſunk and broken by ſo long a Slavery: And not only the manner foretold, but the accompliſhment happened to a Day, according to *Exodus* 12. 41. *And it came to paſs at the end of the* 430 *Years, even the ſelf-ſame Day it came to paſs, that all the Hoſts of the Lord went out from the Land of* Egypt. But againſt this you object, *That the ſojourning is ſpoken of the Children of* Iſrael *in* Egypt *for* 430 *Years; which cannot hold good any ways; ſince, to make it up, the Times of* Abraham, Iſaac, *and* Jacob, *muſt be taken in, who could not be called the Children of* Iſrael. *Anſw.* For the 430 Years, I grant, that according to St. *Paul*, they did commence from the *Covenant* made to *Abraham*, Gal. 3. 17. and that the 400 Years began from *Iſaac*'s being owned for the *Promiſed Seed*; between which time the 30 Years were paſſed; and all appearance of difficulty is avoided, if we admit the reading of the beſt Copies of the *L X X*, which is in theſe Words, Ἡ δὲ παροίκησις τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, ἣν παρῴκησαν ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ, καὶ ἐν γῇ Χαναὰν, αὐτοὶ ϗ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἔτη τετρακόσια τριάκοντα, *Now the ſojourning of the Children of* Iſrael, *who dwelt in* Egypt *and* Canaan, *they and their Fathers was* 430 *Years.* This is the reading of our *Alexandrian* Copy, and the *Complutenſian*, and that of *Aldus*, and of *Euſebius* in his *Chronicon*, and of St. *Hierome* in his Tranſlation of it; and of the *Church* in St. *Auguſtine*'s time, and afterwards; and leſt any ſhould reject this as a late Interpolation, or Gloſs received into the Text, beſides theſe Teſtimonies of the Antiquity of it, we find the very ſame in the *Samaritan* Copy, which the Enemies of it do allow to be as ancient as our *Saviour*'s time. And that which very much confirms the Truth of this reading is, that the *Jews* themſelves follow the Senſe of it, who are the moſt eager Contenders for the *Authority* of the *Hebrew* Copy; who all agree, that the beginning of the Computation of the 430 Years is to be taken before the *Children* of *Iſraels* going into *Egypt*; and *Menaſſeh Ben Iſrael* contends with many others, that the 430 Years did begin from the *Promiſe* made to *Abraham*, and the 400 from the time of *Iſaac*, to which their moſt ancient *Books* of *Chronology* do agree, and to the ſame purpoſe ſpeak both *Philo Judæus*, and *Joſephus*; who although in one place he ſeems to make *the* Iſraelites *affliction in* Egypt *to have been* 400 *Years*, yet when he ſpeaks more particularly of it, *he makes the time of their abode in* Egypt *to have been only* 215, *and the* 430 *to begin from* Abraham's *entrance into* Canaan: The

Targum of *Jonathan* begins the 430 from the Viſion of *Abraham*, and the 400 from the Birth of *Iſaac*; all which I mention, to let you ſee that the *Jews* themſelves do in Senſe concur with the *Samaritan* and *Greek* Copy; and therefore we have more reaſon to ſuſpect ſomething left out in the preſent *Hebrew*, than any thing added in thoſe Copies. *But doth not this take off from the Authority of the Scripture?* Not at all: For the only Queſtion is about the true Reading: And having the Conſent of the *Samaritan*, *Alexandrian*, and other Copies of the *LXX*, and of the ancient *Church*, and of the *Jews* themſelves, as to the Senſe of it, we have reaſon to look on this as the truer Reading; which is making no addition to the *Scripture*, either as to Perſons or Places, but only producing the more authentick Copy; much leſs is this Adding or Changing as we pleaſe, for if we did this without ſo much Authority as we have for it, you might as eaſily reject it as we produce it.

3. After all this, I do not ſee the mighty force of your Reaſon to charge the Scripture with Contradiction, ſuppoſing *the* 400 *Years were to be ſpent in the Servitude of the Children of* Iſrael *in* Egypt. I confeſs, when I found the *Scripture* ſo boldly, ſo frequently charged with no leſs than Contradiction, I expected ſomething like Demonſtration in the Caſe, eſpecially in this place which you choſe to put in the Front of all; but I do not find any thing like ſuch a proof of a Contradiction, ſuppoſing we ſhould allow the 400 Years to be ſpent in *Egypt*. Yes, ſay you, Coath *was* 5 *Years old when he came down into* Egypt, *and when he had lived there* 65 *Years, he begat* Amram, *and* Amram *being* 70 *Years old, begat* Moſes, *to which* Moſes *his* 80 *Years being added, we have only* 215 *Years*. But ſince the *Scripture* doth not aſſign, the particular Age of any of theſe, when they begat their Children, I ſee, no impoſſibility or repugnancy in the Suppoſition, that 400 Years ſhould paſs from *Levi*'s going into *Egypt*, to the Eightieth of *Moſes*, any more than from *Salmon*'s entrance into *Canaan* to the *time* of *David*, for no more are reckoned in *Scripture* than *Boaz* the Son of *Salmon*, by *Raab*, and *Obed*, and *Jeſſe*: So that by the ſame way, this latter may be explained, the former may be ſo too. If it be ſaid, *That either they begat their Children at a great Age, or that the Scripture in Genealogies doth not ſet down all the intermediate Parents, but only the moſt eminent*, (*as* Caleb *is called the Son of* Eſron, 1 Chron. 2. 9, 18. *although there was at leaſt one between them*) the very ſame Anſwer will ſerve to clear this part of the *Chronology* of *Scripture* from any appearance of Contradiction. Theſe things you might have found more largely deduced and fully handled by thoſe Learned Perſons, who have undertaken to clear the *Chronology* of *Scripture*; who were Men of more Judgment, than from any difficulty of this nature, to call in queſtion the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *ſacred Scriptures*! and although the Opinions of *Chronologers*, are like the City Clocks, which ſeldom agree, yet ſome come nearer the time of the Day than others do; and therefore you ought to examine and compare them before you pronounce ſo peremptorily about Contradictions in *Scripture*, which you have no reaſon to do, till you find that no one *Hypotheſis* among them will ſerve to free the *Scripture* from Contradiction: For otherwiſe, you do but blame the *Sun*, becauſe you cannot make the Clocks agree.

This is all I can find in your Papers under the *Head* of Contradictions; and I leave you now ſoberly to conſider, whether this place did afford you ſufficient ground for ſo heavy a Charge; but if you ſay, *you have a great many more by you, but you ſent me this only for a Trial of my Skill*; before you ſend any more, I beſeech you, Sir, to conſider,

1. How eaſily things do appear to be Contradictions to weak, or unſtudied, or prejudiced Minds, which after due conſideration appear to be no ſuch things. A deep prejudice finds a Contradiction in every thing; whereas in *Truth*, nothing but ill-will, and impatience of conſidering, made any thing, it may be, which they Quarrel at, appear to be ſo. If I had been of ſuch a quarrelſome Humour, I would have undertaken to have found out more Contradictions in your Papers, than you imagine, and yet you might have been confident you had been guilty of none at all. When I conſider the great Pains, and Learning, and Judgment, which hath been ſhewn by the *Chriſtian Writers* in the Explication of the *Scriptures*; and the raw, indigeſted Objections which ſome love to make againſt them, if I were to judge of things barely by the fitneſs of Perſons to judge of them, the diſproportion between theſe would appear out of all compariſon. A modeſt Man would in any thing of this nature ſay with himſelf, methinks, if there were ſuch Contradictions in the *Bible*, as now ſeem to me; ſo many Perſons of incomparable Abilities in the Firſt, and latter Ages of the *Chriſtian* Church, who have made it their buſineſs to enquire into theſe things, would have diſcerned them before me: And yet they retained a mighty veneration for the *Scriptures*, as coming from God himſelf; and therefore it may be only weakneſs of Judgment, want of Learning, or ſome ſecret Prejudice may make me ſuſpect theſe things; or elſe I muſt ſuſpect the honeſty of all thoſe Perſons who have pretended ſuch a Devotion to the Scriptures, and yet have believed them full of Contradictions.

2. *Wherein* the Contradiction appears. Is it in the main and weighty parts of the *Religion* revealed herein; or is it only in ſome ſmaller Circumſtances as to Time and Place? The great thing you are to look after, are the Matters thoſe *Scriptures* tell you your Salvation depends upon; and if there be a full Conſent and Agreement therein, you find enough for you to believe and practiſe. And if ſome Contradictions ſhould ſtill appear to you in ſmaller Matters, what follows from thence, but only that the ſame care was not taken about little, as about great things? And you ought to ſet that appearance of Contradiction in ſmall Matters, together with the real conſent in the Things of the higheſt Importance; and from thence rather to infer, that this was no Combination or deſign to deceive others; for ſuch Perſons take the greateſt care to prevent ſuſpicion, by their exactneſs in every minute Circumſtance; and ſometimes the over-much care to prevent ſuſpicion doth raiſe it the more.

3. *What ways* have been uſed by Men of Judgment and Learning, to clear thoſe places from the charge of Contradiction. For, not one of the Objections you can ſtart now, but hath been conſidered over and over; and all the difficulties that belong to it examined; If you will not take the Pains to do this, it is plain you do not deſire ſatisfaction, but only ſeek for a Pretence to cavil; eſpecially, if you only ſearch the weakeſt or moſt injudicious Writers on the Scriptures, and endeavour to expoſe their Opinions, without taking notice of what others have ſaid with more clear and evident Reaſon. This ſhews either want of Judgment in chooſing ſuch Expoſitors, or want of Candor and fair dealing and a deſire of taking any advantage againſt the Scriptures.

4. How hard a matter it is for us at this diſtance to underſtand exactly the grounds of *Chronology*, or the manner of computation of Times uſed ſo long ago: and therefore in all difficulties of this nature, we ought to make the faireſt allowances that may be, conſidering withal, that Eſcapes and Errors are no where more eaſily committed by Tranſcribers, than in *numbers:* and that it is a very unreaſonable thing, that a *Book* otherwiſe deſerving to be thought the beſt *Book* in the World, ſhould be ſcorned and rejected, becauſe there appears ſome difference in the *computation* of *Times*. We do not ſo exactly know the manner of the *Hebrew Chronology*, nor, the nature of their Year, or Intercalations, nor the Cuſtoms of their *Genealogies*, nor the allowance to be made for *Interregnums*, ſo as to be able to define peremptorily in theſe things; but it is ſufficient to ſhew, that there is no improbability in the Accounts that are given; and no ſufficient reaſon can be drawn from thence to reject the Authority of the *Scriptures*.

2. I come to conſider the places you object, *as containing things inconſiſtent with the Wiſdom or Goodneſs of God, according to a rational perſwaſion*; and thoſe are either, 1. *From the Laws of* Moſes. 2. *From the expreſs Story of the Bible, or Actions of the Prophets.*

1. *From the Laws of* Moſes: Your *firſt Objection* is from *Exod.* 21. 7. *Where a Man is ſuppoſed to ſell his Daughter; which you ſay, it is incredible to believe that God ſhould permit; becauſe it implies unnatural Affection and Covetouſneſs in the Father.* But, Sir, 1. You do not conſider, that this is barely a *proviſional Law*, and is not the *permiſſion* of the thing, ſo much as the *regulation* of it, ſuppoſing it to be done, *i. e.* in caſe a Man ſhould part with his intereſt in his Daughter to another Perſon, upon an extraordinary caſe of Neceſſity, as the *Jews* underſtand it; yet then, ſhe was not to be in the Condition of a Servant, but to be either Betrothed to the Perſon who receiv'd her, or to his Son; which was intended for the reſtraint of promiſcuous Buying and Selling Daughters, merely for the ſatisfaction of Luſt. The *Jews* who certainly beſt underſtood their own Judicial *Laws*, do ſay, that this was never to be done but where there was a preſumption of ſuch a *betrothing*; for no Man could ſell his Daughter to thoſe to whom it was unlawful to *marry* by their *Law*; ſo that this was looked on as a kind of *Eſpouſals* of a young Girl, taken into Wardſhip by another; but ſo, that if ſhe were not Betrothed, ſhe was to remain her Six Years during her Minority, as the *Jews* underſtand it; unleſs ſhe were redeemed, or ſet Free, or the *Jubilee* came, or the Maſter died, or the time of her Minority expired.

2. The caſe of *Neceſſity* being ſuppoſed, it hath been thought lawful for *Parents* to make Advantage by their *Children*, not only by the *Jews*, but by other Nations, who have been in the greateſt Eſteem for Wiſdom. For by the *Law* of the 12 *Tables*, among the *Romans*, the *Father* had the liberty of Selling his Son three times for his own Advantage, as *Dionyſ. Halicarnaſſeus* relates; and before that time, it was not only in Uſe among the *Romans*, but in ſuch Eſteem among them, that upon the review of their Laws the *Decemviri* durſt not leave it out; but by one of the *Laws* of *Numa Pompilius*, it was reſtrained to times before Marriage, for in caſe the *Son* had the *Fathers* conſent to Marry, he could not ſell him afterwards, as the ſame *Author* tells us. This *Law* continued in force among them till *Chriſtianity* prevailed in the *Roman Empire*, for although there were a prohibition of *Diocletian* againſt it, yet

that ſignified nothing, till *Conſtantine* took care, *That ſuch indigent Parents ſhould be relieved out of the publick Charge*, Cod. Theodoſ. l. 11. tit. 27. 2. And yet after this, the Cuſtom did continue, when the *Parents* were in great Want, as appears by a *Law* of *Theodoſius*, Cod. 3. tit. 3. *Omnes quos Parentum miſeranda fortuna in ſervitium dum victum requirunt addixit, ingenuitati priſtinæ reformentur.* And it farther appears, that even in *Conſtantin*'s time, notwithſtanding the Law made by him, *Parents* would ſtill, when they thought themſelves overcharged with Children, part with their Intereſt in them to others for advantage, but it was chiefly while they were *ſanguinolenti*, as the Law expreſſes it, *i. e. new Born. Cod. Theod. l. 5. tit. 8.* By the Laws of *Athens*, before *Solon*'s time, Parents might ſell their Children, as appears by *Plutarch*, in his Life; and the ſame *Philoſtratus* reports of the *Phrygians*, *l. 3. vit. Apollon. Tyan.* and the like Cuſtom doth obtain among the *Chineſes* to this Day, if Perſons do think themſelves unable to bring up their *Children* themſelves. And there are two things to be ſaid for it. 1. The natural Obligation lying on Children to provide for their Parents in Neceſſity, by any way they are able. 2. The probability of better Education under more able Perſons; and therefore the *Thebans* had a Law, *That* Parents *in caſe of Poverty, were to bring their* Children *to the Magiſtrate, as ſoon as they were Born, who put them out to ſuch as were judged fit to bring them up, and to have their Service for their Reward.*

Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. 2. c. 7.

But however, you ſay, *This place implies a toleration of having many Wives, becauſe it is ſaid, if he take him another Wife*, ver. 10. I do not deny that the *Moſaical* Law did ſuppoſe the practice of *Polygamy*; but as it doth no where expreſly allow it, neither doth it expreſly condemn it. And although we ſay, the *Chriſtian Law* is far more excellent, which reduceth Marriage to its firſt Inſtitution; yet you will find it a hard Matter to prove ſuch a permiſſion of *Polygamy* as this was, to be ſo repugnant to the *Law* and Principles of *Nature*, as from thence to infer, that this *Law* of *Moſes* could not be from *God:* You might have ſaid the ſame about the Matter of *Divorce*, which was permitted them; *Chriſt* ſaith, *for the hardneſs of their Hearts:* Which ſhews, that *God* doth not always require that from Men which is beſt pleaſing to himſelf; and that as to his *Political Government*, he may not always puniſh that which is not ſo pleaſing to him.

The next Law you quarrel at is that *Deut.* 22. 13, &c. *about the trial of Virginty:* Which you object againſt, *as immodeſt, and uncertain, and therefore unbecoming the Wiſdom of God.* So, many Cuſtoms of thoſe elder Times of the World, and of the *Eaſtern* Parts to this Day ſeem very ſtrange to us, that are not ſo well acquainted with the *Reaſons* of them. Methinks, it better becomes our *Modeſty* in ſuch caſes, to queſtion our underſtanding thoſe Cuſtoms, than preſently to caſt ſo much diſparagement on the Author of them. If you had been offended at the literal Senſe of thoſe Words, many of the *Jews* themſelves ſay, they are to be underſtood Figuratively of the Evidence that was to be brought and laid open before the *Judges*, on behalf of the defamed Perſon. And both *Joſephus* and *Philo* omit the laying open the Cloth. But ſuppoſing it to be taken in the plaineſt literal Senſe, I have two Things to ſay in vindication of this Law. 1. That however uncertain ſome *Phyſicians* have thought that way of Tryal to have been in theſe parts of the

World; yet it is generally agreed to have held for the *Eaſtern* parts, by the moſt ſkilful *Phyſicians* among the *Arabians:* And a Cuſtom of the ſame nature is ſaid by good Authors to have been obſerved among the *Egyptians*, and other *Africans*, as well as the *Arabians*; ſo that this could not be thought ſo ſtrange or immodeſt among the Inhabitants of thoſe Parts: And it is very probable that ſome particulars, as to the Practice of theſe *Laws* are not ſet down, which might very much tend to the certainty of them, as the Age of the married Perſons, which was moſt likely then, as it is to this Day in the *Eaſtern* parts, very early, the *Jews* ſay, at 12 Years old, which would make the Tryal more certain.
2. As to the Modeſty of it, you are to conſider, that the *Law* was intended to keep Perſons from unjuſt *defamations*, and ſuch a way of *Tryal* was therefore pitch'd upon to deter Perſons from ſuch defamations; which Men might otherwiſe have been more ready to, becauſe of the *liberty* of *Divorce*, and the Advantage they had in ſaving the *Dower*, if they could prove the Party vitiated before Marriage; therefore all the proof of that Nature was to be paſſed ſoon after the conſummation of Marriage, which being agreed then by all the Friends, there was to be no liberty left for Defamation afterwards; but in caſe any Man ſhould be guilty of it, the producing thoſe Evidences, which before they were agreed upon, ſhould be ſufficient to clear the Innocency of the Party accuſed. And therefore I look on this *Law*, as the *Jews* do on that of the *rebellious Son*, of which they ſay, that there is no inſtance of the practice of it; the Penalty threatned being ſo effectual to prevent the occaſion of it.

And ſuch in a great meaſure, I ſuppoſe the other *Law* mentioned by you to have been, *viz. Of the Water of Jealouſy*, which you make ſo ſtrange a matter of; and think it *ſavours too much of a deſign to gratify the jealous Humour of the Jewiſh Nation:* But you might have put a fairer conſtruction upon it, *viz.* That it was intended to prevent any occaſion of ſuſpicion being given to the Huſband, by too much familiarity with other Perſons; ſince the Law allowed ſo ſevere a Trial, in caſe the Wife after admonition did not forbear ſuch ſuſpected familiarity, but if you had looked on the Law, as it is, *Num.* 5. 12, 13, *&c.* you would have found, that the deſign of it was to keep Women from committing *ſecret Adultery*, by ſo ſevere a Penalty; yet withal allowing ſo much to a reaſonable Suſpicion, (for ſo the *Jews* underſtand it, with many Cautions and Limitations) that rather than married Perſons ſhould live under perpetual Jealouſies, he appointed this extraordinary way of Tryal, whereby Adultery was moſt ſeverely puniſhed, and the honour of Innocency publickly vindicated; which certainly are not ends at all unbecoming due Conceptions of God.

The laſt of the *Jewiſh Laws*, which you quarrel with is *the prohibition of Uſury, in ſeveral places of* Moſes *his Law and the Pſalms:* And from hence you fall into a long Diſcourſe *to prove the lawfulneſs of Uſury:* But to what purpoſe I beſeech you? For you were to prove, that *God* could never forbid it; you might have ſpared *your pity for Men*, as you think, *blinded with Superſtition, and cheated with New and Aëry Notions:* For by all that I can ſee by theſe Papers, ſome pretended Enemies to *Superſtition* have no better Eyes than their Neighbours, and are as eaſily cheated with groundleſs Fancies and Aëry Imaginations. The only thing to the buſineſs in that long Diſcourſe is this, *That you* *cannot imagine that God ſhould make a Law ſo much to Mans inconvenience, and forbid him ſo nice and indifferent a thing, as moderate increaſe of Profit by letting out of Money, when it is allowed upon Lands, Houſes, and Trade,* &c. To this I anſwer, That the Prohibition of *Uſury* to the *Jewiſh Nation*, was upon *political Grounds* peculiar to the Conſtitution of that *People*; as appears by the Words of the Law, *Deut.* 23. 19, 20. *Thou ſhalt not lend to Uſury unto thy Brother— Unto a Stranger thou mayeſt lend upon Uſury*; but none of the *Laws* which are founded upon common and moral Reaſons have ſuch Limitations as this; for God would never have ſaid, *Thou ſhalt not commit Adultery with thy Brother's Wife*; but *with the Wife of a Stranger thou mayeſt.* But there was this particular Reaſon for the prohibition of *Uſury* to the *Jewiſh Nation:* It pleaſed God to fix their Habitation, not upon the Sea-ſide, as *Tyre* and *Sidon* ſtood, but within Land where they had no conveniencies of Trading, but the Riches of the *Nation* lay in *Agriculture* and *Paſturage:* In which the Returns of Money are neither ſo quick nor ſo advantageous to make ſufficient compenſation for the Intereſt of the Money in the Time they have it: For the main thing valuable in Money is the advantage the Borrower makes of it; and where that is great, it ſeems reaſonable that the Perſon whoſe the Money is, ſhould have a proportionable ſhare of the Advantage made by it; but where Perſons borrow only for preſent Occaſions to ſupply their Neceſſities, there it is only an Act of Kindneſs to lend, and it would be unreaſonable to preſs upon, or take Advantage by anothers Neceſſities. And this ſeems to have been the caſe among the *Jews*; they were only the Poor that wanted Money for preſent Neceſſities; the Rich had no way to imploy it in Trading, unleſs that they lent to the *Tyrian Merchants*, which it was lawful by their Law to do; now if they took *Uſury* of their own People, it muſt be of thoſe whoſe urgent Neceſſity, and not hopes of a mighty Increaſe by it made them borrow, and therefore it was a very juſt and reaſonable *Law* to forbid *Uſury* among them: which I believe he would never have done, if he had placed the *Jews* upon the Coaſts of *Phœnicia*, where Trading was ſo much in requeſt.

Theſe are all the *Laws* which you have picked out of the *whole* Body of the *Jewiſh Law*, to repreſent it unbecoming the *Wiſdom* of *God:* And now I pray, Sir, look back again upon them, ſee how few, how ſmall, how weak your Objections are; and compare them with the *Weight*, and *Juſtice*, and *Prudence*, and *Piety*, expreſſed in all the reſt, and I hope you will find cauſe to be aſhamed of ſpeaking ſo harſhly of thoſe *Laws*, ſo well accommodated to thoſe Ages of the World, and the Condition of that *People* for whom they were appointed.

2. I now conſider what you object againſt the *Story* of the *Bible*.

1. *That Paſſage of* Moſes, *Exod.* 32. 32. *Blot me out of thy Book which thou haſt written:* Where your deſign is to ſhew, *that* Moſes *prayed to be damned, and that this was a very irrational thing*; *and ſavouring more of Paſſion than of the Spirit of God.* But what if *Moſes* meant no ſuch thing as Damnation? As there is not any word in the Context relating that ways, but all the deſign of that Chapter is about a Temporal Puniſhment, which was a preſent Deſtruction of the People for their Sins. And the Book out of which he prayed *God to blot him*, ſeems to me to be no other than the Roll of *Gods choſen People, who were to poſſeſs the Land of* Canaan: For ſo ספר properly ſignifies

a *Roll* or *Regiſter. Pſalm* 69. 28. We meet with ספר חיים *the Roll of the Living, or the Book of the Living* we render it, becauſe all ancient *Books* were in the faſhion of *Rolls.* In that Chapter *Moſes* intercedes with *God* on behalf of the People, that he would make good his Promiſe to them, of bringing them into the *Land of* Canaan, *v.* 13. and *v.* 30. He goes up to make an Atonement for the People, i. e. *as to the cutting them off in the Wilderneſs*, and therefore he deſires rather than the People ſhould be deſtroy'd, *that God would ſtrike him out of the Roll, that he might die in the Wilderneſs rather than the People:* And God gives that anſwer to this purpoſe, *v.* 33. *Whoever hath ſinned againſt me, will I blot out of my Book*, the Senſe of which is the ſame with thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt, He ſware in his Wrath that they ſhould not enter into his Reſt*, Pſal. 95. 11. And according to this interpretation, which is moſt natural and eaſie, all your long Diſcourſe *againſt praying to be damned* comes to juſt nothing; there being no pretence for it, either in the Text or Context.

2. The *Story* of *Ruth* doth not pleaſe you, *as ſavouring in your Opinion of a great deal of Immodeſty*; but you would have a better Opinion of it, if you conſider that the reaſon of her Carriage towards *Boaz*, in ſuch a manner, was upon *Naomies* telling her *that he was one to whom the right of Redemption did belong, and by conſequence*, by their Law, *was to marry her*, Ruth 2. 20. And this *Ruth* pleaded to *Boaz*, Ruth 3. 9. By which it appears, that ſhe verily believed that he was *legally* her Huſband; and *Boaz* we ſee ſpeaks of her *as one that was a vertuous Woman, and known to be ſuch in the whole City*, ver. 11. And he confeſſes *he was her near Kinſman, only*, he ſaith, *there was one nearer*, ver. 12. By which it ſeems, if there had not, *Boaz* had made no ſcruple of the matter: And the *Jews* ſay, in ſuch Marriages very little *Ceremony* was required, if the next of *Kin* did not renounce his Right, becauſe the *Law* had determined the *Marriage* before-hand. If you had but conſidered this one thing, you would have ſpared the many *Obſervations* you make on this Story.

3. You object againſt 2 *Sam.* 12. 8. *As too much countenancing either Inceſt or Adultery, becauſe it is ſaid, that God gave to* David *his Maſter's Wives into his Boſom.* But 1. It is very ſtrange to bring this place as a countenance to *Adultery*, which was purpoſely deſigned to upbraid *David* with the Sin of *Adultery*; and you will find it no eaſie matter, by the Conſtitution of the *Moſaical Law*, to prove *Polygamy* to be *Adultery*. 2. The *Jews* give a fair Interpretation of this place, for they ſay, that the *Wife* of a *King* could never *marry* after her Huſbands deceaſe, as the *Gemara* on the Title *Sanhedrim* expreſly ſaith, although ſome among them follow the Opinion of *R. Jehuda*, that ſhe might marry the ſucceeding *King*; but that is built chiefly on this place; of which the reſt give a better account, *viz.* that נשים doth not imply *Saul*'s *Wives*, but the *Maids of Honour*, or *Attendants* on the *Court* of *Saul*, which all fell into *David*'s Power, and out of whom he might chooſe *Wives*, without danger of *Inceſt*; and even ſome of thoſe who aſſert it lawful for one *King* to marry his predeceſſor's Wife, yet ſay in this caſe of *David*, that the Word only implies, that they were of *Saul*'s *Family*, as *Merab* and *Michal* were, but not *Saul*'s *Wives*. So that all the difficulty here ariſes only from the Interpretation of an *unuſual Word*, in which we have much more reaſon to truſt the *Jews* than other Writers.

Selden. Uxor Ebra. l. 1. c. 10. *Schick. De jure Reg.* c. 16. Theor. 19.

4. You are much offended *at Hoſea's marrying an Adultereſs:* But all the formidable Difficulties of that place will preſently vaniſh, if you allow the *Prophetical Schemes*, wherein thoſe things are ſaid to be done, which are intended only to repreſent in a more lively manner the things ſignified by them. And ſo you may ſee the *Chaldee Paraphraſe*, fully explains this place of *Hoſea*, and *Maimonides* purpoſely diſcourſeth on the *Prophetick Parables*, and brings this as one of the Inſtances of them; *Maim. More Nevoch. l.* 2. *c.* 46. and with him the reſt of the *Jewiſh Interpreters* agree. But you object againſt ſuch a way of Teaching, *as tending to the encouragement of Vice*, which it is very far from, being deſigned to repreſent the odiouſneſs of it: For the whole Scope of the *Prophet* is to let the People underſtand, that their *Idolatry* was as hateful to *God* as the Sin of *Adultery*, and that the conſequences of it would be their Miſery and Ruin. And yet that *God* expreſſed as much Tenderneſs to them, as a Man that was very fond of a Woman would do, in being unwilling to put her away, altho' he knew ſhe were falſe to his Bed: the former is intended in the firſt *Chapter*, and the latter in the third. And what is there tending to Immorality in all this? May not *God* make uſe of one Vice, whoſe evil is more notorious to repreſent another by, whoſe evil they are more hardly convinced of? May not he ſet forth a *Degenerate People* by the *Sons* of an *Adultereſs?* And by the Names given to them expreſs his Deteſtation of their Wickedneſs? Eſpecially when the *Parabolical* Terms are ſo clearly explained, as they are in the Second Chapter.

But you will ſay, *theſe things are related as plain Matters of Fact; with the ſeveral Circumſtances belonging to them.* It is true, they are ſo, but ſo Parables uſe to be; ſo was *Nathan's* to *David*; ſo is that of the Rich Man and *Lazarus* in the *New Teſtament*: ſo is *Jeremy's* going to *Euphrates to hide his Girdle*; *Jer.* 13. 4, 5. (for it is not very likely the *Prophet* ſhould be ſent 18 or 20 Days Journey into an Enemies Country for no other end:) So is *Ezekiel's lying on one ſide for* 390 *Days, and ſhaving his Head and Beard*, *Ezek.* 4. 5, 6. contrary to the Law, as *Maimonides* obſerves: And his *digging in the Walls of the Temple at* *Ezek.* 5. 1. Hieruſalem, while he was in *Babylon:* *Ezek.* 8. 8. And many other things of a like nature, which are ſet forth with as punctual a Narration of Circumſtances, as this of *Hoſea*, and yet they were only figurative Expreſſions. We that are accuſtomed to another way of Learning, think theſe things ſtrange; but this was a very common way in the *elder* Times, and it is to this Day much uſed in the *Eaſtern Countries*, to repreſent *Duties* to ſome, under the *Parables* of things as really done by others: As may be ſeen in *Locman* and *Perzoes*, beſides what *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others have ſaid, concerning the *Antiquity* and common uſe of this *Parabolical* way of Teaching.

I now come to your Objections againſt the *New Teſtament*; but I find them ſo few, and thoſe ſo ſlight and inconſiderable, as to the end for which you produce them, that I may eaſily paſs them over. To that *about the continuance of Miracles*, I have already anſwer'd: And I find not one Word in the places mentioned by you, which implies the neceſſity of the continuance of them in all Ages of the *Chriſtian Church*. That place, *Mark* 10. 29, 30. ſpeaks of no more but ſuch a *recompence* in this Life *as is conſiſtent with Perſecution*; and therefore muſt chiefly lie in inward Contentment; which all wiſe Men have valued above external Accommodations; although withal, by the Account St. *Paul* gives of himſelf, and his Brethren, God did abundantly provide for them one way or other. *As having nothing, and yet enjoying all things:* Which amounts to a Hundred-fold in this Life. 2 *Cor.* 6.10.

But certainly you are the firſt Man, who have objected *the obſcurity of the Book of Revelations, againſt the Authority of the Scriptures*; which is juſt as if one ſhould object the *Quadrature* of the *Circle* againſt *Mathematical Certainty*. If we grant that there are ſome things in that *Myſtical Book*, we do not yet well underſtand; what then? Muſt neither that *Book*, nor any other of the *Bible* be of *Divine Revelation?* I will not purſue the unreaſonableneſs of this way of arguing ſo far as I might, but I leave your ſelf to conſider of it; and of all that I have written, in order to your *ſatisfaction*. If you think fit to return an Anſwer, I pray do it clearly and ſhortly, and with that freedom from Paſſion, which becomes ſo weighty a Matter: And I beſeech *God* to give you a right underſtanding in all things. I am, *A*

S I R,

June 11,
1675.

Your Faithful Servant.

IRENI-

IRENICUM.

A
WEAPON-SALVE
FOR THE
Churches Wounds:
OR THE
DIVINE RIGHT
OF
Particular Forms of CHURCH GOVERNMENT,
Diſcuſſed and examined according to the Principles of the Law of Nature, the poſitive Laws of God, the Practice of the Apoſtles, and the Primitive Church, and the Judgment of Reformed Divines.

Whereby a Foundation is laid for the Church's Peace, and the Accommodation of our preſent Differences.

THE
PREFACE to the READER.

I *Write not to* increaſe *the* Controverſies *of the Times, nor to* foment *the* Differences *that are among us*; *the* one *are by far too* many, *the* other *too* great *already. My only deſign is to* allay *the* heat, *and* abate *the* fury *of that* Ignis ſacer, *or* Eryſipelas *of* Contention, *which hath riſen in the Face of our Church, by the overflowing of that* bilious Humour *which yet appears to have too great* predominancy *in the* Spirits *of Men. And although with the poor* Perſian *I can only bring a* handful *of Water,* *yet that may be my juſt* Apology, *that it is for the quenching thoſe* Flames *in the Church, which have cauſed* the Bells of *Aaron* to jangle *ſo much, that it ſeems to be a Work of the greateſt difficulty to make them* tuneable. *And were this an* Age *wherein any thing might be wondred at, it would be matter of deſerved Admiration, to hear the* noiſe *of theſe* Axes and Hammers *ſo much about the* Temple, *and that after theſe nigh twenty Years* carving *and* hewing, *we are ſo* rude *and* unpoliſhed *ſtill, and ſo far from being* cemented *together in the* unity of the Spirit, and the Bond of Peace. *May we not juſtly fear that Voice,* Migremus hinc, *when we ſee the* Veil *of the* Temple *ſo* rent aſunder, *and the* Church *it ſelf made a* Partition-wall *to* divide *the* Members *of it? And ſince the* wiſe and gracious God *hath been pleaſed (in ſuch an almoſt miraculous manner) ſo lately to abate the* Land-flood *of our* civil inteſtine Diviſions, *how ſtrange muſt it needs ſeem, if our* ſacred Contentions, *(if Contentions may be called ſacred) like* the Waters of the Sanctuary, *ſhould riſe* from the Ancle to the Knee, *till at laſt they may grow unpaſſable? Muſt only the* Fire *of our unchriſtian* Animoſities *be like that of the* Temple, *which was never to be* extinguiſhed? *However I am ſure it is ſuch a one as was never* kindled from Heaven, *nor* blown up *with any* Breathings *of the* Holy and Divine Spirit. *And yet that hath been the* aggravation *of our Diviſions, that thoſe whoſe Duty it is* to lift up their Voices like Trumpets, *have rather ſounded an* Allarm *to our contentious Spirits, than a* Parley *or* Retreat, *which had been far more ſuitable to our* Meſſengers of Peace. *In which reſpect it might be too truly ſaid of our Church, what is ſpoken of the* Eagle *in the* Greek Apologue:

Βλέπει τὸ στῆθος ἀετὸς τρωθὲν πάλαι,
Ἀλγῶν δὲ λοιπὸν, ἧστο πολλὰ δακρύων.
Βλέπων δὲ ὀϊστὸν, εἶπεν ἐπτερωμένον,
Βαβαὶ, πτερὸν με τὸν πτερωτὸν ὀλλύει.

The Eagle ſaw her Breaſt was wounded ſore,
She ſtood, and weeped much, but grieved more:
But when ſhe ſaw the Dart was feather'd, ſaid,
Woe's me, for my own Kind hath me deſtroy'd.

It is ſo long ſince that Verſion of the vulgar *Latin,* Pſal. 68. 15. Inter Domini cleros, *might have been ſadly rendered* to lie among the Pots; *and* Pierius Valerianus *might have met with too many Examples to have increaſed his Book* De Literatorum Infœlicitate; *and in the next Age it might have been true again what* Matthew Paris *obſerves of the* Clergy *in the* Conquerour's *time*; adeò literaturâ carebant ut cæteris ſtupori eſſet qui Grammaticam didiciſſet. *But bleſſed be God who hath freed us from that* Dœmonium meridianum *of* Ignorance *and* Barbariſm; *may we be but as happily delivered from the plague of our Diviſions and Animoſities: Than which, there hath been no greater* Scandal *to the* Jews, *nor* opprobrium *of our Religion among* Heathens *and* Mahumetans, *nor more common objection among the* Papiſts, *nor any thing which hath been more made a Pretence even for* Atheiſm *and* Infidelity. *For our* Controverſies *about* Religion, *have brought at laſt even* Religion *its ſelf into a*

Controverſie, *among ſuch whoſe weaker Judgments have not been able to diſcern where the plain and unqueſtionable Way to Heaven hath lain, in ſo great a* Miſt *as our* Diſputes *have raiſed among us. Weaker Heads, when they once ſee the* Battlements *ſhake, are apt to ſuſpect that the* Foundation *its ſelf is not* firm *enough; and to conclude, if any thing be call'd in queſtion, that there is nothing certain. And truly it cannot but be looked on as a ſad Preſage of an approaching* Famine, not of Bread, but of the Word of the Lord, *that our* lean Kine have devoured the fat, *and our* thin Ears the plump and full; *I mean our* Controverſies *and* Diſputes, *have* eaten *ſo much out the* Life *and* Practice *of* Chriſtianity. Religion *hath been ſo much* rarified *into* aery Notions *and* Speculations, *by the* diſtempered heat *of Mens Spirits, that its inward* Strength, *and the* Vitals *of it have been much* abated *and* conſumed *by it.* Curioſity, *that* Green-ſickneſs *of the Soul, whereby it longs for Novelties, and loaths ſound and wholeſome Truths, hath been the* epidemical Diſtemper *of the Age we live in. Of which it may be as truly ſaid, as ever yet of any, that it was* ſæculum fertile religionis, ſterile pietatis; *I fear this will be the Character whereby our* Age *will be known to Poſterity, that it was* the Age wherein Men talked of Religion moſt, and lived it leaſt. *Few there are who are content with that* Dimenſum *which* God *hath ſet them; every one almoſt is of the* Spaniſh Jeſuite's *Mind,* Beatus qui prædicat verbum inauditum, *ſeeking to find out ſomewhat whereby he may be reckoned, if not among the* Wiſe, *yet among the* Diſputers of this World. *How ſmall is the number of thoſe ſober Chriſtians, of whom it may be ſaid as* Lucian *of his* Paraſites, οὐκ ἠσχόλαζον νοσεῖν, *they were not at leiſure to be ſick of this* pica, (1 Tim. 6. 4.) *ſuch as longed more to taſte of the* Tree of Life, *than of the* Tree of Knowledge: *And as* Zenophon *ſpeaks of the* Perſians, τό ὑγρὸν ἐκποιοῦντες ἀνήλισκον, *they conſume the* fomes morbi, *the Root of this Diſtemper by their ſerious Endeavours after* Peace and Holineſs. *But inſtead of this, the generality of Men let all their Religion run up into* Briars *and* Thorns, *into Contentions and Parties, as tho' Religion were indeed* ſacramentum militiæ, *but more againſt fellow-Chriſtians than the unqueſtionable Hindrances of Mens eternal Happineſs. Men being very loth to put themſelves to the trouble of a* Holy Life, *are very ready to embrace any thing which may but diſpence with that, and if but liſting Mens ſelves under ſuch a Party, may but ſhelter them under a Diſguiſe of Religion, none more ready than ſuch to be known by* diſtinguiſhing Names; *none more zealous in the defence of every* Tittle *and* Punctilio *that lies moſt remote from thoſe eſſential Duties wherein the Kingdom of God conſiſts,* viz. Righteouſneſs and Peace, and Joy in the Holy Ghoſt. *And hence all the ſeveral Parties among us have given ſuch glorious Names only to the outward Government of the Church; the* undoubted Practice of the Apoſtles; the Diſcipline of Chriſt; the order of the Goſpel, *and account only that the* Church, *where their own method of Government is obſerved; juſt as the* Hiſtorian *obſerves of* Brutus *and* Caſſius, Ubicunque ipſi eſſent prætexentes eſſe rempublicam, *they think the Church can never be preſerved, but in that Veſſel they are imbarked in: As though* Chriſt *could not have cauſed his Flock to reſt* ſub Meridie, *unleſs the* Pars Donati *had been in the* South. *And from this* monopolizing *of* Churches *to* Parties, *hath proceeded that ſtrange Uncharitableneſs towards all who come not up to every Circumſtance of their Way and Method, which is a piece of Prudence like that of* Brutus, *who when he had raiſed thoſe Flames* *in the* Common-wealth, *was continually calling* Cæſar Tyrant; ita enim appellari Cæſarem, facto ejus expediebat. *So when Men have cauſed ſuch lamentable Diviſions in the Church, by their ſeveral Parties and Factions, it concerns them to condemn all others beſides themſelves, leſt they moſt of all condemn themſelves for making unneceſſary Diviſions in the Church of God. This Uncharitableneſs and ill opinion of all different Parties, only gathers the Fuel together, and prepares combuſtible Matter, which wants nothing but the claſhing of an adverſe Party, acted upon Principles of a like nature, to make it break out into an open Flame. And ſuch we have ſeen, and with ſadneſs and grief of Heart felt it to be in the Bowels of our own Church and Nation, by reaſon of thoſe violent* Calentures *and* Paroxyſms *of the Spirits of Men, thoſe* Heart-burnings *and* Contentions *which have been among us, which will require both Time and Skill to purge out thoſe* noxious Humours *which have been the cauſes of them. I know no Preſcriptions ſo likely to effect this happy end, as an* Infuſion *of the true* Spirits *of Religion, and the* Revulſion *of that* extravaſated Blood *into its proper Channels: Thereby to take Men off from their eager purſuit after Ways and Parties, Notions and Opinions, (wherein many have run ſo far, that they have left the beſt part of their Religion behind them) and to bring them back to a right underſtanding of the* Nature, Deſign *and* Principles *of* Chriſtianity.

Chriſtianity! *a* Religion, *which it is next to a Miracle Men ſhould ever quarrel or fall out about; much leſs that it ſhould be the* occaſion, *or at leaſt the* pretence *of all that Strife and Bitterneſs of Spirit, of all thoſe Contentions and Animoſities which are at this Day in the Chriſtian World. But our only comfort is, that whatever our Spirits are, our God is* the God of peace, *our Saviour is* the Prince of Peace, *and that* Wiſdom *which this Religion teacheth, is both* pure and peaceable. *It was that which once made our Religion ſo amiable in the Judgment of impartial* Heathens, *that* nil niſi juſtum ſuadet & lene, the Court of a Chriſtian's Conſcience was the beſt Court of equity in the World. Chriſtians *were once known by their* ἥμερον καὶ μειλιχὸν ἦθος, *the Benignity and Sweetneſs of their Diſpoſition, by the Candor and Ingenuity of their Spirits, by their mutual Love, Forbearance and Condeſcenſion towards one another. But* Aut hoc non eſt Evangelium, aut nos non ſumus Evangelici, *either this is not the Practice of Chriſtianity, or it was never* calculated *for our* Meridian, *wherein Mens Spirits are of too* high *an* elevation *for it. If Pride and Uncharitableneſs, if Diviſions and Strifes, if Wrath and Envy, if Animoſities and Contentions were but the Marks of true Chriſtians,* Diogenes *never need light his Lamp at Noon to find out ſuch among us. But if a Spirit of Meekneſs, Gentleneſs and Condeſcenſion, if a ſtooping to the Weakneſs and Infirmities of others, if a purſuit after peace even when it flies from us, be the* indiſpenſable *Duties, and the* Characteriſtical *Notes of thoſe that have more than the Name of* Chriſtians, *it may poſſibly prove a difficult* Inqueſt *to find out ſuch for the Crouds of thoſe who ſhelter themſelves under that glorious Name. Whence came it elſe to be ſo lately looked on as the way to* advance Religion, *to* baniſh Peace, *and to* reform Mens Manners, by taking away their Lives? *Whereas in thoſe pure and primitive Times, when* Religion *did truly* flouriſh, *it was accounted the greateſt* Inſtance *of the Piety of Chriſtians,* not to fight, but to die for Chriſt. *It was never thought then that* Bellona *was a* nurſing Mother to the Church of God, *nor* Mars a God of Reformation. *Religion was then* *propagated, not by* Chriſtians *ſhedding the Blood of others, but by laying down their own. They thought there were other ways to a* Canaan *of* Reformation, *beſides the paſſing through a* Wilderneſs *of* Confuſion, *and a* Red-Sea *of* Blood. Origen *could ſay of the* Chriſtians *in his Time,* οὐκέτι γὰρ λαμβάνομεν ἐπ' ἔθνος μάχαιραν, οὐδὲ μανθάνομεν ἔτι πολεμεῖν γενόμενοι διὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν υἱοὶ τῆς εἰρήνης· *They had not yet learned to make way for Religion into Mens Minds by the Dint of the Sword, becauſe they were the Diſciples of that Saviour who never* preſſed *Followers as Men do* Soldiers, *but ſaid;* If any Man will come after me, let him take up his Croſs, *(not his Sword)* and follow me. *His was* ἥμερος καὶ φιλάνθρωπος νομοθεσία, *his very Commands ſhewed his Meekneſs; his Laws were ſweet and gentle Laws; not like* Draco's, *that were writ in Blood, unleſs it were his own that gave them.*

C. Celſum, l. 3.

His deſign was to eaſe Men of their former Burdens, and not to lay on more; the Duties he required were no other but ſuch as were neceſſary, and withal very juſt and reaſonable. He that came to take away the inſupportable Yoke of Jewiſh Ceremonies, *certainly did never intend to gall the Necks of his Diſciples with another inſtead of it. And it would be ſtrange the Church ſhould require more than* Chriſt *himſelf did; and make other Conditions of her Communion, than our Saviour did of Diſcipleſhip. What poſſible reaſon can be aſſigned or given why ſuch things ſhould not be ſufficient for Communion with a Church, which are ſufficient for eternal Salvation? And certainly thoſe things are ſufficient for that, which are laid down as the neceſſary Duties of Chriſtianity by our Lord and Saviour in his Word. What ground can there be why* Chriſtians *ſhould not ſtand upon the ſame Terms now which they did in the Time of* Chriſt *and his Apoſtles? Was not Religion ſufficiently guarded and fenced in them? Was there ever more true and cordial Reverence in the Worſhip of God? What* Charter *hath* Chriſt *given the Church to bind Men up to more than himſelf hath done? or to exclude thoſe from her Society, who may be admitted into Heaven? Will* Chriſt *ever thank Men at the great Day, for keeping ſuch out from Communion with his Church, whom he will vouchſafe not only Crowns of Glory to, but it* may *be* aureolæ *too, if there be any ſuch things there? The Grand Commiſſion the Apoſtles were ſent out with, was only to* teach what *Chriſt* had commanded them. *Not the leaſt intimation of any power given them to impoſe or require any thing beyond what himſelf had ſpoken to them, or they were directed to by the immediate Guidance of the Spirit of God. It is not whether the things commanded and required be lawful or no? It is not whether Indifferencies may be determined or no? It is not how far* Chriſtians *are bound to ſubmit to a reſtraint of their* Chriſtian Liberty, *which now I enquire after, (of thoſe things in the Treatiſe its ſelf) but whether they do conſult for the Church's Peace and Unity, who ſuſpend it upon ſuch things? How far either the Example of our Saviour, or his Apoſtles doth warrant ſuch rigorous Impoſitions? We never read the Apoſtles making Laws, but of things ſuppoſed neceſſary. When the Council of Apoſtles met at* Jeruſalem, *for deciding a Caſe that diſturbed the Church's peace, we ſee* they would lay no other burden πλὴν τῶν ἐπάναγκες τούτων, beſides theſe neceſſary things, *Acts* 15. 29. *It was not enough with them that the things would be neceſſary when they had required them, but they looked on an* antecedent *neceſſity either abſolute or for the preſent ſtate, which was the only ground of their impoſing thoſe Commands upon the* Gentile Chriſtians.

There were after this, great diverſities of Practice, and varieties of Obſervations among Chriſtians, *but the Holy Ghoſt never thought thoſe things fit to be made matters of Laws, to which all Parties ſhould conform: All that the Apoſtles required as to theſe, was mutual Forbearance and Condeſcenſion towards each other in them. The Apoſtles valued not* Indifferences *at all, and thoſe things it is evident they accounted ſuch, which whether Men did them or not, was not of concernment to Salvation. And what reaſon is there why Men ſhould be ſo ſtrictly tied up to ſuch things, which they may do or let alone, and yet be very good* Chriſtians *ſtill? Without all Controverſie, the main In-let of all the Diſtractions, Confuſions and Diviſions of the* Chriſtian World, *hath been by adding other Conditions of Church-Communion than* Chriſt *hath done. Had the Church of* Rome *never taken upon her to add to the Rule of Faith, nor impoſed idolatrous and ſuperſtitious Practices, all the injury ſhe had done her ſelf, had been to have avoided that fearful Schiſm which ſhe hath cauſed throughout the* Chriſtian World. *Would there ever be the leſs Peace and Unity in a Church, if a Diverſity were allowed as to Practices ſuppoſed indifferent? yea there would be ſo much more as there was a mutual Forbearance and Condeſcenſion as to ſuch things. The Unity of the Church is an Unity of Love and Affection, and not a bare Uniformity of Practice or Opinion. This latter is extremely deſirable in a Church; but as long as there are ſeveral Ranks and Sizes of Men in it, very hardly attainable, becauſe of the different Perſuaſions of Mens Minds, as to the lawfulneſs of the things required. And it is no commendation for a* Chriſtian *to have only the Civility of* Procruſtes, *to commenſurate all other Men to the* Bed *of his* own Humour and Opinion. *There is nothing the* Primitive Church deſerves *greater imitation by us in, than in that admirable Temper, Moderation, and Condeſcenſion which was uſed in it, towards all the Members of it. It was never thought worth the while to make any ſtanding Laws for Rites and Cuſtoms, that had no other original but Tradition, much leſs to ſuſpend Men her Communion for not obſerving them.* Εὔηθες γὰρ καὶ μάλα δικαίως ὑπέλαβον ἐθῶν

Hiſt. Eccl. l. 7. c. 19. ἕνεκεν ἀλλήλων χωρίζεσθαι, περὶ τὰ καίρια τῆς θρησκείας συμφωνοῦντες, *as* Sozomen *tells us.* They judged it, and that very juſtly, a fooliſh and frivolous thing, for thoſe that agree in the weighty Matters of Religion, to ſeparate from one another's Communion for the ſake of ſome petty Cuſtoms and Obſervations. Ὀυ γὰρ τὰς αὐτάς παραδόσεις κατὰ πάντα ὁμοίας κἂν ὁμόδοξοι εἶεν, ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις εὑρεῖν ἐστίν· For Churches agreeing in the ſame Faith, often differ in their Rites and Cuſtoms. *And that not only in different Churches, but in different Places belonging to the ſame Church; for, as he tells us, many Cities and Villages in* Egypt, *not only differed from the Cuſtoms of the* Mother Church *of* Alexandria, *but from all other Churches beſides,* in their publick Aſſemblies on the Evenings of the Sabbath, and receiving the Euchariſt after Dinner: *This admirable Temper in the Primitive Church might be largely cleared from that Liberty they allowed freely to Diſſenters from them in Matters of Practice and Opinion; as might be cleared from* Cyprian, Auſtin, Jerome, *and others; but that would exceed the Bounds of a Preface. The firſt who brake this Order in the Church, were the* Arrians, Donatiſts, *and* Circumcellians, *while the true Church was ſtill known by its priſtine Moderation and ſweetneſs of Deportment towards all its Members. The ſame we hope may remain as the moſt infallible evi-*

dence of the Conformity of our Church of England, *to the Primitive, not ſo much in* uſing *the ſame* Rites *that were in Uſe then, as in* not impoſing them, *but leaving Men to be won by the obſerving the true Decency and Order of Churches, whereby thoſe who act upon a true Principle of Chriſtian Ingenuity, may be ſooner drawn to a Compliance in all lawful things, than by force and rigorous Impoſitions, which make Men ſuſpect the weight of the thing it ſelf, when ſuch force is uſed to make it enter. In the mean time, what cauſe have we to rejoice, that Almighty God hath been pleaſed to reſtore us a* Prince *of that* excellent Prudence and Moderation, *who hath ſo lately given aſſurance to the World, of his* great Indulgence towards all that have any pretence from Conſcience to differ with their Brethren: *The only thing then ſeeming to retard our Peace, is, the* Controverſie *about* Church-Government, *an unhappy Controverſie to us in* England, *if ever there were any in the World. And the more unhappy, in that our Contentions about it have been ſo great, and yet ſo few of the Multitudes engaged in it, that have truly underſtood the Matter they have ſo eagerly contended about. For the State of the Controverſie, as it concerns us, lies not here, as it is generally miſtaken,* what Form of Government comes the neareſt to Apoſtolical Practice; *but* Whether any one individual Form be founded ſo upon Divine Right, that all Ages and Churches are bound unalterably to obſerve it: *The clearing up of which by an impartial enquiry into all the Grounds produced for it, being of ſo great a tendency to an Accommodation of our preſent Differences, was the only Motive which induced me to obſerve* Ariſtotle's *wild* Politicks, *of expoſing this deformed Conception to the entertainment of the wide World. And certainly they who have* eſpouſed *the moſt the* Intereſt *of a* jus divinum, *cannot yet but ſay, that if the Opinion I maintain be true, it doth exceedingly conduce to a preſent Settlement of the Differences that are among us. For then all Parties may retain their different Opinions concerning the Primitive Form, and yet agree and pitch upon a Form compounded of all together, as the moſt ſuitable to the State and Condition of the Church of God among us: That ſo the Peoples Intereſt be ſecured by Conſent and Suffrage, which is the pretence of the Congregational-way; the due Power of Preſbyteries aſſerted by their joint concurrence with the Biſhop, as it is laid down in that excellent Model of the* late incomparable Primate of Armagh; *and the juſt Honour and Dignity of the* Biſhop *aſſerted, as a very laudable and ancient Conſtitution for preſerving the Peace and Unity of the Church of God. So the learned* Iſ. Caſaubon *deſcribes the* Polity *of the* Primitive Church, Epiſcopi in ſingulis Eccleſiis conſtituti cum ſuis Preſbyteris, & propriam ſibi quiſque peculiari curâ, & univerſam omnes in commune curantes, admirabilis cujuſdam Ariſtocratiæ ſpeciem referebant. *My main Deſign, throughout this whole Treatiſe, is to ſhew that there can be no Argument drawn from any pretence of a* Divine Right, *that may hinder Men from conſenting and yielding to ſuch a Form of Government in the Church, as may bear the greateſt correſpondency to the Primitive Church, and be moſt advantagiouſly conduceable to the Peace, Unity, and Settlement of our divided Church. I plead not at all for any Abuſes or Corruptions incident to the beſt Form of Government, thro' the corruption of Men and Times. Nay, I dare not harbour ſo low Apprehenſions of Perſons enjoying ſo great Dignity and Honour in the Church, that they will in any wiſe be unwilling of themſelves to reduce the Form of*

Exercit. 15. §. 11.

of Church-Government among us, to its primitive State and Order, by retrenching all Exorbitances of Power, and reſtoring thoſe Preſbyteries which no Law hath forbidden, but only through diſuſe have been laid aſide. Whereby they will give to the World that rare Example of Self-denial, *and the* higheſt Chriſtian Prudence, *as may raiſe an honourable Opinion of them, even among thoſe who have hitherto the moſt ſlighted ſo ancient and venerable an* Order *in the Church of God; and thereby become the Repairers of thoſe otherwiſe irreparable Breaches in the Church of God. I conclude with the Words of a late* learned, pious *and* moderate Prelate, *in his* Via media; I have done, and now I make no other account, but that it will fall out with me, as it doth commonly with him that offers to part a Fray, both parts will perhaps drive at me for wiſhing them no worſe than Peace. My Ambition of the publick Tranquillity ſhall willingly carry me through this hazard; let both beat me, ſo their Quarrel may ceaſe; I ſhall rejoice in thoſe Blows and Scars which I ſhall take for the Church's Safety.

A WEAPON-

A
WEAPON-SALVE for the CHURCH'S-WOUNDS:
OR,
The Divine Right of particular forms of Government in the Church of God, diſcuſſed and examined according to the principles of the Law of Nature, the poſitive Laws of God, the practice of the Apoſtles, and the Primitive Church, and the judgment of Reformed Divines.

105:1:H.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Things neceſſary for the Church's peace muſt be clearly revealed. The Form of Church Government not ſo, as appears by the remaining controverſie about it. An evidence thence, that Chriſt never intended any one form, as the only means to peace in the Church. The nature of a divine right diſcuſſed. Right in general either makes things Lawful, or elſe Due: For the former, a non-prohibition ſufficient, the latter an expreſs command. Duty ſuppoſeth legiſlation and promulgation. The Queſtion ſtated. Nothing binds unalterably but by vertue of a ſtanding Law, and that twofold. The Law of nature, and poſitive Laws of God. Three ways to know when poſitive Laws are unalterable. The divine right ariſing from Scripture Examples, Divine acts, and Divine approbation conſidered.

§. I. HE that impoſeth any matter of opinion upon the belief of others, without giving evidence of reaſon for it, proportionable to the confidence of his aſſertion, muſt either ſuppoſe the thing propounded, to carry ſuch unqueſtionable credentials of truth and reaſon with it, that none who know what they mean, can deny it entertainment; or elſe that his own underſtanding hath attained to ſo great perfection, as to have authority ſufficient to oblige all others to follow it. This latter cannot be preſumed among any who have aſſerted the freedom of their own underſtandings, from the dictates of an infallible chair: But if any ſhould forget themſelves ſo far as to think ſo, there needs no other argument to prove them not to be infallible in their aſſertions, than this one aſſertion, that they are infallible, it being an undoubted evidence that they are actually deceived, who know ſo little the meaſure of their own underſtandings. The former can never be pretended in any thing which is a matter of controverſie among men, who have not wholly forgot they are reaſonable creatures, by their bringing probable arguments for the maintaining one part of an opinion as well as another. In which caſe, though the arguments brought be not convincing for the neceſſary entertaining either part to an unbiaſſed underſtanding, yet the difference of their opinions is argument ſufficient that the thing contended for is not ſo clear as both parties would make it to be on their own ſide; and if it be not a thing of neceſſity to ſalvation, it gives men ground to think that a final deciſion of the matter in controverſie, was never intended as a neceſſary means for the peace and unity of the Church of God. For we cannot with any ſhew of reaſon imagine that our ſupreme Law-giver and Saviour, who hath made it a neceſſary duty in all true members of his Church, to endeavour after the peace and unity of it, ſhould ſuſpend the performance of that duty upon a matter of opinion, which when men have uſed their utmoſt endeavours to ſatisfie themſelves about, they yet find, that thoſe very grounds which they are moſt inclinable to build their judgments upon, are either wholly rejected by others, as wiſe and able as themſelves, or elſe it may be they erect a far different fabrick upon the very ſame foundations. It is no ways conſiſtent with the wiſdom of *Chriſt* in founding his Church, and providing for the peace and ſettlement of it, to leave it at the mercy of mens private judgments and apprehenſions of things, than which nothing is more uncertain, and thereby make it to depend upon a condition never like to be attained in this world, which is the agreement and uniformity of mens opinions. For as long as mens faces differ, their judgments will. And until there be an *Intellectus Averroiſticus*, the ſame underſtanding in all perſons, we have little ground to hope for ſuch an univerſal harmony in the intellectual world; and yet even then the ſoul might paſs a different judgment upon the colours of things, according to the different tincture of the ſeveral Optick-glaſſes in particular bodies which it takes a proſpect of things through. Reaſon and experience then gives us little hopes of any peace in the Church, if the unity of mens judgments be ſuppoſed the condition of it; the next enquiry then is, how the peace of the Church ſhall be attained or preſerved, when men are under ſuch different perſuaſions; eſpecially if they reſpect the means in order to a peace and ſettlement. For the ways to peace, like the fertile ſoils of *Greece*, have been oft-times the occaſion of the greateſt quarrels. And no ſickneſs is ſo dangerous as that when men are ſick of their remedy, and nauſeate that moſt which tends to their recovery. But while Phyſicians quarrel about the Method of cure, the Patient languiſheth under their hands; and when men increaſe Contentions in the behalf of peace, while they ſeem to court it, they deſtroy it. The only way left for the Church's ſettlement and peace under ſuch variety of apprehenſions concerning the means and method in order to it, is to pitch upon ſuch a foundation, if poſſible to be found out, whereon the different parties retaining their private apprehenſions, may yet be agreed to carry on the ſame work in common, in order to the peace and tranquillity of the Church of God. Which cannot be by leaving all abſolutely to follow their own ways; for that were to build a *Babel* inſtead of *Salem*, *Confuſion* inſtead of *Peace*; it muſt be then by convincing men, that neither of thoſe ways, to peace and order which they contend about, is neceſſary by way of divine command, (though ſome be as a means to an end) but which particular way or form it muſt be, is wholly left to the prudence of thoſe in whoſe power and truſt it is to ſee the peace of the Church be ſecured on laſting foundations. How nearly this concerns the preſent debate about the Government of the Church, any one may quickly diſcern. The main plea for forms of Government in the Church, is their neceſſity in order to its peace and order, and yet nothing hath produced more diſorder and confuſion, than our diſputes about it have done. And our ſad experience ſtill tells us that after all our debates, and the evidences brought on either ſide, men yet continue under very different apprehenſions concerning it. But if we more ſtrictly enquire into the cauſes of the great diſtances and animoſities which have riſen upon this controverſie, we ſhall find it hath not been ſo much the difference of judgments concerning the primitive form of Government which hath divided men ſo much from one another, as the prevalency of faction and intereſt in thoſe whoſe Revenues have come from the rents of the Church, and among others of greater integrity it hath been the principle or hypotheſis which men are apt to take for granted, without proving it, *viz.* that it is in no caſe lawful to vary from that form, which by obſcure and uncertain conjectures they conceive to have been the primitive practice. For hereby men look upon themſelves as obliged by an unalterable Law to endeavour the eſtabliſhment of that Idea of Government which oft-times affection and intereſt, more than reaſon and judgment hath formed within them; and ſo likewiſe bound to overthrow any other form not ſuitable to thoſe correſpondencies which they are already engaged to maintain. If this then were the cauſe of the wounds and breaches this day among us, the moſt ſucceſsful Weapon-ſalve to heal them, will be, to anoint the ſword which hath given the wound, by a ſeaſonable enquiry into the nature and obligation of particular forms of Government in the Church. The main ſubject then of our preſent debate will be whether any one particular form of Church-Government be ſettled upon an unalterable divine right; by vertue whereof all Churches are bound perpetually to obſerve that individual form? or whether it be left to the prudence of every particular Church to agree upon that form of Government which it judgeth moſt conducible within its ſelf to attain the end of Government, the peace, order, tranquillity, ſettlement of the Church. If this latter be made fully appear, it is then evident, that however mens judgments may differ concerning the primitive form of Government, there is yet a ſure ground for men to proceed on in order to the Church's peace. Which one conſideration will be motive ſufficient to juſtifie an attempt of this nature, it being a deſign of ſo great importance, as the recovery of an advantagious piece of ground, whereon different parties may with ſafety not only treat, but agree in order to a ſpeedy accommodation.

§. 2. We come therefore cloſely to the buſineſs in hand, and for the better clearing of our paſſage, we ſhall firſt diſcuſs the nature of a divine right, and ſhew whereon an unalterable divine right muſt be founded, and then proceed to ſhew how far any form of Government in the Church is ſettled upon ſuch a right. Right in the general is a relative thing, and the ſignification and import of it muſt be taken from the reſpect it bears to the Law which gives it. For although in common acceptation it be often underſtood to be the ſame with the Law its ſelf, as it is the rule of actions (in which ſenſe *Jus naturæ, gentium, civile,* is taken for the ſeveral Laws of Nature, Nations and particular States) yet I ſay *jus,* and ſo right, is properly ſomething accruing to a perſon by vertue of that Law which is made, and ſo *jus naturæ* is that right which every man is inveſted in by the Law of nature, which is properly *jus per-*

τὸ δίκαιον ἀναλογόν τι. *Ariſt.* Eth. *l.* 5. c. 6.

ſonæ, and is by ſome call'd *jus activum*, which is defined by *Grotius* to be *Qualitas moralis perſonæ competens ad aliquid juſte habendum aut agendum*; by *Leſſius* to be *Poteſtas legitima ad rem aliquam obtinendam*, &c. So that by theſe deſcriptions, right is that power which a man hath by Law to do, have or obtain any thing. But the moſt full deſcription of it is given by *Martinius*, that it is *adhærens perſonæ neceſſitas vel poteſtas recta ad aliquid agendum, omittendum aut permittendum*, that whereby any perſon lies under a neceſſity of doing, omitting or ſuffering a thing to be, or elſe hath a lawful authority of doing, *&c.* For we are to conſider that there is a twofold right, either ſuch whereby a man hath liberty and freedom by the Law to do any thing; or ſuch whereby it becomes a man's neceſſary duty to do any thing. The opening of the difference of theſe two, and the different Influences they have upon perſons and things, is very uſeful to our preſent purpoſe; *Jus* then is firſt that which is *juſtum*; ſo *Iſidore*, *Jus dictum quia juſtum eſt.* So whatever is juſt, men have right to do it: Now a thing may be ſaid to be juſt either more generally, as it ſignifies any thing which is lawful, or in a more reſtrained ſenſe, when it implies ſome thing that is equal and due to another. So *Ariſtotle* diſtributes τὸ δίκαιον into τὸ νόμιμον ϗ τὸ ἴσον. The former ſenſe of it is here only pertinent, as it implies any thing which may be done according to Law, that is done *jure*, becauſe a man hath a right to do it. In order to this we are to obſerve, that an expreſs poſitive command is not neceſſary to make a thing lawful, but a non-prohibition by a Law is ſufficient for that. For it being the nature of Laws to bound up mens rights, what is not forbidden by the Law is thereby ſuppoſed to be left in mens power ſtill to do it. So that it is to little purpoſe for men to ſeek for poſitive commands for every particular action to make it lawful; it ſufficeth to make any action lawful, if there be no bar made by any direct or conſequential prohibition: unleſs it be in ſuch things whoſe lawfulneſs and goodneſs depend upon a mere poſitive command. For in thoſe things which are therefore only good becauſe commanded, a command is neceſſary to make them lawful, as in immediate poſitive acts of worſhip towards God; in which nothing is lawful any farther than it is founded upon a divine command. I ſpeak not of circumſtances belonging to the acts of worſhip, but whatever is looked upon as a part of divine worſhip if it be not commanded by God himſelf, it is no ways acceptable to him, and therefore not lawful. So our Saviour cites that out of the Prophet, *In vain do they worſhip me, teaching for doctrines, the commandments of men*, which the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt and *Syriack* verſion render thus, *Reverentia quam mihi exhibent, eſt ex præcepto & documento humano*, plainly imputing the reaſon of God's rejecting their worſhip to the want of a divine command for what they did. And therefore *Tertullian* condemns all thoſe things to be *vacuæ obſervationis & ſuperſtitioni deputanda*, as ſuperſtitious, which are done *ſine ullius Dominici aut Apoſtolici præcepti autoritate*, without the warrant of divine command. Although even here we may ſay too, that it is not merely the want of a divine precept which makes any part of divine worſhip uncommanded by God unlawful, but the general prohibition, that nothing ſhould be done in the immediate worſhip of God, but what we have a divine command for. However in matters of mere decency and order in the Church of God, or in any other civil action of the lives of men, it is enough to make things lawful, if they are not for-

bidden

Grot. de jure belli & pac. lib. 1. *cap.* 1. §. 4. *Leſſ. de juſtit. & jure, l.* 2. *cap.* 2. *Dub.* 1. *Etymol. Philol. voc. Jus.*

Etymol. l. 5. *cap.* 3.

Ethic. l. 5. *cap.* 2.

Matt. 15. 9. Iſa. 29. 11.

Tertull. de orat. Cap. 12. *v. Herald. digreſſ. lib.* 2. *cap.* 2. *in Tertull.*

bidden. But againſt this, that a non-prohibition is warrant enough to make any thing lawful, this objection will be ſoon levyed, that it is an argument *ab authoritate negativè*, and thefore it is of no force: To which I anſwer, that the rule if taken without limitation upon which this objection is founded, is not true; for although an argument *ab authoritate negativè* as to matter of Fact avails not, yet the negative from authority as to matter of law and command is of great force and ſtrength. I grant the argument holds not here; we do not read that ever Chriſt or his Apoſtles did ſuch a thing, therefore it is not to be done; but this, We read of no law or precept commanding us to do it, therefore it is not unlawful not to do it; and we read of no Prohibition fobidding us to do it, therefore it may be lawfully done; this holds true and good, and that upon this twofold reaſon. Firſt, from God's intention in making known his will; which was not to record every particular fact done by himſelf, or Chriſt, or his Apoſtles, but it was to lay down thoſe general and ſtanding Laws, whereby his Church in all ages ſhould be guided and ruled: and in order to a perpetual obligation upon the conſciences, there muſt be a ſufficient promulgation of thoſe laws which muſt bind men. Thus in the caſe of infant-baptiſm, it is a very weak unconcluding argument to ſay that Infants muſt not be baptized, becauſe we never read that Chriſt or his Apoſtles did it; for this is a negative in matter of fact; but on the other ſide it is an evidence that infants are not to be excluded from baptiſm, becauſe there is no divine law which doth prohibit their admiſſion into the Church by it; for this is the negative of a law; and if it had been Chriſt's intention to have excluded any from admiſſion into the Church who were admitted before as infants were, there muſt have been ſome poſitive law whereby ſuch an intention of Chriſt ſhould have been expreſſed; for nothing can make that unlawful which was a duty before, but a direct and expreſs prohibition from the legiſlator himſelf, who alone hath power to reſcind as well as to make laws. And therefore *Antipædobaptiſts* muſt inſtead of requiring a poſitive command for baptizing infants, themſelves produce an expreſs prohibition excluding them, or there can be no appearance of reaſon given why the Goſpel ſhould exclude any from theſe privileges, which the law admitted them to. Secondly, I argue from the intention and end of laws, which is to circumſcribe and reſtrain the natural liberty of man, by binding him to the obſervation of ſome particular precepts. And therefore where there is not a particular command and prohibition, it is in Nature and reaſon ſuppoſed that men are left to their natural freedom, as is plain in poſitive humane laws; wherein men by compact and agreement for their mutual good in ſocieties were willing to reſtrain themſelves from thoſe things which ſhould prejudice the good of the community; this being the ground of mens firſt incloſing their rights and Common privileges, it muſt be ſuppoſed, that what is not ſo incloſed, is left common to all as their juſt right and privilege ſtill. So it is in divine poſitive laws, God intending to bring ſome of mankind to happineſs by conditions of his own appointing, hath laid down many poſitive precepts, binding men to the practice of thoſe things as duties which are commanded by him. But where we find no command for performance, we cannot look upon that as an immediate duty, becauſe of the neceſſary relation between duty and law; and ſo where we find no prohibition, there we can have no ground to think that men are debarred from the liberty of doing things not forbidden. For as we ſay of exceptions as to general laws and rules, that an exception expreſſed *firmat regulam in non exceptis*, makes the rule ſtronger in things not expreſſed as excepted; ſo it is as to divine prohibitions; as to the poſitives, that thoſe prohibitions we read in Scripture make other things not prohibited to be therefore lawful, becauſe not expreſly forbidden. As God's forbidding *Adam* to taſte of the fruit of one tree did give him a liberty to taſte of all the reſt. Indeed, had not God at all revealed his will and laws to us by his word, there might have been ſome plea why men ſhould have waited for particular revelations to dictate the goodneſs or evil of particular actions, not determined by the law of nature; but ſince God hath revealed his will, there can be no reaſon given why thoſe things ſhould not be lawful to do, which God hath not thought fit to forbid men the doing of. Further, we are to obſerve that in theſe things which are thus undetermined in reference to an obligation to duty, but left to our natural liberty as things lawful, the contrary to that which is thus lawful, is not thereby made unlawful. But both parts are left in mens power to do, or not to do them; as is evident in all thoſe things which carry a general equity with them, and are therefore conſonant to the law of nature, but have no particular obligation, as not flowing immediately from any dictate of the natural law. Thus community of goods is lawful by the law and principles of nature, yet every man hath a lawful right to his goods by dominion and propriety. And in a ſtate of community it was the right of every man to impropriate upon a juſt equality, ſuppoſing a preceding compact and mutual agreement. Whence it is that ſome of the School-men ſay, that although the Law of nature be immutable as to its precepts and prohibitions, yet not as to its demonſtrations (as they call them) as, *Do, as you would be done to*, bind always indiſpenſably; but *that in a ſtate of nature all things are common to all:* This is true, but it binds not men to the neceſſary obſervance of it. Theſe which they call demonſtrations are only ſuch things as are agreeable to nature, but not particularly commanded by any indiſpenſable precept of it. Thus likewiſe it is agreeable to nature that the next of the kindred ſhould be heir to him who dies inteſtate, but he may lawfully wave his intereſt if he pleaſe. Now to apply this to our preſent caſe, according to this ſenſe of *jus* for that which is lawful, thoſe things may be ſaid to be *jure divino* which are not determined one way or other by any poſitive Law of God, but are left wholly as things lawful, to the prudence of men to determine them in a way agreeable to natural light, and the general rules of the word of God. In which ſenſe I aſſert any particular form of government agreed on by the governours of the Church, conſonant to the general rules of Scripture, to be by divine right, *i. e.* God by his own Laws hath given men a power and liberty to determine the particular form of Church Government among them. And hence it may appear that though one form of government be agreeable to the word, it doth not follow that another is not; or becauſe one is lawful, another is unlawful; but one form may be more agreeable to ſome parts, places, people and times than others are. In which caſe that form of government is to be ſettled which is moſt agreeable to the preſent ſtate of a place, and is moſt advantagiouſly conducible to the promoting the ends of Church-Government in that place or nation. I conclude then according to this

Alex. Alerſis, part. 3. *q.* 27. *m.* 3.

ſenſe of *jus*, that the *Ratio regiminis Eccleſiaſtici* is *juris divini naturalis*, That the reaſon of the Church-Government is immutable, and holds in all times and places, which is the preſervation of the peace and unity of the Church; but the *modus regiminis Eccleſiaſtici*, the particular form of that Government is *Juris Divini permiſſivi*, that both the laws of God and nature have left it to the prudence of particular Churches to determine it. This may be cleared by a parallel inſtance: The reaſon and the ſcience of Phyſick is immutable, but the particular preſcriptions of that ſcience are much varied, according to the different tempers of Patients. And the very ſame reaſon in Phyſick which preſcribes one ſort of Phyſick to one, doth preſcribe a different ſort to another, becauſe the temper or diſeaſe of the one calls for a different method of cure, yet the ground and end of both preſcriptions was the very ſame, to recover the Patient from his diſtemper. So I ſay in our preſent caſe; the ground and reaſon of Government in the Church is unalterable *by Divine Right*, yea, and that very reaſon which determines the particular forms; but yet thoſe particular forms flowing from that immutable reaſon, may be very different in themſelves, and may alter according to the ſeveral circumſtances of times, and places, and perſons, for the more commodious advancing the main end of Government. As in morality there can be but one thing to a man *in genere ſummi boni*, as the chief Good, *quo tendit & in quod dirigit arcum*——— to which he refers all other things, yet there may be many things *in genere boni conducentis*, as means in order to attaining that end. So though Church-Government vary not as to the ground, end and reaſon of it, yet it may as to the particular forms of it: As is further evident as to forms of civil Government, though the end of all be the ſame, yet Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy are in themſelves lawful means for the attaining the ſame common end. And as *Alenſis* determines it in the caſe of community of goods by the Law of nature, that the ſame reaſon of the Law of nature which did dictate Community of goods to be moſt ſuitable to man in the ſtate of innocency, did in his fal'n eſtate preſcribe a propriety of goods, as moſt agreeable to it; ſo that herein the *modus obſervantiæ* differed, but the *ratio præcepti* was the ſame ſtill; which was man's comfortable enjoyment of the accommodations of life: which in innocency might have been beſt done by community, but in man's degenerate condition, muſt be by a propriety. So the ſame reaſon of Church-Government may call for an equality in the perſons, acting as Governours of the Church in one place, which may call for ſuperiority and ſubordination in another.

§. 3 Having now diſpatched the firſt ſenſe of a divine right, I come to the other, which is the main ſeat of the controverſie, and therefore will require a longer debate. And ſo *Jus* is that which makes a thing to become a duty: ſo *jus quaſi juſſum*, and *juſſa jura*, as *Feſtus* explains it, *i. e.* that whereby a thing is not only *licitum*, in mens lawful power to do it or no, but is made *debitum*, and is conſtituted a duty by the force and vertue of a divine command. Now man's obligation to any thing as a duty doth ſuppoſe on the part of him from whoſe authority he derives his obligation, both *legiſlation* and *promulgation*. Firſt, there muſt be a *legiſlative power* commanding it; which if it reſpects only the outward actions of a man in a nation imbodied by Laws, is the ſupreme magiſtrate; but if the obligation reſpect the conſciences of all men directly and immediately, then none have the Power to ſettle any thing by way of an univerſal ſtanding Law, but God himſelf: Who by being ſole Creator and Governour of the World, hath alone abſolute and independent Dominion and Authority over the Souls of men. But beſides legiſlation, another thing neceſſary to man's obligation to duty, is a *ſufficient promulgation* of the Law made; becauſe though before this there be the ground of obedience on man's part to all God's commands, yet there muſt be a particular declaration of the Laws, whereby man is bound in order to the determination of man's duty. Which in poſitives is ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that unleſs there be a ſufficient promulgation and declaration of the will of the Law-giver, man's ignorance is excuſable in reference to them, and ſo frees from guilt and the obligation to puniſhment; but it is otherwiſe in reference to the dictates to the natural Law, wherein though man be at a loſs for them, yet his own contracted pravity being the cauſe of his blindneſs, leaves him without excuſe. Hence it is ſaid with good reaſon, that though man under the moral Law, was bound to obey Goſpel precepts, as to the reaſon and ſubſtance of the duties by them commanded, as Faith, Repentance from dead Works, and new obedience; yet a more full and particular revelation by the Goſpel was neceſſary, for the particular determination of the general acts of obedience, to particular objects under their ſeveral Modifications expreſſed in the Goſpel. And therefore Faith and Repentance under the moral Law, taken as a tranſcript of the Law of nature, were required under their general notion as acts of obedience, but not in that particular relation which thoſe acts have under the Covenant of Grace. Which particular determination of the general acts to ſpecial objects under different reſpects, ſome call New precepts of the Goſpel, others New light; but taking that light as it hath an influence upon the conſciences of men, the difference is ſo ſmall, that it deſerves not to be named a Controverſie.

But that which I am now clearing is this, that whatſoever binds Chriſtians as an univerſal ſtanding Law, muſt be clearly revealed as ſuch, and laid down in Scripture in ſuch evident terms, as all who have their ſenſes exerciſed therein, may diſcern it to have been the will of Chriſt, that it ſhould perpetually oblige all believers to the World's end, as is clear in the caſe of baptiſm, and the Lord's-Supper. But here I ſhall add one thing by way of caution; that there is not the ſame neceſſity for a particular and clear revelation in the *alteration* of a *Law unrepealed* in ſome circumſtances of it, as there is for the eſtabliſhing of a *New Law*. As to the former, *viz.* the change of a ſtanding Law as to ſome particular circumſtance, a different practice by perſons guided by an infallible ſpirit is ſufficient; which is the caſe, as to the obſervation of the Lord's-Day under the Goſpel: For the fourth Command ſtanding in force as to the morality of it, a different practice by the Apoſtles may be ſufficient for the particular determination of the more ritual and occaſional part of it, which was the limitation of the obſervation of it to that certain day. So likewiſe that other Law ſtanding in force, that perſons taken into covenant with God, ſhould be admitted by ſome viſible ſign, apoſtolical practice clearly manifeſted, may be ſufficient ground to conclude what the mind of *Chriſt* was, as to the application of it to particular perſons; and what qualifications are requiſite in ſuch as are capable of admiſſion, as in the caſe of Infants. Whereby it is clear why there is no particular Law or command in reference to them under the Goſpel, becauſe it was only the application of a Law in force already to particular perſons, which might be gathered ſufficiently from the Apoſtles practice, the Analogy of the diſpenſation, the equal reaſon of excluſion under the Law, and yet notwithſtanding the continual admiſſion of them then into the ſame Goſpel-Covenant; Circumciſion being the ſeal of the righteouſneſs of faith. Rom. 4. 8. But this by the way to prevent miſtakes. We muſt now by parity of reaſon ſay, that either the former Law, in thoſe things wherein it was not typical, muſt hold in reference to the form of Government in the Church of Chriſt, or elſe that Chriſt by an univerſal Law hath ſetled all order in Church Government among the Paſtors themſelves; or elſe that he hath left it to the prudence of every particular Church, to determine its own form of Government, which I conceive is the direct ſtate of the Queſtion about Divine Right, *viz.* Whether the particular form of Government in the Church be ſetled by an univerſal binding Law or no?

§. 4. But for a farther clearing the ſtate of the queſtion, we muſt conſider what it is that makes an unalterable Divine Right, or a ſtanding Law in the Church of God: for thoſe who found forms of Government upon a Divine Right, do not plead a Law in expreſs terms, but ſuch things from whence a Divine Right by Law may be inferred. Which I now come to examine; and that which I lay down as a *Poſtulatum*, or a certain concluſion according to which I ſhall examine others aſſertions concerning Divine Right, is, That nothing is founded upon a Divine Right, nor can bind Chriſtians directly or conſequentially as a poſitive Law, but what may be certainly known to have come from God, with an intention to oblige believers to the world's end. For either we muſt ſay it binds Chriſtians as a Law when God did not intend it ſhould, or elſe God's intentions to bind all believers by it muſt be clearly manifeſted. Now then, ſo many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually, a thing may be ſaid to be of an unalterable Divine Right; and thoſe can be no more than theſe two; Either by the Law of Nature, or by ſome poſitive Law of God: Nothing elſe can bind univerſally and perpetually but one of theſe two, or by vertue of them, as ſhall be made appear. I begin with the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature binds indiſpenſably, as it depends not upon any arbitrary conſtitutions, but is founded upon the intrinſecal nature of good and evil in the things themſelves, antecedently to any poſitive declaration of God's will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed, that Law is unalterable as to its obligation. When, I ſay, the Law of Nature is indiſpenſable, my meaning is, that in thoſe things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept, as the three firſt commands of the Moral Law, no man can by any poſitive Law be exempted from his obligation to do them; neither by any abrogation of the Laws themſelves, nor by derogation from them, nor interpretation of them, nor change in the object, matter or circumſtance, whatſoever it be. Now although the *formal reaſon* of man's obedience to the precept of this Law, be the conformity which the things commanded have to the Divine Nature and goodneſs, yet I conceive *the efficient cauſe* of mans *obligation* to theſe things, is to be fetched from the Will, Command, and pleaſure of God: Not as it is taken for an arbitrary poſitive will, but as it is executive of Divine purpoſes, and as it engraves ſuch a Law upon the hearts of men. For notwithſtanding man's reaſon, conſidered in it ſelf, be the chiefeſt inſtrument of diſcovery what are theſe neceſſary duties of humane nature (in which ſenſe *Ariſtotle* defines a natural Law to be that which πανταχȣ̃ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, hath every where the ſame force and ſtrength, *i. e.* as *Andronicus Rhodius* very well interprets it, παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς τε ὀρθῶς ϗ ὑγιῶς ἔχȣσι, ȣ̓δὲ τοῖς νοσȣ̃σι τὰς φρένας ϗ διεστραμμένοις, *among all that have the free uſe of their reaſon and faculties*) yet I ſay, it is not bare reaſon which binds men to the doing of thoſe things commanded in that Law, but as it is expreſſive of an eternal Law, and deduceth its obligation from thence. And ſo this Law, if we reſpect the riſe, extent, and immutability of it, may be call'd deſervedly the Law of Nature; but if we look at the emanation, efflux, and original of it, it is a divine Law, and ſo it is call'd by *Molina*, *Alphonſus à Caſtro*, and others. For the ſanction of this Law of Nature, as well as others, depends upon the will of God, and therefore the obligation muſt come from him, it being in the power of no other to puniſh for the breach of a Law, but thoſe who had the Legiſlative power to cauſe the obligation to it. It appears then from hence, that whatever by juſt conſequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature, is of Divine Right, becauſe from the very nature of that Law (it being indiſpenſible) it appears that God had an intent to oblige all perſons in the world by it.

Ethic. l. 5. *cap.* 10.

V. Selden. de jure nat. apud Ebræ. lib. 1. *c.* 7, & 8. *Mol. de juſt. & jur. p.* 1. *diſp.* 3. *Alphonſ. de leg. pur. l.* 2. *c.* 14.

§. 5. The ſecond way whereby we may know what is of Divine Right, is by God's poſitive Laws; for God being the Supream Governour of the world, hath the Legiſlative power in his hands, to bind to the performance of what duties he pleaſe, which carry no repugnancy in them to his Divine Nature and Goodneſs. Hence ariſe all thoſe poſitive Laws of God which we have in Scripture; for God's end in his written Law was, that man ſhould have a copy of all Divine conſtitutions by him, that he might therein read what his duty was toward his Maker. The precepts of the Law of Nature, are by the Jews call'd משפטים and מצות abſolutely, without any addition; becauſe they are of ſuch things as do perpetually bind, which becauſe they are known to all by natural light, they ſometimes call them מצות הרעת *præcepta ſcientiæ*; and being that their righteouſneſs is ſo evident and apparent, they call them המישורים דברים *verba rectitudinis:* but the cleareſt difference between the precepts of the Law of Nature, and other poſitive commands, is that which the famous *Iſ. Caſaubon* takes notice of out of the Jewiſh Doctors. *Obſervant doctiſſimi è Rabbinis inter* מצות & חוקים *hanc eſſe differentiam, quod* Mitſvoth, *ſive præceptorum ratio aperta eſt, ut Deum cole, honora patrem & matrem, at* Chukin *ſtatuta ſive decreta earum rerum eſſe dicunt quarum* טעם *ratio ſoli Deo ſit nota, ut circumciſionis & ſimilium.* The reaſon of the Laws of Nature is evident, but of poſitive Laws there is no reaſon to be given אינו אלא גזירת מלך *non eſt alia præter decretum regis:* no other account to be given of them but the will of God. The Laws of Nature are by the LXX. often call'd δικαιώματα, and ſo uſed, *Rom.* 2. 16. by *Juſtin Martyr*, τὰ καθόλȣ ϗ φύσει ϗ αἰώνια καλά· by *Joſephus*, τῆς φύσεως δικαιώματα· but God's poſitive Laws are call'd ἐντολαί, thence we read of *Zachary* and *Elizabeth*, Luke 1. 6. πορευόμενοι ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐντολαῖς ϗ δικαιώμασι, *walking in all the ordinances and commandments of God blameleſs*, and thoſe are call'd νόμος ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασι, by St. *Paul* Eph. 2. 15. *The Law of commandments in ordinances.* Now although this difference be not always obſerved in the words in Scripture, yet there is a vaſt difference between the things themſelves though both equally com-

Exercit. Eccleſ. adverſ. Bar. exer. 16. *ſect.* 43.

Seld. de jure Nat. apud Ebr. l. 1. *cap.* 10.

Colloq. cum Tryph. Judæo. Origen. lib. 16. *cap.* 10. *V. Grot. in* Luc. 1. 6.

commanded by God. That which is moſt to our preſent purpoſe to obſerve, is, that poſitives being mutable and alterable in themſelves, a bare Divine command is not ſufficient to make them immutable, unleſs there be likewiſe expreſſed, that it is the will of God that they ſhould always continue. This was that which the Jews ſtumbled at ſo much, and do to this day, becauſe they are aſſured their Law came once from God, therefore it muſt of neceſſity have a perpetual obligation: as may be ſeen in their two great Doctors *Maimonides* and *Abarbinel*, who both of them make the eternity of the Law one of the fundamental Articles of their Creed. But *Abarbinel* ſplits this Article into two; whereof the firſt is, that the Law of *Moſes* ſhall never be changed; the other, that no other Law ſhall come in ſtead of it. The original of which grand error is from want of obſerving the difference between things commanded by God, ſome of which are good, and therefore commanded; others commanded, and therefore good. In which latter, if the reaſon of the command ceaſeth, the command its ſelf obligeth no longer. As the ceremonial Law was to be their παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστὸν, which is not meant in regard of the ſharp ſevere nature of the Law to drive them unto Chriſt, as it is by many interpreted, but the Law is a Pædagogue in regard of its tutorage and conduct, as it ſignified him whoſe office it was to conduct Noblemens Children to the School (as a learned man obſerves.) This being then the office of the Law, when the Church was now entred into Chriſt's School, the office of this Pædagogue then ceaſed. And ſo the ceremonial Law needed no abrogation at all, expiring of its ſelf at Chriſt's coming, as Laws made for the times of war do when peace comes. Only becauſe the Jews were ſo hardly perſuaded that it ſhould expire, (the believing Jews conceiving at firſt the Goſpel came rather to help them to obey the Law of *Moſes* than to cancel the obligation of it) therefore it was neceſſary that a more honourable burial ſhould be given to it, and the Apoſtles ſhould *pro roſtris* declare more fully that believers were freed from that Yoke of ceremonies, under which the neck of their fore-fathers had groaned ſo long. It appears then, that a poſitive Law coming from God, doth not merely, by vertue of its being enacted by God, bind perpetually all perſons, unleſs there be a declaration of God's will adjoined, that it ſhould do ſo.

Maimon. de fundam. legis, cap. 9. ſect. 1. Abarb. de Capit, fidei, cap. 8. p. 29. Ed. Vorſtii.

Gal. 3. 24.

§. 6. It will be here then well worth our enquiry to find out ſome κριτήρια or notes of difference whereby to know when poſitive Laws bind immutably, when not; I ſhall lay down theſe following. Firſt, when the ſame reaſon of the command continues ſtill, then we cannot conceive how that which was inſtituted upon ſuch an account as remains ſtill, ſhould not have the ſame force now which it had at firſt. That poſitive Law under which *Adam* was in his ſtate of innocency touching the forbidden fruit, did not bind any longer than his fall; becauſe the reaſon of the command ceaſed, which was the tryal of man's obedience: For which, God made choice of a very facile and eaſie command, according to that rule of Politicians, *In minimis obedientiæ periculum faciunt Legiſlatores*, of which they give this rational account, *Quia legiſlatoris ad obedientiam obligantis potius habenda eſt ratio quam rei de quâ lex eſt lata:* thence aroſe that Law of the *Ephori* at *Sparta*, *barbam tondere*, to which no other reaſon was annexed but this, *obtemperare legibus*, to learn them to obey the Laws. This was God's aim in that eaſie command given to *Adam*, to make thereon an experiment of man's willingneſs to obey his maker, and wherein man ſoon loſt that *Obſequii gloriâ*, as he in *Tacitus* calls it, which as *Pliny* ſaith is *in eo major quod quis minus velit*. But had this Law been a ſtanding Law for all mankind, it would have continued its obligation ſtill; but ſince we ſee that it was only a perſonal, temporary, probative precept; for no ſooner was man fallen but its obligation ceaſed. So likewiſe thoſe precepts of the Judicial Law, which immediately reſpected the Common-wealth of the Jews as ſuch, their obligation reacheth not to Chriſtians at all, nor (as it is generally conceived) to the Jews themſelves, when out of the Confines of their own country, becauſe the reaſon of thoſe Laws doth neither deſcend to Chriſtians, nor did travel abroad with the Jews. But thoſe judicial Laws which are founded upon common equity do bind ſtill, not by vertue of that *ſanction*, but by virtue of common principles of equity, which certainly in the preſent ſhortneſs of humane reaſon cannot be fetched from a clearer fountain than thoſe Laws which once came from the fountain of goodneſs: none of whoſe conſtitutions can any ways be ſuppoſed to deviate from the exacteſt rules of juſtice and equity. And upon this very ground too, ſome part of the fourth commandment is abrogated, and the other continues to bind ſtill; For the reaſon of the ceremonial and occaſional part is ceaſed, and the reaſon of what was moral, continues. Therefore the School-men ſay right of the Sabbath day, *Cultus eſt à naturâ, modus à lege, virtus à Gratiâ.* Nature dictates that God ſhould be worſhipped, the Law informs what day and time to ſpend in his worſhip, Grace muſt enable us to perform that worſhip on that day in a right manner. And becauſe the ſame reaſon for God's worſhip continues ſtill, therefore it is a precept of the natural Law, that God ſhould be worſhipped. What time preciſely muſt be ſpent in God's worſhip (as one day in ſeven) though the reaſon be evident to the nature of it when it is made known, yet it is hard to conceive that nature could have found out the preciſe determination of the time. Although I muſt confeſs the general conſent of nations, as to the ſeventh part, (if it were fully cleared) would ſpeak fair to be the voice of nature, or at leaſt a tradition received from the Sons of *Noah*, which, if ſo, will be an evidence of the obſervation of the Sabbath before the Children of Iſraels being in the Wilderneſs. But granting that the ſeventh part of time was a poſitive Law of God, yet I ſay it binds immutably, becauſe there is as ſtrong a reaſon for it now as ever, and *ratio immutabilis præcepti, facit præceptum immutabile.* This I take to be the ſenſe of thoſe who diſtinguiſh between *morale poſitivum*, and *morale naturale*, *i. e.* that ſome things are ſo moral, that even nature its ſelf can diſcover them, as that God ſhould be worſhipped. Other things are ſo moral, that though the reaſon of them be founded in nature, yet there wants divine revelation to diſcover them to us; but when once diſcovered, are diſcerned to be very agreeable to common principles of reaſon: And theſe when thus diſcovered, are as immutably obligatory as the other, becauſe the reaſon of them is immutable. And of this nature is the determination of the particular time for God's worſhip, and limitation of it to one day in ſeven. But what was in that precept merely occaſional, as the firſt and original ground of its limitation to the ſeventh in order, *God's reſting on that day from the work of Creation*, and the further ground of its inforcement to the Jews, *viz. their deliverance out of Egypt*; theſe being not immutable but temporary and occaſional, may upon as great ground given, and approved of

Gen. 2. 2.
Deut. 5. 15.

God for that end (as is evident by the Apoſtles practice) be ſufficient reaſon of the alteration of the ſeventh day to the firſt day of the week. By this may briefly be ſeen how irrationally thoſe ſpeak, who ſay we have no farther ground for our obſervation of the Lord's day now, than for other arbitrary Feſtivals in the Church, *viz.* The tradition of the Church of God. I grant, the tradition of the Church doth acquaint us with Apoſtolical practice, but the ground of our obſervation of the Lord's day, is not the Church's tradition, but that Apoſtolical practice conveyed by univerſal tradition, (which ſetting aſide the Feſtivals obſerved upon the Lord's day, can very hardly be found for any other.) But ſuppoſing univerſal tradition for other Feſtivals, I ſay here tradition is not only uſed as a teſtimony and inſtrument of conveyance, as in the other caſe of the Lord's day; but is it ſelf the only argument, and the very ground of the original obſervation: Between which two, what a wide difference there is, let any rational man judge. But for a farther clearing this obſervation, we muſt conſider, that the reaſon of the command, which we ſay is the meaſure of its obligation, muſt not be fetched from mens uncertain conjectures, (among whom dreams often paſs for reaſons) but it muſt be either expreſſed in the Law its ſelf, or deducible by apparent and eaſie collection from it; as is plain in the decrees of the Apoſtles about *things ſtrangled, and offered to Idols*, where the reaſon of the command is plainly implied, to wit, for preſent compliance with the Jews; and therefore no ſooner did the reaſon of the command ceaſe, but the obligation of it ceaſed too: but of this more afterwards. This is one way then to diſcern the difference between poſitive Laws, as to the obligation of them, by the ground and reaſon of the command. And therefore it is well obſerved by Divines, (which farther confirms what I now prove) that no command doth bind againſt the reaſon of the command; becauſe it is not the words, but the ſenſe and reaſon of a command which hath the greateſt obligatory force. Therefore *Tully* tells us that the *ratio juris & legiſlatoris conſilium*, is the beſt interpreter of any Law: who excellently and largely proves that the reaſon of the Law is the law, and not the words. So much for the firſt rule.

Acts 15.29.

Orat. pro A. Cacin.

§. 7. Secondly, Another way to know when poſitive Laws are immutable, is, when God's will is expreſly declared that ſuch Laws ſhall bind immutably. For it being granted on all hands that God may bind us to thoſe things which are left indifferent by the Law of nature, and likewiſe for what term he pleaſe; the only enquiry left, is to ſee in his word whether he hath ſo bound us or no; and if he hath, whether he hath left it in man's power to revoke his Laws. For as to poſitive Laws expreſly laid down in Scripture, the ground of which is only as the Jews ſpeak נרוית מלך *the will of the King*, *i. e.* God's own pleaſure, without any reaſon or occaſion of it ſelf expreſſed or neceſſarily implied, theſe do bind immutably, unleſs the ſame power which commanded them, doth again revoke them. For we cannot in any wiſe conceive that the wiſe God ſhould after the declaring his own will, leave it in the power of any corrupt fallible being to determine, or to diſpence with the obligation of his own Laws. Which to do, and inſtead of them to enforce others immediately upon the conſciences of men, as ſtanding Laws, is an attempt beyond that of the Giants againſt Heaven, (or the men at *Babel*) that being only an affectation of reaching Heaven, but this an actual uſurpation of God's ſupreme and legiſlative power and authority. But though man hath not, God always reſerves to himſelf a power to relax, interpret, and diſpence with his own poſitive Laws, which imply no repugnancy to his own nature. And this power is always to be underſtood in all Laws to be reſerved to God, where he hath not himſelf declared that he will not uſe it; which is done either by the annexing an oath or a promiſe, which the Apoſtle calls the *two* Heb. 6. 18. *immutable things in which it is impoſſible for God to lie.* For though God be free to promiſe, yet when he hath promiſed, his own nature and faithfulneſs binds him to performance; in which ſenſe I underſtand thoſe who ſay, God in making promiſes is bound only to himſelf, and not to men; that is, that the ground of performance ariſeth from God's faithfulneſs. For elſe if we reſpect the right coming by the promiſe, that muſt immediately reſpect the perſon to whom it is made, and in reſpect of which we commonly ſay that the promſer is bound to performance. But the caſe is otherwiſe in penal Laws, which though never ſo ſtrict, do imply a power of *relaxation* in the Legiſlator: becauſe penal Laws do only conſtitute the *debitum pœnæ*, and bind the ſinner over to puniſhment, but do not bind the Legiſlator to an actual execution upon the debt. Which is the ground that the perſon of a Mediator was admittable in the place of fallen man, becauſe it was a penal Law, and therefore relaxable. But becauſe the debt of puniſhment is immediately contracted upon the breach of the Law, therefore ſatisfaction was neceſſary to God as Law-giver, either by the perſon himſelf, or another for him; becauſe it was not conſiſtent with the holineſs of God's nature and his wiſdom as Governor, to relax an eſtabliſhed Law, without valuable conſideration. Now for the third kind of God's Laws beſides promiſſory and penal, *viz.* ſuch as are merely poſitive reſpecting duties, which become ſuch by vertue of an expreſs command: theſe, though they be revocable in themſelves, yet being revocable only by God himſelf, and his own power, ſince he hath already in his word fully revealed his will, unleſs therein he hath declared when their obligation ſhall ceaſe, they continue irreverſible. This is the caſe as to the Sacraments of the New Teſtament, which being commands merely poſitive, yet Chriſt commanding Chriſtians as Chriſtians to obſerve them, and not as Chriſtians of the firſt and ſecond ages of the Church, his mind can be no otherwiſe interpreted concerning them, *Catech. Racov. cap. 4.* than that he did intend immutably to bind all Chriſtians to the obſervance of them. For although the Socinians ſay, that baptiſm was only a Rite inſtituted by Chriſt for the paſſing men from Judaiſm and Gentiliſm to Chriſtianity, yet we are not bound to look upon all as reaſon that comes from thoſe who profeſs themſelves the admirers of it. For Chriſt's command no where implying ſuch a limitation; and an outward viſible profeſſion of Chriſtianity being a duty now, and the Covenant entred into by that Rite of initiation, as obligatory as ever, we have no Acts 3. 38. reaſon to think that Chriſt's command doth not reach us now, eſpecially the promiſe being made to as many as God ſhall call, and conſequently the ſame duty required which was then in order to the obtaining of the ſame ends. A third way to diſcern the immutability of poſitive Laws, is, when the things commanded in particular are neceſſary to the being, ſucceſſion, and continuance of ſuch a ſociety of men profeſſing the Goſpel, as is inſtituted and approved by Chriſt himſelf. For Chriſt muſt be ſuppoſed to have the power himſelf to order what ſociety he pleaſe, and appoint what orders he pleaſe to be obſerved by them; what Rites and Ceremonies to be uſed in admiſſion of Members into his Church, in their continuing in it; in the way, means, manner of ejection out of it; in the preſerving the ſucceſſion of his Church, and the adminiſtration of ordinances of his appointment. Theſe being thus neceſſary for the maintaining and upholding this ſociety, they are thereby of a nature as unalterable, as the duty of obſerving what Chriſt hath commanded is. How much theſe things concern the reſolution of the Queſtion propoſed, will appear afterwards. Thus we have gained a reſolution of the ſecond thing, whereon an unalterable Divine Right is founded; *viz.* either upon the dictates of the Law of Nature, concurring with the Rules of the written word; or upon expreſs poſitive Laws of God, whoſe reaſon is immutable, or which God hath declared ſhall continue, as neceſſary to the being of the Church.

§. 8. The next thing is to examine the other pretences which are brought for a Divine Right; which are either Scripture *examples*, or *Divine acts*, or *Divine approbation.* For *Scripture examples:* Firſt, I take it for granted on all hands, that all Scripture examples do not bind us to follow them; ſuch are the Mediatory acts of Chriſt, the Heroical acts of extraordinary perſons, all accidental and occaſional actions. Example doth not bind us as an example; for then all examples are to be followed, and ſo we ſhall of neceſſity go *qua itur, non qua eundum,* walk by the moſt examples, and not by rule. There is then no obligatory force in example it ſelf. Secondly, there muſt be then ſome rule fixed to know when examples bind, and when not: for otherwiſe there can be no diſcrimination put between examples which we are to follow, and which to avoid. This rule muſt be either immediately *obligatory*, making it a duty to follow ſuch examples, or elſe *directive*, declaring what examples are to be followed: And yet even this latter doth imply as well as the former, that the following theſe examples thus declared, is become a duty. There can be no duty without a Law making it to be a duty: and conſequently, it is the Law making it to be a duty to follow ſuch examples, which gives a Divine Right to thoſe examples, and not barely the examples themſelves. We are bound to follow Chriſt's example, not barely becauſe he did ſuch and ſuch things, (for many things he did we are not bound to follow him in) but becauſe he himſelf hath by a command made it our duty to follow him in his humility, patience, ſelf denial, *&c.* and in whatever things are ſet out in Scripture for our imitation. When men ſpeak then with ſo much confidence, that Scripture examples do bind us unalterably, they either mean that the example it ſelf makes it a duty, which I have ſhewn already to be abſurd; or elſe that the moral nature of the action done in that example, or elſe the Law making it our duty to follow the example, though in it ſelf it be of no moral nature. If the *former* of theſe two, then it is the morality of the action binds us, without its being *incarnate* in the example: For the example in actions not moral, binds not at all, and therefore the example binds only by vertue of the morality of it, and conſequently, it is the morality of the action which binds, and not the example. If the *latter*, the rule making it our duty, then it is more apparent, that it is not the example which binds neceſſarily, but that rule which makes it a duty to follow it; for examples in indifferent things do not bind without a Law making it to be a duty: And ſo it evidently appears, that all obligatory force is taken off from the examples themſelves, and reſolved into one of the two former, the moral nature of the action, or a poſitive Law. And therefore thoſe who plead the obliga-

Matth. 11. 28.
1 Joh. 2. 6.
1 Pet. 2. 22.

obligatory nature of Scripture examples, muſt either produce the moral nature of theſe examples, or elſe a rule binding us to follow thoſe examples. Eſpecially, when theſe examples are brought to found a New poſitive Law, obliging all Chriſtians neceſſarily to the end of the world. Concerning the binding nature of Apoſtolical practice, I ſhall diſcourſe largely afterwards. The next thing pleaded for a Divine Right, is by *Divine Acts*. As to this, it is again evident that all Divine Acts do not conſtitute ſuch a Right; therefore there muſt be ſomething expreſſed in thoſe Acts when ſuch a Divine Right follows them; whence we may infallibly gather it was God's intention they ſhould perpetually oblige: as is plain in the caſes inſtanced in the moſt for this purpoſe; as God's reſting on Gen. 2. 2. the ſeventh day, making the Sabbath perpetual: For it was not God's reſting that made it the Sabbath, for that is only expreſſed as the occaſion of its inſtitution; but it was God's ſanctifying the day, that is, by a Law ſetting it apart for his own ſervice, which made it a duty. And ſo Chriſt's reſurrection was not it which made the Lord's day Sabbath of Divine Right; but Chriſt's reſurrection was the occaſion of the Apoſtles altering only a circumſtantial part of a moral duty already; which being done upon ſo great reaſons, and by perſons endued with an infallible ſpirit, thereby it becomes our duty to obſerve that moral command in this limitation of time. But here it is farther neceſſary to diſtinguiſh between acts merely *poſitive*, and acts *donative* or *legal*. The former confer no right at all, but the latter do; not barely as acts, but as legal acts, that is, by ſome declaration that thoſe acts do confer right. And ſo it is in all donations, and therefore in Law the bare delivery of a thing to another doth not give a legal title to it, without expreſs transferring of dominion and propriety with it. Matth. 16. 19. 18. 18. Thus in Chriſt's delivering the Keys to *Peter* and the reſt of the Apoſtles, by that act I grant the Apoſtles had the power of the Keys by Divine Right; but then it was not any bare act of Chriſt which did it, but it was only the declaration of Chriſt's will conferring that authority upon them. Again, we muſt diſtinguiſh between a *right* conferr'd by a *donative act*, and the *unalterable nature* of that Right; for it is plain there may be a Right *perſonal* as well as *ſucceſſive*, *derivative*, and *perpetual*. And therefore it is not enough to prove that a Right was given by any act of Chriſt, unleſs it be made appear it was Chriſt's intention that Right ſhould be perpetual if it oblige ſtill. For otherwiſe the *extent of the Apoſtolical commiſſion*, *the power of working miracles*, as well as *the power of the Keys*, (whether by it we mean a power declarative of duty, or a power authoritative and penal) muſt continue ſtill, if a difference be not made between theſe two: And ſome rule found out to know when the Right conferr'd by Divine Acts is perſonal, when ſucceſſive; which rule thus found out, muſt make the Right unalterable, and ſo concerning us, and not the bare donative act of Chriſt: For it is evident they were all equally conferr'd upon the Apoſtles by an act of Chriſt; and if ſome continue ſtill, and others do not, then the bare act of Chriſt doth not make an unalterable Divine Right. And ſo though it be proved that the Apoſtles had ſuperiority of order and juriſdiction over the Paſtors of the Church by an act of Chriſt, yet it muſt farther be proved, that it was Chriſt's intention that ſuperiority ſhould continue in their ſucceſſors, or it makes nothing to the purpoſe. But this argument, I confeſs, I ſee not how thoſe who make a neceſſary Divine Right to follow upon the acts of Chriſt, can poſſibly avoid the force of. The laſt thing pleaded for Divine Right, is *Divine approbation*, but this leaſt of all conſtitutes a Divine Right: For if the actions be extraordinary, God's approbation of them as ſuch, cannot make them an ordinary duty. In all other actions which are good, and therefore only commendable, they muſt be ſo either becauſe done in conformity to God's revealed will, or to the nature of things good in themſelves. In the one it is the poſitive Law of God, in the other the Law of Nature, which made the action good, and ſo approved by God, and on that account we are bound to do it. For God will certainly approve of nothing but what is done according to his will revealed, or natural; which will and Law of his, is that which makes any thing to be of Divine Right, *i. e.* perpetually binding, as to the obſervation of it. But for acts of a merely poſitive Nature, which we read God's approbation of in Scripture, by vertue of which approbation thoſe actions do oblige us; in this caſe I ſay it is not God's mere approbation that makes the obligation, but as that approbation ſo recorded in Scripture, is a ſufficient teſtimony and declaration of God's intention to oblige men: And ſo it comes to be a poſitive Law, which is nothing elſe but a ſufficient declaration of the Legiſlator's will and intention, to bind in particular actions and caſes. Thus now we have cleared whereon a neceſſary and unalterable Divine Right muſt be founded; either upon the Law of Nature, or ſome poſitive Law of God, ſufficiently declared to be perpetually binding.

Chap. II.

Six Hypotheſes laid down, as the baſis of the following Diſcourſe. 1. *The irreverſible obligation of the Law of Nature, either by humane, or Divine poſitive Laws, in things immediately flowing from it.* 2. *Things agreeable to the Law of Nature may be lawfully practiſed in the Church of God, where there is no prohibition by poſitive Laws, enlarged into five ſubſervient Propoſitions.* 3. *Divine poſitive Laws, concerning the manner of the thing whoſe ſubſtance is determined by the Law of Nature, muſt be obeyed by vertue of the obligation of the natural Law.* 4. *Things undetermined, both by the natural and poſitive Laws of God, may be lawfully determined by the ſupreme authority in the Church of God.* 5. *What is thus determined by lawful authority, doth bind the conſciences of men ſubject to that authority, to obedience to thoſe determinations.* 6. *Things thus determined by lawful authority, are not thereby made unalterable, but may be revoked, limited, and changed by the ſame authority.*

§. 1. Having ſhewed what a Divine Right is, and whereon it is founded; our next great enquiry will be, how far Church Government is founded upon Divine Right, taken either of theſe two ways. But for our more diſtinct, clear and rational proceeding, I ſhall lay down ſome things, as ſo many *Poſtulata* or general *Principles* and *Hypotheſes*, which will be as the baſis and foundation of the following diſcourſe; which all of them concern the obligation of Laws, wherein I ſhall proceed gradually, beginning with the Law of Nature, and ſo to Divine poſitive Laws; and laſtly to ſpeak to humane poſitive Laws. The firſt Principle or hypotheſis which I lay down, is,

Hypoth. 1. *That where the Law of Nature doth determine any thing by way of duty, as flowing from the principles of it, there no poſitive Law can be ſuppoſed*

poſed to take off the obligation of it. Which I prove, both as to humane poſitive Laws and divine: Firſt as to humane. For *firſt*, the things commanded in the Law of Nature, being juſt and righteous in themſelves, there can be no obligatory Law made againſt ſuch things. *Nemo tenetur ad impoſſibile*, is true in the ſenſe of the civil Law, as well as in Philoſophy; as *impoſſibile* is taken for *turpe*, and *turpe* for that which is contrary to the dictates of nature. A man may be as well bound not to be a man, as not to act according to principles of reaſon: For the Law of Nature is nothing elſe but the dictate of right reaſon, diſcovering the good or evil of particular actions, from their conformity or repugnancy to natural light. Whatever poſitive Law is then made directly infringing and violating natural principles, is thereby of no force at all. And that which hath no obligation in it ſelf, cannot diſſolve a former obligation. Secondly, the indiſpenſableneſs of the obligation of the Law of Nature, appears from the end of all other Laws, which are agreed upon by mutual compact, which is the better to preſerve men in their rights and privileges. Now the greateſt rights of men, are ſuch as flow from Nature it ſelf; and therefore, as no Law binds againſt the reaſon of it, ſo neither can it againſt the common end of Laws. Therefore, if a humane poſitive Law ſhould be made, that God ſhould not be worſhipped, it cannot bind, being againſt the main end of Laws, which is to make men live together as reaſonable creatures, which they cannot do, without doing what Nature requires; which is, to ſerve God who made it. Again, it overturns the very foundation of all Government, and diſſolves the tye to all humane Laws, if the Law of Nature doth not bind indiſpenſably; for otherwiſe, upon what ground muſt men yield obedience to any Laws that are made? is it not by vertue of this Law of Nature, that men muſt ſtand to all compacts and agreements made? If Laws take their force among men from hence, they can bind no farther than thoſe compacts did extend, which cannot be ſuppoſed to be to violate and deſtroy their own natures. Poſitive Laws may reſtrain much of what is only of the permiſſive Law of Nature (for the intent of poſitive Laws, was to make men abate ſo much of their natural freedom, as ſhould be judged neceſſary for the preſervation of humane ſocieties) but againſt the obligatory Law of Nature, as to its precepts, no after Law can derogate from the obligation of it. And therefore it is otherwiſe between the Law of Nature and poſitive Law, than between Laws merely civil: for as to theſe the rule is, that *poſterior derogat priori*, the latter Law caſſates and nulls the obligation of the former; but as to natural Laws and poſitive, *prior derogat poſteriori*, the Law of Nature, which is firſt, takes away the obligation of a poſitive Law, if it be contrary to it. As *Juſtellus* obſerves it was in the primitive Church, in reference to the obligation of the Canons of the Councils, that ſuch as were inſerted in the *Codex Canonum*, being of the more ancient Councils, did render the obligation of later Canons invalid, which were contrary to them, unleſs it were in matters of ſmall moment. We ſee then, that ſuppoſing the Law of Nature doth not continue obligatory, the obligation of all humane poſitive Laws will fall with it (as the ſuperſtructure needs muſt when the foundation is removed) for if any other Law of Nature may be diſſolved, why not that whereby men are bound to ſtand to covenants and contracts made? and if that be diſſolved, how can the obligation to humane Laws remain, which is founded upon that *baſis*? And ſo all civil ſocieties are thereby overturned.

Grot. de jure belli, &c. lib. 1. cap. 1. ſ. 10.

Præfat. in Cod. Canon. Eccleſ. Afric. p. 14.

Thirdly, it appears from the nature of that obligation which follows the Law of Nature, ſo that thereby no humane Law can bind againſt this; for humane Laws bind only outward humane actions *directly*, and internal acts only by virtue of their neceſſary connexion with, and influence upon outward actions, and not otherwiſe; but the Law of Nature immediately binds the ſoul and conſcience of man: And therefore *obligatio naturalis*, and *nexus conſcientiæ*, are made to be the ſame by *Leſſius*, *Suarez*, and others. For *Leſſius* diſputing, Whether a Will made without ſolemnity of Law, doth bind in conſcience or no? He proves it doth by this argument, from the opinion of the Lawyers, that without thoſe ſolemnities there doth ariſe from it a natural obligation, and the *hæres ab Inteſtato*, who is the next of Kin, is bound to make it good; therefore it doth bind in conſcience. So then there ariſeth a neceſſary obligation upon conſcience, from the dictates of the Law of Nature, which cannot be removed by any poſitive Law. For although there lye no action in the civil Law againſt the breach of a meerly natural Law, as in the former caſe of ſucceſſion to a will not legally made; in covenants made without conditions expreſſed, in recovery of debts from a perſon to whom money was lent in his Pupilage without conſent of his Tutor; in theſe caſes though no action lie againſt the perſons, yet this proves not that theſe have no obligation upon a man, but only that he is not reſponſible for the breach of moral honeſty in them before civil Courts. In which ſenſe thoſe Lawyers are to be underſtood which deny the obligation of the Law of Nature. But however conſcience binds the offender over to anſwer at a higher tribunal, before which all ſuch offences ſhall be puniſhed. Thus then we ſee no poſitive humane Law can diſpence with, or diſſolve the obligation of the Law of Nature. Much leſs, Secondly, can we ſuppoſe any poſitive divine Law ſhould. For although God's power be immenſe and infinite to do what pleaſeth him, yet we muſt always ſuppoſe this power to be conjoyned with goodneſs, elſe it is no divine power: and therefore *poſſe malum, non eſt poſſe*, it is no power, but weakneſs to do evil; and without this *poſſe malum* there can be no alteration made in the nature of good and evil; which muſt be ſuppoſed, if the obligation of the natural Law be diſpenſed with. Therefore it was well ſaid by *Origen*, when *Celſus* objected it as the common ſpeech of the Chriſtians, that with God all things are poſſible, that he neither underſtood *how it was ſpoken, nor what all theſe things are, nor how God could do them:* and concludes with this excellent ſpeech, Δύναται δὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς πάντα ὁ θεὸς, ἅπερ δυνάμενος τοῦ θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ἐξίσταται. *We ſay*, ſaith he, *that God can do all things which are reconcileable with his Deity, Goodneſs, and Wiſdom.* And after adds, *That as it is impoſſible for honey to make things bitter, and light to make things obſcure, ſo it is for God to do any thing that is unjuſt.* Ἐναντίον γὰρ ἐστι αὐτοῦ τῇ θειότητι καὶ τῇ καθ' αὐτὴν πάσῃ δυνάμει, ἡ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν δύναμις. *For the power of doing evil is directly contrary to the divine nature, and that omnipotency which is conſiſtent with it.* To the ſame purpoſe he ſpeaks elſewhere, οὐδὲν μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ θεὸς, βούλεται, *God wills nothing unbecoming himſelf:* And again, Φαμὲν δὲ ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι θεὸς· εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἔστι θεός. *We affirm that God cannot do evil actions, for if he could he might as well be no God. For if God ſhould do evil, he would be no God.* So then though God be omnipotent, yet it follows not that he can therefore diſſolve the obligation of the preceptive Law of nature,

Leſſ. de juſt. & jure l. 2. c. 19. dub. 3. n. 12. Suarez de leg. lib. 2. cap. 9. ſect. 6.

Orig. lib. 3. c. Celſum. p. 154. ed. Cant.

C. Celſum. l. 5. p. 247.

ture, or change the natures of good and evil. God may indeed alter the properties of thoſe things from whence the reſpects of good and evil do reſult, as in *Abraham*'s offering *Iſaac*, the *Iſraelites* taking away the *Egyptians* Jewels; which God may juſtly do by vertue of his abſolute dominion; but the change here is not in the obligation of the Law, but in the things themſelves. Murther would be an intrinſecal evil ſtill; but that which was done by immediate and explicite command from God, would have been no murther. Theft had been a ſin ſtill, but taking things alienated from their properties by God himſelf, was not theft. We conclude then, what comes immediately from the Law of nature by way of command binds immutably and indiſpenſably. Which is the firſt Hypotheſis or Principle laid down.

§. 2. The ſecond Hypotheſis is, *that things which are either deducible from the Law of nature, or by the light of nature diſcovered to be very agreeable to it, may be lawfully practiſed in the Church of God, if they be not otherwiſe determined by the poſitive Laws of God, or of lawful humane authority.* We ſhall firſt inquire into the nature of theſe things, and then ſhew the lawfulneſs of doing them. For the nature of theſe things, we muſt conſider what things may be ſaid to be of the Law of nature. They may be reduced to two heads, which muſt be accurately diſtinguiſh'd. They are either ſuch things which nature dictates to be done, or not to be done neceſſarily and immutably; or elſe ſuch things as are judged to be very agreeable to natural light, but are ſubject to poſitive determinations. The former are called by ſome *jus naturæ obligativum*; by others *jus naturæ proprium*, whereby things are made neceſſarily duties or ſins; the latter *jus naturæ promiſſivum*, and *reductivum*, for which it is ſufficient if there be no repugnancy to natural light. From theſe two ariſe a different obligation upon men; either ſtrict, and is called by *Covarruvias obligatio ex juſtitiâ*, an obligation of duty and juſtice; the other larger, *obligatio ex communi æquitate*, or *ex honeſtate morali*, an obligation from common equity, that is according to the agreeableneſs of things to natural light. The former I have ſhewn already do bind indiſpenſably, but theſe latter are ſubject to poſitive Laws. For our better underſtanding the obligation of theſe (which is more intricate than the former) we ſhall conſider men under a double notion, either in a ſtate of abſolute liberty, which ſome call a ſtate of nature, or elſe in a ſtate wherein they have reſtrained their own liberty by mutual compacts, or are determined by a higher Law. Theſe things premiſed, I lay down theſe propoſitions.

Covarr. c. 10. de teſtam. n. 1.

1. *In a ſtate of abſolute liberty before any poſitive Laws were ſuperadded to the natural, whatſoever was not neceſſarily determined by the obligatory Law of Nature, was wholly left to mens power to do it or not, and belongs to the permiſſive Law of Nature.* And thus all thoſe things which are ſince determined by poſitive Laws, were in ſuch a ſuppoſed ſtate, left to the free choice of a man's own will. Thus it was in mens power to join in civil ſociety with whom they pleaſed, to recover things, or vindicate injuries in what way they judged beſt, to ſubmit to what conſtitutions alone they would themſelves, to chooſe what form of Government among them they pleaſed, to determine how far they would be bound to any authority choſen by themſelves, to lodge the legiſlative and coercive power in what perſons they thought fit, to agree upon puniſhments anſwerable to the nature of offences. And ſo in all other things not repugnant to the common light of reaſon, and the dictates of the preceptive part of the Law of Nature.

2. *A ſtate of abſolute liberty not agreeing to the nature of man conſidered in relation to others, it was in mens power to reſtrain their own liberty upon compacts ſo far as ſhould be judged neceſſary for the ends of their mutual ſociety.* A ſtate of nature I look upon only as an imaginary ſtate, for better underſtanding the nature and obligation of Laws. For it is confeſſed by the greateſt aſſertors of it, that the relation of Parents and Children cannot be conceived in a ſtate of natural liberty, becauſe Children aſſoon as born are actually under the power and authority of their parents. But for our clearer apprehending the matter in hand, we ſhall proceed with it. Suppoſing then all thoſe former rights were in their own power; it is moſt agreeable to natural reaſon, that every man may part with his right ſo far as he pleaſe for his own advantage. Here now, men finding a neceſſity to part with ſome of their rights to defend and ſecure their moſt conſiderable ones, men begin to think of compacts one with another (taking this as a principle of the natural Law, and the foundation of ſociety, that all Covenants are to be performed.) When they are thus far agreed, they then conſider the terms upon which they ſhould enter into ſociety one with another. And here men deveſt themſelves of their original liberty, and agree upon an incloſure of properties, and the fences of thoſe properties; I mean, upon living together in a civil ſtate, and of the Laws they muſt be ruled by. This is apparently agreeable to natural reaſon, the things being in their own power, which they agree to part with.

Hobs *de Cive cap.* 1. *ſ.* 11. *Ann.*

§. 3.
Prop. 3.

Men entring upon ſocieties by mutual compacts, things thereby become good and evil which were not ſo before. Thus he who was free before to do what and how he pleaſed, is now bound to obey what Laws he hath conſented to; or elſe he breaks not only a poſitive Law, but that Law of nature which commands man to ſtand to Covenants once made, though he be free to make them. And therefore it is obſervable that the doing of things that were lawful before covenants made, and things thereby determined, may be ſo far from being lawful after, that the doing of them may contradict a principle of the obligatory Law of nature. Thus in a ſtate of liberty every one had right to what he thought fit for his uſe, but Propriety and Dominion being introduced, which was a free voluntary act, by mens determining rights, it now becomes an offence againſt the Law of nature, to take away that which is another mans. In which ſenſe alone it is that theft is ſaid to be forbidden by the Law of nature. And by the ſame reaſon he that reſiſts and oppoſeth the lawful authority, under which he is born, doth not only offend againſt the Municipal Laws of the place wherein he lives, but againſt that Original and fundamental Law of Societies, *viz.* ſtanding to Covenants once made. For it is a groſs miſtake as well as dangerous, for men to imagine that every man is born in a ſtate of abſolute liberty to chooſe what Laws and Governours he pleaſe; but every one being now born a ſubject to that authority he lives under, he is bound to preſerve it as much as in him lies; thence *Auguſtus* had ſome reaſon to ſay, He was the beſt Citizen, *qui præſentem reipublicæ ſtatum mutari non vult, that doth not diſturb the preſent ſtate of the Common-wealth*; and who as *Alcibiades* ſaith in *Thucydides*, ὅπερ ἐδέξατο σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτο συνδιασώζει, *endeavours to preſerve that form of Government he was born under.* And the reaſon of it is, that in contracts and Covenants made for Government, men look not only at themſelves, but at the benefit of poſterity; if then one party be bound to maintain the rights of the others poſterity

Paulus l. 1. *D. de furtis. Ulpian. lib. Poſt. D. de. verb. ſig.*

V. Grot. de jure belli, &c. lib. 2. *cap.* 4. *ſect.* 8.

as well as of his perſon, the other party muſt be ſuppoſed to oblige his poſterity in his Covenant to perform obedience, which every man hath power to do, becauſe Children are at their parents diſpoſal; And equity requires that the Covenant entred ſhould be of equal extent to both parties: And if a man doth expect protection for his poſterity, he muſt engage for the obedience of his poſterity too, to the Governours who do legally protect them. But the farther proſecution of theſe things belongs to another place to conſider of; my purpoſe being to treat of Government in the Church, and not in the State. The ſumm of this is, that the obligation to the performance of what things are determined (which are of the permiſſive Law of nature) by poſitive Laws, doth ariſe from the obligatory Law of nature. As the Demonſtration of the particular Problemes in the Mathematicks, doth depend upon the principles of the Theoremes themſelves; and ſo whoever denies the truth of the Probleme deduced by juſt conſequence from the Theoreme, muſt conſequently deny the truth of the Theoreme its ſelf: ſo thoſe who violate the particular determinations of the permiſſive Law of nature, do violate the obligation of the preceptive part of that Law: Obedience to the other being grounded on the principles of this.

4. *God hath power by his poſitive Laws to take in and determine as much of the permiſſive Law of nature as he pleaſe, which being once ſo determined by an univerſal Law, is ſo far from being lawful to be done, that the doing of them by thoſe under an obligation to his poſitive Laws, is an offence againſt the immutable Law of nature.* That God may reſtrain man's natural liberty, I ſuppoſe none who own God's legiſlative power over the world can deny; eſpecially conſidering that men have power to reſtrain themſelves; much more then hath God, who is the Rector and Governour of the world. That a breach of his poſitive Laws is an offence againſt the common Law of nature, appears hence; becauſe man being God's creature, is not only bound to do what is in general ſuitable to the principles of reaſon in flying evil, and chooſing good; but to ſubmit to the determinations of God's will, as to the diſtinction of good from evil. For being bound univerſally to obey God, it is implyed that man ſhould obey him in all things which he diſcovers to be his will: whoſe determination muſt make a thing not only good, but neceſſary to be done, by vertue of his ſupreme authority over men. This then needs no farther proof, being ſo clear in its ſelf.

5. *Laſtly. What things are left undetermined by divine poſitive Laws, are in the Churches power to uſe, and practiſe according as it judgeth them moſt agreeable to the rule of the Word.* That things undetermin'd by the word are ſtill lawful, evidently appears: becauſe what was once lawful, muſt have ſome poſitive Law to make it unlawful, which if there be none, it remains lawful ſtill. And that the Church of God ſhould be debar'd of any privilege of any other ſocieties, I underſtand not; eſpecially if it belong to it as a ſociety conſidered in its ſelf, and not as a particular ſociety conſtituted upon ſuch accounts as the Church is. For I doubt not but to make it evident afterwards, that many parts of Government in the Church belong not to it as ſuch in a reſtrained ſenſe, but in the general notion of it, as a ſociety of men imbodyed together by ſome Laws proper to its ſelf: Although it ſubſiſt upon a higher foundation, *viz.* of divine inſtitution, and upon higher grounds, reaſons, principles, ends; and be directed by other Laws immediately than any other ſocieties in the world are.

The third Hypotheſis is this, *Where the Law of nature determines the thing, and the divine Law determines the manner and circumſtances of the thing, there we are bound to obey the divine Law in its particular determinations, by vertue of the Law of nature in its general obligation.* As for inſtance, the Law of nature bindeth man to worſhip God; but for the way, manner and circumſtances of worſhip, we are to follow the poſitive Laws of God: becauſe as we are bound by nature to worſhip him, ſo we are bound by vertue of the ſame Law to worſhip him in the manner beſt pleaſing to himſelf. For the light of nature, though it determine the duty of worſhip, yet it doth not the way and manner; and though acts of pure obedience be in themſelves acceptable unto God, yet as to the manner of thoſe acts, and the poſitives of worſhip, they are no farther acceptable unto God than commanded by him. Becauſe in things not neceſſarily determined by the Law of nature, the goodneſs or evil of them lying in reference to Gods acceptance, it muſt depend upon his command, ſuppoſing poſitive Laws to be at all given by God to direct Men in their worſhip of him. For ſuppoſing God had not at all revealed himſelf in order to his worſhip; doubtleſs it had been lawful for men not only to pray to God and expreſs their ſenſe of their dependence upon him, but to appoint ways, time and places for the doing it, as they ſhould judge moſt convenient and agreeable to natural light. Which is evident from the Scripture its ſelf as to places: for as far as we can find, ſacrificing in high places, (that is, ſuch as were of mens own appointment) was lawful, till the Temple was built by *Solomon*; as appears by the ſeveral examples of *Gedeon*, *Samuel*, *David*, and others; Indeed after the place was ſettled by God's own Law, it became wholly ſinful: but if ſo before we ſhould not have read of God's accepting ſacrifices in ſuch places as he did *Gedeons*, nor of the Prophets doing it, as *Samuel* and *David* did. It is a diſputable caſe about Sacrifices, whether the offering of them came only from natural light, or from ſome expreſs command: the latter ſeems far more probable to me, becauſe I cannot ſee how natural light ſhould any wiſe dictate, that God would accept of the blood of other creatures as a token of man's obedience to himſelf. And *Rivet* gives this very good reaſon why the deſtruction of any thing in ſacrifice cannot belong to the Law of nature, becauſe it is only acceptable as a ſign, and token of obedience, and not ſimply as an act of obedience; and this ſign ſignifying *ex inſtituto* (for mans deſtroying the life of a beaſt can never naturally ſignifie mans obedience to God) and therefore it muſt have ſome poſitive Law; for thoſe which ſignifie only by inſtitution, and not naturally, cannot be referred to a dictate of the Law of nature. To which purpoſe it is farther obſervable that God doth ſo often in Scripture ſlight the offering of Sacrifices, in reſpect of any inherent vertue or goodneſs in the action it ſelf, or acceptableneſs to God upon the account of the thing done. In which ſenſe God ſaith, *He that killeth a bullock is as if he ſlew a man; and he that Sacrificeth a ſheep, as if he cut off a dogs neck, &c.* For what is there more in the one than in the other, but only God's appointment, which makes one acceptable and not the other? So that it is no ways probable that God would have accepted *Abel*'s ſacrifice rather than *Cain*'s, had there been no command for their ſacrificing. For as to mere natural light, *Cain*'s Sacrifice ſeems more agreeable to that than *Abel*'s, *Cain*'s being an Euchariſtical offering without hurt to other creatures, but *Abel*'s was *cruentum Sacrificium* a Sacrifice of blood. But

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Heb. 11.4. the chief ground of *Abel*'s acceptance, was his offering in faith, as the Apoſtle to the Hebrews tells us: Now faith is a higher principle than natural light, and muſt ſuppoſe divine revelation, and ſo a divine command as the principle and ground of his action. *Moſes* his ſilence in reference to a command, is no argument there was none, it not being his deſign to write at large all the particular precepts of the *oral* Law, but to deduce the Geneaology of the Patriarchs down from *Adam* and the Creation. But ſuppoſing a command given from God, determining modes and circumſtances of ſuch things of which the ſubſtance depends on a natural Law, men are as well bound to the obſervation of them after their revelation, as the other before. The one being a Teſtimony of their obedience to God as clear and full as the other; yea and ſo much the clearer evidence of obedience, in that there could be no argument for the performing of thoſe things but a divine command. And even in doing things intrinſically good, the ground of purely religious obedience is, becauſe God commands men to do thoſe things more than that they are good in themſelves: Doing a thing becauſe moſt ſuitable to nature, ſpeaking morality; but doing becauſe God commands it, ſpeaks true religion and the obedience of Faith. For as the formal reaſon of the act of faith is a divine Teſtimony diſcovered to our underſtandings, ſo the formal principle of an act of ſpiritual obedience is a divine command inclining the will, and awing it to performance. So far then as divine Law determines things, we are bound to obſerve them from the dictates of the natural Law.

§. 5. The fourth Hypotheſis: *In things which are determined both by the Law of nature, and divine poſitive Laws, as to the ſubſtance and morality of them, but not determined as to all circumſtances belonging to them, it is in the power of Lawful authority in the Church of God to determine them, ſo far as they judge them tend to the promoting the performance of them in due manner.* So that not only matters wholly left at liberty as to the ſubſtance of them are ſubject to humane Laws and Conſtitutions, but even things commanded in the Divine Law, in reference to the manner of performance, if undetermined by the ſame Law, which enforce the duty. Thus the ſetting apart ſome time for God's worſhip, is a dictate of the natural Law: that the firſt day of the week be that time, is determin'd under the Goſpel; but in what places, at what hours, in what order, decency and ſolemnity this worſhip ſhall be then performed, are circumſtances not determined in Scripture, but only by general rules: as to theſe then, ſo they be done in conformity to thoſe rules, they are ſubject to humane poſitive determinations. But this is not an *Hypotheſis* in the age we live in to be taken for granted without proving it: ſome denying the Magiſtrate any power at all in matters of religion, others granting a defenſive, protective power of that religion which is profeſſed according to the Laws of Chriſt, but deny any determining power in the Magiſtrate concerning things left undetermin'd by the Scripture. This *Hypotheſis* then hath landed me into a Field of controverſie, wherein I ſhall not ſo much ſtrive to make my way through any oppoſite party, as endeavour to beget a right underſtanding between the adverſe parties, in order to a mutual compliance; which I ſhall the rather do, becauſe if any controverſie hath been an increaſer and fomenter of heart-burnings and diviſions among us, it hath been about the determination of indifferent things. And, which ſeems ſtrange, the things men can leaſt bear with one another in, are matters of *liberty:* and thoſe things men have divided moſt upon, have been matters of *uniformity*, and wherein they have differed moſt, have been pretended things of *Indifferency*. In order then to laying a foundation for peace and union, I ſhall calmly debate what power the Magiſtrate hath in matters of religion, and how far that power doth extend in determining things left undetermin'd by the word. For the clear underſtanding the firſt of theſe, we ſhall make our paſſage open to it by the laying down ſeveral neceſſary diſtinctions about it, the want of conſidering which hath been the ground of the great confuſion in the handling this controverſie. Firſt then, we muſt diſtinguiſh between a power *reſpecting religion in it ſelf*, and a power *concerning religion as it is the publick owned and profeſſed religion of a Nation.* For although the Magiſtrate hath no proper power over religion in it ſelf, either taking it *abſtractly* for the rule of worſhip, or *concretely*, for the internal acts of worſhip; for he can neither add to that rule, nor diſſolve the obligation of it; nor yet can he force the conſciences of men, (the chief ſeat of religion) it being both contrary to the nature of religion it ſelf, which is a matter of the greateſt freedom and internal liberty, and it being quite out of the reach of the Magiſtrates Laws, which reſpect only external Actions as their proper object; for the obligation of any Law can extend no farther than the juriſdiction and authority of the Legiſlator, which among men is only to the outward actions. But then if we conſider religion as it is publickly owned and profeſſed by a Nation, the ſupreme Magiſtrate is bound by vertue of his office and authority, not only to defend and protect it, but to reſtrain men from acting any thing publickly tending to the ſubverſion of it. So that the plea for liberty of conſcience, as it tends to reſtrain the Magiſtrate's power, is both irrational and impertinent; becauſe liberty of conſcience is the liberty of mens judgments, which the Magiſtrate cannot deprive them of. For men may hold what opinions they will in their minds, the Law takes no cognizance of them: but it is the liberty of practice, and venting and broaching thoſe opinions which the Magiſtrate's power extends to the reſtraint of. And he that hath the care of the publick good, may give liberty to, and reſtrain liberty from men, as they act in order to the promoting of that good; And as a liberty of all opinions tends manifeſtly to the ſubverting a Nation's peace, and to the embroyling it in continual confuſions, a Magiſtrate cannot diſcharge his office, unleſs he hath a power to reſtrain ſuch a liberty. Therefore we find plainly in Scripture that God imputes the increaſe and impunity of Idolatry as well as other vices to the want of a lawful Magiſtracy, *Judges* 17. 5, 6. where the account given of *Micah*'s Idolatry was, becauſe there was no King in *Iſrael*; which implies it to be the care and duty of Magiſtrates to puniſh and reſtrain whatever tends to the oppoſing and ſubverting the true religion. Beſides, I cannot find any reaſon pleaded againſt the Magiſtrate's power now, which would not have held under *David*, *Solomon*, *Aſa*, *Jehoſaphat*, *Hezekias*, *Joſias*, or other Kings of the Jews, who aſſerted the publick profeſſion, to the extirpation of what oppoſed it. For the plea of conſcience, (taken for mens judgments going contrary to what is publickly owned as religion) is indifferently calculated for all Meridians, and will ſerve for a Religion of any elevation. Nay ſtiff and contumacious Infidels or Idolaters may plead as highly, (though not ſo truly) as any, that it goes againſt their judgments or their conſcience to own that religion which is eſtabliſhed by authority. If it be lawful then to reſtrain ſuch, notwithſtanding this pretence, why not others, whoſe doctrine and principles the Magiſtrate judgeth to tend in their degree, (though not ſo highly) to the diſhonouring God, and ſubverting the profeſſion entertained in a Nation? For a mans own certainty and confidence that he is in the right, can have no influence upon the Magiſtrate judging otherwiſe; only if it be true, it will afford him the greater comfort and patience under his reſtraint: which was the caſe of the primitive Chriſtians under perſecutions: The Magiſtrate then is bound to defend, protect and maintain the religion he owns as true, and that by vertue of his office, as he is *Cuſtos utriuſque tabulæ*, The maintainer of the honour of God's Laws, which cannot be, if he ſuffer thoſe of the firſt table to be broken without any notice taken of them. Were it not for this power of Magiſtrates under the Goſpel, how could that Iſa. 49.23. promiſe be ever made good, that *Kings ſhall be nurſing Fathers to the Church of God?* unleſs they mean ſuch Nurſing Fathers as *Aſtyages* was to *Cyrus*, or *Amulius* to *Romulus* and *Remus*, who expoſed their nurſtlings to the Fury of wild Beaſts to be devoured by them. For ſo muſt a Magiſtrate do the Church, unleſs he ſecure it from the incurſion of Hereticks, and the inundation of Seducers. But ſo much for that which is more largely aſſerted and proved by others. The Magiſtrate then hath power concerning Religion, as owned in a Nation.

Secondly, we muſt diſtinguiſh between an *external* and *objective* power, about matters of Religion, and an *internal formal* power; which ſome call an imperative and elicitive power, others a power of order and a power of juriſdiction, others *poteſtas Eccleſiaſtica*, and *poteſtas circa* Euſeb. vit. Conſtant. l. 4. c. 24. *Eccleſiaſtica*, or in the old diſtinction of *Conſtantine*, τῶν ἐκτὸς & τῶν ἔσω τῆς ἐκκλησίας, a power of things within and without the Church; the ſenſe of all is the ſame, though the terms differ. The internal, formal, elicitive power of order, concerning things in the Church, lies in authoritative exerciſe of the Miniſterial function, in preaching the word, and adminiſtration of Sacraments; but the external, objective, imperative power of juriſdiction, concerning the matters of the Church, lies in a due care and proviſion for the defence, protection, and propagation of Religion. The former is only proper to the Miniſtry, the latter to the Supream Magiſtracy: For though the Magiſtrate hath ſo much power about Religion, yet he is not to uſurp the Miniſterial function, nor to do any proper acts belonging to it. To which the inſtance of *Uzzia's* is pertinently applied. But then this takes nothing off from the Magiſtrate's power; for it belongs not to the Magiſtrate *imperata facere*, but De Imp. ſum. Poteſt. cap. 2. l. 1. *imperare facienda*, as *Grotius* truly obſerves, not to do the things commanded, but to command the things to be done. From this diſtinction we may eaſily underſtand, and reſolve that ſo much vexed and intricate Queſtion, concerning the mutual ſubordination of the Civil and Eccle- In Jud. c. 19. ſiaſtical power: For as *Peter Martyr* well obſerves, theſe two powers are ſome ways ἀντιστρεφαὶ, are converſant ſeveral ways about the ſame thing; but the Functions of both of them muſt be diſtinguiſhed: For the Paſtors of the Church are not to adminiſter juſtice, but it is their duty to declare how juſtice ſhould be rightly adminiſtred, without partiality, or oppreſſion. So on the other ſide, the Magiſtrate muſt not preach the Goſpel, nor adminiſter Sacraments; but however, muſt take care that theſe be duly done by thoſe to whoſe function it belongs: but for a clearer making it appear, theſe things are to be conſidered, both in a Magiſtrate and Miniſter of the Goſpel. In a Magiſtrate the *Power it* *ſelf*, and the *perſon bearing that power:* The power it ſelf of the Magiſtrate is no ways ſubordinate to the power of the Miniſtry; indeed if we conſider both powers, in reference to their objects, and ends, there may be an *inferiority of Dignity*, as *Chamier* calls it, in the civil power to the other, conſidered *abſtractly*; but conſidering it *concretely*, as lodged in the perſons, there is an *Inferiority of ſubjection* in the Eccleſiaſtical to the Civil. But ſtill the perſon of the Magiſtrate, though he is not ſubject to the power of the Miniſters, yet both as a Chriſtian, and as a Magiſtrate, he is ſubject to the word of God, and is to be guided by that in the adminiſtration of his Function. So on the other ſide, in a Miniſter of the Goſpel, there are theſe things conſiderable; the object of his function, the function it ſelf, the liberty of exerciſing it, and the perſon who doth exerciſe it. As for the *object of this function*, the Word and Sacraments, theſe are not ſubject to the civil power, being ſettled by a Law of Chriſt; for then for the *function it ſelf*, that may be conſidered, either in the *derivation* of it, or in the *adminiſtration* of it. As for the derivation of the power and authority of the function, that is from Chriſt, who hath ſettled and provided by Law, that there ſhall be ſuch a ſtanding function to the end of the world, with ſuch authority belonging to it: But for the adminiſtration of the function, two things belong to the Magiſtrate: *Firſt*, to provide and take care for *due adminiſtration* of it; and to ſee that the Miniſters preach the true doctrine, though he cannot lawfully forbid the true doctrine to be taught; and that they duly adminiſter the Sacraments, though he cannot command them to adminiſter them otherwiſe than Chriſt hath delivered them down to us: This for due adminiſtration. *Secondly*, in caſe of *male-adminiſtration* of his function, or ſcandal rendring him unfit for it, it is in the Magiſtrate's power, if not formally to depoſe, yet to deprive them of the liberty of ever exerciſing their function within his Dominions; as *Solomon* did *Abiathar*, and *Juſtinian Sylverius*, as *Conſtantius* did *Vigilius*: For the liberty of the exerciſe of the function is in the Magiſtrate's power, though a right to exerciſe it be derived from the ſame power from which the authority belonging to the function was conveyed. And then laſtly, as to *the perſons exerciſing* this function, it is evident, as they are members of a civil ſociety as well as others, ſo they are ſubject to the ſame civil Laws as others are. Which as it is expreſly affirmed by *Chryſoſtom*, on *Rom.* 13. 1. Let every ſoul be ſubject to the higher powers, that is, ſaith he, κἂν ἀπόστολος ᾖς, κἂν εὐαγγελιστὴς, κἂν προφήτης, κἂν ὁτιοῦν. *Be he an Apoſtle, Evangeliſt, Prophet, Prieſt, Monk, be he who he will.* So it is fully, largely, irrefragably proved by our Writers againſt the Papiſts: eſpecially by the learned *Iſ. Caſaubon* in his piece *de libertate Eccleſiaſticâ.* So then we ſee what a fair, amicable, and mutual aſpect theſe two powers have one upon another, when rightly underſtood, being far from claſhing one with the other; either by a ſubjection of the civil power to the Eccleſiaſtical, or the civil powers ſwallowing up and devouring the peculiarity of the Miniſterial function. And upon theſe grounds, I ſuppoſe *Beza* and *Eraſtus* may, as to this, ſhake hands; So that the Magiſtrate do not uſurp the Miniſterial function, which *Vedelius* calls *Papatus politicus*; nor the Miniſters ſubject the civil power to them, which is *Papatus Eccleſiaſticus.*

Panſtrot. Cath. Tom. 2. l. 15. cap. 6.

In loc. To. 3. Ed. Æton. p. 189. Ed. 1607.

De Epiſcop. Conſt. Mag.

§. 7. *Thirdly*, we diſtinguiſh between an *abſolute Architectonical* and *Nomothetical* power, independent upon any other Law, and a *Legiſlative power*, *abſolute* as to *perſons*, but *regulated* by a *higher Law*. The former

Ariſtot. Ethic. lib.6. c. 6.

we attribute to none but God; the latter belongs to a Supreme Magiſtrate, in reference to things belonging to his power, either in Church or Common-wealth. By an Architectonical, Nomothetical power, we mean that power which is diſtinguiſhed from that which is properly call'd Political. The former lies in the making Laws for the good of the Common-wealth; the latter in a due execution and adminiſtration of thoſe Laws for the common good. This we have aſſerted to the Magiſtrate already; we now come to aſſert the other; where we ſhall firſt ſet down the bounds of this power, and then ſee to whom it belongs. *Firſt* then, we ſay not that the Magiſtrate hath a power to revoke, repeal, or alter any Divine poſitive Law; which we have already ſhewn. *Secondly*, we ſay not, that the Magiſtrate by his own will may conſtitute what new Laws he pleaſe for the worſhip of God. This was the fault of *Jeroboam* who made *Iſrael* to ſin, and therefore by the rule of reaſon muſt be ſuppoſed to ſin more himſelf: So likewiſe *Ahab*, *Ahaz*, and others. Religion is a thing ſettled by a Divine Law; and as it is taken for the doctrine and worſhip of God; ſo it is contained in the word of God, and muſt be fetched wholly from thence. But then *thirdly*, The Magiſtrate, by his power, may make that which is a Divine Law already, become the Law of the Land. Thus Religion may be incorporated among our Laws, and the Bible become our *Magna Charta*. So the firſt Law in the *Codex Theod.* is about the believing the Trinity, and many others about Religion are inſerted into it. Now as to theſe things clearly revealed in the word of God, and withal commanded by the Civil Magiſtrate, although the *primary obligation* to the doing them, is from the former determination by a Divine Law; yet the ſanction of them by the Civil Magiſtrate, may cauſe a *farther obligation* upon Conſcience than was before, and may add puniſhments and rewards not expreſſed before. For although when two Laws are contrary the one to the other, the obligation to the higher Law takes away the obligation to the other; yet when they are of the ſame nature, or ſubordinate one to the other, there may a New obligation ariſe from the ſame Law, enacted by a New authority. As the commands of the Decalogue brought a New obligation upon the Conſciences of the Jews, though the things contained in them, were commanded before in the Law of Nature: And as a Vow made by a man, adds a new tie to his Conſcience, when the matter of his Vow is the ſame with what the word of God commands; and renewing our Covenant with God after Baptiſm, renews our obligation: So when the faith of the Goſpel becomes the Law of a Nation, men are bound by a double cord of Duty to entertain and profeſs that faith. *Fourthly*, In matters undetermined by the word, concerning the external Polity of the Church of God, the Magiſtrate hath the power of determining things, ſo they be agreeable to the word of God. This laſt clauſe is that which binds the Magiſtrates power, that it is not abſolutely Architectonical, becauſe all his Laws muſt be regulated by the general rules of the Divine Law. But though it be not as to Laws, yet I ſay it is as to perſons; that is, that no other perſons have any power to make Laws, binding men to obedience, but only the Civil Magiſtrate. This is another part of the controverſie between the Civil and Eccleſiaſtical power, about the power of determining matters belonging to the Churches Government: But there is here no ſuch breach between thoſe two, but what may be made up with a diſtinction or two. We diſtinguiſh then between a *power decla-*

rative, of the obligation of former Laws, and a *power authoritative*, determining a new obligation; between the *office* of *counſelling* and *adviſing* what is *fit to be done*, and a power *determining what ſhall be done*; between the Magiſtrates *duty* of *conſulting*, in order to the doing it, and his *deriving* his *authority* for the doing it. Theſe things premiſed, I ſay: *Firſt*, that the power of declaring the obligation of former Laws, and of conſulting and adviſing the Magiſtrate for ſetling of new Laws, for the polity of the Church, belongs to the Paſtors and Governours of the Church of God. This belongs to them, as *they are commanded to teach what Chriſt hath commanded them*, but no authority thereby given to make new Laws to bind the Church; but rather a tying them up to the commands of Chriſt already laid down in his word. For a power to bind mens Conſciences to their determinations, lodged in the officers of the Church, muſt be derived either from a Law of God giving them this right, or elſe only from the conſent of parties. For any Law of God, there is none produced with any probability of reaſon, but that, *Obey thoſe that are over you in the Lord.* But that implies no more than ſubmitting to the Doctrine and Diſcipline of the Goſpel, and to thoſe whom Chriſt hath conſtituted as Paſtors of his Church, wherein the Law of Chriſt doth require obedience to them, that is, in looking upon them, and owning them in their relation to them as Paſtors. But that gives them no authority to make any new Laws, or Conſtitutions, binding mens Conſciences any more than a command from the ſupream authority that inferiour Magiſtrates ſhould be obeyed, doth imply any power in them to make new Laws to bind them. But thus far I acknowledge a binding power in Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions, though they neither bind by vertue of the matter, nor of the authority commanding (there being no legiſlative power lodged in the Church) yet in reſpect of the circumſtances and the end, they ſhould be obey'd, unleſs I judge the thing unlawful that is commanded, rather than manifeſt open contempt of the Paſtors of the Church, or bring a ſcandal to others by it. But as to the other power, ariſing from mutual compact and conſent of parties, I acknowledge a power to bind all included under that compact, not by vertue of any ſupream binding power in them, but from the free conſent of the parties ſubmitting; which is moſt agreeable to the nature of Church-power, being not coactive but directive; and ſuch was the confederate diſcipline of the Primitive Church, before they had any Chriſtian Magiſtrate: And thence the decrees of Councils were call'd *Canons*, and not Laws. *Secondly*, Though it be the Magiſtrates duty to conſult with the Paſtors of the Church, to know what is moſt agreeable to the word of God, for the ſettlement of the Church; yet the Magiſtrate doth not derive his authority in commanding things from their ſentence, decree, and judgment, but doth by vertue of his own power cauſe the obligation of men to what is ſo determin'd, by his own enacting what ſhall be done in the Church. The great uſe of Synods and Aſſemblies of Paſtors of Churches, is to be as the Council of the Church unto the King, in matters belonging to the Church, as the Parliament is for matters of civil concernment. And as the King, for the ſettling Civil Laws, doth take advice of ſuch Perſons who are moſt verſed in matters of Law; ſo by proportion of reaſon, in matters concerning the Church, they are the fitteſt Council, who have been the moſt verſed in matters immediately belonging to the Church: In the management of which affairs, as much, if not more, prudence, experience,

Matth. 28. 18.

Heb. 13. 17.

V. Pet. Martyr. in 1 Sam. 14. *Whitaker*, *cont.* 4. *q.* 7. *Cameron. de Eccleſ.* *p.* 386. *To.* 1. *op.*

rience, judgment, moderation, is requiſite, as in the greateſt affairs of State. For we have found by doleful experience, that if a fire once catch the Church, and *Aaron*'s bells ring backward, what a Combuſtion the whole State is ſuddenly put into, and how hardly the Churches inſtruments for quenching ſuch fires, *lacryhmæ & preces Eccleſiæ*, do attain their end. The leaſt peg ſcrued up too high in the Church ſoon cauſeth a great deal of diſcord in the ſtate, and quickly puts mens ſpirits out of Tune. Whereas many irregularities may happen in the ſtate, and men live in quietneſs and peace. But if *Phaetons* drive the chariot of the Sun, the world will be ſoon on fire. I mean ſuch in the Church whoſe brains like the Unicorns run out into the length of the Horn; Such who have more fury than zeal, and yet more zeal than Knowledge or Moderation. Perſons therefore whoſe calling, temper, office, and experience hath beſt acquainted them with the State-actions, Polity of the Primitive Church, and the incomparable Prudence and Moderation then uſed, are fitteſt to debate, conſult, deliberate, determine about the ſafeſt expedients for repairing breaches in a divided, broken, diſtracted Church. But yet I ſay when ſuch men thus aſſembled have gravely and maturely adviſed and deliberated what is beſt and fitteſt to be done, the force, ſtrength and obligation of things ſo determin'd doth depend upon the power and authority of the Civil Magiſtrate for taking the Church as incorporated into the Civil-State, as *Eccleſia eſt in republicâ, non reſpublica in Eccleſiâ*, according to that known ſpeech of *Optatus Milivetanus*; ſo though the object of theſe conſtitutions, and the perſons determining them, and the matter of them be eccleſiaſtical, yet the force and ground of the obligation of them is wholly civil. So *Peter Martyr* expreſly; *Nam quod ad poteſtatem Eccleſiaſticam attinet, ſatis eſt civilis Magiſtratus: is enim curare debet ut omnes officium facient* (But for the judgment of the reformed Divines about this, ſee *Vedelius de epiſcopatu Conſtant. M—— & Officium Magiſtratus Chriſtiani*, annexed to *Grotius de Imper. &c.*) I therefore proceed to lay down the reaſon of it. *Firſt*, That whereby we are bound either to obedience or penalty upon diſobedience, is the ground of the obligation; but it is upon the account of the Magiſtrates power that we are either bound to obedience, or to ſubmit to penalties upon diſobedience. For it is upon the account of our general obligation to the Magiſtrate, that we are bound to obey any particular Laws or Conſtitutions. Becauſe it is not the particular determinations made by the Civil Magiſtrate, which do immediately bind Conſcience, but the general Law of Scripture requires it from us as a Duty to obey the Magiſtrate in all things lawful. Obedience to the Magiſtrate is due immediately from Conſcience; but obedience to the Laws of the Magiſtrate comes not directly from Conſcience, but by vertue of the general obligation. And therefore diſobedience to the Magiſtrates Laws is an immediate Sin againſt Conſcience, becauſe it is againſt the general obligation; but obedience to particular Laws ariſeth not immediately from the obligation of Conſcience to them in particular, but to the Magiſtrate in general. So that in things left lawful and undetermined by the word, where there ariſeth no obligation from the matter, it muſt ariſe from our ſubjection and relation to the Magiſtrate; and what is the ground of Obedience, is the cauſe of the Obligation. *Secondly*, He hath only the power of obligations who hath the power of making ſanctions to thoſe Laws. By ſanctions I mean here in the ſenſe of the Civil Law, *eas legum partes quibus pœnas conſtituimus adverſus eos qui contra*

Lib. 2. *c. Parmen.*

In 1 Sam. 8. *Loc. com. Claſſ.* 4. *c.* 5. *ſ.* 11.

contra leges fecerint, thoſe parts of the Law which determine the puniſhments of the violaters of it. Now it is evident that he only hath power to oblige who hath power to puniſh upon diſobedience. And it is as evident that none hath power to puniſh but the Civil Magiſtrate; I ſpeak of legal Penalties which are annexed to ſuch Laws as concern the Church. Now there being no coercive or coactive power belonging to the Church as ſuch, all the force of ſuch Laws as reſpect the outward Polity of the Church, muſt be derived from the Civil Magiſtrate. *Thirdly*, He who can null and declare all other obligations void, done without his power, hath the only power to oblige. For whatſoever deſtroys a former obligation, muſt of neceſſity imply a power to oblige, becauſe I am bound to obey him in the abſtaining from that I was formerly obliged to: But this power belongs to the Magiſtrate. For ſuppoſe in ſome indifferent Rites and Ceremonies, the Church repreſentative, that is, the Governours of it *pro tempore* do preſcribe them to be obſerved by all, the ſupreme Power forbids the doing of thoſe things, if this doth not null the former ſuppoſed obligation, I muſt inevitably run upon theſe abſurdities. Firſt, That there are two ſupreme powers in a Nation at the ſame time. Secondly, That a man may lie under two different obligations as to the ſame thing; he is bound to do it by one power, and not to do it by the other. Thirdly, The ſame action may be a Duty and a Sin; a Duty in obeying the one power, a Sin in diſobeying the other. Therefore there can be but one power to oblige, which is that of the ſupreme Magiſtrate.

Papin. l. 41. D. de pœnis Hiſtor. Hottoman. Com. v. juris v. ſanct. Cicero ad Attic. lib. 3. ep. 23.

§. 8. Having thus far aſſerted the Magiſtrates due power and authority as to matters of Religion, we proceed to examine the extent of this power in determining things left at liberty by the word of God, in order to the Peace and Government of the Church. For our clear and diſtinct proceeding, I ſhall aſcend by theſe three ſteps. Firſt, To ſhew that there are ſome things left undetermin'd by the word. Secondly, That theſe things are capable of poſitive determinations and reſtraint. Thirdly, That there are ſome bounds and limits to be obſerved in the ſtating and determining theſe things. *Firſt*, That there are ſome things left undetermined by the word: by determining here, I do not mean determining whether things be *lawful* or no; for ſo there is no Rite or Ceremony whatſoever, but is determined by the Scripture in that ſenſe, or may be gathered from the application of particular actions to the general rules of Scripture; but by determining, I mean whether all things concerning the Churches Polity and Order be determined as *Duties* or no: *viz.* that this we are bound to obſerve, and the other not. As for inſtance, what time, manner, method, geſture, habit be uſed in preaching the word; whether Baptiſm muſt be by dipping or ſprinkling; at what day, time, place, the Child ſhall be baptized; and other things of a like nature with theſe. Thoſe who aſſert any of theſe as Duties, muſt produce neceſſarily the command making them to be ſo: for duty and command have a neceſſary reſpect and relation to one another. If no command be brought, it neceſſarily follows that they are left at liberty. So as to the Lord's Supper *Calvin* ſaith, whether the Communicants take the Bread themſelves, or receive it being given them: whether they ſhould give the Cup into the hands of the Deacon or to their next Neighbour: whether the Bread be leaven'd or not, the Wine red or white, *nihil refert*, it matters not; *Hæc indifferentia ſunt & in eccleſiæ libertate poſita*; *they are matters of indifferency, and are left to the*

Inſtitut. l. 4. cap. 17. ſ. 43. &c. cap. 15. ſ. 19.

Churches liberty. But this matter of indifferency is not yet ſo clear as it is generally thought to be; we ſhall therefore bare the ground a little by ſome neceſſary diſtinctions, to ſee where the root of indifferency lies: Which we ſhall the rather do, becauſe it is ſtrongly aſſerted by an Honourable perſon, that there is no indifferency in the things themſelves which are ſtill either unlawful or neceſſary, (if Lawful at this time, in theſe circumſtances) but all indifferency lies in the darkneſs and ſhortneſs of our underſtandings, which may make ſome things ſeem ſo to us. But that Honourable perſon clearly runs upon a double miſtake. Firſt, That Indifferency is a *medium participationis* of both extreams, and not only *negationis*, viz. that as intermediate colours partake both of black and white, and yet are neither; ſo in morality, between good and bad, there is an intermediate entity, which is neither, but indifferent to either: Whereas the nature of Indifferency lies not in any thing intermediate between good and bad, but in ſome thing undetermined by divine Laws as to the neceſſity of it; ſo that if we ſpeak as to the extreams of it, it is ſomething lying between a neceſſary duty, and an intrinſecal evil. The other miſtake, is, that throughout that diſcourſe he takes indifferency as circumſtantiated in individual actions, and as the morality of the action is determined by its circumſtances; whereas the proper notion of Indifferency lies in the nature of the action conſidered in it ſelf abſtractly; and ſo theſe things are implied in an indifferent action. Firſt, Abſolute undetermination as to the general nature of the act by a divine Law, that God hath left it free for men to do it or no. Secondly, That one part hath not more propenſion to the rule than the other; for if the doing of it comes nearer to the rule than the omiſſion, or on the contrary, this action is not wholly indifferent. Thirdly, That neither part hath any repugnancy to the rule; for that which hath ſo, is ſo far from being indifferent, that it becomes unlawful: So that an indifferent action is therein like the Iron accoſted by two Loadſtones on either ſide of equal vertue, and ſo hovers *in medio*, inclining to neither, but ſuppoſing any degree of vertue added to the one above the other, it then inclines towards it; or as the Magnetical *needle* about the *Azores*, keeps it ſelf directly parallel to the *Axis* of the world without variation, becauſe it is ſuppoſed then to be at an equal diſtance from the two great Magnets, the Continents of *Europe* and *America*; but no ſooner is it removed from thence, but it hath its variations. So indifferency taken *in ſpecie*, as to the nature of the act, inclines neither way; but ſuppoſing it lie under poſitive determinations, either by Laws or circumſtances, it then neceſſarily inclines either to the nature of good or evil.

Nature of Epiſc. *cap.* 5.

Neither yet are we come to a full underſtanding of the nature of indifferent actions; we muſt therefore diſtinguiſh between indifferency as to goodneſs *neceſſitating* an action *to be done*, and as to goodneſs *neceſſary* to an action *to make it good*; For there is one kind of goodneſs *propter quam fit actio*, in order to which the action muſt neceſſarily be done; and there is another kind of goodneſs *ſine quâ non benè fit actio*, neceſſary to make an action good when it is done. As following after peace hath ſuch a goodneſs in it, as neceſſitates the action, and makes it a neceſſary duty: but handling a particular controverſie is ſuch an action, as a man may let alone without ſin in his courſe of ſtudies; yet when he doth it, there is a goodneſs neceſſary to make his doing it a good action, *viz.* his referring his ſtudy of it to a right end, for the obtaining of truth and peace. This latter goodneſs is twofold, either *bonitas directionis*, as ſome call it, which is referring the action to its true end; in reference to which, the great controverſie among the Schoolmen, is about the indifferency of particular actions, *viz.* Whether a particular direction of a mans intention to the ultimate end, be not ſo neceſſary to particular actions, as that without the action is of neceſſity evil, and with it good; or whether without that an action may be indifferent to good or evil, which is the ſtate of the Queſtion between *Thomas Scotus*, *Bonaventure* and *Durandus*; but we aſſert the neceſſity of at leaſt an habitual direction, to make the action *in individuo* good, and yet the act in it ſelf may notwithſtanding be indifferent, even *in individuo*, as there is no antecedent neceſſity lying upon mens Conſciences for the doing of it; becauſe men may omit it, and break no Law of God. Beſides this, to make an action good, there is neceſſary a *bonitas originis*, or rather *Principii*, a good principle out of which the action muſt flow; Which muſt be that faith, which whatſoever is not of, is ſin, as the Apoſtle tells us. Which we muſt not ſo underſtand, as though in every action a Man goes about, he muſt have a full perſuaſion that it is a neceſſary duty he goes about; but in many actions that faith is ſufficient whereby he is perſwaded upon good grounds, that the thing he goes about is lawful; although he may as lawfully omit that action, and do either another, or the contrary to it. There may be then the neceſſity of ſome things in an action when it is done to make it good, and yet the action it ſelf be no ways neceſſary, but indifferent and a matter of liberty. This may be eaſily underſtood by what is uſually ſaid of God's particular actions, that God is free in himſelf either to do or not to do that action (as ſuppoſe the Creation of the World) but when he doth it, he muſt neceſſarily do it with that goodneſs, holineſs, and wiſdom, which is ſuitable to his nature: So may many actions of men be in themſelves indifferent, and yet there muſt be a concomitant neceſſity of good intention and principle to make the action good. But this concomitant neceſſity doth not deſtroy the radical indifferency of the action it ſelf; it is only an antecedent neceſſity from the obligation of the Law, is that which deſtroys indifferency. So likewiſe it is as to evil; there is ſuch an evil in an action, which not only ſpoils the action, but hinders the perſon from the liberty of doing it, that is, in all ſuch actions as are intrinſecally evil; and there is ſuch a kind of evil in actions, which though it ſpoils the goodneſs of the action, yet keeps not from performance; which is ſuch as ariſeth from the manner of performance, as praying in hypocriſie, *&c.* doing a thing lawful with a ſcrupulous or erring Conſcience. We ſee then what good and evil is conſiſtent with indifferency in actions, and what is not. And that the nature of actions, even *in individuo*, may be indifferent, when as to their circumſtances they may be neceſſarily determin'd to be either good or evil. As marrying, or not marrying, as to the Law of God, is left at liberty, not making it in it ſelf a neceſſary duty, one way or other; but ſuppoſing particular circumſtances make it neceſſary, *pro hic & nunc*, yet the nature of it remains indifferent ſtill; and ſuppoſing marriage, it is neceſſary it ſhould be in the Lord, and yet it is not neceſſary to make choice of this perſon rather than of that; ſo that not only the abſolute indifferency of the action is conſiſtent with this concomitant neceſſity, but the full liberty both of *contradiction* and *contrariety*. Again, we muſt diſtinguiſh between an *indifferency* as to its *nature*, and indifferency

V. Forbeſ. Iren. lib. 1. *cap.* 13.

Rom. 14. 23.

as to its *uſe and end*; or between an indifferency as to a *Law*, and indifferency as *to order and peace*: here I ſay, that in things wholly indifferent in both reſpects, that is, in a thing neither commanded nor forbidden by God, nor that hath any apparent reſpect to the peace and order of the Church of God, there can be no rational account given, why the nature of ſuch indifferencies ſhould be alter'd by any humane Laws and Conſtitutions. But matters that are only indifferent as to a command, but are much conducing to the peace and order of a Church, ſuch things as theſe, are the proper matter of humane conſtitutions concerning the Churches polity: Or rather to keep to the words of the *Hypotheſis* it ſelf, where any things are determin'd in general by the word of God, but left at liberty as to manner and circumſtances, it is in the power of lawful authority in the Church of God to determine ſuch things, as far as they tend to the promoting the good of the Church.

§. 9. And ſo I riſe to the ſecond ſtep, which is, that matters of this nature may be determin'd and reſtrained. Or that there is no neceſſity, that all matters of liberty ſhould remain in their primary indifferency. This I know is aſſerted by ſome of great note and learning; that in things which God hath left to our Chriſtian liberty, man may not reſtrain us of it, by ſubjecting thoſe things to poſitive Laws; but I come to examine, with what ſtrength of reaſon this is ſaid, that ſo we may ſee, whether men may not yield in ſome lawful things to a reſtraint of their Chriſtan liberty, in order to the Peace of the Church of God: Which I now prove by theſe Arguments. *Firſt*, What may be lawfully done when it is commanded, may be ſo far lawfully commanded, as it is a thing in it ſelf lawful: but matters of Chriſtian liberty may be lawfully done when they are commanded to be done, though it were lawful not to do them before that command. The truth of the propoſition appears, becauſe lawful authority may command any thing that may be lawfully done. Becauſe nothing can exempt from obedience to a lawful Magiſtrate, but the unlawfulneſs of the thing commanded; and therefore nothing can debar the Magiſtrate from commanding theſe things; for nothing can hinder him from commanding, but what may hinder the ſubject from obedience. I grant in many caſes it may be lawful to obey, when it is very inconvenient for the Magiſtrate to command; but inconveniency and unlawfulneſs are two things; nay, and in ſome caſes a man may lawfully obey when he is unlawfully commanded; but then the matter of the command it ſelf is unlawful. As in executing an unjuſt ſentence, granting that a Princes ſervants may lawfully do it, eſpecially when they know it not; yet in that caſe, the ground of their lawful obedience, is the ground of the Magiſtrates lawful command, which is the ſuppoſed juſtice of the execution. But that which makes the Magiſtrates command unlawful, is the intrinſecal evil of the thing it ſelf. So for unlawful wars, though the Subjects may lawfully obey, yet the Prince ſins in commanding, not but that he hath a right to command ſo far as they are bound to obey, which is only in things lawful; but that which in this caſe alters the matter, is the Princes knowing his cauſe to be unjuſt. So that however the propoſition holds in things not manifeſtly unjuſt. But however this be, it is hereby granted, that the things may be lawfully done, when they are reſtrained by the Magiſtrates command; and by that it appears that liberty may be reſtrained; elſe it could not be lawful to act under that reſtraint; not as it reſpects the things themſelves, but under that formality, as they are the reſtraint of that which ought to be left free. The reſtraint however then is lawful, as to the perſons acting under authority, who are the ſubjects of this liberty, though it were granted unlawful as to the authority doing it. Which former is ſufficient for my purpoſe, *viz.* that Chriſtian liberty, as to the ſubjects of it, may be lawfully reſtrained. *Secondly,* A leſſer duty ceaſeth to be a duty, when it hinders from the performance of greater: but the preſerving Chriſtian liberty is a leſſer duty, which may hinder the peace of the Church, which is a greater; therefore in that caſe it may be reſtrained. The *Major* is granted by Divines and Caſuiſts; when duties ſtand in competition, the leſſer ceaſeth to bind, as is evident, in that God will have mercy rather than ſacrifice. Poſitives yield to morals and naturals. Thence the obligation of an oath ceaſeth, when it hinders from a natural duty; as the *Corban* among the *Jews* from relief of Parents. And therefore *Grotius* ſaith, that oath taken concerning a thing lawful, if it doth hinder *majus bonum morale*, the obligation of that oath ceaſeth. Now that preſerving liberty is a leſſer duty than the looking after the peace of the Church, is evident, becauſe the one is only a matter of liberty, and left undetermin'd by the Word; and the other a matter of neceſſity, and abſolutely, and expreſly required of all, as a duty as much as poſſibly lies in them to endeavour after. *Thirdly,* If an occaſional offence of weaker brethren may be a ground for reſtraining Chriſtian liberty, then much more may commands from lawful authority do it; but the offence of weaker Brethren may reſtrain Chriſtian liberty, as to the exerciſe of it, as appears by the Apoſtles diſcourſe, *Rom.* 14. 21. The reaſon of the conſequence lies here, that a caſe of mere offence, which is here pleaded towards weak Brethren, cannot have that obligation upon conſcience, which a known duty of obeying lawful authority, in things in themſelves lawful, hath. Nay farther, inſiſting only on the Law of ſcandal, I would fain know, whether it be a greater offence and ſcandal to Chriſtians conſciences, to infringe the lawful authority of the Magiſtrate, and to deny obedience to his commands, in things undetermined by the Law of God; or elſe to offend the Conſciences, that is, go againſt the judgments of ſome well meaning, but leſs knowing Chriſtians. Or thus, whether in the matter of ſcandal, it be a greater offence to go againſt the judgments of the weaker and more ignorant, or the more knowing and able, when the one have only their own weak apprehenſions to biaſs them, the other are backed by and grounded upon an eſtabliſhed Law. And whether it be not a greater ſcandal to Religion to diſobey a Chriſtian Magiſtrate, than it is to offend ſome private Chriſtians. Let theſe things be examined and then let us ſee whether the argument will not hold *à majori*; if the Law of Scandal as to private Chriſtians may reſtrain liberty, then may a command from the Magiſtrate do it. *Fourthly,* I argue thus: If the nature of Chriſtian liberty may be preſerved under the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it, then it is not againſt the nature of Chriſtian liberty to have the exerciſe reſtrained; but the former is true, and therefore the latter. Now that the nature of Chriſtian liberty may be preſerved under the reſtraint of its exerciſe, I prove by theſe Arguments.

Grot. de jure belli & pacis, lib. 2. *cap.* 13. *ſect.* 7.

§. 10. *Firſt.* Becauſe the nature of Chriſtian liberty is founded upon the freedom of judgment, and not the freedom of practice. The caſe is the ſame in moral and natural liberty as in Chriſtian. Now we ſay truly, that the radical liberty of the ſoul is preſerved, though it be determined to a particular action: For the liberty of the Will lying in the *power* of determining it ſelf either way, (as it is generally thought) the actual determination of the will doth not take away the internal power in the ſoul; and in that reſpect there may be *potentia faciendi*, where there is not *poſſibilitas effectûs*, a power of doing, when there is no poſſibility the thing ſhould be done, when the event is otherwiſe determined by a divine decree, as in breaking the bones of Chriſt upon the Croſs. So it is in reference to Chriſtian liberty; though the exerciſe of it be reſtrained, yet the liberty remains; becauſe Chriſtian liberty lies in the freedom of judgment, *that is*, in judging thoſe things to be free which are ſo; ſo that if any thing that is in its ſelf free, be done by a man with an opinion of the neceſſity of doing it antecedent to the Law commanding it, or without any Law preſcribing it, thereby his Chriſtian liberty is deſtroyed; but if it be done with an opinion of the freedom and indifferency of the thing it ſelf, but only with a conſequential neceſſity of doing it, ſuppoſing the Magiſtrate's command, he retains the power of his Chriſtian liberty ſtill, though under the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it. And therefore it would be well obſerved, that the opinion of the neceſſity of any one thing undetermined by Scripture, deſtroys Chriſtian liberty more than a Magiſtrate's command doth. And by this reaſon they that hold any one poſture at receiving the Lord's Supper neceſſary, (as ſitting, leaning, kneeling) do all equally deſtroy their own Chriſtian liberty as to theſe things which are undetermined by the word. So a Magiſtrate, when commanding matters of Chriſtian liberty, if in the preface to the Law, he declares the thing neceſſary to be done in its ſelf, and therefore he commands it, he takes away, as much as in him lies our Chriſtian liberty. And in that caſe we ought to hold to that excellent rule of the Apoſtle, *ſtand faſt therefore in the liberty wherewith Chriſt hath ſet you free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.* But if the Magiſtrate declare the things to be in themſelves indifferent, but only upon ſome prudent conſiderations for peace and order he requires perſons to obſerve them, though this brings a neceſſity of obedience to us, yet it takes not away our Chriſtian liberty. For an antecedent neceſſity expreſſed in the Law, (as a learned and excellent Caſuiſt of our own obſerves) doth neceſſarily require the aſſent of the practical judgment to it; which takes away our liberty of judgment, or our judgment of the liberty of the things; but a conſequential neceſſity upon a command ſuppoſed, doth only imply an act of the will, whereby the freedom of judgment and conſcience remaining, it is inclined to obedience to the commands of a ſuperior Law. Now that liberty doth lie in the freedom of judgment, and not in the freedom of practice, and ſo is conſiſtent with the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it; appears both in the former caſe of ſcandal, and in the actions of the Apoſtles and primitive Chriſtians complying with the Jews in matters of liberty; yea which is a great deal more, in ſuch ceremonies of which the Apoſtle expreſly ſaith, that if they obſerved them, Chriſt would profit them nothing; and yet we find *Paul* himſelf circumciſing *Timothy* becauſe of the Jews, Certainly then however theſe ceremonies are ſuppoſed to be not only *mortuæ* but *mortiferæ* now the Goſpel was preached, and the Law of Chriſtian liberty promulged, yet *Paul* did not look upon it as the taking away his liberty, at any time when it would prevent ſcandal among the Jews, and tend to the furtherance of the Goſpel, to uſe any of them. It was therefore the opinion of the neceſſity of them was it

Gal. 5. 1.

Dr. Sanderſon, *de oblig. conſ. præl.* 6. ſ. 5.

Gal. 5. 2.

Acts 16. 3.

which deſtroyed Chriſtian liberty; and therefore it is obſervable, that where the opinion of the neceſſity of obſerving the Judaical Rites and Ceremonies was entertained, the Apoſtle ſets himſelf with his whole ſtrength to oppoſe them, as he doth in his Epiſtles to the *Galatians* and *Coloſſians*. Whom yet we find in other places, and to other Churches, not leaven'd with this doctrine of the neceſſity of judaical Rites, very ready to comply with weak Brethren, as in his Epiſtles to the *Romans* and *Corinthians*. From which we plainly ſee, that it was not the bare doing of the things, but the doing them with an opinion of the neceſſity of them is that which infringeth Chriſtian liberty, and not the determination of one part above the other by the Supreme Magiſtrate, when it is declared not to be for any opinion of the things themſelves as neceſſary, but to be only in order to the Church's peace and unity. *Secondly.* It appears that liberty is conſiſtent with the reſtraint of the exerciſe of it; becauſe the very power of reſtraining the exerciſe of it, doth ſuppoſe it to be a matter of liberty, and that both antecedently and conſequentially to that reſtraint. *Antecedently*, ſo it is apparent to be a matter of liberty, elſe it was not capable of being reſtrained: *Conſequentially*, in that the ground of obſervance of thoſe things when reſtrained, is not any neceſſity of the matter, or the things themſelves; but only the neceſſity of obeying the Magiſtrate in things lawful and undetermin'd by the word: which leads to another argument. *Thirdly*, Mens obligation to theſe things, as to the ground of it, being only in point of contempt and ſcandal, argues that the things are matter of liberty ſtill. I grant the Magiſtrate's authority is the ground of obedience, but the ground of the Magiſtrate's command is only in point of contempt and ſcandal, and for preſerving order in the Church: For I have already ſhewed it to be unlawful, either to command or obey, in reference to theſe things, from any opinion of the neceſſity of them, and therefore the only ground of obſerving them, is to ſhew that we are not guilty of contempt of the power commanding them, nor of ſcandal to others that are offended at our not obſerving them. *Tota igitur religio eſt in fugiendo ſcandalo & vetando contemptu*, ſaith our learned *Whitaker*: All our ground of obedience is the avoiding ſcandal and contempt of authority. To the ſame purpoſe *Pet. Martyr*, ſpeaking of the obligation of Eccleſiaſtical Laws: *Non obſtringunt ſi removeatur contemptus & ſcandalum:* So that non-obſervance of indifferent things commanded, when there is an apparent contempt or ſcandal, do not involve a man in the guilt of ſin: as ſuppoſe a Law made that all publick prayer be performed kneeling, if any thing lies in a man's way to hinder him from that poſture, in this caſe the man offends not; becauſe there is no contempt or ſcandal: So if a Law were made that all ſhould receive the Lord's-ſupper faſting, if a man's health calls for ſomewhat to refreſh him before, he ſins not in the breach of that Law. And therefore it is obſervable which *Whitaker* takes notice of in the Canons of the Councils of the primitive Church, that though they did determine many things belonging to the external Polity of the Church, yet they obſerved this difference in their Cenſures of Anathema's; That in matters of mere order and decency they never pronounced an *Anathema*, but with the ſuppoſition of apparent contempt; and inſerted, *Si quis contra præſumpſerit, ſi quis contumaciter contra fecerit:* but in matters of doctrine or life, fully determin'd by the Law of God, they pronounced a ſimple *Anathema*, without any ſuch clauſe inſerted. Now from this we may take

Gal. 4. 9, 10, 11.
Coloſſ. 2. 16, 18, 19.
Rom. 14. 3, 6, 21.
1 Cor. 10. 24.

Controv. 4. *queſt.* 7. *cap.* 2.

In 1 Sam. 14.

take notice of a difference between Laws concerning indifferences in Civil and Eccleſiaſtical matters: That in civils the Laws bind to indifferencies without the caſe of contempt or ſcandal, becauſe in theſe the publick good is aimed at, of which every private perſon is not fit to judge, and therefore it is our duty either to obey or ſuffer; but in Eccleſiaſtical conſtitutions, only peace and order is that which is looked at, and therefore, *Si nihil contra ἐυταξίαν feceris, non teneris illis*, is the rule here, if nothing tending to apparent diſorder be done, men break not thoſe Laws: For the end and reaſon of a Law is the meaſure of its obligation. *Fourthly*, Mens being left free to do the things forbidden, either upon a repeal of the former Laws, or when a man is from under obligation to that authority which commands them, argues them ſtill to be matters of liberty, and not matters of neceſſity. That Laws reſpecting indifferent things may be repealed, I cannot imagine that any have ſo little reaſon as to deny, upon a different ſtate of affairs from what it was when they were firſt enacted; or when they cannot attain the ends they are deſigned for, the peace and order of the Church, but rather tend to embroil it in trouble and confuſion: And that when men are from under the authority impoſing them, men are at their own liberty again, muſt neceſſarily be granted, becauſe the ground of reſtraint of that liberty was the authority they were under; and therefore the cauſe being taken away, the effect follows. Therefore for men to do them when authority doth not impoſe them, muſt imply an opinion of the neceſſity of the things themſelves, which deſtroys Chriſtian liberty. Whence it was reſolved by *Auguſtine* in the caſe of Rites, that every one ſhould obſerve thoſe of that Church which he was in: which he ſaith he took from *Ambroſe*. His words are theſe, *Nec diſciplina ulla in his melior gravi prudentique Chriſtiano quàm ut eo modo agat, quo agere viderit Eccleſiam, ad quamcunque forte devenerit. Quod enim neque contra fidem, neque contra bonos mores injungitur, indifferenter eſt habendum, & pro eorum inter quos vivitur ſocietate ſervandum eſt.* He tells us, *He knew no better courſe for a ſerious prudent Chriſtian to take in matters of Rites and Cuſtoms, than to follow the Church's example where he is: for whatſoever is obſerved neither againſt faith or manners, is a matter in its ſelf indifferent, and to be obſerved according to the cuſtom of thoſe he lives among.* And after acquaints us that his Mother coming to *Milan* after him, and finding the Church there not obſerve the Saturday faſt as the Church of *Rome* did, was much perplexed and troubled in mind at it, (as tender but weak conſciences are apt to be troubled at any thing contrary to their own practice) ſhe for her own ſatisfaction ſends her ſon to *Ambroſe*, then Biſhop of the Church there, who told him he would give him no other anſwer but what he did himſelf, and if he knew any thing better, he would do it. *Auguſtin* preſently expects a command from him to leave off Saturday faſts; inſtead of that, *Ambroſe* tells him, *Cum Romam venio, jejuno ſabbato; cum hîc ſum, non jejuno. Sic etiam tu ad quam forte Eccleſiam veneris, ejus morem ſerva, ſi cuiquam non vis eſſe ſcandalo, nec quenquam tibi. When I am at* Rome *I faſt on the Sabbath, but at* Milan *I do not. So thou likewiſe, when thou comeſt to any Church, obſerve its cuſtom, if thou wouldſt neither be an offence to them, nor have them be ſo to thee.* A rare and excellent example of the piety, prudence, and moderation of the Primitive Church: far from rigid impoſing indifferent cuſtoms on the one ſide; from contumacy in oppoſing mere indifferences on the other. Which judgment of *Ambroſe*, *Auguſtine* ſaith, he

Aug. ep. 118. ad Januar.

he always looked on as often as he thought of it, *tanquam cœleſte oraculum*, as an oracle come from Heaven; and concludes with this excellent ſpeech, which if ever God intend peace to our Church, he will make men underſtand: *Senſi enim ſæpe dolens & gemens multas infirmorum perturbationes fieri per quorundam fratrum contentioſam obſtinationem, & ſuperſtitioſam timiditatem qui in rebus hujuſmodi, quæ neque Scripturæ ſanctæ autoritate, neque univerſalis Eccleſiæ traditione, neque vitæ corrigendæ utilitate ad certum poſſunt terminum pervenire (perducere) tantum quia ſubeſt qualiſcunque ratiocinatio cogitantis, aut quia in ſuâ patriâ ſic ipſe conſuevit, aut quia ibi vidit ubi peregrinationem ſuam quo remotiorem à ſuis eo doctiorem factam putat, tam litigioſas excitant quæſtiones ut niſi quod ipſi faciunt, nihil rectum exiſtiment.* *I have often*, ſaith he, *found it to my grief and ſorrow, that the troubles of weaker Chriſtians, have been cauſed by the contentious obſtinacy of ſome on the one hand, and the ſuperſtitious fearfulneſs of others on the other, in things which are neither determin'd by the authority of the holy Scriptures, nor by the cuſtom of the univerſal Church, nor yet by any uſefulneſs of the things themſelves, in order to the making mens lives better; only for ſome petty reaſon in a man's own mind, or becauſe it hath been the cuſtom of their Country, or becauſe they have found it in thoſe Churches, which they have thought to be the nearer to truth, the farther they have been from home, they are continually raiſing ſuch quarrels and contentions, that they think nothing is right and lawful, but what they do themſelves.* Had that bleſſed Saint lived in our age, he could not have uttered any thing more true, nor more pertinent to our preſent ſtate: which methinks admirers of antiquity ſhould embrace for its authority, and others for the great truth and reaſon of it. Did we but ſet up thoſe three things as Judges between us in our matters of Ceremonies, *The authority of the Scriptures, the practice of the Primitive Univerſal Church, and the tendency of them to the reforming mens lives*; how ſoon might we ſhake hands, and our controverſies be at an end! But as long as contentious obſtinacy remains on one ſide, and a ſuperſtitious fearfulneſs on the other, (for ſuperſtition may as well lie in the imagined neceſſity of avoiding things indifferent, as in the neceſſary obſerving of things which are not) we may find our ſtorms increaſe, but we are not like to ſee any Land of Peace. How happy might we be, did men but once underſtand that it was their duty to mind the things of peace! How little of that Duſt might ſtill and quiet our moſt contentious Frays!

Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta
Pulveris exigui jactu compreſſa quieſcunt.

But in order to ſo happy and deſirable an union and accommodation, I ſhall not need to plead much from the nature of the things we differ about; the lowneſs of them in compariſon of the great things we are agreed in, the fewneſs of them in compariſon of the multitude of thoſe weighty things we ought moſt to look after, the benefits of union, the miſeries of diviſion, which if our lamentable experience doth not tell us of, yet our conſciences may; I ſhall crave leave humbly to preſent to ſerious conſideration ſome propoſals for accommodation: which is an attempt which nothing but an earneſt deſire of peace can juſtifie, and I hope that will: which here falls in as the third ſtep of my deſigned diſcourſe, about the bounds to be ſet in the reſtraint of Chriſtian liberty.

The

§. 11. The *firſt* is, that nothing be impoſed as neceſſary, but what is clearly revealed in the word of God. This there is the higheſt reaſon and equity for, ſince none can have command immediately over conſcience, but God himſelf, and whatever is impoſed as neceſſary, doth immediately bind conſcience. And whatever binds mens conſciences with an opinion of the neceſſity of it, doth immediately deſtroy that Chriſtian liberty which men are neceſſarily bound to ſtand faſt in, and not be intangled with any yoke Gal. 5. 1. of bondage. Not only the yoke of Jewiſh Ceremonies, but whatever yoke pincheth, and galls as that did, with an opinion of the neceſſity of doing the thing commanded by any but the word of God. Which the Apoſtle calls *Dogmatizing*, Coloſſ. 2. 20. and *v.* 16. let no man judge you in meat and drink; *nè Præpoſiti quidem veſtri*, ſaith *Whitaker*; theſe impoſitions he calls, *v.* 22. the commandments and doctrines of men. And ſuch he calls a ſnare, 1 *Corinth.* 7. 23. which was the making an indifferent thing, as Cœlibate, neceſſary. *Laqueus eſt quicquid præcipitur ut neceſſarium quod liberum eſſe debet.* So that though obedience be neceſſary to indifferent things when commanded; yet it muſt always be *libera à conſcientiâ quoad res ipſas legum*, no obligation to be laid upon conſcience to look upon the things as neceſſary.

Secondly, That nothing be required, nor determin'd, but what is ſufficiently known to be indifferent in its own nature. The former propoſal was in reference to the manner of impoſing, this reſpects the nature of the things themſelves. The only difficulty here is, how a thing may be ſufficiently known to be indifferent; becauſe one man looks upon that as indifferent, which another doth not. The moſt equal way to decide this controverſie, is to make choice of ſuch judges as are not intereſted in the quarrel: And thoſe are the *ſenſe of the Primitive Church* in the firſt four Centuries, who were beſt able to judge whether they looked upon themſelves as bound by any command of Scripture or no; and withal the judgment of the Reformed Churches: So that what ſhall be made appear to be left indifferent, by both the ſenſe of the Primitive Church, and the Churches of the Reformation, may be a matter determinable by Law, and which all may be required to conform in obedience to.

Thirdly, That whatever is thus determined be in order only to a due performance of what is in general required in the word of God, and not to be looked on as any part of divine worſhip or ſervice. This is that which gives the greateſt occaſion of offence to mens conſciences, when any thing is either required, or if not, yet generally uſed and looked on as a neceſſary part or concomitant of God's worſhip, ſo that without it the worſhip is deemed imperfect. And there is great difference to be made between things indifferent in their own nature, and indifferent as to their uſe and practice. And when the generality of thoſe who uſe them do not uſe them as indifferent, but as neceſſary things, it ought to be conſidered whether in this caſe ſuch a uſe be allowable till men be better informed of the nature of the things they do. As in the caſe of the Papiſts about image-worſhip, their divines ſay, that the images are only as high tenors of Devotion, but the worſhip is fixed on God; but we find it is quite otherwiſe in the general practice of people who look at nothing beyond the image. So it may be, bating the decrees of the offence, when matters of indifferency in themſelves are by the generality of people not looked on as ſuch, but uſed as a neceſſary part of divine ſervice. And it would be conſidered whether ſuch an abuſe of matters ſuppoſed indifferent being known, it be not *ſcandalum datum* to continne their uſe without an effectual remedy for the abuſe of them.

Fourthly, That no ſanctions be made, nor mulcts or penalties be inflicted on ſuch who only diſſent from the uſe of ſome things whoſe lawfulneſs they at preſent ſcruple, till ſufficient time and means be uſed for their information of the nature and indifferency of the things, that it may be ſeen whether it be out of wilful contempt and obſtinacy of ſpirit, or only weakneſs of conſcience and diſſatisfaction concerning the things themſelves that they diſobey. And if it be made evident to be out of contempt, that only ſuch penalties be inflicted as anſwers to the nature of the offence. I am ſure it is contrary to the Primitive practice, and the Moderation then uſed, to ſuſpend or deprive men of their miniſterial function for not conforming in habits, geſtures, or the like. Concerning habits, *Walafridus Strabo*, expreſly tells us, there was no diſtinction of habits uſed in the Church in the Primitive times. *Veſtes ſacerdotales per incrementa ad eum, qui nunc habetur, aucta ſunt ornatum. Nam primis temporibus communi veſtimento induti, Miſſas agebant, ſicut & hactenus quidam Orientalium facere perhibentur.* And therefore the *Concilium Gangrenſe* condemned *Euſtathius Sebaſtenus* for making a neceſſity of diverſity of habits among Chriſtians for their profeſſion, διὰ τὴν ἄσκησιν, it being acknowledged both by *Salmaſius* and his great adverſary *Petavius*, that in the Primitive times the Preſbyters did not neceſſarily wear any diſtinct habit from the people, although the former endeavours to prove that commonly they did in *Tertullian*'s time; but yet that not all the Preſbyters, nor they only did uſe a diſtinct habit, *viz.* the *Pallium Philoſophicum*, but all the Chriſtians who did ἀκριβῶς χριστιανίζειν, as *Socrates* ſaid of *Sylvanus Rhetor*, all that were ἀσκηταὶ among them, ſtricter profeſſors of Chriſtianity; among which moſt of the Preſbyters were. And *Origen* in *Euſebius* expreſly ſpeaks of *Heraclas* a Preſbyter of *Alexandria*, that for a long time κοινῇ ἐσθῆτι χρώμενος, he uſed only the common garment belonging to Chriſtians, and put on the *Pallium Philoſophicum* for the ſtudy of the Grecian Learning, after that Chriſtianity began to loſe in height what it got in breadth: inſtead of the former ſimplicity of their garments as well as manners, and their τριβώνια came in the uſe of the *byrri*, *Penulæ Dalmaticæ*, and ſo daily increaſing, as *Strabo* ſaith. I ſay not this in the leaſt to condemn any diſtinction of habit for mere decency and order, but to ſhew it was not the cuſtom of the Primitive times to impoſe any neceſſity of theſe things upon men, nor to cenſure them for bare diſuſe of them. He muſt be a great ſtranger in the Primitive Church that takes not notice of the great diverſity of rites and cuſtoms uſed in particular Churches, without any cenſuring thoſe who differed from them; or if any by inconſiderate zeal did proceed ſo far, how ill it was reſented by other Chriſtians. As *Victors* excommunicating the *Quarto-decimani* for which he is ſo ſharply reproved by *Irenæus*, who tells him, that the primitive Chriſtians who differed in ſuch things, did not uſe to abſtain from one anothers communion for them, καὶ γὰρ οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς πίστεως ὄντες, διαφωνοῦσι περὶ τὰ ἔθη πρὸς ἑαυτούς, as *Socrates* tells us, *Thoſe that agree in the ſame faith, may differ among themſelves in their rites and cuſtoms*, as he largely ſhews in a whole Chaptet to that purpoſe, as in the obſervation of Eaſter ſome the fourteenth day of *April*, others only upon the Lord's day, but ſome of the more Eaſtern Churches differed from both. In their faſts, ſome ob-

De rebus Eccleſ. cap. 24.

Can. 14. *in Cod. Can. in Vin. Eccleſ. can.* 71.

Salm. Not. in Tertul. de Pallio. 76.

Ant. Cercoth. in Salmaſ. p. 12.

Euſeb. lib. 6. *cap.* 20.

Euſeb. l. 5.

Socrat. hiſt. Eccleſ. l. 5. *c.* 23.

ſerved Lent but for one day, ſome two, ſome three weeks, ſome ſix weeks, others ſeven: and in their Faſts ſome abſtained from all kind of living creatures, others only from fleſh, eating fiſh: and others fowl: others abſtained from fruit and eggs: others eat only dry bread, others not that neither. And ſo for their publick Aſſemblies, Some communicating every Lord's day, others not. The Church of *Alexandria* had its publick Meetings and Sermons every fourth day of the week as he tells us. The ſame Church made the publick readers and interpreters, either of the Catechumeni, or of the baptized, differing therein from all other Churches: Several cuſtoms were uſed about Digamy and the marriage of Miniſters in ſeveral Churches. So about the time of Baptiſm, ſome having only one ſet time in the year for it, as at Eaſter in *Theſſaly*, others two, Eaſter and *Dominica in Albis*, ſo called from the white garments of the baptized. Some Churches in baptiſm uſed three dippings, others only one. Great differences about the time of their being Catechumeni, in ſome places longer, in others a ſhorter time. So about the excommunicate and degrees of penance (as they are called) their *Flentes*, *audientes*, *ſuccumbentes*, *conſiſtentes*, the *Communio peregrinæ*, the ſeveral Chriſms *in vertice*, *in pectore*, in ſome places at Baptiſm, in ſome after. So for placing the Altar (as they metaphorically called the Communion Table) it was not conſtantly towards *Cap.23.l.5.* the Eaſt; for *Socrates* affirms, that in the great Church at *Antiochia* it ſtood to the Weſt end of the Church; and therefore it had ἀντίστροφον *Eccleſ. hiſt. l.10. cap.4.* θέσιν, a different poſiture from other Churches. And *Euſebius* ſaith out of the Panegyriſt, that in the New Church built by *Paulinus* at *Tyre*, the Altar ſtood ἐν μέσῳ *in the middle*. Theſe things may ſuffice for a taſte at preſent of which more largely elſewhere (God willing) in due time. We ſee the primitive Chriſtians did not make ſo much of any uniformity in rites and ceremonies; nay I ſcarce think any Churches in the primitive times can be produced that did exactly in all things obſerve the ſame cuſtoms: Which might eſpecially be an argument of moderation in all as to theſe things, but eſpecially in pretended admirers of the Primitive Church. I conclude with a known ſaying of *Auſtin*, *Indignum eſt ut propter ea quæ nos Deo neque digniores, neque indigniores poſſunt facere, alii alios vel condemnemus, vel judicemus. It is an unworthy thing for Chriſtians to condemn and judge one another for thoſe things which do not further us at all in our way to heaven.*

Laſtly, That Religion be not clog'd with Ceremonies. They when multiplied too much, if lawful, yet ſtrangely eat out the heart, heat, life, vigour of Chriſtianity. Chriſtian Religion is a plain, ſimple, eaſie thing. Chriſt commends his yoke to us by the eaſineſs of it, and his burden by the lightneſs of it. It was an excellent teſtimony which *Amm. Marcellinus* a heathen gave to Chriſtianity, when ſpeaking of *Conſtantius*, *Religionem Chriſtianam rem abſolutam & ſimplicem anili ſuperſtitione confudit, That he ſpoiled the beauty of Chriſtianity, by muffling it up* *Eraſ. in declar. ad Cenſ. Pariſ. art. 14.* *in ſuperſtitious obſervations.* And it is as true which *Eraſmus* ſaid in anſwer to the Sorboniſts, *Quò magis in corporalibus ceremoniis hæremus, hoc magis vergimus ad Judaiſmum. External Ceremonies teach us backward, and bring us back from Chriſt to Moſes*; which is fully proved as to the *Conf. with Hart. cap. 8. Div. 8. De Croy 3. Conformity, part 2.* Papiſts, by our learned *Rainolds* and Mr. *De Croy*; but we need no farther evidence than a bare peruſal of *Durandus Mimatenſis* his *Rationale Divinorum officiorum*. By Ceremonies, I mean not here matters of mere decency and order, for order ſake; which doubtleſs are lawful (if the meaſure of that order be not the pomp and glory of the world, but the gravity, compoſure, ſobriety, which becomes Chriſtianity) for when the Jews were the moſt ſtrictly tyed up by a Ceremonial Law, they did introduce many things upon the account of order and decency: as the building Synagogues, their hours of prayer, their *Paraſhoth* and *Haphtaroth*, the Sections of the Law and Prophets; the continuation of the Paſſover 14 days by *Hezekiah*, when the Law required but ſeven: the feaſt of *Purim* by *Eſter* and *Mordecai*: the faſts of the 4th, 5th, and 10th month under the captivity, the feaſt of dedication by the *Maccabees*. The uſe of Baptiſm in Proſelyting, waſhing the feet before the Paſſover, imitated and practiſed by our Saviour: So that matters of order and decency are allowable and fitting; but Ceremonies properly taken for actions ſignificative, and therefore appointed becauſe ſignificative, their lawfulneſs may with better ground be ſcrupled. Or taking Ceremony in *Bellarmine*'s deſcription of it, to be *actio externa quæ non aliunde eſt bona & laudabilis niſi quia fit ad Deum colendum:* And in this ſenſe it will be hard to manifeſt any thing to be lawful, but what is founded upon a Divine precept; if it be not a matter of order, and ſo no Ceremony. And as for ſignificative Ceremonies, concerning matter of doctrine or fact, a learned Doctor puts us in mind of the old rule, that they be *paucæ & ſalubres*; and the fewer, the more wholſom: For as he obſerves from *Ariſtotle* in Inſectile Animals, the want of blood was the cauſe they run out into ſo many legs. I ſhall conclude this whole Diſcourſe with another ſpeech of S. *Auſtin*, very pertinent to our preſent purpoſe. *Omnia itaque talia quæ neque ſanctarum Scriptuarum autoritatibus continentur, nec in Conciliis Epiſcoporum ſtatuta inveniuntur, nec conſuetudine univerſæ Eccleſiæ roborata ſunt, ſed diverſorum locorum diverſis moribus innumerabiliter variantur, ita ut vix aut omnino nunquam inveniri poſſunt cauſæ, quas in eis inſtituendis ſecuti ſunt homines, ubi facultas tribuitur, ſine ulla dubitatione reſecanda exiſtimo. All ſuch things which are neither founded on the authority of the Scriptures, nor determined by general Councils* (for ſo it muſt be underſtood) *nor practiſed by the Catholick Church, but vary according to the cuſtoms of places, of which no rational account can be given; aſſoon as men have power to do it, I judge them to be cut off without any ſcruple:* For which definitive ſentence of his, he gives this moſt ſufficient reaſon; *Quamvis enim neque hot inveniri poſſit, quomodo contra fidem ſint, ipſam tamen religionem (quam pauciſſimis & manifeſtiſſimis celebrationem ſacramentis miſericordia Dei liberam eſſe voluit) ſervilibus oneribus premunt, ut tolerabilior ſit conditio Judæorum, qui etiamſi tempus libertatis non agnoverint, legalibus tamen ſarcinis, non humanis præſumptionibus ſubjiciuntur; For although we cannot poſitively ſay, how ſuch things as theſe do manifeſtly impugn our faith, yet in that they load our Religion with ſuch ſervile burdens, (which the mercy of God hath left free for all other obſervations, but the celebration of ſome few and moſt clear Sacraments) that they make our condition worſe than that of the Jews; for they, although ſtrangers to Goſpel liberty, had no burdens charged upon them by the conſtitutions of men, but only by the Law and commands of God:* Which ſentence and reaſon of his, I leave to the moſt impartial judgment of every true ſober-minded Chriſtian. And thus I am at laſt come through this field of thorns and thiſtles; I hope now to find my way more plain and eaſie. So much for the fourth Hypotheſis. The two next will be diſcharged with leſſer trouble.

*De Sacram. lib.*2. *c.* 29.

Dr. Ham. *of Superſtition, ſect.* 39.

Ep. 119. *ad Jan. cap.* 19.

§. 12. Hypoth. 5. *What is left undetermin'd both by Divine poſitive Laws, and by principles deduced from the natural Law, if it be determined by lawful authority in the Church of God, doth bind the conſciences of thoſe who are ſubject to that authority, to obedience to thoſe determinations.* I here ſuppoſe, that the matter of the Law be ſomething not predetermined, either by the Law of Nature, or Divine poſitive Laws, for againſt either of theſe no humane Law can bind the conſcience: For if there be any moral evil in the thing commanded, we are bound to obey God rather than men; in which caſe we do not formally and directly diſobey the Magiſtrate, but we chuſe to obey God before him. And as we have obſerved, a former obligation from God or Nature, deſtroys a latter; becauſe God hath a greater power and authority over mens conſciences, than any humane authority can have: And my obedience to the Magiſtrate being founded upon a Divine Law, it muſt be ſuppoſed my duty to obey him firſt, by vertue of whoſe authority I obey another; then the other whom I obey, becauſe the former hath commanded me. If I am bound to obey an inferiour Magiſtrate, becauſe the ſupreme requires it; if the inferiour command me any thing contrary to the Will and Law of the ſupreme, I am not bound to obey him in it, becauſe both he derives his power of commanding, and I my obligation to obedience from the authority of the ſupreme, which muſt be ſuppoſed to do nothing againſt it ſelf. So it is between God and the ſupreme Magiſtrate; *by him Kings reign*; God, when he gives them a Legiſlative power, doth it *cumulativè non privativè*, not ſo as to deprive himſelf of it, nor his own Laws of a binding force againſt his: So that no Law of a Magiſtrate can in reaſon bind againſt a poſitive Law of God. But what is enacted by a lawful Magiſtrate, in things left undetermined by God's Laws, doth even by vertue of them bind men to obedience, which require ſubjection to the higher powers *for conſcience ſake*. So that whatſoever is left indifferent, obedience to the Magiſtrate in things indifferent is not: And if we are not bound to obey in things undetermin'd by the word, I would fain know wherein we are bound to obey them? or what diſtinct power of obligation belongs to the authority the Magiſtrate hath over men? For all other things we are bound to already by former Laws; therefore either there muſt be a diſtinct authority without power to oblige, or elſe we are effectually bound to whatſoever the Magiſtrate doth determine in lawful things. And if it be ſo in general, it muſt be ſo as to all particulars contained in that general, and ſo in reference to matters of the Church, unleſs we ſuppoſe all things concerning it to be already determined in Scripture; which is the thing in queſtion, and ſhall be largely diſcuſſed in its due place.

Rom. 13. 5.

§. 13. *Sixthly*, Hypoth. 6. *Things undetermined by the Divine Law, natural and poſitive, and actually determined by lawful authority, are not thereby made unalterable, but may be revoked, limited, and changed, according to the different ages, tempers, inclinations of men, by the ſame power which did determine them.* All humane conſtitutions are reverſible by the ſame power which made them: For the obligation of them not ariſing from the matter of them, but from the authority of the perſon binding, are conſequently alterable, as ſhall be judged by that power moſt ſuitable to the ends of its firſt promulgation. Things may ſo much alter, and times change, that what was a likely way to keep men in unity and obedience at one time, may only enrage them at another: The ſame Phyſick which may at one time cure, may at another only enrage the diſtemper more. As therefore the ſkill of a Phyſician lies moſt in the application of Phyſick to the ſeveral tempers of his Patients: So a wiſe Magiſtrate, who is as *Nicias* ſaid in *Thucydides*, πόλεως κακῶς βουλευσαμένης ἰατρός. *The Phyſician to cure the diſtempers of the body Politick*; and conſiders, (as *Spartian* tells us *Adrian* uſed to ſay in the Senate, *ita ſe Rempub. geſturum, ut ſciret populi rem eſſe, non propriam*) that the peoples intereſt is the main care of the Prince, will ſee a neceſſity of altering, reforming, varying many humane conſtitutions, according as they ſhall tend moſt to the ends of Government, either in Church or State. Thence it is ſaid of the ſeveral Laws of nature, divine and humane: that *Lex naturæ poteſt poni, ſed non deponi, Lex divina nec poni nec deponi, Lex humana & poni & deponi. The Law of Nature may be laid down*, (as in caſe of marriage with Siſters in the beginning of the world) *but not laid aſide*; *the Law of God can neither be laid down nor laid aſide: but humane Laws both may be laid down and laid aſide.* Indeed the Laws of the *Medes* and *Perſians* are ſaid to be unalterable, (but if it be meant in the ſenſe it is commonly underſtood in) yet that very Law which made them unalterable, (for they were not ſo of their own nature) was an alterable Law, and ſo was whatever did depend upon it. I conclude then, whatever is the ſubject of humane determination may lawfully be altered and changed, according to the wiſdom and prudence of thoſe in whoſe hands the care of the publick is. Thus then, as thoſe things which are either of natural or Chriſtian liberty, are ſubjected to humane Laws and Reſtraints, ſo thoſe Laws are not irreverſible; but if the Fences be thrown down by the ſame authority which ſet them up, whatever was thereby incloſed, returns to the community of natural right again. So much for theſe *Hypotheſes*, which I have been the longer in explaining and eſtabliſhing, becauſe of the great influence they may have upon our preſent peace, and the near concernment they have to this whole diſcourſe, the whole Fabrick of which is erected upon theſe foundations.

Hiſt. lib. 6.
Spartian. in Adrian.
Dan. 6. 8.

Chap. III.

How far Church Government is founded upon the Law of nature. Two things in it founded thereon. 1. *That there muſt be a ſociety of men for the worſhip of God.* 2. *That this ſociety be governed in the moſt convenient manner. A ſociety for worſhip manifeſted.* Gen. 4. 26. *conſidered. The ſons of God and the ſons of men, who? Societies for worſhip among heathens evidenced by three things.* 1. *Solemnity of ſacrifices*; *ſacrificing how far natural*; *the antiquity of the Feaſt of Firſt-fruits largely diſcovered.* 2. *The original of Feſtivals for the honour of their Deities.* 3. *The ſecrecy and ſolemnity of their myſteries. This farther proved from man's ſociable nature*; *the improvement of it by religion, the honour redounding to God by ſuch a ſociety for his worſhip.*

§. 1. Having now laid our foundation, we proceed to raiſe a ſuperſtructure upon it. And we now come cloſely to enquire how far Government in the Church is founded upon an unalterable divine right? That we have found to be built upon a double foundation, *the dictates of the Law of nature, and Divine poſitive Laws.* We ſhall impartially enquire into both of them; and ſee how far Church Government is ſettled upon either of theſe two. I begin then with the Law of Nature. Two general things I conceive are of an unalterable divine right in reference to this. *Firſt, That there be a ſociety and joining together of men for the worſhip of God. Secondly, That this Society be governed, preſerved, and maintained in a moſt convenient manner. Firſt,* That there muſt be a ſociety of men joining together for the worſhip of God. For the dictate of nature being common to all, that God muſt be ſerved, nature requires ſome kind of mutual ſociety for the joint performance of their common duties. An evidence of which dictate of nature appears in the firſt mention we find of any publick ſociety; ſo that a ſociety for religious worſhip was as ancient as the firſt civil ſocieties we have any records of. Nay the very firſt publick ſociety we read of was gathered upon this account. For we read in the early days of the world, that the Charter for this ſociety was ſoon made uſe of, *Gen.* 4. 26. *In the days of* Enoſh *men began to call upon the name of the Lord.* Now *Enoſh* was *Seth*'s ſon, whom *Adam* had given to him in the place of *Abel*; and as ſoon as the number of men did increaſe, that men grew into Societies, they then had their publick Societies for God's worſhip. For we cannot underſtand that place abſolutely, as though God had not been called on before, but now he was called on more ſignally and ſolemnly; when men were increaſed, that they began to imbody themſelves into Societies, *Cœpit congregare populum ad tractandum ſimul dei cultum,* ſaith *Pererius*; *Tunc cœptum eſt populariter coli Deus, Mariana. Invocare,* i. e. *palam colere, Emanuel Sa,* relating all to the publick Societies being then gathered for the worſhip of the true God. From which time, in all probability did commence that title of thoſe who joined in thoſe Societies that they were called בני----האלהים *The ſons of God* which we read of ſoon after, *Gen.* 6. 2. as they are diſtinguiſhed from the —— האדם בני the ſons of men, which titles, as I am far from underſtanding in the ſenſe of the Fathers taking them for the Angels, (which in likelihood they took from the ſuppoſititious piece going under the name of *Enoch*'s Prophecy) ſo I cannot underſtand them as commonly they are taken, for mere diſcretive titles of the poſterity of *Seth* and *Cain*; as though all that came of *Seth* were the Sons of God, and all of *Cain* were the ſons of men. For as there certainly were many bad of *Seth*'s Poſterity, becauſe the flood deſtroyed all of them, *Noah* only and his Family excepted; ſo there might be ſome good of the other, vice being no more entail'd than vertue is; and Jewels may ſometimes lie in a heap of dung: and ſo this name of the ſons of God might be appropriated to thoſe who joined themſelves to thoſe ſocieties for God's worſhip. In which ſenſe ſome underſtand the very words of the Text, הוחל לקרא בשם יהוה *then began men to be called by the name of the Lord:* Which I ſuppoſe is the ſenſe of *Aquila*, who thus renders the place, τότε ἤρχθη τοῦ καλεῖσθαι ἐν ὀνόματι Κυρίου, although it be brought by *Dionyſ. Voſſius* to juſtifie the former interpretation of the words. This ſenſe, if the conſtruction of the words will bear it, (which *Druſius* queſtions, but others are much for it, and *Theodoret*, the *French* and *Piſcator* ſo render it) ſeems moſt genuine and natural; and not at all impugning what I have formerly gathered from the words, but implying it; For this diſtinction of names and titles did argue a diſtinction of Societies among them. I am not ignorant that the generality of Jewiſh Expoſitors, and many of their followers, do cary the ſenſe of the words quite another way, from the ambiguity of the ſignification of הוחל which may be interpreted as well to

Not. in Maim. de Idol. c. 1. *ſect.* 1.

V. Chamier. Pauſtrat. Cath. To. 2. *l.* 9. *c.* 9. *ſ.* 9. *Amam. Antib. Bibl. l.* 2. *p.* 228.

to prophane as begin, and ſo they read it, *tunc prophanatum eſt ad invocandum nomen Domini*, Then men prophaned the name of the Lord: And accordingly *Maimonides* begins Idolatry בימי אנוש *from the days of* Enoſh. But the words will ſcarce bear this conſtruction, as *Voſſius* upon him obſerves; and beſides there is no mention at all of the name of any falſe Gods, but only of the true one. So much then for the firſt original of this Society for religion, which we ſee began as ſoon as there was matter for a Society to be gathered up of. Some indeed derive this Society a great deal higher; and becauſe we read that *Abel* and *Cain* brought their ſacrifices, they thence infer, that it was to *Adam* who was the publick Prieſt then, and performed all publick duties of worſhip in his own perſon, and ſo was indeed Œcumenical Biſhop of the whole world, and yet had but four perſons, or but few more for his charge. Such a Dioceſe we might be content to allow him that pleads for the ſame office, and derives his Title ſomewhat higher than *Adam*; for Pope *Boniface* the eight proved there muſt be but one chief Prieſt, and ſo one Pope, becauſe it is ſaid, *Gen.* 1. 1. that God created the world *in Principio* not *in Principiis*; mark the number, therefore there muſt be but one beginning, and ſo one Biſhop, and not many. What excellent diſputants an infallible chair makes men! Much good may his argument do him.

*V. Selden de Diis Syris Proleg. p.*28. & 44. *Abodazara cap.* 1.

Bertram. de Polit. Jud. cap. 2. *p.* 12. *Franz. Sch. Sacrif. diſp.* 2. *Coppenb. Sch. Sacrif. p.* 14.

§. 2. As a farther evidence, how much nature dictates that ſuch a Society there ſhould be for Divine worſhip, we ſhall enquire into the practice of men in their diſperſion after the Flood. And what we find unanimouſly continued among them, under ſuch groſs Idolatry as they were given to, and which did ariſe not from their Idolatry as ſuch, but from the general nature of it as a kind of worſhip, we have reaſon to look upon as one of thoſe planks which hath eſcaped the common ſhipwrack of humane nature by the fall of man. And ſo though that argument from the general conſent of Nations owning a way of worſhip, though a falſe one, in order to the proving the exiſtence of God, be ſlighted by ſome, yet there is this double evidence in it to prove it, more than is generally taken notice of, and beyond the bare Teſtimony it ſelf given by that conſent. *Firſt*, From mens being ſo eaſily impoſed upon by falſe religions, in that they are ſo ſoon gull'd into Idolatry; it argues there are ſome Jewels in the world, or elſe men would never be deceived with counterfeits; it argues that a Child hath a Father, who is ready to call every one that comes to him Father; ſo it argues there is ſome natural inſtinct in men towards the worſhip of God, when men are ſo eaſily brought to worſhip other things inſtead of God. We ſee no other creatures can be ſo impoſed upon; we read of no Idolatry among the Brutes, nor that the Bees, though they have a King, and honour him, did ever bow their Knees to *Baal*, or worſhip the Hive inſtead of him. If men had no journeys to go, others need not be ſworn as the *Athenians* were, not to put them out of their way. If there were no inclinableneſs to religion, all cautions againſt Idolatry were ſuperfluous; there is then from mens proneneſs to error, as to the perſon and object of worſhip, an evidence of a natural ὅρμην, an inſtinct within towards the act of worſhip: And as when I ſee ſheep flock together, even in their wandrings, I may eaſily gather, that though they are out of their proper paſtures, yet they are of a tame and ſociable nature; ſo when we ſee Societies for worſhip were preſerved among men after they were degenerated into Idolatry, is an evident argument that ſuch aſſociating together

Socinus præl. cap. 2.

together for the general nature of the act, doth flow from the nature of man. *Secondly*, All mens agreeing in ſome kind of worſhip, though differing as to the object and manner of it, is an evidence it comes from nature, becauſe it plainly evinces it could be nothing taken up out of deſign, received by cuſtom, nor conveyed by tradition, becauſe even among thoſe whoſe intereſts and deſigns have been contrary to one another, and could have no mutual compacts to deceive their people, have all agreed in this thing, though almoſt in all other things they have ſtrangely differed. All other Cuſtoms and Traditions, are either changed, or loſt, among ſeveral Nations; as the rude barbarous Northern Nations, that in their inroads and incurſions upon other places, have left in proceſs of time, almoſt all other cuſtoms but only their religion behind them. This ſticks cloſer than *Saladine*'s black ſhirt, or the old *Monk*'s cloaths, which they put not off till they died. Nay even thoſe Nations, who openly, and as by a Law, violate the other received dictates of nature, do yet maintain and hold up this. Thoſe that have had the leaſt of commerce and converſe with civilized people, have yet had their Societies for worſhip: And when they could find no Gods to worſhip, they would rather make than want them. The *Egyptians* would rather ſpoil their Sallets than be without Gods; and they that whipt their Gods, yet had them ſtill. They who had no ſenſe of another Life, yet would pray to their Gods for the good things of this; and they that would not pray that the Gods would do them good, yet would that they might do them no hurt: So that in the moſt prodigious Idolatry, we have an argument for Religion, and in the ſtrange diverſities of the ways of worſhip, we have an evidence how natural a Society for worſhip is. This to ſhew the validity and force of the argument drawn from conſent of Nations, even in their Idolatry.

§. 3. Three things I ſhall evidence theſe Societies for worſhip among the Heathens by; the ſolemnity of their ſacrifices, their publick Feſtivals, and their ſecret Myſteries, all which were inſtituted peculiarly in honour of their Gods: It being neceſſary in ſuch Societies for worſhip, to have ſome particular Rites, whereby to teſtifie the end of ſuch Societies to be for the honour of their Deity, and to diſtinguiſh thoſe ſolemnities from all other. *Firſt* then for ſacrifices; *Paulus Burgenſis* obſerving how this cuſtom ſpread all the world over, concludes from thence that it was natural to men. *In qualibet ætate, & apud quaſlibet hominum nationes ſemper fuit aliqua ſacrificiorum oblatio. Quod autem eſt apud omnes, naturale eſt.* Thus far I confeſs ſacrificing natural, as it was a ſolemn and ſenſible Rite of worſhip; but if he meant by that, the deſtroying of ſome living creatures to be offered up to God, I both deny the univerſal practice of it, and its being from the dictate of nature; and I rather believe with *Fortunius Licetus*, that it was continued down by tradition, from the ſacrifices of *Cain* and *Abel* before the flood, or rather from *Noah*'s after; which might the eaſier be, becauſe Nature dictating there muſt be ſome way of worſhip, and it being very agreeable to Nature it ſhould be by ſenſible ſigns, all Nations having no other rule to direct them, were willing to obſerve that Rite and Cuſtom in it, which was conveyed down to them from their Progenitors: But let us ſee what reaſon *Burgenſis* gives; *Ratio naturalis dictat, ut ſecundum naturalem inclinationem, homines ei quod eſt ſupra omnes, ſubjectionem exhibeant, ſecundum modum homini convenientem. Qui quidem modus eſt, ut ſenſibilibus ſignis utatur, ad exprimendum interiorem conceptum, ſicut ex*

Scrutin. Scrip. part. 2. diſt. 3. cap. 11.

V. Porphyr. περὶ ἀποχῆς.

Encyclop. ad aram Nonarii Terrig. c. 9. p 96.

ſenſibilibus cognitionem accipit inviſibilium. Unde ex naturali ratione procedit, quod homo ſenſibilibus ſignis utatur, offerens eas Deo in ſignum ſubjectionis & honoris ad ſimilitudinem eorum qui Dominis ſuis aliquid offerunt in recognitionem Dominii. But all this will extend no farther, than that it is very agreeable to natural reaſon, that as man attains the knowledge of inviſible things by viſible, ſo he ſhould expreſs his ſenſe of inviſible things by ſome viſible ſigns, thereby declaring ſubjection to God as his Lord and Maſter, as Tenants expreſs their Homage to their Lords by offering ſomething to them. And I withal acknowledge, that as to oblations without blood, they ſeem indeed very natural: Whence we ſhall ſomewhat largely diſcover the antiquity of the Feaſts of Firſt-fruits, which were the cleareſt acknowledgment of their dependence upon God, and receiving theſe things from him. *Ariſtotle* tells us, αἱ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς· οἷον ἀπαρχαί. *That the moſt ancient Sacrifices and Aſſemblies appear to have been upon the ingathering of fruits, ſuch as the ſacrifices of firſt-fruits to the Gods were.* Nicomach. l. 8. To the ſame purpoſe *Porphyrius*, ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς μὲν γὰρ αἱ τῶν καρπῶν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς θεοῖς θυσίαι. The firſt ſacrifices were of firſt fruits. And *Horace*, De Abſtin. lib. 2. ſ. 27.

Agricolæ priſci fortes, parvoque beati
Condita poſt frumenta, levantes tempore feſto Ep. ad Aug.
Corpus, & ipſum animum ſpe finis dura ferentes,
Cum ſociis operum & pueris & conjuge fidâ,
Tellurem porco, Sylvanum lacte piabant.

Although he be not ſo expreſs for offering the very fruits of the earth; yet it is evident from him, that their great Feſtivals in honour of their Gods, were immediately after harveſt, and that they had great Aſſemblies for that purpoſe, and did then ſolemnly ſacrifice. And from theſe ſolemnities came the original of Tragedies and Comedies, as *Horace* intimates, and is largely ſhewed by *Iſaac Caſaubon* in his Treatiſe *de Satyricâ Poeſi.* Lib. 1. c. 1. But to fetch this yet a little higher, and ſo bring it downwards: The firſt ſacrifice we read of in Scripture, was this of the fruits of the earth, (unleſs the ſkins which *Adam* cloathed himſelf with, were of the beaſts ſacrificed, as ſome conjecture) *Cain*'s ſacrifice was מנחה an Gen. 4. 2. *oblation of the fruits of the earth*; in all probability, the firſt-fruits as *Abel* offered the firſt-born of the Cattle to the Lord: This ſeems to have been at ſome ſolemn time of ſacrificing, which is implied in מקץ ימים *At the end of days.* In proceſs of time we render it; but the Jews underſtand it at the end of the year; days in Scripture being often put for years, which Interpretation if we follow, we find a very early obſervation of the Anniverſary feſtival of firſt-fruits: But however this be, we have by unqueſtionable Tradition, that no Feſtival was more anciently, nor more univerſally obſerved, than this of offering the firſt fruits to God of their increaſe. V. Ainſworth in loc. The Jews were bound up ſo ſtrictly to it by their Law, *Leviticus* 23. 14. that they were to eat nothing of their crop, till the offering of the firſt fruits was made. And *Porphyrius* tells us out of *Hermippus*, that one of the Laws made for the *Athenians* by *Triptolemus*, was, Θεοὺς καρποῖς ἀγάλλειν, *To feaſt the Gods with their fruits.* De abſtin. l. 4. ſ. 22. Of which *Xenocrates* there gives a twofold reaſon; ſenſe of gratitude to the Gods, and the eaſineſs at all times to offer up theſe; by which he ſuppoſed the cuſtom would continue longer. *Draco* afterwards put this among his Θεσμοὶ αἰώνιοι, his unalterable Laws, Θεοὺς τιμᾷν ἀπαρχαῖς καρπῶν, To V. Petit. ad Leg. Att. p. 3.

worſhip their Gods with their firſt fruits. Beſides which, for other *Quæſt.Græc. q. 6.* Greeks we have the teſtimony of *Plutarch*, οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τὰς πάνυ παλαιὰς θυσίας ἐχρῶντο ταῖς κριθαῖς, ἀπαρχομένων τῶν πολιτῶν. *The moſt of the Grecians*, ſaith he, *in their moſt ancient ſacrifices did uſe barley, the firſt-fruits being offered by the Citizens*; and therefore the *Opuntii* called their chief Prieſt κριθολόγος, becauſe he gathered in the firſt fruits. The manner of offering the firſt fruits among them, was much of the ſame nature with the *Mincha* among the Jews, which was Levit. 23. 13. of *fine flower mingled with oyl for a burnt offering to the Lord:* The word there uſed implies the bruiſing the ears of corn in a mortar, becauſe they were as yet moiſt, and could not be ground as hard corn was. Whence, becauſe it was not all brought to flower, the Cake was called σῶα, and κρίμνα. It is called by the *Septuagint* κριθὴ πεφρυγμένη. So I ſuppoſe it ſhould be read, which in our great Bibles is πεφρυγμένα χίδρα· and it is called by the Greeks οὐλοχύται, which word is frequently uſed by *Homer* and *Apollonius Rhodius*, whom I forbear to tranſcribe, it being ſo obvious; which is expounded both by the excellent Scholiaſt on *Apollonius*, *Iliad. α. v. 449. Arg. 1. v. 409, &c.* and by *Euſtathius* and the ſhort Scholiaſt on *Homer*, to be κριθαὶ μεθ' ἁλῶν μεμιγμέναι, Barley and Salt mixed together. To which among the Romans the *Mola ſalſa* anſwered, of which *Feſtus: Eſt far toſtum & ſale conſperſum*, as the *Mincha* under the Law, was always ſalted with ſalt, *Levit*. 2. 13. This *Mola ſalſa* among the Romans, had originally relation to the firſt fruits: For the cuſtom of offering up firſt fruits among them, was as ancient as their inſtitution of Religious Rites; as *Hiſt.Natur. lib. 18. c. 2.* *Pliny* fully informs us. *Numa inſtituit Deos fruge colere, & mola ſalſa ſupplicare, atque ut autor eſt Hemina, far terrere:* which likewiſe anſwers Lev. 2. 14. to the Jewiſh *Mincha*, which was to be קלוי באש *toſta in igne*, parched in the fire: For which purpoſe *Numa* inſtituted the *Fornicalia*, which were *farris torrendi feriæ, the feaſt of firſt fruits among them*, the parching the corn being in order thereto: For as *Pliny* adds, *ac ne deguſtabant novas fruges, aut vina antequam ſacerdotes primitias libâſſent*; which may be *V. Sanbertum de ſacrif. c. 19.* exactly rendred in the very words of the Law, *Leviticus* 23. 14. But though the *Mola ſalſa* came originally from hence, it afterwards came to be uſed in moſt ſacrifices; thence the word *immolare* to ſacrifice, again parallel to the *Mincha acceſſorium*, as ſome call it among the Jews, which was uſed in other ſacrifices, and was diſtinct from the *Mincha per ſe*, which of its ſelf was an oblation to the Lord. From this offering up *Voſſius de Idol. l. 2. cap. 59.* bruiſed corn, ſome derive the name of *Ceres* from גרש which ſignifies as much, and was required *Leviticus* 2. 14. thence *Ovid l.* 8. *Met. Primitias frugum Cereri, ſua vina Lyæo*; but beſides *Ceres* they offered their firſt fruits among the Greeks to *Horæ*, *Diana*, *Apollo*, *Veſta*, as may be *Græc. Fer.* ſeen in *Meurſius* in Ὡραῖα, Θαργήλια, Ἑστιαῖα. Thus we ſee how theſe three Nations did agree not only in the obſervation of the Feaſt of firſt fruits, but very much in the ceremonies of their offerings too. Only this difference may be obſerved between them, the Romans did mix their *Mola ſalſa* with water, the Jews their *Mincha* with oyl only; the Greeks did not bruiſe the corn in their οὐλοχύται, but only mixed ſalt with the grains of corn. But the Jews and Romans both bruiſed and parched it, before they offered it up for the firſt fruits. Thus much to ſhew the antiquity and obſervation of the offering up of the firſt fruits among the moſt ancient and civilized nations. Which though it may ſeem a Digreſſion, yet I hope not wholly unacceptable, it being likewiſe the offering of my firſt fruits, and therefore the more ſeaſonable.

§. 4.

Proceed we now to other Feſtival Solemnities, to ſee what evidences of a ſociety for worſhip we find in them. And for this, it is apparent that the firſt original of Feſtivals among the heathen was for the honour of the Gods. Upon which account a grave and prudent author accounts the obſervation of ſome Feſtivals natural; becauſe nature doth dictate the neceſſity of ſome ſociety for the worſhip of God. For thus *Strabo*, Κοινὸν τοῦτο καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς ἱεροποιίας μετ᾽ ἀνέσεως ἑορταστικῆς ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ἡ φύσις οὕτως ὑπαγορεύει. It was the cuſtom of all nations (who are comprehended under his words) to have Feſtival days for the honour of their Gods, which nature it ſelf dictates. Hence the Greeks as *Athenæus* obſerves, πάσης εὐωχίας τὴν αἰτίαν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀνέφερον, uſed to ſay *that their Gods beg'd them all their play-days.* After telling us of the mirth and jollity uſed after their ſacrifices, which was always the ſecond courſe at theſe Feſtivals, thence the Jews called their high Feſtival days ימים טובים good days or days of Mirth. We read of few Nations but had theſe Feſtival ſolemnities for the honour of their Gods. The Perſians had theirs for their God *Mithras:* The Babylonians ſaith *Athenæus* out of *Beroſus*, had their Feaſt *Sacæa* which *Caſaubon* would have called *Seſacæa*, becauſe *Babylon* in Scripture is called ששך *Seſac*, as the *Ludi Romani* were from *Rome*. It is to no purpoſe to mention the Feſtivals obſerved by the Greeks and Romans in honour of their Gods being ſo many that whole Books have been compoſed of them. That which I obſerve from hence, is, that Societies for the worſhip of God are natural; becauſe of their ſolemn reſting from their ordinary labour upon days appointed for the honour of their Gods: Thereby ſhewing they looked upon thoſe as peculiar days, and themſelves as peculiar Societies upon thoſe days from what they were at other times. One thing more evidenceth this among them; their ſolemn and ſecret myſteries which were ſocieties on purpoſe, as pretended for this very end in honour of their Gods. Their σεμνὰ, μεγάλα, φρικτὰ μυστήρια, as they were wont to call them, preſerved with the greateſt ſecrecy by the ἐπόπται. Their great and leſſer *Eleuſinian*, *Samothracian*, *Cotyttian*, *Mithriacal* Myſteries, to which none were admitted without paſſing through many degrees, κάθαρσις, μύησις, σύστασις, before they came to be ἐπόπται perfectly initiated. Wherein they were much imitated by the Chriſtians in the celebration of the Lord's ſupper about the fourth or fifth Century, as is largely ſhewed by *Caſaubon* in a moſt learned *Diatriba* on this ſubject in his Exercitations: to which I refer the reader. We ſee what ſtrict rules they had for admiſſion of any into theſe pretendedly ſacred but truly moſt impious ſocieties. In thoſe of *Mithras* as *Suidas* and *Nonnus* tell us, they paſſed through eighty degrees before they were throughly initiated, and ſeldom eſcaped with life. However we may gain from them this general notion, that they looked on a peculiar diſtinct ſociety as neceſſary for the worſhip and honour of the Deity they ſerved. Thus we ſee *à poſteriori* how a diſtinct ſociety for God's worſhip appears to be a dictate of Nature.

Geogr. l. 10.

Deipnoſoph. lib. 9.

Deipnoſ. l. 14. *cap.* 10.

V. Meurſii Græc. Ariſt. Caſtellon. ἑορτολόγιον. *Hoſpin. de Feſtis. Mich. Benther de Faſtis.*

Exercit. in Bar. 16. *ſ.* 42. *ſed vide Gothofred. in* Tim. 3. 16. *Salmaſ. in hiſt. Aug. p.* 31, 33. *Suidas in v. Mithras. Nonnus in Naz. Stelit. p.* 132. *Meurſ. in Eleuſinis.*

§. 5.

We ſhall now ſee if we can evidence *à priori* that it is a dictate of nature that there muſt be ſome ſociety for the worſhip of God. Three things will make that appear. *Firſt*, The ſociableneſs of man's nature. Man is ἀγελαῖόν τι, a creature that loves to herd it ſelf with thoſe of his own kind. Ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα. If a man had all other comforts of life and wanted ſociety, he would not think his life worth leading, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves who farther

Ariſtot. Nicom. l. 8. *c.* 1.

takes notice of the ſociableneſs of man's nature Ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν, from the general commendation that is given to courteous and affable men. I deny not but in the entring into a civil ſtate of ſociety, either fear or profit might be a main inducement to it; but though it be an inducement, yet there muſt be ſuppoſed an inclinableneſs to a ſociety; or a Commonwealth might be as ſoon ſet up among Tigers as men. So that they have very little ground of reaſon, who from the external inducements of fear or profit, in entring into civil ſocieties, do conclude againſt the ſociableneſs of man's nature. If then mans nature be ſociable in all other things, then nature will tell men, they ought to be ſo in things of common concernment to them all, and which is every ones work or duty, as religion is; if in other things men are ſociable, much more in this; For *Secondly*, Religion gives a great improvement to mans ſociable nature; and therefore *Plutarch* well calls Religion συνεκτικὸν ἁπάσης κοινωνίας καὶ νομοθεσίας ἔρεισμα. *A foundation that knits and joins ſocieties together.* And thence wiſely obſerves that in the conſtitution of Laws, πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ θεῶν δόξα καὶ μέγιστον· the firſt and greateſt thing to be looked at, is, the religion eſtabliſhed, or the opinions men entertain of the Gods. ~~To~~ which he ſubjoyns this excellent reaſon, πόλις ἂν μοι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐδάφους χωρὶς, ἢ πολιτεία τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης ἀναιρεθείσης, παντάπασι σύστασιν λαβεῖν ἢ λαβοῦσα τηρῆσαι. *That it is more impoſſible for a Common-wealth either to be formed or ſubſiſt without religion, than a City to ſtand without foundations.* Thence a prudent Stateſ-man called *Religion* the beſt *Reaſon of State.* It appears then evidently both from reaſon and experience, that Religion hath a great influence upon the modelling and ordering civil ſocieties, whence as the ſame *Moraliſt* obſerves, *Lycurgus* did as it were conſecrate the *Lacedemonians* with religious rites, as *Numa* the *Romans*, *Jon* the *Athenians*, and *Deucalion* the *Hellens*. Whence ſome half-witted men (but I know not whether more defective in wit or grace) have (obſerving the great influence religion hath to keep men in order) been ready to look upon it as only a Politick device, to awe men with greater eaſe. It is not here a place largely to examine and refute this unworthy pretence. Only I adjure them by their only Goddeſs, Reaſon, to tell me whence come men to be ἐμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα δι' ἐλπίδων ἅμα καὶ φόβων, as *Plutarch* expreſſeth it, to be ſo eaſily awed by the hopes and fears of another life more than other creatures are? Why are they at all affected with the diſcourſe of them? why cannot they ſhake off the thoughts of theſe things when they pleaſe? Are not men hereby made the moſt miſerable of creatures? for no other creature can be perſuaded that it ſhall ever quench its thirſt in thoſe rivers of pleaſures, nor make its bed in everlaſting flames. The beaſts of *Sardinia* that have their only refreſhment by the dew of Heaven, yet have never any hopes to come there. The Lyon never keeps from his prey by the thoughts and fears of a great Tribunal. But ſuppoſe only mankind of all creatures ſhould be liable to be thus impoſed on, as is pretended; How comes it to paſs that in no age of the world this impoſture hath not been diſcovered, confuted, ſhaken off by ſome people as wiſe as themſelves? Or have there never been any ſuch in the world? But whence come ſome men then to be wiſer than others? Whence come ſome to know things which all the reaſon in the world could never find out, without revelation? Whence comes a power to do any thing above the courſe of nature, if there be nothing but nature? Or are all men deceived that believe ſuch things?

Moral. adverſ. Coloтem.

Lord Bacon Eſſay of a King.

things? If ſo, then there muſt be ſomewhat that muſt deceive men; men would not deceive themſelves, and they could not be ſo long impoſed upon by other men; there muſt be then ſome evil ſpirit muſt do it; and whence ſhould that come? from nature too? but then whence comes nature its ſelf? from its ſelf too, or ſomething elſe? Did it make it ſelf, or was it made by a greater power than it? if it made its ſelf, it muſt be and not be at the ſame time; it muſt be as producing and not be as produced by that act. And what is become of our Reaſon now? there muſt be then a ſupreme, eternal, infinite Being which made the world and all in it; which hath given nature ſuch a *Touch* of its own immortality and dependence upon God, that reaſon capable of Religion is the moſt proper diſtinctive Character of man from all inferior beings. And this Touch and ſenſe being common to the whole nature, they therefore incline more to one anothers ſociety in the joint performance of the common duties, due from them to their Maker. And ſo Religion not only makes all other bonds firm (which without it are nothing, as Oaths, Covenants, Promiſes, and the like, without which no civil ſociety can be upheld) but muſt of its ſelf be ſuppoſed eſpecially to tye men in a nearer ſociety to one another in reference to the proper acts belonging to its ſelf. *Thirdly*, It appears from the greater honour which redounds to God by a ſociable way of worſhip. Nature that dictates that God ſhould be worſhipped, doth likewiſe dictate that worſhip ſhould be performed in a way moſt for the honour and glory of God. Now this tends more to promote God's honour, when his ſervice is owned as a publick thing, and men do openly declare and profeſs themſelves his ſubjects. If the honour of a King lies in the publickly profeſſed and avowed obedience of a multitude of ſubjects; it muſt proportionably promote and advance God's honour more to have a fixed, ſtated Worſhip, whereby men may in a Community and publick ſociety declare and manifeſt their homage and fealty to the ſupreme Governour of the World. Thus then we ſee the light of Nature dictates there ſhould be a ſociety and joyning together of men for and in the Worſhip of God.

CHAP. IV.

The ſecond thing the Law of Nature dictates, that this ſociety be maintained and governed in the moſt convenient manner. A farther inquiry, what particular orders for Government in the Church came from the Law of Nature. Six laid down, and evidenced to be from thence. Firſt, A diſtinction of ſome perſons, and their ſuperiority over others, both in power and order, cleared to be from the Law of Nature. The power and application of the power diſtinguiſhed; this latter not from any Law of Nature binding, but permiſſive: therefore may be reſtrained. Peoples right of chooſing Paſtors conſidered. Order diſtinguiſhed from the form and manner of Government: the former natural, the other not. The ſecond is, that the perſons imployed in the ſervice of God, ſhould have reſpect anſwerable to their imployment, which appears from their relation to God as his ſervants; from the perſons imployed in this work before poſitive Laws. Maſters of families the firſt Prieſts.

The Prieſthood of the firſt born before the Law diſcuſſed: the arguments for it anſwered. The conjunction of civil and ſacred authority largely ſhewed, among Egyptians, Grecians, Romans, and others. The ground of ſeparation of them afterwards, from Plutarch *and others.*

§. 1. THE *ſecond* thing which the light of Nature dictates, in reference to Church Government, is, That the ſociety in which men joyn for the worſhip of God, be preſerved, maintained, and governed in the moſt convenient manner. Nature, which requires ſociety, doth require Government in that ſociety, or elſe it is no ſociety. Now we ſhall inquire what particular orders for Government in this ſociety eſtabliſhed for the worſhip of God, do flow from the light of Nature, which I conceive are theſe following.

Firſt, *To the maintaining of a ſociety, there is requiſite a diſtinction of perſons, and a ſuperiority of power and order, in ſome over the other.* If all be rulers every man is *ſui juris*, and ſo there can be no ſociety, or each man muſt have power over the other, and that brings confuſion. There muſt be ſome then inveſted with power and authority over others, to rule them in ſuch things wherein they are ſubordinate to them, that is, in all things concerning that ſociety they are entred into. Two things are implied in this: Firſt, Power; ſecondly, Order. By Power, I mean right to govern; by Order, the ſuperiority of ſome as rulers, the ſubordination of others as ruled. Theſe two are ſo neceſſary, that no civil ſociety in the world can be without them: For if there be no power, how can men rule? if no order, how can men be ruled, or be ſubject to others as their Governours? Here ſeveral things muſt be needfully diſtinguiſhed. *The power* from the *application* of that *power*, which we call the Title to government. The *Order it ſelf* from the *form or manner of government*. Some of theſe I aſſert as abſolutely neceſſary to all Government of a ſociety, and conſequently of the Church, conſidered without poſitive Laws; but others to be accidental, and therefore variable. I ſay then, that there be a Governing power in the Church of God, is immutable, not only by vertue of God's own conſtitution, but as a neceſſary reſult from the dictate of nature, ſuppoſing a Society: but whether this power muſt be derived by ſucceſſion, or by a free choice, is not at all determined by the light of Nature; becauſe it may be a lawful power and derived either way: and the Law of Nature as binding, only determines of neceſſaries. Now in civil Government, we ſee that a lawful Title is by ſucceſſion in ſome places, as by election in other. So in the Church under the Law, the power went by lineal deſcent, and yet a lawful power; and on the other ſide, none deny (ſetting aſide poſitive Laws,) but it might be as lawful by choice and free election. The main reaſon of this is, that the Title or manner of conveying authority to particular perſons, is no part of the preceptive obligatory Law of Nature, but only of the permiſſive; and conſequently is not immutable, but is ſubject to Divine or humane poſitive determinations, and thereby made alterable: And ſuppoſing a determination, either by Scripture or lawful authority, the exerciſe of that natural right is ſo far reſtrained as to become ſinful, according to the 3^d^ Propoſition under the 2^d^ Hypoth. and the 5^th^ Hypoth. So that granting at preſent, that people have the right of chooſing their Paſtors; this right being only a part of the permiſſive Law of Nature, may be lawfully reſtrained and otherwiſe determined, by thoſe that have lawful authority over the people, as a civil ſociety, according to the 5th Hypoth. If it be pleaded that they have a right by Divine poſitive Law, that Law muſt be produced; it being already proved, that no bare example, without a declaration by God that ſuch an example binds, doth conſtitute a Divine Right which is unalterable. We ſay then, that the manner of inveſting Church-Governours in their Authority, is not determin'd by the Law of Nature; but that there ſhould be a power Governing is (ſuppoſing a ſociety) of the immutable Law of Nature, becauſe it is that without which no ſociety can be maintained. And this is one of thoſe things which are of the Law of Nature, not in an abſolute ſtate of liberty, but ſuppoſing ſome acts of men (which once ſuppoſed) become immutable, and indiſpenſible. As ſuppoſing propriety, every man is bound to abſtain from what is in anothers poſſeſſion, without his conſent, by an immutable Law of Nature; which yet ſuppoſeth ſome act of man, *viz.* the voluntary introducing of propriety by conſent: So ſuppoſing a ſociety in being, it is an immutable dictate of the Law of Nature, that a power of Government ſhould be maintained and preſerved in it.

§. 2. So I ſay for the ſecond thing, Order, This, as it implies the ſubordination of ſome in a ſociety, to others as their rulers, is immutable and indiſpenſable; but as to the form whereby that order ſhould be preſerved, that is, whether the Government ſhould be in the hands of one or more, is no wiſe determined by the obligatory Law of Nature; becauſe either of them may be lawful and uſeful for the ends of Government, and ſo neither neceſſary by that Law: for as to the Law of Nature, the caſe is the ſame in civil and religious ſocieties; now who will ſay, that according to the Law of Nature, any form of Government, Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, Democracy, is unlawful. Theſe things are then matters of natural liberty, and not of natural neceſſity, and therefore muſt be examin'd according to poſitive determinations of divine and humane Laws, where we ſhall ſpeak of it. This then is clear as to our purpoſe, That a power in the Church muſt be conſtantly upheld and preſerved, fitly qualified for the ends of Government, is an immutable Law, ſo that this power be lodged in ſome particular Perſons to act as Governours, and ſo diſtinct from others, as ſubordinate to them; but whether the power of Government come from people by election, or from Paſtors by ordination, or from Magiſtrates by commiſſion and delegation; whether one, two, or all theſe wayes, is not determined by natural Law, but muſt be looked for in God's poſitive Laws; if not there neither to be found, we muſt acquieſce in what is determined by lawful authority. The ſame I ſay again, as to forms of Government, whether the power of ſole juriſdiction, and ordination, be inveſted in one perſon above the rank of Preſbyters, or be lodged in a College acting in a parity of power, is a plea muſt be removed from the Court of Common Law of Nature, to the King's Bench; I mean to the poſitive Laws of God, or the Supreme power in a Commonwealth: There being no Statutes in the Law of Nature to determine it; it muſt be therefore *Placitum Regis*, ſome poſitive Law muſt end the controverſie. We therefore traverſe the ſuit here, and ſhall enter it at the other Court.

§. 3. The ſecond thing dictated by the Law of Nature, is, *That the Perſons imployed in the immediate ſervice of God, and entruſted with the power of governing the ſociety appointed for that end, ſhould have reſpect paid them anſwerable to the nature of their imployment.* This appears to have foundation in the Law of Nature, being eaſily deducible from one of the firſt principles of that Law, that God is to be worſhipped; if ſo, then thoſe whoſe employment is chiefly to attend upon himſelf, ought to have greater reverence than others. By the ſame reaſon in nature, that if we do honour the King himſelf, the nearer any are to the King's perſon in attendance or employment, the greater honour is to be ſhewed them. The ground of which is, that the honour given to ſervants as ſuch, is not given to their perſons, but to their relation, or to the one only upon the account of the other; and ſo it doth not fix and terminate upon themſelves, but rebounds back, and reflects upon the original and fountain of that honour, the Prince himſelf: So if any be honoured upon the account of their immediate employment in the ſervice of God, it is God who is chiefly honour'd, and not they; it being the way men have to expreſs their honour to God, by ſhewing it proportionably and reſpectively to thoſe who either repreſent him, or are employed by him. Εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων δεσπότην ἡ τιμὴ διαβαίνει, as *Chryſoſtome* ſpeaks in this very caſe. *The honour paſſeth through them to God himſelf.* Where he largely proves this very thing from the Egyptians ſparing the Land of their Prieſts; and argues at leaſt for an equality of honour, from reaſon, to be given to thoſe who ſerve the true God. Nay, he is ſo far from looking upon it as a part of their ſuperſtition, that he mounts his argnment *à pari* to one, *à minori ad majus*, ἀλλ' ὅση ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς πλάνης πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τῶν ἐκείνων ἱερέων πρὸς τοὺς τοῦ θεοῦ ἱερεῖς, τοσαύτην διαφορὰν καὶ περὶ τὴν τιμὴν ἐπιδεξώμεθα, that is, *as much as truth exceeds error, and the ſervants of God do the Idol prieſts, ſo much let the honour we give to them, exceed that which was given by the Heathen to theirs:* But we have a farther evidence of the honourableneſs of this employment, by the light of Nature, from the perſons employed in this work, before any poſitive Laws did reſtrain it: for I ſay not, that the Law of Nature doth dictate, that the function of thoſe employed in this work ſhould be differenced from all other; that is done by divine poſitive Laws; but the honour of thoſe in that function is from the Law of Nature: which appears hence, in that in the eldeſt times, thoſe who had the greateſt authority civil, had likewiſe the ſacred conjoined with it. For as *Ariſtotle* rightly obſerves, that the original of civil government was from private families: ſo in thoſe families, before they came to aſſociate for more publick worſhip, the Maſter of the Family was the Prieſt of it. Thence we read of *Noah*'s ſacrificing, *Abraham*'s duty to inſtruct his family, and his own command for offering up his ſon: we read of *Jacob*'s ſacrificing, and *Job*'s, and ſo of others, Every maſter of the family then was the High-prieſt too, and governed his family, not only as ſuch, but as a religious ſociety.

Homil. 65. *in* Gen. 47. 26. *Tom.* 1. *p.* 505. *Ed. Savil.*

Politic. lib. 1. *cap.* 2.

Gen. 8. 20. 18, 19. 22. 2. 31. 54. Job. 42. 8.

§. 4. Afterwards (from what inſtitution we know not; but certainly the reaſon of it, if it were ſo, was to put the greater honour upon the eldeſt Son) it is generally conceived, that the firſt-born had the Prieſthood of the family in their poſſeſſion, till the time of the Levitical Law. The Jewiſh Doctors think that was the Birthright which *Jacob* procured from his Father, and which *Abraham* gave to *Iſaac*, when it is ſaid that he gave him כל all that he had: For ſaith *Poſtellus*, if it be meant in a literal ſenſe, how could he give thoſe gifts to his other Sons which are mentioned before? Wherefore he conjectures, by that All is meant the ſpiritual knowledge of Chriſt, which he calls *Intellectus generalis*; which might be proper to him as a Prieſt of the family. But the plain meaning

V. Selden. de ſucceſſ. ad leo. Heb. cap. 5. *Origin. cap.* 15. *p.* 69.

ing is no more, than when *Abraham* had beſtowed Legacies on his other Children, he left *Iſaac hæredem ex aſſe*, his lawful heir: I am unwilling to deny a tradition ſo generally received, among both Jewiſh and Chriſtian Writers, as the Prieſthood of the firſt-born before the Law; but this I ſay, I cannot yet find any other ground for it but tradition: no place of Scripture giving us ſufficient evidence for it, and many againſt it. That which ſerves ſufficiently for the confutation of it, is that obſervation of *Theodoret* ἐπισημαντέον ὅτι πανταχοῦ τῶν πρωτοτόκων οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς προτιμῶνται. *It is to be obſerved, that the younger are always preferred before the firſt-born.* Which he takes notice of from the caſe he there ſpeaks to of *Ephraim* and *Manaſſes*; and ſo runs it up to *Abel* preferr'd before *Cain*, *Seth* before *Japheth*, *Abraham* before his elder brethren, *Iſaac* before *Iſmael*, *Jacob* before *Eſau*, *Judas* and *Joſeph* before *Reuben*, *Moſes* before *Aaron*, and *David* before the reſt of his Brethren; (although that was after the Law.) That place which gives the greateſt countenance to the opinion is, *Numb.* 3. 41. *And thou ſhalt take the Levites for me inſtead of the firſt-born:* Where it ſeems, that the firſt-born were formerly the Prieſts, in whoſe room the Levites were taken. But with ſubmiſſion to better judgments, I can ſee nothing implied in this place, but only that God having delivered their firſt-born in *Egypt*, *Exod.* 12. 23. and calling for them to be ſanctified to him, *Exod.* 13. 2. upon the account of the propriety he had in them, in a peculiar manner, by that deliverance (and not on the account of any ſpecial ſervice, for many were very unfit for that by reaſon of age, and which is obſervable, God requires as well the firſt-born of beaſts both to be ſanctified and redeemed, *Numb.* 3. 41.) therefore God now ſetling a way of worſhip, he gave the Iſraelites liberty to redeem them, and inſtead of them pitched on the tribe of *Levi* for his own ſervice. Another place is *Exodus* 24. 5. where the young men are mentioned that offered burnt offering. It is confeſſed that the Chaldee Paraphraſt and Arabick Verſion underſtand here the firſt-born; but however the place implies no more than that they were employed to bring the ſacrifices, for ſo the Septuagint renders it, καὶ ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς νεανίσκους τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ καὶ ἀνήνεγκεν ὁλοκαυτώματα, or elſe that they were employed as the *Popæ* only to kill the ſacrifices; for we ſee the ſprinkling of the blood which was the main thing intended here as a fœderal rite, was done by *Moſes* himſelf, who was the High Prieſt of the people as well as Prince, till *Aaron* and his ſons were ſet apart, which was not till *Exodus* 28. 1, 2. and yet *Aaron* was three years elder than *Moſes*, *Exod.* 7. 7. which is an evidence that *Aaron* as firſt-born was not the Prieſt; for till his conſecration, *Moſes* and not *Aaron* performed the offices of Prieſthood. Thence we read *Pſalm* 99. 6. Moſes *and* Aaron *among his Prieſts*. For although the word כהן be ſometimes attributed to thoſe in civil authority, as, 2 *Sam.* 8. 18. compared with 1 *Chron.* 18. 17. and 2 *Sam.* 20. 26. *Gen.* 41. 50. *Exod.* 2. 16. *Job.* 12. 19. Yet there is no reaſon ſo to underſtand it of *Moſes*: And farther the ground why כהן was attributed to both Prince and Prieſt before the Law, was, becauſe the ſame Perſon might be both; as the Prieſts of *Egypt* were Princes too, *Gen.* 41. 50. But for *Moſes*, we read not only of the title, but the proper offices of Prieſts attributed to him, as ſacrificing, *Exod.* 24. 5. conſecrating *Aaron* and his ſons, *Exod.* 29. 35. and therefore *Aben Ezra* upon that Pſalm forecited, calls him כהן הכהנים the High-Prieſt.

Qu. 108. *in Gen.*

V. Iſidor. Pel. lib. 2. *ep.* 47. & 48. *ad fin.*

V. Selden. de ſucceſſ. ad Pontif. Ebr. cap. 1. *ſed & V. eum de Syned. l.* 1. *cap.* 16.

V. Selden. de Syned. l. 2 *cap.* 2. *ſ.* 3.

§. 5. The Prieſthood of *Moſes* leads us to another evidence of the honour of thoſe who were employed in the ſervice of God, which is that when Families increaſed and many aſſociated into a Commonwealth, though the private ſervice might belong to the maſter of the Family, yet the publick before poſitive Laws reſtraining it, was moſt commonly joined with the civil power. Thus *Melchizedeck* was both King and Prieſt in *Salem*; if with the Jews we conclude he was *Sem* (which we have little reaſon for) it will be a greater evidence, *Sem* being then the greateſt Potentate living. But we paſs from him to other Nations after the diſperſion, to ſee where the power over religious ſocieties was generally held. In *Egypt* we find that their Prieſts were often made Kings, as *Plutarch* obſerves out of *Heccateus*, and is confeſſed by *Strabo*, *Diodorus* and others. Of the Greeks the ſame *Plutarch* gives us a large teſtimony, that among them ἀντίῤῥοπον ἦν τὸ τῆς ἱερωσύνης ἀξίωμα πρὸς τὸ τῆς Βασιλείας, *the Prieſthood was accounted of equal dignity with the Kingdom.* The ſame doth *Ariſtotle* in ſeveral places in his Politicks: and particularly of the *Spartans*, of whom *Herodotus* adds that the Prieſthood of *Jupiter Cæleſtis* and *Lacedæmonius* did always belong to the King's own perſon. For the old Latins *Virgil*'s *Anius* is ſufficient: and among the Romans after the power was ſeparated, the *Pontifex Max.* had royal ſtate, his *cella curulis* and *Lictors* as the Conſuls had; only their Prieſts medled not in civil affairs, of which *Plutarch* gives a double reaſon; the impoſſibility of minding both employments as they ſhould do, and ſo muſt either ἀσεβεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς, neglect the worſhip of the Gods, or elſe βλάπτειν τοὺς πολίτας, wrong the people with the neglect of the adminiſtration of juſtice. The other reaſon is, becauſe thoſe that were employed in civil affairs, were put upon execution of juſtice; and it was no ways fit a man ſhould come reeking from the blood of Citizens, to go and ſacrifice to the Gods. This conjunction of civil and ſacred power is atteſted by *Clemens Alexandrinus* of the moſt civilized heathens, ſo likewiſe by *Syneſius* of the moſt ancient Nations, by *Strabo* of the *Epheſians*, by the Roman Hiſtorians of the Roman Emperors, who from *Auguſtus* to *Gratian*, and ſome ſay after, continued the title of *Pontifex Maximus* among the reſt of the Imperial Honours. Thus much then may ſerve to manifeſt how the Honour of thoſe perſons who are employed in the ſervice of God, and the Government of religious ſocieties, is a dictate of the Law of Nature.

Plut. *de Iſ. & Oſirid.* *Str. Geog. l.* 17. *Queſt. Rom.* 110. *Politic. l* 3. *cap.* 10 11. *l.* 6. *cap.* 8. *lib.* 3. *c.* 4. Herod. *l.* 6. *V. Crag. de rep. Laced. lib.* 2. *c.* 2.

Qu. Rom. 110.

Strom. l. 7. *ep.* 121. *Geogr. l.* 41. *Sueton. in Aug. c.* 31. *V. Caſaub. in l. & Seld. de Syned. l.* 1. *c.* 10.

Chap. V.

The third thing dictated by the Law of Nature, is the ſolemnity of all things to be performed in this ſociety; which lies in the gravity of all Rites and Ceremonies, in the compoſed temper of mind. God's worſhip rational. His ſpirit deſtroys not the uſe of reaſon. The Enthuſiaſtick Spirit diſcovered. The circumſtantiating of fit time and place for worſhip, The ſeventh day, on what account ſo much ſpoken of by the Heathens. The Roman Holy-days. Ceſſation of labour upon them. The ſolemnity of Ceremonies uſed. Χέρνιψ, περιῤῥαντήρια, *ſilence in devotions. Excluſion of unfit perſons. Solemnity of diſcipline: excommunication among the Jews by the ſound of a Trumpet, among Chriſtians by a Bell.*

§. 1. THE next thing in reference to religious ſocieties which nature dictates, is, *that all things, either pertaining to the immediate worſhip*

worſhip of God, or belonging to the Government of that ſociety, be performed with the greateſt ſolemnity and decency that may be. Which dictate ariſeth from the nature of the things themſelves; which being moſt grave and ſerious, do require the greateſt gravity and ſeriouſneſs in the doing of them. And therefore any Ceremonies, actions, or geſtures, which tend to the diſcompoſing mens ſpirits, are upon that account to be exploded out of any religious ſocieties, as being ſo directly repugnant to the nature, deſign, and performance of religious duties. Wherefore that is the ſtanding rule of all inſtituted Ceremonies, by the Law of Nature in the worſhip of God, that they be ſuch as tend immediately to the advancing the ſerenity, tranquillity, and compoſure of their minds who obſerve them; and not ſuch which in their own nature, or by continual cuſtom of the uſers of them, do either rarifie mens ſpirits too much into a ſuperficial lightneſs and vanity of ſpirit; or elſe ſink them too much below the command of reaſon, into the power of unruly paſſions. A clear and compoſed ſpirit, is only fit for converſe with things of ſo high a nature. That region which is neareſt heaven, is the freeſt from clouds and vapours, as well as thoſe dancing Meteors, which hover about in a light uncertain Motion. It ſtrangely unbecomes the Majeſty of religious worſhip to have any thing vulgar, trivial, much more ridiculous in it. The worſhip of God is λατρεία λογικὴ, a rational worſhip, Rom. 12. 1. as well in regard of that worſhip which ſhould moderate and govern the manner of ſervice, as in regard of thoſe faculties which ſhould be moſt employed in it; or the foundation which the ſervice hath upon the dictates of mens natural reaſon.

§. 2. And as nature tells us, there ſhould be nothing too light or ſuperficial, ſo neither any thing whereby men are carried beyond the bounds of their own reaſon: For what men do at ſuch a time, is not their own proper act, but is more properly to be aſcribed to the power, ſtrength, and exceſs of a melancholy fancy, or elſe to a higher Enthuſiaſtical ſpirit, which then actuates and informs their fancies: and therefore it hath been well obſerved, as a *Characteriſtical* difference between the true *Prophetical ſpirit*, and the falſe and counterfeit; that the one leaves men in the free uſe of their reaſon and faculties; the other alienates them by panick fears, tremblings, and conſternations both of body and mind. To which purpoſe many evidences are brought by a *late learned Writer*, in his *Diſcourſe* of *Prophecy* out of the Heathen and Chriſtian Authors. Theſe latter diſcovering the vanity of the *Montaniſtical ſpirit* by this one obſervation: which beſides the Authors there cited, *viz.* (*Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Miltiades* in *Euſebius*, *Jerom* and *Chryſoſtom*) may appear from *Epiphanius*, who largely and excellently diſcourſeth on this ſubject, when he diſcovers the folly of *Montanus* and his followers: and gives this reaſon why they could be no true Prophets; for thoſe that were ſo, had ἐῤῥωμένην τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν καὶ τὴν διαλογήν· *A great conſiſtency of ſenſe, reaſon, and diſcourſe*; and inſtanceth in *Iſaiah* and *Ezekiel*: for, ſaith he, ὁ προφήτης μετὰ καταστάσεως λογισμῶν, καὶ παρακολουθήσεως ἐλάλει καὶ ἐφθέγγετο ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου τὰ πάντα ἐῤῥωμένως λέγων. *A true Prophet had always the free uſe of his reaſon and faculties, and ſpake from the ſpirit of God with conſiſtency and coherence of Diſcourſe.* But it was quite otherwiſe with the Montaniſts; οὐδὲ εὐσταθοῦντες φανοῦνται, οὔτε παρακολουθίαν λόγου ἔχοντες· λοξὰ γὰρ τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν ῥήματα καὶ σκαληνὰ καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ὀρθότητος ἐχόμενα. *They were always trembling both in body and mind; uſed no conſequence of reaſon in diſcourſe, their words*

Mr. Smith's *diſc.* 6. *of prophecy, cap.* 4.

Strom. 1. *Eccl. hiſt. l.* 5. 17. *præf. in Iſ. Nahum. Habak. Chryſ. in* 1 Cor. *Hom.* 29. *Epiph. hæreſ.* 48. Ezek. 4. 14.

had no proper ſenſe, but were all dark, intricate, and obſcure. An exact deſcription of a late prevailing Sect among us, who have their names from thoſe conſternations they were wont to fall into, and whoſe language carries as much obſcurity with it, as any of the followers of *Montanus* could wrap up theirs into. Only inſtead of *Montanus* his *Paraclete*, they tell us of a *Light within*, whoſe office is much of the ſame nature with the other; and one of the great errors of *Montanus* was, the adhering to *Enthuſiaſms* and Revelations beyond and beſide the written Word; which is the *Helena* of our late Opinioniſts, becauſe it gives a liberty for venting any conceptions of their own brains, under the pretence and diſguiſe of a *Light within.* But we ſee hence, how far ſuch tremblings and conſternations of body or mind are from a true, ſober, prophetick ſpirit; and how thoſe Chriſtians who lived in the time when the ſpirit of Prophecy had not yet left the Church of Chriſt (as appears by *Origen*, *Tertullian*, and others:) yet they always looked upon any violent extaſie, or fury, as an evidence of a falſe Prophet. And therefore *Tertullian*, when grown a *Proſelyte* of *Montanus*, endeavours ſtrongly to remove that apprehenſion of the ecſtatical fury of *Montanus*, and *Priſca*, and *Maximilla*, granting, if it were true, that it was a mark of a falſe and counterfeit prophetical ſpirit. The true Prophets I grant of old, were by the ſtrength of the impreſſion of their viſions upon their Animal ſpirits, ſometimes thrown into a fit of trembling; but when it was not continually ſo, and when it was, it might be rather a preſent aſtoniſhment from ſo ſtrange and unwonted ſight (as is common in ſuch caſes) or elſe from the ſtrong apprehenſion they had of the diſmal judgments God threatned to the people; but however, it never took from them the free uſe of their reaſon and faculties, which were always converſant about the matters revealed unto them. But as *Procopius Gazæus* obſerves of the falſe Prophets, τοῖς μαινομένοις ἐῴκασιν. they were acted like mad men. Which he takes notice of upon occaſion of *Saul*'s propheſying when the evil ſpirit came upon him: and interprets with the Jewiſh Writers, of a madneſs rather than true Prophecy. Such as that of *Caſſandra* when ſhe is brought in by *Lycophron.*

Orig. c. Celſum, lib. 2. *p.* 62. *l.* 3. *p.* 124. *Tertul. de an. c.* 9.

Dan. 10. 11. Habak. 3. 16. *Procop. Gaz. in* 1 Reg. 18. *Ed. Meurſii.*

Lycophr. Alex. p. 2.

Ἀσπετὸν χέασα παμμιγῆ βοὴν,
Σφιγγὸς κελαινῆς γῆρυν ἐκμιμουμένη.

Utt'ring a ſtrange confuſed noiſe,
Much like unto black Sphynx'*s voice.*

Ἀσπετὸν, ſaith *Tzetzes*, that is πολλὴν, ἀπεριηγολέθετον· which is fully deſcribed by *Lucan*, of one pretending *Enthuſiaſm*:

———*ſub pectore ficta quieto*
Verba refert, nullo confuſæ murmure vocis,
Inſtinctam ſacro mentem teſtata furore.

And ſoon after,

———*non rupta trementi*
Verba ſono, nec vox antri complere capacis
Sufficiens ſpatium——

Whereby he diſcovers her not to be a true *Enthuſiaſt*, becauſe ſhe uſed not a ſtrange confuſed voice and tremblings as they did who were their proper *Enthuſiaſts*, as the *Sibyls* and the *Pythian propheteſs.* By this we ſee, that theſe earthquakes of violent paſſions are cauſed by the Prince of the air, and not by the gentle breathings of the divine Spirit: That theſe convulſions of mens ſpirits, are not the conſequents of the inhabitation of the good Spirit, but of the violent intruſion of the evil one: That that temper of mind is moſt ſuitable to religion, which is as well free from the *bleakneſs* and *turbulency* of paſſion, as the faint *gleams* of Lightneſs and Vanity.

§. 3. But a farther ſolemnity than this is required by the dictates of nature too, which lies in the circumſtantiating of time and place, and a dedication of both to the end of worſhip. That theſe are very conſonant to natural reaſon, appears by the univerſal conſent of all Nations agreeing in any form of the Worſhip of a Deity: who have all had their ſet times and fixed places to perform this worſhip in. I ſhall not inſiſt as ſome have done, that the ſeventh day hath been particularly and ſolemnly obſerved for the worſhip of God by the conſent of Nations: Although there be many probable arguments and plauſible teſtimonies brought for a peculiarity of honour to, if not ſervice on, the ſeventh day, out of *Joſephus*, *Ariſtobulus Judæus* (and by him from *Linus*, *Heſiod*, *Homer*) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tertullian*, *Lampridius*, *Seneca*, *Tibullus*, and many others. From which Teſtimonies it appears that ſome kind of reverence and honour was given to the ſeventh day; but whether that day was the ſeventh of the week, or the ſeventh of the month; (which was conſecrated among the Greeks to *Apollo*, upon which the Θαργήλια and Πυανέψια, and the ſeventh of every month were obſerved in honour of him;) whether the Title of ἱερὸν ἦμαρ did belong to the ſeventh as one of the ἑορτάσιμοι or ἀποφράδες, *Feſtival* or *inauſpicious days* (for it was common to both)? Whether obſerved by any publick religious cuſtom, or by ſome private ſuperſtition, are things too large to inquire into, too difficult now to determine, and not neceſſary for my preſent purpoſe; It being ſufficient in order to that, if they had any ſet times at all for worſhip, which ſhews how ſolemn the worſhip of God ought to be. And this is not denyed by any; it being ſo neceſſary a conſectary from the duty of worſhip that there muſt be a time for performance of it. And not only in general that there muſt be ſome time, but a ſufficient proportion of time to be conſecrated to the publick exerciſe of piety, both from the conſideration of mans obligation to divine ſervice from his nature, from the weight and concernment of the things that time is employed in, and in the inward ſenſe of immortality upon the ſoul of man. But then what this proportion of time muſt exactly be, I ſee not how meer natural light could determine it, but it would rather ſuggeſt it to be highly reaſonable to wait for and expect ſuch a determination from the ſupreme Rector and Governor of the world. It being far more fit for the Maſter to preſcribe unto the ſervant what proportion of ſervice he expects from him; than that the ſervant ſhould both divide and chooſe his own time, and the proportion of ſervice which he owes to his Maſter. Nay it being ſo much more reaſonable for us to wait for God's order, than for a ſervant for his Maſters, as God's Power and Dominion over the creature is greater than that of a Maſter over his ſervant; as it is the voice and ſenſe of nature that God's commands cannot otherwiſe be but juſt, holy, reaſonable and good: which may be otherwiſe from men; as the acceptance of our perſons with God, lies not barely in the work done, but in the doing it

Joſeph. c. App. l. 2. Euſeb. Præp. l. 13. cap. 12. Tertul. Apol. c. 16. c. Notion. l. 1. c. 13. Lamprid. vit. Alex. Sever. Seneca ep. 95. Tibullus. eleg. 3. l. 1. Lucian. Pſeudol. p. 893. ed. Pariſ.

out of obedience to the commands of God, which is otherwiſe with men; as God can give ſtrength to perform what he commands, which man cannot; which things conſidered make it evident to be highly reaſonable that God himſelf ſhould preſcribe the proportion of time, and not mans nature. But when God hath thus determined it, nature cannot but aſſent to that particular determination, that in conſideration of the works of God, it is moſt reaſonable that rather one day in a week, than one in a month, ſhould be dedicated to God's ſervice; that the ſeventh day of the week upon God's reſting on that day and ſanctifying it ſhould be the preciſe day, unleſs ſome reaſon equivalent to that of the firſt inſtitution, and approved by God for that end, be the ground of its alteration to another of the ſeven, which is the reaſon of the change under the Goſpel.

§. 4. As an evidence of the ſolemnity of times for worſhip, the *Romans* as well as other Nations had their ſeveral *feriæ*, their days ſet apart for the honour of their Gods. In which *Macrobius* tells us the Prieſts held them polluted, *ſi indictis conceptiſque opus aliquod fieret*; *præterea regem ſacrorum flamineſque non licebat videre feriis opus fieri, & ideò per præconem denuntiabatur nè quid tale ageretur, & præcepti negligens mulctabatur.* If any work were done upon thoſe days of reſt, the day was polluted, and the perſon puniſhed, unleſs it were as *Umbro* there affirms, in order to the honour of their Gods, or for neceſſaries of life. To which purpoſe *Scævola* anſwered him that aſked what work muſt be done upon the *Feriæ*: *Quod prætermiſſum noceret, which would be ſpoiled by letting it alone*; as taking an Oxe out of a ditch, ſtrengthening a beam like to fall and ruine men; and thence *Maro* allowed it lawful to waſh ſheep if it were to cure and not only to cleanſe them.

Macrob. Saturnal. l. 1. c. 16.

Balantumque gregem fluvio merſare ſalubri.

By which laſt word *Macrobius* ſaith it was only lawful to do it for healing them, and not in order to gain. *Servius* informs us likewiſe, that the Prieſts when they went to ſacrifice, ſent their ſervants before to bid all tradeſmen leave working, *ne pro negotio ſuo & ipſorum oculos & Deorum ceremonias attaminent*; *Feriæ enim operæ Deorum creditæ ſunt*; Leſt by following their work they both offend them and the Gods too: For theſe Holy days are devoted to the ſervice of the Gods. *Feſtus* ſaith, that upon their *dies religioſi, niſi quod neceſſe eſt, nefas habetur facere*; *nothing but works of pure neceſſity were to be done.* But by *dies religioſi*, probably he means the *dies atri & nefaſti*; their ominous unlucky days, as they accounted them. But however *Macrobius* diſtinguiſheth the days among the *Romans* into *Dies feſti, profeſti, & interciſi.* The *Feſti* were dedicated to the Gods, the *Profeſti* to their own work, the *Interciſi* were divided between both, at ſome hours of which it was lawful to follow their civil employments, at others not. *Nam cum hoſtia cæditur, fari nefas eſt*; *inter cæſa & porrecta fari licet*: *rurſus cum adoletur non licet.* While the ſacrifice was killing, no Courts of Judicature were opened (in which the Prætor might *fari tria verba ſolemnia*, *do*, *dico*, *addico*, thence called *dies faſti*) but between the killing the ſacrifice and offering up the entrails (called *Porrecta* from *porricere*, which was *verbum ſacrificiale pervetuſtum*, ſaith *Turnebus*, an old word belonging to ſacrificing, *exta Diis cum dabant porricere dicebant*, Varro.) then it was lawful to open the Courts; but again, when the ſacrifice was offered,

Servius Honor. in Virgil. Georgic. 1.

Feſtus *V. religioſ.*

Adverſ. l. 24. c. 13.

ed, it was not. By which we ſee as from the light of nature, that what days and times whether weekly, monthly, or Anniverſary, were deſigned and appointed as *dies Feſti*, for the ſervice of God, were to be ſpent wholly in order to that end, and not to give ſome part to God, and to take others to themſelves: as they were wont to do in their ſacrifices to offer up ſome part to the Gods, and feaſt upon the reſt themſelves; as *Athenæus* tells us, that *Conon* and *Alcibiades* offered ſuch *Hecatombs* to the Gods, that they entertained the people upon the remainders of them. And from hence we may ſee how far ſhort of natural light their Religion falls, who make no ſcruple of ſpending a great part of the days devoted to God's worſhip in following either their imployments or recreations: Which latter ſeem more directly to impugn the end of ſuch time appointed than the other, in as much as recreations tend more to the rarifying mens ſpirits, and evaporating them into lightneſs and vanity, and ſo diſcompoſing them for the duties of ſpiritual worſhip, than mens ſerious and lawful callings do. But farther, we obſerve, among the *Romans* the ſeveral ſorts of days appointed for publick worſhip. *Macrobius* reckons up four ſorts of them, *Stativæ*, *Conceptivæ*, *Imperativæ*, & *Nundinæ*. *Stativæ*, were the ſet Feſtival days obſerved every year by the whole people, and marked for that end in their *Faſti*. Such were the *Agonalia*, *Carmentalia*, *Lupercalia*, which are marked with red Letters in the *Faſti conſulares*, or the *Calendarium Romanum*, by *Joſ. Scaliger* called *Calendarium Colotianum*, which may be ſeen at large in Mr. *Selden*: beſides which, their other anniverſary feſtivals are there ſet down: which *Tertullian* ſaith, being all put together, *Pentecoſtem implere non poterunt*, make not up the number of fifty; and ſo not ſo many as our Lord's days in a year are. *Conceptivæ*, were ſuch Feſtivals as were annually obſerved, but the days of the keeping them were every year determined by the Magiſtrates or the Prieſts, as *Latinæ*, *Sementivæ*, *Paganalia*, *Compitalia*, *Imperativæ*, were ſuch as the *Conſuls* or *Prætors* did command at their own pleaſure. Such were their ſolemn *ſupplications* in times of trouble, and their days of Triumph and Thankſgiving for victories. The *Nundinæ* were thoſe which returned every ninth day, and therefore the Letter by which they obſerved the return of the ninth day, was H. as among us Chriſtians G. which becauſe it notes the return of the Lord's days, we call the *Dominical* Letter. Theſe *Nundinæ* were the days when the country people brought in their wares into the City to be ſold, which were anciently obſerved as feſtival days, ſacred to *Jupiter*; but by the *Lex Hortenſis* were made *Dies faſti*, for determining the controverſies that might ariſe among the people in their dealings; as the *Court of Pye powder* was inſtituted among us upon the ſame account. So much for the ſolemnity of time uſed in the ſervice of God.

De Re Ruſt. l. 1. c. 29.

Deipnoſ. l. 1.

Saturn. l. 1. c. 16.

De jure Nat. apud Heb. l. 3. cap. 15.

de Idolol. c. 14.

§. 5.

Another evidence of the ſolemnity of Worſhip, was the extraordinary care of the Heathens in preparing themſelves for it, by cleanſing and purifying themſelves with water, for which purpoſe they had their χέρνιψ for cleanſing their hands, and their λοῦτρα and περιῤῥαντήρια ſtanding at the porch of their Temples for their whole bodies, which cuſtom was generally obſerved by the Heathens, as is very obvious in the ſeveral Writers of their cuſtoms in ſacrificing; beſides which they obſerved likewiſe this waſhing with water, by way of luſtration and expiation of their faults, as *Triclinius* the Scholiaſt on *Sophocles* tells us, it was an ancient cuſtom when men had murdered others, ὕδατι ἀπονίπτειν

Hom. Iliad. Apoll. Argon. l. 1. Caſaub. ad Theophr. περὶ Δεισιδαιμον. *Saub. de ſacri. cap. 12.*

Pauſ. l. 2. Matth. 27. 24. *Caſaub. ad. Bar. exer.* 16. *ſ.* 75. *Baron. ad An. Chriſti* 34. *Montacutius Orig. Ecclеſ. To.* 1. *l.* 2. *p.* 388. *Voſſius Harm. Evang. l.* 2. *cap.* 5. *V. Meyerum de Papatu Rom. l.* 1. *c.* 32. *De Croy. Conſ.* 1. *c.* 33.

τὰς χεῖρας εἰς κάθαρσιν τοῦ μιάσματος, to waſh their hands in expiation of their guilt; as *Oreſtes* did in *Pauſanias* after the killing his mother, and ſome think *Pilate* in the Goſpel did ſo for the ſame end; but his was only to declare his innocency, and not to expiate his ſin, as is obſerved by many upon that place. But however, from hence we may take notice of the Spring and Fountain of the Pope's Holy-water: which was conſecrated by *Numa* long before *Alexander* I. to whom *Polydore Virgil*, and others attribute the firſt uſe of it in the Chriſtian Church: And as the uſe of it, and the manner of ſprinkling it is the ſame among the Papiſts, as it was among the Heathen; ſo likewiſe the end of it, witneſs the old Rime,

Hæc aqua benedicta deleat mihi mea delicta.

Which may be ſufficiently anſwered with the cenſure of a heathen:

Ovid. Faſt. lib. 2.

Ah nimium faciles qui triſtia crimina cædis
Tolli fluminea poſſe putatis aquâ!

Too eaſie ſouls who think the ſpots of blood
Can be waſh'd out with ev'ry watry flood!

V. Briſſon. de formulis l. 1. *p.* 8.

Onomaſtic. lib. 4. *c.*12.

V. Leon. 5. *Allatium de Narthec. vet. Eccleſ. p.* 45, *&c.*

*Athenæus Deipnoſ. l.*8. *c.* 8.

But from this I paſs to the ſolemnity in their worſhip it ſelf, evidenced by the general ſilence commanded in it; which appears by *Horace*'s *Favete linguis*, Ovid's *Ore favent populi nunc cum venit aurea pompa*; Virgil's *fida ſilentia ſacris*; Feſtus's *linguam paſcito*, i. e. *coerceto*; The *Egyptians* ſetting *Harpocrates* his image in the entrance to their Temples, and the Romans placing the Statue of *Angerona* on the Altar of *Volupia*. The Greeks had their κήρυκες which did ἡσυχίαν κατακηρύττειν ἐν ἱερουργίαις, as *Julius Pollux* tells us, which *Plautus* calls *facere audientiam*, to command ſilence: much as the Deacons afterwards did in the Primitive Church, who were wont to command ſilence by their *Orarium*, and were thence called κήρυκες among the Chriſtians (for though κηρύττειν, as applied to the Biſhop and Preſbyters, did ſignifie ὁμιλεῖν and εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, *to preach*; yet as it was applied to the Deacons, it implyed only their commanding ſilence in order to the prayers of the *Catechumeni* called παραθέσεις, as *Ariſtenus* obſerves on *Concil. Carthag. can.* 106. But this by the way.) The *formula* uſed by the Greeks in commanding ſilence was, ἀκούετε λαοί, to which *Ariſtonicus* the Fidler alluded when in the market place of *Mylaſſa*, a Town in *Caria*, he ſaw many Temples, and but few Citizens, he cried out ἀκούετε ναοὶ inſtead of ἀκούετε λαοί. But I paſs theſe things over, as being commonly known, only obſerving from them the ſolemnity of their publick devotions, which is farther ſeen in their ſolemn excluding unfit perſons from partaking with them in their ſacrifices. Of which *Virgil*, *Ovid*, *Statius*, *Silius Italicus*, and others among the Romans ſpeak; and the Lictor in ſome ſacrifices ſtood up, ſaith *Feſtus*, and cryed aloud, *Hoſtis, mulier, vinctus exeſto*, i. e. *extra eſto*: and to keep unfit perſons the better off, the *Flamines* had a *Commentaculum*, a kind of rod in their hands. Among the Greeks the old form continued from *Orpheus* or *Onomacritus* his *Orphaica*, ἑκὰς ἑκὰς ἐστε βέβηλοι· and thoſe that ſacrifice, aſked τίς τῇδε; the other anſwered πολλοὶ κἀγαθοί. From all theſe things laid together, we ſee the great ſolemnity uſed by them in their worſhip, which conſidered in its ſelf, was not the product

*V. apud Briſſ. de formulis, l.*1. *& apud Seld. de Syned. lib.* 1. *cap.* 10.

Suidas in τίς τῇδε;

of ſuperſtition, but a dictate of the Law of Nature. And it ſeems moſt natural to the acts of diſcipline, that they ſhould be performed in the moſt publick ſolemn manner, and not in any private clandeſtine way: which being ſo done, oft times loſe the deſigned effect of them, in making men ſenſible and aſhamed of thoſe miſcarriages which made them deſerve ſo ſharp and ſevere a cenſure. Thence among the Jews, their ſolemn ſentence of the greater excommunication was pronounced by the ſound of a Trumpet; and ſo they ſay *Meroz* was excommunicated with 400 Trumpets: and the ſame number they report was uſed in excommunicating *Jeſus* of *Nazareth*, which was uſually done by the Magiſtrate, or the Rector of the Univerſity: As they tell us a ſtory of a man coming to buy fleſh at *Pombeditha* (which was one of the three Univerſities of the remaining Jews in *Chaldea*, after the return from captivity, the other were *Sora* and *Neharda*) but offering ſome opprobrious language to *R. Jehuda* then Governor of the Univerſity, he makes no more to do, but *prolatis tubis hominem excommunicavit*, brings out his Trumpets and excommunicates him. And as the uſe of bells, ſince their invention, did ſupply the former uſe of Trumpets in calling the Congregation together, (which I ſuppoſe was the account of uſing Trumpets in excommunicating from the Congregation) ſo it ſeems the bells were ſometimes uſed to ring men out of, as well as into the Church; thence the ſolemn Monkiſh curſe, curſing men with *Bell*, *Book*, and *Candle*, which can have no other ſenſe but from this practice. So much ſhall ſuffice to ſhew the foundation which the ſolemnity of worſhip, and the acts belonging to it, have in the dictates of nature manifeſted by the voice and conſent of Nations; for herein *vox populi* is *vox naturæ*, as at other times it is *Vox Dei*.

Joh. Coch. Excerpt. Gen. Sanhed. cap. 1. p. 146. Vorſtius in Pirke Elieſer. p. 226. Selden. de Syned. l. 1. cap. 7.

CHAP. VI.

The fourth thing dictated by the Law of Nature, that there muſt be a way to end controverſies ariſing, which tend to break the peace of the ſociety. The nature of Schiſm conſidered; Liberty of judgment and authority diſtinguiſhed; the latter muſt be parted with in religious ſocieties as to private perſons, What way the light of nature directs to, for ending controverſies, in an equality of power, that the leſs number yield to the greater: on what Law of Nature that is founded. In a ſubordination of power that there muſt be a liberty of Appeals defined. Independency of particular Congregations conſidered. Elective Synods. The Original of Church-Government as to congregations. The caſe parallel'd between civil and Church-Government. Where appeals finally lodge. The power of calling Synods, and confirming their acts in the Magiſtrate.

§. 1. THE *fourth* thing which Nature dictates in reference to a Church ſociety, is, *That there muſt be a way agreed upon to determine and decide all thoſe controverſies ariſing in this ſociety, which immediately tend to the breaking the peace and unity of it.* We have ſeen already that natural reaſon requires a diſparity between perſons in a ſociety, to form and conſtitute a ſociety; there muſt be order and power in ſome, there muſt be inferiority and ſubjection in others anſwering to the former; and by theſe we ſuppoſe a ſociety to be now model'd. But nature muſt either be ſuppoſed defective in its deſigns and contrivements as to the neceſſaries required for the management of them; or elſe there muſt likewiſe be implyed a ſufficient proviſion for the maintenance and preſervation of a ſociety thus entred into. It is no wiſe agreeable to the wiſdom of nature to erect a fabrick with ſuch materials, which though they may lie one upon the other, yet if not fitly compacted together, will fall in pieces again as ſoon as it is ſet up: nor yet to frame a body with mere fleſh and bones, and the ſuperiority of ſome members above the other; for unleſs there be joints and ſinews and ligatures to hold the parts together, the diſſolution will immediately follow the formation of it. The end and deſign of nature is, preſervation and continuance, and therefore things neceſſary in order to that muſt be implyed in the firſt deſign of the being of the thing; ſo that at leaſt, as to its ſelf, there be no defect in order to that. This muſt in reaſon be ſuppoſed in all ſocieties, that when they are firſt entred, it muſt be upon ſuch terms as may be ſufficient to maintain and keep up thoſe ſocieties in that peace and order which is requiſite in order to the continuance of them. For what diſeaſes are to bodies, age and fire are to buildings, that diviſions and animoſities are to ſocieties, all equally tending to the ruine and deſtruction of the things they ſeize upon. And as bodies are furniſhed by nature not only with a receptive and concoctive faculty, of what tends to their nouriſhment, but with an expulſive faculty of what would tend to the ruine of it; ſo all civil bodies muſt not only have ways to ſtrengthen them, but muſt have likewiſe a power to expel and diſperſe thoſe noxious humours and qualities, which tend to diſſolve the frame, compages and conſtitution of them. A power then to prevent miſchiefs is as neceſſary in a ſociety, as a power to ſettle things in order to the advancement of the common good of ſociety. This therefore the Church as a religious ſociety muſt likewiſe be endowed with, *viz.* a power to maintain its ſelf, and keep up peace and unity within its ſelf: which cannot otherwiſe be ſuppoſed (conſidering the *bilious* humour in mens natures, not wholly purged out by Chriſtianity) without ſome way to decide controverſies which will ariſe, diſturbing the peace of it. For the clearing of this, which much concerns the power and government of the Church, we ſhall conſider what the controverſies are which tend to break the Churches peace: and what way the Law of Nature finds out for the ending of them. Which we are the more neceſſitated to ſpeak to, becauſe nothing hath begotten controverſies more than the power of determining them hath done.

§. 2. The controverſies then which tend to break the peace of a religious ſociety, are either matter of different practice, or matter of different opinion. The former, if it comes from no juſt and neceſſary cauſe, and ends in a total ſeparation from that ſociety, the perſon guilty of it was joined with, is juſtly call'd *Schiſm*; which (as one defines it) is an Eccleſiaſtical ſedition, as ſedition is a Lay-Schiſm; both being directly contrary to that communion and friendlineſs, which ſhould be preſerved in all ſocieties. The latter, if impugning ſomewhat fundamental, in order to the end of conſtituting religious ſocieties, or being a leſſer matter, if wilfully taken up, and obſtinately maintained, is called *Hereſie:* which two are ſeldom ſeen out of each others company; and when they are together, are like the blind and lame man in the Fable, the one lent the other eyes, and the other lent him feet: one to find out what they deſired, the other to run away with it when they had it. The Heretick he uſeth his eyes to ſpie out ſome cauſe or pretence of deſerting communion; the Schiſmatick he helps him with his legs to run away from it; but between them both, they rob the Church of its peace and unity. But in order to the making clear what the Churches power is in reference to theſe, we are to take notice of theſe things. *Firſt*, That the Church hath no direct immediate power over mens opinions. So that a matter of mere different opinion lies not properly within the cognizance of any Church power: the reaſon of it is this, becauſe the end of power lodged in the Church, is to preſerve the peace and unity of its ſelf: now a mere different opinion doth not violate the bonds of ſociety; for *opinionum diverſitas & opinantium unitas non ſunt* ἀσύστατα. Men may preſerve communion under different apprehenſions. So long then as diverſity of opinion tends not to the breaking the quiet and tranquillity of the Church of God, a man may ſafely enjoy his own private apprehenſions, as to any danger of moleſtation from Church Governours; That is, ſo long as a man keeps his opinion to himſelf; and hath the power of being his own counſellor. It is not the difference of opinion formally conſidered when it is divulged abroad that is puniſhable, but the tendency to Schiſm, which lies in the divulging of it, and drawing others away from the received Truths: For the opinion its ſelf is an internal act of the mind, and therefore puniſhable by no external power, as that of the Magiſtrate or Church is; as no internal action is under the juriſdiction or authority of a Magiſtrate, any farther than as neceſſarily conjoyned with the outward action, or as it hath a direct influence upon it. The caſe of blaſphemy, which is a thing of the higheſt nature in this kind, is not puniſhable by men, as blaſphemy implies low and undervaluing thoughts of God; but as being a thing divulged (elſe no formal blaſphemy) it tends apparently to the diſhonour of God, and conſequently to the breaking in pieces all ſuch ſocieties, whoſe great foundation is the belief of the Majeſty and Glory of God. So idolatry under the Law was puniſhed, as it was immediately deſtructive of that obedience which men did owe to the true God. And under the Goſpel, it is not mere difference of opinion, judgment, and apprehenſion, which lays men open to the Cenſures of that power which moderates and rules a religious ſociety; but the indeavour by difference of opinion to alienate mens ſpirits one from another, and thereby to break the ſociety into fractions and diviſions, is that which makes men liable to reſtraint and puniſhment. From whence it follows, that where the peace and unity of the Church may be preſerved, and yet men keep up indifferent apprehenſions of things, there is nothing deſerving any ſevere animadverſion from the rulers of that ſociety: for a power corrective and vindictive muſt ſuppoſe ſomething acted contrary to the Laws and rules of the ſociety, and the end of committing that power into the hands of Governours: now here is nothing of that nature; for the Laws of mutual ſociety are obſerved; and the end of Church Government is to ſee *ne quid Eccleſia detrimenti capiat*, leſt the Church as a ſociety be any ways prejudiced: which cannot be while men maintain that love, affection, and communion which becomes the members of ſuch a ſociety. The unity then required in the Church is not an unity of judgment and apprehenſion among the members of it; which though it be their duty to indeavour after, yet it is no farther attainable by mens indeavours than perfection is; and *Unio Chriſtianorum* in this ſenſe, is one of the Jewels belonging to the Crown of Heaven. There is no neceſſity then of inquiring

quiring after an infallible judge of controverſies, unleſs we had ſome promiſe and aſſurance from Chriſt, that the members of his Church ſhould never differ in their judgments from one another, and then what need of an infallible Judge? and if Chriſt had appointed an infallible Judge, he would infallibly have diſcovered it to the minds of all ſober men; or elſe his infallibility could never attain its end: For while I queſtion whether my Judge be infallible or no, I cannot infallibly aſſent to any of his determinations. And where there is no ground for an infallible Judge, for any to pretend to it, is the worſt of ſuppoſable errors; becauſe it renders all others incurable by that apprehenſion, and takes away all poſſibility of repentance while men are under that perſuaſion. The unity then of the Church, is that of communion, and not that of apprehenſion; and different opinions are no farther liable to cenſures, than as men by the broaching of them, do endeavour to diſturb the peace of the Church of God.

§. 3. That then which ſeems moſt liable to cenſures in a Church, is Schiſm, as being immediately deſtructive of that communion which ſhould be maintained in a religious ſociety. But as to this too, we muſt obſerve ſomething farther, and not to think and judge every thing to deſerve the name, which is by many call'd Schiſm; it being well obſerved by a very learned and judicious Divine, *that Hereſie and Schiſm, as they are commonly uſed, are two Theological Scarecrows, with which, they who uſe to uphold a party in religion, uſe to fright away ſuch, as making enquiry into it, are ready to relinquiſh and oppoſe it, if it appear either erroneous or ſuſpicious. For as* Plutarch *reports of a Painter, who having unskilfully painted a Cock, chaſed away all Cocks and Hens, that ſo the imperfection of his Art might not appear by compariſon with nature; ſo men willing for ends, to admit of no fancy but their own, endeavour to hinder an enquiry into it, by way of compariſon of ſomewhat with it, peradventure truer, that ſo the deformity of their own might not appear.* Thus he. Schiſm then, as it imports a ſeparation from communion with a Church ſociety, is not a thing intrinſecally and formally evil in it ſelf, but is capable of the differences of good and evil according to the grounds, reaſons, ends, and circumſtances inducing to ſuch a ſeparation. The withdrawing from ſociety, is but the materiality of Schiſm; the formality of it muſt be fetched from the grounds on which that is built. It is therefore a ſubject which deſerves a ſtrict enquiry, what things thoſe are which may make a withdrawing from a religious ſociety, to which a man is joined, to be lawful: For as it is a great ſin on the one hand, unneceſſarily to divide and ſeparate from Church ſociety; ſo it is an offence on the other ſide, to continue communion when it is a duty to withdraw it. For the reſolving this knotty and intricate Queſtion, I ſhall lay down ſome things by way of premiſal, and come cloſely to the reſolution of it.

Tract of Schiſm, 1642.

Firſt, *Every Chriſtian is under an obligation to join in Church ſociety with others*; becauſe it his duty to profeſs himſelf a Chriſtian, and to own his religion publickly, and to partake of the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Goſpel, which cannot be without ſociety with ſome Church or other. Every Chriſtian, as ſuch, is bound to look upon himſelf as the member of a body, *viz.* the viſible Church of Chriſt; and how can he be known to be a member, who is not united with other parts of the body? There is then an obligation upon all Chriſtians, to engage in a religious ſociety with others, for partaking of the Ordinances of the

Goſpel. It hath been a caſe diſputed by ſome (particularly by *Grotius* the ſuppoſed Author of a little Tract, *An ſemper ſit communicandum per ſymbola?* when he deſigned the Syncretiſm with the Church of *Rome*) whether in a time when Churches are divided, it be a Chriſtian's duty to communicate with any of thoſe parties which divide the Church, and not rather to ſuſpend the communion from all of them. A caſe not hard to be decided; for either the perſon queſtioning it, doth ſuppoſe the Churches divided to remain true Churches, but ſome to be more pure than other; in which caſe, by virtue of his general obligation to communion, he is bound to adhere to that Church which appears moſt to retain its Evangelical purity: Or elſe he muſt ſuppoſe one to be a true Church, and the other not; in which the caſe is clearer, that he is bound to communicate with the true Church; or he muſt judge them alike impure, which is a caſe hard to be found; but ſuppoſing it ſo, either he hath joined formerly with one of them, or he is now to chooſe which to join with; if he be joined already with that Church, and ſees no other but are as impure as that, he is bound to declare againſt the impurity of the Church, and to continue his communion with it; if he be to chooſe communion, he may ſo long ſuſpend till he be ſatisfied, which Church comes neareſt to the primitive conſtitution, and no longer. And therefore I know not whether *Chryſoſtome*'s act were to be commended, who after being made a Deacon in the Church of *Antioch* by *Meletius*, upon his death, becauſe *Flavianus* came in irregularly as Biſhop of the Church, would neither communicate with him, nor with *Paulinus* another Biſhop at that time in the City, nor with the *Meletians*, but for three years time withdrew himſelf from communion with any of them. Much leſs were the Διακρινόμενοι or the *Hæſitantes* as the *Latins* called them, to be commended, who after the determination of the *Council* of *Chalcedon*, againſt *Eutyches*, becauſe of great differences remaining in *Egypt* and the Eaſtern Churches, followed *Zenoes Henoticum*, and would communicate neither with the Orthodox Churches, nor *Eutychians*. But I ſee not what cenſure *Jerome* could incur, who going into the Dioceſe of *Antioch*, and finding the Churches there under great Diviſions, there being beſides the *Arian* Biſhop, three others in the Church of *Antioch*, *Meletius*, *Paulinus*, and *Vitalis*, did ſo long ſuſpend communion with any of them, till he had ſatisfied himſelf about the occaſion of the Schiſm, and the innocency of the Perſons and Churches engaged in it. But if he had withdrawn longer, he had offended againſt his obligation to join in Church ſociety with others, for participation of Goſpel ordinances; which is the neceſſary Duty of every Chriſtian.

Socrat. hiſt. Eccleſ. lib. 6. cap. 3.

V. Petavii. Diatrib. de Poteſt. Conſa. & com. uſurp. cap. 4.

§. 4.

Secondly, *Every Chriſtian actually joined in Church ſociety with others, is ſo long bound to maintain ſociety with them, till his communion with them becomes ſin.* For nothing elſe can juſtifie withdrawing from ſuch a ſociety, but the unlawfulneſs of continuing any longer in it. Suppoſing a Church then to remain true, as to its conſtitution and eſſentials, but there be many corruptions crept into that Church; whether is it the duty of a Chriſtian to withdraw from that Church becauſe of thoſe corruptions, and to gather new Churches only for purer adminiſtration, or to join with them only for that end? This as far as I underſtand it, is the ſtate of the Controverſie between our Parochial Churches, and the Congregational. The reſolution of this great Queſtion muſt depend on this, Whether it is a ſin to communicate with Churches true as to eſſentials, but ſuppoſed corrupt in the exerciſe of diſcipline? For Parochial Churches are not denied to have the eſſentials of true Churches by any ſober Congregational men. For there is in them the true word of God preached, the true Sacraments adminiſtred, and an implicite Covenant between Paſtor and People, in their joining together. All that is pleaded then, is corruption, and defect in the exerciſe and adminiſtration of Church order and diſcipline. Now that it is lawful for Chriſtians to join with Churches ſo defective, is not only acknowledged by reverend Mr. *Norton* in his anſwer to *Apollonius*, but largely and fully proved. For which he lays down five propoſitions which deſerve to be ſeriouſly conſidered by all, which make that a plea for withdrawing from ſociety with other Churches. *Firſt*, A believer may lawfully join himſelf in communion with ſuch a Church, where he cannot enjoy all the ordinances of God; as in the Jewiſh Church, in our Saviour's time, which refuſed the Goſpel of Chriſt, and the Baptiſm of *John*; and yet our Saviour bids us hear the Scribes and Phariſees ſitting in *Moſes* chair, which hearing, ſaith he, doth imply *conjunctionem Eccleſiæ Judaicæ*, a joining with the *Jewiſh* Church; and ſo with Churches rejecting an article of faith, as in the Church of *Corinth* the doctrine of the reſurrection, the Churches of *Galatia* the doctrine of juſtification by faith; but the Apoſtle no where requires ſeparation on that account from them. *Secondly*, A believer may lawfully join in communion with ſuch a Church in which ſome corruption in the worſhip of God is tolerated without reformation. As the offering on high places from *Solomon* to *Hezekiah* in the Church of *Juda*, obſervation of circumciſion, and the neceſſity of keeping the ceremonial Law in the Churches of *Galatia*. *Thirdly*, A believer may lawfully join himſelf in communion with ſuch a Church in which ſuch are admitted to ſacraments, who give no evident ſigns of grace, but ſeem to be Lovers of this world; which he proves, becauſe it is every one's main duty to examine himſelf, and becauſe another's ſin is no hurt to him, and therefore cannot keep him from his duty; and then by mens coming unworthily, *non polluitur communio, licet minuitur conſolatio*, the communion is not defiled, though the comfort of it be diminiſhed. He brings inſtance from the Church of *Corinth*, among whom were many ſcandalous, and had not repented, 2 *Cor.* 12. 20, 21. So in the Jewiſh Church which lay under great corruptions, when our Saviour and his Apoſtles communicated with it. *Fourthly*, Although a Believer join with ſuch a Church, he is not therefore bound with the guilt nor defiled with the pollutions of others; which he proves, becauſe it is lawful to do it, and ſo he contracts no guilt by it. *Fifthly*, A believer that hath joined himſelf to ſuch a Church, is not bound to withdraw, and ſeparate from ſuch a Church under pain of guilt if he doth it not, becauſe it implies a contradiction to be lawful to join to ſuch a Church, and yet unlawful to continue in its communion; for that ſpeaks it to be a Church, and this latter to be no Church: and by that he doth imply it to be unlawful to ſeparate from any ſociety which is acknowledged to be a true Church. Thus for that *learned* and *reverend Man*, by whom we ſee that the received Principles of the ſober and moderate part of thoſe of that perſuaſion, are not at ſuch a diſtance from others, as many imagine. We ſee then that communicating with a Church not ſo pure as we deſire, is no ſin by the arguments by him produced. And how it ſhould be then lawful to withdraw from ſuch a Church, merely for

Reſponſ. ad Syllog. Queſt. cap. 16.

1 Cor. 14. 34. 1 Cor. 6. 4.--15.

purer communion, I underſtand not. This I am ſure was not the caſe of our Churches in their ſeparation from the Church of *Rome:* the main ground of which was the ſin of communicating with that Church in her Idolatry and Superſtition, and the impoſſibility of communicating with her, and not partaking of her ſins, becauſe ſhe required a profeſſion of her errors, and the practice of her Idolatry as the neceſſary conditions of her communion; in which caſe it is a ſin to communicate with her.

§. 5. And this leads me now to a cloſer reſolution of the caſe of withdrawing from Churches in which men have formerly been aſſociated, and the grounds which may make ſuch a withdrawing lawful. In order to that we muſt diſtinguiſh between theſe things. *Firſt*, Between *corruptions in the Doctrine* of a Church, and *corruptions in the practice* of a Church. *Secondly*, Between *corruptions* whether in doctrine, or practice *profeſſed and avowed by a Church, and required as conditions of communion* in all members of it, *and corruptions crept in, and only tolerated in a Church. Thirdly*, Between *Non-communion* as to the *abuſes of a Church*, and a *poſitive* and *total ſeparation* from a Church, as it is ſuch. From theſe things I lay down theſe following *Propoſitions.*

First, *Where any Church is guilty of corruptions, both in doctrine and practice, which it avoweth and profeſſeth, and requireth the owning them as neceſſary conditions of communion with her, there a Non-communion with that Church is neceſſary, and a total and poſitive ſeparation is lawful and convenient.* I have ſaid already that the neceſſity and lawfulneſs of this departing from communion with any Church is wholly to be reſolved by an enquiry into the grounds and reaſons of the action it ſelf. So that the matter of fact muſt of neceſſity be diſcuſſed, before the matter of Law as to ſeparation from the Church, be brought into debate. If there be a juſt and neceſſary cauſe for ſeparation, it muſt needs be juſt and neceſſary; therefore the cauſe muſt be the ground of reſolving the nature of the Action. Schiſm then is a ſeparation from any Church upon any ſlight, trivial, unneceſſary cauſe; but if the cauſe be great and important, a departure it may be, Schiſm it cannot be. They who define Schiſm to be a voluntary ſeparation from the Church of God; if by *voluntary* they mean that where the will is the cauſe of it, the definition ſtands good and true; for that muſt needs be groundleſs and unneceſſary as to the Church it ſelf: but if by *voluntary* be meant a ſpontaneous departing from communion with a Church, which was cauſed by the corruptions of that Church, then a ſeparation may be ſo voluntary, and yet no Schiſm: for though it be voluntary, as to the act of departing, yet that is only conſequentially, ſuppoſing a cauſe ſufficient to take ſuch a reſolution; but what is voluntary antecedently, that it hath no other Motive but faction and humour, that is properly Schiſm, and ought ſo to be looked upon. But in our preſent caſe, three things are ſuppoſed as the cauſes and motives to ſuch a forſaking communion. *Firſt*, *Corruption in Doctrine*; the main ligature of a religious ſociety is the conſent of it in doctrine with the rule of religion, the word of God. Therefore any thing which tends to ſubvert and overthrow the foundation of the gathering ſuch a ſociety (which is the profeſſion and practice of the true religion) yield ſufficient ground to withdraw from communion with thoſe who profeſs and maintain it. Not that every ſmall error is a juſt ground of ſeparation, for then there would be no end of ſeparation, and men muſt ſeparate from one another, till knowledge comes to its perfection,

fection, which will only be in glory; but any thing which either directly or conſequentially doth deſtroy any fundamental article of Chriſtian faith. Which may be as well done by adding to fundamental articles, as by plain denying them. And my reaſon is this: becauſe the very *ratio* of a fundamental article doth imply, not only its neceſſity to be believed and practiſed (and the former in reference to the latter; for things are therefore neceſſary to be known, becauſe neceſſary to be done, and not *è contrà*) but likewiſe its ſufficiency as to the end for which it is called fundamental. So that the articles of faith called fundamental, are not only ſuch as are neceſſary to be believed, but if they be, are ſufficient for ſalvation to all that do believe them. Now he that adds any thing to be believed or done as fundamental, that is, neceſſary to ſalvation, doth thereby deſtroy the ſufficiency of thoſe former articles in order to ſalvation; for if they were ſufficient, how can new ones be neceſſary. The caſe will be clear by an inſtance. We aſſert the ſatisfaction of Chriſt for ſinners to be a fundamental article, and thereby do imply the ſufficiency of the belief of that in order to ſalvation; now if a Pope or any other command me to believe the meritoriouſneſs of good works with the ſatisfaction of Chriſt as neceſſary to ſalvation, by adding this, he deſtroys the former as a fundamental article: for if Chriſt's ſatisfaction be ſufficient, how can good works be meritorious? and if this latter be neceſſary, the other was not; for if it were, what need this be added: Which is a thing the Papiſts with their new Creed of *Pius* the *fourth* would do well to conſider: and others too, who ſo confidently aſſert that none of their errors touch the foundation of faith. Where there is now ſuch corruption in doctrine ſuppoſed in a Church, withdrawing and ſeparation from ſuch a Church is as neceſſary as the avoiding of her errors, and not partaking of her ſins is. Thence we read in Scripture, of *rejecting ſuch as are hereticks*, and *withdrawing from their ſociety*, which will as well hold, as to Churches as Perſons, and ſo much the more, as the corruption is more dangerous, and the relation nearer of a member to a Church, than of one man to another: And from the reaſon of that command, we read in Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, that when *Eulalius*, *Euphronius*, and *Placentius* were conſtituted Biſhops of *Antioch*, being Arians, many both of the Clergy and people, who reſolved to adhere to the true faith, withdrew from the publick meetings, and had private Aſſemblies of their own. And after, when *Leontius* was made Biſhop of *Antioch*, who favour'd the Arians, *Flavianus* and *Diodorus*, not only publickly reproved him for deſerting the Orthodox faith, but withdrew the people from communion with him, and undertook the charge of them themſelves: So when *Fœlix* was made Biſhop of *Rome*, none of the Church of *Rome* would enter into the Church while he was there. And *Vincentius Lirinenſis* tells us a remarkable ſtory of *Photinus* Biſhop of *Sirmium* in *Pannonia*, a man of great abilities and fame, who ſuddenly turned from the true faith, and though his people both loved and admired him, yet when they diſcerned his errors, *Quem antea quaſi arietem gregis ſequebantur, eundem deinceps veluti lupum fugere cœperunt. Whom they followed before as the leader of the flock, they now run away from as a devouring Wolf.* This is the firſt thing which makes ſeparation, and withdrawment of communion, lawful and neceſſary, *viz.* corruption of doctrine. The *ſecond* is *Corruption of practice*: I ſpeak not of practice, as relating to the civil converſation of men, but as it takes in the *Agenda* of Religion. When idolatrous cuſtoms, and ſuperſtitious practice are not only crept

into

Theodoret. lib. 1. *c.* 22.

Id. l. 2. *Cap.* 24.

Lib. 2. *c.* 17.

Adverſ. hæreſ. cap. 16.

into a Church, but are the preſcribed devotion of it: Such as the adoration of the Euchariſt (chiefly inſiſted on by Mr. *Daillé* in his Apology, as a cauſe of ſeparation from the Church of *Rome*) invocation of Saints and Angels, worſhipping images, and others of a like nature, uſed among the Papiſts, which are of themſelves ſufficient to make our ſeparation from them neceſſary. But then *Thirdly*, as an acceſſion to theſe two, is the publick owning and profeſſing them, and requiring them, as neceſſary conditions of communion, from all the members of their Church, which makes our withdrawing from them unavoidably neceſſary, as long as we judge them to be ſuch corruptions as indeed they are. For men not to forſake the belief of errors, ſuppoſing them to be ſuch, is impoſſible; and not to forſake the practice and profeſſion of them upon ſuch belief, were the higheſt hypocriſie: and to do ſo, and not to forſake the communion of that Church where theſe are owned, is apparently contradictious (as Mr. *Chillingworth* well obſerves) ſeeing the condition of communion with it is, that we muſt profeſs to believe all the doctrines of that Church, not only to be errors, but to be certain and neceſſary truths: So that on this account, to believe there are any errors in the Church of *Rome*, is actually, and *ipſo facto*, to forſake the communion of that Church; becauſe the condition of its communion is the belief that there are none: And ſo that learned and rational Author there fully proves, that thoſe who require unlawful and unneceſſary conditions of communion, muſt take the imputation of Schiſm upon themſelves, by making ſeparation from them juſt and neceſſary. In this caſe, when corruptions in opinion or practice are thus required, as conditions of communion, it is impoſſible for one to communicate with ſuch a Church without ſin; both materially, as the things are unlawful which he joyns with them in; and formally, as he judgeth them ſo. This is the firſt Propoſition.

Anſw. to the pref. p. 16. *ſ.* 22.

§. 6.

The *ſecond* is, *Where a Church retains the purity of doctrine in its publick profeſſion, but hath a mixture of ſome corruptions, as to practice, which are only tolerated and not impoſed, it is not lawful to withdraw communion from ſuch a Church, much leſs to run into total ſeparation from it:* For here is no juſt and lawful cauſe given of withdrawing; here is no owned corruption of doctrine or practice, nor any thing required as a condition of communion, but what is in its ſelf neceſſary; and therefore there can be no plea, but only pollution, from ſuch a communion, which cannot be to any who do not own any ſuch ſuppoſed corruptions in the Church. Men may communicate with a Church, and not communicate with the abuſes of a Church; for the ground of his communicating is, its being a Church, and not a corrupt or defective Church. And that men are not themſelves guilty, by partaking with thoſe who are guilty of corruptions in a Church, might be eaſily and largely proved, both from the Church of the Jews in the caſe of *Eli*'s ſons, and the Chriſtian Churches of *Aſia*, and *Corinth*, where we read of many corruptions reproved, yet nothing ſpoken of the duty of the members of thoſe Churches to ſeparate from them, which would have been, had it been a ſin to communicate with thoſe Churches when ſuch corruptions were in it. Beſides, what reaſon is there that one mans ſins ſhould defile another, more than anothers graces ſanctifie another? and why corruption in another ſhould defile him more than in himſelf, and ſo keep him from communicating with himſelf? and what ſecurity any one can have in the moſt refined Churches, but that there is ſome ſcandalous, or at leaſt unworthy perſon among them? and whether then it is not his duty to try and examine all himſelf particularly, with whom he communicates? and why his preſence at one Ordinance ſhould defile it more than at another? and why at any more than in worldly converſe, and ſo turn at laſt to make men *Anchorets*, as it hath done ſome? Many other reaſons might be produced againſt this, which I forbear, it being fully ſpoke to by others. And ſo I come to the *Third* Propoſition, which is,

See Mr. Durham's *Tract of ſcandal, part.* 2. *ch.* 12.

Where any Church, retaining purity of doctrine, doth require the owning of, and conforming to any unlawful or ſuſpected practice, men may lawfully deny conformity to, and communion with that Church in ſuch things, without incurring the guilt of Schiſm. I ſay not: Men may proceed to poſitive Schiſm as it is call'd, that is, erecting of new Churches, which from *Cyprian* is call'd *erigere Altare contra Altare*; but only that withdrawing communion from a Chruch in unlawful or ſuſpected things, doth not lay men under the guilt of Schiſm: which becauſe I know it may meet with ſome oppoſition from thoſe men, who will ſooner call men Schiſmaticks than prove them ſo, I ſhall offer this reaſon for it to conſideration. If our ſeparation from the Church of *Rome* was therefore lawful, becauſe ſhe required unlawful things, as conditions of her communion; then where-ever ſuch things are required by any Church, non-communion with that Church in thoſe things will be lawful too; and where non-communion is lawful, there can be no Schiſm in it. Whatever difference will be thought of, as to the things impoſed by the Church of *Rome* and others, will be ſoon anſwered by the proportionable difference between bare non-conformity, and total and poſitive ſeparation. What was in its ſelf lawful and neceſſary then, how comes it to be unlawful and unneceſſary now? Did that juſtifie our withdrawing from them, becauſe they required things unlawful, as conditions of communion; and will not the ſame juſtifie other mens non-conformity, in things ſuppoſed by them unlawful? If it be ſaid here, that the Pope's power was an uſurpation, which is not in lawful Governours of Churches; it is ſoon replyed, That the Pope's uſurpation mainly lies in impoſing things upon mens conſciences as neceſſary, which are doubtful, or unlawful; and where-ever the ſame thing is done, there is an uſurpation of the ſame nature, though not in ſo high a degree; and it may be as lawful to withdraw communion from one as well as the other. If it be ſaid that men are bound to be ruled by their Goverours, in determining what things are lawful, and what not? To this it is anſwered: firſt, no true Proteſtant can ſwear blind obedience to Church Governours in all things. It is the higheſt uſurpation to rob men of the liberty of their judgments: That which we plead for againſt the Papiſts, is, that all men have eyes in their heads as well as the Pope; that every one hath a *judicium privatæ diſcretionis*, which is the rule of practice, as to himſelf; and though we freely allow a miniſterial power, under Chriſt, in the Governours of the Church, yet that extends not to an obligation upon men, to go againſt the dictates of their own reaſon and conſcience. Their power is only directive and declarative, and in matters of duty can bind no more than reaſon and evidence brought from Scripture by them doth. A man hath not the power over his own underſtanding, much leſs can others have it. *Nullus credit aliquid eſſe verum, quia vult credere id eſſe verum; non eſt enim in poteſtate hominis facere aliquid*

*Picus Mirand. Apol. p.*225, 226.

quid apparere intellectui ſuo verum quando voluerit. Either therefore men are bound to obey Church Governours in all things abſolutely, without any reſtriction or limitation; (which if it be not uſurpation and dominion over others faith in them, and the worſt of implicite faith in others, it is hard to define what either of them is,) or elſe if they be bound to obey only in lawful things; I then enquire who muſt be judge what things are lawful in this caſe, what not? if the Governours ſtill, then the power will be abſolute again; for to be ſure, whatever they command, they will ſay is lawful, either in it ſelf, or as they command it: if every private perſon muſt judge what is lawful, and what not, which is commanded (as when all is ſaid, every man will be his own judge in this caſe, in things concerning his own welfare) then he is no farther bound to obey than he judgeth the thing to be lawful which is commanded. The plea of an erroneous conſcience, takes not off the obligation to follow the dictates of it; for as he is bound to lay it down, ſuppoſing it erroneous, ſo he is bound not to go againſt it, while it is not laid down. But then again, if men are bound to ſubmit to Governours in the determination of lawful things, what plea could our Reformers have to withdraw themſelves from the Pope's yoke? it might have ſtill held true, *Boves arabant & Aſinæ paſcebantur ſimul*, which is Job 1. 14. *Aquinas* his argument for the ſubmiſſion of inferiours in the Church to *Summ.* 2.2. *q.* 2. *art.* 6. their ſuperiours: for did not the Pope plead to be a lawful Governour, and if men are bound to ſubmit to the determination of Church Governours, as to the lawfulneſs of things, they were bound to believe him in that as well as other things; and ſo ſeparation from that Church was unlawful then: So that let men turn and wind themſelves which way they will, by the very ſame arguments that any will prove ſeparation from the Church of *Rome* lawful, becauſe ſhe required unlawful things, as conditions of her communion, it will be proved lawful, not to conform to any ſuſpected or unlawful practice, required by any Church Governours upon the ſame terms; if the thing ſo required, be after ſerious and ſober enquiry, judged unwarrantable by a man's own conſcience. And withal it would be farther conſidered, whether when our beſt Writers againſt the Papiſts, do lay the imputation of Schiſm, not on thoſe who withdraw communion, but on them for requiring ſuch conditions of communion (whereby they did rather eject men out of their communion, than the others ſeparate from them) they do not by the ſame arguments, lay the imputation of Schiſm on all who require ſuch conditions of communion, and take it wholly off from thoſe who refuſe to conform for conſcience ſake. To this I ſhall ſubjoin the judgment of as a learned and judicious a Divine, as moſt our Nation hath bred, in his excellent (though little) Tract concerning Schiſm. "In thoſe Schiſms, *ſaith he*, which concern fact, nothing can be a juſt *Mr.* Hales *of Schiſm,* *p.* 8. "cauſe of refuſing communion, but only to require the execution of "ſome unlawful or ſuſpected act; for not only in reaſon, but in religion "too, that Maxim admits of no releaſe, *cautiſſimi cujuſque præceptum* "*quod dubitas nè feceris*. And after inſtanceth in the Schiſm about "image-worſhip, determin'd by the ſecond Council of *Nice*, in which "he pronounceth the Schiſmatical party to be the Synod it ſelf, and "that on theſe grounds: Firſt, becauſe it is acknowledged by all, that "it is a thing unneceſſary. Secondly, it is by moſt ſuſpected. Thirdly, it is by many held utterly unlawful: Can then (ſaith he) the "enjoining of ſuch a thing be ought elſe but abuſe? or can the refu-

" ſal of communion here, be thought any other thing than duty? Here, " or upon the like occaſion, to ſeparate, may peradventure bring per- " ſonal trouble or danger (againſt which it concerns any honeſt man to " have *pectus præparatum*) farther harm it cannot do, ſo that in theſe " caſes you cannot be to ſeek what to think, or what you have to do. " and afterwards propounds it as a remedy to prevent Schiſm, to have " all Liturgies and publick forms of ſervice ſo framed, as that they ad- " mit not of particular and private fancies, but contain only ſuch things " in which all Chriſtians do agree. For, ſaith he, conſider of all the " Liturgies that are, and ever have been, and remove from them what- " ever is ſcandalous to any party, and leave nothing but what all agree " on; and the evil ſhall be, that the publick ſervice and honour of " God ſhall no ways ſuffer: Whereas, to load our publick forms, with " the private fancies upon which we differ, is the moſt ſovereign way " to perpetuate Schiſm unto the World's end. Prayer, Confeſſion, " Thankſgiving, reading of Scriptures in the plaineſt and ſimpleſt man- " ner, were matter enough to furniſh out a ſufficient Liturgy, though " nothing either of private opinion, or of Church Pomp, of Garments " or preſcribed geſtures, of Imagery, of Muſick, of matter concerning " the dead, of many ſuperfluities, which creep into the Church, under " the name of Order and Decency, did interpoſe it ſelf. To charge " Churches and Liturgies with things unneceſſary, was the firſt begin- " ning of all ſuperſtition; and when ſcruple of conſcience began to be " made, or pretended; there Schiſm began to break in; if the ſpecial " guides and Fathers of the Church, would be a little ſparing of in- " cumbring Churches with ſuperfluities, or not over rigid, either in re- " viving obſolete cuſtoms, or impoſing new, there would be far leſs " cauſe of Schiſm or Superſtition; and all the inconvenience were like- " ly to enſue, would be but this, they ſhould in ſo doing yield a little " to the imbecillity of their inferiors, a thing which St. *Paul* would " never have refuſed to do: mean while, whereſoever falſe or ſuſpected " opinions are made a piece of Church Liturgy, he that ſeparates is " not the Schiſmatick; for it is alike unlawful, to make profeſſion of " known or ſuſpected falſhood, as to put in practice unlawful or ſuſpe- " cted actions. Thus far that excellent perſon, whoſe words I have taken the pains to tranſcribe, becauſe of that great wiſdom, judgment, and moderation, contained in them; and the ſeaſonableneſs of his counſel and advice, to the preſent poſture of affairs among us. Were we ſo happy but to take off things granted unneceſſary by all, and ſuſpected by many, and judged unlawful by ſome; and to make nothing the bonds of our communion, but what Chriſt hath done, *viz.* one faith, one baptiſm, *&c.* allowiug a liberty for matters of indifferency, and bearing with the weakneſs of thoſe who cannot bear things which others account lawful, we might indeed be reſtored to a true Primitive luſtre far ſooner, than by furbiſhing up ſome antiquated ceremonies, which can derive their pedigree no higher, than from ſome ancient cuſtom and tradition. God will one day convince men, that the Union of the Church lies more in the Unity of faith and affection, than in uniformity of doubtful rites and ceremonies. The bond of Church-communion ſhould be ſomething common to ſtrong and weak Chriſtians, as St. *Auſtin* ſaith of the rule of faith, that it is *puſillis magniſque communis*; and certainly the Primitive Church, that did not charge mens faith with ſuch a load of articles, as now in theſe latter ages men are charged

Ep. 57.

charged with, would much leſs burden men with impoſing doubtful practices upon them, as the ground of Church-communion. And for publick forms of Divine ſervice, ſuch of all things certainly ſhould be ſo compoſed, as to be the leaſt ſubject to any ſcruple from any perſons whatſoever; being on purpoſe compoſed for the declaring mens unity and conſent in their publick worſhip: And thoſe who are the moſt addicted to any one form, can never plead it unlawful to amend it, whereas others may, that it is not lawful or convenient, at leaſt to uſe it without ſuch alterations. And therefore, were there that ſpirit of mutual condeſcenſion, which was moſt certainly in *Eccleſiâ primo primitivâ*, as *Gratian* ſomewhere ſpeaks, in the firſt and truly primitive Church in the Apoſtles time; our breaches as to this thing too, might ſoon be cloſed up, and the voice of Schiſm be heard among us no more. It argued very much the prudence and temper of the French Churches, in compoſing their publick forms of prayer, that they were ſo far from inſerting any thing controverſial into them, that *Amyraldus* tells us, the Papiſts themſelves would uſe them. *Et quod vix credibile eſſet niſi publicè viſeretur, eas inſeruerunt in eos libros in quos congeſſerunt varias precationum formulas.* And that which men would ſcarce believe unleſs they ſaw it, they inſerted them into their own prayer-books. The ſame temper was uſed by our Reformers in the compoſing our Liturgy, in reference to the Papiſts, to whom they had then an eſpecial eye, as being the only party then appearing, whom they deſired to draw into their communion, by coming as near them as they well and ſafely could: And certainly thoſe holy men, who did ſeek by any means to draw in others, at ſuch a diſtance from their principles as the Papiſts were, did never intend by what they did for that end, to exclude any truly tender conſciences from their communion. That which they laid as a bait for them, was never intended by them as a hook for thoſe of their own profeſſion. But the ſame or greater reaſon which made them ſeek ſo much at that time (before the rent between the Papiſt and us was grown to that height it is now at; they being then in hopes by a fair complyance to have brought the whole Kingdom to join with them) I ſay the ſame reaſon which at that time made them yield ſo far to them then, would now have perſuaded them to alter and lay aſide thoſe things which yield matter of offence, to any of the ſame profeſſion with themſelves now. For ſurely none will be ſo uncharitable towards thoſe of his own profeſſion, as not to think there is as much reaſon to yield in compliance with them, as with the Papiſts. And it cannot but be looked upon as a token of God's ſevere diſpleaſure againſt us, if any, though unreaſonable propoſals of peace between us and the Papiſts ſhould meet with ſuch entertainment among many; and yet any fair offers of union and accommodation among our ſelves, be ſo coldly embraced and entertained.

De ſeceſſ. ab Eccl. Rom. & pace inter Evang. conſt. p. 225.

§. 7.

Having thus far ſhewed how far the obligation to keep in a Church ſociety doth reach to the ſeveral members of it: I now proceed to ſhew what way the light of nature directs men to for the quieting and compoſing any differences which may ariſe in ſuch a ſociety tending to break the peace of it. But before I come to the particular ways directed to, by the Law of nature, for ending Controverſies in the Church, I ſhall lay down ſome things by way of caution, for the right underſtanding of what is already ſpoken, leſt I ſhould be thought inſtead of pleading for peace, to leave a door open for an univerſal liberty, and ſo pave a new cauſeway towards *Babel*. *Firſt*, that though it be law-

ful

ſul not to conform to unlawful or ſuſpected practices in a Church, yet it is not therefore lawful to erect new Churches. For all other eſſentials ſuppoſed in a Church, a mere requiring conformity in ſome ſuſpected rites, doth not make it to be no true or ſound Church, as to other things, from which it is lawful to make a total divorce and ſeparation. A total ſeparation is when a new and diſtinct ſociety for worſhip is entred into, under diſtinct and peculiar officers governing by Laws and Church-rules different from that form which they ſeperate from. This I do not aſſert to be therefore lawful, becauſe ſome things are required, which mens conſciences aae unſatisfied in: unleſs others proceed to eject and caſt them wholly out of communion on that account, in which caſe their ſeparation is neceſſary, and their ſchiſm unavoidable. *Secondly*, therefore I aſſert, that as to things in the judgment of the Primitive and Reformed Churches left undetermined by the Law of God, and in matters of mere order and decency, and wholly as to the form of Government, every one notwithſtanding what his private judgment may be of them, is bound for the peace of the Church of God to ſubmit to the determination of the lawful Governours of the Church. And this is that power of ending controverſies which I ſuppoſe to be lodged in a Church ſociety; not ſuch a one as whereto every man is bound to conform his private judgment, but whereto every private perſon is bound to ſubmit in order to the Churches peace. That is, that in any controverſies ariſing in a Church, there is ſuch a power ſuppoſed, that may give ſuch an authoritative deciſion of the controverſie in which both parties are bound to acquieſce, ſo as to act nothing contrary to that deciſion. For as it is ſuppoſed that in all contracts and agreements for mutual ſociety, men are content to part with their own liberties for the good of the whole; ſo likewiſe to part with the authority of their own judgments, and to ſubmit to the determination of things by the rulers of the ſociety conſtituted by them. For there muſt be a difference made between the *liberty and freedom* of a man's own judgment, and the *authority* of it: for ſuppoſing men out of all ſociety, every man hath both; but ſocieties being entred, and contracts made, though men can never part with the freedom of their judgments, (men not having *a Deſpotical power* over their own underſtandings) yet they muſt part with the authority of their judgments, *i.e.* in matters concerning the Government of the ſociety, they muſt be ruled by perſons in authority over them. Elſe there can be nothing imagined but confuſion, and diſorder, inſtead of peace and unity in every civil ſtate and ſociety. The caſe is the ſame in a religious ſociety too, in which men muſt be ſuppoſed to part with the authority of their own judgments in matters concerning the Government of the Church, and to ſubmit to what is conſtituted and appointed by thoſe who are intruſted with the care and welfare of it. Elſe it is impoſſible there ſhould be unity and peace in a Church conſidered as a ſociety; which is as much as to ſay, there neither is, nor can be ſuch a ſociety. And that God hath commanded that which is naturally impoſſible; I mean, freedom from diviſions, and the unity and peace of his Church: Which will appear from hence, becauſe it can never be expected that all men ſhould be exactly of one mind, Either then men retaining their private apprehenſions, are bound to acquieſce in what is publickly determined, or there is a neceſſity of perpetual confuſions in the Church of God. For the main inlet of all diſturbances and diviſions in the Church, is from hence, that men conſider themſelves abſolutely, and not as members of a governed ſociety, and ſo that they may follow their own private judgments, and are bound ſo to do in matters belonging to the Government of the Church, and not to acquieſce for the Churches peace in what is eſtabliſhed in order to the ruling of this ſo conſtituted ſociety, by lawful authority.

§. 8. Theſe things premiſed, the way is now fully cleared for the diſcovering what ways are preſcribed by the Light of Nature for ending controverſies in the Church; which will appear to be theſe two.

1. *In ſocieties wherein perſons act with an equality of power, for the ending differences ariſing, the leſs number muſt always acquieſce in the determination of the greater.* And therefore it is a generally received *Axiome*, that in all ſocieties *pars major jus habet univerſitatis*, the greater part hath the power of the whole: And it is a ſtanding rule in the Civil Law, *refertur ad univerſos quod publicè fit per majorem partem*, which is determined by the Lawyers to hold not of the perſons in power, but of the perſons preſent at the determination; as when *Alexander Severus* made fourteen of the *Viri Conſulares* to be *Curatores Urbis* joyned with the *Præfectus Urbis*, to determine caſes brought before them, what was determined by the greater part of thoſe preſent, was looked upon as binding, as if the whole number had been there. And this *Ariſtotle* lays down as one of the fundamental laws of a Democratical Government. ὅ, τι ἂν δόξη τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. *That muſt be looked on as a juſt and final deciſion of a caſe debated, which the major part determines.* And therefore rationally infers, that in a Democracy the poorer ſort (and ſo likewiſe the worſe) muſt always bear the greateſt ſway, becauſe they are the moſt. Which is an unavoidable inconvenience in that form of Government whether in Church or State. The ſame he elſewhere applies to other forms of Government which have a multitude of rulers, as *Ariſtocracy* and *Oligarchy:* That which ſeems good to the moſt obtains as a Law amongſt all, Which *Appian* thus briefly expreſſeth, τὸ πλεῖον δικαιότερον· and *Dinoyſ. Halicarnaſſeus* ὅ, τι ἂν δόξη τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτο νικᾶν, the one ſpeaking of matter of fact, that it doth obtain, the other of matter of Law that it ſhould do ſo. It appears then from the Law and light of Nature, that wherever any multitude acts in an equality of power, the greater part have the power of the whole; not from any right which the major part hath as ſuperior over the leſs; but from the Law of Nature, which will have every part ordered for the good of the whole; which good cannot oft times be obtained without a ſpecial determination on one ſide or other; nor that determination have its effect, if the Act of the major part may be reſcinded by the leſs. So that in every thing requiring ſpecial determination, this is to be eſteemed the moſt juſt and final deciſion which is done by the major part: For it would be manifeſtly unjuſt for the leſſer part to determine the greater, and therefore by the Law of Nature, the greater part hath the right of the whole.

C. de decurion. lib. 10. l. nominationem Pet. Fabri Comment. ad tit. de diverſis Reg. juris. Lampridius in Alex. Severo.

Politic. l. 6. cap. 2.

V. Grotium de jure bel. &c. lib. 2. cap. 5. ſect. 17.

2. *In a ſociety conſiſting of many particular companies or congregations, there muſt be a ſubordination of powers by the Law of Nature, which grants a right of appeal to an injured perſon from the lower and ſubordinate power to the higher and ſuperior.* Appealing is defined by the Lawyers to be *Provocatio iniquæ ſententiæ querelam continens.* An addreſs to a higher power with complaint of wrong: and ſo in general it is defined by *Ulpian* to be *ab inferioris Judicis ſententiâ ad ſuperiorem provocatio:* but as *Hottoman* obſerves, appeals may ſometimes be made to a co-ordinate

V. Jac Omphalium de uſurp. Leg. l. 7. c. 2. Ulp. l. 1. D. de Appel. Hottom. com. V. Juris.

co-ordinate power upon complaint of injuſtice done. As one Prætor, Conſul, Tribune might be appealed to, from the ſentence of another. The original of appeals then is, that injuries may be redreſſed, and in order to that, nature dictates that there ought to be a ſubordination of powers one to another, leſt any injury done through corruption or ignorance of the immediate Judges, prove irremediable. To which purpoſe our learned *Whitaker* ſaith, that Appeals are *juris divini & naturalis, & in omni ſocietate admodum neceſſariæ; propter multorum judicum vel iniquitatem, vel ignorantiam; alioqui actum eſſet de innocente, ſi non liceret ab iniqua ſententia appellare:* So that appeals are founded upon natural right, leſt men ſhould be injured in any determination of a caſe, by thoſe who have the cognizance of it. And in order to a redreſs of wrongs, and ending controverſies, nature tells us that Appeals muſt not be infinite, but there muſt be ſome power, from whence Appeals muſt not be made: What that ſhould be, muſt be determined in the ſame manner that it is in Civils; not that every controverſie in the Church muſt be determined by an Œcumenical Council, but that it is in the power of the ſupreme Magiſtrate, as Supreme head in cauſes Eccleſiaſtical, to limit and fix this ſubordination, and determine how far it ſhall go, and no farther. The determination being in order to the peace of the Church, which Chriſtian Magiſtrates are bound to look after, and ſee that cauſes hang not perpetually without deciſion: And ſo we find the Chriſtian Emperours conſtituting to whom Appeals ſhould be made, and where they ſhould be fixed, as *Juſtinian* and *Theodoſius* did. For when the Church is incorporated into the Commonwealth, the chief authority in a Commonwealth as Chriſtian, belongs to the ſame to which it doth as a Commonwealth: But of that already. It is then againſt the Law and Light of Nature, and the natural right of every man, for any particular company of men, calling themſelves a Church, to engroſs all Eccleſiaſtical power ſo into their hands, that no liberty of Appeals for redreſs can be made from it. Which (to ſpeak within compaſs) is a very high uſurpation made upon the Civil and Religious Rights of Chriſtians; becauſe it leaves men under a cauſeleſs cenſure, without any authoritative vindication of them from it. As for that way of *elective Synods*, ſubſtitued in the place of authoritative power to determine controverſies, it is a σοφὸν φάρμακον, which will never be ſoveraign enough to cure the diſtemper it is brought for: For elective Synods are but like that which the Lawyers call *arbitrium boni viri*, which they diſtinguiſh from *arbitrium ex compromiſſo*, and binds no farther than the party concerned doth judge the ſentence equal and juſt. So that this helps us with no way to end controverſies in the Church, any farther than the perſons engaged are willing to account that juſt which ſhall be judged in their caſe. Taking then a coercive power, only for ſuch a one as may authoritatively decide a controverſie, we ſee what great reaſon there is for what the Hiſtorian obſerves: *Arbitriis ii ſe debent interponere, qui non parentem coercere poſſunt*; That all power of arbitration ſhould have ſome juridical power going along with it, to make a final end of quarrels. But that which ſeems yet more ſtrange to me, is this, that by thoſe who aſſert the Independency of particular Congregations, it is ſo hotly pleaded, that Chriſt hath given every particular Congregation a power over its own members, to determine controverſies ariſing between them: but, that if one, or many of theſe particular Congregations ſhould err, or break

Controv. 4. *qu.* 4. *c.* 2.

Juſt. auth. diſſ. epiſ. collat. 9. *Theod. cod. de SS. Eccl. c. omni.*

Grot. de jure belli ac pacis, l. 3. *cap.* 20. *ſect.* 46.

Vell. Paterc. hiſt. lib. 2.

break the rule, he hath left no power authoritatively to decide what ſhould be done in ſuch caſes. Can we conceive that Chriſt ſhould provide more for the caſes of particular perſons, than of particular Churches? And that he ſhould give authority for determining one, and not the other? Is there any more coactive power given by any to Synods, or greater officers, than there is by them to particular Churches? which power is only declarative as to the rule, though authoritative as to perſons wherever it is lodged. Is there not more danger to God's people, by the ſcandals of Churches, than perſons? Or did Chriſt's power of governing his people reach to them only as particular congregations? Doth not this too ſtrongly ſavour of the *Pars Donati*? only the *Meridies* muſt be rendred a particular Congregational Church, where Chriſt cauſeth his Flock to reſt? But ſuppoſing the Scripture not expreſly to lay down a rule for governing many Churches, are men out-lawed of their natural rights? that ſuppoſing a wrong ſentence paſſed in the Congregation, there is no hopes, way, or means to redreſs his injury, and make his innocency known? Doth this look like an inſtitution of Chriſt? But that which I conceive is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος, and the original of this miſtake, is, that the Churches we read of firſt planted in Scripture, were only particular Congregations; and therefore there is no proper Church-power beyond them, or above them. I meddle not with the antecedent now, which is largely diſcuſſed by others; but the extream weakneſs of the conſequence, is that I am here obliged to diſcover. For what a ſtrange ſhortneſs of diſcourſe is it to argue thus, if when there was but one Congregation, that Congregation had all power within its ſelf; then when there are more particular Congregations, it muſt be ſo; and yet this is the very foundation of all thoſe Kingdoms of *Yvetot*, as one calls them, thoſe ſole ſelf-governing Congregations. When there was but one Congregation in a Church, it was neceſſary if it had any Church power, that it muſt be lodged in that one Congregation: But when this Congregation was multiplyed into many more is it not as neceſſary for their mutual government, there ſhould be a common power governing them together, as a joynt-ſociety? Beſides, the firſt Congregational Church in the New Teſtament, *viz.* that of *Jeruſalem*, could be no particular organical Church; for it had many, if not all, univerſal officers in it; and if they were the fixed Paſtors of that Church, they could not, according to the principles of thoſe who thus ſpeak, preach to any other Congregation but their own, by vertue of their office: And ſo, either their Apoſtolical office and commiſſion muſt be deſtroyed, if they were Paſtors of particular organical Churches; or if their Apoſtolical office be aſſerted, their Paſtorſhip of particular organical Churches is deſtroyed by their own principles, who aſſert that the Paſtor of a Church can do no Paſtoral office out of his own Congregation. The caſe is the ſame, as to other Churches planted by the Apoſtles and governed by themſelves; which two, as far as I can find in the New Teſtament, were of an equal extent; *viz.* that all the Churches planted by the Apoſtles, were chiefly governed by themſelves, though they had ſubordinate officers under them. Theſe firſt Churches then were not ſuch particular organized Churches, but they were as the *firſt matter* of many Congregations to be propagated out of them; which after made one ſociety, conſiſting of thoſe ſeveral Congregations imbodied together, and ruled by one common government. As in a College, every Tutor hath his own pupils, which he rules; and if we ſuppoſe but one Tutor at firſt in the College, with his pupils, all the power, both common to the ſociety, and peculiar to his flock, is joined together; but when there are many more Tutors, having Pupils under their charge, all theſe, for their better ordering as a ſociety, muſt be governed by the common government of the College, to which the particular government of every Tutor is and muſt be ſubordinate: But this will be more fully made appear in the original of Civil government. It is far more evident, that all Civil power lay at firſt in *Adam* and his family, and afterwards in particular families, than that all Church power lay in particular Congregations at firſt. We may then with as good reaſon ſay, that there is no lawful Civil Government now, but that of particular families; and that no National Government hath any right or power over particular families, becauſe families had once all Civil power within themſelves; as becauſe it is ſuppoſed, that all Church-power lay firſt in particular Congregations, therefore there muſt be no Church power above them; nor that particular Congregations are ſubject to ſuch Government as is requiſite for the regulating of the ſociety in common, as comprehending in it many particular Congregations. Let them ſhew then, how any Government in the State is lawful, when families had the firſt power, and by what right now thoſe families are ſubordinate to the Civil Magiſtrate, and what neceſſity there is for it; and by the very ſame reaſons will we ſhew the lawfulneſs of Government in the Church over many Congregations, and that thoſe are by the ſame right, and upon the ſame neceſſity, to ſubordinate themſelves to the Governours of the Church conſidered as a ſociety taking in many particular Congregations. The Parallel runs on farther and clearer ſtill: For as the heads of the ſeveral families after the Flood, had the command over all dwelling under their roofs, while they remained in one family; and when that increaſed into more, their power was extended over them too; which was the firſt original of Monarchy in the world: So the planters of the firſt Churches, that while the Church was but one Congregation, had power over it, then this Congregation was multiplied into more, their power equally extended over them all. And as afterwards, ſeveral heads of families upon their encreaſe, did conſtitute diſtinct Civil Governments, wherein were ſubordinate officers, but thoſe Governments themſelves were co-ordinate one with another: So in the Church, ſo many Congregations as make up one Provincial, or National ſociety (as ſucceſſion and prudence doth order the bounds of them) do make up ſeveral particular Churches, enjoying their officers ruling them, but ſubordinate to the Governours of the Church in common: Which ſociety, National or Provincial, is ſubordinate to none beyond its ſelf, but enjoys a free power within its ſelf of ordering things for its own Government, as it judgeth moſt convenient, and agreeable to the rules of Scripture. The ſumm then of what I ſay, concerning ſubordination of officers and powers in the ſociety of the Church, is this, that by the light and Law of Nature it appears, that no individual company or Congregation, hath an abſolute, independent power within its ſelf; but that for the redreſſing grievances happening in them, appeals are neceſſary to the parties aggrieved, and a ſubordination of that particular Congregation, to the government of the ſociety in common. So that, the right of appealing, and original of ſubordination, is from Nature; the particular manner and form of ſubordinate and ſuperiour Courts, is to be fetched from poſitive Laws; the limitation of Appeals, extent of juriſdiction, the binding power of ſentence, ſo far as concerns external Unity in the Church, is to be fetched from the power of the Magiſtrate, and civil ſanctions and conſtitutions. The Churches power, as to Divine Law, being only directive and declarative; but being confirmed by a civil ſanction, is juridical and obligatory. Concerning the Magiſtrates power to call, confirm, alter, repeal the decrees of Synods, ſee *Grotius*, *Chamier*, *Whitaker*, *Caſaubon*, *Mornay*, and others, who fully and largely handle it; To whom having nothing to add, I will take nothing at all from them: As for that time when the Church was without Magiſtrates ruling in it, in thoſe things left undetermined by the rule of the Word, they acted out of principles of Chriſtian prudence agreeable to the rules of Scripture, and from the principles of the Law of Nature: One of which we come in the next place to ſpeak to. So much for the Churches power, conſidered as a ſociety for ending controverſies ariſing within its ſelf, tending to break the peace and unity of it.

Grot. de Imp. ſummr. Poteſt. c. 7. ſ. 14, 15. &c. c. 8. ſ. 13. Chamir. T. 2. l. 13. c. 12. Whitaker Contr. 3. q. 2. Caſ. de Lib. Eccleſ. c. 2. Mornæ. hiſt. Papatus paſſim.

Chap. VII.

The fifth thing dictated by the Law of Nature, That all that are admitted into this ſociety, muſt conſent to be governed by the Laws and Rules of it. Civil ſocieties founded upon mutual conſent; expreſs in the firſt entrance, implicite in others born under ſocieties actually formed. Conſent as to a Church neceſſary, the manner of conſent determined by Chriſt by baptiſm and profeſſion. Implicite conſent ſuppoſed in all baptized, explicite, declared by challenging the privileges, and obſerving the duties of the Covenant. Explicite by expreſs owning the Goſpel when adult, very uſeful for recovering the credit of Chriſtianity. The Diſcipline of the Primitive Church cleared from Origen, Juſtin Martyr, Pliny, Tertullian. *The neceſſary requiſites of Church memberſhip, whether poſitive ſigns of grace: Explicite Covenant, how far neceſſary; not the formal conſtitution of a Church, proved by ſeveral arguments.*

§. 1. THE Law of Nature dictates, *that all who are admitted into this ſociety, muſt conſent to be governed by the Laws and Rules of that ſociety, according to its conſtitution.* For none can be looked upon as a member of a ſociety, but ſuch a one as ſubmits to the Rules and Laws of the ſociety, as conſtituted at the time of his entrance into it. That all civil ſocieties are founded upon voluntary conſent and agreement of parties, and do depend upon contracts and Covenants made between them, is evident to any that conſider that men are not bound by the Law of Nature to aſſociate themſelves with any but whom they ſhall judge fit; that dominion and propriety was introduced by free conſent of men: and ſo there muſt be Laws and Bonds fit, agreement made, and ſubmiſſion acknowledged to thoſe Laws; elſe men might plead their natural right and freedom ſtill, which would be deſtructive to the very nature of thoſe ſocieties. When men then did firſt part with their natural liberties, two things were neceſſary in the moſt expreſs terms to be declared; firſt a free and voluntary conſent to part with ſo much of their natural rights as was not conſiſtent with the well being of the ſociety: Secondly, a free ſubmiſſion to all Laws, which ſhould be agreed upon at their entrance into ſociety, or afterwards as they ſee cauſe. But when ſocieties were already entred, and children born under them, no ſuch expreſs conſent was required in them, being bound by vertue of the protection, they find from authority to ſubmit to it, and an implicite conſent is ſuppoſed in all ſuch as are born under that authority. But for their more full underſtanding of this obligation of theirs, and to lay the greater tye of obedience upon them, when they come to underſtanding, it hath been conceived very requiſite by moſt States to have an explicite declaration of their conſent, either by ſome formal oath of allegiance, or ſome other way ſufficiently expreſſing their fidelity, in ſtanding to the Covenants long ſince ſuppoſed to be made. To apply this now to the Church.

We have all along hitherto conſidered the Church in general, as a ſociety or corporation which was neceſſary in order to our diſcovering what is in it from the Light of Nature without poſitive Laws.

§. 2. *Hiſt. Council of Trent. l.7. p.612.* But here we muſt take notice of what was obſerved by Father *Laynez* the Jeſuit at the Council of *Trent*, That it is not with the Church as with other ſocieties, which are firſt themſelves, and then conſtitute the Governours. But the Governour of this ſociety was firſt himſelf, and he appointed what Orders, Rules, and Laws ſhould govern this ſociety; and wherein he hath determined any thing, we are bound to look upon that, as neceſſary to the maintaining of that ſociety which is built upon his conſtitution of it. And in many of thoſe orders which Chriſt hath ſetled in his Church; the foundation of them is in the Law of Nature, but the particular determination of the manner of them is from himſelf. Thus it is in the caſe we now are upon; nature requires that every one entring into a ſociety, ſhould conſent to the rules of it. Our Saviour hath determined how this conſent ſhould be expreſſed, *viz.* by receiving Baptiſm from thoſe who have the power to diſpenſe it; which is the fœderal rite whereby our conſent is expreſſed to own all the Laws and ſubmit to them, whereby this ſociety is governed: which at the firſt entring of men into this ſociety of the Church was requiſite to be done by the expreſs and explicite conſent of the parties themſelves, being of ſufficient capacity to declare it; but the Covenant being once entred into by themſelves, not only in their own name, but in the name of their poſterity (a thing implied in all Covenants wherein benefits do redound to poſterity, that the obligation ſhould reach unto them too, but more particular in this, it having been always the tenour of God's Covenants with men, to enter the ſeed as well as the perſons themſelves, as to outward privileges) an implicite conſent as to the children in Covenant, is ſufficient to enter them upon the privileges of it by baptiſm, although withal it be highly rational for their better underſtanding the ingagement they entred into, that when they came to age they ſhould explicitely declare their own voluntary conſent to ſubmit to the Laws of Chriſt, and to conform their lives to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity; which might be a more than probable way, and certainly moſt agreeable both to reaſon and Scripture to advance the credit of Chriſtianity once more in the world, which at this day ſo much ſuffers by ſo many profeſſing it without underſtanding the terms of it; who ſwallow down a profeſſion of Chriſtianity, as boys do pills, without knowing what it is compounded of, which is the great reaſon it works ſo little alteration upon their ſpirits.

Deut. 29. 19. Act. 2. 38.

§. 3.

The one great cauſe of the great flouriſhing of religion in the Primitive times, was certainly the ſtrictneſs uſed by them in their admiſſion of members into Church ſocieties, which is fully deſcribed by *Origen* againſt *Celſus*, who tells us they did φιλοπευστεῖν τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς τῶν προσιόντων, *inquire into their lives and carriages, to diſcern their ſeriouſneſs in their profeſſion of Chriſtianity during their being Catechumeni:* Who after tells us they did require τὸ κεκαθάρθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ὅση δύναμις βέλτιον βεβιωκέναι, *true repentance and reformation of life,* τὸ τηνικάδε καλοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς παρ' ἡμῖν τελετάς, *then we admit them to the participation of our myſteries.* I confeſs the Diſcipline of the Primitive Church hath been very much miſrepreſented to us, by mens looking upon it through the glaſs of the modern practices and cuſtoms obtaining among us: as though all this only concerned the admiſſion to the Lord's Supper; though that was always in chiefeſt veneration in the Church of God, as being the chief of Goſpel myſteries (as they loved to ſpeak) yet I cannot find that any were admitted to all other Ordinances freely with them who were debarred from this: but their admiſſion to one, did include an admiſſion to all: ſo on the contrary, I find none admitted to baptiſm, who were not to the Lord's Supper; and if *Catechumeni*, preſently after, only confirmation intervening (which will hardly be ever found ſeparate from baptiſm, till the diſtinction of the double *Chriſme in vertice & pectore* came up, which was about *Jerom*'s time.)

Lib. 3. *p.* 142, 143. *&* 147.

Tertul. Apol. 39. deſcribes excluſion to be *à communicatione Orationis & conventus, & omnis ſancti commercii.*

§. 4.

The thing then which the Primitive Church required in admitting perſons adult to baptiſm, and ſo to the Lord's Supper, was a ſerious viſible profeſſion of Chriſtianity, which was looked upon by them as the greateſt evidence of their real conſent to the rules of the Goſpel. For that purpoſe it will be worth our taking notice what is ſet down by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Apolog.* 2. ſpeaking of the celebration of the Lord's Supper; καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αὕτη καλεῖται παρ' ἡμῖν εὐχαριστία, ἧς οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεταχεῖν ἐξὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τῷ πιστεύοντι ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ δεδιδαγμένα ἐφ' ἡμῶν, καὶ λουσαμένῳ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἀφέσεως ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ εἰς ἀναγέννησιν λουτρὸν, καὶ οὕτως βιοῦντι ὡς ὁ Χριστὸς παρέδωκεν, where we ſee what was required before admiſſion to the Lord's Supper, *a profeſſion of faith in the truths of the Goſpel, and anſwerable life to the Goſpel, without which it was not lawful to participate of the Lord's Supper.* And farther we ſee by *Pliny*, that the Chriſtians of thoſe times did make uſe of ſome ſolemn ingagements among themſelves which he calls *Sacramenta*; they did *ſe ſacramento obſtringere, ne furta, ne latrocinia ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent*, &c. and *Tertullian* reports it out of *Pliny*, that he found nothing *de Sacramentis eorum* (as *Junius* firſt reads it out of *M. S.* for *de ſacris*, after him *Heraldus*, and as it is now read in *Rigaltius*'s Edition) beſides *cautelam & ad confederandum diſciplinam, &c. ſcelera prohibentes*, which *Euſebius* calls συνθήκας *pacta*, Covenants between them; and ſo Mr. *Selden* interprets the place of *Origen* in the beginning of his book againſt *Celſus*, where *Celſus* begins his charge againſt the Chriſtians, ὡς συνθήκας κρύβδην πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιουμένων χριστιανῶν παρὰ τὰ νενομισμένα· where he takes συνθήκας not as *Gelenius* renders it, *conventus*, but in its proper ſenſe for contracts or covenants that were made by the Chriſtians as by other ſocieties, only permitted, and tolerated by the Commonwealth. And we find by *Pliny*, that when the *hæteriæ* were forbidden, he brought the Chriſtian in under the Law; the ground of thoſe ſocieties was only a mutual compact and agreement among the perſons of it: Such as among the Eſſens of the Jews,

P. 97. *ed. Pariſ.* 1636.

Lib. 10. *ep.* 97.

Hiſt. Eccl. lib. 3. *c.* 33. *Selden. de Syned. l.* 1. *cap.* 9. *V. Heraldum in Tertul. Apologet. cap.* 39.

Joſeph. Haleſ. p. 2. cap. 12. Jews, and the Schools of Philoſophers among the Greeks. *Joſephus* mentions the ὅρκȣς φρικώδεις of thoſe who were admitted into the ſociety of the Eſſens. And ſo in all other ſocieties which ſubſiſt only from mutual confederation in a Commonwealth. Thus I acknowledge it to be in Chriſtianity, that there muſt be ſuch a ſuppoſed contract or voluntary conſent in the perſons ingaged in ſuch ſocieties. But with this obſervable difference, that although there muſt be a conſent in both, yet the one is wholly free, as to any pre-ingagement or obligation to it, as well as to the act its ſelf; but in religious ſocieties, though the act of conſent be free, yet there is an antecedent obligation upon men, binding them to this voluntary conſent. The want of the underſtanding this difference, is, the very foundation of that opinion men call *Eraſtianiſm*; for the followers of *Eraſtus*, when they find that Chriſtians did act *ex confederatâ diſciplinâ*, they preſently conclude all Church power to lay only in mutual conſent. It is granted Church power doth ſuppoſe conſent, but then all Chriſtians are under an obligation from the nature of Chriſtianity to expreſs this conſent, and to ſubmit to all cenſures legally inflicted. About the *betæriæ* and ſocieties among the Romans, we may take notice of the Law of twelve Tables. So in the collection of *Lud. Charondus, Sodalibus qui ejuſdem collegii ſunt, & jus coeundi habent, poteſtas eſto pactionis quam volent inter ſe ineundæ dum nè quid ex publicâ lege corrumpant. Ex Caio c.* 4. *D. de Collec. & corp.*

§. 5. I confeſs when perſons are entred into a viſible Church-Society by Baptiſm, if they will own that profeſſion they were baptized into, and are not guilty either of plain ignorance of it, or manifeſt ſcandal, and demand as their right the other ordinances of the Goſpel, I ſee not by what power they may be excluded. If we fix not in a ſerious viſible profeſſion as the ground of giving right, but require poſitive evidences of grace in every one to be admitted to ordinances as the only thing giving right, for my part, ſetting aſide the many inconveniencies beſides which attend that in reference to the perſons to be admitted, I ſee not how with a ſafe and good conſcience ordinances can be adminiſtred by any. My reaſon is this. Every one, eſpecially a Miniſter in that caſe ought to proceed upon certain grounds that the perſon admitted hath right to the ordinance to be adminiſtred; but if poſitive ſigns of grace be required, a mans conſcience cannot proceed upon any certainty, without infallible knowledge of anothers ſpiritual ſtate, which I ſuppoſe none will pretend to. My meaning is, that which gives right, muſt be ſomething evident to the perſon admitting into it, if it be his duty to inquire after it; but if only poſitive ſigns of grace be looked on, as giving right, the ground of right can never be ſo evident to another perſon, as to proceed with a good conſcience, *i. e.* with a full perſuaſion of anothers right to the adminiſtration of any ordinance to him. If it be ſaid, that theſe are required only as tokens of a true viſible profeſſion, and it is that which gives the right; I reply, our knowledge of, and aſſent to the concluſion, can be no ſtronger, nor more certain than to the premiſſes from whence it is inferred; if therefore true profeſſion gives right, and our knowledge of that proceeds upon our knowledge of the work of grace, we are left at the ſame uncertainty we were at before. But if we ſay that an outward profeſſion of the Goſpel (where there is nothing rendring men uncapable of owning it, which is ignorance, nor declaring they do not own it, which is ſcandal) is that which gives a viſible right to the ordinances of the Church as viſible, we have ſomething to fix our ſelves upon, and to bottom a perſuaſion of the right of perſons to ordinances.

Chriſt when he inſtituted Churches, did inſtitute them as viſible ſocieties, that is, to have marks whereby to be known and diſtinguiſhed, as other ſocieties in the world are; now that which puts a difference between this and other ſocieties, is an open profeſſion of Chriſtianity, which profeſſion is looked upon as the outward expreſſion of the internal conſent of the ſoul to the doctrine and laws of the Goſpel. Which outward evidence of conſent, where there is nothing evidently and directly oppugning it, is that which the Church of God in admiſſion of viſible members is to proceed upon. I no where find that ever Chriſt or his Apoſtles in making diſciples, or admitting to Church memberſhip, did exact any more than a profeſſed willingneſs to adhere to the doctrine which they preached; nor that they refuſed any who did declare their deſire to joyn with them. An owning Chriſtianity is all we read of antecedent to admiſſion of Church-members. And if any thing elſe be farther required as neceſſary, we muſt either ſay the word of God is defective in inſtitutions of neceſſity to the Church, which I ſuppoſe the aſſertors of it will not be ſo inconſiſtent to their own principles, as to do; or elſe muſt produce where any thing farther is required by the word of God.

By this we may ſee what to anſwer thoſe who require an explicite Covenant from all members of the Church, as that which gives the form and being to a Church. If they mean only in the firſt conſtitution of a viſible Church, an expreſs owning of the Goſpel Covenant, there is none will deny that to be neceſſary to make one a member of the viſible Church of Chriſt. If they farther mean that there muſt be a real confederation between thoſe who joyn together in Goſpel ordinances in order to their being a Church, I know none will queſtion it that know what it is that makes a ſociety to be ſo; which is ſuch a real confederation with one another: If they mean farther, that though Chriſtians be bound by vertue of their Goſpel Covenant to joyn with ſome Church ſociety, yet not being determined by Scripture to what particular Church they ſhould joyn; therefore for Chriſtians better underſtanding what their mutual duty is to one another; and who that Paſtor is to whom they owe the relation of member, that there ſhould be ſome ſignificant declaration either by words or actions of their willingneſs to joyn with ſuch a particular ſociety in Goſpel ordinances; I ſhall grant this to be neceſſary too. But if beyond this their meaning be, that a formal explicite covenant be abſolutely neceſſary to make any one a member of a Church, I ſee no reaſon for it. For, §. 7.

1. If there may be a real confederation without this; then this is not neceſſary, but there may be a real confederation without this explicite Covenant; as appears in thoſe Churches of Chriſt, both in the Primitive times, and ſince the Reformation, who have never uſed it, which none I ſuppoſe who maintain this opinion will deny to have been true viſible Churches of Chriſt.

2. If the Goſpel Covenant entred into by any, gives a right to Goſpel ordinances by its ſelf, then an explicite Covenant is not that which makes one a member of a Church; but the Goſpel Covenant gives that right to all Goſpel ordinances. If by baptiſm, the perſon baptized have

a legal title to all Goſpel ordinances, then, *&c.* the *Minor* appears in that they are admitted Church members by baptiſm; and how can any be a member of a Church, and not have right to all ordinances in it, ſuppoſing capacity to receive them? A right once received, continues till it be forfeited, eſpecially when it is ſuch a right as is not limited to any particular privileges, but to all the privileges of that ſociety into which they are entred.

3. The reality of conſent may be ſufficiently manifeſted without an explicite Covenant, as in the joyning with thoſe who are under the ſame profeſſion in the common acts of the ſociety and acceptance of, and ſubmiſſion to the rulers of that ſociety, which implicitely is that Covenant which they would have expreſſed; and actions in this caſe are as declarative and ſignificative as words.

4. If a Church may ceaſe to be a true Church, without explicite diſowning ſuch a Covenant, then it is not explicite Covenanting which makes a Church; but a Church may ceaſe to be a true Church without explicite diſowning it; as in caſe of univerſal corruption, as to word and Sacraments; as in the Church of *Rome*, that ſtill owns her ſelf for a Church. The ground of the conſequence, is from the parity of reaſon as to contraries.

§. 8. But though I ſee no reaſon at all, why an explicite Covenant ſhould be ſo neceſſary to a Church, that we cannot ſuppoſe a true Church without it; yet I no ways deny the lawfulneſs or expediency, in many caſes, of having a perſonal profeſſion from all baptized in infancy, when they come to age (which we may if we pleaſe, call *Confirmation*) and the neceſſity of deſiring admiſſion, in order to participation of all Ordinances: which deſire of admiſſion doth neceſſarily imply mens conſenting to the Laws of that ſociety, and walking according to the duties of it; and ſo they are *conſequentially* and *virtually*, though not *expreſly* and *formally*, bound to all the duties required from them in that relation. When Churches are over-run with looſneſs, ignorance, and prophaneneſs, or when Chriſtians are under perſecution, an external profeſſion of the Goſpel Covenant, and declaring their owning the ſociety they are entred into, and ſubmitting to the Laws of it, may be, if not wholly neceſſary, yet very uſeful and expedient: And indeed, at all times we ſee people underſtand ſo little of their duty or engagements, and are ſo hardly brought under the exerciſe of Goſpel diſcipline, that an open profeſſion of their ſubmiſſion to the rules of the Goſpel, ſeems the moſt likely way to advance the practice, power, and purity of Religion: But of this much is ſpoken by others lately, and therefore I ſuperſede. From all this we ſee, that every ſociety implying a joyning together in ſome common duties, Nature tells us there muſt be a real conſenting together, explicite, or implicite in all perſons, who enter into ſuch a ſociety.

CHAP.

Chap. VIII.

The laſt thing dictated by the Law of Nature, is, that every offender againſt the Laws of the ſociety, muſt give an account of his actions to the Governours of it, and ſubmit to the cenſures inflicted upon him by them. The original of penalties in ſocieties. The nature of them, according to the nature and ends of ſocieties. The penalty of the Church no civil mulct: becauſe its Laws and ends are different from civil ſocieties. The practice of the Druids *in excommunication. Among the Jews whether a mere civil or ſacred penalty. The latter proved by ſix arguments.* Cherem Col Bo *objections anſwered. The original of the miſtake ſhewed. The firſt part concluded.*

§. 1. *Nature dictates farther, that in a well ordered ſociety, every offender againſt the rules of that ſociety, muſt give an account of his actions to the Governours of that ſociety, and ſubmit to the cenſures of it, according to the judgment of the rulers of it.* In all ſocieties ſubſiſting by Laws, men being more ruled by hopes and fears, than by a ſenſe of duty, or love of goodneſs, it is neceſſary for maintaining a ſociety, that there muſt be not only a declaration of what men ought to do, but a ſetting forth the penalties which they muſt undergo upon violation of the Laws whereon the ſociety doth ſubſiſt: And as there muſt be penalties annexed, as the ſanction of the Law, ſo it muſt of neceſſity be implyed in a well ordered ſociety, that every perſon, as he doth promiſe obedience to the Laws, ſo by the ſame obligation he is bound to ſubmit to the penalties upon diſobedience: For whatever Law binds to duty where there is a penalty threatned, doth bind likewiſe to puniſhment upon neglect of duty: for no ſooner is the Law broken, but the offender lies under the penal ſanction of that Law, and is thereby bound to give an account of himſelf and actions, to thoſe Governours who are bound to ſee the Laws obeyed, or offenders puniſhed. Guilt follows immediately upon the breach of the Law, which is nothing elſe but the offenders obligation to puniſhment. From this obligation on the offenders part, ariſeth a new relation between the Governour of the ſociety and the offender. On the Governours part a right to puniſh, vindictive juſtice ſuppoſing offences committed; and on the offenders part, an obligation to undergo what ſhall be inflicted upon him for his offence: Puniſhment being nothing elſe, but *malum paſſionis ob malum actionis*. There muſt be then theſe things ſuppoſed in any well ordered ſociety; Laws to be governed by, Rulers to ſee the Laws kept, or offenders puniſhed, penalties made known for offenders, ſubmiſſion of the perſons in the ſocieties to the penalties, if they deſerve them. But now of what kind, nature, and degree the penalties muſt be, muſt be reſolved according to the nature, end, and deſign of the conſtitution of the ſociety. If it be a ſociety for preſervation of the rights of bodies, or eſtates, the penalties muſt be either pecuniary or corporal: And the ground is, becauſe the end of legal puniſhment is not properly revenge, but the preſervation of the ſociety, which without puniſhments could not be: A threefold end is therefore aſſigned to puniſhments; the reformation of the offending perſon, the prevention of farther offences in the ſociety of the ſame kind, and the being a terror and example to o-

Gellius Noct. Attic. l. 6. c. 16. V. Grotium de jure belli. l. 2. c. 20. ſ. 6, 7, 8. Matth. 1. 19.

thers; the firſt is called νουθεσία, κόλασις, or παραίνεσις, the ſecond τιμωρία, being for the preſervation of the honour of the Magiſtrate: the third παράδειγμα, when the puniſhment is inflicted upon one, that others ſhould take notice of it; which muſt be always done in a publick manner: So παραδειγματίσαι in *Matthew*, is oppoſed to λάθρα ἀπολῦσαι.

§. 2. Theſe things being thus in general conſidered, come we now to apply it to the Church conſidered as a ſociety. That it hath peculiar Laws to be governed by, appears by the diſtinct nature, end, and deſign of the conſtitution of it; which is not to preſerve any outward rights, but to maintain and keep up a religious ſociety for the ſervice of God; and therefore the penal ſanctions of theſe Laws cannot properly be any corporal or pecuniary mulct, but ſomewhat anſwerable to the nature of the ſociety. It muſt be then ſomewhat which implies the deprivation of that which is the chiefeſt benefit of that ſociety. The benefits of it are the privileges and honour which men enjoy by thus aſſociating themſelves for ſo high an employment: That puniſhment then muſt be the loſs of thoſe privileges which the Corporation enjoys, which muſt be by excluſion of the offending perſon from communion with the ſociety. Hence we ſee it is evident, that which we call excommunication is the greateſt penalty which the Church, as a ſociety, can inflict upon the members of it, conſidered as ſuch. And hence it is likewiſe clear, that as the ſociety of the Church is diſtinct from others, the Laws, Ends, Governours of a different nature, ſo the puniſhment muſt be a puniſhment diſtinct from civil, and ordained wholly in order to the peculiar ends of this ſociety; which they do not well conſider, who deny any ſuch power as that of excommunication peculiar to the Church, which is as much as to deny that the Laws whereby the Church is ruled, are different from the civil Laws, or the ends of this ſociety from the ends of civil ſocieties: for the puniſhment muſt be proportioned to the Laws, and referred immediately to its proper ends. It were no ways difficult to anſwer the pretences brought againſt this: For although I acknowledge a ſubordination of this religious ſociety to the ſupreme authority in the Commonwealth, and that the rules concerning the Government of the ſociety in common muſt have their ſanction from thence; yet this no ways implies but it may have its peculiar penalties and power to inflict them, any more than any Company of Tradeſmen have not power to exclude any from their Company for breaking the rules of the Company, becauſe they are ſubordinate to the Supreme Authority: or any College to expel any from thence, for breaking the local Statutes of it, which are diſtinct from the common Laws. Nor is it any argument, that becauſe Chriſtians had mutual confederations in times of perſecution for the exerciſe of cenſures, therefore theſe cenſures were only arbitrary and humane; unleſs it be proved, that it was not a duty in them ſo to confederate and join together, nor was there any antecedent obligation to inflict thoſe cenſures upon offenders. Much leſs, thirdly, becauſe their juriſdiction is not civil and coactive, therefore they have none at all; which is as much as to ſay, the Laws of Scripture are not our common Laws, therefore they are none at all.

§. 3. I ſhall not here inſiſt upon the divine right of a power to excommunicate offenders, founded upon the poſitive Laws of Chriſt, it being my only buſineſs now to ſhew what foundation ſuch a power hath in the Law of nature; which we have ſeen doth follow upon the Churches being a diſtinct ſociety ruled by other Laws, acting on other ends, ſubſiſting upon differing grounds from any other ſociety. A farther evidence we have of this, how conſonant it is to the light of nature, from the practice of all ſocieties pretending to be for the worſhip of God, who have looked upon this as the proper penalty of offenders among them, to be excluded out of thoſe ſocieties. Thus we find among the *Druids*, whoſe great office was to take care of the worſhip of their Gods, and to inſtruct the people in religion, as *Cæſar* relates, *illi rebus divinis interſunt, ſacrificia publica ac privata procurant, religiones interpretantur*; and accordingly the puniſhment of diſobedience among them was excommunication from their ſacrifices, which they looked upon as the greateſt puniſhment could be inflicted upon them, as *Cæſar* at large deſcribes it; *Si quis aut privatus aut publicus eorum decreto non ſtetit, ſacrificiis interdicunt: hæc pœna apud eos eſt graviſſima; quibus ita eſt interdictum ii numero impiorum & ſceleratorum habentur, iis omnes decedunt, additum eorum ſermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant, neque iis petentibus jus redditur, neque honos ullus communicatur.*

Cæſar de bello Gallico. l. 6.
V. Nicolaum Damaſcenum de moribus gentium de Cercetis, τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπείργουσιν.

§. 4. The practice of excommunication among the Jews is not queſtioned by any, but the right ground and original of that practice, with the effect and extent of it. Some conceive it to have been only taken up among the Jews after the power of capital puniſhments was taken from them; and that it was uſed by them, wholly upon a civil account, not extending to the excluſion of men from their worſhip in the Temple or Synagogues, but only to be a note of infamy upon offending perſons. This opinion though entertained by perſons of much skill and learning in the Jewiſh Antiquities, yet carries not that evidence with it to gain my aſſent to it. For firſt, the cauſe of excommunication were not ſuch as were expreſſed by their Law to deſerve ſuch civil puniſhments as might have been inflicted by them upon offenders, nor were they generally matters of a civil nature, but matters of offence and ſcandal, as will appear to any that ſhall peruſe the twenty four cauſes of excommunication related out of the Jewiſh Writers by *Selden* and *Joh. Coch.* Such were *the neglecting the precepts of the Scribes, the vain pronouncing the name of God, bearing witneſs againſt a Jew before Heathen tribunals, doing any common work in the afternoon of the day before the paſſover,* with others of a like nature. If Excommunication had been then taken up among them only *ex confederatâ diſciplinâ*, to ſupply the defect of civil judicatories, at leaſt all capital offenders muſt have lain under the ſenſe of excommunication. But here we read not of any being excommunicated for thoſe, but for other leſſer matters, which were looked upon as matters of ſcandal among them; and though ſome of them were matters of civil injuries, yet it follows not that men were excommunicated for them as ſuch, but for the ſcandal which attended them. As in the Chriſtian Church, men are excommunicated for matters which are puniſhable by the civil Magiſtrate, but not under that notion, but as they are offences to that Chriſtian ſociety which they live among. *Secondly*, It appears that excommunication was not a meer civil penalty, becauſe the increaſing or abatement of that penalty did depend upon the perſon's repentance and deſire of abſolution. Now civil penalties do not regard the intention and mind of the perſon, but the quality and deſert of the action; the reaſon is, becauſe humane Laws do reſpect immediately *actionem ipſam*, and not *animum agentis*, unleſs it be only ſo far

Selden de jure natur. &c. l. 4. cap. 8. Excerpt. Gem. Sanh. p. 147.

far as the mind hath influence upon the action. But now it is otherwiſe in ſuch Laws which take immediate notice of the intention of the mind, and only of outward actions as they are ſignificative and expreſſive of the inward intentions: for in theſe, though the ground of proceeding to penalties be from the notice taken of the outward action, yet that outward action being ſubject to penalty, as expreſſive of the minds intention; where there may be ſufficient evidence given of the integrity and uprightneſs of the intention afterwards, there may be proportionably a relaxation of the penalty; becauſe the end of the penalty inflicted was not to be an act of juſtice excluded from mercy in the end of adminiſtration as in civil judicatories, but an act of juſtice whoſe end was mercy, that is, the regaining and recovering the offenders ſoul from ſin, by inflicting ſuch a penalty upon him, as might humble him under the ſenſe of it. Hence appears the great reaſonableneſs of their proceedings in the managery of diſcipline in the primitive times, who did not fix a certain time as a ſtanding Law for all offenders, but did increaſe, or leſſen both the time and weight of their penance, according to the evidences given of their ſubmiſſion and true repentance for their miſcarriages. That it was thus now in reference to excommunication among the Jews, appears from what is aſſerted by the Learned *Buxtorf* concerning the time of the leſſer excommunication, called נדוי *Niddui*, which remained thirty days uſually, but were ſhortned by confeſſion and deſire of abſolution; *durat* 30. *dies, qui tamen pœnitentiâ & deprecatione decurtantur.* But if after thirty days paſt, he continue impenitent, the Judge as he ſees fit, increaſeth the puniſhment, ſo as to double or treble the time, or extend it to his whole life: if he died without repentance, a ſtone is laid upon his bier, to ſhew he deſerved lapidation; they wept not for him, nor buried him in the common place of burial. Farther, *Buxtorf* there alledgeth this conſtitution of their Law: that if he that was under *Niddui*, and deſired not abſolution, was the ſecond time under it, if that did no good on him, then he was excommunicated with the higher ſort of excommunication, called חרם which is likewiſe obſerved by *Joh. Coch.* Mr. *Selden*, and others. From whence it is evident that this was an Eccleſiaſtical cenſure, and not merely civil, becauſe the main end of it was not ſatisfaction to the Law, but the repentance of the perſon who lay under the fault; and according to the evidence given of it, the penalty was relaxed or increaſed; which argument not yet taken notice of nor improved by writers on this ſubject, ſeems to make the caſe clear, that excommunication among the Jews was not a mere *out-lawry*, as ſome conceive it to have been.

Epiſt. Hebr. Inſtit. p. 55.

V. Selden. de jure nat. &c. lib. 4. *c.* 8. *p.* 516. *Shulchan Aruch. Choſen hammiſchpat. ſect.* 100. *Excerpt. Gem. Sanhed. p.*148, *c.* 11, 12.

§. 5. *Thirdly*, I argue, it was not the breach of the Law, but the publickneſs of the offence, or the ſcandal of it which was the ground of excommunication; then it was not a mere civil penalty, but an eccleſiaſtical cenſure: for civil penalties do proceed upon the breach of the Law, and alter not as to the publickneſs or privateneſs of the offence; but here it is evident, that the ſame offence deſerving excommunication if done in publick, did not if done in private, or was left at the perſons liberty to have the offender excommunicated or not. That which is reckoned as the firſt cauſe of excommunication, is affront or contempt put upon a wiſe man, or *Rabbi*, or one that was תלמיד חכם a ſtudent in the Law; now it is determined by them in this caſe, that if it were done in private, the *Rabbi* might pardon him: but if in publick, he could not. For as *Joh. Coch.* gives the reaſon, *publicum Doctoris ludibrium in legis contemptum redundat:* the contempt of publick teachers of the Law, redounds to the diſhonour of the Law its ſelf. Thus it was the ſcandal of the fault, and not the bare offence which made excommunication neceſſary among them; and not as that ſcandal was a mere defamation of the perſon, but as it redounded to the contempt of the Law. *Fourthly*, I argue from the form uſed in excommunication by them. There are two forms produced of their excommunications, the one by *Buxtorf* out of an old Hebrew Manuſcript, the beginning of which is *Ex ſententiâ Domini Dominorum, ſit in Anathemate Ploni filius Ploni, in utraqùe domo judicii, ſuperiorum, ſc. & inferiorum, &c.* where two things evidence, it was accounted a ſacred and no civil action doing it immediately in the name and authority of the Lord of Lords; and pronouncing him excommunicate both in heaven and earth. So *R. Elieſer* ſpeaking of the excommunication of the Cuthites or Samaritans: *atque anathemate devovebant Cuthæos myſterio nominis Amphoraſch, & Scriptura exarata in tabulis, & anathemate domus judicii ſuperioris, atque anathemate curiæ inferioris,* as it is tranſlated by *Guli. Vorſtius*, who in his notes upon that book produceth a moſt dreadful ſentence of excommunication uſed to this day in many Synagogues, which they call *Cherem Col. Bo.* from the book whence it is taken, which runs moſt ſolemnly in the ſeveral names of God, whereby they do *Schamatize*, curſe and devote the perſons againſt whom it is pronounced. *Fifthly*, It appears not to be a merely civil thing inſtead of civil power, becauſe they uſe it againſt thoſe over whom they have no civil juriſdiction, as appears by their *Schamatizing* the Chriſtians in their Liturgies, as *Buxtorf* obſerves. *Sixthly*, I argue from the effects of it, becauſe they who lay under it were excluded from publick worſhip, which is averred by *Buxtorf*, *Coch.* and others in the places forecited. It is acknowledged that he that was only under *Niddui*, might be preſent at publick worſhip, but even there he was under his ſeparation too, of four Cubits from any other Iſraelite.

P. 146.

Lex Rabbinic. p.8,28.

Pirk. R. Elieſer. c.38.p.101.

P. 226. ad 230.

§. 6. And hence in probability might the miſtake ariſe, becauſe thoſe under *Niddui* might appear at the Temple or Synagogue; therefore excommunication was no prohibition *à ſacris.* But he that was under *Cherem, non docet, non docetur, neither teacheth others, nor is taught himſelf*, ſaith, *Joh. Cocceius*; and *Buxtorf* of one under *Cherem, omninò à cœtu ſacro excluditur*, and in this ſenſe *Buxtorf* expreſly takes the turning out of the Synagogue, *Joh.* 9. 22.——12. 42. which, ſaith he, is done by *Cherem.* But againſt this it is ſtrongly pleaded by our Learned Mr. *Selden*, that putting out of the Synagogue is nothing elſe but excommunicating רברול סן הקהל *to ſeparate from the Congregations*, taking קדר and ſo συναγωγὴ in the civil and not ſacred ſenſe, as it denotes an excluding them from common ſociety; but though it be freely granted that that is ſometimes the ſignification of קהל and συναγωγὴ as *Mat.* 10. 17. yet thoſe particulars being conſidered, which are already laid down, I ſhall leave it to conſideration whether it be more probable to take the word *Synagogue* here in a civil or ſacred ſenſe; when the occaſion expreſſed is merely a matter of doctrine and opinion, and not any thing condemned by their Law. Another thing which hath been I believe a great ground of miſtaking, in this matter, is, that excluding from the civil ſociety among them was always conſequent upon

Ep. inſtitut. p. 56.

De Synedriis. lib. 1. cap. 7.

upon excommunication; the reaſon whereof was, becauſe the Church and Commonwealth were not diſtinct among the Jews; and the ſame perſons who took care of ſacred, did likewiſe of civil things (there being no diſtinct *Sanhedrins* among them as ſome imagine) but from hence it no ways follows, but their excommunication might be an excluſion from ſacred worſhip as well as civil ſociety. However, were it as they pretend, that it was from civil commerce, yet the whole people of the Jews being סגולה God's peculiar people, and his only Church in being before the times of the Goſpel, an excluſion in that reſpect from the common ſociety of them might deſervedly be looked upon as a ſacred action, and not merely Civil, it being a ſeparation from a people whoſe main ligature was their being a Church of God, or a Community gathered together for God's worſhip and ſervice. Thus we ſee the Church of the Jews had this power among them; and for the Chriſtian Church, the practice of diſcipline upon offenders was never queſtioned, though the right hath been; ſo that from hence we gather, in that it hath been the practice of ſocieties conſtituted for the worſhip of God, to call offenders to an account for their offences, and if upon examination they be found guilty, to exclude them their ſociety; that it is a dictate of the Law of Nature, that every offender againſt the Laws of a ſociety muſt give an account of his actions to the rulers of it, and ſubmit to the cenſures inflicted on him by them. Thus I am now come to the end of my firſt ſtage, to ſhew how far Church Government is founded upon the Law and Light of Nature.

And ſo to the end of the firſt Part.

PART

A
WEAPON-SALVE for the CHURCH'S-WOUNDS, &c.

PART II.

CHAP. I.

The other ground of Divine Right conſidered, viz. God's poſitive Laws; which imply a certain knowledge of God's intention to bind men perpetually. As to which, the arguments drawn from Tradition, and the practice of the Church in after ages, proved invalid by ſeveral arguments. In order to a right ſtating the Queſtion, ſome conceſſions laid down. Firſt, That there muſt be ſome form of Government in the Church. The notion of a Church explained: whether it belongs only to particular Congregations, which are manifeſted not to be of God's primary intention, but for our neceſſity. Evidence for National Churches under the Goſpel. A National Church-Government neceſſary.

I Now come to the ſecond way, whereby any thing comes to be of unalterable Divine Right, which is by the poſitive Laws of God, which do bind univerſally to obedience. In the entrance into this diſcourſe, it is neceſſary to lay down the ways, whereby we find out a Divine poſitive Law determining an unalterable obligation: which muſt be either by expreſs words of Scripture, or by ſome other certain way, whereby to gather from thence, that it was God's intention to bind men. For the main thing requiſite to make a ſtanding univerſal poſitive Law, is God's declaring his mind, that the thing inquired into, ſhould unalterably bind men to the practice of it. Now whatever doth ſufficiently manifeſt God's intention, is a *medium* to find out ſuch a Law by, and nothing elſe: But it muſt be ſuch a manifeſtation as gives a mans mind ſufficient evidence and teſtimony whereon to build a true, certain, and divine aſſent to the thing, as revealed: So that whatſoever binds the Conſcience as a Law, muſt firſt be entertained by the underſtanding as a matter of faith; not as it imports ſomething merely *doctrinal* and *dogmatical*, but as it implies the *matter* of a *Divine Revelation*, and the object of an aſſent upon the credibility of a *Teſtimony*. For God having the only immediate authority over the conſciences of men, nothing can bind immediately the conſcience but a Divine Law, neither can any thing bind as ſuch, but what the underſtanding aſſents unto, as revealed by God himſelf. Now the word of God being the only *Codex* and *Digeſts* of Divine Laws, what ever Law we look for, muſt either be found there in expreſs terms, or at leaſt ſo couched therein, that every one by the exerciſe of his underſtanding, may by a certain and eaſy collection, gather the univerſal obligation of the thing inquired after. In this caſe then, whatſoever is not immediately founded upon a Divine *Teſtimony* cannot be made uſe of as a *Medium* to infer an univerſally binding Law by: So that all Traditions and hiſtorical evidence will be unſerviceable to us, when we inquire into §. 1.

into God's intentions in binding mens conſciences. Matters of fact, and mere Apoſtolical practice, may I freely grant, receive much light from the Records of ſucceeding ages; but they can never give a man's underſtanding ſufficient ground to infer any Divine Law, ariſing from thoſe facts atteſted to by the practice or Records of ſucceeding ages.

§. 2. For *firſt*, the foundation and ground of our aſſent in this caſe, is not the bare teſtimony of antiquity; but the aſſurance which we have, either that their practice did not vary from what was Apoſtolical, or in their writings, that they could not miſtake concerning what they deliver unto us: And therefore thoſe who would infer the neceſſary obligation of men to any form of Government, becauſe that was practiſed by the Apoſtles, and then prove the Apoſtolical practice from that of the ages ſucceeding, or from their writings, muſt firſt of all prove, that what was done then, was certainly the Apoſtles practice, and ſo prove the ſame thing by its ſelf, or that it was impoſſible they ſhould vary from it, or that they ſhould miſtake in judging of it: For here ſomething more is required than a mere matter of fact, in which I confeſs their nearneſs to the Apoſtles times doth give them an advantage above the ages following, to diſcern what it was; but ſuch a practice is required, as infers an univerſal obligation upon all places, times, and perſons. Therefore theſe things muſt be manifeſted, *that ſuch things were unqueſtionably the practice of thoſe ages and perſons; that their practice was the ſame with the Apoſtles; that what they did was not from any prudential motives, but by vertue of a Law which did bind them to that practice.* Which things are eaſily paſſed over by the moſt eager Diſputers of the controverſie about Church Government, but how neceſſary they are to be proved before any form of Government be aſſerted, ſo neceſſary, that without it there can be no true Church, any weak underſtanding may diſcern.

Secondly, Suppoſing that Apoſtolical practice be ſufficiently atteſted by the following ages, yet unleſs it be cleared from Scripture that it was God's intention that the Apoſtles actions ſhould continually bind the Church, there can be nothing inferred that doth concern us in point of conſcience. I ſay, that though the matter of fact be evidenced by poſterity, yet the obligatory nature of that fact muſt depend on Scripture: and the Apoſtles intentions muſt not be built upon mens bare ſurmiſes, nor upon after-practices, eſpecially if different from the conſtitution of things during the Apoſtles times. And here thoſe have ſomewhat whereon to exerciſe their underſtandings, who aſſert an obligation upon men to any form of Government, by vertue of an Apoſtolical practice, which muſt of neceſſity ſuppoſe a different ſtate of things from what they were when the Apoſtles firſt eſtabliſhed Governours over Churches. As how thoſe who were appointed Governours over particular Congregations by the Apoſtles, come to be by vertue of that ordination, Governours over many Congregations of like nature and extent with that over which they were ſet: And whether, if it were the Apoſtles intention that ſuch Governours ſhould be always in the Church, is it not neceſſary that that intention of theirs be declared by a ſtanding Law, that ſuch there muſt be; for here matter of fact and practice can be no evidence, when it is ſuppoſed to be different from the Conſtitution of Churches afterward: But of this more hereafter.

Thirdly, Suppoſing any form of Government in its ſelf neceſſary, and that neceſſity not determined by a Law in the word of God, the Scripture is thereby apparently argued to be inſufficient for its end; for then *deficit in neceſſariis*; ſome things are neceſſary for the Church of God which the Scripture is wholly ſilent in. I ſay not, that every thing about Church Government muſt be written in Scripture; but ſuppoſing any one form neceſſary, it muſt be there commanded, or the Scripture is an imperfect rule, which contains not all things neceſſary by way of precept: For there can be no other neceſſity univerſal, but either by way of *means to an end*, or by way of *Divine command:* I know none will ſay that any particular form of Government is neceſſary abſolutely, by way of means to an end; for certainly, ſuppoſing no obligation from Scripture, Government by an equality of power in the officers of the Church, or by ſuperiority of one order above another, are indifferent in order to the general ends of Government, and one not more neceſſary than the other. If any one form then be neceſſary, it muſt be by that of command; and if there be a command univerſally binding, whoſe footſteps cannot be traced in the word of God, how can the Scriptures be a perfect rule, if it fails in determining binding Laws? So that we muſt, if we own the Scriptures ſufficiency as a binding rule, appeal to that about any thing pleaded as neceſſary, by virtue of any Divine command, and if ſuch a Law cannot be met with in Scripture, which determines the caſe in hand one way or other by way of neceſſary obligation, I have ground to look upon that which is thus left undetermined by God's poſitive Laws, to be a matter of Chriſtian liberty; and that neither part is to be looked upon as neceſſary for the Church of God, as excluſive of the other.

This I ſuppoſe is the caſe, as to particular forms of Government in the Church of God; but that I may not only ſuppoſe but prove it: I now come to the ſtating of the Queſtion, which if ever neceſſary to be done any where, it is in the Controverſie of Church Government, the moſt of mens heats in this matter ariſing from want of right underſtanding the thing in queſtion between them. In the ſtating the Queſtion I ſhall proceed by degrees, and ſhew how far we acknowledge any thing belonging to Government in the Church to be of an unalterable Divine Right. *Firſt*, That there muſt be a form of Government in the Church of God, is neceſſary by vertue, not only of that Law of Nature which provides for the preſervation of ſocieties, but likewiſe by vertue of that Divine Law, which takes care for the Churches preſervation in peace and unity. I engage not here in the controverſie, whether a particular Congregation be the firſt *Political* Church or no; it ſufficeth for my purpoſe that there are other Churches beſides particular Congregations: I mean, not only the *Catholick* viſible Church, which is the *firſt*, not only in *order* of *conſideration*, but *nature* too, as a *totum Integrale* before the *ſimilar parts* of it; but in reſpect of all other accidental modifications of Churches, from the ſeveral ways of their combination together. They who define a Church by ſtated worſhipping Congregations, do handſomely beg the thing they deſire, by placing that in their definition of a Church, which is the thing in queſtion: which is, whether there be no other Church but ſuch particular Congregations? Which is as if one ſhould go about to prove, that there were no civil ſocieties but in particular Corporations, and to prove it, ſhould give ſuch a definition of civil ſociety, that it is a company of men joyned together in a Corporation, for the preſervation of their Rights and §. 3.

Privileges,

Privileges, under the Governours of ſuch a place. It muſt be firſt proved, that no other company of men can be call'd a civil ſociety beſides a Corporation: and ſo that no other ſociety of men joyning together in the profeſſion of the true Religion, can be call'd a Church, but ſuch as join in particular Congregations.

§. 4. To which purpoſe it is very obſervable, that particular Congregations are not *de primariâ intentione divinâ*; for if the whole world could join together in the publick worſhip of God, no doubt that would be moſt properly a Church, but particular Congregations are only accidental, in reference to God's intention of having a Church, becauſe of the impoſſibility of all mens joyning together for the convenient diſtribution of Church-privileges, and adminiſtration of Goſpel-ordinances. For it is evident, that the Privileges and Ordinances, do immediately and primarily belong to the Catholick viſible Church, in which Chriſt to that end hath ſet officers, as the Apoſtle clearly expreſſeth, 1 *Corinth.* 12. 28. (for how Apoſtles ſhould be ſet as officers over particular Congregations, whoſe Commiſſion extended to the whole World, is, I think, ſomewhat hard to underſtand) but for the more convenient participation of Privileges and Ordinances, particular Congregations are neceſſary: This will be beſt illuſtrated by examples. We read that *Eſther* 1. 3. King *Ahaſhuerus* made a feaſt for all his Princes and Servants: Doubtleſs the King did equally reſpect them all as a body in the feaſting of them, and did beſtow his entertainment upon them all as conſidered together; but by reaſon of the great multitude of them, it was impoſſible that they ſhould all be feaſted together in the ſame room; and therefore for more convenient participation of the King's bounty, it was neceſſary to divide themſelves into particular companies, and to aſſociate as many as conveniently could in order to that end. So it is in the Church, Chriſt in donation of privileges equally reſpects the whole Church; but becauſe men cannot all meet together to participate of theſe privileges, a more particular diſtribution was neceſſary for that end. But a clearer example of this kind we have yet in Scripture, which is *Mark* 6. 39. in our Saviour's feeding the multitude with five loaves and two fiſhes; where we ſee our Saviour's *primary intention*, was to feed the whole multitude; but for their more convenient partaking of this food, our Saviour commands them to ſit down συμπόσια συμπόσια, according to the *Hebraiſm* of ingeminating the words, to note the diſtribution of them, and therefore the Vul. Lat. renders it *ſecundum contubernia*, that is διαμεμερισμένως, as *Camerarius* expounds it, according to ſo many companies and diviſions as might conveniently ſit together, as at a table: Where we plainly ſee this diſtribution was only accidental, as to Chriſt's primary intention of feeding the multitude, but was only neceſſary for their own conveniency. Thus the caſe is evident, as to the Church of God, it is our neceſſity and conveniency which makes ſeveral congregations of the Catholick viſible Church, and not God's primary intention, when he beſtowed ſuch privileges upon the Church, that it ſhould be underſtood of particular Congregations.

§. 5. If then particular congregations be only accidental for our conveniency, it evidently follows that the primary notion of a Church, doth not belong to theſe; nor that theſe are the firſt ſubject of Government which belongs to a Church as ſuch, and not as crumbled into particular congregations; although the actual exerciſe of Government be moſt viſible

ſible and diſcernable there; Becauſe the joyning together for participation of Goſpel ordinances muſt be in ſome particular company or other aſſociated together for that end. Where ever then we find the notion of a Church particular, there muſt be government in that Church; and why a National ſociety incorporated into one civil Government, joyning in the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, and having a right thereby to participate of Goſpel ordinances in the convenient diſtributions of them in particular congregations, ſhould not be called a Church, I confeſs I can ſee no reaſon. The main thing objected againſt it, is, that a Church implies an actual joyning together for participation of all Goſpel ordinances; but as this, as I ſaid before, is only a begging the Queſtion, ſo I ſay now, that actual communion with any particular Congregation is not abſolutely neceſſary to a member of a Church; for ſuppoſing one baptized at ſea, where no ſetled Congregation is (nor any more ſociety than that which *Ariſtotle* calls συμπλοία) yet ſuch a one is thereby a member of the Church of God, though not of any Congregation; ſo likewiſe a Church then may conſiſt of ſuch as have a right to ordinances, without the inſerting their actual participation of them in fixed Congregations. A particular Church then I would deſcribe thus, that it is a *ſociety of men joyning together in the viſible profeſſion of the true Faith, having a right to, and enjoying among them the Ordinances of the Goſpel.* That a whole Nation profeſſing Chriſtianity, in which the ordinances of the Goſpel are duly adminiſtred in particular Congregations, is ſuch a ſociety, is plain and evident. A clear inſtance of ſuch a National conſtitution of a Church under the Goſpel, we have in the Prophecy of the converſion of *Egypt* and *Aſſyria* in Goſpel times. *Iſaiah* 19. 19, 21, 24, 25. *We have Egypts profeſſing the true Faith, and enjoying Goſpel ordinances, verſ.* 19, 21. which according to the prophetical ſtyle are ſet down under the repreſentation of ſuch things as were then in uſe among the Jews: *by an Altar in the midſt of the Land, v.* 19. The Altar noting the true worſhip of God; and being in the midſt of the Land, the univerſal owning of this worſhip by all the people of the Land. God owns them for a Church. *v.* 25. *Whom the Lord of Hoſts ſhall bleſs, ſaying, Bleſſed be Egypt my people.* The very name whereby Iſrael was called while it was a Church, עמי *Hoſea* 2. 1. and when God unchurched them, it was under this name עמי —— לא *ye are not my people.* As much then as *Iſrael* was a Church when God owned it for his people, ſo ſhould *Egypt* be upon their converſion to the Faith of Chriſt, which was done upon *Mark*'s preaching at *Alexandria* not long after the death of Chriſt.

§. 6.

This then we have now briefly cleared, that a Nation joyning in the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, is a true Church of God; whence it evidently follows, that there muſt be a form of Eccleſiaſtical Government over a Nation as a Church, as well as of civil Government over it, as a ſociety governed by the ſame Laws. Therefore ſome make this neceſſary to a National Church, *National union in one Eccleſiaſtical body in the ſame community of Eccleſiaſtical Government.* For every ſociety muſt have its Government belonging to it as ſuch a ſociety; and the ſame reaſon that makes Government neceſſary in any particular congregation, will make it neceſſary for all the particular congregations joyning together in one viſible ſociety as a particular National Church. For the unity and peace of that Church, ought much more to be looked after than of any one particular Congregation, in as much as the peace of all the parti-

Hudſon of the Church, *cap.* 1. *ſ.* 3.

particular combinations of men for participation of ordinances doth depend upon, and is comprehended in the peace of the whole. But though I ſay from hence, that ſome form of publick Government by the ſub-ordination of particular aſſemblies to the Government of the whole body of them is neceſſary, yet I am far from aſſerting the neceſſity of any one form of that Government, much more, from ſaying that no National Church can ſubſiſt without one National officer, as the High-Prieſt under the Law; or one National place of worſhip, as the Temple was. The want of conſidering which, *viz.* that National Churches may ſubſiſt without that form of them under the Jews, is doubtleſs the great ground of mens quarrelling againſt them; but with what reaſon, let men impartially judge. This then we agree, that ſome form of Government is neceſſary in every particular Church, and ſo that Government in the Church of Divine and unalterable right; and that not only of particular Congregations, but of all ſocieties which may be call'd Churches, whether Provincial, or National.

CHAP. II.

The ſecond conceſſion is, That Church government formally conſidered, muſt be adminiſtred by officers of Divine appointment. To that end, the continuance of a Goſpel Miniſtry fully cleared from all thoſe arguments, by which poſitive Laws are proved immutable. The reaſon of the appointment of it continues; the dream of a ſeculum Spiritus Sancti *diſcuſſed, firſt broached by the Mendicant Fryers. Its occaſion and unreaſonableneſs ſhewed. God's declaring the perpetuity of a Goſpel Miniſtry,* Matth. 28. 19. *explained. A novel interpretation largely refuted. The World to come, what. A Miniſtry neceſſary for the Churches continuance,* Epheſ. 4. 12. *explained, and vindicated.*

§. 1. SEcondly, That the Government of the Church ought to be adminiſtred by officers of Divine appointment, is another thing I will yield to be of Divine Right: but the Church here, I take not in that latitude which I did in the former Conceſſion, but I take it chiefly here for the members of the Church, as diſtinct from officers, as it is taken in *Acts* 15. 22. So that my meaning is, that there muſt be a ſtanding perpetual Miniſtry in the Church of God, whoſe care and employment muſt be, to overſee and Govern the people of God, and to adminiſter Goſpel ordinances among them, and this is of Divine and perpetual Right. That Officers were appointed by Chriſt in the Church for theſe ends at firſt, is evident from the direct affirmation of Scripture. *God hath ſet in the Church, firſt Apoſtles, ſecondly Prophets, thirdly Teachers,* &c. 1 *Corinth.* 12. 28. *Eph.* 4. 8, 11. and other places to the ſame purpoſe. This being then a thing acknowledged, that they were at firſt of Divine inſtitution, and ſo were appointed by a Divine poſitive Law, which herein determines and reſtrains the Law of Nature (which doth not preſcribe the certain qualifications of the perſons to govern this ſociety, nor the inſtalment, or admiſſion of them into this imployment, *viz.* by ordination.) The only inquiry then left is, whether a ſtanding Goſpel-miniſtry be ſuch a poſitive Law, as is to remain perpetually in the Church, or no? which I ſhall make appear by thoſe things which I laid down in the entrance of this Treatiſe, as to the notes whereby to know when poſitive Laws are unalterable.

§. 2. The firſt was when the ſame reaſon of the command continues ſtill; and what reaſon is there why Chriſt ſhould appoint officers to rule his Church then, which will not hold now? Did the people of God need Miniſters then to be as *Stars* (as they are call'd in Scripture) to lead them unto Chriſt, and do they not as well need them now? Rev. 1. 16. Had people need of *guides* then, when the doctrine of the Goſpel *was confirmed to them by miracles*, and have they not much more now? Heb. 13. 7. Heb. 2. 3. Muſt there be ſome then to *oppoſe gainſayers*, and muſt they have an abſolute liberty of propheſying now, when it is foretold what times of ſeduction the laſt ſhall be? Titus 1. 9. 2 Tim. 3. 1. Muſt there be ſome then *to rule over their charge, as they that muſt give an account*, and is not the ſame required ſtill? Heb. 13. 17. Were there ſome then *to reprove, rebuke, exhort, to preach in ſeaſon, out of ſeaſon*, and is there not the ſame neceſſity of theſe things ſtill? 2 Tim. 4. 2. Was it not enough then, that there were ſo many in all Churches that had extraordinary gifts of *tongues, propheſying, praying, interpretation of tongues*, 1 Cor. 14. but beſides thoſe there were *ſome Paſtors by office*, whoſe duty it was to *give attendance to reading, to be wholly in theſe things*, 1 Tim. 4. 13. and now when theſe extraordinary gifts are ceaſed, is not there a much greater neceſſity than there was then, for ſome to be ſet apart and wholly deſigned for this work? Were Ordinances only then adminiſtred by thoſe whom *Chriſt commiſſioned*, and ſuch as derived their authority from them; Mat 28. 18. and what reaſon is there that men ſhould arrogate and take this employment upon themſelves now? If Chriſt had ſo pleaſed, could he not have left it wholly at liberty for all believers to have gone about Preaching the Goſpel? or why did he make choice of twelve Apoſtles chiefly for that work, were it not his will to have ſome particularly to diſpenſe the Goſpel? And if Chriſt did then ſeparate ſome for that work, what reaſon is there why that office ſhould be thrown common now, which Chriſt himſelf incloſed by his own appointment?

§. 3. There can be no poſſible reaſon imagined, why a Goſpel Miniſtry ſhould not continue ſtill, unleſs it be that Fanatick pretence of a *ſeculum Spiritus Sancti, a diſpenſation of the Spirit*, which ſhall evacuate the uſe of means of inſtruction, and the uſe of all Goſpel ordinances; which pretence is not ſo novel as moſt imagine it to be; for ſetting aſide the *Montaniſtical ſpirit* in the Primitive times, which acted upon principles much of the ſame nature with theſe we now ſpeak of; the firſt riſe of this *Ignis fatuus* was from the *bogs* of Popery, *viz.* from the orders of the *Dominicans* and *Franciſcans*, about the middle of the twelfth *Century*. For no ſooner did the *Pauperes de Lugduno*, or the *Waldenſes* appear, making uſe of the word of God to confute the whole Army of Popiſh traditions, but they, finding themſelves worſted at every turn while they diſputed that ground, found out a *Stratagem* whereby to recover their own credit, and to beat their adverſaries quite out of the field. Which was, that the Goſpel which they adhered to ſo much, was now out of date, and inſtead of that they broached another Goſpel out of the writings of the *Abbot Joachim*, and *Cyril*'s *viſions*, which they blaſphemouſly named *Evangelium Spiritus Sancti, Evangelium Novum*, and *Evangelium Æternum*, as *Gulielmus de Sancto Amore*, their great Antagoniſt relates, in his Book *de periculis noviſſ. temporum*, purpoſely deſigned againſt the Impoſtures of the Mendicant Friers, who then like Locuſts, roſe in multitudes with their ſhaven crowns

Matthæus Paris. hiſt. Angl. in Hen. 3. *A.* 1257. *p.* 939. *Ed. Vatſii. cap.* 8. *apud Balæum. App. de vitis Pontif. p.* 480.

crowns out of the bottomleſs pit. This Goſpel of the ſpirit they ſo much magnified above the Goſpel of Chriſt, that the ſame Author relates theſe words of theirs concerning it; *Quod comparatum ad Evangelium Chriſti, tanto plus perfectionis ac dignitatis habet, quantum Sol ad Lunam comparatus, aut ad nucleum teſta*; that it exceeded it as much as the kernel doth the ſhell, or the Light of the Sun doth that of the Moon. We ſee then from what quarter of the world this new light began to riſe: but ſo much for this digreſſion. To the thing it ſelf.

§. 4. If there be ſuch a diſpenſation of the ſpirit which takes away the uſe of Miniſtry and Ordinances, it did either commence from the time of the effuſion of the Spirit upon the Apoſtles, or ſome time ſince. Not then; for even of thoſe who had the moſt large portion of the Spirit poured upon them, we read that they continued in all Goſpel-ordinances, *Acts* 2. 42. and among the chief, τῇ διδαχῇ τῶν Ἀποστόλων, *under the Apoſtles Miniſtry*, it may be better rendred than *in the Apoſtles Doctrine*: And which is moſt obſervable, the prophecy of *Joel* about the Spirit, is then ſaid to be fulfilled, *Acts* 2. 17. Beſides, if either that place of *Joel*, or that of *Jeremy*, cited *Heb.* 8. 11. *or the Unction of the Spirit*, 1 Joh. 2. 20, 27. did take away the uſe of preaching, how did the Apoſtles themſelves underſtand their meaning, when they were ſo diligent 1 Joh.4.1. in preaching and inſtructing others: *John* writes to thoſe *to try the Spi-* 1 Joh.2.20. *rits*, of whom he ſaith, *they have an unction to know all things*; and thoſe to whom the Apoſtle writes, that *they need not teach every one his neighbour*: of them he ſaith, *that they had need be taught the firſt prin-* Heb. 5. 12. *ciples of the oracles of God*. And even in that very Chapter where he ſeems to ſay, they that are under the New Covenant, need not be taught, he brings that very ſpeech in as an argument, that the old diſpenſation of the Law was done away; And ſo goes *about to teach*, when he ſeems to *take away the uſe of it*. Theſe ſpeeches then muſt not be underſtood in their abſolute and literal ſenſe, but with a reflection upon, and compariſon with, the ſtate of things in the times wherein thoſe prophecies were utter'd: For God to heighten the Jews apprehenſions of the great bleſſings of the Goſpel, doth ſet them forth *Calvin in* under a kind of Hyperbolical expreſſions, that the dull capacity of the Joel 2. 28. Jews might at leaſt apprehend the juſt weight and magnitude of them, Jer.31. 31. which they would not otherwiſe have done. So in that place of *Jeremy*, God to make them underſtand how much the knowledge of the Goſpel exceeded that under the Law, doth as it were ſet it down in this Hyperbolical way, that it will exceed it as much, as one that needs no teaching at all, doth one that is yet but in his rudiments of learning. So that the place doth not deny the uſe of teaching under the Goſpel, but becauſe teaching doth commonly ſuppoſe ignorance, to ſhew the great meaſure of knowledge, he doth it in that way, as though the knowledge ſhould be ſo great, that men ſhould not need be taught in ſuch a way of rudiments as the Jews were, *viz.* by Types and Ceremonies, and ſuch things. We ſee then no ſuch diſpenſation was in the Apoſtles times; for the ſame Apoſtle after this in Chap. 10. 25. bids them *not* Heb.10.25. *to forſake Aſſembling themſelves together as ſome did*: Wherefore were theſe Heb. 13. 7. Aſſemblies, but for inſtruction? and in the laſt Chapter, *bids them obey their rulers*. What need of rulers, if no need of teaching? But ſo ſenſleſs a dream will be too much honour'd with any longer confutation. In the Apoſtles times then, there was no ſuch diſpenſation of the Spirit, which did take away the uſe of Miniſtry and Ordinances. If it

be expected ſince their times, I would know whence it appears, that any have a greater meaſure of the Spirit than was poured out in the Apoſtles times; for then the Miniſtry was joyned with the Spirit: and what prophecies are fulfilled now, which were not then? or if they pretend to a doctrine diſtinct from, and above what the Apoſtles taught, let them produce their evidences, and work thoſe miracles which may induce men to believe them: Or let them ſhew what obligation any have to believe pretended new revelations, without a power of miracles, atteſting that thoſe revelations come from God? Or whereon men muſt build their faith, if it be left to the dictates of a pretended ſpirit of revelation? or what way is left to diſcern the good ſpirit from the bad, in its acting upon mens minds, if the word of God be not our rule ſtill? Or how God is ſaid to have ſpoken *in the laſt days by his Son,* if a far- Heb. 1. 1.
ther ſpeaking be yet expected? For the Goſpel diſpenſation is therefore call'd the Laſt days, becauſe no other is to be expected: Times being differenced in Scripture according to God's ways of revealing himſelf to men. But ſo much for this.

§. 5. The ſecond way whereby to know when poſitive Laws are unalterable, is, when God hath declared that ſuch Laws ſhall bind ſtill. Two ways whereby God doth expreſs his own will concerning the perpetuity of an office founded on his own inſtitution. *Firſt,* If ſuch things be the work belonging to it, which are of neceſſary and perpetual uſe. *Secondly,* If God hath promiſed to aſſiſt them in it perpetually, in the doing of their work. *Firſt,* The objects of the Miniſterial office are ſuch things which are of neceſſary and perpetual uſe; I mean the adminiſtration of Goſpel-ordinances, *viz.* the Word and Sacraments, which were appointed by Chriſt for a perpetual Uſe. The Word as a means of converſion and edification; the Sacraments, not only as notes of diſtinction of Profeſſors of the true faith from others, but as Seals to confirm the truth of the Covenant on God's part towards us, and as inſtruments to convey the bleſſings ſealed in the Covenant to the hearts of belivers. Now the very nature of theſe things doth imply their perpetuity and continuance in the world, as long as there ſhall be any Church of God in it. For theſe things are not *typi rerum futurarum,* only Ceremonies to repreſent ſomething to come, but they are *ſymbola rerum inviſibilium,* ſigns to repreſent to our ſenſes things inviſible in their own nature; and between theſe two there is a great difference, as to the perpetuity of them: For Types of things as to come, muſt of neceſſity expire when the thing typified appears; but repreſentation of inviſible things cannot expire on that account, becauſe the thing repreſented as inviſible, cannot be ſuppoſed to be made viſible, and ſo to evacuate the uſe of the ſigns which repreſent them to us. *Types* repreſent a thing which is at preſent inviſible, but under the notion of it as future; *Symbols* repreſent a thing at preſent inviſible, but as preſent, and therefore *Symbols* are deſigned by God's inſtitution for a perpetual help to the weakneſs of our faith. And therefore the Lord's Supper is appointed *to ſet forth the Lord's death, till* 1 Cor. 11. 26.
he come: whereby the continuance of it in the Church of God is neceſſarily implied. Now then, if theſe things which are the proper object of the Miniſterial function be of a perpetual nature, when theſe things are declared to be of an abiding nature, it neceſſarily follows, that that function to which it belongs to adminiſter theſe things, muſt be of a perpetual nature.

§. 6. Eſpecially if we conſider in the ſecond place, that Chriſt hath promiſed to be with them continually in the adminiſtration of theſe things:

For that notwithſtanding the duſt lately thrown upon it, we have a clear place, *Matth.* 28. 19. *Go teach and baptize,* &c. *Lo I am with you always to the end of the World.* If πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας, did not ſignifie perpetuity, yet certainly the latter words do; for how could Chriſt be with the Apoſtles themſelves perſonally to the end of the World? it muſt be therefore with them, and all that ſucceed them in the office of teaching and baptizing, to the world's end: For that I aſſert to be the meaning of ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος. I inſiſt not barely on the ſignification of the word αἰὼν, either as to its ſuppoſed Etymology, or as it anſwers the Heb. עיל ם knowing how fallible the arguments drawn from thence are, when in the diſpute of the eternity of the Law of *Moſes* with the Jews, it is confeſſed that עולם relates only to a long continuance of time. But however, I ſuppoſe that it will hardly be found in Scripture, that either αἰὼν or עולם doth barely relate to the time of life of any individual perſons, eſpecially if abſolutely put as it is here. One great ſignification of αἰὼν in the New Teſtament (which we are to inquire into, and not how it is uſed among Greek Authors) is that wherein αἰὼν is taken for the world its ſelf, which *Vorſtius* reckons among the Hebraiſms of the N. Teſt. in which ſenſe the Jews call God
Philolog. Sacr. de Hebr. N. T. cap. 2. רב העולם and great perſons גדולי העלם *Magnates mundi*; in which ſenſe, in the N. Teſtament, the Devil is call'd ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, *John* 12. 31.—— 14. 31. and ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, 2 *Cor.* 4. 4. And ſo God is ſaid to create τοὺς αἰῶνας, *the world, Heb.* 1. 2.—11. 3. If we take it in this ſenſe, Chriſt's promiſe muſt of neceſſity relate to the diſſolution of the fabrick of the world, and that he would be with his ſervants in the Goſpel, till all things be diſſolved. Againſt this it is pleaded, that the συντέλεια here relates to the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, and that αἰὼν implies the ſtate of things under the Law, which would continue till *Jeruſalem* was deſtroyed, from which time a new αἰὼν would commence. But to this I anſwer *firſt*, I abſolutely deny that συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, doth ever in Scripture relate to the deſtruction of the Jewiſh State. This will be beſt made out by a particular view of the places wherein this phraſe occurs. The firſt time we meet with this phraſe is in *Matthew* 13. where we have it thrice. *v.* 39. ὁ δὲ θερισμὸς συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνός ἐστι. Now can any be ſo ſenſleſs, as to imagine that the harveſt wherein the Tares ſhall be gathered, and caſt into unquenchable fire, when the Angels are ſaid to be the Reapers, and to gather out of Chriſt's Kingdom every thing that offends, ſhould be attributed to the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*? And ſo *v.* 40. and *v.* 49. where the ſame phraſe expreſſeth the ſame time, οὕτως ἔσται ἐν τῇ συντελείᾳ τοῦ αἰῶνος, where the antecedents and conſequents fully declare, what the time is there meant, which is the general judgment of the world. The only place pleaded for this ſenſe is *Matth.* 24. 3. where the Diſciples inquire of Chriſt what ſhould be the ſign, τῆς σῆς παρουσίας καὶ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, where granting, that the former *Chriſt's coming* may reſpect his coming to alter the preſent ſtate of things according to the Jews apprehenſion of the Meſſias; yet I deny that the latter doth, but it reſpects the general deſtruction of the world, conſequent upon that alteration: for the Jews not only expect an alteration of the preſent ſtate of things among them, but a conſequent deſtruction of the world, after the coming of the Meſſias, according to that ſpeech of theirs cited by Dr. *Lightfoot*, אלף שבים
Horæ hebr. in Matth. 24. 3. p. 262. ערלם וזה חרב *This world ſhall be deſtroyed for* 1000 *years*, and after that עחור לבא *there ſhould be the ſtate of Eternity.* So that the Diſciples,

ſciples, ſpeaking in the ſenſe of the Jews, do not only inquire of the ſigns of his altering the preſent ſtate of things among them, but likewiſe of the deſtruction of the whole world too. Accordingly it is obſervable, that throughout that Chapter, our Saviour intermixeth his anſwers to theſe two Queſtions. Sometimes ſpeaking in reference to the Jewiſh State, as it is plain he doth, *verſe* 15, 16. and ſo on; and when he ſaith, *that this Generation ſhall not paſs, till all theſe things be fulfilled*, ver. 34. But then it is as evident, that ſome places muſt relate to the deſtruction of the world, as when he ſaith, *of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the Angels of heaven, but the Father only, v.* 36: which will appear more plainly, by comparing it with *Mark* 13. 32. *Where the ſon is excluded from knowing that hour too*; But how can any ſay, that the Son did not know the time of the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, which he himſelf foretold when it ſhould be. And thoſe words *heaven and earth ſhall paſs away, v.* 35. ſeem to be our Saviour's tranſition to the Anſwer of the other Queſtion, about the final deſtruction of all things; however that be, we ſee no reaſon at all why συντέλεια τ͂ αἰῶνος, ſhould only reſpect the ſubverſion of the Jewiſh ſtate: but ſuppoſing it ſhould, yet there is far leſs reaſon why it ſhould be ſo meant, in the place whoſe ſenſe we are inquiring into; for if by Chriſt's coming to deſtroy *Jeruſalem*, the old ſtate and diſpenſation ſhould be taken away, we muſt ſuppoſe a new ſtate under the Meſſias to begin from thence. And how rational doth this ſound, that Chriſt ſhould promiſe his peculiar preſence with his own Apoſtles, whom he imployed in erecting the Goſpel State, only till the old Jewiſh State be ſubverted; but his promiſe not at all to extend to that time, wherein the State of the Kingdom of the Meſſias ſhould be ſet up inſtead of it: And how could any of the Apoſtles, for example S. *John*, who ſurvived the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, expect Chriſt's preſence with him, by vertue of this promiſe, if it extended no farther than to the deſtruction of the Jewiſh State? Beſides, it is a mere groundleſs fancy, and ſavours of the Jewiſh apprehenſions of the State of the Meſſias Kingdom, to imagine that the temporal State of *Jeruſalem* muſt be firſt ſubverted before that αἰὼν or diſpenſation of things was at an end. For the Jewiſh State and diſpenſation did not lie in the *Jewiſh Polity*, but an obligation to the *Law of Moſes*, which expired together with Chriſt. And ſo the Goſpel State, which is call'd the *Kingdom of Heaven*, and the *Regeneration*, began upon Mat. 19. 28. Chriſt's Reſurrection and Aſcenſion, when he was ſolemnly (as it were) inaugurated in his Mediatory Kingdom. And preſently after ſends down his *Vice-Roy* upon the day of *Pentecoſt*, in the effuſion of Acts 2. 1. the Spirit upon the Apoſtles, making good his Promiſe of the *Paraclet* to ſupply his abſence: Whereby the Apoſtles were more ſignally impowered for the advancing of the Goſpel State.

§. 7. The αἰὼν then of the Goſpel commenceth from Chriſt's reſurrection, and to this αἰὼν I am very inclinable to think that our Saviour hath reference in theſe words, when he ſaith *he will be with his diſciples to the end of that αἰὼν*, if we take it for a ſtate of things, or the Goſpel diſpenſation; *that is*, as long as the Evangelical Church ſhall continue: For that in Scripture is ſometime called the world to come, and that Phraſe among the Jews of עילם הבא *the world to come* is ſet to expreſs Heb. 2. 5. the time of the Meſſias; and it may be the Apoſtle may refer to this, when *Lightfoot Horæ. Hebr. in* Mat. 12. 32. *p.* 173. he ſpeaks of Apoſtates taſting δυνάμεις τε μέλλοντος αἰῶνος, *that is*, the force and energy of the Goſpel preached; whence the Kingdom of God Heb. 6. 5.

1 Cor. 4. 20. is ſaid to be not ἐν λόγῳ, but ἐν δυνάμει, *not in word, but in power,*
which is the ἀπόδειξις πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως, ſpoken of by the Apoſtle
1 Cor. 2. 4. elſewhere, *the powerful demonſtration of the* ſpirit accompanying the
preaching of the Goſpel. When Chriſt is called by the Prophet אבי עד
Iſai. 9. 5. *the everlaſting Father,* the Septuagint renders it by πατὴρ τοῦ μέλλοντος
αἰῶνος, and ſo the Vulgar Latin. *Pater futuri ſæculi, the Father of
the world to come; that is, the Goſpel State:* and to this ſenſe Chriſt is
Heb. 9. 11. ſaid to be made an High-Prieſt, τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, and the Law to
Heb. 10. 1. be a ſhadow τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, of *good things which ſhould be under
the new ſtate of the Goſpel.* And which is more plain to the purpoſe,
the Apoſtle expreſſeth what was to come to paſs in the days of the Goſpel,
Eph. 2. 7. ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις, *in the Ages to come,* where the very
word αἰὼν, is uſed to this ſenſe. And according to this importance of
Mat. 12. 32. the word αἰὼν ſome very probably interpret that place of our Saviour
concerning the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt, that it ſhould be forgiven
D. *Reynolds* οὔτε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰῶνι, οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, *neither in the preſent ſtate of*
on *Hoſea* *the Jewiſh Church, wherein there is no ſacrifice of expiation for contumacious*
14. 3. *ſinners,* but they that deſpiſed *Moſes*'s Law died without mercy;
Heb. 10. 26, 27, 28. ſo neither ſhall there be any under the *World to come,* that is *the
diſpenſation of Goſpel Grace,* any pardon proclaimed to any ſuch ſinners
who trample under foot the blood of the Covenant, and offer deſpight
to the ſpirit of grace. Thus we ſee how properly the word αἰὼν may
agree here to the Goſpel ſtate, and ſo Chriſt's promiſe of his preſence
doth imply the perpetuity of that office as long as the Evangelical ſtate
ſhall remain, which will be to the world's end.

§. 8. The third thing whereby to know when poſitive inſtitutions are unalterable, is, when they are neceſſary to the being, ſucceſſion, and continuance of the Church of God. Now this yields a farther evidence of the perpetuity of officers in the Church of God, ſeeing the Church its ſelf cannot be preſerved without the Government; and there can be no Government without ſome to rule the members of the Church of God, and to take care for a due adminiſtration of Church-privileges, and to inflict cenſures upon offenders, which is the power they are inveſted in by the ſame authority which was the ground of their inſtitution at firſt. It is not conceivable how any ſociety, as the Church is, can be preſerved without the continuance of Church officers among them. As long as the body of Chriſt muſt be edified, there muſt be ſome κατηρτισμένοι εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, *fitted for the work of the Miniſtry,* which is appointed in order to that end; For that I ſuppoſe is the Apoſtles meaning in *Epheſ.* 4. 12. πρὸς τὸν καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, εἰς οἰκοδομὴν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, following the *Complutenſian copy,* leaving out the *comma* between ἁγίων and εἰς ἔργον, which makes as though it were a diſtinct thing from the former; whereas the Original carries the ſenſe on; for otherwiſe it ſhould have been εἰς καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, &c. and thoſe who follow the ordinary reading, are much at a loſs how to explain that εἰς ἔργον διακονίας coming in ſo in the midſt without dependance upon the former. Therefore the *vulgar Latin* beſt renders it *ad conſummationem ſanctorum ad opus miniſterii, for the compleating of the Saints for the work of the miniſtry in order to the building up of the body of Chriſt;* and to this purpoſe *Muſculus* informs us the *German verſion* renders it. And ſo we underſtand the enumeration
Eph. 4. 11. in the verſe before of *Apoſtles, Prophets, Evangeliſts, Paſtors and Teachers,* not for the perſons themſelves, but for the gifts of thoſe

perſons, *the office of Apoſtles, Evangeliſts, Paſtors, &c.* which is moſt ſuitable to the ἔδωκε δώματα in the *eighth verſe. He gave gifts to men*; now theſe gifts, ſaith he, Chriſt gave to men πρὸς καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, *for the fitting the Saints for the work of the Miniſtry.* Not as a late *Democratical writer* would perſuade us, as though all the Saints were thereby fitted for this work of the Miniſtry; for that the Apoſtle excludes by the former enumeration; for are all the Saints fitted for Apoſtles? are all Prophets, are all Evangeliſts, are all Paſtors and Teachers? as the Apoſtle himſelf elſewhere argues. And in the eighth *verſe* of that Chapter he particularly mentions the ſeveral gifts 1 Cor. 12. 29,8,9,10, 11.
qualifying men for ſeveral uſeful imployments in the Church of God, the Spirit dividing to every man ſeverally as he will. Therefore it cannot be that all the Saints are hereby fitted for this work, but God hath ſcattered theſe gifts among the Saints, that thoſe who have them might be fitted εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, becauſe God would not leave his Church without perſons qualified for the ſervice of himſelf in the work of the Miniſtry, in order to the building up of the body of Chriſt. And by the τῶν ἁγίων here may be meant no other than thoſe he ſpeaks of in the Chapter before, when he ſpeaks of the revelation made τοῖς ἁγίοις ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ καὶ προφήταις, to his holy Apoſtles and Prophets, Eph. 3. 5.
and ſo God gave theſe gifts for the fitting the Holy Apoſtles, &c. for the work of the Miniſtry. It cannot be meant of all, ſo as to deſtroy a peculiar function of the Miniſtry; for *God's very giving theſe gifts to ſome and not to others*, is an evidence that the function is *peculiar.* For elſe had the gifts been common to all, every Saint had been an Apoſtle, every believer a Paſtor, and Teacher, and then where had the People been that muſt have been ruled and governed? So that this very place doth ſtrongly aſſert both the peculiarity of the function, from the peculiarity of gifts in order to fitting men for it, and the perpetuity of the function from the end of it, the building up of the body of Chriſt. Thus I have now aſſerted the *perpetual divine right of a Goſpel Miniſtry*, not only for teaching the word, but adminiſtration of ordinances, and governing the Church as a ſociety: which work belongs to none but ſuch as are appointed for it, who are the ſame with the diſpenſers of the word, as appears from the titles of ἡγούμενοι, προεστῶτες ποιμένες, Go- Heb. 13. 7, 17.
vernours, Rulers, Paſtors, all which neceſſarily imply a Governing 1 Tim. 5. 17.
power, which having been largely proved by others, and yielded by me, Eph. 4. 11.
I paſs over.

CHAP. III.

The Queſtion fully ſtated. Not what form of Government comes the neareſt to the Primitive practice, but whether any be abſolutely determined. Several things propounded for reſolving the Queſtion. What the form of Church-Government was under the Law. How far Chriſtians are bound to obſerve that. Neither the neceſſity of ſuperiority, nor the unlawfulneſs can be proved thence.

AND now I come to the main ſubject of the preſent controverſie, §. 1.
which is acknowledging a form of Government neceſſary, and the Governours of the Church perpetual; whether the particular form

whereby the Church muſt be governed, be determined by any poſitive Law of God, which unalterably binds all Chriſtians to the obſervation of it. By Church here I mean not a particular Congregation, but ſuch a ſociety which comprehends in it many of theſe leſſer Congregations united together in one body under a form of Government. The forms of Government in controverſie, the Queſtion being thus ſtated, are only theſe two; the particular officers of ſeveral Churches acting in an equality of power, which are commonly called a *College of Preſbyters*; or a ſuperior order above the ſtanding Miniſtry, having the power of juriſdiction and ordination belonging to it by vertue of a divine inſtitution. Which order is by an *Antonomaſia* called *Epiſcopacy*. The Queſtion now is not which of theſe two doth come the *neareſt* to *Apoſtolical practice*, and the firſt inſtitution, which hath hitherto been the controverſie ſo hotly debated among us; but whether either of theſe two forms be ſo ſettled by a *jus divinum*, *that is*, be ſo determined by a poſitive Law of God, that all the Churches of Chriſt are bound to obſerve that one form ſo determined, without variation from it: or whether Chriſt hath not in the ſetling of his Church (provided there be ſome form of Government, and a ſetled Miniſtry for the exerciſe of it,) left it to the prudence of every particular Church, conſiſting of many Congregations, to agree upon its own form which it judgeth moſt conducing to the end of Government in that particular Church. Αὐτοῦ ῥόδος, αὐτοῦ πήδημα. Here now we fix our ſelves, and the firſt thing we do is to agree upon our ways of reſolution of this Queſtion, whereby to come to an end of this debate. And the moſt probable way to come to an iſſue in it, is to go through all the ways whereon men do fix an unalterable divine right, and to ſee whether any of theſe do evince a divine right ſetled upon a poſitive Law or no, for one of theſe forms. The pleas then for ſuch a divine right are theſe. Either ſome former Law ſtanding in force under the Goſpel, or ſome plain inſtitution of a new Law by Chriſt in forming his Church; or the obligatory nature of Apoſtolical practice, or the General ſenſe of the Primitive Church, to which we ſhall add by way of Appendix, the Judgment of the chief Divines and Churches ſince the Reformation; if we go happily through theſe, we may content our ſelves with having obtained the thing we aim at.

§. 2. The firſt inquiry then is, whether any former Law of God concerning a form of Government for his Church, either by perſons acting in an equality of power, or ſubordination of one order to another, under the Goſpel, doth remain in force or no, binding Chriſtians to the obſerving of it. The Reaſon why I begin with this, is, becauſe I obſerve the diſputants on both ſides make uſe of the Pattern under the Law to eſtabliſh their form by. * Thoſe who are for ſuperiority of one order above another in the Government of the Church, derive commonly their firſt argument from the Pattern under the Law. † Thoſe who are for an equality of power in the perſons acting in Government, yet being for a ſubordination of Courts, they bring their firſt argument for that, from the Jewiſh Pattern. So that theſe latter are bound by their own argument, though uſed in another caſe, to be ruled in this Controverſie by the Jewiſh Pattern. For why ſhould it be more obligatory as to ſubordination of Courts, than as to the ſuperiority of orders? If it holds in one caſe, it muſt in the other. And if there be ſuch a Law for ſuperiority ſtanding unrepealed, there needs no new Law to inforce it under the Goſpel. We ſhall therefore firſt inquire what foundation

* B. *Bilſon Perpet. Govern. cap.* 2. B. *Andrews* Form of Government, in the old T. B. *Uſher*. Original of Epiſc.

† *Herl.* of Indep. *p.* 4. *Apol. Spanhem. omnes.*

dation there is for either Form in that pattern, and how far the argument drawn from thence is obligatory to us now. For the practice then in the Jewiſh Church, That there was no univerſal equality in the Tribe of *Levi*, which God ſingled out from the reſt for his own ſervice, is obvious in Scripture. For there we find *Prieſts* above the *Levites*; the family of *Aaron* being choſen out from the other families of *Cohath* (one of the three Sons of *Levi*) to be employed in a nearer attendance upon God's ſervice, than any of the other Families. And it muſt be acknowledged, that among both *Prieſts* and *Levites* there was a ſuperiority; for God placed *Eleazar* over the *Prieſts*, *Elizaphan* over the *Cohathites*, Numb. 2. v. 30, 34, 35. *Eliaſaph* over the *Gerſhonites*; *Zuriel* over the *Merarites*, and theſe are called נשיאים *the rulers over the ſeveral Families*; for it is ſaid of every one of them ונשיא בית אב *he was the ruler over the houſe of his Father.* Numb. 4. 28, 32. Neither were theſe equal, for over *Eliaſaph* and *Zuriel* God placed *Ithamar*, Numb. 4. 16. over *Elizaphan* and his own Family, God ſet *Eleazar*, who by reaſon of his authority over all the reſt, is called נשיא נשיאי *the Ruler of the rulers of Levi*; and beſides theſe, there were under theſe rulers ראשי אבות *the chief fathers of the ſeveral diſtinct Families*, as they are called, *Exodus* 6. 25. Thus we briefly ſee the ſubordination that there was in the Tribe of *Levi*; the *Levites* firſt, over them the *heads of the Families*, over them the *Rulers* of the *chief* of the *heads*, over them *Ithamar*, over both *Prieſts* and *Levites*, *Eleazar*; over all, *Aaron* the *High-Prieſt*.

§. 3. There being then ſo manifeſt an inequality among them, proceed we to ſhew how obligatory this is under the Goſpel. For that end it will be neceſſary to conſider whether this imparity and ſuperiority were peculiarly appointed by God for the Eccleſiaſtical Government of the Tribe of *Levi*, as it conſiſted of perſons to be employed in the ſervice of God, or it was only ſuch an inequality and ſuperiority as was in any other Tribe. If only common with other Tribes, nothing can be inferred from thence peculiar to Eccleſiaſtical Government under the Goſpel, any more than from the Government of other Tribes to the ſame kind of Government in all civil States. We muſt then take notice that *Levi* was a particular diſtinct Tribe of its ſelf, and ſo not in ſubordination to any other Tribe; for they had *the heads of their Fathers as well as others*, *Exodus* 6. 25. and although when they were ſetled in *Canaan*, their habitations were intermixt with other Tribes in their *forty eight* Cities, yet they were not under the Government of thoſe Tribes among whom they lived, but preſerved their Authority and Government entire among themſelves. And therefore it was neceſſary there ſhould be the ſame Form of Government among them, which there was among the reſt. The whole body of the Nation then was divided into *thirteen Tribes*; theſe Tribes into their *ſeveral Families*; ſome ſay *ſeventy*, which they called משפחות. theſe Families were divided into ſo many houſholds, כתים their houſholds into perſons נכרים over the ſeveral perſons were the ſeveral Maſters of Families; over the ſeveral houſholds were the Captains of 1000 and 100, 50———10; over the Families, I ſuppoſe were the heads of the Fathers. And over the thirteen Tribes were the ראשי אבות המטות *the chief Fathers of the Tribes of the Children of Iſrael*, *Numb.* 32. 28. and we have the names of them ſet down, *Numb.* 34. 17, &c. So that hitherto we find nothing peculiar to this Tribe, nor proper to it as employed in the ſervice of God. For their ſeveral Families had their ſeveral heads, and *Eleazar* over them as chief of the

Tribe. And ſo we find throughout *Numbers* 2. all the heads of the ſeveral Tribes are named and appointed by God, as *Eleazar* was.

§. 4. The only things then which ſeem proper to this Tribe were, the ſuperiority of the Prieſts over the Levites in the ſervice of God, and the ſupereminent power of the High-Prieſt, as the Type of Chriſt. So that nothing can be inferred from the order under the Law, to that under the Goſpel, but from one of theſe two. And from the *firſt* there can be nothing deduced but this, that as there was a ſuperiority of Offices under the Law, ſo likewiſe ſhould there be under the Goſpel, which is granted by all in the ſuperiority of *Prieſts* over *Deacons*, to whom theſe two anſwer in the Church of God, in the judgment of thoſe who contend for a higher order by divine inſtitution above Preſbyters. And withal we muſt conſider that there was under that order no power of juriſdiction inveſted in the Prieſts over the Levites, but that was in the heads of the Families; and ordination there could not be, becauſe their office deſcended by ſucceſſion in their ſeveral Families. Thoſe who would argue from *Aaron*'s power, muſt either bring too little, or too much from thence: *Too little*, if we conſider his office was typical and ceremonial, and as High-Prieſt, had more immediate reſpect to God than men, *Heb.* 5. 1. and therefore *Eleazar* was appointed over the ſeveral Families during *Aaron*'s life-time, and under *Eleazar*'s his ſon *Phinehas*. *Too much*, if a neceſſity be urged for the continuance of the ſame authority in the Church of God, which is the argument of the Papiſts, deriving the Pope's Supremacy from thence. Which was acutely done by Pope *Innocentius the third*, the Father of the *Lateran Council*, who proved that the Pope may exerciſe temporal juriſdiction from that place in *Deuteronomy* 17. 8. and that by this reaſon, becauſe *Deuteronomy did imply the ſecond Law, and therefore what was* there written, *in Novo Teſtamento debet obſervari*, muſt be obſerved under the Goſpel, which according to them, is a new Law.

§. 5. All that can be inferred then from the Jewiſh pattern, cannot amount to any obligation upon Chriſtians, it being, at the beſt, but a judicial Law, and therefore binds us not up as a poſitive Law, but only declares the equity of the thing in uſe then. I conclude then, that the Jewiſh pattern is no ſtanding Law for Church-Government now, either in its common or peculiar Form of Government; but becauſe there was ſome ſuperiority of order then, and ſubordination of ſome perſons to others, under that Government, that ſuch a ſuperiority and ſubordination is no ways unlawful under the Goſpel, for that would deſtroy the equity of the Law. And though the Form of Government was the ſame with that of other Tribes, yet we ſee God did not bind them to an equality, becauſe they were for his immediate ſervice, but continued the ſame way as in other Tribes; thence I infer, that there is no neceſſary obligation upon Chriſtians to continue that Form under the Jews, becauſe their Laws do not bind us now; ſo neither is there any repugnancy to Law, in ſuch a ſubordination, but it is very agreeable with the equity of it, being inſtituted for peace and order, and therefore ought not to be condemned for Antichriſtian. The Jewiſh pattern then of Government neither makes equality unlawful, becauſe their Laws do not oblige now; nor doth it make ſuperiority unlawful, becauſe it was practiſed then. So that notwithſtanding the Jewiſh Pattern, the Church of Chriſt is left to its own liberty for the choice of its Form of Government, whether by an equality of power in ſome perſons, or ſuperiority and ſubordination of one order to another.

Chap. IV.

Whether Chriſt hath determined the Form of Government by any poſitive Laws. Arguments of the neceſſity why Chriſt muſt determine it, largely anſwered; as, Firſt, Chriſt's faithfulneſs compared with Moſes, *anſwered, and retorted; and proved, that Chriſt did not inſtitute any Form of Church-Government, becauſe no ſuch Law for it as* Moſes *gave; and we have nothing but general rules, which are applyable to ſeveral Forms of Government.—The Office of* Timothy *and* Titus, *what it proves, in order to this queſtion: The Lawfulneſs of Epiſcopacy ſhewn thence, but not the Neceſſity. A particular Form; how far neceſſary, as Chriſt was the Governour of his Church; the ſimilitudes the Church is ſet out by, prove not the thing in queſtion. Nor the difference of Civil and Church-Government; nor Chriſt's ſetting Officers in his Church; nor the inconvenience of the Church's power in appointing new Officers. Every Miniſter hath a power reſpecting the Church in common, which the Church may reſtrain. Epiſcopacy thence proved lawful; the argument from the Scripture's perfection anſwered.*

§. 1. WE come then from the Type to the *Antitype*, from the *rod of Aaron* to the *root of Jeſſe*, *from the Pattern* of the Jewiſh Church, to the *Founder* of the Chriſtian: To ſee whether our Lord and Saviour hath determined this Controverſie, or any one Form of Government for his Church, by any univerſally binding Act or Law of his. And here it is pleaded more hotly by many, that *Chriſt muſt do it*, than *that he hath done it*. And therefore I ſhall firſt examine the pretences of the neceſſity of Chriſt's determining the particular Form; and then the arguments that are brought that he hath done it. The main Pleas that there muſt be a perfect Form of Church-Government laid down by Chriſt, for the Church of God, are *from the compariſon of Chriſt with* Moſes, *from the equal neceſſity of Forms of Government now, which there is for other ſocieties, from the perfection and ſufficiency of the Scriptures*; all other arguments are reducible to theſe three heads. Of theſe in their order. Heb. 1. 2, 5, 6.

Arg. 1. Firſt, *From the compariſon of Chriſt with* Moſes, they argue thus; *If* Moſes *was faithful in his houſe as a ſervant, much more Chriſt as a ſon; now* Moſes *appointed a particular Form of Government for the Church under the Old Teſtament, therefore Chriſt did certainly lay down a Form of Church-Government for the New Teſtament.*

Anſ. 1. To this I anſwer, Firſt: Faithfulneſs implies the diſcharge of a Truſt repoſed in one by another: ſo that it is ſaid, *Ver.* 2. *he was faithful to him that appointed him:* Chriſt's faithfulneſs then lay in diſcharging the work which his Father laid upon him, which was the work of mediation between God and us; and therefore the compariſon is here inſtituted between *Moſes* as typical *Mediator*, and Chriſt as the true *Mediator*; that as *Moſes* was faithful in his work, ſo was Chriſt in his. Now *Moſes* his faithfulneſs lay in keeping cloſe to the Pattern received in the Mount, that is, obſerving the commands of God: Now therefore if Chriſt's being faithful in his office, doth imply the ſetling any one form of Government in the Church, it muſt be made appear that the ſetling of this form was part of Chriſt's mediatory work, and that which the Father commanded him to do as Mediator; and that Chriſt received ſuch a form

a form from the Father for the Chriſtian Church, as *Moſes* did for the
Iſa. 9. 6. Jewiſh. To this it is ſaid, that the *Government is laid upon Chriſt's ſhoulders,*
Mat. 28.18. *and all power is in his hands*; and therefore it belongs to him as
Mediator. Chriſt, I grant, is the King of the Church, and doth govern
it outwardly by his Laws, and inwardly by the conduct of his ſpirit;
but ſhall we ſay that therefore any one form of Government is neceſſary,
which is neither contained in his Laws, nor dictated by his ſpirit?
the main original of miſtakes here, is, the confounding the *external* and
internal Government of the Church of Chriſt, and thence whenſoever
men read of Chriſt's power, authority and government, they fanſie it
refers to the outward Government of the Church of God, which is intended
of his internal mediatory power over the hearts and conſciences
of men. But, withal, I acknowledge, that Chriſt, for the better government
of his Church and people, hath appointed officers in his Church,
inveſted them by vertue of his own power, with an authority to preach
and baptize, and adminiſter all Goſpel ordinances in his own name, *that*
Mat. 28. 18, 19. *is, by his authority*; for it is clearly made known to us in the word of
God, that Chriſt hath appointed theſe things. But then, whether any
ſhall ſucceed the Apoſtles in ſuperiority of power over Preſbyters, or all
remain governing the Church in an equality of power, is no where determined
by the will of Chriſt in Scripture, which contains his Royal-Law;
and therefore we have no reaſon to look upon it as any thing
flowing from the power and authority of Chriſt as mediator, and ſo not
neceſſarily binding Chriſtians.

§. 2. Secondly, I anſwer, If the correſpondency between Chriſt and *Moſes*
in their work, doth imply an equal exactneſs in Chriſt's diſpoſing of
every thing in his Church, as *Moſes* did among the Jews; then the
Church of Chriſt muſt be equally bound to all circumſtances of worſhip
as the Jews were. For there was nothing appertaining in the leaſt to
the worſhip of God, but was fully ſet down even to the pins of the
Tabernacle in the Law of *Moſes*; but we find no ſuch thing in the
Goſpel. The main duties and ordinances are preſcribed indeed, but
their circumſtances and manner of performance are left as matters of
Chriſtian liberty, and only couched under ſome general rules; which
is a great difference between the Legal and Goſpel ſtate. Under the
Law all ceremonies and circumſtances are exactly preſcribed; but in the
Goſpel we read of ſome general rules of direction for Chriſtians carriage
in all circumſtantial things. Theſe four eſpecially contain all the directions
1 Cor. 14. 40. of Scripture concerning circumſtantials. *All things to be done decently*
1 Cor. 14. 26. *and in order*; *all to be done for edification. Give no offence. Do all*
to the glory of God. So that the particular circumſtances are left to Chriſtian
1 Cor. 10. 32. liberty with the obſervation of general rules. It is evident as to
1 Cor. 10. 31. Baptiſm and the Lord's-Supper, which are unqueſtionably of divine
inſtitution, yet as to the circumſtances of the adminiſtration of them,
Rom. 14. 6, 7. how much leſs circumſtantial is Chriſt than *Moſes* was! as to Circumciſion
and the Paſſover under the Law, the age, time, perſons, manner,
place, form, all fully ſet down, but nothing ſo under the Goſpel; whether
Baptiſm ſhall be adminiſtred to infants or no, is not ſet down in expreſs
words, but left to be gathered by analogy and conſequences; what
manner it ſhall be adminiſtred in, whether by dipping or ſprinkling, is
not abſolutely determined; what form of words to be uſed, whether
Acts 2. 38. 8. 12. 19. 5. in the name of all three perſons, or ſometimes in the name of Chriſt
only, as in the *Acts* we read (if that be the ſenſe, and not rather in
Chriſt's

Chriſt's name, *i.e.* by Chriſt's authority) whether ſprinkling or dipping ſhall be thrice, as ſome Churches uſe it, or only once, as others. Theſe things we ſee relating to an ordinance of divine inſtitution, are yet paſt over without any expreſs command determining either way in Scripture. So as to the Lord's-Supper; what perſons to be admitted to it, whether all viſible profeſſors, or only ſincere Chriſtians: upon what terms, whether by previous examination of Church-Officers, by an open profeſſion of their faith, or elſe only by their own tryal of themſelves, required of them as their duty by their Miniſters; whether it ſhould be always after ſupper, as Chriſt himſelf did it; whether taken faſting, or after meat; whether kneeling, or ſitting, or leaning; whether to be conſecrated in one form of words, or ſeveral: Theſe things are not thought fit to be determined by any poſitive command of Chriſt, but left to the exerciſe of Chriſtian liberty; the like is as to preaching the word, publick Prayer, ſinging of Pſalms; the duties are required, but the particular modes are left undetermined. The caſe is the ſame as to Church-Government. That the Church be governed, and that it be governed by its proper Officers, are things of divine appointment; but whether the Church ſhould be governed by many joining together in an equality, or by ſubordination of ſome perſons to others, is left to the ſame liberty which all other circumſtances are, this being not the ſubſtance of the thing its ſelf, but only the manner of performance of it.

3. I anſwer, That there is a manifeſt diſparity between the Goſpel §. 3.
and Jewiſh Sate; and therefore reaſons may be given why all punctilioes were determined then, which are not now; as,

1. The perfection and liberty of the Goſpel-ſtate above the Jewiſh. The Law was only as a Pedagogy, the Church then in her infancy and nonage, and therefore wanted the *Feſcues* of Ceremonies to direct her, and every part of her leſſon ſet her, to bring her by degrees to ſkill and exactneſs in her underſtanding the myſtery of the things repreſented to her. But muſt the Church now grown up under Chriſt, be ſtill *ſub ferulâ*, and not dare to vary in any circumſtance, which doth not concern the thing it ſelf. A boy at ſchool hath his leſſon ſet him, and the manner of learning it preſcribed him in every mode and circumſtance. But at the Univerſity hath his Lectures read him, and his work ſet, and general directions given, but he is left to his own liberty how to perform his work, and what manner to uſe in the doing of it. So it was with the Church under age, every mode and circumſtance was determined; but when the fulneſs of time was come, the Church being then grown up, the main offices themſelves were appointed, and general directions given; but a liberty left how to apply and make uſe of them, as to every particular caſe and occaſion. Things moral remain ſtill in their full force, but circumſtantials are left more at liberty by the Goſpel liberty; as a Son that is taught by his Father, while he is under his inſtruction, muſt obſerve every particular direction for him in his learning; but when he comes to age, though he obſerves not thoſe things as formerly, yet his Son-ſhip continues, and he muſt obey his Father as a Child ſtill, though not in the ſame manner. The ſimilitude is the Apoſtles, *Galat.* 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10. which he there largely amplifies to this very purpoſe of freeing Chriſtians from Judaical ceremonies.

2. The form of Government among the Jews in the Tribe of *Levi*, was agreeable to the form of Government among the other Tribes;

and

and ſo *Moſes* was not more exact in reference to that, than to any other; and thoſe perſons in that Tribe who were the chief before the inſtitution of the Aaronical Prieſthood, were ſo after; but now under the Goſpel, people are not under the ſame reſtrictions for civil government by a Judicial Law, as they were then. For the form of Eccleſiaſtical Government then took place among them as one of their Judicial Laws; And therefore if the argument hold, Chriſt muſt as well preſcribe a form for civil government as Eccleſiaſtical, if Chriſt in the Goſpel muſt by his faithfulneſs follow the pattern of *Moſes*. But if Chriſt be not bound to follow *Moſes*'s Pattern as to Judicial Law for his Church and people, neither is he as to a form of Eccleſiaſtical Government, becauſe that was a part of their civil and Judicial Law.

3. The people of the Jews was a whole and entire people, ſubſiſting by themſelves when one ſet form of Government was preſcribed them; but it is otherwiſe now under the Goſpel. The Church of Chriſt was but forming in Chriſt's own time, nor the Apoſtles, in whoſe time we read of but ſome Cities and no whole Nations converted to the Faith; and therefore the ſame form of Government would not ſerve a Church in its firſt conſtitution, which is neceſſary for it when it is actually formed. A Paſtor and Deacons might ſerve the Church of a City while believers were few, but cannot when they are increaſed into many Congregations, and ſo proportionably when the Church is inlarged to a whole Nation, there muſt be another form of Government then. Therefore they who call for a National Church under the Goſpel, let them firſt ſhew a Nation converted to the faith, and we will undertake to ſhew the other. And this is the chief reaſon why the Churches Polity is ſo little deſcribed in the New Teſtament, becauſe it was only growing then: and it doth not ſtand to reaſon, that the coat which was cut out for one in his infancy, muſt of neceſſity ſerve him when grown a man; which is the argument of thoſe who will have nothing obſerved in the Church, but what is expreſſed in Scripture. The Apoſtles looked at the preſent ſtate of a Church in appointing officers, and ordered things according to the circumſtances of them, which was neceſſary to be done in the founding of a Church; and the reaſon of Apoſtolical practice binds ſtill, though not the individual action, that as they regulated Churches for the beſt conveniency of Governing them, ſo ſhould the Paſtors of Churches now. But of this largely afterwards.

4. Another difference is, that the people of the Jews lived all under one Civil Government; but it is otherwiſe with Chriſtians who live under different forms of Civil Government. And then by the ſame reaſon, that in the firſt inſtitution of their Eccleſiaſtical Government it was formed according to the Civil; by the ſame reaſon muſt Chriſtians do under the Goſpel, if the argument holds that Chriſt muſt be faithful as *Moſes* was. And then becauſe Chriſtians do live under ſeveral and diſtinct forms of Civil Government, they muſt be bound by the Law of Chriſt, to contemperate the Government of the Church to that of the State. And what they have gained by this for their cauſe, who aſſert the neceſſity of any one form from this argument, I ſee not; but on the contrary this is evident, that they have evidently deſtroyed their own principle by it. For if *Moſes* did preſcribe a form of Government for *Levi* agreeable to the form of the Commonwealth, and Chriſt be as faithful as *Moſes* was, then Chriſt muſt likewiſe order the Government of Chriſtian Churches according to that of the State, and ſo muſt

have different forms as the other hath. Thus much will ſerve abundantly to ſhew the weakneſs of the argument drawn from the agreement of Chriſt and *Moſes*, for the proving any one form of Government neceſſary; but this ſhall not ſuffice. I now ſhall *ex abundanti* from the anſwers to this argument, lay down ſeveral arguments that Chriſt did never intend to inſtitute any one form of Government in his Church.

§. 4. 1. Whatever binds the Church of God as an inſtitution of Chriſt, muſt bind as an univerſal ſtanding Law; but one form of Government in the Church cannot bind it as a ſtanding Law. For whatever binds as a ſtanding Law, muſt either be expreſſed in direct terms as ſuch a Law; or deduced by a neceſſary conſequence from his Laws, as of an univerſally binding nature; but any one particular form of Government in the Church, is neither expreſſed in any direct terms by Chriſt, nor can be deduced by juſt conſequence; therefore no ſuch form of Government is inſtituted by Chriſt. If there be any ſuch Law, it muſt be produced, whereby it is determined in Scripture, either that there muſt be ſuperiority or equality among Church Officers as ſuch after the Apoſtles deceaſe. And though the Negative of a Fact holds not, yet the Negative of a Law doth, elſe no ſuperſtition. I have not yet met with any ſuch produced, and therefore ſhall ſee what conſequences can be made of a binding nature. To this I ſay, that no conſequences can be deduced to make an inſtitution, but only to apply one to particular caſes: becauſe poſitives are in themſelves indifferent without inſtitution and Divine appointment; and therefore that muſt be directly brought for the making a Poſitive univerſally binding, which it doth not in its own nature do. Now here muſt be an inſtitution of ſomething merely poſitive ſuppoſed, which in its ſelf is of an indifferent nature; and therefore no conſequence drawn can ſuffice to make it unalterably binding, without expreſs declaration that ſuch a thing ſhall ſo bind: for what is not in its own nature moral, binds only by vertue of a command, which command muſt be made known by the will of Chriſt, ſo that we may underſtand its obligatory nature. So that both a conſequence muſt be neceſſarily drawn, and the obligation of what ſhall be ſo drawn muſt be expreſſed in Scripture: which I deſpair of ever finding in reference to any one form of Government in the Church.

2. If the ſtanding Laws for Church Government be equally applyable to ſeveral diſtinct forms, then no one form is preſcribed in Scripture; but all the ſtanding Laws reſpecting Church Government, are equally applyable to ſeveral forms. All the Laws occurring in Scripture reſpecting Church Government, may be referred to theſe three heads. Such as ſet down the *Qualifications of the perſons for the office of Government, ſuch as require a right management of their office, and ſuch as lay down rules for the management of their office.* Now all theſe are equally appliable to either of theſe two forms we now diſcourſe of. We begin then with thoſe which ſet down the qualifications of the perſons imployed in Government; thoſe we have largely and fully ſet down by St. *Paul* in his *Ordo* to *Timothy* and *Titus*, preſcribing what manner of perſons thoſe ſhould be who are to be imployed in the Government of the Church. 1 Tim. 3. 1, 8. Titus 1. 5, 10. *A Biſhop muſt be blameleſs as the Steward of God not ſelf willed, not ſoon angry, not given to Wine, no ſtriker,* &c. All theſe and the reſt of the Qualifications mentioned, are equally required as neceſſary in a Biſhop, whether taken for one of a ſuperior order above Preſbyters, or elſe only for a ſingle Preſbyter; how ever

that be, if he hath a hand in Church Government, he muſt be ſuch a one as the Apoſtle preſcribes; And ſo theſe commands to *Timothy* and *Titus* given by *Paul*, do equally reſpect and concern them, whether we conſider them as Evangeliſts acting by an extraordinary commiſſion, or as fixed Paſtors over all the Churches in their ſeveral precincts; ſo that from the commands themſelves nothing can be inferred either way to determine the Queſtion; only one place is pleaded for the perpetuity of the office *Timothy* was imployed in, which muſt now be examined: the place is 1 *Tim.* 6. 13, 14. *I give thee charge in the ſight of God*, &c. *that thou keep this commandment without ſpot, unrebukeable, until the appearing of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.* From hence it is argued thus: The commandment here was the charge which *Timothy* had of Governing the Church; this *Timothy* could not keep perſonally till Chriſt's ſecond coming; therefore there muſt be a ſucceſſion of Officers in the ſame kind till the ſecond coming of Chriſt. But this is eaſily anſwered. For firſt, It is no ways certain what this command was which St. *Paul* ſpeaks of; ſome underſtand it of fighting the good fight of Faith, others of the precept of love, others moſt probably the ſum of all contained in this Epiſtle, which I confeſs implies in it (as being one great part of the Epiſtle) *Paul*'s direction of *Timothy* for the right diſcharge of his office; but granting that the command reſpects *Timothy*'s office, yet I anſwer, *ſecondly*, It manifeſtly appears to be ſomething *perſonal*, and not *ſucceſſive*, or at leaſt nothing can be inferr'd for the neceſſity of ſuch a ſucceſſion from this place which it was brought for: Nothing being more evident than that this command related to *Timothy*'s perſonal obſervance of it. And therefore, *thirdly*, Chriſt's appearing here, is not meant of
Hom. 18. *in* 1 *Tim.To.*4. his ſecond coming to judgment, but it only imports the time of *Timothy*'s deceaſe; ſo *Chryſoſtome* μέχρι τῆς σῆς τελευτῆς, μέχρι τῆς ἐξόδου. So *Eſtius*
Epiſtol. 80. *ad Heſych.* underſtands it, *uſque ad exitum vitæ*; and for that end brings that ſpeech of *Auguſtine*, *Tunc unicuique veniet dies adventus Domini, cum venerit ei dies, ut talis hinc exeat, qualis judicandus eſt illo die.* And the reaſon why the time of his death is ſet out by the coming of Chriſt, is ἵνα μᾶλλον αὐτὸν διεγείρῃ, as *Chryſoſtom*, and from him *Theophylact* obſerves; to incite him more, both to diligence in his work and patience under ſufferings, from the conſideration of Chriſt's appearance. The plain meaning of the words then is the ſame with that, *Revel.* 2. 10. *Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a Crown of life.* Nothing then can be hence inferred as to the neceſſary ſucceſſion of ſome in *Timothy*'s office, whatever it is ſuppoſed to be.

§. 5. Secondly, The precepts of the Goſpel requiring a right management
Acts 20.28. of the work, are equally appliable to either form. *Taking heed to the flock over which God hath made them overſeers*; is equally a duty, whether by *flock* we underſtand either the particular Church of *Epheſus*, or the adjacent Churches of *Aſia*; whether by *Overſeers* we underſtand ſome acting over others, or all joyning together in an equality. So *ex-*
2Tim. 4. 2. *horting, reproving, preaching in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, doing all things*
1 Tim. 5. 1. 21. ἄνευ προκρίματος, *without raſh cenſures and partiality; watching over the*
Heb. 13. 17. *flock as they that muſt give an account: Laying hands ſuddenly on no man:*
1 Tim. 5. 22. 1 Tim. 5. 19. *rebuking not an elder, but under two or three witneſſes.* And whatever precepts of this nature we read in the Epiſtles to *Timothy* and *Titus*, may be equally appliable to men acting in either of theſe two forms of Government: There being no precept occuring in all thoſe Epiſtles preſcribing to *Timothy*, whether he muſt act only as a *Conſul in Senatu*

with the conſent of the Preſbytery, or whether by his ſole power he ſhould determine what was the common intereſt, and concern of thoſe Churches he was the Superintendent over. Neither doth the Apoſtle determine at all in thoſe Epiſtles chiefly concerning Church Government, whether upon the removal of *Timothy* or *Titus* thence as Evangeliſts, as ſome pretend, or upon their death as fixed Paſtors and Biſhops, as others, any ſhould ſucceed them in the power they enjoyed, or no: nor in what manner the Paſtors of the ſeveral Churches ſhould order things of common concernment. Which would ſeem to be a ſtrange omiſſion, were either of theſe two forms ſo neceſſary, taken excluſively of the other, as both parties ſeem to affirm. For we cannot conceive but if the being and right conſtitution of a Church did depend upon the manner of the Governours acting in it, but that care which *Paul* had over all the Churches, would have prompted him (eſpecially being aſſiſted and guided by an infallible ſpirit in the penning thoſe Epiſtles) to have laid down ſome certain rules for the acting of the Paſtors of the Churches after the departure of *Timothy* and *Titus*. Conſidering eſpecially that the Epiſtles then written by him, were to be of ſtanding perpetual uſe in the Church of God; and by which the Churches in after ages were to be guided as well as thoſe that were then in being. The Apoſtle in both Epiſtles takes care for a ſucceſſion of Paſtors in thoſe Churches: *Timothy* is charged to *commit the things that he had heard of* Paul *to faithful men,* 2 Tim. 2. 2. *who ſhall be fit to teach others.* Had it not been as requiſite to have charged him to have committed his power of Government to men fit for that, had the Apoſtle looked on the form of Government to be as neceſſary as the office of preaching? *Paul*, ſaith he, left *Titus* in *Crete* Titus 1. 5. on purpoſe *to ſettle the Churches and ordain Preſbyters in every City:* had it not been as neceſſary to have ſhewed in what order the Churches muſt be ſetled, and what power did belong to thoſe Preſbyters, and how they ſhould act in the governing their Churches, had he thought the conſtitution of the Churches did depend upon the form of their acting? We ſee here then that St. *Paul* doth not expreſs any thing neceſſarily inferring any one conſtant form to be uſed in the Church of God. And whence can we infer any neceſſity of it, but from the ſcriptures laying it down as a duty that ſuch a form and no other there muſt be uſed in the Church of God? For all that we can ſee then by *Paul's* direction for Church Government, (when if ever, this ſhould have been expreſſed) it was left to the Chriſtian wiſdom and prudence of the Churches of *Epheſus* and *Crete* to conſult and determine in what manner the Government of their Churches ſhould be provided for, upon the departure of *Timothy* and *Titus* from them.

§. 6. But here it will be ſoon replyed, that though nothing be expreſſed in *Pauls* Epiſtles to *Timothy* and *Titus*, *yet* Paul*'s appointing* Timothy *and* Titus *over thoſe Churches, did determine the form of Government, and they were intruſted with a power to provide for future Governours after them.*

To this I anſwer: *Firſt*, the ſuperiority which *Timothy* and *Titus* had over thoſe Churches, doth not prove that form of Government neceſſary in all Churches; I diſpute not whether they were *Evangeliſts or no*, or acted as ſuch in that ſuperiority (of that afterwards) it is evident they might be ſo; there being no convincing argument to the contrary. And the bare poſſibility of the truth of the negative deſtroys the neceſſity of the Affirmative of a Propoſition. As, *ſi poſſibile eſt hominem non eſſe animal*, then that propoſition is falſe *Neceſſe eſt hominem eſſe animal.* For *Neceſſe eſt eſſe*, and *Non poſſibile eſt non eſſe*, being *æquipollents* on the one ſide; and *Poſſibile eſt non eſſe*, *Et non neceſſe eſt eſſe*, being *æquipollents* on the other; *Poſſibile eſt non eſſe* muſt be contradictory to *neceſſe eſt eſſe*, as *Non poſſibile eſt non eſſe* is to *Non neceſſe eſt eſſe*. So that if only the poſſibility of their acting as *Evangeliſts*, that is, by an extraordinary commiſſion, be evicted, which I know none will deny, the neceſſity of their acting as fixed Biſhops is deſtroyed, and conſequently the neceſſity of the continuance of their office too, which depends upon the former. For if they acted not as Biſhops, nothing can be drawn from their example neceſſarily inforcing the continuance of the Superiority which they enjoyed. But though nothing can be inferred from hence as to the neceſſity of that office to continue in the Church, which *Timothy* and *Titus* were inveſted in; yet from the ſuperiority of that power which they enjoyed over thoſe Churches, whether as Evangeliſts, or as fixed Biſhops, Theſe two things may be inferred. *Firſt*, That the ſuperiority of ſome Church officers over others is not contrary to the rule of the Goſpel: for all parties acknowledge the ſuperiority of their power above the Preſbyters of the ſeveral Cities; only the continuance of this power is diſputed by many. But if they had any ſuch power at all, it is enough for my preſent deſign, *viz.* that ſuch a ſuperiority is not contrary to the Goſpel rule: or that the nature of the Government of the Church doth not imply a neceſſary equality among the Governours of it. *Secondly*, Hence I infer, that it is not repugnant to the conſtitution of Churches in Apoſtolical times, for men to have power over more than one particular congregation. For ſuch a power *Timothy* and *Titus* had; which had it been contrary to the nature of the regiment of Churches, we ſhould never have read of in the firſt planted Churches. So that if thoſe popular arguments of a neceſſary relation between a Paſtor and particular people, of perſonal knowledge, care and inſpection, did deſtroy the lawfulneſs of extending that care and charge to many particular congregations, they would likewiſe overthrow the nature, end and deſign of the office which *Timothy* and *Titus* acted in: which had a relation to a multitude of particular and congregational Churches. Whether their power was extraordinary or no, I now diſpute not; but whether ſuch a power be repugnant to the Goſpel or no; which from their practice is evident that it is not. But then others who would make this office neceſſary, urge farther, that *Timothy* or *Titus might ordain and appoint others to ſucceed them in their places and care over all thoſe Churches under their charge.* To which I anſwer firſt, What they might do is not the queſtion, but what they did; as they might do it, ſo they might not do it, if no other evidence be brought to prove it; for *Quod poſſibile eſt eſſe, poſſibile eſt non eſſe.* *Secondly*, Neither what they did, is the whole queſtion, but what they did with an opinion of the neceſſity of doing it, whether they were bound to do it or no? and if ſo, whether by any Law extant in Scripture and given them by *Paul* in his Epiſtles, or ſome private command and particular inſtructions when he deputed them to their ſeveral charges: If the former, that Law and command muſt be produced, which will hardly be, if we embrace only the received Canon of the Scripture. If the latter, we muſt then fetch ſome ſtanding rule and Law from unwritten traditions: for no other evidence can be given of the Inſtructions by word of mouth given by *Paul* to *Timothy* and *Titus*, at the taking their charges upon them. But yet, *Thirdly*, Were it only the matter of fact that was diſputed, that would hold a controverſie ſtill, *viz.* whether any did ſucceed *Timothy* and *Titus* in their offices. But this I ſhall leave to its proper place to be diſcuſſed, when I come to examine the argument from Apoſtolical ſucceſſion. Thus we ſee then that neither the qualification of the perſons, nor the commands for a right exerciſe of the office committed to them, nor the whole Epiſtles to *Timothy* or *Titus*, do determine any one form of Government to be neceſſary in the Church of God.

§. 7. *Thirdly*, Let us ſee whether the general rules do require any one form; which rules, in that they are general, can determine nothing of the authority it ſelf, as to its particular mode, being intended only for the regulation of the exerciſe of the authority in which Men are placed. And it is an evidence that nothing is particularly determined in this caſe, when the Spirit of God lays down ſuch rules for Government which are appliable to diſtinct forms. Otherwiſe certainly ſome rule would have been laid down, which could have been applied to nothing but to that one form. *That none take the office of preaching without a call, nor go without ſending*, will equally hold, whether the power of ordination lie in a Biſhop with Preſbyters, or in Preſbyters acting with equality of power. *That offenders be cenſured, and complaints made to the Church in caſe of ſcandal*, determines nothing to whom the power of juriſdiction doth ſolely belong, nor what that Church is which muſt receive theſe complaints. *That all things be done with decency and order*, doth preſcribe nothing wherein that decency lies, nor how far that order may extend; nor yet who muſt be the Judges of that decency and order. *That all be done for edification, and the common benefit of the Church*, doth no ways reſtrain the Church's freedom in diſpoſing of its ſelf as to the form of its Government, ſo the aim of the Church be for the better edification of the body of the Church, and to promote the benefit of it. But, methinks, theſe general orders and rules for diſcipline, do imply the particular manner of Government to be left at liberty to the Church of God, ſo that in all the ſeveral forms theſe general rules be obſerved. Whereas had Chriſt appointed a ſuperior order to govern other ſubordinate officers and the Church together; Chriſt's command for governing the Church would have been particularly addreſſed to them; and again, had it been the will of Chriſt there ſhould be no ſuperior order above the Paſtors of particular Churches, there would have been ſome expreſs and direct prohibition of it; which becauſe we no where read, it ſeems evident that Chriſt hath left both the one and the other to the freedom and liberty of his Church. So much ſhall ſerve, in this place, to ſhew how improbable it is that Chriſt did ever preſcribe any one form of Government in his Church, ſince he hath only laid down general rules for the management of Church-Government.

Heb. 5. 2.
Rom. 10. 14.

§. 8. But this will not yet ſuffice thoſe who plead that Chriſt muſt determine one immutable form of Government in his Church; but although it be a high preſumption to determine firſt what Chriſt muſt do, before we examine what he hath done, yet we ſhall ſtill proceed and examine all the pretences that are brought for this opinion. The next thing then which is generally urged for it, *is the equal neceſſity of Chriſt's inſtituting a certain form, as for any other Legiſlator who models a Common-wealth.*

mon-wealth. Now, for anſwer to this, I ſay, *firſt*, That Chriſt hath inſtituted ſuch an immutable Government in his Church as is ſufficient for the ſucceſſion and continuance of it; which is all which Founders of Common-wealths do look after, *viz.* that there be ſuch an order and diſtinction of Perſons, and ſubordination of one to the other, that a ſociety may ſtill be preſerved among them; now this is ſufficiently provided for by Chriſt appointing officers continually to rule his Church, and eſtabliſhing Laws for the perpetuating of ſuch officers; ſo whatſoever is neceſſary in order to the general ends of Government, is acknowledged to be appointed by Jeſus Chriſt. Until then that it be proved that one form of Government is in it ſelf abſolutely neceſſary for the being of a Church, this argument can prove nothing; for what is drawn from neceſſity, will prove nothing but in a caſe of neceſſity. *Secondly*, I anſwer, That thoſe things which are not abſolutely neceſſary to the being of a Church, or left to Chriſt's liberty, whether he will determine them or no; and are no farther to be looked on as neceſſary than as he hath determined by his Laws whether they ſhall be or no in his Church. The thing will be thus cleared: When I read that *Zaleucus*, *Lycurgus*, or *Numa* did form a Common-wealth, and make Laws for it; I preſently conclude that there muſt be ſome order or diſtinction of perſons in this Common-wealth, and ſome rules whereby perſons muſt be governed, and whereby others muſt rule: But I cannot hence infer that *Zaleucus*, or *Lycurgus* did inſtitute Monarchical, Ariſtocratical, or Democratical Government, becauſe any of theſe forms might be agreeable to their deſign; and therefore what kind of Government they did appoint; can no otherwiſe be known than by taking a view of the Laws which they made in order thereto. So it is in reference to Chriſt; when we read that Chriſt hath inſtituted a Church always to continue in the world, we preſently apprehend that there muſt be ſome power and order in the members of that ſociety, and Laws for the governing it; but we cannot hence gather that he hath bound up his Officers to act in any one form, becauſe ſeveral forms might in themſelves equally tend to the promoting the end of Government in his Church. And therefore what Chriſt hath expreſly determined in his poſitive Laws, muſt be our rule of judging in this caſe, and not any preſumption of our own, that ſuch a form was neceſſary, and therefore Chriſt muſt inſtitute and appoint it. Which is fully expreſſed by judicious Mr. *Hooker*, whoſe words will ſerve as a ſufficient anſwer to this objection. *As for thoſe marvelous diſcourſes, whereby they adventure to argue that God muſt needs have done the thing which they imagine was to be done; I muſt confeſs I have often wonder'd at their exceeding boldneſs herein. When the queſtion is, whether God have delivered in Scripture, (as they affirm he hath) a complete particular immutable form of Church Polity: Why take they that other both preſumptuous and ſuperfluous labour to prove he ſhould have done it; there being no way in this caſe to prove the deed of God, ſaving only by producing that evidence wherein he hath done it? But if there be no ſuch thing apparent upon record, they do as if one ſhould demand a Legacy by force and vertue of ſome written Teſtament, wherein there being no ſuch thing ſpecified, he pleadeth that there it muſt needs be, and bringeth arguments from the love and good will which always the Teſtator bore, imagining that theſe or the like proofs will convict a Teſtament to have that in it, which other men can no where by reading find. In matters which concern the actions of God, the moſt dutiful way on our part, is to ſearch what God hath done,*

Eccleſiaſt. Polity, lib. 3. ſect. 11.

done, and with meekneſs to admire that, rather than to diſpute what he in congruity of reaſon ought to do. Thus he, with more to the ſame purpoſe. The ſum then of the anſwer to this Argument, is this, that nothing can be infer'd of what Chriſt muſt do, from his relation to his Church, but what is abſolutely neceſſary to the being of it; as for all other things, they being arbitrary conſtitutions, we can judge no more of the neceſſity of them, than as we find them clearly revealed in the Word of God. And therefore the Plea muſt be removed from what Chriſt muſt do, to what he hath done, in order to the determining the particular form of Government in his Church.

§. 9. *Parker de Polit. Ecclеſ. lib. 2. c. 40.*

But ſtill it is argued for the neceſſity of a particular form of Government in the Church, from the ſimilitudes *the Church is ſet out by in Scripture; it is call'd a* Vine, *and therefore muſt have* Keepers; *an* Houſe, *and therefore muſt have* Government; *a* City, *and therefore muſt have a* Polity; *a* Body, *and therefore muſt have* Parts. I anſwer, *Firſt*, All theſe Similitudes prove only that which none deny, that there muſt be order, power, and a Government in the Church of God; we take not away the Keepers from the Vine, nor the Government from the Houſe, nor Polity from the City, nor diſtinction of Parts from the Body; we aſſert all theſe things as neceſſary in the Church of God. The Keepers of the Vine to defend and prune it; the Governours of the Houſe to rule and order it; the Polity of the City to guide and direct it; the Parts of the Body to compleat and adorn it. But, *Secondly*, None of theſe Similitudes prove what they are brought for; *viz.* that any one immutable form of Government is determined. For may not the Keepers of the Vine uſe their own diſcretion in looking to it, ſo the flouriſhing of the Vine be that they aim at? and if there be many of them, may there not be different orders among them, and ſome as Superviſors of the others work? The Houſe muſt have Governours, but thoſe that are ſo, are entruſted with the power of ordering things in the Houſe according to their own diſcretion; and where there is a multitude, is there not diverſity of offices among them? and is it neceſſary that every houſe muſt have officers of the ſame kind? In great and large Families there muſt be more particular diſtinct orders and offices, than in a ſmall and little one. The City muſt have its Polity; but all Cities have not the like, ſome have one form, and ſome another, and yet there is a City ſtill, and a Polity too. A Body muſt have all its Parts; but are all the Parts of the Body equal to one another? it ſufficeth that there be a proportion, though not equality in them; the ſeveral Parts of the Body have their ſeveral offices; and yet we ſee the Head is ſuperintendent over them all; and thus if we make every particular Church a Body, yet it follows not that the form of cloathing that Body muſt always be the ſame; for the manner of Government is rather the Cloathing to the Body, than the Parts of it; the Governours indeed are Parts of the Body, but their manner of governing is not; that may alter according to the proportion and growth of the Body, and its faſhion change for better conveniency.

§. 10.

But if theſe Similitudes prove nothing, yet certainly, ſay they, *the difference as to Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government will; for though there may be different forms in civil Government, which are therefore call'd an* Ordinance of man, *yet there muſt be but one in Church Government, which is an Ordinance of God, and Chriſt hath appointed Officers to rule it.* I anſwer, *Firſt*, We grant and acknowledge a difference between the Church

1 Pet. 2.13.

and the Common-wealth; they are conſtituted for other ends; the one Political, the other Spiritual; one Temporal, the other Eternal; they ſubſiſt by different Charters; the one given to men as men, the other to men as Chriſtians: They act upon different Principles, the one to preſerve civil Rights, the other to promote an eternal Intereſt; nay, their formal Conſtitution is different, for a man by being a member of a Common-wealth, doth not become a member of the Church, and by being excommunicated out of the Church, doth not ceaſe to be a member of the Common-wealth: The Officers of the one are clearly diſtinct from the other, the one deriving their power from the Law of Chriſt, the other from God's general Providence. The Magiſtrate hath no power to excommunicate formally out of the Church, any more than to admit into it, nor have Church-officers any power to caſt men out of the Common-wealth. We ſee then there is a difference between Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government: But then I anſwer, *Secondly*, The power of the Magiſtrate is not therefore called an Ordinance of man, becauſe of the mutability of its form, and as diſtinguiſhed from the form of Church Government. For, *Firſt*, The Apoſtle ſpeaks not of the form of Government, but of the power; *ſubmit to every Ordinance of man, &c.* the ground of ſubmiſſion is not the form, but the power of Civil Government; and therefore there can be no oppoſition expreſſed here between the forms of Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government: But if any ſuch oppoſition be, it muſt be between the powers; and if this be ſaid as to Civils, that the power is an ordinance of man in that ſenſe, (whereas Rom. 13. 1. *Paul* ſaith it is of God) yet as to the Church, it is freely acknowledged that the power is derived from God. *Secondly*, The Civil power is not called ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, becauſe it is a creature of man's making, and ſo ſubject to mens power, but the ground of that ſpeech is, becauſe all Civil power reſpects men as men, without any farther connotation. *Humana dicitur, non quod ab hominibus ſit excogitata, ſed quod hominum ſit propria*, ſaith *Beza*. And to the ſame purpoſe *Calvin*, *Humana dicitur ordinatio, non quod humanitùs inventa fuerit; ſed quod propria hominum eſt digeſta & ordinata vivendi ratio.* *Piſcator*, *Humanam appellat, non quod magiſtratus homines authores habeat, ſed quod homines eam gerant.* So then the Civil power is not called an Ordinance of man, as it is of man's ſetting up, but as it is proper to man; and ſo if there be any oppoſition between the Civil and Church power, it is only this, that the one belongs to men as men, the other to men as Chriſtians. *Thirdly*, Although it be granted that Chriſt hath appointed and ſet up his own officers in his Church, yet it doth not thence follow, that he hath determined in what manner they ſhall rule his Church. It is true, Eph. 4. 12. Chriſt hath ſet up in his Church, *ſome Apoſtles, ſome Evangeliſts, and ſome Paſtors and Teachers*; but it doth not thence follow, that Chriſt hath determined, whether the power of Apoſtles and Evangeliſts ſhould continue in his Church or no, as it implyed ſuperiority over the ordinary Paſtors of the Churches; nor whether the Paſtors of the Church ſhould act in an equality in their governing Churches. I grant that all Church-Government muſt be performed by officers of Chriſt's appointing, but that which I ſay is not determined in Scripture, is the way and manner whereby they ſhall govern Churches in common.

§. 11. It is yet farther argued, *That if the form of Church-Government be not immutably determined in Scripture, then it is in the Church's power, to make new officers which Chriſt never made, which muſt be a plain addition*

Parker Polit. Eccleſ. l. 2. c. 45. §. 6.

to the Laws of Chriſt, and muſt argue the Scripture of Imperfection. This being one of the main arguments, I have reſerved it to the place of the *Triarii*, and ſhall now examine what ſtrength there lies in it. To this therefore I anſwer, *Firſt*, Thoſe officers are only ſaid to be new, which were never appointed by Chriſt, and are contrary to the firſt appointments of Chriſt for the regulating of his Church; ſuch it is granted the Church hath no power to inſtitute; but if by new officers be meant only ſuch as have a charge over more than one particular congregation, by the conſent of the Paſtors themſelves, then it is evident ſuch an office cannot be ſaid to be new; for beſides the general practice of the Church of God, from the firſt Primitive Times, which have all conſented in the uſe of ſuch officers; we find the foundation of this power laid by Chriſt himſelf, in the power which the Apoſtles were inveſted in, which was extended over many, both Churches and Paſtors; but if it be ſaid, *The Apoſtolical power being extraordinary, muſt ceaſe with the perſons which enjoyed it*; I anſwer, *Firſt*, What was extraordinary did ceaſe; but all the diſpute is, what was extraordinary, and what not; ſome things were ordinary in them, as Preaching, Baptizing, Ordaining, Ruling Churches, ſome things were again extraordinary, as immediate Miſſion from Chriſt, (the main diſtinguiſhing note of an Apoſtle) a power of working Miracles, to confirm the truth of what they preached: Now the Queſtion is, whether the power which they enjoyed over Preſbyters and Churches, be to be reckoned in the firſt or the ſecond number. It muſt therefore be proved to be extraordinary, before it can be ſaid to ceaſe with them; and that muſt be done by ſome arguments proper to their perſons; for if the arguments brought be of a common and moral nature, it will prove the office to be ſo too. *Secondly*, By ceaſing may be meant, either ceaſing as to its *neceſſity*, or ceaſing as to its *lawfulneſs:* I ſay not, but that the *neceſſity* of the office, as in their Perſons, for the firſt preaching and propagating the Goſpel, did ceaſe with them; but that after their death it became *unlawful* for any particular perſons to take the care and charge of *Dioceſan* Churches, I deny. For to make a thing unlawful which was before lawful, there muſt be ſome expreſs prohibition forbidding any farther uſe of ſuch a power, which I ſuppoſe men will not eaſily produce in the Word of God.

§. 12. I anſwer therefore, *Secondly*, That the extending of any Miniſterial power, is not the appointing of any new Office; becauſe every Miniſter of the Goſpel hath a relation *in actu primo* to the whole Church of God; the reſtraint and enlargement of which power is ſubject to poſitive determinations of prudence and conveniency *in actu ſecundo*; and therefore if the Church ſee it fit for ſome men to have this power enlarged for better government in ſome, and reſtrained in others, that enlargement is the appointing no new office, but the making uſe of a power already enjoyed for the benefit of the Church of God. This being a foundation tending ſo fully to clear the lawfulneſs of that Government in the Church which implies a ſuperiority and ſubordination of the officers of the Church to one another; and the Churches uſing her prudence in ordering the bounds of her officers, I ſhall do theſe two things: *Firſt*, Shew that the power of every Miniſter of the Goſpel doth primarily and habitually reſpect the Church in common. *Secondly*, That the Church may in a peculiar manner ſingle out ſome of its officers for the due adminiſtration of Eccleſiaſtical power. *Firſt*, That every Miniſter of the Goſpel hath a power reſpecting the Church in common: This I find fully and largely proved by thoſe who aſſert the equality of the power of Miniſters; *Firſt*, From Chriſt's beſtowing the ſeveral offices of the Church for the uſe of the whole Church, *Eph.* 4. 12, 13. Chriſt hath ſet Apoſtles, *&c.* Paſtors and Teachers in his Church; now this Church muſt needs be the Catholick viſible Church, because indiſputably the Apoſtles office did relate thereto, and conſequently ſo muſt that of Paſtors and Teachers too: Again, The end of theſe offices is the building up the body of Chriſt, which cannot otherwiſe be underſtood than of his whole Church; elſe Chriſt muſt have as many bodies as the Church hath particular congregations. Which is a new way of *Conſubſtantiation*. *Secondly*, The miniſterial office was in being before any particular congregations were gathered; for Chriſt upon his aſcenſion to glory *gave theſe gifts to men*; and the Apoſtles were impowered by Chriſt before his aſcenſion; either then they were no Church-officers, or if they were ſo, they could have no other *Correlate*, but the whole body of the Church of God then lying under the power of darkneſs, a few perſons excepted. *Thirdly*, Becauſe the main deſign of appointing a Goſpel-Miniſtry, was the converſion of Heathens and Infidels; and if theſe be the proper object of the miniſterial Function, then the office muſt have reference to the whole Church of Chriſt; elſe there could be no part of that office performed towards thoſe who are not yet converted. *Fourthly*, Elſe a Miniſter can perform no office belonging to him as ſuch, beyond the bounds of his particular congregation, and ſo can neither preach nor adminiſter the Sacraments to any other but within the bounds of his own particular place and people. *Fifthly*, Becauſe Miniſters by baptizing do admit men into the catholick viſible Church, (elſe a man muſt be baptized again every time he removes from one Church to another) and none can admit beyond what their office doth extend to; therefore it is evident that every particular Paſtor of a Church hath a relation to the whole Church: To which purpoſe our former obſervation is of great uſe, *viz.* That particular Congregations are not of God's *primary intention*, but for *mens conveniency*, and ſo conſequently is the fixedneſs of particular Paſtors to their ſeveral places for the greater conveniency of the Church; every Paſtor of a Church then hath a relation to the whole Church; and that which hinders him from the exerciſe of this power, is not any unlawfulneſs in the thing, but the preſerving of order and conveniency in the Church of God. This being premiſed, I ſay, *Secondly*, That the officers of the Church may in a peculiar manner attribute a larger and more extenſive power to ſome particular perſons for the more convenient exerciſe of their common power. We have ſeen already that their power extends to the care of the Churches in common, that the reſtraint of this power is a matter of order and decency in the Church of God: Now in matters of common concernment, without all queſtion, it is not unlawful when the Church judgeth it moſt for edification, to grant to ſome the *executive part* of that power, which is originally and fundamentally common to them all. For our better underſtanding of this, we muſt conſider a twofold power belonging to Church-officers, *a power of order*, and *a power of juriſdiction*; for in every *Preſbyter*, there are ſome things inſeparably joined to his Function, and belonging to every one in his perſonal capacity, both in *actu primo*, and in *actu ſecundo*, both as to the *right and power* to do it, and the *exerciſe and execution* of

1 Cor. 12. 28, 29.

Eph. 4. 8. Mat. 28. 19.

of that power, ſuch are Preaching the Word, viſiting the ſick, adminiſtring Sacraments, *&c.* but there are other things which every Preſbyter hath an aptitude, and a *jus* to *in actu primo*, but the limitation and exerciſe of that power doth belong to the Church in common, and belong not to any one perſonally, but by a farther power of choice or delegation to it, ſuch is the power of viſiting Churches, taking care that particular Paſtors diſcharge their duty; ſuch is the power of ordination and Church cenſures, and making rules for decency in the Church; this is that we call the *power of juriſdiction.* Now this latter power, though it belongs habitually and *in actu primo* to every Preſbyter; yet being about matters of publick and common concernment, ſome farther authority in a Church conſtituted is neceſſary beſides the power of order; and when this power, either by conſent of the Paſtors of the Church, or by the appointment of a Chriſtian Magiſtrate, or both, is devolved to ſome particular perſons, though *quoad aptitudinem* the power remain in every Preſbyter, yet *quoad executionem* it belongs to thoſe who are ſo appointed. And therefore *Camero* determines that *Ordinatio non fit à paſtore quatenus paſtor eſt, ſed quatenus ad tempus ſingularem authoritatem obtinet*, i. e. That Ordination doth not belong to the power of order but to the power of juriſdiction, and therefore is ſubject to poſitive reſtraints, by prudential determinations. By this we may underſtand how lawful the exerciſe of an Epiſcopal power may be in the Church of God, ſuppoſing an equality in all Church officers as to the power of order. And how incongruouſly they ſpeak, who ſuppoſing an equality in the Preſbyters of Churches at firſt, do cry out, that the Church takes upon her the office of Chriſt, if ſhe delegates any to a more peculiar exerciſe of the power of juriſdiction.

De Eccleſia in Mat. 18. 15. *Tom.* I. *op. in* 4. *p.* 27.

§. 13. The laſt thing pleaded why an immutable form of Church Government muſt be laid down in Scripture, is *from the perfection and ſufficiency of the Scriptures; becauſe otherwiſe the Scriptures would be condemned of imperfection.* But this will receive an eaſie diſpatch: For, *Firſt*, The controverſie about the perfection of the Scriptures, is not concerning an eſſential or integral perfection, but a perfection *ratione finis & effectuum* in order to its end: now the end of it is to be an adæquate rule of faith and manners, and ſufficient to bring men to ſalvation; which it is ſufficiently acknowledged to be, if all things neceſſary to be believed or practiſed be contained in the Word of God: now that which we aſſert not to be fully laid down in Scripture, is not pleaded to be any ways neceſſary, nor to be a matter of faith, but ſomething left to the Churches liberty; but here it is ſaid by ſome, that this *is adding to the Law of God*, which deſtroys the Scriptures perfection: therefore I anſwer, *Secondly*, Whatever is done with an opinion of the neceſſity of doing it, deſtroys the Scriptures perfection if it be not contained in it: for that were to make it an imperfect rule; and in this ſenſe every *additio perficiens* is *additio corrumpens*, becauſe it takes away from the perfection of the rule which it is added to; and thus Popiſh traditions are deſtructiue of the Scriptures ſufficiency. But the doing of any thing not poſitively determined in Scripture, not looking upon it as a thing we are bound to do from the neceſſity of the thing, and obſerving the general rules of Scriptures in the doing of it, is far from deſtroying the perfection or ſufficiency of the Word of God. *Thirdly*, All eſſentials of Church Government, are contained clearly in Scripture: The eſſentials of Church Government, are ſuch as are neceſſary to the preſervation of ſuch a ſociety

Rivet. Iſagog. ad Script. ſacr. cap. 24. §. 3.

as the Church is; now all theſe things have been not only granted, but proved to be contained in Scripture; but whatever is not ſo neceſſary in its ſelf, can only become neceſſary by vertue of God's expreſs command, and what is not ſo commanded, is accidental and circumſtantial, and a matter of Chriſtian liberty, and ſuch we aſſert the form of Church Government to be. It is not our work to enquire, why God hath determined ſome things that might ſeem more circumſtantial than this, and left other things at liberty, but whether God hath determined theſe things or no. Which determination being once cleared, makes the thing ſo commanded neceſſary as to our obſervance of it: but if no ſuch thing be made appear, the thing remains a matter of liberty, and ſo the Scriptures perfection as to the neceſſaries in order to ſalvation, is no ways impeached by it. So much now for the neceſſity of Chriſt's determining the particular form of Government: we now proceed to the conſideration of Chriſt's actions, whether by them the form of Church Government is determined or no?

CHAP. V.

Whether any of Chriſt's actions have determined the form of Government. All power in Chriſt's hands for Governing his Church: what order Chriſt took in order thereto when he was in the world. Calling Apoſtles the firſt action reſpecting outward Government; the name and office of Apoſtles cleared; an equality among them proved during our Saviour's life. Peter *not made Monarch of the Church by Chriſt. The Apoſtles power over the ſeventy Diſciples conſidered, with the nature and quality of their office*, Matth. 20. 25, 26, 27. *largely diſcuſſed and explained. It makes not all inequality in Church officers unlawful; by the difference of Apoſtles and Paſtors of Churches.* Matth. 18, 15. *How far that determines the form of Church Government. No evidence of any exact order for Church Government from thence,* Matth. 16. 15, 16, 17, 18. *conſidered how far that concerns the Government of the Church.*

§. 1. HAving conſidered and anſwered the Arguments which are brought, why Chriſt muſt determine the particular form of Government: Our next taſk will be to enquire into thoſe actions of our Saviour which are conceived to have any plauſible aſpect towards the ſetling the form of Government in his Church. And were it not that men are generally ſo wedded to an *hypotheſis* they have once drunk in by the prevalency of intereſt or education, we might have been ſuperſeded from our former labour, but that men are ſo ready to think that opinion to be moſt neceſſary, which they are moſt in love with, and have appeared moſt zealous for. Men are loth to be perſuaded that they have ſpent ſo much breath to ſo little purpoſe, and have been ſo hot and eager for ſomewhat, which at laſt appears to be a matter of Chriſtian liberty. Therefore we find very few that have been ever very earneſt in the maintaining or promoting any matter of opinion, but have laid more weight upon it, than it would really bear; leſt men ſhould think, that with all their ſweat and toil, they only beat the air, and break their teeth in cracking a nut, with a hole in it; which if they had been ſo wiſe as to diſcern before, they might have ſaved their pains for ſomewhat which would have better recompenced them. But thus it generally fares with men; they ſuck in principles according as intereſt and education diſpoſeth them, which being once in, have the advantage of inſinuating themſelves into the underſtanding, and thereby raiſe a prejudice againſt what ever comes to diſturb them; which prejudice being the *Yellow Jaundiſe* of the ſoul, leaves ſuch a tincture upon the eyes of the underſtanding, that till it be cured of that *Icteriſm*, it cannot diſcern things in their proper colours. Now this prejudice is raiſed by nothing more ſtrongly, than when the opinion received is entertained upon a preſumption, that there is a *Divine ſtamp* and *Impreſs* upon it, though no ſuch *Effigies* be diſcernable there. Hence come all the ſeveral contending parties about Church Government, equally to plead an intereſt in this *Jus Divinum*, and whatever opinion they have *eſpouſed*, they preſently conceive it to be of no leſs than *Divine* extract and *Original*. And as it ſometimes was with great perſonages among the *Heathens*, when their miſcarriages were diſcernable to the eye of the world, the better to *palliate* them among the *vulgar*, they gave themſelves out to be impregnated by ſome of their adored Deities; ſo I fear it hath been among ſome whoſe Religion ſhould have taught them better things, when either faction, deſign, or intereſt, hath formed ſome conceptions within them ſuitable thereunto, to make them the more paſſable to the world, they are brought forth under the pretence of Divine truths. Far be it from me to charge any ſincere, humble, ſober Chriſtians with an offence of ſo high a nature, who yet may be poſſeſſed with ſome miſtakes and apprehenſions of this nature; but theſe are only wrought on by the *Maſters of parties*, who know, unleſs they fly ſo high, they ſhall never hit the game they aim at. This is moſt diſcernable in the *Factors* for the *Roman Omnipotency* (as *Paulus* the fifth was call'd *Omnipotentiæ Pontificiæ Conſervator*) they who ſee not that Intereſt and Faction upholds that *Court* rather than *Church*, may well be preſumed to be hoodwinked with more than an implicite faith; and yet if we believe the great ſupporters of that intereſt, the power they plead for is plainly given them from Chriſt himſelf, and not only offer to prove that it was ſo, but that it was not conſiſtent with the wiſdom of Chriſt that it ſhould be otherwiſe. Leſt I ſhould ſeem to wrong thoſe of any religion, hear what the author of the *Gloſs* upon the *Extravagancies* (ſo they may well be called) ſaith to this purpoſe, **Extravag. unum ſanctum.** applying that place of our Saviour, *all power is given to me in heaven and earth*, Matth. 28. 18. to the *Pope*, adds theſe words, *Non videretur Dominus diſcretus fuiſſe, ut cum reverentia ejus loquar, niſi unicum poſt ſe talem vicarium reliquiſſet, qui hæc omnia poſſet.* We ſee by this what blaſphemies men may run into, when they argue from their private fancies and opinions, to what muſt be done by the Law of Chriſt. It therefore becomes all ſober Chriſtians impartially to inquire what Chriſt hath done, and to ground their opinions only upon that, without any ſuch preſumptuous intruſions into the Counſels of Heaven. We here therefore take our leave of the diſpute, why it was neceſſary a form of Government ſhould be eſtabliſhed, and now enter upon a ſurvey of thoſe grounds which are taken from any paſſages of our Saviour, commonly produced as a foundation for any particular Forms.

§. 2. I ſhall not ſtand to prove that *Chriſt* as *Mediator* hath all the power over the *Church* in his own hands, it being a thing ſo evident from Scripture, and ſo beyond all diſpute with thoſe whom I have to deal with. **Mat. 28. 18. Iſa. 9. 6.** In which reſpect he is the only head of the Church, and from whom all divine right for authority in the Church muſt be derived. Which right can ariſe only from ſome actions or Laws of Chriſt, which we therefore now ſearch into. The firſt publick action of Chriſt after his ſolemn entrance upon his office, which can be conceived to have any reference to the Government of his Church, was the calling the *Apoſtles.* In whom for our better methodizing this diſcourſe, we ſhall obſerve theſe three ſeveral ſteps. Firſt, When they were called to be Chriſt's Diſciples. Secondly, When Chriſt ſent them out with a power of Miracles. Thirdly, When he gave them their full Commiſſion of acting with Apoſtolical power all the world over. Theſe three ſeaſons are accurately to be diſtinguiſhed; for the Apoſtles did not enjoy ſo great power when they were diſciples, as when they were ſent abroad by Chriſt; neither had they any proper power of Church-Government after that ſending Mat. 28. 18, 19. forth, till after Chriſt's reſurrection, when Chriſt told them, *all power was put into his hands*, and therefore gave them full commiſſion to *go and preach the Goſpel to all nations.* The *firſt ſtep* then we obſerve in the Apoſtles towards their power of Church-Government, was in their firſt calling to be Diſciples. Two ſeveral calls are obſerved in Scripture, concerning the Apoſtles; the firſt was more general, when they were called only to follow Chriſt; the ſecond more ſpecial when Chriſt told them what he called them to, and ſpecified and deſcribed their office to them, by telling them he would make them *Fiſhers of Men.* We ſhall endeavour to digeſt the order of their calling as clearly and as briefly as we can. Our bleſſed Saviour, about the thirtieth year of his Luke 3.23. age, ſolemnly entring upon the diſcharge of his prophetical office in making known himſelf to be the true *Meſſias* to the world, to make his Mat. 3. 13. Mat. 4. 1. appearance more publick, goes to *Jordan*, and is there baptized of *John*; preſently after he is led up by the Spirit into the wilderneſs, where he continued forty days. In this ſpace of time *John* removes from *Jordan* John 1.29. and comes on the other ſide to *Bethabara*; thither *Chriſt* comes to *John*; *John* not only owns *Chriſt* himſelf, but tells his diſciples this was he into whoſe name he had baptized them. Upon this, two of *John*'s John 1.37. diſciples leave their Maſter and follow *Chriſt.* Theſe two are the firſt diſciples we ever read our Saviour had; whereof the one was *Andrew*, *Peter*'s brother, and the other probably conceived to be *John* (it being his cuſtom to conceal his name when he ſpeaks of himſelf); *Andrew* calls his brother *Peter*; Chriſt next day calls *Philip*; *Philip* he finds *Nathaniel.* And this as far as we read, was the firſt number of Chriſt's diſciples. John 2. 2. John 2.17, 23. Here we find *two or three gathered together in the name of Chriſt, and Chriſt* (truly) *in the midſt of them.* Theſe diſciples it appears ſtaid with Chriſt ſome time, for they went with him to the marriage in *Cana:* and after went up with him to *Jeruſalem*, when many profeſſed to be John 3. 22. John 4. 1. his diſciples; from thence he goes into *Judea*, where he gathers many diſciples, and baptizeth them. After this he returns with his diſciples, by the way of *Samaria* into *Galilee:* and theſe diſciples being now again at home, in probability did return for their livelihood to their old imployments for ſome ſmall time, Chriſt having not yet commanded them to forſake all and follow him. Not long after (about a years ſpace from the firſt calling them) *Jeſus* being in *Galilee* goes to the lake of Luke 5. 1. *Genezareth*, there he finds *Andrew* and *Peter* fiſhing: after the miracle there Math. 4. 18, 19. wrought, he then in a more ſolemn manner calls them to leave their Mark 1.16, 17. imployment, for he had deſigned them for a greater, which was to be Fiſhers of men. Whereby *our Saviour* expreſſeth the care, pains, diligence,

gence, deſign and end of the Miniſterial function he had appointed them for. *Andrew* and *Peter* preſently leave all and follow Chriſt; the like do *James* and *John*, whom they met with a little farther upon the ſhore. And now thoſe who were before but as common Diſciples, are admitted into a higher order, and bred up by Chriſt, as perſons deſigned for an employment of ſo high a nature. We ſee here a neceſſity of making a double call of the Apoſtles; elſe it were impoſſible to reconcile the narration of *John* with the other Evangeliſts. Therefore *Auguſtine* thinks their firſt being with *Chriſt* in *John*, was only for preſent ſatisfaction who he was, which as ſoon as they underſtood and admired, they returned to their own habitations. *Thomas* he makes three ſeveral callings of them, the firſt *ad agnitionem & familiaritatem*, which is that in *John*; the ſecond *ad Diſcipulatum* that ſpoken of in *Luke* 5. 1. the third *ad adheſionem*, Mat. 4. 18. Mark 1. 16. But I ſee no reaſon to make the ſtory in *Luke* to be different from that of *Matthew* and *Mark*; the former ſome ſay was *vocatio ad fidem*, a general preparatory call to the latter; the latter was *vocatio ad munus Apoſtolicum*; although they were not choſen to be Apoſtles till afterwards, yet now Chriſt made them *Candidates* of the Apoſtleſhip, *& amicos interioris admiſſionis*, in order to that great employment he had deſigned them for. Farther we muſt take notice that from the time of the Baptiſm of *John*, the *Apoſtles* did generally continue with *Chriſt*, which appears from the qualification of an Apoſtle given by *Peter* at the choice of *Matthias: Of thoſe men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jeſus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptiſm of* John, *unto the ſame day he was taken up from us.* The ſtrength of which teſtimony is impregnable for proving that the Apoſtles did generally continue with Chriſt after their being called to follow him; but that time from the baptiſm of *John* muſt not be taken ſtrictly, for many of the *Apoſtles*, as *Matthew*, *&c.* were not called till ſome time after. About four months after *Chriſt*'s more ſolemn calling of the *Apoſtles*, at the time of *Pentecoſt*, as *Chemnitius* conjectures, our Saviour proceeds to a ſolemn choice of them into their offices, which is deſcribed by *Luke* 6. 13. after he had prayed the whole night before, v. 12. *Mark* he acquaints us with the ends of Chriſt's chuſing them: Firſt, That they might continually attend upon him the better to be fitted for their employment afterwards; which he expreſſeth, when he adds, that he might ſend them out to preach, and to give them power over Devils and Diſeaſes, to caſt out the one, and to cure the other. Their actual ſending out was not (ſay ſome) till half a year after, which is the ſtory related by *Mat.* 10. 1. near a *twelve* month, (ſay others) but preſently, upon their choice, *Chriſt* makes the Sermon in the Mount, as appears by the comparing *Luke* 6. 17, 20. with *Mat.* 5. 1. wherein, among other things, our Saviour takes occaſion to declare their duty to them, telling them, they were the *Light of the world*, &c. which he doth the more to fit them for the diſcharge of their employment.

De Conſenſu Evan. l. 2. cap. 17.

V. Caſaub. excer. in Bar. 13. ſ. 11. Montacut. Orig. Eccleſ. To. 1. p. 2. p. 41. Chemnit. Harm. Evan. c. 36.

Acts 1. 21, 22.

Harmon. cap. 50.

Mark 3. 14, 15.

§. 3. Having thus laid theſe things together about the Apoſtles, from their firſt calling, to the time of their *miſſion*, we ſhall take notice of theſe things from them which may relate to the office which the Apoſtles were called to, and to the government of the Church by them. *Firſt*, We here obſerve that our Saviour no ſooner began to preach the Goſpel himſelf, but he made choice of ſome perſons as a peculiar order of men, for the propagation of the Goſpel in the world. The peculiarity of the

Function of a Goſpel-Miniſtry under Chriſt was, we ſee, deſigned from Chriſt's firſt publick appearance in his office; he might have left the *Apoſtles* in the common order of *Diſciples*, had he not intended an office in his Church, diſtinct and peculiar from all other employments; and therefore it is obſervable that Chriſt did not call the *Apoſtles* off from their other employments, till he deſigned to make them *Apoſtles*; before, when they were only private Diſciples, they did follow their employments at ſome times ſtill; but when he calls them to be *Fiſhers of Men*, he bids them leave all and follow him. *Secondly*, We take notice of the admirable wiſdom of our Saviour in the choice he made of the perſons for firſt founding his Church; and the means he uſed to fit them for it. The perſons were ſuch as were moſt ſuitable to his deſign; the means ſuch as were moſt ſuitable to the perſons. The perſons were ſuch, who by reaſon of the known meanneſs of their condition, and ſuppoſed weakneſs of abilities, were the fitteſt to convince the world, that the doctrine which they preached was not the product of humane wiſdom, but the *expreſs Image* and *character* of *Divine Truth*; whoſe nakedneſs and ſimplicity would gain more upon mens belief by the power which accompanied the preaching of it, than the moſt refined and ſublimated notions of their wiſe men ſhould do, managed with the greateſt ſubtilty and prudence by the maintainers of them. *Chriſt* would make men ſee that his doctrine ſtood not in need either of the wiſdom or power of men, to defend or propagate it; and therefore made choice of the moſt unlikely inſtruments for that end; *that mens* 1 Cor. 2. 5. *faith ſhould not ſtand in the wiſdom of men, but in the power of God.* But withal we are to take notice of Chriſt's admirable wiſdom in the means he uſed to fit and qualifie them for the firſt builders of his Church; for although the power and efficacy of their preaching was wholly from God, and not from themſelves, yet our Saviour doth not preſently, upon his calling them, place them in the higheſt office he intended them for, but proceeds gradually with them, and keeps them a long time under his own eye and inſtruction, before he ſends them abroad; and that for two ends chiefly: Firſt, *To be witneſſes of his actions.* Secondly, *To be auditors of his doctrine. Firſt*, To be witneſſes of his actions, which was looked on by the Apoſtles, as the moſt neceſſary qualification for an Apoſtle, in the place fore-cited, *Acts* 1. 21, 22. *Peter* calls himſelf a *witneſs of the ſufferings of Chriſt*, 1 Pet. 5. 1. *John* ſaith, *that which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have ſeen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life; that which we have ſeen and heard, declare we unto you*, 1 Joh. 1. 1, 3. whereby the *credibility* of the Goſpel was ſufficiently evidenced to the world, when the Preachers of it ſpake nothing but what their own ſenſes were witneſſes of, both as to the doctrines and actions of Chriſt; and therefore is no ways *credible*, they ſhould be deceived themſelves in what they ſpoke; and more *improbable* they would deceive others, whoſe *intereſt* lay wholly upon the *truth* of the doctrine which they preached; for by the very preaching of that doctrine they robb'd themſelves of all the comforts of life, and expoſed themſelves to a thouſand miſeries in this life; ſo that unleſs their doctrine was true in order to another life, they were guilty of the greateſt folly this world ever heard of. We ſee what care our Saviour took to ſatisfie the reaſons of men concerniug the *credibility* of his doctrine, when the perſons he employed in the founding of a Church upon it, were only ſuch as

were intimately converſant with the whole life, doctrine, and works of him from whom they received it; and thereby we cannot ſuppoſe any ignorance in them concerning the things they ſpoke; and leſt men ſhould miſtruſt they might have a deſign to impoſe on others, he made their faithfulneſs appear, by their expoſing themſelves to any hazards to make good the truth of what they preached. Eſpecially having ſuch a Divine power accompanying them in the miracles wrought by them, which were enough to perſuade any rational men, that they came upon a true *Embaſſie*, who carried ſuch *Credentials* along with them. Another end of our Saviour's training up his Apoſtles ſo long in his School before he ſent them abroad, was, that they might be auditors of his doctrine, and ſo might learn themſelves before they taught others. Chriſt was no friend to thoſe haſty births which run abroad with the ſhell on their heads; no, although it was in his power to confer the gifts of the Holy Ghoſt, as well at their firſt entrance into Diſcipleſhip as afterwards, yet we ſee he nurtures and trains them up gradually, teaching them as *Quintilian* would have Maſters do, *Guttatim*, acquainting them now with one, then with another of the Myſteries of the Goſpel. Chriſt doth not overwhelm them with floods and torrents of diſcourſes, but gently drops now one thing into them, then another, by which way ſuch narrow-mouth'd veſſels would be the ſooneſt filled. Yea our Saviour uſeth ſuch an οἰκονομία, as the Greek Fathers call it, ſuch a prudent Temper in inſtructing them, that it is matter of juſt admiration to conſider under how great and ſtupendous ignorance of the main points of redemption, (Chriſt's death and reſurrection, and the nature of Chriſt's Kingdom) they diſcovered, after they had been ſome years under Chriſt's Tutorage. And we ſee what induſtry and diligence was uſed in the training up of thoſe for the Apoſtleſhip, who were in an immediate way ſent out by Chriſt. And it is very probable that upon the firſt ſending abroad, they taught not by immediate revelation, but only what they had learned from Chriſt during their being with him. Whence we ſee what a ſubordination there is in acquired parts, labour, and induſtry, to the teachings and inſpirations of the Divine Spirit; our Saviour looked not on his labour as loſt, although afterwards the *Unction from the Holy One ſhould teach them all things.* It was Chriſt's deſign to have them go מחיר אל——חיל *from ſtrength to ſtrength,* Pſal. 84. 7.
à domo ſanctuarii in domum doctrinæ, as the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* renders that place, *from one School of learning to another.* As under the Law, even thoſe that waited for the *Ruach-hakkodeſh*, *the inſpiration of the Divine Spirit*, were brought up in the *Schools* of the *Prophets* under inſtruction there; which was the place where they lay expecting the gentle gale of the Holy Spirit to carry them forth; which was the ground of *Amos* his complaint, *that he was neither a Prophet, nor the ſon of a* Amos 7.14.
Prophet; by which it ſeems evident, that God's ordinary courſe was to take ſome of the Sons of the Prophets out of the Colleges where they lived, and employ them in the Prophetical-office. But of this largely elſewhere. Such a *School* of the *Prophets* did our Saviour now erect, wherein he entred his Diſciples as *Scholars*, and educated them in order to the office he intended them for.

§. 4.
The next thing we take notice of, is the name and nature of that office which Chriſt call'd them to. They who derive the uſe of the name of Apoſtles, as apply'd by Chriſt to his Diſciples, either from the ἀποστολεῖς at *Athens*, by which name the Maſters of ſome Ships were

Suidas in v. call'd, as the Ships ἀπόστολοι, or from *Heſychius* his ἀπόστολοι, which he *Digeſt.l.50. tit. 16. leg. 106.* interprets νυμφαγωγοί, or from the ἀπόστολοι, in the ſenſe of the *Civil Law*, which ſignifie the dimiſſory Letters granted for appeals; or from *Cont. Ebionitas.* the Jewiſh שליחין as thereby were underſtood thoſe ἀπόστολοι, as *Epiphanius* calls them, who were as Aſſeſſors and Counſellors to the *Patriarch* of the Jews at *Tiberias*; or thoſe Officers who were ſent up and down by the *Patriarch* to gather up Tenths, firſt Fruits, and ſuch other *Lib.16. tit. 8.* things, who are call'd thence *Apoſtoli* in the *Codex Theod. tit. de Judæis*; all theſe, I ſay, do equally loſe their labour, and run far to fetch that which might be found much nearer home: Our Saviour taking the word from common uſe, but applying it in a ſpecial manner to a peculiar ſenſe, which is the cuſtom of the Scriptures. The original of the word properly imports ſuch as are employed by commiſſion from an*Exercit.14. Sect. 4.* other, for the diſpatch of ſome buſineſs in his name. So *Caſaubon*, (who was ſufficiently able to judge of the uſe of a Greek word) *In communi Græcorum uſu* ἀπόστολοι *dicebantur certi homines, qui negotii gerendi gratiâ, magis quam deferendi nuntii, aliquo mittebantur.* And ſo it is taken, *John* 13. 16. οὐδὲ ἀπόστολος μείζων τοῦ πέμψαντος αὐτὸν, *He that is ſent is not greater than he that ſent him.* Thence *Epaphroditus*, when employed upon a ſpecial meſſage to *Paul*, in the name of the Churches, is call'd ἀπόστολος ὑμῶν, *Phil.* 2. 25. which we tranſlate *your meſſenger.* And ſo *Titus*, and the two other, ſent to the Church of *Co-2Cor. 8.23. rinth*, to gather their charity, are call'd ἀπόστολοι ἐκκλησιῶν, *the meſſengers of the Churches.* Thence *Paul* fully renders the import and ſenſe of the word Apoſtle by πρεσβεύομεν, 2 *Corinth.* 5. 20. *We act as Ambaſſadors for Chriſt.* To which purpoſe it is obſervable, that the Septuagint, (whoſe Greek is moſt followed by the New Teſtament) do render the word שלח when it ſignifies to employ a meſſenger upon ſpecial ſervice, by ἀποστέλλειν, as 1 *Kings* 21. 11.——— 1 *Kings* 12. 18. *Exod.* 4. 30. and the very word ἀπόστολος is uſed in this ſenſe, 1 *Kings* 14. 6. where *Abijah* ſaith, *I am* ἀπόστολος πρὸς σὲ σκληρός, *a ſad meſſenger to thee; for thus ſaith the Lord.* Whereby the full ſenſe and importance of the word Apoſtle appears to be, one that is employed by a peculiar commiſſion from him that hath authority over him, for the doing ſome ſpecial ſervice. Thus were Chriſt's Diſciples called Apoſtles, from the immediate commiſſion which they had from Chriſt, for diſcharge of that work which he employed them in. Thence our Saviour makes uſe of the word *ſending* in the proper and peculiar ſenſe, when he gives the Apoſtles their commiſſions, in thoſe remarkable words of Chriſt to them. *As the Father hath ſent me, ſo ſend I you*, Joh. 20. 21. Whereby our Saviour delegates his power and authority which he had as Doctor of the Church, to his Apoſtles, upon his leaving the world, not in a *privative way*, ſo as to deſtroy his own authority over the Church, but in a *cumulative way*, inveſting them with that authority which they had not before, for both teaching and governing the Church. No argument then can be drawn for the right or form of Church-Government from Chriſt's actions towards his diſciples, before the laſt and full commiſſion was given unto them; becauſe they had no power of Church-Government before that time.

§. 5. Which will be farther cleared, if we conſider their firſt ſending out, ſpoken of, *Mat.* 10. 1. *Mark* 6. 7. *Luke* 9. 1. Several things lie in our way to be obſerved, in reference to this *Miſſion* of the Apoſtles. *Firſt*, That though the Apoſtles had been now for ſome competent time, not only called to their office, but ſolemnly choſen to it; yet we no where read that they did ever exerciſe that office till now they were ſent forth by Chriſt. They remained ſtill at Chriſt's feet, learning for their own inſtruction, and fitting themſelves for their future employment, and thought it no inconvenience while they lay for a wind, to lay in ſufficient lading and proviſion for their voyage. Baptize indeed they did before, *Joh.* 4. 2. but that I ſuppoſe was done by them by an immediate preſent order from Chriſt himſelf, being by as the chief in the action; thence Chriſt in one place is ſaid to baptize, *Joh.* 3. 22. and yet he is ſaid not to baptize, but his diſciples, *Joh.* 4. 2. Chriſt did it *authoritatively*, the diſciples *miniſterially*. Yet if we ſhould grant the diſciples did then baptize as private men after the received cuſtom of the Jews, (among whom only a *Conſeſſus trium* was requiſite to baptize a Proſelyte) this doth not at all take off from the peculiarity of a Function both to preach and baptize, becauſe as yet the Goſpel-Miniſtry was not inſtituted; and therefore what might be lawful before reſtraint, doth not follow it ſhould be ſo after; when all thoſe ſcattered Rays and Beams which were diſperſed abroad before, were gathered into the Miniſterial-office upon Chriſt's appointing it, as that great *Hemiſphere* of Light in the Creation was after ſwallowed up in the body of the Sun. But now were the Apoſtles firſt ſent out to preach, and now God firſt begins to null the Jewiſh-Miniſtry, and ſet up another inſtead of it, and makes good that threatning, *that he was againſt the* Ezek. 34. 10. *Shepherds, and would require the flock at their hand, and cauſe them to ceaſe to feed the flock*, &c. Here then we have the firſt exerciſe of the Apoſtles Miniſtry, for which we ſee, beſides their former call and choice, particular Miſſion was after neceſſary. *Secondly*, We obſerve, That the employment Chriſt ſent them upon now, was only a temporary employment, confined as to work and place, and not the full Apoſtolical work. The want of conſidering and underſtanding this, hath been the ground of very many miſtakes among men, when they argue from the occaſional precepts here given the *Apoſtles*, as from a ſtanding perpetual rule for a Goſpel-Miniſtry; whereas our Saviour only ſuited theſe inſtructions to the preſent caſe, and the nature and condition of the Apoſtles preſent employment; which was not to preach the Goſpel up and down themſelves, but to be as ſo many *John Baptiſts*, to call the people to the hearing of *Chriſt* himſelf; and therefore the doctrine they were to preach, was the ſame with his, *the Kingdom* Mat. 10. 7. *of Heaven is at hand*, whereby it appears their doctrine was only preparatory to Chriſt; it being only to raiſe up higher expectations of the Goſpel-ſtate under the *Meſſias*; and theſe were they *whom the King now* Mat. 22. 9 *ſent into the high-ways, to invite men to the marriage-feaſt, and to bid them to come in to him.* This was the only preſent employment of the Apoſtles in their firſt Miſſion, in which they were confined to the Cities of *Judæa*, that they might have the firſt refuſal of the Goſpel offers. This Miſſion then being *occaſional*, *limited*, and *temporary*, can yield no foundation for any thing *perpetual* to be built upon it. *Thirdly*, We obſerve, That thoſe whom Chriſt employed in the firſt diſperſing the Goſpel abroad, were furniſhed with arguments ſufficient to evince not only the *credibility*, but the certain *truth* of what they preached. Therefore Chriſt, when he now ſent them out, gave them ἐξουσίαν πνευμάτων, Mat. 10. 2. not only a *mere power to work miracles*, but *a right conferred on them to do it* as the *Apoſtles* of *Chriſt*. Theſe were the *Credentials* which the

Apoſtles carried along with them, to ſhew from whom they derived their power, and by whoſe authority they acted. And theſe were the moſt ſuitable to them, as making it appear that a divine preſence went along with them, and therefore they could not falſifie to the world in what they declared unto them; which was the beſt way for them to evidence the truth of their doctrine, becauſe it was not to be diſcovered by the evidence of the things themſelves, but it depended upon the teſtimony of the Author, and therefore the only way to confirm the truth of the doctrine, was to confirm the credibility of the Author, which was beſt done by doing ſomething above what the power of nature could reach unto. And this was the prerogative of the *Apoſtles* in their firſt Miſſion above *John the Baptiſt*; for of him it is ſaid, that he did no miracle. *Fourthly*, We obſerve, That the Apoſtles in this Miſſion were inveſted in no power over the Church, nor in any ſuperiority of order one over another. The firſt is evident, becauſe Chriſt did not now ſend them abroad to gather Churches, but only to call perſons to the doctrine of the *Meſſias*; and while Chriſt was in the world among them, he retained all Church power and authority in his own hand. When this temporary Miſſion expired, the Apoſtles lived as private perſons ſtill under Chriſt's Tutorage, and we never read them acting in the leaſt as Church-officers all that while. Which may appear from this one argument, becauſe all the time of our Saviour's being in the world, he never made a total ſeparation from the *Jewiſh Church*, but frequented with his diſciples the *Temple-worſhip* and ſervice to the laſt; although he ſuper-added many *Goſpel-obſervations* to thoſe of the *Law*. And therefore when no Churches were gathered, the Apoſtles could have no Church power over them. All that can be pleaded then in order to Church-Government, from the conſideration of the form of Government, as ſetled by our Saviour, muſt be either from *a ſuppoſed inequality among the Apoſtles themſelves, or their ſuperiority over the* LXX. *Diſciples; or from ſome rules laid down by Chriſt, in order to the* Government *of his Church, of which two are the moſt inſiſted on,* Mat. 20. 25. Mat. 18. 17. Of theſe then in their order.

§. 6. The firſt argument drawn for an eſtabliſhed form of Government in the Church, from the ſtate of the Apoſtles under Chriſt, is, *from a ſuppoſed inequality among the Apoſtles, and the ſuperiority of one as Monarch of the Church*; which is the Papiſts Plea from St. *Peter*, as the chief and head of the Apoſtles. Whoſe loud exclamations for St. *Peter*'s authority are much of the ſame nature with thoſe of *Demetrius* the Silver-ſmith at *Epheſus*, with his fellow Craftſmen, who cried up, Great is *Diana* of the *Epheſians*, not from the honour they bore to her as *Diana*, but from the gain which came to them from her worſhip at *Epheſus*. But I diſpute not now the *entail* of St. *Peter*'s *power*, what ever it was to the *Roman Biſhop*; but I only enquire into the *Pleas* drawn for his authority from the Scriptures, which are written in ſo ſmall a character, that without the *Spectacles* of an implicite Faith, they will ſcarce appear legible to the eyes of men. For what though *Chriſt changed St. Peter's name?* muſt it therefore follow that Chriſt baptized him Monarch of his Church? Were not *John* and *James* called by Chriſt *Boanerges?* and yet who thinks that thoſe *Sons of Thunder* muſt therefore overturn all other power but their own? *Chriſt* gave them new names, to ſhew his own *authority over them*, and not their *authority over others*; to be as *Monitors of their duty*, and not as *Inſtruments to convey power*.

power. So *Chryſoſtome* ſpeaks of the very name *Peter* given to *Simon*, it was to ſhew him his duty of being fixed and ſtable in the faith of Chriſt, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδάσκαλον διηνεχῆ τὴν προσηγορίαν τῆς τοιαύτης στερρότητος, *this name might be* (as a ſtring upon his finger) *a continual remembrancer of his duty.* And likewiſe, I conceive, as an encouragement to him after his fall, that he ſhould recover his former ſtability again; elſe it ſhould ſeem ſtrange, that he alone of the *Apoſtles*, ſhould have his name from *firmneſs* and *ſtability*, who *fell* the ſooneſt, and the fouleſt of any of the Apoſtles; unleſs it were κατ' ἀντίφρασιν, which would be worſe *Divinity* than Rhetorick. The change then of Saint *Peter*'s name imports no ſuch univerſal power, neither from the change, nor from the name. *But why then hath St.* Peter *the honour to be named firſt of all the Apoſtles?* *Firſt*, It ſeems to be implyed as an honour given to *Peter* above the reſt; but doth all honour carry an univerſal power along with it? There may be order certainly among equals; and there may be *firſt*, *ſecond* and *third*, *&c.* where there is no imparity and juriſdiction in the firſt over all the reſt. *A Primacy of order* as among equals, I know none will deny St. *Peter*: *A Primacy of power* as over Inferiors, I know none will grant, but ſuch as have ſubdued their reaſon to their paſſion and intereſt. Nay, a farther order of mere place, may without danger be attributed to him; a primacy *in order of time*, as being of the firſt called, and it may be the firſt who adhered to Chriſt, *in order of age*; of which *Jerom*, *ætati delatum quia Petrus ſenior erat*, ſpeaking of *Peter* and *John*, nay, yet higher, ſome *order of dignity* too; in regard of his θερμότης, which the *Greek Fathers* ſpeak ſo much of; the fervency and heat of his ſpirit, whence by *Euſebius* he is called προήγορος τῶν ἀποστόλων *the Prolocutor among the Apoſtles*, who was therefore moſt forward to enquire, moſt ready to anſwer, which *Chryſoſtome* elegantly calls προπηδᾷν alluding to the name κορυφαῖος and ἔξαρχος, which are frequently given to *Peter* by the Fathers, which import no more than *præſultor in choreâ*, he that led the dance among the Diſciples; but his being κορυφαῖος implies no ſuperiority of power. For *Dionyſſ. Halycarnaſſ.* calls *Appius Claudius* τὸν κορυφαιότατον τῆς δεκαρχίας, whereas all know that the *Decemviri* had an equality of power among themſelves. Neither doth his being as the mouth of the Diſciples imply his power; for *Aaron* was a mouth to *Moſes*, but *Moſes* was *Aaron*'s maſter. Neither yet doth this primacy of order always hold in reference to *Peter*; for although generally he is named firſt of the Apoſtles, as *Mat.* 10. 2. *Mark* 3. 16. *Acts* 1. 13. *Mark* 1. 36. *Luke* 8. 45. *Acts* 2. 14.——37. yet in other places of Scripture we find other Apoſtles ſet in order before him, as *James*, *Galat.* 2. 9. *Paul* and *Apollos*, and others, 1 *Cor.* 3, 22. 1 *Cor.* 1. 12.——9. 5. No argument then can be drawn hence, if it would hold, but only a primacy of order; and yet even that fails too in the Scriptures changing of the order ſo often. *But*, ſay they, *whatever becomes of this order, we have a ſtrong foundation for Saint* Peter*'s power, becauſe Chriſt ſaid, He would build his Church upon him*, Mat. 16. 17. This were ſomething indeed, if it were proved; but I fear this *Rock* will not hold water, as it is brought by them; nor Saint *Peter* prove to be *that Rock*. For, indeed, was the Church built upon Saint *Peter*? then he muſt be the chief foundation-ſtone, and *Peter* muſt build upon himſelf, and not upon Chriſt, and all the Apoſtles upon him; and thus in exalting the Servant, we depreſs the Maſter; and ſetting a *new foundation*, we take away the *only foundation Jeſus Chriſt*. If by being built upon

Tom. 8. *ed. Savil. p.* 105.

Lib. 1. *c. Jovin.*

Hiſt. Eccleſiaſt. lib. 2. *c.* 14.

Chryſoſt. in Mat. 6. 16.

Hiſt. Rom. lib. 11.

1 *Cor.* 3. 12.

upon *Peter*, they mean no more than being built by him as the chief inſtrument; it is both a very incongruous ſpeech, and implies nothing more than what was common to him, and the reſt of the Apoſtles, who were all Maſter-builders in the Church of Chriſt, as *Paul* calls himſelf; Rev. 21. 19. and in that reſpect are ſet forth as *the twelve foundation-ſtones*, in the walls of the *New-Jeruſalem*.

The rock then ſpoken of by Chriſt, in his ſpeech to *Peter*, if taken *doctrinally*, was St. *Peter*'s confeſſion, as many of the Fathers interpret it; if taken *perſonally*, it was none other but Chriſt himſelf, who uſed Joh. 2. 19. a like ſpeech to this, when he ſaid, *Deſtroy this Temple, and in three days I will raiſe it up*. Which words, though ſpoken by occaſion of the material Temple, (as thoſe were of *Peter*'s name) yet Chriſt underſtood them of the temple of his body, (as here likewiſe he doth of his perſon.) *But ſtill they urge, Chriſt put the Keys into Saint* Peter'*s hands*, Mat. 16. 19. *Now the power of the Keys doth denote regal authority.* I anſwer, *Firſt*, The Keys may be given two ways, either *from a Prince to a Subject*, or *from a City to a Prince*. In this latter acception, they denote principality in the receiver, but withal inferiority and ſubjection in the Giver; and in this ſenſe, I am ſo charitable, as to think they will not ſay that Chriſt gave the Keys to *Peter*; it muſt be then as a Prince to a Subject; and when they are ſo given, it doth not imply any univerſal power in the perſons to whom they are given, but an inveſting them in that particular place he hath appointed them to; the office which the power of the Keys implies, is *Miniſterial*, and not *Authoritative*, *Declarative*, and not *Juridical*, *over perſons committed to their charge, and not over officers joined in equality of power with them*. For ſo were the reſt of the Apoſtles with *Peter* in the ſame power of the Keys, *Mat.* 18. 18. *John* 20. 23. This power of the Keys then was given to *Peter* in a *peculiar manner*, but *nothing peculiar* to him given thereby. *But ſtill there remains another Ward in Saint* Peter'*s Keys, and the laſt Foot to the Pope's Chair; which is* Paſce oves, *Feed my ſheep; a charge given particularly to* Peter, *John* 21. 15. Thence they infer *his power over the whole Church*. But this *Foot* hath neither *Joints* nor *Sinews* in it, and is as infirm as any of the reſt; for neither did this *command*, rather than *commiſſion*, belong only to *Peter*; for Chriſt had before given them all their general commiſſion; *As the Father hath ſent me, even ſo ſend I you, John* 20. 21. whereby is implied an inveſting all the Apoſtles equally, with the power and authority of governing the Church of God; although this charge be peculiarly renewed to *Peter*, becauſe as he had particularly fall'n, ſo he ſhould be particularly reſtored; neither yet did we grant this: doth the word ποιμαίνειν, imply ſuch a *power* and authority as they plead for, *viz.* a ſupreme power over the Church of God? for this even by *Peter* himſelf is attributed to the fixed *Preſbyters* of the *Churches*, who by this argument have as much authority conveyed them, as Saint *Peter* had, 1 *Pet.* 5. 2. and yet, ſhould we grant this, it would not infer what they deſire; for theſe *Sheep* were not the whole Church of Chriſt, taken *abſolutely*, but *indefinitely*. For all the Apoſtles had a command *to preach to every creature*, Mat. 28. 18. which was, as to the words, larger, as to the ſenſe the ſame with Gal. 2. 7. that to Saint *Peter* here. And afterwards we find *Peter* called *the Apo-* Acts 8. 14. Gal. 2. 9. *ſtle of Circumciſion*, and *the Apoſtles ſending him to* Samaria, *and* Paul *in the right-hand of fellowſhip with* Peter, which had been certainly diſhonourable to *Peter*, had he been inveſted with ſuch an univerſal ſupreme power over the Apoſtles and the whole Church. Such pretences then as theſe are, for ſuch an extravagant power in the Church of God, from ſuch miſerably weak foundations, for the upholding a corrupt intereſt, have given the occaſion to that tart *Sarcaſm*, *In Papatu ſub* Petri *nudo nomine Satan non amplius Larva.* But that which would ſeem ſufficient to awaken any out of this dream of Saint *Peter*'s power over the reſt of the Apoſtles, is, the frequent contendings of the twelve Apoſtles, one among another, who ſhould be greateſt, and that even after that Chriſt had ſaid, *Upon this rock will I build my Church*, as we may ſee, *Mat.* 20. 24. If Chriſt had conferred ſuch a power on Saint *Peter*, what little ground had there been for the requeſt of *James* and *John*? and would not our Saviour rather have told them, the chiefeſt place was conferred on *Peter* already, than have curbed their ambition in ſeeking who ſhould be greateſt; and would have bid them be ſubject to *Peter* as their Head and Ruler. We ſee not then the leaſt foundation for an univerſal *Monarchy* in the Church of God; and ſo this form of Government is not determined by any actions or commands of Chriſt. Mat. 18. 1. Mark 9. 34. Luke 9. 46.

§. 7. We come now to conſider the Pleas of others, who join in renouncing any ſupreme power under Chriſt, over the Church of God; but differ as to the particular forms of Government in the Church; thoſe who are for an *inequality*, uſually fix on the *imparity between the Apoſtles and the L X X.* Thoſe that are for a *parity* upon *Mat.* 20. 25. and *Mat.* 18. 17. I ſhall here proceed in the former method, to ſhew that none of thoſe can prove the form they contend for as only *neceſſary*, nor their adverſaries prove it *unlawful.* *Firſt* then, for the inequality between the Apoſtles and the *L X X.* Diſciples: By that inequality is meant, either only *an inequality of order*, or elſe, an *inequality carrying ſuperiority and ſubordination.* It is evident that the *L X X. Diſciples* were not of the ſame *Order* with the *twelve Apoſtles*, whom Chriſt had deſigned for the chief Government of his Church, after his *Aſcenſion*; and in this reſpect the compariſon of the *twelve Heads of the Tribes*, and the *ſeventy Elders*, ſeems parallel with the *twelve Apoſtles*, and the *L X X. Diſciples*; but if by imparity, be meant, that the twelve Apoſtles had a *ſuperiority of power and juriſdiction* over the *L X X.* Diſciples, there is not the leaſt evidence or foundation in Reaſon or Scripture for it. For the *L X X.* did not derive their power from the *Apoſtles*, but immediately from *Chriſt*, they enjoyed the ſame privileges, were ſent upon the ſame meſſage, (making way for Chriſt's entertainment in the ſeveral Cities they went to) yea all things were parallel between them and the Apoſtles in their Miſſion, (unleſs any difference be made in the Cities they went to, and their number.) So that there is no ſuperiority of office in the Apoſtles, above the *L X X.* nor of power and juriſdiction over them; their Commiſſions being the ſame: And it ſeems moſt probable, that both their Miſſions were only temporary; and after this the *L X X.* remained in the nature of private Diſciples, till they were ſent abroad by a new Commiſſion after the reſurrection, for preaching the Goſpel, and planting Churches. For we ſee that the Apoſtles themſelves were only *Probationers*, till Chriſt ſolemnly authorized them for their *Apoſtolical employment*, *Mat.* 28. 18. *John* 20. 21. when their full Commiſſions were granted to them, and then indeed they acted with a *plenitude of power*, as Governours of the Church, but not before. Nothing can be inferred then for any neceſſary ſtanding rule for Luke 10. 1.

Church-Government, from any compariſon between the Apoſtles and the *LXX.* during the life of Chriſt, becauſe both their Miſſions were temporary and occaſional. Only we ſee, that becauſe Chriſt did keep up the number of the *Twelve* ſo ſtrictly, that as the *LXX.* were a diſtinct number from them, ſo when one was dead, another was to be choſen in his ſtead, (which had been needleſs, if they had not been a diſtinct Order and College by themſelves) it is thence evident that the Apoſtolical power, was a ſuperior power to any in the Church; and that ſuch an inequality in Church-Officers as was between them and particular Paſtors of Churches, is not contrary to what our Saviour ſaith, when he forbids that dominion and authority in his Diſciples, which was exerciſed by the Kings of the earth, *Mat.* 20. 25. *Luke* 22. 25. which places, becauſe they are brought by ſome, to take away all inequality among Church-Officers, I ſhall ſo far examine the meaning of them, as they are conceived to have any influence thereupon. *Firſt* then, I ſay, That it is not only the *abuſe of civil power*, which our Saviour forbids his Diſciples, but the *exerciſe of any ſuch power as that is.* And therefore the *Papiſts* are miſtaken, when from the words of *Luke*, *Vos autem non ſic*, they conclude *all power* is not forbidden, but only *ſuch a tyrannical power*, as is here ſpoken of. For thoſe words are not a *limitation* and *modification* of the *power* ſpoken of, but a *total prohibition* of it; for, *Firſt*, The compariſon is not between the *Apoſtles* and *Tyrants*, but between *them and Princes*; yea ſuch as *Luke* calls εὐεργέται. Luk. 22.25. Indeed had Chriſt ſaid, The Kings of the earth abuſe their authority, *vos autem non ſic*, then it would have been only a limitation of the exerciſe of power; but the mere exerciſe of civil authority being ſpoken of before, and then it being ſubjoined, *but you not ſo*; it plainly implies a forbidding of the power ſpoken of, in the perſons ſpoken to. But, *ſay they*, the words uſed in *Matthew* are κατακυριεύουσιν and κατεξουσιάζουσιν, which import the abuſe of their power which is forbidden; but I anſwer, *Firſt*, In *Luke* it is otherwiſe, for there it is the ſimple κυριεύουσιν and ἐξουσιάζοντες, when it follows, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. So that if the abuſe be forbidden in one, the uſe is in the other: But, *Secondly*, κατακυριεύειν, by the *LXX.* is uſed frequently for κυριεύειν, and רדה is often rendred by that word, as *Pſalm* 72. 7. *He ſhall have dominion*, καὶ κατακυριεύσει, *Pſalm* 110. 2. κατακυρίευε, *Rule thou in the midſt of thine enemies*; in both which places it is ſpoken of Chriſt's Kingdom. So v. Pſal. 109. Jer. 3. Numb. 23—32. in *Geneſis* 1. 28. πληρώσατε τὴν γῆν καὶ κατακυριεύσατε αὐτῆς. *Repleniſh the earth, and have dominion over it.* In all which places it is uſed ſimply for dominion, and not for tyrannical power.

It is not then the abuſe of civil power, but the uſe of it, which is here forbidden; which will be more evident, *Secondly*, From the importance of the Phraſe οὐχ οὕτως; which anſwers to the Hebrew לאכן and ſimply denies what went before; as when *Cain* expreſſeth his fear of being kill'd, *Gen.* 4. 14. the *Septuagint* render God's anſwer by οὐχ οὕτως, whereby is not denyed only the manner of his death to be as *Abel's* was, but it is ſimply denied; and ſo *Pſalm* 1. 4. the *LXX.* render לא כן הרשעים by οὐχ οὕτως οἱ ἀσεβεῖς· οὐχ οὕτως, *the wicked are not ſo.* So, when Chriſt ſaith, *Mat.* 19. 8. ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς δὲ οὐ γέγονεν οὕτω, *from the beginning it was not ſo*; it imports an abſolute denial of giving Bills of divorce from the beginning. *Thirdly*, This no ways anſwers to the ſcope of the Apoſtle's contention, which was merely about primacy and power, and not at all about the abuſe of this power. So that by this place, all affectation and uſe of a civil, co-active, external power is forbidden to the Officers of the Church; the power of the Church being only a directive, voluntary power; and is rather a *Miniſtry* than a *power*, as our Saviour expreſſeth there, *Mat.* 20. 26. *Luke* 22. 26. But having thus excluded all Civil Power from the Governours of the Church, as ſuch: I ſay, *Secondly*, That this place doth no ways imply a prohibition of all inequality among the Governours of the Church; which is abundantly cleared by this reaſon, becauſe by the acknowledgment of all parties, the Apoſtles had a ſuperior power over the ordinary Paſtors of Churches: Now if the exerciſe of all ſuperiority had been forbidden, this muſt have been forbidden too, as implying plainly an exerciſe of authority in ſome over others in the Church. And therefore *Muſculus* thus explains the place, *Non exigit hoc Chriſtus ut omnes in regno ſuo ſint æquales, ſed nè quiſpiam cupiat magnus & primus haberi & videri.* It is not an inequality of Order, but Ambition, which Chriſt forbids; and therefore he obſerves, that Chriſt ſaith not, Let none be great among you, and none firſt; which ſhould have been, if all primacy and ſuperiority had been forbidden, and a neceſſity of an equality among Church-Officers; *but he that will be great among you, let him be your Miniſter.* Let thoſe that are above others, look upon themſelves as the ſervants of others, and not as their maſters. For God never beſtows any power on any, for the ſake of thoſe that have it, but for the ſake of thoſe for whom they are employed: When men ſeek then their own greatneſs, and not the ſervice of the Church, they flatly contradict this precept of Chriſt, *But with you it ſhall not be ſo.* But however an inequality of power and Order for the Church's good is not thereby prohibited; which is ſufficient for my purpoſe.

§. 8. The next place to be conſidered is that in *Mat.* 18. 15, 16, 17. *If thy brother ſhall treſpaſs againſt thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone; if he ſhall hear thee, thou haſt gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witneſſes every word may be eſtabliſhed. And if he ſhall neglect to hear them, tell it to the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.* It ſeems a very ſtrange thing to conſider, that this one place hath been *preſſed* by all parties, to *ſerve* under them, for the maintenance of their own particular form of Government; ſo that, (as the *Jews* fable of the *Manna*) it hath had a different taſte, according to the diverſity of the palates of men. Thoſe that are for a *Congregational Church*, being the firſt receptacle of Church power, ſet this place in the front of their arguments; thoſe who plead for *Standing Preſbyteries, Lay-Elders, ſubordination of Courts*, fetch all theſe out of this place; thoſe that are for a *power of Church Diſcipline* to be only lodged in a *higher Order of Church-Officers* ſucceeding the Apoſtles, derive the ſucceſſion of that power from this place; nay, leſt *quidlibet* ſhould not be proved *è quolibet*, the Papiſts deſpair not of proving the *conſtant viſibility of the Church, the ſubordination of all to the Pope, the infallibility of general Councils*, all out of this place. Methinks then it might be argument enough of the incompetency of this place to determine any one particular form, when it is with equal confidence on all ſides brought to prove ſo many; eſpecially if it be made appear, that the general rule laid down in theſe words, may be obſerved under a diverſity of forms of Government. For whether by the Church we mean the community of the faithful in a particular Congregation, or the ſtanding Officers of ſuch a Church, or a Conſiſtorial-Court, or Synodical-Aſſembly, or higher Church-Officers, it is ſtill the duty of men, in caſe of offences, to tell the Church for redreſs of grievances, or vindication of the perſon himſelf, that he hath diſcharged his duty.

This place then determines not what this Church is, nor what the form of its Government ſhould be, when the ſenſe of it holds good and true under ſuch diverſity of forms. But we ſhall farther enquire, what influence this place can have upon the modelling the Government
To. 2. l. 10. c. 5. ſ. 2. in the Church of God. For *Chamier* tells us, the *prima Politiæ Eccleſiaſticæ origo* is to be found in theſe words; it will be then worth our enquiry to ſee what foundation for Church-Government can be drawn out of theſe words. In which the variety of Expoſitions, (like a multitude of Phyſicians to a diſtempe'd Patient) have left it worſe than they found it; I mean more difficult and obſcure. We ſhall therefore endeavour to lay aſide all pre-conceptions by other mens judgments and opinions, and ſee what innate light there is in the Text it ſelf, to direct us to the full ſenſe and meaning of it. Two things the great difficulty of the place lies in, *What the offences are here ſpoken of? What the Church is which muſt be ſpoken to?* For the *Firſt*, I conceive it evident to any unprejudicated mind, that the matter our Saviour ſpeaks of, is a matter of private offence and injury, and not a matter of ſcandal, as ſuch conſidered in a Church-ſociety; which I make appear thus: *Firſt*, From the parallel place to this, *Luke* 17. 3. *If thy brother treſpaſs againſt thee, rebuke him, and if he repent, forgive him.* This can be nothing elſe but a matter of private injury, becauſe it is in the power of every private perſon to forgive it; which it was not in his power to do, were it a matter of ſcandal to the whole Church; unleſs we make it among Chriſtians, (as it was among the Jews) that every private perſon might excommunicate another, and ſo releaſe him afterward. *Secondly*, It manifeſtly appears from St. *Peter*'s words next after this Paragraph, *Mat.* 18. 20. *Lord, how often ſhall my brother ſin againſt me, and I forgive him, till ſeven times?* &c. Chriſt anſwers him, *till ſeventy times ſeven*, that is, as often as he doth it. And thence Chriſt brings the parable of the King forgiving his ſervants, *v.* 23. *Thirdly*, Were it meant of any ſcandalous ſin committed with the privacy of any particular perſon, (as many underſtand treſpaſſing *againſt thee*, that is, *te conſcio*) then this inconvenience muſt neceſſarily follow, that matters of ſcandal muſt be brought to the Church's cognizance, when there can be no way to decide them, that is, when one offends, and only one perſon knows it; here will be a ſingle affirmation on one ſide, and denial on the other ſide, and ſo there can be no way to decide it; the matter here ſpoken of then is ſomewhat only relating to the offence or injury of ſome particular perſon, and not a matter of ſcandal to the whole Church. The Queſtion then as propounded to be ſpoken to by our Saviour, is, *What is to be done in caſe of private offences between man and man?* and not in caſe of ſecret ſins againſt God, and ſcandalous to the Church: Now to this our Saviour lays down his anſwer gradually: Firſt, There muſt be *private admonition*; if that ſucceed not, *admonition before witneſſes*; if not that, *telling the Church*; if not that neither, *reputing him as a Heathen and Publican.* Now in this anſwer we muſt conceive our Saviour ſpeaks as to an ordinary caſe, ſo in a way eaſie to be underſtood by all that heard him; and therefore

fore he muſt ſpeak in alluſion to what was at that time among the Jews in ſuch caſes, which is freely acknowledged both by *Calvin* and *Beza* Beza in loc. upon the place. *Nam certè tanquam de Judæis hæc dici apparet, ſaltem ex eo quod addit, ſit tibi ſicut Ethnicus & Publicanus.* We muſt then ſee what the cuſtom was among the Jews in ſuch caſes, and how far our Saviour doth either approve the cuſtom received, or appoint new. The Law was very ſtrict in caſe of offences, *for every man in any wiſe to rebuke his neighbour, and not to ſuffer ſin upon him*; *Arguendo argues*, Lev. 19. 17. our old Tranſlation renders it, *Thou ſhalt plainly rebuke thy Neighbour.* Now this piece of neceſſary Diſcipline our Saviour endeavours to recover among them, which it ſeems was grown much out of uſe with them. For *Rabbi Chanina*, as Mr. *Selden* obſerves, gave this as one De ſyned. l. 1. c. 9. In Gemar. Babyl. ad tit. Shabbath. c. 16. f. 119. reaſon of the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem, becauſe they left off reproving one another: Non exciſa fuiſſent Hieroſolymæ, niſi quoniam alter alterum non coarguebat.* Our Saviour therefore enforceth this Law upon them in caſe of offences; firſt to deal plainly with their Neighbour in reproving him; but our Saviour reſts not here, but being himſelf a pattern of meekneſs and charity, he would not have them to reſt in a bare private admonition, but to ſhew their own readineſs to be reconciled, and willingneſs to do good to the ſoul of the offending party thereby, he adviſeth farther, to take two or three witneſſes with them, hoping thereby to work more upon him; but if ſtill he continues refractory, and is not ſenſible of his miſcarriage, *tell it the Church.* What the Church here is, is the great Controverſie; ſome, as *Beza*, and his followers, underſtand an Eccleſiaſtical *Sanhedrin* among the Jews, which had the proper cognizance of Eccleſiaſtical cauſes; but it will be hard to prove any ſuch V. Grotium in Mat. 5. 12. *Sanhedrin* in uſe among them; the Prieſts and Levites indeed were very often choſen into the *Sanhedrin*, (which it may be is the ground of the Selden de ſyned. l. 2. c. 8. miſtake) but there was no ſuch *Sanhedrin* among them, which did not reſpect matters criminal and civil; ſo we muſt underſtand what *Joſephus* Joſeph. l. 2. cont. Appion. ſpeaks of the Prieſts among the Jews. Τούτοις δὲ ἦν καὶ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀκριβὴς ἐπιμέλεια· καὶ γὰρ ἐπόπται πάντων, καὶ δικασταὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, καὶ κολασταὶ τῶν κατεγνωσμένων οἱ ἱερεῖς ἐτάχθησαν. *The Prieſts were always very ſtudious of the Law, and other matters of concernment. Theſe were appointed as the Overſeers of all things, Judges of Controverſies, and the Puniſhers of condemned Perſons.* Thus we ſee he is ſo far from attributing a diſtinct Eccleſiaſtical-Court to them, that he ſeems to make them the only Judges in civil and criminal cauſes. Others by the Church, underſtand the Chriſtian Church, but herein they are divided, ſome underſtand by it only the Officers of the Church, ſo *Chryſoſtome* τοῖς προεδρεύουσι. *Euthymius Eccleſiam nunc vocat præſides fidelium Eccleſiæ.* Others underſtand it not in its repreſentative notion, but in its diffuſive capacity, as taking in all the members. But our Saviour ſpeaking to a preſent caſe, muſt be ſuppoſed to lay down a preſent remedy, which could not be, if he gave only rules for governing his Church, which was not as yet gathered nor formed, there being then no *Court Eccleſiaſtical* for them to appeal unto. Suppoſe then this caſe to have fallen out immediately after our Saviour's ſpeaking of it, that one brother ſhould treſpaſs againſt another, either then notwithſtanding our Saviour's ſpeech, (which ſpeaks to the preſent time, *Go and tell the Church*) the offended brother is left without a power of redreſs, or he muſt underſtand it in ſome ſenſe of the word Church, which was then in uſe among the Jews. And theſe who tell us, *That unleſs* ἐκκλησία *be*

underſtood

Gelleſpy Aaron's rod, lib. 3. c. 2. p. 552. l. 2. c. 9. p. 296.

underſtood for a Church as we underſtand it, it would be no eaſie matter for us now to conceive what the Holy Ghoſt meant by it, would do well withal to conſider how thoſe to whom Chriſt ſpoke, ſhould apprehend his meaning, if he ſpoke in a ſenſe they never heard of before. And certainly our beſt way to underſtand the meaning of Scripture, is to conſider, *what*, *of whom*, *to whom* the Scripture ſpeaks; for although the Scripture, as a rule of faith for us, be ſuppoſed to be ſo written, as to be eaſily underſtood by us, yet as the parcels of it were ſpoken upon ſeveral occaſions, they muſt be ſuppoſed to be ſo ſpoken, as to be apprehended by them to whom they were ſpoken in the common ſenſe of the words, if nothing peculiar be expreſſed in the ſpeech, whereby to reſtrain them to another ſenſe. And therefore the *Church* muſt be underſtood in the ſame ſenſe wherein the word קהל or the *Syriack* anſwering to it was apprehended among the Jews in our Saviour's time. Which could not be for any new Conſiſtory or *Sanhedrin* to be erected under the Goſpel. Thence others conceiving that Chriſt did ſpeak according to the cuſtom of the Jews, by the *Church*, underſtand nothing elſe but the *Sanhedrin*, and ſo make the ſenſe of the words to be this. The caſe our Saviour ſpeaks to is that of private quarrels, wherein our Saviour lays down two Directions in a way of charity, *private admonition*, and *before witneſſes*; but if the party continues refractory, then it may be lawful to convent him before the Courts of Judicature among them, the *Triumvirate*, the Twenty three, or the great *Sanhedrin*; for although the *Romans* had taken away the power of the *Jews* in capital matters, yet they allowed them liberty of judging in caſe of private quarrels; but if he neglect to hear the *Sanhedrin*, then it may be lawful to implead him before the *Governour* of the *Province* in his Court of Judicature, by which Heathens and Publicans were to be judged; which is meant by *let him be to thee*, not as a brother Jew, *but as a Heathen and a Publican*. This Expoſition is ſaid to be firſt broached by *Eraſtus*, but much improved and enlarged by *Rev. Biſhop Bilſon*, who ſpends a whole Chapter upon it. But this Expoſition, though it ſeems fair and plauſible, yet there are ſeveral things in it which keep me from embracing it; as *Firſt*, It ſeems not very probable that our Saviour ſhould ſend his Diſciples to whom he ſpeaks, to the Jewiſh *Sanhedrin*, for the ending any controverſies ariſing among themſelves; knowing how bitter enemies they were to all who were followers of Chriſt. *Secondly*, It ſeems not very agreeable with the ſcope of our Saviour's ſpeech, which was to take up differences as much as may be among his diſciples, and to make them ſhew all lenity and forbearance towards thoſe that had offended them, and to do good to the ſouls of thoſe that had injured and provoked them; whereas this command of telling the *Sanhedrin*, and impleading offenders before Heathen-Courts, tends apparently to heighten the bitterneſs and animoſities of mens ſpirits one againſt another, and lays Religion ſo open to obloquies, which makes *Paul* ſo ſeverely reprove the *Chriſtians* at *Corinth*, *for going to Law before Heathen Magiſtrates*; therefore to ſay that *Chriſt* allows their going to Law before Heathens, and *Paul* to forbid it, were inſtead of finding a way to end the differences among *Chriſtians*, to make one between *Chriſt* and *Paul*. *Thirdly*, The thing chiefly aimed at by *Chriſt*, is not a man's vindication of himſelf, or recovering loſſes by injuries received, but the recovering and *gaining the offending brother*? which evidently appears by what our Saviour adds to the uſing admonition in private, *if he ſhall hear thee*,

Theſ. 41. Perpetual Government. c. 4.

1 Cor. 6. 1——6.

thou haſt gained thy brother. Now κερδαίνειν in the New Teſtament is uſed for the converſion and turning others from ſin. *That I might gain them that are under the Law,* 1 *Corinth.* 9. 19, 20, *&c.* ſo 1 *Pet.* 3. 1. explained by *Jam.* 5. 20. Our Saviour then ſpeaks not to the manner of proceeding as to civil injuries, which call for *reſtitution*, but to ſuch as call for *reconciliation.* And ſo the caſe I conceive is that of *private differences and quarrels* between men, and not *Law ſuits, nor civil cauſes*: I mean ſuch *differences* as reſpect *perſons*, and not *things*, which our Saviour lays down theſe rules for the ending of. And therefore I cannot but wonder to ſee ſome men inſiſt ſo much on that place againſt ſuch an Expoſition of this *Luke* 12. 14. where Chriſt ſaith, *Who made me a judge and a divider among you?* For doth it any ways follow, becauſe Chriſt would not take upon him to be a temporal Judge among the Jews, therefore he ſhould take no courſe for the ending differences among his Diſciples, and the taking away all animoſities from among them? Nay, on the contrary, doth not our Saviour very often deſignedly ſpeak to this very purpoſe, to root out all bitterneſs, malice, envy, and rancour from mens ſpirits, and to perſuade them to forgive injuries, even to pray for perſecutors, and by any means to be reconciled to their Brethren. Which he makes to be a duty of ſo great neceſſity, that *if a man had brought his gift to the Altar, and remembred his brother had ought againſt him, he bids him leave his gift there, and go, and be reconciled to his brother, and then offer up the gift.* We ſee hereby how ſuitable it was to our Saviour's Doctrine and deſign, to lay down rules for the ending any differences ariſing among his Diſciples; and this being now cleared to be the ſtate of the caſe, it will not be difficult to reſolve what is meant by *telling the Church*: Which I make not to be any *appeal* to a *juridical Court*, acting *authoritatively* over the perſons brought before it, but the *third* and *higheſt ſtep of charity* in a man towards a perſon that hath offended him, *viz.* that when neither private admonition, nor before two or three witneſſes would ſerve to reclaim the offender, *then to call a ſelect company together*, (which is the natural importance of the word ἐκκλησία) and before them all to lay open the cauſe of the breach and difference between them, and to refer it to their arbitration to compoſe and end it. Which Senſe of the place, I humbly conceive to have the leaſt force in it, and in every part of it to be moſt genuine and natural, and fully agreeable to the received practice among the Jews; which the Author of the Book *Muſar*, cited by *Druſius*, fully acquaints us with, whoſe words I ſhall tranſcribe, as being a plain Paraphraſe on theſe of our Saviour. *Qui arguit ſocium ſuum, debet primum hoc facere placide inter ſe & ipſum ſolum verbis mollibus, Ita ut non pudefaciat eum. Si reſipiſcit bene eſt; ſin, debet eum acritèr arguere & pudefacere inter ſe & ipſum. Si non reſipiſcit, debet adhibere ſocios, ipſumque coram illis pudore afficere; ſi nec hoc modo quicquam proficit, debet eum pudefacere coram multis, ejuſque delictum publicare. Nam certè detegendi ſunt hypocritæ.* That which this Author calls *pudefacere eum coram multis*, is that which our Saviour means when he bids him *tell the Church*, or the *Congregation*, as our old tranſlation renders it. This the Jews called reproving of men כרבים before a multitude, as the *Vulg. Latin*, though falſly renders that place *Leviticus* 19. 17. *publice argue eum*, and to this the Apoſtle may allude, when he ſpeaks of the ἡ ἐπιτιμία ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν πλειόνων, 2 Cor. 2. 6. *the cenſure of many*; and the reproof

Mat. 5. 23, 24.

Præterit. lib. 1. *p.* 43.

ἐνώπιον πάντων *before all*, 1 *Tim.* 5. 20. which was to be in matters of publick ſcandal *upon Religion*, שמום כרברים as the Jews call them, but in caſe the offender ſhould ſtill παρακούειν *ſlight this overture of reconciliation*, before the company ſelected for hearing the caſe, then ſaith our Saviour, look upon him as an obſtinate refractory creature, and have no more to do with him, than with a *Heathen* and *a Publican*; by which terms the moſt wilful obſtinate ſinners were ſet out among the Jews, and by which our Saviour means a man's withdrawing himſelf, as much as in him lies, from all familiar ſociety from ſuch a perſon. And thus ſaith Chriſt, *Whatſoever you bind in earth, ſhall be bound in heaven, and whatſoever you looſe on earth ſhall be looſed in heaven*, v. 18. *that is*, if after all your endeavours of reconciliation, the offender will hearken to no agreement, it is an evidence and token That man's ſin is *bound upon him*, (that is, *ſhall not be pardoned* ſo long as he continues impenitent) but if he repent of his offence, and you be reconciled, as the offence is removed on earth thereby, ſo the ſin is *looſed in* heaven, that is, *forgiven*. The guilt of ſin that *binds*, it being an obligation to puniſhment; and ſo the pardon of ſin that *looſeth*, as it cancels that obligation. And ſo *Grotius* obſerves, that δεῖν is the ſame with κρατεῖν, and λύειν with αφίεναι; what is called *retaining* in one place, is *binding* in another; and what is *looſing* in one place, is *remitting* in the other. But now, although I aſſert this to be the true, proper, genuine meaning of this difficult place, yet I deny not but that this place hath influence upon Church-Government; but I ſay, the influence it hath, is only by way of Accommodation, and by Analogy deduced from it. According to which, theſe things, I conceive, have foundation in theſe words, *Firſt*, *Gradual Appeals* from the method here laid down by our Saviour. *Secondly*, *Church-Cenſures*, and the duty of ſubmitting to Church-Authority; for although before any Church-power was actually ſet up, (as when our Saviour ſpake theſe words then there was none) yet after that Church-Government was fixed and ſet up, it muſt in reaſon be ſuppoſed that all matters of the nature of ſcandals to the Church, muſt be decided there. *Thirdly*, *The lawfulneſs of the uſe of excommunication* in Chriſtian Churches; for if every particular perſon might withdraw from the ſociety of ſuch a one as continues refractory in his offences, then much more may a whole ſociety, and the officers of it declare ſuch a one to be avoided both in religious and familiar civil ſociety, which is the formal nature of excommunication. Herein we ſee the wiſdom of our Saviour, who in ſpeaking to a particular caſe, hath laid down ſuch general rules as are of perpetual uſe in the Church of God for accommodating differences ariſing therein. Thus have we hitherto cleared, that our Saviour hath determined no more of Church-Government, than what is appliable to a diverſity of particular forms, and ſo hath not, by any Law or practice of his own, determined the neceſſity of any one form.

V. Rainold's *Conf.* with *Hart. cap.* 2, *div.* 3. *Grot.* in Mat. 16.

CHAP.

Chap. VI.

The next thing pleaded for determining the form of Government, is Apoſtolical practice; two things enquired into concerning that, what it was? how far it binds? The Apoſtles inveſted with the power and authority of governing the whole Church of Chriſt by their Commiſſion, John 20. 21. Mat. 28. 18. *What the Apoſtles did in order to Church-Government before* Pentecoſt, κλῆρος ἀποστολῆς, τόπος ἴδιος *explained. How the Apoſtles did divide Provinces; whether* Paul *and* Peter *were confined to the circumciſion and uncircumciſion, and different Churches erected by them in the ſame Cities? What the Apoſtles did in order to ſetling particular Churches? the names and office of Biſhops, Preſbyters, Deacons conſidered. Four general conſiderations laid down about the Apoſtles practice. Firſt, It cannot be fully known what it was.* 2. *Great probability they obſerved no one certain form in ſetling Churches; proved from* Epiphanius, Jerome, Ambroſe *or* Hilary. 3. *Their caſe different from ours in regard of the paucity of believers.* 4. *If granted for any form, yet proves not the thing in queſtion. For,* 1. *Offices appointed by them are ceaſed. Widows, Deaconeſſes aboliſhed. Rites and Cuſtoms Apoſtolical grown out of uſe.* 1. *Such as were founded upon Apoſtolical precept,* Acts 15. 29. *conſidered.* 2. *Such as were grounded on their practice, Holy-kiſs, Love-feaſts, dipping in Baptiſm, community of goods, with ſeveral others.*

§. 1. Having found nothing, either in our Saviour's practice, or in the rules laid down by him, (conceived to reſpect Church-Government) which determines any neceſſity of one particular form; the only argument remaining, which can be conceived of ſufficient ſtrength to found the neceſſity of any one form of Government, is, *the practice of the Apoſtles*, who were by their employment and commiſſion entruſted with the Government of the Church of God. For our Saviour after his reſurrection taking care for the planting and governing of his Church after his aſcenſion to Glory, doth at two ſeveral times call his Apoſtles together, and gives now their full *Charter* and Commiſſion to them; *the firſt*, containing chiefly the power it ſelf conferred upon them, *Joh.* 20. 21. the other the extent of that power, *Mat.* 28. 19. in the former our Saviour tells them, *As the Father had ſent him, ſo did he ſend them.* Which we muſt not underſtand of a parity and equality of power, but in a ſimilitude of the Miſſion; that as Chriſt before had managed the great affairs of his Church in his own perſon, ſo now (having according to the Prophecies made of him at the *end of ſeventy weeks, made reconciliation for iniquity by his death, and brought in everlaſting righteouſneſs by his reſurrection,*) he diſpatched abroad his Goſpel-Heralds to proclaim the *Jubilee* now begun, and the *Act of Indempnity* now paſt upon all penitent offenders, which is the ſenſe of the other part of their commiſſion, *Whoſeſoever ſins ye remit, they are remitted, and whoſeſoever ſins ye retain, they are retained,* Joh. 20. 23. *i. e.* as many as upon the preaching the Goſpel by you, ſhall come in and yield up themſelves to the tenders of Grace proclaimed therein, ſhall have their former rebellions pardoned; but ſuch as will ſtill continue obſtinate, their former guilt ſhall ſtill continue to bind them over to deſerved puniſhment. And to the end the *Apoſtles* might have ſome evidence of the power thus conferred

Dan. 9. 24. **with Rom.** 4. 25.

Joh.20.22. ferred upon them, *he breaths the Holy Ghoſt on them, and ſaid, receive ye the Holy Ghoſt*; which we are not to underſtand of the extraordinary Gifts of the *Holy Ghoſt*, which were not received till the day of *Pentecoſt*, Acts 2. 1. but of the *Authoritative power* of preaching the Goſpel, which was now conferred upon them, by this ſolemn rite of breathing the Holy Ghoſt on the Apoſtles. In which ſenſe the *Church of England* underſtands that expreſſion in the Ordination of Miniſters, as it implies only the conferring thereby an authority for the preaching of the Goſpel, which being conveyed by Ordination, is fitly expreſſed by the ſame words which our Saviour uſed in the conferring the ſame power upon his Apoſtles at his ſending them forth to be Goſpel Preachers.

After this comes the ſolemn appointed meeting of Chriſt with his Mat.28.16. Diſciples at the mountain of *Galilee*, (where in probability, beſides the 1 Cor.15.6. eleven, were preſent the five hundred brethren at once.) And here Chriſt more ſolemnly inaugurates the Apoſtles in their office, declaring all power to be in his hands, and therefore appoints the Apoſtles *to preach the* Mar.16.15. Mat.18.19. *Goſpel to every creature*, that is, to all men indefinitely, Gentiles as well as Jews, which *Matthew* fully expreſſeth by all *Nations*. Now are the Apoſtles left as chief Governours of the Church under Chriſt, and in this laſt Commiſſion, wherein the extent of the Apoſtles power is more fully expreſſed, there is nothing mentioned of any order for the Government of the Church under them, nor what courſe ſhould be taken by the Church after their deceaſe. All that remains then to be enquired into, is what the Apoſtles practice was, and how far they acted for the determining any one form of Government as neceſſary for the Church.

§. 2. The Apoſtles being thus inveſted in their authority, we proceed to conſider the exerciſe of this authority for the governing the Church. And here we are to conſider, that the Apoſtles did not preſently, upon their laſt Commiſſion from Chriſt, go forth abroad in the world to preach, but were commanded by Chriſt to go firſt to *Jeruſalem*, and there to expect the coming of the Holy Ghoſt, according to our Saviour's own appointment, *Luke* 24. 49. And therefore what *Mark* adds, *Mark* 16. 20. that after Chriſt's appearance to them, *the Apoſtles went abroad, and preached every where, working miracles*, muſt either be underſtood of what they did only in their way returning from *Galilee* to *Jeruſalem*; or elſe, more probably, of what they did indefinitely afterwards, For preſently after we find them met together at *Jeruſalem*, whence Luk.24.52. Acts 1. 12. they came from Mount *Olivet*, where Chriſt's Aſcenſion was. Here Luk.24.53. we find them employed ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ſaith St. *Luke* in his Goſpel, which we render the *Temple*, but I underſtand it rather as referring to the action than the place, and is beſt explained by what *Luke* ſaith in *Acts* 1. 14. they were προσκαρτεροῦντες τῇ προσευχῇ ϗ τῇ δεήσει, *continuing in prayer and ſupplication*. And that it cannot be meant of the Temple, Acts 1. 13. appears by the mention of the ὑπερῷον, *an upper room*, where they continued together. For that it ſhould be meant of any of the ὑπερῷα, about the Temple, is moſt improbable to conceive, becauſe not only *V. L'Emper. in Cod. Middoc. c.4. Sect. 5.* thoſe ninety *Cells* about the Temple were deſtined and appointed for the Prieſts in their ſeveral ἐφημερίαις, or times of Miniſtration; and it is moſt unlikely the chief Prieſts and Maſters of the Temple ſhould ſuffer thoſe whom they hated ſo much, to continue ſo near them, without any moleſtation or diſturbance. While the Apoſtles continue here, they proceed to the choice of a new Apoſtle, inſtead of *Judas*, thereby making it appear how neceſſary that number was to the firſt forming of Churches, when the vacant place muſt be ſupplied with ſo great ſolemnity. Which office of Apoſtleſhip, (which *Judas* once had, and *Matthias* was now choſen into) is call'd by *Peter* κλῆρος διακονίας ϗ ἀποστολῆς. *Acts* 1. 25. which a learned Interpreter renders *the portion of his Apoſtolacy*, or the *Province* which fell to *Judas* his lot in the diſtribution of them among the Apoſtles, which, ſaith he, is call'd ὁ τόπος ὁ ἴδιος, into which *Matthias* did πορευθῆναι *go, and from which* Judas *fell by his ſin.* This Expoſition is very often ſuggeſted by that learned Author (but with all due reverence to his name and memory) I cannot ſee any ſuch evidence either from Scripture or reaſon, to enforce any ſuch Expoſition of either phraſe, yielding us ſufficient ground to forſake the received ſenſe of both of them. For κλῆρος ἀποστολῆς is plainly nothing elſe but that *Office of Apoſtleſhip* which belonged to *Judas*, without any relation to a Province; and ὁ τόπος ὁ ἴδιος, is that proper place which belonged to *Judas*, as he is call'd υἱὸς ἀπωλείας, *the Son of perdition*, and no other. But the very foundation of this miſtake, is, that the ſeveral *Provinces* into which the Apoſtles were to go for preaching the Goſpel, were diſtributed among them before they were filled with the *Holy Ghoſt*, which is an *Hypotheſis* will not eaſily be granted by any one that doth but impartially conſider theſe things. That if the *Provinces* were ſo diſtributed among them, it muſt be either before the death of Chriſt, or after; and it muſt be before, if *Judas* had a peculiar *Province* aſſigned to him, which this Expoſition neceſſarily implies; but how *Provinces* could be divided among them before they had their Commiſſion given them to preach to all Nations, is ſomewhat hard to underſtand. It muſt be then immediately after Chriſt had bid them preach to every creature, that they thus diſtributed the *Provinces* among them; but ſeveral things make this very improbable. *Firſt*, The groſs miſtake of the Apoſtles concerning the very nature of Chriſt's Kingdom, which we read, *Acts* 1. 16. when they jointly aſk Chriſt, *Lord wilt thou at this time reſtore the Kingdom to* Iſrael? They dreamt ſtill of a temporal Kingdom, according to the common opinion of the Jews; and is it probable they ſhould diſtribute among themſelves the ſeveral *Provinces* for preaching the Goſpel, who thought that Chriſt's Kingdom would have been eſtabliſhed by other means than going up and down the world? They looked that Chriſt himſelf ſhould do it by his own power, *Wilt thou at this time*, &c. and did not think it muſt be done by their means, much leſs by their ſingle going into ſuch vaſt parts of the world, as the twelve diviſions of the world would be. *Secondly*, It appears very improbable any ſuch diviſion of *Provinces* ſhould be made then, when they were commanded to ſtay at *Jeruſalem*, and not to ſtir thence till the promiſe of the Spirit was fulfilled upon them. *Tarry ye in the City of* Jeruſalem, *till ye be endued with power from on high*, Luke 24. 49. *And being aſſembled together with them, he commanded them not to depart from* Jeruſalem, *but wait for the promiſe of the Father*, Acts 1. 4. Is it likely, the Apoſtles, when they were thus ſtraightly charged not to leave *Jeruſalem* till they were endued with the power of the Holy Ghoſt, ſhould contrive the diſperſing themſelves abroad all over the world? eſpecially when Chriſt told them, that it ſhould be after the coming of the Spirit that they ſhould go abroad, *Acts* 1. 8. and that the Spirit ſhould fit them for their work, (*Joh.* 15. 26, 27. *Joh.* 16. 13.) *by teaching them, and teſtifying of Chriſt. Thirdly*, If ſuch a diſtribution of *Provinces* had been made ſo early among the Apoſtles, how

Annot. in loc. Diſſert. 3. c. 4. *Schiſm*, c. 4. *Sect.* 13. *Anſw.* to the Cath. c. 4. §. 2. Schiſm diſarmed. *Anſw.* c. 3. §. 4.

how comes it to paſs, that after they were endued with the Holy Ghoſt,
they did not every one betake himſelf to his ſeveral *Province?* There
could have been then no plea nor excuſe made for their ſtay any longer
at *Jeruſalem*, after the promiſe of the Spirit was fulfilled upon them.
And yet after the perſecution raiſed at *Jeruſalem*, when moſt of the
Church were diſperſed abroad, we find the Apoſtles remaining ſtill at
Jeruſalem, Acts 8. 1, 14. would they have been ſo long abſent from
their charge, if any ſuch diſtribution had been made among themſelves?
Fourthly, The Apoſtles occaſional going to places as they did, argues
there was no ſuch ſet diviſion of *Provinces* among them. The firſt departure
of any of the Apoſtles from *Jeruſalem*, was that of *Peter* and
Acts 8. 14. *John*, who were ſent by common order of the Apoſtles to *Samaria*, after
they heard that by *Philip*'s preaching, they had received the word of
God. Not the leaſt mention of any peculiar *Province* of theirs, which
they were ſent to. So *Peter*'s going from *Joppa* to *Cæſarea*, was occaſioned
Acts 10. 5. by *Cornelius* his ſending for him. *Fifthly*, That *Provinces* were
32. not divided, appears, becauſe of ſo frequent reading of many of the
Apoſtles being together in one place; firſt the whole twelve at *Jeruſalem*,
after that, *Peter* and *John* together at *Samaria*; about four years
after *Paul*'s converſion, we meet with *James* and *Peter* together at *Jeruſalem*;
Gal. 1. 18, 19. fourteen years after this, we find *James*, *Peter*, and *John* there.
Gal. 2. 1, 9. Is it any ways probable, if all theſe had their diſtinct *Provinces* aſſigned
then, they ſhould be ſo often found together at *Jeruſalem*, which certainly
muſt belong but to the Province of one of them. *Sixthly*, It ſeems
evident, that they divided not the world into Provinces among them,
becauſe it was ſo long before they thought it to be their duty to preach
unto the *Gentiles*; *Peter* muſt have a viſion firſt before he will go to
Acts 10. 11. *Cornelius*; and as yet we ſee they retained that perſuaſion, *that it is*
unlawful for a Jew to keep company, or come unto one that is of another
Nation, *Acts* 10. 28. Nay, more than this, *Peter* is accuſed for this very
action, before the Apoſtles at *Jeruſalem*, *Acts* 11. 2, 3. and they laid
this as the ground of their quarrel, that he went in to men uncircumciſed,
and did eat with them; how this is reconcilable with the whole
world's being divided into *Provinces* ſo early among the Apoſtles, is not
eaſie to conceive; unleſs ſome of them thought it unlawful to go to
their own *Provinces*, which certainly muſt be of the *Gentiles* moſt of them.
Seventhly, Another evidence that Provinces were not divided ſo ſoon,
is, that *Peter*'s *Province*, ſo much ſpoken of, *viz.* that of the circumciſion,
fell not to his ſhare, till near twenty years after this time we
Gal. 2. 7, 8, 9. now ſpeak of, upon the agreement between *Paul* and *Peter*, at *Jeruſalem*.
Anſwer to *Cath. Gent. chap.* 4. *ſ.* 3. *numb.* 7. If Provinces had been ſo ſoon divided, how comes the Apoſtleſhip
of the circumciſion to be now at laſt attributed to *Peter?* was it not known
what *Peter*'s Province was before this time? and if it was, how come
Paul and he now to agree about dividing their Provinces? Nay, farther,
Eighthly, Theſe Provinces, after all this time were not ſo divided, as to
exclude one from another's Province, which is requiſite for a diſtribution
of them; much leſs were they ſo at firſt; for as to this diviſion of
the Jews and Gentiles between *Paul* and *Peter*, it cannot be underſtood
excluſively of others, for what work then had the reſt of the Apoſtles to
do? Neither taking them diſtributively, was *Paul* excluded from preaching
to the *Jews*, or *Peter* to the *Gentiles*. We ſee *Paul* was at firſt
Acts 9. 15. choſen *to be a veſſel to bear Chriſt's name before the Gentiles, and Kings,*
Acts 9. 20, 22. *and the Children of Iſrael.* We ſee hereby he was appointed an Apoſtle

as well to Jews as Gentiles; and accordingly we find him preſently *preaching Chriſt in the Synagogues, and confounding the Jews.* So in all places where *Paul* came, he firſt preached to the Jews in the Synagogues; Acts 13. 5, 14. and when they would not hearken to him, then he turned to the Gentiles. Neither was this done only before the Apoſtles meeting at Jeruſalem, ſuppoſed to be that ſpoken of *Acts* 15. but after at *Epheſus* we find him entering into the Synagogues there, and preaching to the Jews. Acts 19. 8. So likewiſe he did at *Corinth*, Acts 18. 4. *And he reaſoned in the Synagogue every Sabbath, and perſuaded the Jews and the Greeks.* *Paul* then we ſee thought not himſelf excluded from preaching to the Jews, Acts 18. 19. becauſe they were St. *Peter*'s Province. Neither did *Peter* think himſelf excluded from the *Gentiles*; he was the firſt that opened the Acts 10. 28. door of faith to them by preaching to them; in which reſpect it is not altogether improbably conceived by ſome, that the power of the Keys Mat. 16. 19. was peculiarly given to him. And afterwards in the open Council at *Jeruſalem*, he owns himſelf as the Apoſtle to the Gentiles; Acts 15. 7. *God made choice among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth ſhould hear the Word of the Goſpel and believe.* This then evidently deſtroys any ſuch early diſtinction of Provinces; when *Peter*, whoſe Province ſeems moſt expreſs in Scripture, *viz. the circumciſion*, yet we find him him acting as an Apoſtle to the *Gentiles* too. I deny not but at the meeting of *Paul* and *Peter* at *Jeruſalem*, when they obſerved how God did bleſs the one moſt in the circumciſion, the other in the uncircumciſion, there was an agreement between them for the one to lay out his pains chiefly upon the *Jews*, and the other upon the *Gentiles*; and in probability where they met in any City, the one gathered a *Church* of the *Jews*, and the other of the *Gentiles*; but this makes no ſuch diſtinction of Provinces, as to exclude the one from the other's charge; and farther this agreement between *Paul* and *Peter* then after both had preached ſo many years, makes it fully clear, that the pretended diviſion of Provinces ſo early among the Apoſtles, is only the wind-egg of a working fancy, that wants a ſhell of reaſon to cover it. As for that diviſion of Provinces mentioned in Eccleſiaſtical writers, though as to ſome few they generally agree; as that *Thomas* went to *Parthia*, *Andrew* went to *Scythia*, *Euſeb. lib. 3. cap. 1.* *John* to the leſſer *Aſia*, &c. yet as to the moſt, they are at a loſs where to find their Provinces, and contradict one another in reference to them; and many of them ſeem to have their firſt original from the fables of *Doratheus*, *Nicephorus*, and ſuch writers.

§. 3. Having ſhewed that the Apoſtles obſerved no ſet order for diſtributing *Provinces*, we come to ſhew what courſe they took for the ſetling of Churches in the places they went to. In the clearing of which, nothing is more neceſſary than to free our Judgments of thoſe prejudices and prepoſſeſſions which the practice either of the former ages of the Church, or our own have cauſed within us. For it is eaſie to obſerve, that nothing hath been a more fruitful mother of miſtakes, and errors, than the looking upon the practice of the primitive Church through the glaſs of our own cuſtoms. Eſpecially when under the ſame name, (as it is very often ſeen) ſomething far different from what was primarily intended by the uſe of the word, is ſet forth to us. It were no difficult taſk to multiply examples in this kind; wherein men meeting with the ſame names, do apprehend the ſame things by them, which they now through cuſtom ſignifie, without taking notice of any alteration in the things themſelves ſignified by thoſe names. Thus ſince the name

Miſſa was appropriated by the *Papiſts* to that which they call the ſacrifice of the Altar, wherever they meet among ancient writers with that name, they preſently conceive the ſame thing was underſtood by it then. Whereas it was then only taken for the publick ſervice of the Church, ſo called from the diſmiſſion of the people after it, with an *Ite, Miſſa eſt*; and from the different forms of Chriſtians they had two ſeveral ſervices, the one called *Miſſa Catechumenorum*, becauſe at the end of that the *Catechumeni* were diſmiſſed out of the Aſſembly; the other *Miſſa fidelium*, at which they received the Lord's-Supper; which afterwards (the former diſcipline of the Church decaying) engroſſed the name *Miſſa* to its ſelf; and when the ſacrifice of the Altar came up among the Papiſts, it was appropriated to that: For though they innovated things never ſo much, yet it hath been always the Policy of that Church not to innovate names, that ſo the incautelous might be better deceived with a pretence of antiquity; and thus under the anciently ſimple name of *Miſſa* lies at this day couched a *Maſs* of errors. So after the word λειτουργεῖν was applied by them to that ſacrifice, wherever they meet that word in Scripture, they interpret it in that ſenſe; and hence when we only read of the teachers at *Antioch*, λειτουργούντων αὐτῶν, Acts 13. 2. no other rendering of the words will be taken but *Sacrificantibus illis*, although it be not only contrary to the ſenſe of the word in the New Teſtament, but to the Expoſition of *Chryſoſtome*, *Theophylact*, and *Œcumenius*, who expound it by κηρυττόντων. Thus when publick Liturgies were grown into uſe in the Church after the decay of the Gifts of the firſt primitive Church, *Euſebius* his bare calling St. *James* λειτουργὸς (tho' he relates only to his *Miniſtry* in the Church of *Jeruſalem*) is enough to entitle him Father to a *Liturgy*, which ſoon crept forth under his name; by an argument much of the ſame ſtrength with that which ſome have brought for reading Homilies, becauſe it is ſaid of St. *Paul*, Acts 20. 11. ὁμιλήσας ἄχρις αὐγῆς. Of the ſame ſtamp is *Bellarmine*'s argument for invocation of Saints, becauſe of *Jacob*'s ſaying *invocetur ſuper eos nomen meum.* But we need not go far for examples of this kind. The buſineſs we are upon, will acquaint us with ſome of them. As the argument for popular election of Paſtors, from the Grammatical ſenſe of the word χειροτονία, for Lay-elders from the name πρεσβύτεροι, and modern Epiſcopacy from the uſe of the word ἐπίσκοπος in Scriptures. Names and things muſt then be accurately diſtinguiſhed, and the ſenſe of the names muſt neither be fetched from the cuſtom now uſed, nor from the Etymology of the word, but from the undoubted practice of Apoſtolical times, if that can be made appear what it was, Which will be beſt done, if we can once find out what courſe and order the Apoſtles took in the forming and modelling the Churches by them planted.

V. Picherellum de Miſſa, cap. 1. Caſaub. Exercit. 16. §. 58.

§. 4. That which we lay then as a foundation, whereby to clear what Apoſtolical practice was, is, that the Apoſtles in the forming Churches did obſerve the cuſtoms of the Jewiſh Synagogue. *Totum regimen Eccleſiarum Chriſti conformatum fuit ad Synagogarum exemplar*, ſaith *Grotius* truly. *Præſides & curatores Eccleſiarum ad inſtar Preſbyterorum Synagogæ Judaicæ conſtitutos fuiſſe conſtat*, as *Salmaſius* often affirms. In which ſenſe we underſtand that famous ſpeech of the Author of the Commentary on St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles, which goes under the name of *Ambroſe*, but now judged by moſt to be done by *Hilary*, a Deacon of the Church of *Rome*, under which name St. *Auguſtine* quotes ſome words

V. Bezam in Acts 13. 15. in Acts 11. 30.—6. 3. —14. 12. —20. 28. *Apparat. ad lib. de Prim. Papæ. p.* 151, 220.

on the fifth to the *Romans*, which are found ſtill in thoſe Commentaries. *Nam apud omnes utique gentes honorabilis eſt ſenectus; unde & Synagoga & poſtea Eccleſia Seniores habuit, ſine quorum conſilio nihil agebatur in Eccleſiâ*, which words are not to be underſtood of a diſtinct ſort of Preſbyters from ſuch as were employed in preaching the Word, but of ſuch Preſbyters as were the common Council of the Church, for the moderating and ruling the affairs of it, which the Church of Chriſt had conſtituted among them, as the Jewiſh Synagogue had before. And from hence we obſerve, that the *Ebionites*, who blended Judaiſm and Chriſtianity together, (whence *Jerome* ſaith of them, *Dum volunt & Judæi eſſe & Chriſtiani, nec Judæi ſunt nec Chriſtiani*, they made a *Linſey-woolſey*-Religion, which was neither *Judaiſm* nor *Chriſtianity.*) Theſe, as *Epiphanius* tells us, called their publick meeting-place συναγωγὴ and the Paſtors of their Churches Ἀρχισυναγώγους. Thereby implying the reſemblance and analogy between the form of Government in both of them. But this will beſt be made appear by comparing them both together. For which we are to take notice how much our Saviour, in the New Teſtament, did delight to take up the received practices among the Jews only, with ſuch alterations of them as were ſuitable to the nature and doctrine of Chriſtianity; as hath been abundantly manifeſted by many learned men, about the Rites of the Lord's-Supper, taken from the *poſt-cœnium* among the Jews; the uſe of Baptiſm, from the Baptiſms uſed in initiating Proſelytes; Excommunication from their putting out of the Synagogue. As to which things, it may be obſerved, that thoſe Rites which our Saviour tranſplanted into the Goſpel-ſoil, were not ſuch as were originally founded on *Moſes* his Law, but were introduced by a confederate Diſcipline among themſelves. And thus it was in reference to the Government of the Synagogues among them; for although the reaſon of erecting them was grounded on a command in the Levitical Law, *Levit.* 23. 3. where holy Convocations are required upon the Sabbath-days; yet the building of Synagogues in the Land, was not, as far as we can find, till a great while after. For although *Moſes* required the duty of aſſembling, yet he preſcribes no orders for the place of meeting, nor for the manner of ſpending of thoſe days in God's ſervice, nor for the perſons who were to ſuper-intend the publick worſhip performed at that time. Theſe being duties of a moral nature, are left more undetermined by *Moſes* his Law, which is moſt punctual in the Ceremonial part of Divine ſervice. And therefore even then when God did determine the poſitives of worſhip, we ſee how much he left the performance of morals to the wiſdom and diſcretion of God's people, to order them in a way agreeable to the mind and will of God. We ſhall not here diſcourſe of the more elder cuſtoms and obſervations of the Synagogues, but take the draught of them by the beſt light we can about our Saviour's time, when the Apoſtles copied out the Government of Chriſtian Churches by them.

In 1 Tim. 5. 1. *v. etiam* in 1 Cor. 12. 28. *Aug. lib.* 4. *ad Bonif. cap.* 4.

Ep. ad Aug.

C. Ebion.

V. Scaliger. de Emend. temp. l. 6. *& Lud. Capelli vind. c. Buxtorfii diſſ. Selden. Com. in Eutychium. p.* 25.

§. 5. About the time of Chriſt we find Synagogues in very great requeſt among the Jews; God ſo diſpoſing it, that the moral part of his ſervice ſhould be more frequented now the Ceremonial was expiring; and by thoſe places ſo erected, it might be more facile and eaſie for the Apoſtles to diſperſe the Goſpel by preaching it in thoſe places, to which it was the cuſtom of the people to reſort. And as *Paul* at *Athens* obſerving the Altar inſcribed, Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ, *To the unknown God*, takes his

Acts 17. 23.

Text from thence, and begins to preach God and Chriſt to them; ſo the Apoſtles in every Synagogue meet with a copy of the Law, from whence they might better take their riſe to diſcover him *who was the end of the Law for righteouſneſs to all that believe. For* Moſes *of old* Acts 15.21. *time hath in every City them that preach him, being read in the Synagogues every Sabbath-day.* It was their conſtant cuſtom then every Sabbath-day to have the Law publickly read; for which every Synagogue was *V. Buxtorf. Synag. Jud. c. 9. p. 216.* furniſhed with a moſt exact copy, which was looked upon as the great treaſure and glory of their Synagogue, in the copying out of which, the greateſt care and diligence was uſed. In their Synagogues they read on- *V. Lud. de Dieu in* Acts 13.15. ly the Law and the Prophets, the כתובים or *Hagiographa* were not ordinarily read in publick; the Law for the more convenient reading it, was diſtributed into twenty four *Sections*, which they call'd פרשיות every week one Section being read, (joining twice two leſſer Sections together) the whole Law was read through once every eear.

But here I cannot ſay that the Jews were abſolutely bound up to read the ſeveral Sections appointed for the days, as it is commonly thought, *V. Cloppenb. tract. de ſab. deuteroproto & Lud. Capelli ep. ad Clopp. p. 74. cum reſp. Clop. p. 143.* Luke 4. 17. (from which *Paraſchæ* and the times prefixed of reading them, *Cloppenburgh* fetcheth a new interpretation of the Σάϐϐατον δευτερόπρωτον, which is, that the firſt *Sabbath* was that of the civil year, which began with the Section בראשית upon the twenty fourth of the month *Tiſri*; but the *ſecond Sabbath after the firſt*, was the firſt Sabbath of the ſacred year, which began with the Section החדש upon the Calends of *Niſan*) but I do not ſee any ſuch evidence of ſo exact and curious a diviſion of the ſeveral Sections ſo long ſince as the time of our Saviour is, which appears by our Saviour's reading in the *Synagogue* at *Nazareth*, where it ſeems he read after the *Synagogue*-cuſtom, as one of the ſeven call'd out by the חזן to read before the people, but we find no Section aſſigned him by him that delivered the book to him (the office of the מגן) but it is ſaid of him, ἀναπτύξας τὸ βιϐλίον εὗρε τ̀ τόπον, *when he had unfolded the book, he found out that place in* Iſaiah. So that then it ſeems there was no ſuch preciſe obſervation of the ſeveral Sections to be read. And our Saviour's reading the book of the Prophets in the Synagogue, puts us in mind of the הפטרות the Sections of the Prophets anſwer- *In Thisbi v.* פטר. able to thoſe of the Law; which *Elias Levita* tells us came up after the time of *Antiochus Epiphanes*, who ſo ſeverely prohibited the Jews the reading of their Law, but from that time hath been obſerved ever ſince, Acts 13.27. of which we read in *Paul*'s Sermon at *Antioch* in *Piſidia*, ſpeaking of Chriſt: *For they that dwell at* Jeruſalem *and their Rulers, becauſe they knew him not, nor the voices of the Prophets, which are read every Sab-* *Itiner. p. 114. ed. L'Emper.* *bath-day. Benjamin Tudelenſis*, in his *Itinerary*, tells us, that the ſame cuſtom was not obſerved among all the Jews for the reading the Sections *V. L'Emper. in Not. p. 220.* of the Law. For in *Mitſraim*, (which he there takes not for *Egypt* it ſelf, as it is commonly taken, but for *Grand Cairo*) where there were near two thouſand Jews, there were two *Synagogues*, the one of *Syrian*, the other of *Babylonian Jews*. The latter read over every week an entire Section of the Law, (as the Jews in *Spain* in his time did) and ſo finiſhed the Law in a year's ſpace. The *Syrian* Jews, or thoſe that were born in *Judæa*, divided every Section into three parts, and read not the Law through but in three years time. Theſe Synagogues were very much multiplied, both in *Jeruſalem* and elſewhere, about the time of our Saviour's being in the world. When the common tradition of the Jews is, that in *Jeruſalem* it ſelf, there were Four hundred and eighty one Synagogues, which they ridiculouſly obſerved by their *Gematry*, from the word מלאתי uſed *Iſa.* 1. 20. whoſe numeral Letters being put together, amount to that number; but a clearer evidence of the multitude of *Synagogues*, is our *Saviour's* ſo often appearing in them; and ſo likewiſe the Apoſtles when they went abroad to preach the Goſpel, we find in moſt places that they firſt entred into the Synagogues, which were, by the liberty given to the Jews, allowed them in all the Cities where they inhabited by the *Roman* Governours. And ſo in all their diſperſions, both in *Babylon*, *Egypt*, and the *Weſtern* Parts, we read of the Synagogues which the Jews enjoyed, and the liberty they had therein, for exerciſe of their own way of worſhip and diſcipline. And therefore even at *Rome* we read of their *Proſeuchæ*,

V. Serrarium Rabb. prior. c. 32.
Mat. 4. 9.
Mark 1. 23.
Luke 4. 17.
John 6. 59.
—18. 20.
Acts 13. 14.
—14. 1.
—17. 10.
—18. 4.
—19. 8.

> *Ede ubi conſiſtas; in quâ te quæro proſeucha?*

Juvenal, ſat. 3.

Which by the old Scholiaſt upon *Juvenal*, is ſaid to be the place *ad quem convenire ſolebant mendici ad ſtipem petendam*, of which *Turnebus* gives this account, *Proſeuchæ fana Judæorum erant, ut Alexandriæ & Romæ, alibique, ſic nomen adeptæ quod oracula quædam eſſent, vel* (*ut Chriſtiani loquuntur*) *oratoria. Cum autem ad Eleemoſynam Judæi dandam eſſent propenſiſſimi, eò ceu mendicorum conventus coibat; ſed & Judæi & ipſi mendici, inviſi erant omnibus, & mendici ea loca quod domicilia non haberent, diverſores interdum occupabant, in iiſque cubabant, ideoque Proſeuches nomen in contemptum abierat.* *Scaliger* thinks that the *Proſeucha* differed from the Synagogue; for which he is checked by *Grotius*, from that place of *Philo*, where he ſpeaks of *Auguſtus* giving the Jews the liberty of their *Proſeuchæ*, for the learning the Religion of their Country, Τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις προσευχτήρια τί ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ διδασκαλεῖα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφρωσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, εὐσεβείας τε καὶ ὁσιότητος καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς, which in brief is that the *Proſeuchæ were the Schools of all Religion and Learning*, by which words he ſeems to confound not only the *Synagogue* and the *Proſeucha* together, but the Synagogue and the בית מרדש which was their *Divinity-School*, whither they uſed to repair after dinner, upon Sabbath-days, and where the Queſtions about their Law were diſcuſſed; but though I cannot ſay theſe were always diſtinguiſhed, yet in ſome places they were. Such ſeems the *School of Tyrannus* to be, where *Paul* taught, having withdrawn himſelf from the Synagogue. And ſo ſometimes the *Proſeuchæ* were diſtinguiſhed from *the Synagogues*, as *Grotius* himſelf elſewhere acknowledgeth, *viz.* either where there was not a competent number of Jews, (for ten Students in the Law were required to make a Synagogue.) or elſe where the Magiſtrate would not permit the uſe of them, in which caſe the poor Jews were fain to content themſelves with a place remote from the City, either by ſome river, as that προσευχὴ, mentioned *Acts* 16. 13. or by ſome Grove or Wood, whence that of *Juvenal*.

Adverſ. l. 1. *cap.* 19.
Not. in Frag. Græc. p. 25. in Mat. 4. 23. *Leg. ad Caium.*
Acts 19. 9.
Annot. in Acts 16. 13.

> *Nunc ſacri fontis nemus, & delubra locantur*
> *Judæis, quorum cophinus fænumque ſupellex.*

Which Fountain, as *Voſſius* obſerves, was *extra portam Capenam in luco quem medium irrigabat*; and from hence *Scaliger* gathers *Judæos in nemoribus proſeuchas collocâſſe.* Thus it appears now what privileges the

De Idol. *l.* 2. *c.* 80. *p.* 715.
In Fragm. Gr. p. 15.

the Jews generally enjoyed in their diſperſion, for their Synagogues and publick places, to meet, pray, and diſcourſe in.

§. 6. We now come to enquire after what manner the Government of the Synagogue was modell'd. Wherein we muſt firſt enquire whether there were any peculiar Government belonging to the Synagogue, diſtinct from the civil Conſiſtories which were in uſe among them. This
Dr. Lightfoot Horæ Hebr. in Mat. 2. 23. *p.* 70. is often left untouched by learned men in their diſcourſe of Synagogues; ſome indeed make the leaſt Conſiſtory or *Sanhedrin* in uſe among the Jews, *viz.* the *Triumvirate*, to be the rulers of the Synagogue, and part of the *ten*, who were to be where-ever there was a Synagogue. But although I cannot ſee ſufficient evidence for a great Eccleſiaſtical *Sanhedrin* founded by *Moſes*, anſwering to the great *Sanhedrin* of *LXXI.* yet I conceive it probable, that when Synagogues were ſo multiplied both at home and abroad, there was a diſtinct *Bench* of Officers, who did particularly belong to the Synagogue to ſuperintend the affairs of that, which I ſhall now endeavour to make out by theſe following reaſons, *Firſt*, Becauſe the *Ten* required for the Synagogue are ſet down by Jewiſh writers, as diſtinct from the number required for the civil Conſi-
De Syned. l. 2. *c.* 5. *ſ.* 4. ſtory. For in the *Gemara Babylonia* (cited by *Selden*) the account given why there muſt be 120 inhabitants where there was to be a *Sanhedrin*, of twenty three, is this, *There muſt be twenty three to make up the* Sanhedrin, *and three orders of twenty three*, (who ſat in a hemicycle under the Sanhedrin, in the ſame form as they ſat) *and beſides theſe, the ten who were to be employed wholly in the affairs of the Synagogue*, for the Gloſs there explains them to be עשרה בני ארם כטילין מכל סלאכה *decem filii hominis vacantes ab omni operi ut parati ſint* וערבית לבית הכנסת שחרית *domui Synagogæ manè & veſperi*, and there adds, that every City, though it be wall'd, where ten ſuch perſons are wanting, is looked on only as a village, and thought unworthy to have a *Sanhedrin* of twenty three.) So that by this it appears the number of the *Decemvirate*
In Jud. tit. Sanhed. c. 1. *ſect.* 5. for the Synagogue, was diſtinct from the Perſons employed in the civil Courts. To the ſame purpoſe *Maimonides* gives the account of the number of 120; who likewiſe requires the ten for the Synagogue as a
Ad Miſn. tit. Sanhed. c. 1. *ſect.* 6. diſtinct and peculiar number. *Atque hi erant viri qui vacabant tantum rebus divinis, nimirum lectioni legis & ſeſſioni in ſynagogis*, as Mr. *Selden* quotes it from another place in him; whereby it is evident that thoſe who were employed in the Synagogue, did make a peculiar Bench and Conſiſtory, diſtinct from the civil Judicature of the place. And therefore the 'Αρχισυνάγωγοι are nor the civil Rulers, but ſome peculiar Officers belonging to the ſervice of the Synagogue. And thence when all civil Power and Government was taken from the Jews, yet they retained their *Archiſynagogues* ſtill. Whence we read of *Archiſynagogues,*
Cod. Theod. l. 16. *tit.* 8. *l.* 13. *&* 14. *Patriarchs and Preſbyters* among the Jews in the times of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, when all civil Power and Juriſdiction was taken from them. The *Second* reaſon is from the peculiar ordination of thoſe who were the Rulers of the Synagogues. This I know is denied by many, becauſe, ſay they, ordination was proper only to the *Preſbyters* among the Jews, who were thereby made capable of being members of the *Sanhedrin*, thence it was called סמיכה וקנים *ordinatio preſbyterorum*, i. e. *impoſitio manuum quâ preſbyteri fiunt*. This ordination was I grant primarily uſed in order to the making men members of the great *Sanhedrin*, and therefore the Jews derive the cuſtom of ordaining them, from *Moſes* his firſt conſtituting the *L X X.* elders, which, ſay they, was done

done by impoſition of hands; which was ſeconded by the example of *Moſes* laying his hands on *Joſhua*, from whence the cuſtom was continued down among them till the time of *Adrian*, who ſeverely prohibited it by an Edict, That whoſoever ſhould ordain another, ſhould forfeit his Life, and ſo every one that was ſo ordained. Thence the Jews tell us that *R. Jehuda Ben Baba* is called הסומך *the Ordainer*, becauſe in the time of that Edict he ordained five *Preſbyters*, without which they had wholly loſt their ſucceſſion of Preſbyters for Courts of Judicature. But though it be thus evident that their ordination was chiefly uſed in order to the fitting men to be members of the *Sanhedrin*, yet that beſides this, there was a peculiar ordination for perſons not employed in civil matters, will appear, *Firſt*, From the different *forms* of their ordination; ſome were general, without any reſtriction or limitation at all; which power was conferred in words to this purpoſe, *Ordinatus jam ſis, & ſit tibi facultas judicandi etiam cauſas pœnales.* He that was thus ordained, was fit for any court of Judicature; but there was another form of ordination, which was more particular and reſtrained; a form limiting the general power, either to pecuniary caſes, or criminal, or only to the power of binding and looſing, without any judiciary power at all. Now thoſe that were thus ordained, were the Jewiſh Caſuiſts, reſolving men only *in foro conſcientiæ* of the lawfulneſs and unlawfulneſs of things propounded to them. This they called רשות להורות באסר והתר *Facultas decernendi circa ligatum & ſolutum*, that is, *a power of decreeing what was lawful or unlawful.* For in that ſenſe binding and looſing is uſed by the Jewiſh writers. In which ſenſe they tell us commonly that one School, as that of *Hillel* אוסר *binds*, that is, judgeth a thing unlawful, another מותר looſeth, (as that of *Schammai*) that is, judgeth it lawful and free to be done. Now the perſons thus ordained with this power only, were thereby no members of any civil Court of Judicature, nor thereby made capable of it; it appears then that this ordination was peculiar to a particular function, which exactly anſwers to the miniſterial Office under the Goſpel. And that thoſe who were thus ordained, either might not, or did not exerciſe that Office of theirs in the Synagogue, I can ſee no reaſon; I am ſure it was moſt ſuitable to that place, or at leaſt to the בית מדרש where there was ſuch a one diſtinct from the Synagogue.

Numb. 13.
Numb. 37. 18.
Gem. Babyl. ad tit. anhed. c. 1. *ſ.* 13, 14.
Scaliger Elench. Triher. c. 10.
Tzemach. David. p. 1. *mil.* 4. *An.* 880.
Selden. ad Eutych. p. 19. *de Syned. l.* 2. *c.* 7. *ſ.* 2.
V. Lightfoot Horæ Hebr. in Mat. 16. 19.

But a clearer evidence of the particular ordination of thoſe employed in the Synagogue, we have from *Benjamin* in his *Itinerary*, for granting his palpable miſtakes about the civil power of the Jews in his time, (which was about the middle of the twelfth Century) ſufficiently diſcovered by the learned *L'Empereur*, yet as to the ordaining of perſons for the ſeveral Synagogues, we have no ground to ſuſpect his Teſtimony, which is very plain and evident. For ſpeaking of *R. Daniel Ben Haſdai*, who was the ראש הגולה or the αἰχμαλωτάρχης, *the Head of the Captivity*, then reſiding at *Bagdad:* He tells us the Synagogues of *Babylon*, *Perſia*, *Choreſan*, *Sheba*, *Meſopotamia*, and many other places, derived power from him על כל קהל וקהל רבוחזן *of ordaining a Rabbi and Preacher over every Synagogue*, which he tells us was done *by laying on his hands upon them.* Theſe two the *Rabbi* and the חזן he makes to be the fixed Officers of every Synagogue, and the office of the latter lay chiefly in expounding the Scriptures. The like he hath of *R. Nathaniel* the ראש הישיבה to whoſe office it belonged to ordain in all the Synagogues in *Egypt* רבנים וחזנין *the Rabbies and Lecturers of the Synagogue:*

Diſſertati. ad Lectorem & in not. 193, &c.
P. 73. *ad. L'Emper. Heb. Lat.*
P. 115.

By which we ſee clearly, that there was a peculiar ordination for the Miniſters belonging to the Synagogue. *Elench. Triher. c. 10.* Thence *Scaliger* wonders how Chriſt at twelve years old ſhould be permitted to ſit among the Doctors aſking Queſtions, when he was no ordained *Rabbi* to whom that place belonged. Luke 2. 46. But although ἐν μέσῳ τῶν διδασκάλων may poſſibly mean no more than ſitting on one of the lower ſeats belonging to thoſe who were yet in their קטנות or *Minority*, where they ſat at the feet of their Teachers, which was not within the Temple its ſelf, but as *Arias Montanus* thinks, *In Appar. de Templo.* was at the East-Gate of the Temple, where the Doctors ſat; yet this is evident by *Scaliger*, that he looked on an ordination for that end, as neceſſary to thoſe who ſat in the Synagogues, as the Doctors there; which is likewiſe affirmed by *Grotius*, who tells us, that among the Jews, not only all publick civil Offices were conferr'd by impoſition of hands, *Sed & in Archiſynagogis & ſenioribus Synagogæ, idem obſervatum, unde mos* χειροθεσίας *ad Chriſtianos tranſiit*; *Annot. in Evang. p. 39.* *but likewiſe all the Rulers and Elders of the Synagogue were ſo ordained, from whence the cuſtom was tranſlated into Chriſtianity*, (of which afterwards.) Thus now we have cleared that there was a peculiar Government belonging to the Synagogue, diſtinct from the civil judicatures.

§. 7. Having thus far proceeded in clearing that there was a peculiar form of Government in the Synagogue; we now enquire what that was, and by what Law and rule it was obſerved. The Government of the Synagogue, either relates to the publick ſervice of God in it, or the publick rule of it as a ſociety. As for the ſervice of God to be performed in it, as there were many parts of it, ſo there were many Officers peculiarly appointed for it. The main part of publick ſervice lay in the reading and expounding the Scriptures: For both, the known place of *Philo* will give us light for the underſtanding them. *Lib. omnem probum liberum eſſe.* Εἰς ἱεροὺς ἀφικνούμενοι τόπους οἳ καλοῦνται συναγωγαὶ καθ' ἡλικίας ἐν τάξεσιν ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέροις νέοι καθέζονται μετὰ κόσμου προσήκοντος, ἔχοντες ἀκροατικῶς· εἶθ' ὁ μὲν τὰς βίβλους ἀναγινώσκει λαβὼν ἕτερος δὲ τῶν ἐμπειροτάτων, ὅσα μὴ γνώριμα, παρελθὼν ἀναγινώσκει. *Coming to their holy places call'd Synagogues, they ſit down in convenient order, according to their ſeveral forms, ready to hear, the young under the elder; then one taketh the book and readeth, another of thoſe beſt ſkill'd comes after and expounds it,* *In Luc. 4. 16.* For ſo *Grotius* reads it ἀναδιδάσκει for ἀναγινώσκει, out of *Euſebius*. We ſee two ſeveral Offices here, the one of the *Reader* in the Synagogue, the other of him that did interpret what was read. Great difference I find among learned men about the חזן of the Synagogue; ſome by him underſtand the ἀναγνώστης, Luke 4. 20. call'd ſometimes in Scripture ὑπηρέτης, and ſo make him the under Reader in the Synagogue; and hence I ſuppoſe it is (and not from looking to the poor, which was the Office of the *Parnaſim*) that the Office of *Deacons* in the primitive Church, is ſuppoſed to be anſwerable to the חזנים *6. Ebionites.* among the Jews; for the *Deacon*'s Office in the Church, was the publick reading of the Scriptures: And hence *Epiphanius* parallels the ἀρχισυναγώγους, πρεσβυτέρους and Ἀζανίτας among the Jews, to the Biſhop, Preſbyters and Deacons among the Chriſtians. But others make the Office of the חזן to be of a higher nature, not to be taken for the Reader himſelf, (for that was no ſet Office, but upon every Sabbath-day *Synag. Jud. lib. 11.* ſeven were call'd out to do that work, as *Buxtorf* tells us; firſt a Prieſt, then a Levite, and after, any five of the people; and theſe had every one their ſet parts in every Section to read, which are ſtill marked by the numbers in ſome Bibles.) But the חזן was he that did call out every one of theſe in their order to read, and did obſerve their reading, whether they did it exactly or no. So *Buxtorf* ſpeaking of the חזן, *Hic maximè oratione ſive precibus & cantu Eccleſiæ præibat, præerat lectioni legali, docens quod & quomodo legendum, & ſimilibus quæ ad ſacra pertinebant.* So that according to him the חזן was the Superintendent of all the publick ſervice, thence others make him parallel to him they call'd שליח ציבור *the Angel of the Church, Legatus Eccleſiæ L'Empereur* renders it, as though the name were impoſed on him, as acting in the name of the Church, which could only be in offering up publick prayers; but he was *Angelus Dei*, as he was *inſpector Eccleſiæ*, becauſe the Angels are ſuppoſed to be more immediately preſent in, and Superviſors over the publick place, and duties of worſhip; ſee 1 *Cor.* 11. 10. this חזן is by *L'Empereur* often rendred *Concionator Synagogæ*, as though it belonged to him to expound the meaning of what was read in the Synagogue, but he that did that, was call'd דרשן from דרש *to enquire*; thence συζητητὴς τȣ͂ κόσμȣ τȣ́τȣ *the enquirer, or diſputer of this world*, thence *R. Moſes Haddarſan*; but it is in vain to ſeek for ſeveral Offices from ſeveral names; nay, it ſeems not evident, that there was any ſet Officers in the Jewiſh Church for expounding Scriptures in all Synagogues, or at leaſt not ſo fixed, but that any one that enjoyed any repute for Religion, or knowledge in the Law, was allowed a free liberty of ſpeaking for the inſtruction of the people, as we ſee in Chriſt and his Apoſtles; *for the Rulers of the Synagogue ſent to* Paul *and* Barnabas, *after the reading of the Law, that if they had any word of exhortation, they ſhould ſpeak on.* From hence it is evident, that there were more than one who had rule over the Synagogues, they being call'd Rulers here. It ſeems very probable, that in every City where there were *ten wiſe men*, (as there were ſuppoſed to be in every place where there was a Synagogue) that they did all jointly concur for the ruling the affairs of the Synagogue. But what the diſtinct Offices of all theſe were, it is hard to make out, but all joining together ſeem to make the *Conſiſtory*, or *Bench*, as ſome call it, which did unanimouſly moderate the affairs of the Synagogue, whoſe manner of ſitting in the Synagogues, is thus deſcribed by Mr. *Thorndike* out of *Maimonides*, whoſe words are theſe: *How ſit the people in the Synagogue? The Elders ſit with their faces towards the people, and their backs towards the* Hecall, (the place where they lay the copy of the Law) *and all the people ſit rank before rank, the face of every rank towards the back of the rank before it, ſo the faces of all the people are towards the Sanctuary, and towards the Elders, and towards the Ark; and when the Miniſter of the Synagogue ſtandeth up to prayer, he ſtandeth on the ground before the Ark, with his face to the Sanctuary, as the reſt of the people.* Several things are obſervable to our purpoſe in this Teſtimony of *Maimonides:* Firſt, That there were ſo many Elders in the Synagogue, as to make a Bench or Conſiſtory, and therefore had a place by themſelves, as the Governours of the Synagogue. And the truth is, after their diſperſion we ſhall find little Government among them, but what was in their Synagogues, unleſs it was where they had liberty for erecting Schools of learning. Beſides this College of Preſbyters, we here ſee the publick Miniſter of the Synagogue, the חזן הכנסת *i. e. Epiſcopus congregationis, the Superintendent over the Congregation*, whoſe peculiar Office it was to pray for, and to bleſs the people. We are here farther to take notice of the form of their ſitting in the Synagogue;

Lex Rabb. ad verb.

In Benjam. not. p. 149.

1 Cor. 1.20.

Acts 13.15.

Service of God at *Rel. Aſ.c.*3.*p.*90.

gogue; the Preſbyters ſat together upon a Bench by themſelves, with their faces towards the people, which was in an *Hemicycle*, the form wherein all the Courts of Judicature among them ſat; which is fully deſcribed by Mr. *Selden* and Mr. *Thorndike* in the places above-cited. This was afterwards the form wherein the Biſhop and Preſbyters uſed to ſit in the primitive Church, as the laſt named learned Author largely obſerves and proves. Beſides this College of Preſbyters, there ſeems to be one particularly call'd the *Ruler of the Synagogue*, ראש הקהל in the Scriptures ἀρχισυνάγωγος or ἄρχων τῆς συναγωγῆς, which in the importance of the New Teſtament Greek, (following that of the *Alexandrian Jews*, in the Verſion of the Old Teſtament) implies no more than a primacy of order in him above the reſt he was joined with. And thence ſometimes we read of them in the plural number, οἱ ἀρχισυνάγωγοι, *Acts* 13. 15. implying thereby an equality of power in many; but by reaſon of the neceſſary primacy of one in order above the reſt, the name may be appropriated to the Preſident of the College. *Acts* 18. 8, 17, we read of two, *viz. Criſpus* and *Soſthenes*, and either of them is call'd Ἀρχισυνάγωγος, which could not be, did the name import any peculiar power of Juriſdiction lodged in one excluſive of the reſt; unleſs we make them to be of two Synagogues, which we have no evidence at all for; I confeſs *Beza* his argument from εἷς τῶν ἀρχισυναγώγων, *Mark* 5. 22. for a multitude of thoſe ſo called in the ſame Synagogue, is of no great force, where we may probably ſuppoſe there were many Synagogues. But where there is no evidence of more than one in a place, and we find the name attributed to more than one, we have ground to think that there is nothing of power or Juriſdiction in that one, which is not common to more beſides himſelf. But granting ſome peculiarity of honour belonging to one above the reſt in a Synagogue, which in ſome places, I ſee no great reaſon to deny, yet that implies not any power over and above the Bench, of which he was a Member, though the firſt in order; much as the נשיא the *Prince* of the *Sanhedrin*, whoſe place imported no power peculiar to himſelf, but only a priority of dignity in himſelf above his fellow Senators; as the *Princeps Senatûs* in the *Roman* Republick, anſwering to the אבבית דין in the great *Sanhedrin*, who was next to the *Naſi*, as the *Princeps Senatûs* to the Conſuls, which was only an honorary Dignity, and nothing elſe: Under which diſguiſe that politick Prince *Auguſtus* raviſhed the *Roman* Common-wealth of its former liberty. The name ἀρχισυνάγωγος, may, I ſuppoſe, in propriety of ſpeech, be rendred in Latin, *Magiſter ordinis*, he being by his Office *Præſul*, a name not originally importing any power, but only dignity: Thoſe whom the Greeks call ἀρχιερέας, the Latins render *Magiſtros ſui ordinis*, and ſo *Suetonius* interprets ἀρχιερωσυνήν by *Magiſterium Sacerdotii*. They who meet then with the name *Archiſynagogues* either in *Lampridius*, *Vopiſcus*, *Codex Theodoſii*, *Juſtinian*'s *Novels*, in all whom it occurs, and in ſome places as diſtinct from Preſbyters, will learn to underſtand thereby only the higheſt honour in the Synagogue, conſidering before how little, yea nothing of power the Jews enjoyed under either the Heathen or Chriſtian Emperors.

De ſyned. l. 2. *c.* 6. *ſ.* 2. Thorndike, *Rel. Aſſem. cap.* 3.

Mark 5. 35. Luke 8. 49. —13. 14.

Mark 2. 25.

Annot. in Luc. 13. 14.

In Caligula Lampr. vit. Alex. Sever. Vopiſcus in Saturn.

Cod. de Jud. Colic. & Eam. l. 13. *Cod. Jud. l.* 17. *c. de Judæis.*

One thing more we add, touching this honour of the Rulers of the Synagogue among the Jews, that whatever honour, title, power or dignity is imported by that name, it came not from any Law enforcing or commanding it, but from mutual confederation and agreement among the perſons employed in the Synagogue, whoſe natural reaſon did dictate;

that where many have an equality of power, it is moſt convenient, (by way of accumulation upon that Perſon, of a power more than he had, but not by deprivation of themſelves of that inherent power which they enjoyed) to entruſt the management of the executive part of Affairs of common concernment to one perſon eſpecially choſen, and deputed thereunto. So it was in all the *Sanhedrins* among the Jews, and in all well-ordered Senates and Councils in the world. And it would be very ſtrange, that any Officers of a religious ſociety, ſhould upon that account be out-Lawed of thoſe natural Liberties, which are the reſults and products of the free actings of reaſon. Which things, as I have already obſerved, God hath looked on to be ſo natural to man, as when he was moſt ſtrict and punctual in ceremonial commands, he yet left theſe things wholly at liberty. For we read not of any command, that in the *Sanhedrin* one ſhould have ſome peculiarity of honour above the reſt; this mens natural reaſon would prompt them to, by reaſon of a neceſſary priority of order in ſome above others; which the very inſtinct of nature hath taught irrational creatures, much more ſhould the light of reaſon direct men to. But yet all order is not power, nor all power juridical, nor all juridical power a ſole power; therefore it is a meer Paralogiſm in any from order to infer power, or from a delegated power by conſent, to infer a juridical power by Divine right; or laſtly, from a power in common with others, to deduce a power excluding others. All which they are guilty of, who merely from the name of an *Archiſynagogue*, would fetch a perpetual neceſſity of juriſdiction in one above the elders joined with him, or from the הנשוא in the *Sanhedrin*, a power of a ſole ordination in one without the conſent of his fellow Senators. But of theſe afterwards. Thus much may ſuffice for a draught, in little, of the Government of the Jewiſh Synagogue.

§. 8. Having thus far repreſented the Jewiſh Synagogue that the Idea of its Government may be formed in our underſtandings, we now come to conſider how far, and in what the Apoſtles in forming Chriſtian Churches, did follow the pattern of the Jewiſh Synagogue. Which is a notion not yet ſo far improved, as, I conceive it may be, and I know no one more conducible to the happy end of compoſing our differences, touching the Government of the Church, than this is. I ſhall therefore, for the full clearing of it, premiſe ſome general conſiderations to make way for the entertainment of this *Hypotheſis* in mens minds, at leaſt as probable; and then endeavour particularly to ſhew how the *Apoſtles* did obſerve the model of the Synagogue, *in its publick ſervice, in ordination of Church-officers, in forming Preſbyteries in the ſeveral Churches, in ruling and governing thoſe Preſbyteries.* The general conſiderations I premiſe, to ſhew the probability of what I am aſſerting, ſhall be from theſe things, *from the community of name and cuſtoms between the believing Jews and others, at the firſt forming Churches; from the Apoſtles forming Churches out of Synagogues in their travelling abroad; from the agreeableneſs of that model of Government to the State of the Chriſtian Churches at that time.* I begin with the firſt, *From the community of names and cuſtoms, between the believing and unbelieving Jews, at the firſt forming Churches.* All the while our bleſſed Saviour was living in the world, Chriſt and his Diſciples went ſtill under the name of Jews; they neither renounced the name, nor the cuſtoms in uſe among them. Our Saviour goes up to the *Feaſts* at *Jeruſalem*, conforms to all

the rites and cuſtoms in uſe then; not only thoſe commanded by God
himſelf, but thoſe taken up by the Jews themſelves, if not contrary to
God's commands, as in obſerving the Feaſt of Dedication, in going into
their Synagogues, and teaching ſo often there, in waſhing the Feet
of the Diſciples, (a cuſtom uſed by them before the Paſſover) in uſing
Baptiſm, for proſelyting men to the profeſſion of Chriſtianity, *&c.* In
theſe and other things our Saviour conformed to the received practice
among them, though the things themſelves were no ways commanded
by the Law of *Moſes*. And after his reſurrection, when he took care
for the forming of a Church upon the doctrine he had delivered, yet
we find not the Apoſtles withdrawing from communion with the Jews,
but, on the contrary, we find the Diſciples frequenting the Temple,
Acts 2. 46. *Acts* 3. 1. *Acts* 5. 20, 21, 26. whereby it appears how they
owned themſelves as Jews ſtill, obſerving the ſame both time and place
for publick worſhip which were in uſe among the Jews. We find *Paul*,
Acts 9. 20. preſently after his converſion, in the Synagogues, preaching that Chriſt
whom he had before perſecuted; and where ever he goes abroad afterwards,
we find him ſtill entring into the Synagogues to preach; where
Acts 13. 5. we cannot conceive he ſhould have ſo free and eaſie admiſſion, unleſs
14. ——17. 10. the Jews did look upon him as one of their own religion, and obſerv-
——18. 4. ing the ſame cuſtoms in the Synagogues with themſelves, only differing
——19. 8. in the point of the coming of the *Meſſias*, and the obligation of the
ceremonial Law, the leaſt footſteps of which were ſeen in the Synagogue
worſhip. But that which yet farther clears this, is the general prejudice
of the Diſciples againſt the Gentiles, even after the giving the
Acts 11. 3. *Holy Ghoſt*, as appears by their contending with *Peter* for going in to
men uncircumciſed. It is evident that then the Apoſtles themſelves
did not clearly apprehend the extent of their commiſſion; for elſe what
Acts 10.28. made *Peter* ſo ſhy of going to *Cornelius*? But by *every creature*, and *all
nations*, they only apprehended the Jews in their diſperſions abroad, or
at leaſt that all others who were to be ſaved, muſt be by being *proſelyted*
to the Jews, and obſerving the Law of *Moſes*, together with the
Goſpel of Chriſt. And therefore we ſee the neceſſity of circumciſion
Acts 15. 1. much preſſed by the believing Jews which came down from *Jeruſalem*,
which raiſed ſo high a diſpute, that a convention of the Apoſtles together
at *Jeruſalem* was called for the ending of it: And even there we
——15. 7. find great heats before the buſineſs could be decided πολλῆς δὲ συζητήσεως
γενομένης, *After there had been much diſputing*. Nay, after this Council,
and the determination of the Apoſtles therein, all the eaſe and release
that was granted, was only to the Gentile-converts, but the Jews
ſtick cloſe to their old Principles ſtill, and are as zealous of the cuſtoms
of the Jews as ever before: For which we have a pregnant teſtimony
in *Acts* 21. 20, 21, 22. where the Elders of the Church of Jeruſalem
tell *Paul there were many myriads* Ἰουδαίων τῶν πεπιστευκότων *of believing Jews,
who were* πάντες ζηλωταὶ τοῦ νόμου, *all very zealous for the Law ſtill*, and
therefore had conceived a ſiniſter opinion of *Paul*, as one who taught
a defection from the Law of *Moſes*, *ſaying, They might not circumciſe
their Children, nor walk after the cuſtoms.* One copy reads it as *Beza*
tells us, τοῖς ἔθεσι τοῖς πατρώοις πορεύεσθαι *to follow the cuſtom of their Fathers.*
We ſee how equally zealous they are for the cuſtoms obtaining
among them, as for the Law its ſelf. And is it then any ways probable
that theſe who continued ſuch zealots for the cuſtoms among them,
ſhould not obſerve thoſe cuſtoms in uſe in the Synagogues for the Go-

vernment of the Church? Might not they have been charged as well as *Paul*, with relinquiſhing *the cuſtoms*, if they had thrown off the model of the Jewiſh Synagogue, and taken up ſome cuſtoms different from that? And that which farther confirms this, is, that this Church of *Jeruſalem* continued ſtill in its zeal for the Law, till after the deſtruction of the Temple; and all the ſeveral Paſtors of that Church, (whom Eccleſiaſtical Writers call Biſhops) were of the circumciſion. For both we have the teſtimony of *Sulpicius Severus*, ſpeaking of the time of *Adrian*. *Et quia Chriſtiani ex Judæis potiſſimum putabantur, (namque tum Hieroſolymæ, non niſi ex circumciſione habebat Eccleſia ſacerdotem) militum cohortem cuſtodias in perpetuum agitare juſſit, quæ Judæos omnes Hieroſolymæ aditu arceret. Quod quidem Chriſtianæ fidei proficiebat; quia tum penè omnes Chriſtum Deum, ſub legis obſervatione, credebant.* We ſee hereby that the Chriſtians obſerved ſtill the Law with the Goſpel; and that the Jews and Chriſtians were both reckoned as one body, which muſt imply an obſervation of the ſame rites and cuſtoms among them: For thoſe are the things whereby Societies are diſtinguiſhed moſt. Now it is evident that the *Romans* made no diſtinction at firſt between the Jews and Chriſtians. Thence we read in the time of *Claudius*, when the Edict came out againſt the Jews, *Aquila* and *Priſcilla*, though converted to Chriſtianity, were forced to leave *Italy* upon that account, being ſtill looked on as Jews; yet theſe are called by *Paul*, *his helpers in Chriſt Jeſus*. For which *Onuphrius* gives this reaſon, *Nullum adhuc inter Judæos & Chriſtianos diſcrimen noſcebatur*, which account is likewiſe given by *Alphonſus Ciaconius*, *Congeneres & comprofeſſores ejuſdem religionis gentilibus cenſebantur, (Chriſtiani pariter ac Judæi.)* The Edict of *Claudius* we may read ſtill in *Suetonius*, *Judæos impulſore Chreſto aſſidue tumultuantes Roma expulit.* We find here the Edict fully expreſſed for baniſhing the Jews, and the occaſion ſet down; which moſt interpret of the doctrine of Chriſt, as the occaſion of the ſtirs between the Jews and Chriſtians. For the *Romans* called Chriſt *Chreſtus*, and Chriſtians, *Chreſtiani*, as the Authors of the Chriſtians *Apologies* againſt the Heathens often tell us. But *Marcellus Donatus* conjectures this *Chreſtus* to have been ſome ſeditious Jew called by that name, for which he brings many *Inſcriptions* wherein the name occurs, but none wherein it is given to a Jew; which ſhould be firſt produced, before we leave the received interpretation of it. However that be, we ſee the Jews and Chriſtians equally undergo the puniſhment, without any difference obſerved in them; and therefore when *Paul* was brought before *Gallio* the *Proconſul* of *Achaia*, he looked upon the difference between the Jews and *Paul* to be only *a Queſtion of words and names, and of their Law*, and thereupon refuſed to meddle in it. And ſo *Celſus* upbraids both Jews and Chriſtians, as though their contentions were about a matter of nothing. By all this we may now conſider how little the Chriſtians did vary from the cuſtoms and practice of the Jews, when they were thought by thoſe who were equally enemies to both, to be of the ſame body and community. Which conſideration will make the thing I aim at, ſeem more probable, when withal we obſerve that the Jewiſh cuſtoms in their Synagogues were thoſe whereby they were moſt known among the *Romans*; and therefore when they looked on the Chriſtians as of the ſame religion with the Jews, it is evident they obſerved no difference as to their publick practices in their religious Societies. Which is the firſt conſideration, to ſhew how probable it is that Chriſtians

Euſeb. hiſt. l. 4. c. 6. & Chronic.

Hiſt. ſacr. l. 2. p. 281. ed. Horn.

Acts 18. 2.

Rom. 16. 3.

Annot. in vit. Petri ap. Platin.

in vit. Petri.

In Claud. cap. 25.

Lactant. l. 4. c. 7.

Tertul. Apol. cap. 3.

V. Pet. Pithæum Hor. ſubſeciv. l. 2. cap. 3.

Donatus dilucid. in Suet. in Claud. cap. 25.

Acts 18. 15.

Apud Orig. lib. 3. cont. Celſ.

obſerved the ſame form in Government with what they found in the Synagogues.

§. 9. To which I add a *Second* Conſideration, which is the Apoſtles forming Chriſtian Churches out of Jewiſh Synagogues. We have already ſhewed how much their reſort was to them in their preaching from the conſtant practice of *Paul*, although he was in a more peculiar manner the *Apoſtle of the uncircumciſion*; much more then is it probable that the others, eſpecially *Peter*, *James* and *John* did reſort to the circumciſion. And in the ſetling things at firſt, we ſee how fearful the Apoſtles were of giving offence to the Jews, how ready to condeſcend to them in any thing they lawfully might. And can we think that *Paul* would yield Acts 16. 3. ſo far to the Jews, as to circumciſe *Timothy*, rather than give offence to the Jews in thoſe parts where he was, (and that in a thing which ſee- Gal. 5. 2. med moſt immediately to thwart the deſign of the Goſpel, as circumciſion did, witneſs the Apoſtle himſelf) that yet he would ſcruple the retaining the old model of the Synagogue, when there was nothing in it at all repugnant to the doctrine of the Goſpel, and the nature and conſtitution of Chriſtian Churches? When the Apoſtles then, did not only gather Churches out of Synagogues, but at ſome places, in probability, whole Synagogues were converted, as well as whole Churches formed: What ſhew of reaſon can be given why the Apoſtles ſhould ſlight the conſtitution of the Jewiſh Synagogue, which had no dependence on the Jewiſh Hierarchy, and ſubſiſted not by any command of the ceremonial Law? The work of the Synagogue not belonging to the Prieſts as ſuch, but as perſons qualified for inſtructing others; and the firſt model of the Synagogue-Government, is with a great deal of probability derived from the *School of the Prophets*, and the Government thereof. This conſideration would be farther improved, if the notion of diſtinct *Cœtus* of the Jewiſh and Gentile-Chriſtians in the ſame places could be made out by any irrefragable teſtimony of Antiquity, or clear evidence of reaſon drawn from Scripture: Becauſe the ſame reaſon which would ground the diſtinction of the Jewiſh Church from the Gentile, would likewiſe hold for the Jewiſh Church to retain her old form of Government in the Synagogue-way. For it muſt be ſome kind of peculiarity ſuppoſe by the Jews in themſelves as diſtinct from the Gentiles, which did make them form a diſtinct congregation from them; which peculiarity did imply the obſerving thoſe cuſtoms among them ſtill, by which that peculiarity was known to others; among which thoſe of the Synagogue were not the leaſt known or taken notice of. But I muſt freely confeſs, I find not any thing brought Dr. *Ham.* of Schiſm, *ch.* 4. §. 6, 7, *&c.* by that learned perſon who hath managed this *Hypotheſis* with the greateſt dexterity, to have that evidence in it which will command aſſent from an unprejudicated mind. And it is pity that ſuch infirm *Hypotheſes* ſhould be made uſe of for the juſtifying our ſeparation from *Rome*, which was built upon reaſons of greater ſtrength and evidence, than thoſe which have been of late pleaded by ſome aſſertors of the Proteſtant cauſe, though men of excellent abilities and learning. For there are many reaſons convictive enough that *Peter* had no univerſal power over the Church, ſuppoſing that there was no ſuch thing as a diſtinction between the Jewiſh and the Gentile *Cœtus*. I deny not but at firſt, before the Jews were fully ſatisfied of the Gentiles right to Goſpel-privileges, they were very ſhy of communicating with them, eſpecially the believing Jews of the Church of *Jeruſalem:* Upon the occaſion of ſome of whom coming down to *Antioch* from *James*, it was that *Peter withdrew, and ſeparated himſelf from the Gentiles*, with whom before he familiarly converſed. Which action of his is ſo far from being an *argument* of the ſetling any diſtinct Church of the Jews from the Gentiles there, that it yields many reaſons againſt it. For, *Firſt*, *Peter*'s withdrawing was only occaſional, and not out of deſign; whereas, had it been part of his commiſſion to do it, we cannot conceive *Peter* ſo mindleſs of his Office, as to let it alone till ſome Jews came down from *Jeruſalem* to tell him of it. *Secondly*, It was not for the ſake of the Jews at *Antioch* that he withdrew, but for the Jews which came down from *Jeruſalem*; whereas had he intended a diſtinct Church of the Jews, he would before have ſetled and fixed them as members of another body; but now it evidently appears, that not only *Peter* himſelf, but the Jews with him, did before thoſe Jews coming to *Antioch*, aſſociate with the Gentiles, which is evident by v. 13. *And other Jews diſſembled likewiſe with him, in ſo much that* Barnabas *alſo was carried away with their diſſimulation*. Whereby it is clear that theſe Jews did before join with the Gentile Chriſtians, or elſe they could not be ſaid to be led away with the diſſimulation of *Peter*. *Thirdly*, St. *Paul* is ſo far from looking upon this withdrawing of *Peter*, and the *Jews* from the *Gentiles* ſociety, to be a part of St. *Peter*'s Office, that he openly and ſharply reproves him for it. What then, was *Paul* ſo ignorant, that there muſt be two diſtinct Churches of *Jews* and *Gentiles* there, that he calls this action of his *diſſimulation*? In all reaſon then, ſuppoſing this notion to be true, the blame lights on *Paul*, and not on *Peter*, as not underſtanding that the Jews were to be formed into diſtinct bodies from the Gentile Chriſtians. And therefore it is obſervable, that the ſame Author who is produced, as aſſerting that *ſeorſim quæ ex Judæis erant Eccleſiæ habebantur, nec his quæ erant ex gentibus miſcebantur*, is he who makes this reproof of *Peter* by *Paul*, to be a mere matter of diſſimulation between them both; which ſenſe of that action, whoſoever will be ſo favourable to it as to embrace it, (as ſome ſeem inclinable to do it) will never be able to anſwer the arguments brought by St. *Auguſtine* againſt it. This place then was unhappily light upon to ground a diſtinction of the ſeveral *Cœtus*, or diſtinct Churches of Jews and Chriſtians at *Antioch*. But it may be, more evidence for it may be ſeen in the *Reſcript* of the Council of *Jeruſalem*, which is directed, τοῖς κατ᾽ ἀντιόχειαν ——— ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν, *To the brethren at Antioch, thoſe of the Gentiles.* But leaſt ſome hidden myſteries ſhould lie in this *curtailing* the words, let us ſee them at large: *Unto the Brethren, which are of the Gentiles in* Antioch, *and* Syria, *and* Cilicia. There was nothing then peculiar to thoſe of the Gentiles at *Antioch*, more than in *Syria* and *Cilicia*; and if thoſe words τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν imply a *Cœtus* diſtinct of Gentile Chriſtians, from the Jews at *Antioch*, it muſt do ſo through all *Syria*, and *Cilicia*, which was *Paul*'s *Province*, and not *Peter*'s, as appears by his travels in the *Acts*. Either then the Apoſtle of the uncircumciſion muſt form diſtinct Churches of *Jews* and *Gentiles* in his preaching through *Syria* and *Cilicia*, (which is irreconcilable with the former pretence of diſtinct Provinces, aſſerted by the ſame Author, who pleads for diſtinct *Cœtus*) or the τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν can imply no ſuch thing as a diſtinct Church of *Gentiles*, to whomſoever it is ſpoken; and ſo not at *Antioch* more than through all *Syria* and *Cilicia*. The plain ground then of the Apoſtles inſcribing the order of the Council to the *Bretbren of the Gentiles*, was,

Gal. 2. 12.

Schiſm, ſ. 8.

Anſwer to Schiſ. Diſ. ch. 2. §. 5.

Hieronym. in Gal. 1. 22.

Reply to Cath. Gent. *ch.* 4. §. 6. *n.* 6.

Aug. ep. 8. 9. 19. *Hier.*

Acts 15. 23.

Schiſm, p. 75.

Acts 15. 41.

—18. 18.

—21. 3.

becauſe the matter of that order did particularly concern them, and not the Jews, as is obvious to any that will but caſt an eye upon the 23, 24, 29 Verſes of the 15th of the *Acts*. As well might then an order ſuppoſed from the Apoſtles to the ſeveral Paſtors of Churches in things concerning them as ſuch, imply that they make diſtinct Churches from their people, as this order concerning the *Gentile Brethren*, being therefore directed to them, doth imply their making diſtinct Churches from the Jewiſh Brethren in the Cities where they lived together. What is farther produced out of *Antiquity* to this purpoſe, hath neither evidence nor pertinency enough, to ſtop the paſſage of one who is returning from this digreſſion to his former matter. Although then we grant not any ſuch diſtinct *Cœtus* of the Jews from the Chriſtians, yet that hinders not, but that both Jews and Chriſtians joining together in one Church, might retain ſtill the *Synagogue* form of Government among them; which there was no reaſon at all, why the Chriſtians ſhould ſcruple the uſing of, either as Jews or Gentiles; becauſe it imported nothing, either Typical and Ceremonial, or heavy and burdenſome, which were the grounds, why former cuſtoms, in uſe among the Jews, were laid aſide by the Chriſtians. But inſtead of that, it was moſt ſuitable and agreeable to the ſtate of the Churches in Apoſtolical times, which was the *third conſideration* to make it probable that the Synagogue form of Government was uſed by the Chriſtians. And the ſuitableneſs of this Government to the Churches, lay in the conveniency of it for the attaining all ends of Government in that condition wherein the Churches were at that time. For Church Officers acting then either in gathering or governing Churches, without any authority from Magiſtrates, ſuch a way of Government was moſt ſuitable to their ſeveral Churches, as whereby the Churches might be governed, and yet have no dependency upon the ſecular power, which the way of Government in the Synagogues was moſt convenient for; for the Jews, though they enjoyed a bare permiſſion from the civil ſtate where they lived, yet by the exerciſe of their Synagogue Government, they were able to order all affairs belonging to the ſervice of God, and to keep all members belonging to their ſeveral Synagogues in unity and peace among themſelves. The caſe was the ſame as to Synagogues and Churches; theſe ſubſiſted by the ſame permiſſion which the others enjoyed; the end of theſe was the ſervice of God, and preſerving that order among them, which might beſt become Societies ſo conſtituted; there can be no reaſon then aſſigned, why the Apoſtles in ſetling particular Churches ſhould not follow the Synagogue in its model of Government. Theſe things may ſuffice to make it appear probable that they did ſo, which is all theſe Conſiderations tend to.

§. 10. Having thus prepared the way by making it probable, I now farther enquire into the particular parts of Government, and what orders in the Synagogue were, which there is any evidence for, that the Apoſtles did take up and follow. Here I begin with the thing firſt propounded, *The orders of publick Worſhip*, which did much reſemble thoſe of the Synagogue; Only with thoſe alterations which did ariſe from the advancing of Chriſtianity. That the Chriſtians had their publick and ſet meetings for the ſervice of God, is evident from the firſt riſing of a ſociety conſtituted upon the account of Chriſtianity. We read of the *Three thouſand* converted by *Peter*'s Sermon, *That they continued in the Apoſtles doctrine and fellowſhip, and breaking of bread and prayers.* Where

Acts 2. 42.

Where we have all that was obſerved in the Synagogue; and ſomewhat more; here there is publick joining together, implied in the word κοινωνία, their ſolemn prayers expreſſed, which were conſtantly obſerved in the Synagogue; inſtead of reading the Sections of the Law and Prophets, we have the Apoſtles teaching by immediate inſpiration; and to all theſe as the proper ſervice of Chriſtianity, is ſet down the celebration of the Lord's Supper, which we ſhall ſeldom or never in the Primitive Church read the publick ſervice on Lords days performed without. During the Apoſtolical times, in which there was ſuch a Landflood of extraordinary gifts overflowing the Church, in the publick meeting we find thoſe perſons who were indued with thoſe gifts, to be much in exerciſing them (as to the cuſtom, agreeing with the Synagogue, but as to the gifts exceeding it) concerning the ordering of which for the publick edification of the Church, the Apoſtle *Paul* lays down ſo many rules in the fourteenth Chapter to the *Corinthians*; but aſſoon as this flood began to abate, which was then neceſſary for the quicker ſoftening the world for receiving Chriſtianity, the publick ſervice began to run in its former channel as is apparent from the unqueſtionable teſtimonies of *Juſtin Martyr* and *Tertullian*; who moſt fully relate to us, the order of publick worſhip uſed among the Chriſtians at that time. *Juſtin Martyr* the moſt ancient (next to *Clemens* whoſe Epiſtle is lately recovered to the Chriſtian world) of the unqueſtionable writers of the Primitive Church, gives us a clear narration of the publick orders obſerved by the Church in his time: Τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου λεγομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ πάντων κατὰ πόλεις ἢ ἀγροὺς μενόντων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέλευσις γίνεται, καὶ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων, ἢ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν προφητῶν ἀναγινώσκεται μέχρις ἐγχαρεῖ· εἶτα παυσαμένου τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος, ὁ προεστὼς διὰ λόγου τὴν νουθεσίαν καὶ πρόκλησιν τῆς τῶν καλῶν τούτων μιμήσεως ποιεῖται· ἔπειτα ἀνιστάμεθα κοινῇ πάντες, καὶ εὐχὰς πέμπομεν καὶ ὡς προέφημεν, παυσαμένων ἡμῶν τῆς εὐχῆς ἄρτος προσφέρεται καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ὁ προεστὼς εὐχὰς ὁμοίως καὶ εὐχαριστίας ὅση δύναμις αὐτῷ ἀναπέμπει, καὶ ὁ λαὸς ἐπευφημεῖ λέγων τὸ Ἀμήν. *Upon the day call'd Sunday, all the Chriſtians whether in Town or Country aſſemble in the ſame place, wherein the* Memoires *or Commentaries of the Apoſtles and the Writings of the Prophets are read as long as the time will permit; Then the Reader ſitting down, the Preſident of the Aſſembly ſtands up and makes a Sermon of Inſtruction and Exhortation to the following ſo good Examples. After this is ended, we all ſtand up to prayers; prayers ended, the Bread, Wine and Water are all brought forth; then the Preſident again praying and praiſing to his utmoſt ability, the People teſtifie their conſent by ſaying* Amen.

Juſt. Mart Apol.2.p.98 ed. Par.

What could have been ſpoken with greater congruity or correſpondency to the Synagogue, abating the neceſſary obſervation of the Euchariſt as proper to Chriſtianity?

Here we have the Scriptures read by one appointed for that purpoſe, as it was in the Synagogue; after which follows the word of Exhortation in uſe among them by the Preſident of the Aſſembly anſwering to the Ruler of the Synagogue; after this, the publick prayers performed by the ſame Preſident, as among the Jews by the publick Miniſter of the Synagogue (as is already obſerved out of *Maimoni,*) then the ſolemn acclamation of *Amen*, by the people, the undoubted practice of the *Synagogue*. To the ſame purpoſe *Tertullian*, who if he had been to ſet forth the practice of the Synagogue, could ſcarce have made choice of words more accommodated to that purpoſe.

Apologet. cap. 39.

Coimus (ſaith he) *in cœtum & congregationem, ut ad Deum quaſi manu factâ precationibus ambiamus orantes — Cogimur ad divinarum literarum Commemorationem, ſi quid præſentium temporum qualitas aut præmonere cogit aut recognoſcere. Certè fidem ſanctis vocibus paſcimus, ſpem erigimus, fiduciam figimus, diſciplinam præceptorum nihilominus inculcationibus denſamus; ibidem etiam exhortationes, caſtigationes & cenſura divina. Nam & judicatur magno cum pondere, ut apud certos ne Dei conſpectu, ſummumque futuri judicii præjudicium eſt, ſi quis ita deliquerit, ut à communicatione orationis & conventûs & omnis ſancti commercii relegetur. Præſident probati quique ſeniores, honorem, iſtum non pretio ſed teſtimonio adepti.* Where we have the *ſame orders for prayers, reading the Scriptures according to occaſions, and Sermons made out of them for increaſe of faith, raiſing hope, ſtrengthening confidence.* We have *the Diſcipline of the Church* anſwering the admonitions and excommunication of the Synagogue; and laſt of all we have the *Bench of Elders ſitting in theſe Aſſemblies, and ordering the things belonging to them.*

Thus much for the general correſpondency between the publick ſervice of the Church and Synagogue; they that would ſee more particulars, may read our learned Mr. *Thorndike*'s *Diſcourſe of the ſervice of God in Religious Aſſemblies.* Whoſe deſign throughout is to make this out more at large; But we muſt only touch at theſe things by the way, as it were, look into the Synagogue, and go on our way.

§. 11. We therefore proceed from their ſervice, to their *cuſtom of ordination*, which was evidently taken up by the Chriſtians, from a correſpondency to the Synagogue. For which we are firſt to take notice, that the Rulers of the Church under the Goſpel do not properly ſucceed the Prieſts and Levites under the Law, whoſe office was Ceremonial, and who were not admitted by any ſolemn ordination into their function, but ſucceeded by birth into their places; only the great *Sanhedrim* did judge of their fitneſs, as to birth and body, before their entrance upon their function. So the Jewiſh Doctors tell us לשכת הגזיה בה היתה סנהדרין גדולה של ישראל ישבת ודנה את הכהונה i. e. *In the ſtone Parlour, the great* Sanhedrim *of* Iſrael *ſat and did there judge the Prieſts. The Prieſt that was found defective, put on mourning garments, and ſo went forth; he that was not, put on white, and went in and miniſtred with the Prieſts his Brethren. And when no fault was found in the ſons of* Aaron, *they obſerved a Feſtival ſolemnity for it. Three* things are obſervable in this Teſtimony, *Firſt*, That the inquiry that was made concerning the Prieſts, was chiefly concerning the purity of their birth, and the freedom of their bodies from thoſe defects which the Law mentions, unleſs in the caſe of groſſer and more ſcandalous ſins, as *Idolatry, Murther*, &c. by which they were excluded from the Prieſtly office. The *Second*, is, that the great *Sanhedrim* had this inſpection over, and examination of the Prieſts before their admiſſion; For what that learned man *Conſt. L'empereur* there conjectures, that there was an *Eccleſiaſtical Sanhedrim* which did paſs judgment on theſe things, is overthrown by the very words of the *Talmudiſts* already cited. The laſt thing obſervable, is, the garments which the Prieſts put on, *viz. white raiment* upon his approbation by the *Sanhedrim*, and ſoon after they were admitted into the Temple with great joy; to which our Saviour manifeſtly alludes, *Revel.* 3. 4, 5. *Thou haſt a few names even in* Sardis *which have not defiled their garments, and they ſhall walk with*

Cod. Middoth. cap. 5. ſect. 3.

V. Selden. de ſucceſ. ad Pontif. Ebre. l. 2 c. 2, 3, 5, & 6.

Not. in Cod. Middoth. p. 187, 188.

me in white, for they are worthy. He that overcometh, the ſame ſhall be cloathed in white raiment. But the Prieſts under the Law, were never ordained by impoſition of hands, as the Elders and Rulers of the Synagogue were; and if any of them came to that office, they as well as others had peculiar deſignation and appointment to it. It is then a common miſtake to think that the Miniſters of the Goſpel ſucceed by way of correſpondence and Analogy to the Prieſts under the Law; which miſtake hath been the foundation and original of many errors. For when in the Primitive Church, the name of Prieſts came to be attributed to Goſpel Miniſters from a fair compliance (as was thought then) of the Chriſtians only to the name uſed both among Jews and Gentiles; in proceſs of time, corruptions increaſing in the Church, thoſe names that were uſed by the Chriſtians by way of Analogy and Accommodation, brought in the things themſelves primarily intended by thoſe names; ſo by the Metaphorical names of Prieſts and Altars, at laſt came up the ſacrifice of the Maſs; without which, they thought the names of Prieſt and Altars were inſignificant. This miſtake we ſee run all along through the writers of the Church, aſſoon as the name Prieſts was applyed to the Elders of the Church, that they derived their ſucceſſion from the Prieſts of *Aaron*'s order. *Preſbyterorum ordo exordium ſumpſit à filiis Aaron. Qui enim ſacerdotes vocabantur in veteri Teſtamento, hi ſunt qui nunc appellantur Preſbyteri: & qui nuncupabantur principes ſacerdotum, nunc Epiſcopi nominantur:* as *Iſidorus* and *Ivo* tells us. So before them both, *Jerome* in his known Epiſtle to *Evagrius*. *Et ut ſciamus traditiones Apoſtolicas ſumptas de veteri Teſtamento, Quod Aaron & filii ejus atque Levitæ in Templo fuerunt; hoc ſibi Epiſcopi & Preſbyteri atque Diaconi vendicent in Eccleſia.* From which words a learned Doctor, and ſtrenuous aſſerter of the *jus divinum* of Prelacy, queſtions not but to make *Jerome* either apparently contradictious to himſelf, or elſe to aſſert that the ſuperiority of Biſhops above Preſbyters, was by his Confeſſion an Apoſtolical tradition. For ſaith he, *Nihil manifeſtius dici potuit*; and S. 2. *Quid ad hoc reſponderi poſſit, aut quo σοφοῦ φαρμάκου artificio deliniri aut deludi tam diſerta affirmatio, fateor ego me divinando aſſequi non poſſe; ſed è contra & iis quæ D. Blondellus, quæ Walo, quæ Ludov. Capellus hâc in re præſtiterunt, mihi perſuaſiſſimum eſſe, Nihil uſpiam contra apertam lucem obtendi poſſe.* In a caſe then ſo deſperate as poor *Jerome* lyes in, by a wound he is ſuppoſed to have given himſelf; when the Prieſt and the Levite hath paſſed him by, it will be a piece of Charity in our paſſing by the way a little to conſider his caſe, to ſee whether there be any hopes of recovery. We take it then for granted, that *Jerome* hath already ſaid, that *Apoſtolus perſpicuè docet eoſdem eſſe Preſbyteros quos & Epiſcopos*, in the ſame Epiſtle which he proves there at large; and in another place; *Sicut ergo Preſbyteri ſciunt ſe ex Eccleſiæ conſuetudine, ei qui ſibi præpoſitus fuerit, eſſe ſubjectos; ita Epiſcopi noverint ſe magis conſuetudine, quam diſpoſitionis Dominicæ veritate Præſbyteris eſſe majores, & in commune debere Eccleſiam regere.* The difficulty now lies in the reconciling this with what is before cited out of the ſame Author; ſome ſolve it by ſaying, that in *Jerom*'s ſenſe, *Apoſtolical tradition and Eccleſiaſtical cuſtome* are the ſame; as *ad Marcellum*, he ſaith the obſervation of Lent is *Apoſtolica Traditio*, and *adverſ. Luciferian.* ſaith it is *Eccleſiæ conſuetudo*; ſo that by Apoſtolical tradition, he meant not an Apoſtolical inſtitution, but an Eccleſiaſtical cuſtom. And if *Jerome* ſpeak according to the general

Iſid. Hiſp. de Eccleſ. offic. l. 2. c. 7.

Ivo Carnot. decret p. 6. c. 11.

Ep. 85.

Diſſert. 2. cap. 28.

Comment. in 1 Tit.

neral vogue, this ſolution may be ſufficient notwithſtanding what is ſaid againſt it; for according to that common rule of *Auſtin*, *Things that were generally in uſe, and o certain Author aſſigned of them, were attributed to the Apoſtles.* Two things therefore I ſhall lay down for reconciling *Jerome* to himſelf: the *firſt* is, the difference between *Traditio Apoſtolica*, and *Traditio Apoſtolorum*; this latter doth indeed imply the thing ſpoken of to have proceeded from the Apoſtles themſelves, but the former may be applyed to what was in practice after the Apoſtles times; and the reaſon of it is, that whatever was done in the Primitive Church, ſuppoſed to be agreeable to Apoſtolical practice, was call'd Apoſtolical. Thence the Biſhops *See* was call'd *Sedes Apoſtolica*, as *Tertullian* tells us, *ob conſanguinitatem doctrinæ.* So *Sidonius Apollinaris* calls the See of *Lupus* the Biſhop of *Tricaſſium* in *France*, *Sedem Apoſtolicam.* And the Biſhops of the Church were call'd *Viri Apoſtolici*, and thence the *Conſtitutions* which go under the Apoſtles names, were ſo call'd, ſaith *Albaſpinæus*, *ab antiquitate*; *nam cum eorum aliquot ab Apoſtolorum Succeſſoribus* (*qui teſte Tertulliano Apoſtolici viri nominabantur*) *facti eſſent*, *Apoſtolicorum primum Canones*, *deinde nonnullorum Latinorum ignorantiâ*, *aliquot literarum detractione*, *Apoſtolorum dicti ſunt.* By which we ſee whatever was conceived to be of any great antiquity in the Church, though it was not thought to have come from the Apoſtles themſelves yet it was call'd *Apoſtolical*, ſo that in that ſenſe, *traditio Apoſtolica* is no more than *traditio antiqua*, or *ab Apoſtolicis viris profecta*, which was meant rather of thoſe that were conceived to ſucceed the Apoſtles, than of the Apoſtles themſelves. But I anſwer, *Secondly*, that granting *traditio Apoſtolica* to mean *traditio Apoſtolorum*, yet *Jerome* is far from contradicting himſelf, which is obvious to any that will read the words before, and conſider their coherence. The ſcope and drift of his Epiſtle is to chaſtiſe the arrogance of one who made Deacons ſuperiour to Preſbyters. *Audio quendam in tantam erupiſſe vecordiam, ut Diaconus Preſbyteris*, i. e. *Epiſcopis anteferret*, and ſo ſpends a great part of the Epiſtle, to prove that a Biſhop and Preſbyter are the ſame; and at laſt brings in theſe words; giving the account, why *Paul* to *Timothy* and *Titus* mentions no Preſbyters, *Quia in Epiſcopo & Preſbyter continetur. Aut igitur ex Preſbytero ordinetur Diaconus, ut Preſbyter minor Diacono comprobetur, in quem creſcat ex parvo; aut ſi ex Diacono ordinatur Preſbyter, noverit ſe lucris minorem, ſacerdotio eſſe majorem.* And then preſently adds, *Et ut ſciamus traditiones Apoſtolicas ſumptas de veteri Teſtamento, Quod Aaron & filii ejus atque Levitæ in Templo fuerunt, hoc ſibi Epiſcopi & Preſbyteri atque Diaconi vendicent in Eccleſiâ.* Is it imaginable that a man who had been proving all along the ſuperiority of a Preſbyter above a Deacon, becauſe of his Identity with a Biſhop in the Apoſtles times, ſhould at the ſame time ſay, that a Biſhop was above a Preſbyter by the Apoſtles inſtitution, and ſo directly overthrow all he had been ſaying before? Much as if one ſhould go about to prove that the *Præfectus urbis*, and the *Curatores urbis*, in *Alexander Severus* his times were the ſame office, and to that end ſhould make uſe of the Conſtitution of that Emperour whereby he appointed fourteen *Curatores urbis*, and ſet the *Præfectus* in an office above them. Such an incongruity is ſcarce incident to a man of very ordinary eſteem for intellectuals, much leſs to ſuch a one as *Jerome* is reputed to be. The plain meaning then of *Jerome* is no more but this, that *as* Aaron

De præſcrip. adv. hæret. c. 32.

Epiſt. lib. 6. *Ep.* 1.

Obſervat. lib. 1. *c.* 13.

and his ſons in the order of Prieſt-hood were above the Levites under the Law: ſo the Biſhops and Preſbyters in order of the Evangelical Prieſthood are above the Deacons under the Goſpel. For the compariſon runs not between *Aaron* and his Sons under the Law, and Biſhops and Preſbyters under the Goſpel; but between *Aaron* and his Sons, as one part of the compariſon under the Law, and the Levites under them as the other; ſo under the Goſpel, Biſhops and Preſbyters make one part of the compariſon anſwering to *Aaron* and his Sons, in that wherein they all agree, *viz. the Order of Prieſthood*; and the other part under the Goſpel, is that of Deacons, anſwering to the Levites under the Law. The oppoſition is not then in the power of Juriſdiction between Biſhops and Prieſts, but between the ſame power of order, which is alike both in Biſhops and Preſbyters, (according to the acknowledgment of all) to the Office of Deacons, which ſtood in competition with them. Thus I hope we have left *Jerome* at perfect harmony with himſelf, notwithſtanding the attempt made to make him ſo palpably contradict himſelf; which having thus done, we are at liberty to proceed in our former courſe; only hereby we ſee how unhappily thoſe arguments ſucceed, which are brought from the Analogy between the *Aaronical* Prieſthood, to endeavour the ſetting up of a *jus Divinum* of a parallel ſuperiority under the Goſpel. All which arguments are taken off by this one thing we are now upon, *viz.* that the orders and degrees under the Goſpel, were not taken up from Analogy to the Temple, but to the Synagogue; which we now make out as to ordination, in three things: *The manner of conferring it. The Perſons authorized to do it. The remaining effect of it upon the perſon receiving it.*

Firſt, For the manner of conferring it; that under the Synagogue §. 12. was done by laying on of hands; which was taken up among the Jews, as a ſignificative rite in the ordaining the Elders among them, and thereby qualifying them either to be members of their *Sanhedrins*, or Teachers of the Law. A twofold uſe I find of this Symbolical-rite, beſide the ſolemn deſignation of the perſon on whom the hands are laid. The *firſt* is to denote the delivery of the perſon or thing thus laid hands upon, for the right, uſe, and peculiar ſervice of God. And that, I ſuppoſe was the reaſon of laying hands upon the beaſt under the Law, Lev. 16. 21. which was to be ſacrificed, thereby noting their own parting with any right in it, and giving it up to be the *Lord*'s, for a ſacrifice to him. Thus in the civil Law, this delivery is requiſite in the transferring dominion, which they call *tranſlatio de manu in manum.* The *ſecond* end of laying on of hands, was the ſolemn invocation of the *Divine preſence* and *aſſiſtance* to be upon, and with, the perſon upon whom the hands are thus laid. For the hands with us being the inſtruments of action, they did by ſtretching out their hands upon the perſon, repreſent the efficacy of Divine power which they implored in behalf of the perſon thus deſigned. *Tunc enim orabant ut ſic Dei efficacia eſſet ſuper illum, ſicut manus efficaciæ ſymbolum, ei imponebatur*, as *Grotius* obſerves. (*Ep. ad Gallos, ep.* 154, & 166.) Thence in all ſolemn prayers, wherein any perſon was particularly deſigned, they made uſe of this cuſtom of impoſition of hands; from which cuſtom *Auguſtine* ſpeaks, *Quid aliud eſt manum impoſitio niſi oratio ſuper hominem?* (*Joh. Cord.* & *V.* in *Mat.* 9. 19.) Thence when *Jacob* prayed over *Joſeph*'s Children, he laid his hands upon them; (Gen. 48. 14.) ſo when *Moſes* prayed over *Joſhua*. (Numb. 27. 23.) The practice likewiſe our Saviour uſed in bleſſing Children, healing the ſick; and the Apoſtles in conferring the gifts of the Holy-Ghoſt; and from thence

it was conveyed into the practice of the primitive Church, who uſed it in any more ſolemn invocation of the name of God in behalf of any particular perſons, *as over the ſick, upon repentance and reconciliation to the Church, in Confirmation, and in Matrimony*; which, (as *Grotius* obſerves) is to this day uſed in the *Abiſſine* Churches. But the moſt ſolemn and peculiar uſe of this Impoſition of hands among the Jews was in the deſigning of any perſons for any publick employment among them: Not as though the bare impoſition of hands, did confer any power upon the perſon, (no more than the bare delivery of a thing in Law gives a legal title to it, without expreſs transferring dominion with it) but with that ceremony they joined thoſe words whereby they did confer that Authority upon them; which were to this purpoſe הרי את סמוך *Ecce ſis tu Ordinatus*, or אני סומך אורך *ego ordino te*, or תהוה סמוך *ſis ordinatus*, to which they added according to the authority they ordained them to, ſome thing peculiarly expreſſing it, whether it was for cauſes finable, or pecuniary, or binding and looſing; or ruling in the Synagogue. Which is a thing deſerving conſideration by thoſe who uſe the rite of impoſing hands in ordination, without any thing expreſſing that authority they convey by that Ordination. This cuſtom being ſo generally in uſe among the Jews in the time when the Apoſtles were ſent forth with authority for gathering and ſetling Churches, we find them accordingly making uſe of this, according to the former practice, either in any more ſolemn invocation of the preſence of God upon any perſons, or deſignation and appointing them for any peculiar ſervice or function: For we have no ground to think that the Apoſtles had any peculiar command for laying on their hands upon perſons in prayer over them, or ordination of them: But the thing its ſelf being enjoined them, *viz.* the ſetting apart ſome perſons for the peculiar work of attendance upon the neceſſities of the Churches by them planted, they took up and made uſe of a laudable rite and cuſtom then in uſe upon ſuch occaſions. And ſo we find the Apoſtles uſing it in the ſolemn deſignation of ſome perſons to the Office of Deacons, anſwering to the
Acts 6. 6. פרנסין in the Synagogue, whoſe Office was to collect the monies for the poor, and to diſtribute it among them. Afterwards we read it uſed upon an occaſion not heard of in the Synagogue, which was for
Acts 8. 17. the conferring the gifts of the Holy-Ghoſt; but although the occaſion was extraordinary, yet ſuppoſing the occaſion, the uſe of that rite in it, was very ſuitable, in as much as thoſe gifts did ſo much anſwer to the שכינה and the רות דקורש which the Jews conceived did reſt upon thoſe who were ſo ordained by impoſition of hands. The next time we
Acts 13. 3. meet with this rite, was upon a peculiar deſignation to a particular ſervice of perſons already appointed by God for the work of the *Miniſtry*, which is of *Paul* and *Barnabas*, by the Prophets and Teachers at *Antioch*; whereby God doth ſet forth the uſe of that rite of ordination to the Chriſtian Churches. Accordingly we find it after practiſed in
1 Tim. 4. 14. the Church, *Timothy* being ordained *by the laying on of the hands of the Preſbytery.* And *Timothy* hath direction given him for the right manage-
1 Tim. 5. 22. ment of it afterwards, *Lay hands ſuddenly on no man.* For they that would interpret that of reconciling men to the Church by that rite, muſt firſt give us evidence of ſo early an uſe of that cuſtom, which doth not yet appear. But there is one place commonly brought to prove that the Apoſtles in ordaining Elders in the Chriſtian Churches,
did

did not obſerve the Jewiſh form of laying on of hands, but obſerved a way quite different from the Jewiſh practice, *viz.* appointing them by the choice, conſent and ſuffrages of the people. Which place is *Acts* 14. 23. where it is ſaid of *Paul* and *Barnabas*, χειροτονήσαντες δὲ αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους κατ᾽ ἐκκλησίαν, we render it, *Ordaining them Elders in every Church.* But others from the ſignification of the word χειροτονεῖν, would have it rendred, *when they had appointed Elders by the ſuffrages of the people.* But how little the peoples power of ordination can be inferred from theſe words, will be evident to any one that ſhall but conſider theſe things. *Firſt*, That though χειροτονεῖν did originally ſignifie the chuſing by way of ſuffrage among the Greeks, yet before the time of *Luke*'s writing this, the word was uſed for ſimple deſignation without that ceremony. So *Heſychius* interprets it by καθιστᾶν, the word uſed of *Titus* for ordaining Elders in every City; and in *Demoſthenes*, and others, it occurs for νομοθετεῖν; and διατάττειν, *to decree and appoint*; and that ſenſe of the word appears in Saint *Luke* himſelf, *Acts* 10. 41. μάρτυσι τοῖς προκεχειροτονημένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, *Witneſſes fore-appointed of God.* Many examples of this ſignification are brought by learned men of writers before, and about the time when *Luke* writ, from *Philo Judæus*, *Joſephus*, *Appian*, *Lucian*, and others. But, *Secondly*, grantiug it uſed in the primary ſignification of the word, yet it cannot be applied to the people, but to *Paul* and *Barnabas*; for it is not ſaid that the people did χειροτονεῖν, but that *Paul* and *Barnabas* did χειροτονεῖν; now wherever that word is uſed in its firſt ſignification, it is implied to be the action of the perſons themſelves giving ſuffrages, and not for other perſons appointing by the ſuffrages of others. *Thirdly*, χειροτονεῖν may import no more then χειροθετεῖν, in that laying on of the hands muſt ſuppoſe the ſtretching them out; which is only a common figure in Scripture, for the Antecedent to be put for the Conſequent, or one part for the whole action; and concerning this Senſe of the word in Eccleſiaſtical Writers, ſee the large Quotations in Biſhop *Bilſon* to this purpoſe. *Fourthly*, It ſeems ſtrangely improbable that the Apoſtles ſhould put the choice at that time into the hands of the people, when there were none fitted for the work the Apoſtles deſigned them for, but whom the Apoſtles did lay their hands on, by which the Holy Ghoſt fell upon them, whereby they were fitted and qualified for that work. The people then could no ways chuſe men for their abilities, when their abilities were conſequent to their ordination. So much to clear the manner of ordination to have been from the Synagogue.

Titus 1. 5. *V. Demoſt. Phil.* 1. & *adver. Simon,* & *Ulpian. in Schol.*

V. Selden de Syned. l. 1. *cap.* 14. *Grot. de Imp. Sum. Poteſt. c.* 10. §. 5.

Perpet. Govern. of Chriſt's Church, c. 7.

§. 13. The *Second* thing we conſider, is, *The perſons authorized to do it.* Whom we conſider under a double reſpect, *before their liberties were bound up by compact among themſelves*, and *after*. *Firſt*, Before they had reſtrained themſelves of their own liberty, then the general rule for ordinations among them was כל כיו שנסמך סומך לתלמידיו *every one regularly ordained, himſelf had the power of ordaining his Diſciples*, as *Maimonides* affirms. To the ſame purpoſe is that teſtimony of the *Gemara Babylonia* in Mr. *Selden* אחד ואחד מסנה את תלמידיו אמר רבי בא בראשונה היה כל *Rabbi Abba Bar Jonah ſaid that in times of old, every one was wont to ordain his own Diſciples*; to which purpoſe many inſtances are there brought. But it is generally agreed among them, that in the time of *Hillel* this courſe was altered, and they were reſtrained from their former liberty; in probability finding the many inconveniencies of

Tract. San. cap. 4. §. 5. *Ad tit. Sanhed. c.* 1. *De Syned. l.* 2. *c.* 7. §. 1.

ſo common ordinations; or, as they ſay, out of their great reverence to the houſe of *Hillel*, they then agreed that none ſhould ordain others without the preſence of the הנשיא the Prince of the *Sanhedrin*, or a licenſe obtained from him for that end; and it was determined that all ordinations without the conſent of the Prince of the *Sanhedrin*, ſhould be looked upon as null and void, which is atteſted by the former Authors. The ſame diſtinction may be obſerved under the Goſpel in reference to the fixed Officers of the Church; for we may conſider them in their firſt ſtate and period, as the Preſbyters did rule the Churches in common, as *Jerome* tells us, *communi Preſbyterorum concilio Eccleſiæ gnbernabantur*; before the juriſdiction of Preſbyters was reſtrained by mutual conſent, in this inſtant, doubtleſs, the Preſbyters enjoyed the ſame liberty that the Preſbyters among the Jews did, of ordaining other Preſbyters, by that power they were inveſted in at their own ordination. To which purpoſe we ſhall only at preſent take notice of the Confeſſion of two Canoniſts, who are the higheſt among the Papiſts, for defence of a diſtinct order of Epiſcopacy. Yet *Gratian* himſelf confeſſeth, *Sacros ordines dicimus Diaconatum & Preſbyteratum; hos quidem ſolos Eccleſia primitiva habuiſſe dicitur.* And *Johannes Semeca*, in his *Gloſs* upon the *Canon-Law*; *Dicunt quidem quod in Eccleſia prima primitiva commune erat officium Epiſcoporum & Sacerdotum, & nomina erant communia.——— Sed in ſecundâ primitivâ cœperunt diſtingui & nomina & officia.* Here we have a diſtinction of the Primitive Church very agreeable both to the opinion of *Jerome*, and the matter we are now upon; in the firſt Primitive Church, the Preſbyters all acted in common for the welfare of the Church, and either did or might ordain others to the ſame authority with themſelves; becauſe the intrinſecal power of order is equally in them, and in thoſe who were after appointed Governours over Preſbyteries. And the collation of orders doth come from the power of order, and not merely from the power of juriſdiction. It being likewiſe fully acknowledged by the Schoolmen, that Biſhops are not ſuperior above Preſbyters as to the power of order. But the cleareſt evidence of this, is in the Church of *Alexandria*, of which *Jerome* ſpeaks; *Nam &* Alexandria *à* Marco *Evangeliſtâ uſq; ad* Heraclam *&* Dionyſium *Epiſcopos, Preſbyteri ſemper unum ex ſe electum, in excelſiori gradu collocatum, Epiſcopum nominabant; quomodo ſi exercitus imperatorem faciat, aut Diaconi eligant de ſe quem induſtrium noverint, & Archidiaconum vocent.* That *learned Doctor*, who would perſuade us that the Preſbyters did only make choice of the perſon, but the ordination was performed by other Biſhops, would do well *firſt* to tell us who and where thoſe Biſhops in *Egypt* were, who did conſecrate or ordain the Biſhop of *Alexandria* after his election by the Preſbyters; eſpecially, while *Egypt* remained but one Province, under the Government of the *Præfectus Auguſtalis*. *Secondly*, How had this been in the leaſt pertinent to *Jerome*'s purpoſe, to have made a particular Inſtance in the Church of *Alexandria*, for that which was common to all other Churches beſides? For the old rule of the *Canon-Law* for Biſhops was, *Electio clericorum eſt, conſenſus principis, petitio plebis.* *Thirdly*, This election in *Jerome* muſt imply the conferring the power and authority whereby the Biſhop acted. For, *Firſt*, The firſt ſetting up of this power is by *Jerome* attributed to this choice, as appears by his words, *Quod autem poſtea unus electus eſt qui cæteris præponeretur, in ſchiſ-*

Hieronym. in 1 Tit.

Diſt. 60. c. *Mull. ex. urb. Pap.*

Diſt. 95. *Gloſs.*

V. Francis Maſon's defence of Ordination of Presbyters.

Ep. 85. *ad Evagrium.*

*V. Selden ad Eutych. n.*22.*p.*143.

Diſt. 62. §. *hær.*

Adverſ. Lucil.

matis remedium factum eſt, ne unuſquiſque ad ſe trahens Chriſti Eccleſiam rumperet. Whereby it is evident *Jerome* attributes the firſt original of that *Exſors poteſtas*, as he calls it elſewhere in the Biſhop above Preſbyters, not to any Apoſtolical inſtitution, but to the free choice of the Preſbyters themſelves: which doth fully explain what he means by *conſuetudo Eccleſiæ*, before ſpoken of, *viz.* that which came up by a voluntary act of the Governours of Churches themſelves. *Secondly*, It appears, that by election, he means conferring authority, by the inſtances he brings to that purpoſe, as the *Roman* Armies chuſing their Emperours, who had then no other power but what they received by the length of the ſword; and the Deacons chuſing their Archdeacon, who had no other power, but what was merely conferred by the choice of the College of Deacons. To which we may add what *Eutychius*, the *Patriarch* of *Alexandria*, ſaith in his *Origines Eccleſiæ Alexandrinæ*, publiſhed in *Arabick*, by our moſt learned *Selden*, who expreſly affirms, *that the twelve Preſbyters conſtituted by* Mark, *upon the vacancy of the See, did chuſe out of their number one to be head over the reſt, and the other eleven did lay their hands upon him, and bleſſed him, and made him Patriarch.* Neither is the authority of *Eutychius* ſo much to be ſlighted in this caſe, coming ſo near to *Jerome* as he doth, who, doubtleſs, had he told us that *Mark* and *Anianus, &c.* did all there without any Preſbyters, might have had the good fortune to have been quoted with as much frequency and authority as the *Anonymous Author* of the martyrdom of *Timothy* in *Photius*, (who there unhappily follows the ſtory of the ſeven Sleepers) or the Author of the *Apoſtolical Conſtitutions*, whoſe credit is everlaſtingly blaſted by the excellent Mr. *Daillè*, *De Pſeudepigraphis Apoſtolorum*; ſo much doth mens intereſt tend to the inhancing or abating the eſteem and credit both of the dead and the living. By this we ſee that where no poſitive reſtraints from conſent and choice, for the unity and peace of the Church, have reſtrained mens liberty, as to their external exerciſe of the power of order or juriſdiction, every one being himſelf advanced into the authority of a Church Governour, hath an internal power of conferring the ſame upon perſons fit for it. To which purpoſe *the laying on of the hands of the Preſbytery*, is no wiſe impertinently alledged, although we ſuppoſe St. *Paul* to concur in the action, (as it is moſt probable he did) becauſe if the Preſbytery had nothing to do in the ordination, to what purpoſe were their hands laid upon him? Was it only to be witneſſes of the fact, or to ſignifie their conſent? both thoſe might have been done without their uſe of that ceremony; which will ſcarce be inſtanced in, to be done by any but ſuch as had power to confer what was ſignified by that ceremony. We come therefore to the *ſecond* period or ſtate of the Church, when the former liberty was reſtrained, by ſome act of the Church it ſelf, for preventing the inconveniencies which might follow the too common uſe of the former liberty of ordinations. So *Antonius de Roſellis* fully expreſſeth my meaning in this; *Quilibet Preſbyter & Preſbyteri ordinabant indiſcretè, & ſchiſmata oriebantur. Every Preſbyter and Preſbyters did ordain indifferently, and thence aroſe ſchiſms.* Thence the liberty was reſtrained, and reſerved peculiarly to ſome perſons who did act in the ſeveral Preſbyteries, as the הנשיא or Prince of the *Sanhedrin*, without whoſe preſence no ordination by the Church was

Orig. p. 29, 80.

Biblioth. Cod. 254.

1 Tim. 4. 14.

Roſellis de pot. Imper. & Papæ. p. 4. c. 18.

was to be looked on as regular. The main controverſie is when this reſtraint began, and by whoſe act; whether by any act of the Apoſtles, or only by the prudence of the Church it ſelf, as it was with the *Sanhedrin.* But in order to our peace, I ſee no ſuch neceſſity of deciding it, both parties granting that in the Church ſuch a reſtraint was laid upon the liberty of ordaining Preſbyters: and the exerciſe of that power may be reſtrained ſtill, granting it to be radically and intrinſecally in them. So that this controverſie is not ſuch as ſhould divide the Church. For thoſe that are for ordinations only by a Superiour order in the Church acknowledging a radical power for ordination in Preſbyters, which may be exerciſed in caſe of neceſſity, do thereby make it evident, that none who grant that, do think that any poſitive Law of God hath forbidden Preſbyters the power of ordination; for then it muſt be wholly unlawful, and ſo in caſe of neceſſity it cannot be valid. Which doctrine I dare with ſome confidence aſſert to be a ſtranger to our Church of *England*, as ſhall be largely made appear afterwards. On the other ſide, thoſe who hold ordinations by Preſbyters lawful, do not therefore hold them neceſſary, but it being a matter of liberty, and not of neceſſity (Chriſt having no where ſaid that none but Preſbyters ſhall ordain) this power then may be reſtrained by thoſe who have the care of the Churches peace, and matters of liberty being reſtrained, ought to be ſubmitted to, in order to the Churches peace. And therefore ſome have well obſerved the difference between the opinions of *Jerome* and *Aërius.* For as to the matter it ſelf, I believe upon the ſtricteſt inquiry *Medina's* judgement will prove true, that *Jerome, Auſtin, Ambroſe, Sedulius, Primaſius, Chryſoſtome, Theodoret, Theophylact*, were all of *Aërius* his judgement, as to the Identity of both name and order of Biſhops and Preſbyters in the Primitive Church; but here lay the difference; *Aërius* from hence proceeded to ſeparation from Biſhops and their Churches, becauſe they were Biſhops. And *Blondell* well obſerves that the main ground why *Aërius* was condemned, was for unneceſſary ſeparation from the Church of *Sebaſtia*, and thoſe Biſhops too who agreed with him in other things, as *Euſtathius* the Biſhop did: Whereas had his mere opinion about Biſhops been the ground of his being condemned, there can be no reaſon aſſigned, why this hereſie if it were then thought ſo, was not mentioned either by *Socrates, Theodoret, Sozomen*, or *Evagrius*, before whoſe time he lived; when yet they mention the *Euſtathiani*, who were Contemporaries with him. But for *Epiphanius* and *Auguſtine* who have liſted him in the roll of hereticks it either was for the other heretical opinions maintained by him, or they took the name *heretick* (as it is evident they often did) for one who upon a matter of different opinion from the preſent ſenſe of the Church, did proceed to make ſeparation from the Unity of the Catholick Church; which I take to be the trueſt account of the reputed hereſie of *Aërius.* For otherwiſe is it likely that *Jerom* who maintained ſo great correſpondency and familiarity with *Epiphanius*, and thereby could not but know what was the cauſe why *Aërius* was condemned for hereſie, ſhould himſelf run into the ſame hereſie, and endeavour not only to aſſert, but to avouch and maintain it againſt the Judgment of the whole Church? *Jerome* therefore was not ranked with *Aërius*, becauſe though he held the ſame opinion as to Biſhops and Preſbyters, yet he was far from the Conſequence of *Aërius* that

Mich. Medinas de ſacr. hom. orig. & contin. l. 1. cap. 5.

Præf. p. 58.

that therefore all Biſhops were to be ſeparated from; nay he was ſo far from thinking it neceſſary to cauſe a ſchiſm in the Church, by ſeparating from Biſhops, that his opinion is clear, that the firſt inſtitution of them, was for preventing ſchiſm, and therefore for peace and unity he thought their inſtitution very uſeful in the Church of God. And among all thoſe fifteen teſtimonies produced by a learned Writer out of *Jerome* for the ſuperiority of Biſhops above Preſbyters, I cannot find one that doth found it upon any *divine right*, but only upon the conveniency of ſuch an order for the peace and unity of the Church of God: which is his meaning in that place moſt produced to this purpoſe; *Eccleſiæ ſalus in ſummi ſacerdotis dignitate pendet, cui ſi non exſors quædam & ab omnibus eminens detur poteſtas, tot in Eccleſiis efficientur ſchiſmata, quot ſacerdotes.* Where nothing can be more evident than that he would have ſome ſupereminent power attributed to the Biſhop for preventing ſchiſms in the Church. But granting ſome paſſages may have a more favourable aſpect towards the ſuperiority of Biſhops over Preſbyters in his other writings, I would fain know whether a man's judgment muſt be taken, from occaſional and incidental paſſages, or from deſigned and ſet diſcourſes; which is as much as to aſk, whether the lively repreſentation of a man by picture, may be beſt taken, when in haſte of other buſineſs he paſſeth by us, giving only a glance of his Countenance, or when he purpoſely and deſignedly ſits in order to that end, that his countenance may be truly repreſented? Beſides, it is well known that *Jerome* in his *Commentaries* on Scripture, (where he doth not expreſly declare his own opinion) doth often tranſcribe what he finds in others without ſetting down the name of any Author he had it from. For which we have his ingenuous confeſſion in his Epiſtle to *Auguſtine, Itaque ut ſimpliciter fatear, legi hæc omnia* (ſpeaking of former Commentaries) *& in mente mea plurima conſervans, accito notario, vel mea vel aliena dictavi, nec ordinis, nec verborum interdum, nec ſenſuum memor.* A ſtrange way of writing Commentaries on Scripture, wherein a man having jumbled other mens notions together in his brain, by a kind of lottery draws out what comes next to hand, without any choice: yet this we ſee was his practice, and therefore, he puts *Auſtin* to this hard taſk of examining what all other men had writ before him, and whether he had not tranſcribed out of them, before he would have him charge him with any thing which he finds in his Commentaries. How angry then would that haſty Adverſary have been, if men had told him he had contradicted himſelf in what he writes on the forty fifth *Pſalm* about Biſhops, if it be compared with his Commentaries on *Titus*, where he profeſſeth to declare his opinion, or his Epiſtles to *Evagrius* and *Oceanus!* But yet ſomething is pleaded even from thoſe places in *Jerome*, wherein he declares his opinion more fully, as though his opinion was only, that Chriſt himſelf did not appoint Epiſcopacy, which (they ſay) he means by *Dominica diſpoſitio*, but that the Apoſtles did it, which in oppoſition to the former he calls *Eccleſiæ conſuetudo*, but elſewhere explains it by *traditio Apoſtolica*; and this they prove by two things; *Firſt*, The occaſion of the inſtitution of Epiſcopacy, which is thus ſet down by him, *antequam Diaboli inſtinctu, ſtudia in religione fierent, & diceretur in populis, Ego ſum* Pauli, *ego* Apollo, *ego autem* Cephæ, *communi Preſbyterorum conſilio Eccleſiæ gubernabantur.* Thence it is argued that the time of this Inſtitution of Biſhops was when it was ſaid at *Corinth, I am of* Paul, *I of* Apollos,

Dial. ad Lucifer.

Ep. Auguſt. ep. 11.

pollos, *and I of* Cephas; which was certainly in Apoſtolical times. But to this it is anſwered; *Firſt*, that it is impoſſible *Jerome*'s meaning ſhould be reſtrained to that individual time, becauſe the Arguments which *Jerome* brings that the name and office of Biſhops and Preſbyters were the ſame, were from things done after this time. *Paul*'s firſt Epiſtle to the *Corinthians*, wherein he reproves their ſchiſms, was written according to *Ludovicus Capellus* in the twelfth year of *Claudius*, of Chriſt fifty one, after which *Paul* writ his Epiſtle to *Titus*, from whoſe words *Jerome* grounds his diſcourſe; but moſt certainly *Paul*'s Epiſtle to the *Philippians* was not written, till *Paul* was priſoner at *Rome*; the time of the writing of it is placed by *Capellus* in the third of *Nero*; of *Chriſt* 56. by *Blondell* 57. by our *Lightfoot* 59, by all, long after the former to the *Corinthians*; yet from the firſt verſe of this Epiſtle, *Jerome* fetches one of his Arguments. So *Paul*'s charge to the Elders at *Miletus*, *Peter*'s Epiſtle to the diſperſed Jews, were after this time too, yet from theſe are fetched two more of *Jerome*'s Arguments. Had he then ſo little common ſenſe, as to ſay that Epiſcopacy was inſtituted upon the ſchiſm at *Corinth*, and yet bring all his Arguments for parity, after the time, that he ſets for the Inſtitution of Epiſcopacy? But *ſecondly*, *Jerome* doth not ſay, *cum diceretur apud Corinthios*, *Ego ſum* Pauli, *&c.* but *cum diceretur in populis*, *Ego ſum* Pauli, *&c.* ſo that he ſpeaks not of that particular ſchiſm, but of a general and univerſal ſchiſm abroad among moſt people, which was the occaſion of appointing Biſhops; and ſo ſpeaks of others imitating the ſchiſm and language of the *Corinthians*. *Thirdly*, had Epiſcopacy been inſtituted on the occaſion of the ſchiſm at *Corinth* certainly of all places we ſhould the ſooneſt have heard of a Biſhop at *Corinth* for the remedying of it; and yet almoſt of all places, thoſe *Heralds* that derive the ſucceſſion of Biſhops from the Apoſtles times, are the moſt plunged whom to fix on at *Corinth*. And they that can find any one ſingle Biſhop at *Corinth*, at the time when *Clemens* writ his Epiſtle to them (about another ſchiſm as great as the former, which certainly had not been according to their opinion, if a Biſhop had been there before) muſt have better eyes and judgment, than the deſervedly admired *Grotius*, who brings this in his Epiſtle to *Bignonius* as one argument of the undoubted antiquity of that Epiſtle: *Quod nuſquam meminit exſortis illius Epiſcoporum auctortatis*, *quæ Eccleſiæ conſuetudine*, *poſt* Marci *mortem* Alexandriæ, *atque eo exemplo alibi*, *introduci cœpit*; *ſed plane ut* Paulus *Apoſtolus oſtendit*, *Eccleſias communi Preſbyterorum*, *qui iidem omnes & Epiſcopi ipſi Paulóque dicuntur*, *conſilio fuiſſe gubernatas*. What could be ſaid with greater freedom, that there was no ſuch Epiſcopacy then at *Corinth*? *Fourthly*, They who uſe this argument, are greater ſtrangers to St. *Jerome*'s language than they would ſeem to be: whoſe cuſtome it is upon incidental occaſions to accomodate the Phraſe and language of Scripture to them: as when he ſpeaks of *Chryſoſtome*'s fall, *Cecidit Babylon*, *cecidit*; of the *Biſhops* of *Paleſtine*, *Multi utroque claudicant pede*; of the Roman Clergy, *Phariſæorum conclamavit Senatus*; but which is moſt clear to our purpoſe, he applyes this very ſpeech to the men of his own time; *Quando non id ipſum omnes loquimur*, *& alius dicit*, *Ego ſum* Pauli, *ego* Apollo, *ego* Cephæ, *dividimus ſpiritus unitatem*, *& eam in partes & membra diſcerpimus*. All which inſtances are produced by *Blondell*, but have the good fortune to be paſt over without being taken notice of. But ſuppoſing, *ſay they*, that it was not till after the ſchiſm

Hiſt. Apoſtolica. p. 70.

Ep. ad Gal. ep. 162.

Apol. p. 4.

at *Corinth*; yet it muſt needs be done by the Apoſtles; elſe how could it be ſaid to be *toto orbo decretum, ut unus de Preſbyteris electus ſuperponeretur cæteris? Quomodo enim* (ſaith a learned man) *fieri potuit, ut toto hoc orbe decerneretur, nullo jam Oecumenico Concilio ad illud decernendum congregato, ſi non ab Apoſtolis ipſis, fidem toto orbe promulgantibus, & cum fide hanc regendi Eccleſias formam conſtituentibus factum ſit?* So that he conceives, ſo general an order could not be made, unleſs the Apoſtles themſelves at that time were the authors of it.

But *Firſt*, *Jerom*'s *in toto orbe decretum eſt*, relates not to an antecedent order which was the ground of the inſtitution of Epiſcopacy, but to the univerſal eſtabliſhment of that order which came up upon the occaſion of ſo many ſchiſms; it is ſomething therefore conſequent upon the firſt ſetting up Epiſcopacy, which is the general obtaining of it in the Churches of Chriſt, when they ſaw its uſefulneſs in order to the Churches peace; therefore the Emphaſis lies not in *decretum eſt*, but *in toto orbe*; noting how ſuddenly this order met with univerſal acceptance when it firſt was brought up in the Church after the Apoſtles death. Which that it was *Jerom*'s meaning, appears by what he ſaith after, *paulatim verò (ut diſſentionum plantaria evellerentur) ad unum omnem, ſolicitudinem eſſe delatam:* Where he notes the gradual obtaining of it: which I ſuppoſe was thus, according to his opinion; firſt, in the College of Preſbyters appointed by the Apoſtles, there being a neceſſity of order, there was a Preſident among them who had αὐθεντίαν τοῦ πράγματος, as the Preſident of the Senate, *i. e.* did moderate the affairs of the Aſſembly, by propoſing matters to it, gathering voices, being the firſt in all matters of concernment, but he had not αὐθεντίαν τῶν συνέδρων, as *Caſaubon* very well diſtinguiſheth them, *i. e.* had no power over his fellow-Preſbyters, but that ſtill reſided in the College or body of them. After this when the Apoſtles were taken out of the way, who kept the main power in their own hands of ruling the ſeveral Preſbyteries, or delegated ſome to do it (who had a main hand in the planting Churches with the Apoſtles, and thence are called in ſcripture ſometimes Fellow-labourers in the Lord, and ſometimes Evangeliſts; and by *Theodoret* Apoſtles, but of a ſecond order) after I ſay, theſe were deceaſed, and the main power left in the Preſbyteries, the ſeveral Preſbyters enjoying an equal power among themſelves, eſpecially being many in one City, thereby great occaſion was given to many ſchiſms, partly by the bandying of the Preſbyters one againſt another, partly by the ſidings of the people with ſome againſt the reſt, partly by the too common uſe of the power of ordinations in Preſbyters, by which they were more able to increaſe their own party, by ordaining thoſe who would joyn with them, and by this means to perpetuate ſchiſms in the Church; upon this, when the wiſer and graver ſort conſidered the abuſes following the promiſcuous uſe of this power of ordination; and withal having in their minds the excellent frame of the Government of the Church under the Apoſtles, and their Deputies, and for preventing of future ſchiſms and diviſions among themſelves, they unanimouſly agreed to chooſe one out of their number, who was beſt qualified for the management of ſo great a truſt, and to devolve the exerciſe of the power of ordination and juriſdiction to him; yet ſo as that he act nothing of importance, without the conſent and concurrence of the Preſbyters, who were ſtill to be as the Common Council to the Bi-

Exercit. ad Annal. Eccl. 15. ſ. 12.

ſhop. This I take to be the true and juſt account of the Original of Epiſcopacy in the Primitive Church according to *Jerome:* Which model of Government thus contrived and framed, ſets forth to us a moſt lively character of that great Wiſdom and Moderation, which then ruled the heads and hearts of the Primitive Chriſtians; and which, when men have ſearched and ſtudied all other ways, (the abuſes incident to this Government, through the corruptions of men and times being retrenched) will be found the moſt agreeable to the Primitive form, both as aſſerting the due intereſt of the Preſbyteries, and allowing the due honour of Epiſcopacy, and by the joynt harmony of both carrying on the affairs of the Church with the greateſt Unity, Concord, and Peace. Which form of Government I cannot ſee how any poſſible reaſon can be produced by either party, why they may not with chearfulneſs embrace it.

Secondly, Another evidence that *Jerome* by *decretum eſt* did not mean an order of the Apoſtles themſelves, it is by the words which follow the matter of the decree, *viz. Ut unus de Preſbyteris electus ſuperponeretur cæteris*, one choſen not only *out of*, but *by* the Preſbyters, ſhould be ſet above the reſt; for ſo *Jerome* muſt be underſtood; for the Apoſtles could not themſelves chooſe out of all Preſbyteries one perſon to be ſet above the reſt; and withal the inſtance brought of the Church of *Alexandria* makes it evident to be meant of the chooſing by the Preſbyters, and not by the Apoſtles. Beſides, did *Jerome* mean chooſing by the Apoſtles, he would have given ſome intimations of the hand the Apoſtles had in it: which we ſee not in him the leaſt ground for. And as for that pretence, that *Eccleſiæ conſuetudo* is *Apoſtolica Traditio*, I have already made it appear that *Apoſtolica Traditio* in *Jerome*, is nothing elſe but *Conſuetudo Eccleſiæ*, which I ſhall now confirm by a pregnant and unanſwerable teſtimony out of *Jerome* himſelf. *Unaquæque provincia abundet in ſenſu ſuo, & precepta majorum leges Apoſtolicas arbitretur. Let every province abound in its own ſenſe, and account of the ordinances of their Anceſtors as of Apoſtolical Laws.* Nothing could have been ſpoken more fully to open to us what *Jerome* means by Apoſtolical traditions, *viz.* the practice of the Church in former ages, though not coming from the Apoſtles themſelves. Thus we have once more cleared *Jerome* and the truth together; I only wiſh all that are of his judgment for the practice of the Primitive Church, were of his temper for the practice of their own; and while they own not Epiſcopacy as neceſſary by a divine right, yet (being duly moderated, and joyned with Preſbyteries) they may embrace it, as not only a lawful, but very uſeful conſtitution in the Church of God. By which we may ſee what an excellent temper may be found out, moſt fully conſonant to the primitive Church for the management of ordinations, and Church power, *viz.* by the Preſidency of the Biſhop and the concurrence of the Preſbytery. For the Top gallant of Epiſcopacy can never be ſo well managed for the right ſteering the ſhip of the Church, as when it is joyned with the under ſails of a moderate Preſbytery. So much ſhall ſuffice to ſpeak here as to the power of ordination, which we have found to be derived from the Synagogue, and the cuſtoms obſerved in it, tranſplanted into the Church.

Hieronym. ep. 20. ad Lucinum.

There

§. 14.

There are yet ſome things remaining as to ordination, wherein the Church did imitate the Synagogue; which will admit of a quick diſpatch, as *the number of the perſons*, which under the Synagogue were always to be at leaſt *three.* This being a fundamental conſtitution among the Jews, as appears by their writings, סמיכה זקנים בשלשה *Ordination of Preſbyters, by laying on of hands, muſt be done by three at the leaſt.* To the ſame purpoſe *Maimonides*, ואין סימכין סמיכה שהיא מינוי הזקנים לריינות אלא בשלשה *They did not ordain any by impoſition of hands into a power of judicature without the number of three.* Which number *Peter Gallatinus* and *Poſtellus* conceive neceſſary to be all ordained themſelves; but Mr. *Selden* thinks it was ſufficient if there were but one of that number ſo ordained, who was to be as principal in the action; whoſe opinion is favoured by *Maimonides*, who adds to the words laſt cited out of him: *Of which Three, one at the leaſt muſt be ordained himſelf.* Let us now ſee the parallel in the Church of God. The firſt ſolemn ordination of Elders under the Goſpel, which ſome think to be ſet down as a pattern for the Church to follow, is that we read of, *Acts* 13. 1, 2, 3. which was performed by three; for we read in the firſt verſe, that there were in the Church at *Antioch*, five Prophets and Teachers, *Barnabas*, *Simeon*, *Lucius*, *Manaen*, and *Saul*, of theſe five the Holy Ghoſt ſaid, *that two muſt be ſeparated for the work whereto God had called them*, which were *Barnabas* and *Saul*; there remain only the other three, *Simeon*, *Lucius*, and *Manaen*, to lay their hands on them, and ordain them to their work. Accordingly thoſe who tell us that *James* was ordained Biſhop of *Jeruſalem*, do mention the three Apoſtles, who concurred in the ordaining of him. But moſt remarkable for this purpoſe is the Canon of the *Nicene Council*, wherein this number is ſet down as the regular number for the ordination of Biſhops, without which it was not accounted Canonical. The words are theſe, Επίσκοπον προσήκει μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐπαρχίᾳ καθίστασθαι· εἰ δὲ δυσχερὲς εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ διὰ κατεπείγουσαν ἀνάγκην, ἢ διὰ μῆκος ὁδοῦ, ἐξ ἅπαντος τρεῖς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συναγομένους, συμψήφων γινομένων καὶ τῶν ἀπόντων καὶ συντιθεμένων διὰ γραμμάτων, τότε τὴν χειροτονίαν ποιεῖσθαι. *i. e. The ordination of a Biſhop ſhould, if poſſible, be performed by all the Biſhops of the Province, which if it cannot eaſily be done, either through ſome urgent neceſſity, or the tedriouſneſs of the way, three Biſhops, at leaſt, muſt be there, for the doing it, which may be ſufficient for the ordination, if thoſe that are abſent do expreſs their conſent, and by Letters approve of the doing of it.* To the ſame purpoſe *Theodoret*, Κανόνες πάντας συγκαλεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπαρχίας τοὺς ἐπισκόπους κελεύουσι, καὶ αὖ πάλιν δίχα τριῶν ἐπισκόπων ἐπισκόπῳ χειροτονίαν ἀπαγορεύουσι γίνεσθαι. *The Canons enjoin all the Biſhops of the Province to be preſent at the ordination of one; and forbid the ordination of any, without three being preſent at it.* Thus we ſee how the conſtitution of the Synagogue was exactly obſerved in the Church, as to the number of the perſons concurring to a regular ordination. The laſt thing as to ordination, bearing Analogy to the Synagogue, is the *effect of this ordination upon the perſon.* It was the cuſtom of the Jews, to ſpeak of all that were legally ordained among them, ושרתה עליהן שכינה *and the Divine preſence or* Shechinah *reſted upon them*, which ſometimes they called רוח הקורש the *Holy Spirit*, ſuppoſed to be in a peculiar manner preſent after this ſolemn ſeparation of them from others in the world, and dedication of them unto God. Anſwerable to this may that of our Saviour be, when he gives his Apoſtles authority to preach the Goſpel, he

Miſna &c. Gemar. tit. Sanhed. c. 1.

Tit. Sanhed. cap. 4. §. 3.

Arcan. Cath. Veritat. l. 4. cap. 6.

De Concord. orbis, p. 377.

Euſeb. hiſt. Eccleſ. lib. 2. cap. 1.

Can. 4.

Hiſt. Eccleſ. lib. 5. c. 23.

V. Juſtell. not. in Canon. Univerſæ Eccleſ. p. 140.

Joh. 20. 21. doth it in that form of words, *Receive ye the Holy Ghoſt*; and then gives them the power of binding and looſing, uſually conveyed in the Jewiſh ordinations. v. 29. *Whoſe ſins ye remit, they are remitted; and whoſe ſins ye retain, they are retained.* So that as under the Law, they by their ordination received a moral faculty or right to exerciſe that power they were ordained to; ſo under the Goſpel, all who are ordained according to Goſpel rules, have a right, authority, and power conveyed thereby, for the diſpenſing of the Word and Sacraments. Which right and power muſt not be conceived to be an internal indelible character, as the Papiſts groundleſly conceive, but a moral legal right, according to the Laws of Chriſt, becauſe the perſons ordained do not act in it in a natural, but a moral capacity, and ſo the effect muſt be moral, and not phyſical, which they muſt ſuppoſe it to be, who make it a Character, and that indelible. Thus much may ſerve to clear how ordination, in all its circumſtances, was derived from the Jewiſh Synagogue.

§. 15. The other thing remaining to be ſpoken to, as to the correſpondence of the Church with the Synagogue in its conſtitution, is, what order the Apoſtles did ſettle in the ſeveral Churches of their plantation, for the ruling and ordering the affairs of them. Before I come to ſpeak ſo much to it as will be pertinent to our preſent purpoſe and deſign, we may take notice of the ſame name for Church-rulers under the Goſpel, which there was under the Synagogue, *viz.* that of *Preſbyters.* The name *Preſbyter*, as the Heb. זקן though it originally import age, yet by way of connotation it hath been looked on as a name both of dignity and power. Becauſe Wiſdom was ſuppoſed to dwell with a multitude of years, therefore perſons of age and experience were commonly choſen to places of honour and truſt, and thence the name importing age, doth likewiſe carry dignity along with it. Exod. 3. 16. 18. 4. 29. 12. 21. 17. 5. 18. 12, &c. Thence we read in the time of *Moſes*, how often the *Elders* were gathered together. Thence *Eliezer* is called זקן ביתו *Gen.* 24. 2. which the Greek renders πρεσβύτερος τῆς οἰκίας the *Seignior Domo*, the chief Officer in his houſe; and ſo we read, *Gen.* 50. 6. זקני ארץ מצרים *the Elders of the Land of Egypt.* So the *Elders of* Midian, the *Elders of* Iſrael, the *Elders of the Cities*; ſo among the Greeke, γερουσία for their Council of State; and among the Latins *Senatus*, and our Saxon *Aldermen*, in all importing both age and honour and power together. But among the Jews, in the times of the Apoſtles, it is moſt evident that the name πρεσβύτεροι imported not only dignity, but power; the Preſbyters among the Jews having a power both of judging and teaching given them by their *Semicha* or ordination. Now under the Goſpel the Apoſtles retaining the name and the manner of ordination, but not conferring that judiciary power by it, which was in uſe among the Jews, to ſhew the difference between the Law and the Goſpel, it was requiſite ſome other name ſhould be given to the Governours of the Church, which ſhould qualifie the importance of the word Preſbyters to a ſenſe proper to a Goſpel-ſtate; which was the original of giving the name ἐπίσκοποι to the Governours of the Church under the Goſpel: A name importing duty more than honour, and not a title above *Preſbyter*, but rather uſed by way of diminution and qualification of the power implied in the name of *Preſbyter.* Therefore to ſhew what kind of power and duty the name Preſbyter imported in the Church, the Office conveyed by that name is call'd ἐπισκοπὴ, and Preſbyters are ſaid ἐπισκοπεῖν, 1 *Pet.* 5. 2. where it is oppoſed to that κατακυριεύειν τῶν κλήρων, *Lording it over the people*, as was the cuſtom of the Preſbyters among the Jews. So that if we determine things by importance of words, and things ſignified by them, the power of ordination was proper to the name πρεσβύτερος and not ἐπίσκοπος, becauſe the former name did then import that power, and not the latter. We come therefore from the names to the things then implyed by them, and the Offices eſtabliſhed by the Apoſtles for the ruling of Churches. But my deſign being not to diſpute the arguments of either party, (*viz.* thoſe who conceive the Apoſtles ſetled the Government of the Church in an abſolute parity; or elſe by ſuperiority and ſubordination among the ſettled Officers of the Church) but to lay down thoſe Principles which may equally concern both, in order to accommodation: I find not my ſelf at preſent concerned to debate what is brought on either ſide for the maintaining their particular opinion, any farther than thereby the Apoſtles intentions are brought to have been to bind all future Churches to obſerve that individual form they conceived was in practice then. All that I have to ſay then concerning the courſe taken by the Apoſtles in ſetling the Government of the Churches, (under which will be contained the full reſolution of what I promiſed, as to the correſpondency to the Synagogue in the Government of Churches) lies in theſe three Propoſitions, which I now ſhall endeavour to clear, *viz. That neither can we have that certainty of Apoſtolical practice, which is neceſſary to conſtitute a Divine right: Nor,* Secondly, *is it probable that the Apoſtles did tie themſelves up to any one fixed courſe in modelling Churches: Nor,* Thirdly, *if they did, doth it neceſſarily follow that we muſt obſerve the ſame.* If theſe three conſiderations be fully cleared, we may ſee to how little purpoſe it is to diſpute the ſignificancy and importance of words and names, as uſed in Scripture, which hitherto the main quarrel hath been about. I therefore begin with the *Firſt* of theſe, *That we cannot arrive to ſuch an abſolute certainty what courſe the Apoſtles took in governing Churches, as to infer from thence the only divine right of that one form which the ſeveral parties imagine comes the neareſt to it.* This I ſhall make out from theſe following arguments. *Firſt,* From the equivalency of the names, and the doubtfulneſs of their ſignification from which the Form of Government uſed in the New Teſtament ſhould be determined. That the form of Government muſt be derived from the importance of the names of Biſhop and Preſbyter, is hotly pleaded on both ſides. But if there can be no certain way found out whereby to come to a determination of the certain ſenſe of thoſe names in Scripture, we are never like to come to any certain knowledge of the things ſignified by thoſe names. Now there is a fourfold equivalency of the names Biſhop and Preſbyter taken notice of. 1. That both ſhould ſignifie the ſame thing, *viz.* a Preſbyter in the modern notion, *i. e.* one acting in a parity with others for the Government of the Church. And this ſenſe is evidently aſſerted by *Theodoret,* ἐπισκόπους τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καλεῖ· ἄλλως τε οὐδὲ οἷόν τε ἦν πολλοὺς ἐπισκόπους μίαν πόλιν ποιμαίνειν. *The Apoſtle,* Acts 20. 28. Phil. 1. 1. Titus 1. 5. 1 Tim. 3. 1. *doth by Biſhops mean nothing elſe but Preſbyters; otherwiſe it were impoſſible for more Biſhops to govern one City.* 2. That both of them ſhould ſignifie promiſcuouſly ſometimes a Biſhop, and ſometimes a Preſbyter; ſo *Chryſoſtome,* and after him *Œcumenius* and *Theophylact,* in Phil. 1. ἐπισκόπους τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καλεῖ, τότε γὰρ ἐκοινώνουν τοῖς ὀνόμασι· and in *Acts* 20. 28. ἐπειδὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς λανθάνει ἡ συνήθεια μάλιστα τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης τοὺς ἐπισκόπους πρεσβυτέρους ὀνομάζουσι, καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἐπισκόπους,

Diſſert. de jure Epiſ. 3. *cap.* 6. *Vindicat. cap.* 2. §. 1. *Theodoret. in* 1 Tim. 3. 1.

ἐπισκόπους, σημειωτέον τοῦτο ἐντεῦθεν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Τίτον ἐπιστολῆς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς Φιλιππησίους, καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Τιμόθεον πρώτης. Where they aſſert the Community and promiſcuous uſe of the Names in Scripture; ſo that a Biſhop is ſometimes called a Presbyter, and a Presbyter ſometimes called a Biſhop. 3. That the Name Biſhop, always imports a ſingular Biſhop; but the name Presbyter is taken promiſcuouſly both for Biſhop and Presbyter. 4. That both the Names Biſhop and Presbyter, do import only one thing in Scripture, *viz.* the Office of a ſingular Biſhop in every Church; which Senſe, though a Stranger to Antiquity, is above all other embraced by a late very learned Man, who hath endeavoured by ſet Diſcourſes to reconcile all the Places of Scripture where the Names occur to this Senſe, but with what Succeſs it is not here a Place to examine. By this Variety of Interpretation of the Equivalency of the Names of Biſhop and Presbyter, we may ſee how far the Argument from the promiſcuous uſe of the Names is from the Controverſie in hand; unleſs ſome evident Arguments be withal brought, that the Equivalency of the Words cannot poſſibly be meant in any other Senſe, than that which they contend for. Equivocal Words can never of themſelves determine what Senſe they are to be taken in, becauſe they are equivocal, and ſo admit of different ſenſes. And he that from the uſe of an equivocal word would infer the neceſſity only of one ſenſe, when the word is common to many, unleſs ſome other argument be brought inforcing that neceſſity, will be ſo far from perſuading others to the ſame belief, that he will only betray the weakneſs and ſhortneſs of his own reaſon. When *Auguſtus* would be called only *Princeps Senatus*, could
Tacitus hiſt. lib. 1. any one infer from thence, that certainly he was only the προεστὼς in the Senate, or elſe that he had ſuperiority of power over the Senate, when that title might be indifferent to either of thoſe ſenſes? All that can be infer'd from the promiſcuous ſenſe of the words, is that they may be underſtood only in this ſenſe; but it muſt be proved that they can be underſtood in no other ſenſe, before any one particular form of Government as neceſſary can be inferred from the uſe of them. If notwithſtanding the promiſcuous uſe of the name Biſhop and Presbyter, either that Presbyter may mean a Biſhop, or that Biſhop may mean a Presbyter, or be ſometimes uſed for one, ſometimes for the other; what ground can there be laid in the equivalency of the words which can infer the only divine right of the form of Government couched in any one of thoſe ſenſes? So likewiſe it is in the titles of *Angels of the Churches*; If the Name Angel imports no incongruity, though taken only for the שליח צבור in the Jewiſh Synagogue, the publick Miniſter of the Synagogue, called the *Angel of the Congregation*, what power can be inferred from thence, any more than ſuch an officer was inveſted with? Again if the προεστὼς or Preſident of the Aſſembly of Presbyters, might be ſo called: what ſuperiority can be deduced thence, any more than ſuch a one enjoys? Nay if in the Prophetical ſtile, an unity may be ſet down by way of Repreſentation of a Multitude: what Evidence can be brought from the name, that by it ſome one particular Perſon muſt be underſtood? And by this means *Timothy* may avoid being charged
Rev. 2. 4. *with leaving his firſt love*, which he muſt of neceſſity be, by thoſe that make him the Angel of the Church of *Epheſus* at the time of writing theſe Epiſtles. Neither is this any ways ſolved by the Anſwer given, that the name Angel is repreſentative of the whole Church, and ſo there is no neceſſity, the Angel ſhould be perſonally guilty of it. For *firſt*,

it ſeems ſtrange that the whole diffuſive body of the Church ſhould be charged with a crime by the name of the *Angel*, and he that is particularly meant by that name ſhould be free from it. As if a Prince ſhould charge the Major of a Corporation as guilty of rebellion, and by it ſhould only mean that the Corporation was guilty, but the Major was innocent himſelf. *Secondly*, if many things in the Epiſtles be directed to the Angel, but yet ſo as to concern the whole body, then of neceſſity the Angel muſt be taken as repreſentative of the body; and then why may not the word Angel be taken only by way of repreſentation of the body it ſelf, either of the whole Church, or which is far more probable, of the *Conſeſſus* or order of Preſbyters in that Church? We ſee what miſerably unconcluding arguments thoſe are which are brought for any form of Government from Metaphorical or Ambiguous expreſſions, or names promiſcuouſly uſed, which may be interpreted to different ſenſes. What certainty then can any rational man find what the form of Government was in the Primitive times, when only thoſe arguments are uſed which may be equally accommodated to different forms? And without ſuch a *certainty* with what confidence can men ſpeak of a Divine right of any one particular form? *Secondly*, the uncertainty of the Primitive form is argued, from the places moſt in controverſie about the form of Government; becauſe that without any apparent incongruity they may be underſtood of either of the different forms. Which I ſhall make out by going through the ſeveral places. The Controverſy then on foot is this, (as it is of late ſtated) whether the Churches in the Primitive times were governed by a Biſhop only and Deacons, or by a College of Presbyters acting in a parity of power? The places inſiſted on, on both ſides are theſe, *Act.* 11. 30. *Acts* 14. 23. *Acts* 28. 17. 1 *Tim.* 3. 1. *Titus* 1. 5. the thing in controverſy is, whether Biſhops with *Deacons*, or Presbyters in a parity of power, are underſtood in theſe places? I begin then in order with *Acts* 11. 30. the firſt place wherein the name ϖρεσβύτεροι occurs, as applied to the officers of the Chriſtian Church. Thoſe that are for a College of Presbyters, underſtand by theſe Elders thoſe of the Church of *Jeruſalem*, who did govern the Affairs of that Church; thoſe that are for a ſolitary Epiſcopacy by theſe Elders underſtand not the local Elders of *Jeruſalem*, but the ſeveral Biſhops of the Churches of *Judea*. Let us now ſee whether there be any evidence from the place to determine which of theſe two muſt neceſſarily be underſtood. There is nothing at all mentioned in the place, but only that *upon the occaſion of the Famine they ſent relief to the Brethren of* Judea, *and ſent it to the Elders by the hands of* Barnabas *and* Saul; Which might either be to the Elders of the Church at *Jeruſalem* to be diſtributed to the ſeveral Churches of *Judea*, or elſe to the ſeveral Paſtors of thoſe Churches either collectively as met together at *Jeruſalem* to receive this contribution, or diſtributively as they were in their ſeveral Churches. The relief might be ſent to all the Brethren of *Judea*, and yet either be conveyed to the particular Elders of *Jeruſalem* to ſend it abroad, or to the ſeveral Elders of the Churches within the circuit of *Judea*. But other places are brought by both parties for their particular ſenſe in this; As *Acts* 15. 6. here indeed mention is made of the Apoſtles and Elders together at *Jeruſalem*, but nothing expreſſed whereby we may know whether the fixed Elders of that Church, or elſe the Elders of all the Churches of *Judea* aſſembled upon this ſolemn occaſion of the Council of the Apoſtles there. So *Acts* 21. 11. when *Paul* went in to

James, it is ſaid that *All the Elders were preſent.* No more certainty here neither; for either they might be the fixed officers of that Church, meeting with *James* upon *Paul*'s coming; or elſe they might be the Elders of the ſeveral Churches of *Judea* met together, not to take Account of *Paul*'s Miniſtry (as ſome improbably conjecture,) but aſſembled together there at the Feaſt of Pentecoſt, *at which* Paul came to *Jeruſalem*, which is more probable upon the account of what we read, *v.* 20. of the *many thouſand believing Jews then at* Jeruſalem *who were zealous of the Law:* who in all probability were the believing Jews of *Judea*, who did yet obſerve the annual Feſtivals of *Jeruſalem*, and ſo moſt likely their ſeveral Elders might go up together with them, and there be with *James* at *Paul*'s coming in to him. No certainty then of the Church of *Jeruſalem* how that was governed; whether by Apoſtles themſelves, or other unfixed Elders, or only by *James* who exerciſed his Apoſtle-ſhip moſt there, and thence afterwards called the Biſhop of *Jeruſalem.* We proceed therefore to the government of other Churches; and the next place is, *Acts* 14. 23. *And when they had ordained them Elders in every Church.* Here ſome plead for a plurality of Elders as fixed in every Church; but it is moſt evident, that the words hold true if there was but one in each Church. For κατ' ἐκκλησίαν here and κατὰ πόλιν *Titus* 1. 5. (for both places will admit of the ſame anſwer) doth ſignifie no more then *oppidatim*, or *Eccleſiatim*, as κατὰ βαθμὸν *gradatim*, κατ' ἄνδρα, *viritim*, κατὰ μέρος *particulatim*, κατὰ κώμην *vicatim.* No more then is imported than that Elders were ordained, *City by City*, or *Church by Church*, as we would render it, and thereby nothing is expreſſed but that no Church wanted an Elder, but not that every Church had more Elders than one. But the place moſt controverted is, *Acts* 20. 17. *And from Miletus, Paul ſent to Epheſus, and called the Elders of the Church.* Thoſe that ſay theſe Elders were thoſe only of the Church of *Epheſus*, ſeem to be moſt favoured by the article τῆς ἐκκλησίας as ſeeming to apply it to that particular Church of *Epheſus*, and by the *Syriack verſion* which renders it, *Venire fecit Presbyteros Eccleſiæ Epheſi*; to the ſame purpoſe likewiſe *Hierome* underſtands it. On the contrary thoſe that ſay that theſe Elders were thoſe of the ſeveral Churches of *Aſia*, are favoured by *v.* 18. *that from the firſt day he came into* Aſia, *he had been with them at all ſeaſons.* Now *Paul* did not remain all the time at *Epheſus*, as appears by *Acts* 19. 10, 22, 26. where he is ſaid to preach the word abroad in *Aſia* and ſo in probability Churches were planted, and Rulers ſetled in them; and that theſe were at this time called to *Miletus* by *Paul*, is the expreſs affirmation of *Irenæus*; *In Mileto enim convocatis Epiſcopis & Presbyteris, qui erant ab Epheſo & à reliquis proximis civitatibus, quoniam ipſe feſtinavit Hieroſolymis Pentecoſtem agere.* Here is nothing then either in the text or antiquity, that doth abſolutely determine whence theſe Elders came; but there may be a probability on either ſide; and ſo no certainty or neceſſity of underſtanding it either way. And ſo for the other places in *Timothy* and *Titus*, it is certain the care of thoſe Perſons did extend to many places; and therefore the Elders or Biſhops made by them are not neceſſarily to be underſtood of a Plurality of Elders in one place. Thus we ſee that there is no incongruity in applying either of theſe two forms to the ſenſe of the places in Queſtion. I diſpute not which is the true, or at leaſt more probable ſenſe, but that we can find nothing in the ſeveral places which doth neceſſarily determine how they are to be underſtood as to one particular

Adverſ. hæreſ. l. 1. *cap.* 14.

form of Government, which is the thing I now aim at the proving of. And if neither form be repugnant to the ſenſe of theſe places, how can any one be neceſſarily inferred from them? As if the ſeveral motions and *phænomena* of the Heavens may be with equal probability explained according to the *Ptolemaick* or *Copernican* Hypotheſis, *viz.* about the reſt or motion of the Earth; then it neceſſarily follows, that from thoſe *Phænomena* no argument can be drawn evincing the neceſſity of the one *Hypotheſis*, and overturning the probability of the other. If that great wonder of Nature the flux and reflux of the Sea, might with equal congruity be ſolved according to the different opinions, of its being cauſed by ſubterraneous fires, or from the motion of the Moon, or the depreſſion of the Lunar *vortex*, or (which to me is far the moſt probable) by a motion of conſent of the Sea with all the other great bodies of the world, we ſhould find no neceſſity at all of entertaining one opinion above another, but to look upon all as probable, and none as certain. So likewiſe for the compoſition and motion of all natural bodies, the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* of the old and new *Philoſophy* implying no apparent incongruity to nature, do make it appear that all or any of them, may be embraced as Ingenious *Romances* in Philoſophy (as they are no more) but that none of them are the certain truth; or can be made appear ſo to be to the minds of men. So it is in controverſies in *Theology*, if the matter propounded to be believed, may as to the truth and ſubſtance of it be equally believed under different ways of explication, then there is no neceſſity as to the believing the truth of the thing, to believe it under ſuch an explication of it, more than under another. As for inſtance, in the caſe of Chriſt's deſcent εἰς ᾅδου, if I may truly believe that Chriſt did deſcend εἰς ᾅδου, whether by that we underſtand the ſtate of the dead, or a local deſcent to hell, then there is no neceſſity in order to the belief of the ſubſtance of that article of the ancient Creed (called the Apoſtles) under that reſtriction of a local deſcent. By this time I ſuppoſe it is clear, that if theſe places of Scripture may be underſtood in theſe two different ſenſes of the word *Elders*, *viz.* either taken collectively in one City, or diſtributively in many, then there is no certainty which of theſe two ſenſes muſt be embraced, and ſo the form of Church Government, which muſt be thence derived, is left ſtill at as great uncertainty as ever, notwithſtanding theſe places of Scripture brought to demonſtrate it; ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

§. 16.

Thirdly, The uncertainty of the primitive Form of Government will be made appear from the *Defectiveneſs*, *Ambiguity*, *Partiality* and *Repugnancy* of the records of the ſucceeding ages which ſhould inform us what Apoſtolical practice was. When men are by the force of the former arguments driven off from Scripture, then they preſently run to take ſanctuary in the records of ſucceeding ages to the Apoſtles. Thus *Eſtius* no mean School-man, handling this very queſtion of the difference of Biſhops and Preſbyters, very fairly quits the Scriptures, and betakes himſelf to other weapons. *Quod autem jure divino ſint Epiſcopi Preſbyteris ſuperiores, etſi non ita clarum eſt è ſacris literis, aliunde tamen ſatis efficaciter probari poteſt.* Ingenuouſly ſaid however; but all the difficulty is how a *Jus divinum* ſhould be proved when men leave the Scriptures, which makes others ſo loth to leave this hold; although they do it in effect, when they call in the help of ſucceeding ages to make the Scripture ſpeak plain for them. We follow therefore the ſcent of the Game into this Wood of Antiquity, wherein it will be eaſier to loſe

In Sentent. lib. 4. diſt. 4. ſect. 25.

our ſelves then to find that which we are upon the purſuit of, a *Jus Divinum* of any one particular form of Government. I handle now only the teſtimony of Antiquity (for the practice of it will call for a particular diſcourſe afterwards) and herein I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the incompetency of this Teſtimony as to the ſhewing what certain form of Church Government was practiſed by the Apoſtles; for that I ſhall make uſe of that fourfold argument from the *defectiveneſs* of this Teſtimony, from the *Ambiguity* of it, from the *Partiality* of it, and from the *Repugnancy* of it to its ſelf. *Firſt*, then for the defectiveneſs of the teſtimony of Antiquity in reference to the ſhewing what certain form the Apoſtles obſerved in ſetling the Government of Churches; A threefold defectiveneſs I obſerve in it, as to *places*, as to *times*, as to *Perſons*. *Firſt* defectiveneſs as to *places*; for him that would be ſatisfied what courſe the Apoſtles took for governing Churches, it would be very requiſite to obſerve the uniformity of the Apoſtles practice in all Churches of their plantation. And if but one place varied, it were enough to overthrow the neceſſity of any one form of Government, becauſe thereby it would be evident, that they obſerved no certain or conſtant courſe, nor did they look upon themſelves as obliged ſo to do. Now the ground of the neceſſity of ſuch an univerſal Teſtimony as to places, is this; We have already made it appear, that there is no Law of Chriſt abſolutely commanding one form, and forbidding all other. We have no way then left to know whether the Apoſtles did look upon themſelves as bound to ſettle one form, but by their practice; this practice muſt be certain and uniform in them; this uniformity muſt be made known to us by ſome unqueſtionable way: the Scriptures they are very ſilent in it, mentioning very little more than *Paul*'s practice, nor that fully and clearly; therefore we muſt gather it from antiquity, and the records of following ages: if theſe now fall ſhort of our expectation, and cannot give us an account of what was done by the Apoſtles in the ſeveral Churches planted by them, how is it poſſible we ſhould attain any certainty of what the Apoſtles practice was? Now that antiquity is ſo defective as to places, will appear from the general ſilence as to the Churches planted by many of the Apoſtles. Granting the truth of what *Euſebius* tells us, That *Thomas* went into *Parthia*, *Andrew* into *Scythia*, *John* into the leſſer *Aſia*, *Peter* to the Jews in *Pontus*, *Galatia*, *Bythinia*, *Cappadocia*, *Aſia*; beſides what we read in Scripture of *Paul*, what a pitiful ſhort account have we here given in, of all the Apoſtles travels, and their ſeveral fellow-labourers! And for all theſe, little or nothing ſpoke of the way they took in ſetling the Churches by them planted. Who is it will undertake to tell us what courſe *Andrew* took in *Scythia*, in governing Churches? If we believe the records of after-ages, there was but one Biſhop, *viz.* of *Tomis* for the whole Countrey; how different is this from the pretended courſe of *Paul* ſetting up a ſingle Biſhop in every City? where do we read of the Preſbyteries ſetled by *Thomas* in *Parthia* or the *Indies*? what courſe *Philip*, *Bartholomew*, *Matthew*, *Simon Zelotes*, *Mathias* took: might not they for any thing we know, ſettle another kind of Government from what we read *Paul*, *Peter* or *John* did, unleſs we had ſome evidence that they were all bound to obſerve the ſame? nay, what evidence have we what courſe *Peter* took in the Churches of the circumciſion? Whether he left them to their Synagogue way or altered it, and how and wherein? Theſe things ſhould be made appear, to give men a certainty of the way and courſe the A-

Hiſt. Eccleſ. lib. 3. c. 1.

poſtles did obſerve in the ſetling Churches by them planted. But inſtead of this, we have a general ſilence in antiquity, and nothing but the forgeries of latter ages to ſupply the vacuity: whereby they filled up empty places as *Plutarch* expreſſeth it, as Geographers do maps with ſome fabulous creatures of their own invention. Here is work now for a *Nicephorus Calliſthus*, a *Simeon Metaphraſtes*, the very *Jacobus de Voragine* of the Greek Church, (as one well calls him) thoſe hiſtorical Tinkers, that think to mend a hole where they find it, and make three inſtead of it. This is the firſt defect in antiquity as to places. The *ſecond* is as obſervable as to *times*; and what is moſt conſiderable: Antiquity is moſt defective where 'tis moſt uſeful, *viz.* in the time immediately after the Apoſtles, which muſt have been moſt helpful to us in this inquiry. For who dare with confidence believe the conjectures of *Euſebius* at three hundred years diſtance from Apoſtolical times, when he hath no other teſtimony to vouch, but the *Hypotypoſes* of an uncertain *Clement* (certainly not he of *Alexandria*, if *Joſ. Scaliger* may be credited) and the Commentaries of *Hegeſippus*, whoſe relation and authority are as queſtionable as many of the reports of *Euſebius* himſelf are in reference to thoſe elder times: for which I need no other Teſtimony, but *Euſebius* in a place enough of its ſelf to blaſt the whole credit of antiquity, as to the matter now in debate. For ſpeaking of *Paul* and *Peter*, and the Churches by them planted, and coming to enquire after their ſucceſſors, he makes this very ingenuous confeſſion. Ὅσοι δὲ τούτων, καὶ τινες γνήσιοι ζηλωταὶ γεγονότες τὰς πρὸς αὐτῶν ἱδρυθείσας ἱκανοὶ ποιμαίνειν ἐδοκιμάσθησαν ἐκκλησίας, οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν· μὴ ὅτι γε ὅσους ἄν τις ἐξ τῶν Παύλου φωνῶν ἀνελέξοιτο. Say you ſo? *Is it ſo hard a matter to find out who ſucceeded the Apoſtles in the Churches planted by them, unleſs it be thoſe mentioned in the writings of* Paul? What becomes then of our unqueſtionable line of ſucceſſion of the Biſhops of ſeveral Churches, and the large Diagramms made of the Apoſtolical Churches, with every ones name ſet down in his order, as if the Writer had been *Clarenceaux* to the Apoſtles themſelves? Is it come to this at laſt that we have nothing certain, but what we have in Scriptures? and muſt then the Tradition of the Church be our rule to interpret Scriptures by? An excellent way to find out the truth doubtleſs, to bend the rule to the crooked ſtick, to make the Judge ſtand to the opinion of his Lacquey, what ſentence he ſhall paſs upon the cauſe in queſtion: to make Scripture ſtand cap in hand to tradition to know whether it may have leave to ſpeak or no? Are all the great outcries of Apoſtolical tradition, of perſonal ſucceſſion, of unqueſtionable records reſolved at laſt into the Scripture its ſelf by him from whom all theſe long pedegrees are fetched? then let ſuceeſſion know its place, and learn to vail bonnet to the Scriptures? And withal let men take heed of over-reaching themſelves when they would bring down ſo large a Catalogue of ſingle Biſhops from the firſt and pureſt times of the Church? for it will be hard for others to believe them, when *Euſebius* profeſſeth it is ſo hard to find them. Well might *Scaliger* then complain that the Interval from the laſt chapter of the Acts to the middle of *Trajan*, in which time *Quadratus* and *Ignatius* began to flouriſh, was *tempus* ἄδηλον, as *Varro* ſpeaks, a meer Chaos of time filled up with the rude conceptions of *Papias*, *Hermes* and others, who like *Hannibal* when they could not find a way through, would make one either by force or fraud. But yet, *Thirdly*, here is another defect conſequent to

Plut. in Theſeo.

Eccl. Hiſt. l. 3. *c.* 4.

Proleg. in Chron. Euſ.

that of time, which is that of perſons; ariſing not only from a defect of records, the *Diptychs* of the Church being loſt, which would have acquainted us with the times of ſuffering of the ſeveral Martyrs (by them called their Natalitia) at which times their ſeveral names were *Cont. 3. l. 2. c. 5. not. 18.* inrolled in theſe Martyrologies, which ſome as *Junius* obſerves, have ignorantly miſtaken for the time of their being made Biſhops of the places wherein their names were entred, as *Anacletus*, *Cletus*, and *Clemens* at *Rome*; I ſay the defect as to perſons not only ariſeth hence, but becauſe the Chriſtians were ſo much harraſſed with perſecutions, that they could not have that leiſure then to write thoſe things which the leiſure and peace of our ages have made us ſo eagerly inquiſitive after. Hence even the Martyrologies are ſo full ſtuffed with Fables, witneſs one for all, the famous Legend of *Catharina* who ſuffered, ſay they, *V. Chamier. Tom. 1. l. 2. cap. 16.* in *Diocletian*'s time. And truly the ſtory of *Ignatius* (as much as it is defended with his Epiſtles) doth not ſeem to be any of the moſt probable. For wherefore ſhould *Ignatius* of all others be brought to *Rome* to ſuffer, when the *Proconſuls* and the *præſides provinciarum* did every where in time of perſecution execute their power in puniſhing Chriſtians at their own tribunals, without ſending them ſo long a journey to *Rome* to be martyr'd there? And how came *Ignatius* to make ſo many and ſuch ſtrange excurſions as he did by the ſtory, if the ſoldiers that were his guard were ſo cruel to him, as he complains they were? Now all thoſe uncertain and fabulous narrations as to perſons then, ariſing from want of ſufficient records made at thoſe times, make it more evident how incompetent a Judge Antiquity is as to the certainty of things done in Apoſtolical times. If we ſhould only ſpeak of the Fabulous Legends of the firſt planters of Churches in theſe Weſtern parts, we need no farther evidence of the great defect of Antiquity as to perſons. Not to go out of our own nation; Whence come the ſtories of *Peter*, *James*, *Paul*, *Simon*, *Ariſtobulus*, beſides *Joſeph* of *Arimathea*, and his company, all being preachers of the Goſpel, and planters of Churches here, but only from the great defect in Antiquity as to the Records of Perſons imployed in the ſeveral places for preaching the Goſpel? Thus much to ſhew the defectiveneſs as to the records of antiquity, and thereby the incompetency of them for being a way to find out the certain courſe the Apoſtles took in ſettling and governing Churches by them planted.

§. 17. The next thing ſhewing the incompetency of the records of the Church for deciding the certain form of Church Government in the Apoſtles times, is, the *Ambiguity* of the Teſtimony given by thoſe records. A Teſtimony ſufficient to decide a controverſie, muſt be plain and evident, and muſt ſpeak full and home to the caſe under debate. Now if I make it appear that antiquity doth not ſo; nothing then can be evident from thence, but that we are left, to as great uncertainties as before. The matter in controverſie is, whether any in a ſuperiour order to Preſbyters were inſtituted by the Apoſtles themſelves for the regulating of the Churches by them planted? for the proving of which, *three* things are the moſt inſiſted on; *firſt*, the Perſonal ſucceſſion of ſome perſons to the Apoſtles and Churches by them planted; *Secondly*, the appropriating the name ἐπίσκοποι to Biſhops in a ſuperiour order to Preſbyters, after the Apoſtles deceaſe; *Thirdly*, the Churches owning the order of Epiſcopacy as of Divine inſtitution. If now we can make theſe three things evident; *Firſt*, *that perſonal ſucceſſion*

might

might be without ſuch ſuperiority of order; *Secondly*, *that the names of Biſhop and Preſbyters were common after the diſtinction between them was introduced*; and *Thirdly*, *that the Church did not own Epiſcopacy as a Divine inſtitution, but Eccleſiaſtical*; *and thoſe who ſeem to ſpeak moſt of it, do mean no more*; I ſhall ſuppoſe enough done to invalidate the Teſtimony of Antiquity as to the matter in hand. *Firſt*, then for the matter of *ſucceſſion in Apoſtolical Churches*, I ſhall lay down theſe four things, to evince that the argument drawn from thence, cannot fully clear the certain courſe which the Apoſtles took in ſettling the Government of Churches. *Firſt*, *that the ſucceſſion might be only as to different* degree, *and not as to a different* order; where the ſucceſſion is clear nothing poſſibly can be inferred from it beyond this. For bare ſucceſſion implies no more than that there was one in thoſe Churches ſucceeding the Apoſtles, from whom afterwards the ſucceſſion was derived. Now then, ſuppoſing only at preſent, that it was the cuſtom in all the Churches at that time to be ruled by a college of Preſbyters acting in a parity of power, and among theſe, one to ſit as the *Naſi* in the *Sanhedrin*, having a priority of order above the reſt in place, without any ſuperiority of power over his Colleagues; will not the matter of ſucceſſion be clear and evident enough notwithſtanding this? *Succeſſion* of *perſons* was the thing inquired for, and not a *ſucceſſion* of *power*; if therefore thoſe that would prove a ſucceſſion of Apoſtolical power, can only produce a liſt and Catalogue of names in Apoſtolical Churches, without any evidence of what power they had, they apparently fail of proving the thing in queſtion, which is not, whether there might not be found out a liſt of perſons in many Churches derived from the Apoſtles times; but whether thoſe perſons did enjoy by way of peculiarity and appropriation to themſelves, that power, which the Apoſtles had over many Churches while they lived? Now this, the meer ſucceſſion will never prove, which will beſt appear by ſome Parallel inſtances. At *Athens* after they grew weary of their ten years Ἄρχοντες, the people choſe nine every year to govern the affairs of the Common-wealth; theſe nine enjoyed a Parity of power among themſelves, and therefore had a place where they conſulted together about the matters of State, which was called Στρατήγιον, as * *Demoſthenes*, *Plutarch* and others tell us: Now although they enjoyed this equality of power, yet one of them had greater dignity than the reſt, and therefore was called Ἄρχων by way of excellency, and his name was only ſet in the publick Records of that year, and there was called Ἄρχων ἐπώνυμος, and the year was reckoned from him, as † *Pauſanias* and *Julius Pollux* inform us. Here we ſee now the ſucceſſion clear in one ſingle perſon and yet no ſuperiority of power in him over his Colleagues: The like may be obſerved among the *Ephori* and *Bidiæj* at *Sparta*; the number of the *Ephori* was always five from their firſt inſtitution by *Lycurgus*, and not nine (as the Greek Etymologiſt imagines) theſe enjoyed likewiſe a parity of power among them; but among theſe to give name to the year, they made choice of one who was called ἐπώνυμος here too, as the ἄρχων at *Athens*, and him they called προεστῶτα τῶν ἐφόρων, as *Plutarch* tells us. Where we have the very name προεστὼς attributed to him that had only this primacy of order without any ſuperiority of power, which is uſed by *Juſtin Martyr* of the Preſident of Aſſemblies among the Chriſtians. Now from hence we may evidently

* *Demoſt. in Midiam. Plut. in Per. & vit. Nicii. V. Meurſium de Archont. Ath. l. 1. c. 9. Ennium de Ep. Ath.*

† *Pauſ. in Lacon. Pollux. Onom. lib. 8. c. 9.*

Pauſ. Lacon. V. Nic. Cragium de Rep. Laced. lib. 2. c. 4.

ſee that meer ſucceſſion of ſingle perſons named above the reſt, in the ſucceſſions in Apoſtolical Churches, cannot inforce any ſuperiority of power in the perſons ſo named, above others ſuppoſed to be as joint-Governours of the Churches with them. I diſpute not whether it were ſo or no; whether according to *Blondel* the ſucceſſion was from the πρωτοχειροτονηθεὶς, or whether by choice as at *Alexandria*; but I only now ſhew that this argument from ſucceſſion is weak, and proves not at all the certainty of the power thoſe perſons enjoyed. *Secondly, This ſucceſſion is not ſo evident and convincing in all places as it ought to be, to demonſtrate the thing intended.* It is not enough to ſhew a liſt of ſome perſons in the great Churches of *Jeruſalem*, *Antioch*, *Rome*, and *Alexandria*, (although none of theſe be unqueſtionable) but it ſhould be produced at *Philippi*, *Corinth*, *Cæſarea*, and in all the ſeven Churches of *Aſia* (and not only at *Epheſus*) and ſo likewiſe in *Creet* ſome ſucceeding *Titus*, and not think men will be ſatisfied with the naming a Biſhop of *Gortyna* ſo long after him. But as I ſaid before, in none of the Churches moſt ſpoken of is the ſucceſſion ſo clear as is neceſſary. For at *Jeruſalem* it ſeems ſomewhat ſtrange how fifteen Biſhops of the circumciſion ſhould be crouded into ſo narrow a room as they are, ſo that many of them could not have above two years time to rule in the Church. And it would bear an inquiry where the ſeat of the Biſhops of *Jeruſalem* was from the time of the deſtruction of the City by *Titus*, (when the walls were laid even with the Ground by *Muſonius*) till the time of *Adrian*; for till that time the ſucceſſion of the Biſhops of the circumciſion continues. For *Antioch*, it is far from being agreed, whether *Evodius* or *Ignatius* ſucceeded *Peter*, or *Paul*, or the one *Peter* and the other *Paul*; much leſs at *Rome*, whether *Cletus*, *Anacletus*, or *Clemens* are to be reckon'd firſt (but of theſe afterwards) At *Alexandria* where the ſucceſſion runs cleareſt, the original of the power is imputed to the choice of Preſbyters, and to no divine inſtitution. But at *Epheſus* the ſucceſſion of Biſhops from *Timothy* is pleaded with the greateſt confidence, and the teſtimony brought from it is from *Leontius* Biſhop of *Magneſia* in the Council of *Chalcedon*, whoſe words are theſe ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου Τιμοθέου μέχρι νῦν εἴκοσι ἑπτὰ ἐπίσκοποι ἐγένοντο. πάντες ἐν ἐφέσῳ ἐχειροτονήθησαν. *From* Timothy *to this day there hath been a ſucceſſion of ſeven and twenty Biſhops, all of them ordained in* Epheſus. I ſhall not inſiſt ſo much on the incompetency of this ſingle witneſs to paſs a judgement upon a thing of that nature, at the diſtance of four hundred years; in which time records being loſt, and Biſhops being after ſettled there, no doubt they would begin their account from *Timothy*, becauſe of his imployment there once for ſettling the Churches thereabout. And to that end we may obſerve that in the after-times of the Church, they never met with any of the Apoſtles, or Evangeliſts in any place, but they preſently made them Biſhops of that place. So *Philip* is made Biſhop of *Trallis*, *Ananias* Biſhop of *Damaſcus*, *Nicolaus* Biſhop of *Samaria*, *Barnabas* Biſhop of *Milan*, *Silas* Biſhop of *Corinth*, *Sylvanus* of *Theſſalonica*, *Creſcens* of *Calcedon*, *Andreas* of *Byzantium*, and upon the ſame grounds *Peter* Biſhop of *Rome*. No wonder then if *Leontius* make *Timothy* Biſhop of *Epheſus*, and derive the ſucceſſion down from him. But again, this was not an act of the Council its ſelf, but only of one ſingle perſon delivering his private opinion in it; and that which is moſt obſervable

Conc. Chalcedon par. 2. Act. 11. ad Bin. Concil. Gr. La. To. 3. p. 410.

is, that in the thing mainly inſiſted on by *Leontius*, he was contradicted in the face of the whole Council, by *Philip* a Preſbyter of *Conſtantinople.* For the caſe of *Baſſianus* and *Stephen* about their violent intruſion into the Biſhoprick of *Epheſus*, being diſcuſſed before the Council; a queſtion was propounded by the Council where the Biſhop of *Epheſus* was to be regularly ordained, according to the *Canons. Leontius* Biſhop of *Magneſia* ſaith, that there had been twenty ſeven Biſhops of *Epheſus* from *Timothy*, and all of them ordained in the place. His buſineſs was not to derive exactly the ſucceſſion of Biſhops, but ſpeaking according to vulgar tradition, he inſiſts that all had been ordained there. Now if he be convicted of the *crimen falſi* in his τὸ ἔργον, no wonder if we meet with a miſtake in his πάρεργον, *i.* e. if he were out in his allegation, no wonder if he were deceived in his tradition. Now as to the ordination of the Biſhops in *Epheſus*, *Philip*, a Preſbyter of *Conſtantinople* convicts him of falſhood in that; For, ſaith he, *John*, Biſhop of *Conſtantinople* going into *Aſia*, depoſed fifteen Biſhops there, and ordained others in their room. And *Aetius*, Archdeacon of *Conſtantinople*, inſtanceth in *Caſtinus*, *Heraclides*, *Baſilius*, Biſhops of *Epheſus*, all ordained by the Biſhop of *Conſtantinople.* If then the certainty of ſucceſſion relies upon the credit of this *Leontius*, let them thank the Council of *Chalcedon*, who have ſufficiently blaſted it, by determining the cauſe againſt him in the main evidence produced by him. So much to ſhew how far the cleareſt evidence for ſucceſſion of Biſhops from Apoſtolical times, is from being convincing to any rational man. *Thirdly*, The ſucceſſion ſo much pleaded by the Writers of the primitive Church, was *not a ſucceſſion of perſons in Apoſtolical power*; *but a ſucceſſion in Apoſtolical doctrine*; which will be ſeen by a view of the places produced to that purpoſe. The firſt is that of *Irenæus. Quoniam valdè longum eſt in hoc tali volumine omnium Eccleſiarum enumerare ſucceſſiones, maximæ & antiquiſſimæ, & omnibus congnitæ à glorioſiſſimis duobus Apoſtolis* Petro *&* Paulo Romæ *fundatæ & conſtitutæ Eccleſiæ, eam quam habet ab Apoſtolis traditionem, & annunciatam hominibus fidem, per ſucceſſiones Epiſcoporum pervenientes uſque ad nos, indicantes, confundimus omnes eos, &c.* Where we ſee *Irenæus* doth the leaſt of all aim at the making out of a ſucceſſion of Apoſtolical power in the Biſhops he ſpeaks of, but a conveying of the doctrine of the Apoſtles down to them by their hands; (which doctrine is here called tradition, not as that word is abuſed by the Papiſts to ſignifie ſomething diſtinct from the Scriptures, but as it ſignifies the conveyance of the doctrine of the Scripture its ſelf) which is cleared by the beginning of that *Chapter, Traditionem itaq; Apoſtolorum in toto mundo manifeſtatam in Eccleſia adeſt perſpicere omnibus qui vera velint audire; & habemus annumerare eos qui ab Apoſtolis inſtituti ſunt Epiſcopi in Eccleſiis, & ſucceſſores eorum uſq; ad nos qui nihil tale docuerunt neq; cognoverunt, quale ab his deliratur.* His plain meaning is, that thoſe perſons who were appointed by the Apoſtles to overſee and govern Churches, being ſufficient witneſſes themſelves of the Apoſtles doctrine, have conveyed it down to us by their ſucceſſors, and we cannot learn any ſuch thing of them, as *Valentinus* and his followers broached. We ſee it is the doctrine ſtill he ſpeaks of, and not a word what power and ſuperiority theſe Biſhops had over Preſbyters in their ſeveral Churches. To the ſame purpoſe *Tertullian*, in that known ſpeech of his; *Edant origines Eccleſiarum ſuarum, evolvant ordinem Epiſcoporum ſuorum, ita per*

Adverſ. hæreſ. l. 3. cap. 3.

De præſcrip. adverſ. hæret. cap. 32.

ſucceſſiones ab initio decurrentem, ut primus ille Epiſcopus aliquem ex Apoſtolis aut Apoſtolicis viris habuerit authorem & anteceſſorem. Hoc modo Eccleſiæ Apoſtolicæ cenſus ſuos deferunt; ſicut Smyrnæorum Eccleſia habens Polycarpum à Johanne conlocatum refert, ſicut Romanorum Clementem à Petro ordinatum edit; proinde utiq; & cæteræ exhibent, quos ab Apoſtolis in Epiſcopatum conſtitutos Apoſtolici ſeminis traduces habeant. A ſucceſſion I grant is proved in Apoſtolical Churches by theſe words of *Tertullian*, and this ſucceſſion of perſons, and thoſe perſons Biſhops too; but then it is only ſaid, that theſe perſons derived their Office from the Apoſtles, but nothing expreſſed what relation they had to the Church, any more than is implied in the general name of *Epiſcopi*, nor what power they had over Preſbyters, only that there were ſuch perſons, was ſufficient to his purpoſe, which was to *preſcribe againſt Hereticks*, *i. e.* to non-ſuit them, or to give in general reaſons why they were not to be proceeded with as to the particular debate of the things in queſtion between them. For *præſcribere* in the civil Law, (whence *Tertullian* tranſplanted that word as many other into the Church) is, *cum quis adverſarium certis exceptionibus removet à lite conteſtandâ, ita ut de ſumma rei neget agendum, eamve cauſam ex juris præſcripto judicandam:* three *De Virgin. veland. c.* 1. ſorts of theſe preſcriptions *Tertullian* elſewhere mentions: *Hoc exigere veritatem cui nemo præſcribere poteſt, non ſpatium temporum, non patrocinia perſonarum, non privilegium regionum.* Here he ſtands upon the firſt, which is a preſcription of time, becauſe the doctrine which was contrary to that of the Hereticks, was delivered by the Apoſtles, and conveyed down by their ſucceſſors, which was requiſite to be ſhewed, in order to the making his preſcription good. Which he thus farther ex- *Cap.* 36. *de præſcript.* plains: *Age jam qui voles curioſitatem melius exercere in negotio ſalutis tuæ; percurre Eccleſias Apoſtolicas, apud quas ipſæ adhuc Cathedræ Apoſtolorum ſuis locis preſidentur, apud quas ipſæ authenticæ eorum literæ recitantur, ſonantes vocem & repræſentantes faciem uniuſcujuſque. Proxime eſt tibi Achaia; habes Corinthum. Si non longe es à Macedonia, habes Philippos, habes Theſſalonicenſes. Si potes in Aſiam tendere, habes Epheſum. Si autem Italia adjaces, habes Romam, unde nobis quoque auctoritas preſto eſt.* What he ſpoke before of the perſons, he now ſpeaks of the Churches themſelves planted by the Apoſtles, which by retaining the authentick Epiſtles of the Apoſtles ſent to them, did thereby ſufficiently preſcribe to all the novel opinions of the Hereticks. We ſee then evidently, that it is the doctrine which they ſpeak of as to ſucceſſion, and the perſons no farther than as they are the conveyers of that doctrine; either then it muſt be proved, that a ſucceſſion of ſome perſons in Apoſtolical power is neceſſary for the conveying of this doctrine to men, or no argument at all can be inferred from hence for their ſucceeding the Apoſtles in their power, becauſe they are ſaid to *Aug. Ep.* 42. convey down the Apoſtolical doctrine to ſucceeding ages. Which is *Auſtin*'s meaning, in that ſpeech of his, *Radix Chriſtianæ ſocietatis per ſedes Apoſtolorum & ſucceſſiones Epiſcoporum, certa per orbem propagatione diffunditur. The root of Chriſtian ſociety,* (i. e. *the doctrine of the Goſpel*) *is ſpread abroad the world, through the channels of the Apoſtolical* *Aug. Ep.* 29. *Sees, and the continued ſucceſſions of Biſhops therein.* And yet if we may believe the ſame *Auſtin*, *Secundum honorum vocabula quæ jam Eccleſiæ uſus obtinuit, Epiſcopatus Preſbyterio major eſt.* The difference between Epiſcopacy and Preſbytery riſes from the cuſtom of the Church, attributing a name of greater honour to thoſe it had ſet above others. And as for *Tertullian*, I believe neither party will ſtand to his judgment as to the original of Church-power: For he ſaith expreſly, *Differentiam inter ordinem & plebem conſtituit Eccleſiæ auctoritas*; *all the difference between Miniſters and people comes from the Church's authority*; unleſs he means ſomething more by the following words, *& honor per Ordinis conſeſſum ſanctificatus à Deo, viz.* that the honour which is received by ordination from the bench of Church-Officers, is ſanctified by God, *i. e.* by his appointment as well as bleſſing. For otherwiſe I know not how to underſtand him. But, however, we ſee here he makes the Government of the Church to lie in a *Conſeſſus ordinis*, which I know not otherwiſe to render, than by a *bench of Preſbyters*; becauſe only they were ſaid *in ordinem cooptari*, who were made Preſbyters, and not thoſe who were promoted to any higher degree in the Church. By the way we may obſerve the original of the name of *Holy-Orders* in the Church, not as the Papiſts, and others following them, as tho' it noted any thing inherent, by way of (I know not what) character in the perſon, but becauſe the perſons ordained were thereby admitted *in Ordinem* among the number of Church-Officers. So there was *Ordo Senatorum*, *Ordo Equeſtris*, *Ordo Decurionum*, and *Ordo Sacerdotum* among the *Romans*, as in this Inſcription.

Exhort. Caſtil. c. 7.

V. Selden in Eutych. p. 28, &c.

ORDO SACERDOT. DEI
HERCULIS INVICTI.

From hence the uſe of the word came into the Church, and thence Ordination, *ex vi vocis* imports no more than ſolemn admiſſion into this order of Preſbyters; and therefore it is obſervable, that laying on of hands never made men Prieſts under the Law, but only admitted them into publick Office. So much for *Tertullian*'s *Conſeſſus ordinis*, which hath thus far drawn us out of our way, but we now return: And therefore, *Fourthly, This perſonal ſucceſſion, ſo much ſpoken of, is ſometimes attributed to Preſbyters, even after the diſtinction came into uſe between Biſhops and them.* And that even by thoſe Authors who before had told us the ſucceſſion was by Biſhops, as *Irenæus*. *Cum autem ad eam iterum traditionem, quæ eſt ab Apoſtolis, quæ per ſucceſſiones Preſbyterorum in Eccleſiis cuſtoditur, provocamus eos qui adverſantur traditioni, dicent ſe non ſolum Preſbyteris ſed etiam Apoſtolis exiſtentes ſapientiores, &c.* Here he attributes the keeping of the tradition of Apoſtolical doctrine to the ſucceſſion of Preſbyters, which before he had done to Biſhops. And more fully afterwards, *Quapropter iis qui in Eccleſiâ ſunt Preſbyteris obaudire oportet, his qui ſucceſſionem habent ab Apoſtolis, ſicut oſtendimus, qui cum Epiſcopatûs ſucceſſione, chariſma veritatis certum ſecundum placitum patris acceperunt.* In this place he not only aſſerts the ſucceſſion of Preſbyters to the Apoſtles, but likewiſe attributes the *ſucceſſio Epiſcopatûs* to theſe very Preſbyters. What ſtrange confuſion muſt this raiſe in any one's mind, that ſeeks for a ſucceſſion of Epiſcopal power above Preſbyters from the Apoſtles, by the Teſtimony of *Irenæus*, when he ſo plainly attributes both the ſucceſſion to Preſbyters, and the Epiſcopacy too, which he ſpeaks of? And in the next Chapter adds, *Tales Preſbyteros nutrit Eccleſia, de quibus & Propheta ait. Et dabo principes tuos in pace, & Epiſcopos tuos in juſtitiâ.* Did *Irenæus* think that Biſhops in a ſuperior order to Preſbyters were derived by an immediate ſucceſſion from the Apoſtles, and yet call the Preſbyters by the name of Biſhops? It is ſaid indeed, that in the Apoſtles times the names

Adver. hæreſ. l. 3. c. 2.

Lib. 4. cap. 43.

Cap. 44.

Biſhop and Preſbyter were common, although the Office was diſtinct; but that was only during the Apoſtles life, ſay ſome, when after the name Biſhop was appropriated to that order that was in the Apoſtles (ſo called before) but, ſay others, it was only till ſubject Preſbyters were conſtituted, and then grew the difference between the names. But neither of theſe σοφὰ φάρμακα can draw forth the difficulty in theſe places of *Irenæus*; for now both the Apoſtles were dead, and ſubject Preſbyters certainly in ſome of theſe Apoſtolical Churches were then conſtituted; whence comes then the community of names ſtill, that thoſe who are ſaid to ſucceed the Apoſtles, are called Biſhops in one place, but Preſbyters in another, and the very ſucceſſion of Epiſcopacy attributed to Preſbyters? Can we then poſſibly conceive that theſe teſtimonies of *Irenaus* can determine the point of ſucceſſion, ſo as to make clear to us what that power was which thoſe perſons enjoyed, whom he ſometimes calls Biſhops, and ſometimes Preſbyters. But it is not *Irenæus* alone who tells us that Preſbyters ſucceed the Apoſtles; even *Cyprian* who pleads ſo much for obedience to the Biſhops as they were then conſtituted in the Church, yet ſpeaks often of his *compreſbyteri*; and in his Epiſtle to *Florentius Papianus*, who had reproached him, ſpeaking of thoſe words of Chriſt, *He that heareth you, heareth me*, &c. *Qui dicit ad Apoſtolos, ac per hoc ad omnes præpoſitos qui Apoſtolis vicaria ordinatione ſuccedent*, where he attributes Apoſtolical ſucceſſion to all that were *præpoſiti*, which name implies not the relation to Preſbyters as over them, but to the people, and is therefore common both to Biſhops and Preſbyters; * for ſo afterwards he ſpeaks, *nec fraternitas habuerit Epiſcopum, nec plebs Præpoſitum, &c. Jerome* ſaith that Preſbyters are *loco Apoſtolorum*, and that they do *Apoſtolico gradui ſuccedere*; and the ſo much magnified *Ignatius*, πρεσβύτεροι εἰς τόπον συνεδρίου τῶν Ἀποστόλων *that the Preſbyters ſucceeded in the place of the Bench of Apoſtles*; and elſewhere of *Sotion* the Deacon ὅτι ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ ὡς χάριτι θεοῦ καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ ὡς νόμῳ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, as it is read in the *Florentine* copy ſet out by *Voſſius*; but in the former Editions both by *Vedelius* and the moſt learned *Primate* of *Armagh* it is read, ὅτι ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ χάριτι Θεοῦ ἐν νόμῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ· but that of *Voſſius* ſeems to be the true reading, to which the old Latin verſion in *Biſhop Uſher* fully agrees; *Quoniam ſubjectus eſt Epiſcopo ut gratiæ Dei, & preſbyterio ut legi Jeſu Chriſti.* It might be no improbable conjecture to gueſs from hence at *Ignatius* his opinion concerning the original both of Epiſcopacy and Preſbytery. The former he looks on as an excellent gift of God to the Church; ſo a learned Doctor paraphraſeth *gratiæ dei*. i. e. *Dono à Deo Eccleſiæ indulto*; ſo *Cyprian* often *Divina dignatione*, ſpeaking of Biſhops; *i. e.* that they looked on it as an act of God's ſpecial favour to the Church, to find out that means for unity in the Church, to pitch upon one among the Preſbyters who ſhould have the chief rule in every particular Church; but then for Preſbytery, he looks on that as νόμος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, *an Inſtitution and Law of Jeſus Chriſt*, which muſt, on that account always continue in the Church. And ſo *Sotion* did commendably in ſubmitting to the Biſhop as a favour of God to the Church for preventing ſchiſms; on which account it is, and not upon the account of divine inſtitution, that *Ignatius* is ſo earneſt in requiring obedience to the Biſhop, becauſe, as *Cyprian* ſaith, *Eccleſia eſt plebs Epiſcopo coadunata, & grex Paſtori adhærens*; and the Biſhops then being orthodox, he lays ſuch a charge upon the people to adhere to

Ep. 69. ed. Pamel. ſ. 4.

*V. Cyprian. ep. 3. à Clero. Rom. ep. 62. & 65. in Mich. 2. epiſt. 1. Ep. ad Mag. p. 33. ed. Iſ.

Voſſii p. 31. Vedel. p. 50.

Uſſer, p. 49.

Ep. 69.

them, (for it is to the people, and not to the Preſbyters he ſpeaks moſt) which was as much as to bid them hold to the unity of the faith, and avoid thoſe pernicious hereſies which were then abroad; and ſo *Ignatius* and *Jerome* may eaſily be reconciled to one another; both owning the Council of Preſbyters as of divine inſtitution, and both requiring obedience to Biſhops as a ſingular privilege granted to the Church, for preventing Schiſms, and preſerving unity in the Faith. And in all thoſe thirty five teſtimonies produced out of *Ignatius* his Epiſtles for Epiſcopacy, I can meet but with one which is brought to prove the leaſt ſemblance of an Inſtitution of Christ for Epiſcopacy; and if I be not much deceived, the ſenſe of that place is clearly miſtaken too. The place is *Ep. ad Epheſios*: He is exhorting the Epheſians, συντρέχειν τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ, which I ſuppoſe may be rendred *to fulfil the will of God*, ſo ποιῆσαι τὴν γνώμην ſignifies *Apocalypſ.* 17. 17. and adds, καὶ γὰρ Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τὸ ἀδιάκριτον ἡμῶν ζῆν, τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ γνώμη, ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐπίσκοποι οἱ κατὰ τὰ πέρατα ὁρισθέντες ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ γνώμῃ, εἰσίν· ὅθεν πρέπει ὑμῖν συντρέχειν τῇ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου γνώμῃ, ὅπερ καὶ ποιεῖτε. He begins to exhort them *to concur with the will of God*, and concludes his exhortation, *to concur with the will or council of the Biſhop*; and in the middle he ſhews the ground of the connexion of theſe two together; *for Chriſt*, ſaith he, *who is our inſeparable Life, is the counſel of the Father, and the Biſhops, who are ſcattered abroad to the ends of the earth, are the Counſel of Jeſus Chriſt*, i. e. do concur with the will of Chriſt; *therefore follow the Counſel of your Biſhop, which alſo you do.* Every thing is plain and obvious in the ſenſe here, and very coherent to the expreſſions both before and after; only the ἐν muſt be left out as plainly redundant, and ὁρισθέντες muſt not be rendred *determinati*, but rather *diſterminati*, becauſe it refers to a place here, and ſo it notes their being diſperſed into ſeveral places, and ſeparated from one another, thereby implying the unity of their Faith, and the *coagulum fidei*, notwithſtanding their diſtance from one another, as to place in the world, which in *Cyprian*'s words is, *Eccleſia univerſa per totum mundum unitatis vinculo copulata.* And certainly a ſtronger argument than this could not have been given for the *Epheſians* chearful obedience to their Biſhop, (which is the thing he aims at) than the univerſal conſent of all the Biſhops in the Chriſtian World in the unity of the Faith of Chriſt; ſo that as Chriſt is the will and counſel of the Father, becauſe of that harmony and conſent which is between their wills; ſo the Biſhops are the will and counſel of Chriſt, as chearfully uniting in the profeſſion of his Faith. So that we ſee *Ignatius* himſelf cannot give a doubting mind ſatisfaction of the Divine inſtitution of Biſhops, when in the only place brought to that purpoſe, his ſenſe is quite different from what it is brought for. So that the Records of the Church are far from deciding this controverſie as to the certainty of the form of Government inſtituted by Chriſt, becauſe of the ambiguity of thoſe Records as to the point of ſucceſſion to the Apoſtles, in that this ſucceſſion might be only of a different degree, in that it is not clear and convincing in all places; in that where it is cleareſt, it is meant of a ſucceſſion of doctrine, and not of perſons; in that if it were of perſons, yet Preſbyters are ſaid to ſucceed the Apoſtles as well as Biſhops, by the ſame perſons who ſpeak of theſe. By which laſt thing we have likewiſe cleared the *Second* thing propounded, to ſhew the ambiguity of the teſtimony of Antiquity, which was *the promiſcuous uſe of the names of Biſhops and Preſbyters, after the diſtinction*

P.19. Voſſii.

between their Office was brought in by the Church. For we have made it appear that the names are promiſcuouſly uſed, when that ſucceſſion which is ſometimes attributed to Biſhops, is at other times given to Preſbyters. Other inſtances might be brought of that nature, as, firſt, that of *Clemens Romanus*, in his excellent Epiſtle, which like the River *Alpheus* had run under ground for ſo many centuries of years, but hath now in theſe laſt times of the world appeared publickly to the view of the world, to make it appear how true that is which he ſaith the Apoſtles
Ep. gr. lat. p. 57. did foreſee, ὅτι ἔρις ἔσται περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς, *that there would be great contention about the name of Epiſcopacy*; and ſo there are ſtill, and that from his Epiſtle too. For when in one place he tells us,
Page 54. *that the Apoſtles ordained their firſt fruits to be Biſhops and Deacons*, τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν, *of thoſe that ſhould believe*; afterwards he makes no
Page 57. ſcruple of calling thoſe Biſhops *Preſbyters* in ſeveral places, μακάριοι οἱ προοδοιπορήσαντες πρεσβύτεροι, &c. and ſpeaking of the preſent ſchiſm at *Corinth*, he ſaith, *it was a moſt ſhameful thing, and unworthy of Chriſtians.* Αἰσχρὰ ἀγαπητοὶ καὶ λίαν αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ἀγωγῆς ἀκούεσθαι, τὴν βεβαιωτάτην καὶ ἀρχαίαν Κορινθίων ἐκκλησίαν δι' ἓν ἢ δύο πρόσωπα στασιάζειν πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. *To hear the firm and ancient Church of Corinth, for the ſake of one or two perſons to raiſe a ſedition againſt the Preſbyters*; and afterwards,
Page 69. & p. 73. p. 2, 3. μόνον τὸ ποίμνιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰρηνευέτω μετὰ τῶν καθεσταμένων πρεσβυτέρων, *Only let the flock of Chriſt enjoy its peace with the Preſbyters which are ſet over it.* But becauſe this is ſaid to be ſpoken before the time of diſtinction between Biſhops and Preſbyters, it being ſuppoſed that there were no ſubject Preſbyters then, (although no reaſon can be aſſigned why the Apoſtles ſhould ordain Biſhops τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν *of thoſe that ſhould believe*, and ſhould not likewiſe ordain Preſbyters for them) yet to take away all ſcruple, we ſhall go farther; when ſubject Preſbyters, as they are called, are acknowledged to be, and yet Biſhops are call'd Preſbyters then too: For which we have the clear teſtimony of the Martyrs of the Gallican Church, in their Epiſtle
Apol. p. 31. to *Eleutherius*, Biſhop of *Rome*, who call *Irenæus* πρεσβύτερον ἐκκλησίας,
Euſeb. l. 5. cap. 3. when as *Blondell* obſerves, he had been nine years Biſhop of *Lyons*, in the place of *Pothinus*; neither doth *Blondell*'s argument lie here, that becauſe they call him the Preſbyter of the Church, therefore he was no Biſhop, as his Antagoniſt ſuppoſeth; but he freely acknowledgeth him to have ſucceeded *Pothinus* there in his Biſhoprick; but becauſe after the difference aroſe between Biſhop and Preſbyters, yet they called him by the name of Presbyter, it ſeems very improbable, that when they were commending one to the Biſhop of another Church, they ſhould make uſe of the loweſt name of honour then appropriated to ſubject Presbyters, which, inſtead of commending, were a great debaſing of him, if they had looked on a ſuperior order above thoſe Presbyters, as of divine inſtitution, and thought there had been ſo great a diſtance between a Biſhop and ſubject Presbyters, as we are made to believe there was. Which is, as if the Maſter of a College, in one Univerſity, ſhould be ſent by the Fellows of his Society, to the Heads of the other, and ſhould in his Commendatory-Letters to them, be ſtiled a Senior-Fellow of that Houſe: Would not any one that read this, imagine that there was no difference between a Senior-Fellow and a Maſter, but only a primacy of order, that he was the firſt of the number, without any power over the reſt? This was the caſe of *Irenæus*; he is ſuppoſed to be Biſhop of the Church of *Lyons*; he is

ſent by the Church of *Lyons* on a Meſſage to the Biſhop of *Roma*; when notwithſtanding his being Biſhop, they call him *Preſbyter of that Church*, (when there were other Presbyters who were not Biſhops) what could any one imagine by the reading of it, but that the Biſhop was nothing elſe but the Senior-Presbyter, or one that had a primacy of order among, but no divine right to a power of juriſdiction over his fellow-Presbyters? More inſtances of this nature are brought there by that learned Author, which the Reader may compare with the anſwers, and then let him judge whether the Teſtimony of Antiquity have not too much ambiguity in it to decide the Controverſie clearly on either ſide. But that which ſeems yet more material, is that which we obſerved in the *third place*, *that thoſe who acknowledge the ſuperiority of Biſhops over Preſbyters, do impute it to an act of the Church, and not aſcribe it to any divine inſtitution.* The teſtimony of *Jerome* to this purpoſe is well known, and hath been produced already; that of the counterfeit *Ambroſe*, but true *Hilary*, is in every one's mouth upon this controverſie; *Quia primum Preſbyteri Epiſcopi appellabantur, ut recedente uno ſequens ei ſuccederet; ſed quia cœperunt ſequentes Preſbyteri indigni inveniri ad primatus tenendos, immutata eſt ratio, proſpiciente Concilio ut non ordo ſed meritum crearet Epiſcopum multorum Sacerdotum judicio conſtitutum, ne indignus temerè Uſurparet & eſſet multis ſcandalum.* Very ſtrange that an opinion ſo directly contrary to the divine right of Epiſcopacy ſhould be publiſhed by a Deacon of the Church of *Rome*, and theſe Commentaries cited by *Auſtin*, with applauſe of the Perſon, without ſtigmatizing him, for a heretick with *Aerius*, if it had been then the opinion of the Church, that Biſhops in their power over Preſbyters did ſucceed the Apoſtles by a divine right. Nothing more clear, than that he aſſerts all the difference between a Biſhop and Preſbyters to ariſe from an act of the Church chuſing men for their deſerts, when before they ſucceeded in order of place; it is a miſtake of *Blondel*'s, to attribute this to the *Nicene Council*; doubtleſs he means no more than that *Hierom* calls *Concilium Preſbyterorum*, or which he himſelf means by *judicium Sacerdotum.* The teſtimony of *Auſtin* hath been already mentioned. *Secundum honorum vocabula quæ jam Eccleſiæ uſus obtinuit, Epiſcopatus Preſbyterio major eſt.* Thereby implying it was not ſo always; elſe to what purpoſe ſerves that *jam obtinuit*, and that the original of the difference was from the Church? But more expreſs and full is *Iſidore* himſelf, the Biſhop of *Sevil* in *Spain* ſpeaking of Preſbyters. *His ſicut Epiſcopis diſpenſatio myſteriorum Dei commiſſa eſt; præſunt enim Eccleſiis Chriſti, & in confectione corporis & ſanguinis conſortes cùm Epiſcopis ſunt; ſimiliter & in doctrina populi & in officio prædicandi, ſed ſola propter auctoritatem ſummo ſacerdoti Clericorum ordinatio reſervata eſt, ne à multis Eccleſiæ diſciplina vindicata concordiam ſolveret, ſcandala generaret.* What could be ſpoken more to our purpoſe than this is? he aſſerts the identity of power, as well as name, in both Biſhops and Preſbyters, in governing the Church, in celebrating the Euchariſt, in the Office of preaching to the people, only for the greater honour of the Biſhop, and for preventing ſchiſms in the Church, the power of ordination was reſerved to the Biſhop; by thoſe words *propter auctoritatem*, he cannot poſſibly mean the authority of a divine command, for that his following words contradict, that it was to prevent ſchiſms and ſcandals, and after produceth the whole place of *Jerome* to that purpoſe. Agreeable to this, is the judgment of the ſecond Council of *Sevil*

In Eph. 4.

De Eccleſ. Officiis, l. 7. *cap.* 7.

3 in

Conc. Hiſpal. ſecundum decret. 7: *apud Bin T.* 4. *p.* 560.

in *Spain*, upon the occaſion of the irregular proceedings of ſome Preſbyters ordained by *Agapius* Biſhop of *Corduba.* Their words are theſe: *Nam quamvis cum Epiſcopis plurima illis Miniſteriorum communis ſit diſpenſatio, quædam novellis & Eccleſiaſticis regulis ſibi prohibita noverint, ſicut Preſbyterorum & Diaconorum & Virginum conſecratio,* &c. *Hæc enim omnia illicita eſſe Preſbyteris, quia Pontificatus apicem non habent, quem ſolis deberi Epiſcopis authoritate Canonum præcipitur: ut per hoc & diſcretio graduum, & dignitatis faſtigium ſummi Pontificis demonſtretur.* How much are we beholding to the ingenuity of a *Spaniſh Council,* that doth plainly diſavow the pretence of any divine right to the Epiſcopacy by them ſo ſtrenuouſly aſſerted? All the right they plead for, is from the *novellæ & Eccleſiaſticæ regulæ,* which import quite another thing from divine inſtitution; he that hath not learnt to diſtinguiſh between the authority of the Canons of the Church, and that of the Scriptures, will hardly ever underſtand the matter under debate with us: and certainly it is another thing to preſerve the honour of the different degrees of the Clergy, but eſpecially of the chief among them, *viz.* the Biſhop, than to obſerve a thing merely out of obedience to the command of Chriſt; and upon the account of divine inſtitution. That which is rejoyned in anſwer to theſe teſtimonies, as far as I can learn, is only this, *that the Council and* Iſidore *followed* Jerome, *and ſo all make up but one ſingle teſtimony.* But might it not as well be ſaid, that all that are for Epiſcopacy did follow *Ignatius* or *Epiphanius*, and ſo all thoſe did make up but one ſingle teſtimony on the other ſide? yea I do as yet deſpair of finding any one ſingle teſtimony in all antiquity, which doth in plain terms aſſert Epiſcopacy, as it was ſetled by the practice of the Primitive Church in the ages following the Apoſtles, to be of an unalterable divine right. Some expreſſions I grant in ſome of them ſeem to extol Epiſcopacy very high; but then it is in order to the peace and unity of the Church, and in that ſenſe they may ſometimes be admitted to call it *Divine* and *Apoſtolical*, not in regard of its inſtitution, but of its end, in that it did in their opinion tend as much to preſerve the unity of the Church, as the Apoſtles power did over the Churches while they were living. If any ſhall meet with expreſſions ſeeming to carry the fountain of Epiſcopal power higher, let them remember to diſtinguiſh between the power it ſelf, and the reſtrained exerciſe of that power; the former was from the Apoſtles, but common to all diſpenſers of the word; the latter was appropriated to ſome, but by an act of the Church, whereby an eminency of power was attributed to one for the ſafety of the whole. And withal let them conſider that every Hyperbolical expreſſion of a Father will not bear the weight of an argument: and how common it was to call things Divine, which were conceived to be of excellent uſe, or did come from perſons in authority in the Church. One would think that ſhould meet with θεῖον γράμμα in the Acts of the Council of *Chalcedon*, it could be rendred by nothing ſhort of the Scriptures: whereas they mean no more by it, but only the Emperour's letters to the Council. It hath been already obſerved how ready they were to call any cuſtom of the Church before their times an Apoſtolical tradition. And as the Heathens when they had any thing which they knew not whence it came, they uſually call it Διοπετὲς as though it came immediately from heaven; ſo the Fathers when traditions were conveyed to them, without the names of the Authors, they conclude they could have no other fountain but the Apoſtles. And thus we ſee many traditions in ſeveral Churches

Con. Chal. Part. 2. *Aſt.* 11.

directly contrary to one another, were looked on as Apoſtolical, only from the prevalency of this perſwaſion, that whatever they derived from their Fathers, was of that nature. But then for that anſwer to the *Council*, and *Iſidore*, and *Jerome*, that they make but one teſtimony; I ſay, that although the words be of the ſame ſenſe, yet they have the nature of a different teſtimony, upon theſe accounts. *Firſt*, as produced by perſons of different condition in the Church; ſome think they are even with *Jerome* when they tell us what a *pique* there was between him and *John* Biſhop of *Jeruſalem*, and that he might have the better advantage of his adverſary, when he could not raiſe himſelf up to the honour of Epiſcopacy, he would bring that down to the State of Preſbytery; but, as ſuch entertain too unworthy thoughts of one of thoſe Fathers, whom they profeſs themſelves admirers of; ſo this prejudice cannot poſſibly lie againſt *Iſidore*, or the *Council:* For the firſt was himſelf a Biſhop of no mean account in the Church of God; and the *Council* was compoſed of ſuch; it could be no bias then of that nature could draw them to this opinion: and no doubt they would have been as forward to maintain their own authority in the Church, as the truth and conſcience would give them leave. Therefore on this account one teſtimony of a ſingle Biſhop, much more of a whole Council of them, againſt their acting by divine authority in the Church, is of more validity than ten for it, in as much as it cannot but be in reaſon ſuppoſed that none will ſpeak any thing againſt the authority they are in, or what may tend in the leaſt to diminiſh it, but ſuch as make more conſcience of the truth, than of their own credit and eſteem in the world. *Secondly*, In that it was done in different ages of the Church; *Jerome* flouriſhed about 380. *Iſidore* ſucceeded *Leander* in *Sevil*, 600. the Council ſat, 619. the Council of *Aquen* which tranſcribes *Iſidore* and owns his doctrine, 816. So that certainly ſuppoſing the words of all to be the ſame, yet the Teſtimony is of greater force, as it was owned in ſeveral Ages of the Church, by whole Councils, without any the leaſt control that we read of. And if this then muſt not be looked on as the ſenſe of the Church at that time, I know not how we can come to underſtand it: if what is poſitively maintained by different perſons in different ages of the Church, and in different places without any oppoſing it by Writers of thoſe ages, or condemning it by Councils, may not be conceived to be the ſenſe of the Church at that time. So that laying all theſe things together, we may have enough to conclude the *Ambiguity* at leaſt, and thereby *incompetency* of the *Teſtimony* of *Antiquity*, for finding out the certain form which the Apoſtles obſerved in planting Churches.

We proceed to the *third* thing to ſhew the incompetency of Antiquity for deciding this controverſy, which will be from the *Partiality* of the Teſtimony brought from thence. Two things will ſufficiently manifeſt the *Partiality* of the judgment of Antiquity in this caſe. *Firſt*, Their apparent judging of the practice of the firſt primitive Church, according to the cuſtoms of their own. *Secondly*, Their ſtiff and pertinacious adhering to private traditions contrary to one another, and both ſides maintaining theirs as Apoſtolical. First, *judging the practice of the Apoſtles by that of their own times*; as is evident by *Theodoret*, and the reſt of the Greek Commentators, aſſigning that as the reaſon why the Preſbyters ſpoken of in the Epiſtles to *Timothy* and *Titus*, were not Biſhops in the ſenſe of their age, becauſe there could be but one Biſhop in a City, whereas there are more expreſſed in thoſe places, as being in the §. 18.

the ſeveral Cities: whereas this is denied of Apoſtolical times by the late pleaders for Epiſcopacy; and it is ſaid of them, that they ſpoke according to the Cuſtom of their own time. And it is now thought there were two Biſhops in Apoſtolical times in ſeveral Cities; the one the head of the Jewiſh *Cœtus*, and the other of the Gentile. I enter not the diſpute again here, whether it were ſo or no, only I hence manifeſt, how far thoſe perſons themſelves who plead for the judgment of the Fathers as deciding this controverſy, are from thinking them impartial judges, when as to the grounds of their ſentence they are confeſſed to ſpeak only of the practice of their own time. Who can imagine any force in *Chryſoſtome*'s argument, *that the Preſbyters who laid hands on* Timothy *muſt needs be Biſhops, becauſe none do ordain in the Church but Biſhops*, unleſs he makes this the *medium* of his argument, that whatever was the practice of the Church in his days, was ſo in Apoſtolical times. There is, I know not what ſtrange influence in a received Cuſtom, if generally embraced, that doth poſſeſs men with a fancy it was never otherwiſe than it is with them; nay when they imagine the neceſſity of ſuch a cuſtom at preſent in the Church, they preſently think it could never be otherwiſe than it is. But of this I have ſpoken ſomewhat already. *Secondly*, that which makes it appear how *partial* the judgment of Antiquity is, *in adhering to their particular traditions, and calling them Apoſtolical, though contrary to one another*. How can we then fix upon the teſtimony of antiquity as any thing certain or impartial in this caſe? when it hath been found ſo evidently partial in a caſe of leſs concernment than this is. A Witneſs that hath once betrayed his faithfulneſs in the open court, will hardly have his evidence taken in a caſe of moment, eſpecially when the cauſe muſt ſtand or fall according to his ſingle teſtimony. For my part, I ſee not how any man that would ſee reaſon for what he doth, can adhere to the Church for an unqueſtionable tradition received from the Apoſtles; when in the caſe of keeping Eaſter, whether with the Jews on the fourteenth Moon, or only on the Lord's day, there was ſo much unreaſonable heat ſhewed on both ſides, and ſuch confidence that on either ſide their tradition was Apoſtolical. The ſtory of which is related by *Euſebius*, and *Socrates* and many others. They had herein all the advantages imaginable in order to the knowing the certainty of the thing then in queſtion among them. As their nearneſs to Apoſtolical times, being but one remove from them: yea the perſons contending pleaded perſonal acquaintance with ſome of the Apoſtles themſelves, as *Polycarp* with *John*, and *Anicetus* of *Rome*, that he had his tradition from St. *Peter*; and yet ſo great were the heats, ſo irreconcilable the controverſy, that they proceeded to dart the Thunderbolt of excommunication in one anothers faces; as *Victor* with more zeal than piety, threw preſently the *Aſiatick* Churches all out of Communion, only for differing as to this tradition. The ſmall coals of this fire kindled a whole *Ætna* of contention in the Chriſtian world, the ſmoak and aſhes, nay the flames of which, by the help of *the Prince of the air* were blown over into the boſom of the then almoſt infant Northern Churches of *Britain*, where a ſolemn diſpute was cauſed upon this quarrel between *Colmannus* on one ſide, and *Wilfride* on the other. The like conteſt was upon this occaſion between *Auguſtine* the Monk, and the *Britiſh Biſhops*. The obſervation of this ſtrange combuſtion in the primitive Church upon the account of ſo vain, frivilous, unneceſſary a thing as this was, drew this note from a learned and judicious man, formerly quoted,

Eccleſ. hiſt. l. 5. *c.* 15. *Socrat. l.* 25. *c.* 21.

in his *Tract of Schiſm*; *By this we may plainly ſee the danger of our appeal to antiquity, for reſolution in controverted points of faith, O how ſmall relief we are to expect from thence! for if the diſcretion of the chiefeſt Guides and Directors of the Church did in a point ſo trivial, ſo inconſiderable, ſo mainly fail them, as not to ſee the truth in a ſubject, wherein it is the greater marvail how they could avoid the ſight of it, can we without the imputation of great groſſneſs and folly, think ſo poor-ſpirited perſons, competent judges of the queſtions now on foot betwixt the Churches?* P. 5. Thus that perſon, as able to make the beſt improvement of the Fathers, as any of thoſe who profeſs themſelves the moſt ſuperſtitious admirers of antiquity. But if we muſt ſtand to the judgment of the Fathers, let us ſtand to it in this, that no tradition is any farther to be embraced, than as it is founded on the word of God. For which purpoſe thoſe words of *Cyprian* are very obſervable; *In compendio eſt autem apud* Cyprian ep. 74. n. 13. *religioſas & ſimplices mentes, & errorem deponere, & invenire atque eruere veritatem: Nam ſi ad divinæ traditionis caput & originem revertamur, ceſſat error humanus.* He aſſerts it an eaſie matter for truly religious and plain-hearted men to lay aſide their error, and to find out the truth, which is by returning to the head and ſpring of divine tradition, *viz.* the Scriptures; Which he expreſſeth farther, with an elegant ſimilitude; *Si Canalis aquam ducens, qui copioſe prius & largiter profluebat, ſubito deficiat, nonne ad fontem pergitur ut illic defectionis ratio noſcatur;* ib. n. 14. *utrumne areſcentibus venis, in capite unda ſiccaverit; an verò integra deinde & plena procurrens, in medio itinere deſtiterit? ut ſi vitio interrupti aut bibuli canalis affectum eſt, quò minus aqua continua perſeveranter & jugiter flueret, refecto & confirmato canali ad uſum atque ad potum civitatis aqua collecta eadem ubertate atque integritate repreſentaretur, qua de fonte proficiſcitur, Quod & nunc facere oportet Dei ſacerdotes præcepta divina ſervantes, ut ſi in aliquo mutaverit (l. nutaverit) & vacillaverit veritas, ad originem Dominicam, & Evangelicam, & Apoſtolicam traditionem revertamur, & inde ſurgat actus noſtri ratio, unde & ordo & origo ſurrexit.* His meaning is; That as when a channel ſuddenly fails, we preſently enquire where and how the breach was made, and look to the ſpring and fountain, to ſee the waters be fully conveyed from thence as formerly; ſo upon any failure in the tradition of the Church, our only recourſe muſt be to the true fountain of tradition the word of God, and ground the reaſon of our actions upon that which was the foundation of our profeſſion. And when *Stephen* the Biſhop of *Rome* would tedder him to tradition, *Cyprian* keeps his liberty by this cloſe queſtion, *unde illa traditio? utrumne de Dominica & Evangelica auctoritate deſcendens, an de Apoſtolorum mandatis atque Epiſtolis veniens.—Si ergo aut Evangelio præcipitur, aut in Apoſtolorum Epiſtolis, aut actibus continetur—obſervetur Divina hæc & ſancta traditio.* We ſee this good man would not baulk his way one foot for the great bug-bear of Tradition, unleſs it did bear the character of a divine truth in it, and could produce the *credentials* of Scripture to teſtifie its authority to him. To the ſame purpoſe that ſtout Biſhop of *Cappadocia, Firmilian,* whoſe unhappineſs with *Cyprian*'s, was only that of *Job*'s friends, that they excellently managed a bad cauſe, and with far more Firmil. ep. of the ſpirit of Chriſtianity, than *Stephen did*, who was to be juſtified inter ep. in nothing but the truth he defended. *Eos autem*, ſaith *Firmilian*, *qui* Cyprian. 75. n. 9. *Romæ ſunt, non ea in omnibus obſervare quæ ſint ob origine tradita, & fruſtra Apoſtolorum auctoritatem prætendere,* which he there makes out at large, *viz.* that the Church of *Rome* had gathered corruption betimes, which after broke out into an *Impoſthume* in the *head* of it. Where then muſt we find the certain way of reſolving the controverſy we are upon? the Scriptures determine it not, the Fathers tell us there is no believing tradition any farther than it is founded in Scripture; thus are we ſent back from one to the other, till at laſt we conclude there is no certain way at all left to find out a deciſion of it. Not that we are left at ſuch uncertainties, as to matters of faith, (I would not be ſo miſtaken) we have *Archimedes* his *Poſtulatum* granted us for that, a place to fix our faith on, though the world be moved out of its place, I mean the undoubted word of God; but as to matters of fact not clearly revealed in Scripture, no certainty can be had of them, from the hovering light of unconſtant tradition. Neither is it only unconſtant, but in many things repugnant to its ſelf, which was the laſt conſideration to be ſpoke to in reference to the ſhewing the incompetency of antiquity for deciding our Controverſie. Well then, ſuppoſe we our ſelves now waiting for the final *verdict* of Church tradition to determine our preſent cauſe: If the *Jury* cannot agree, we are as far from ſatisfaction as ever; and this is certainly the caſe we are now in. The main difficulty lies in the immediate ſucceſſion to the Apoſtles; if that were but once cleared, we might bear with interruptions afterwards; but the main ſeat of the controverſie lies there, whether the Apoſtles upon their withdrawing from the Government of Churches, did ſubſtitute ſingle perſons to ſucceed them or no; ſo that unleſs that be cleared, the very *Deed of gift* is queſtioned; and if that could be made appear, all other things would ſpeedily follow. Yes, *ſay ſome*, that is clear: For at *Jeruſalem*, *Antioch*, and *Rome*, it is evident that ſingle perſons were entruſted with the Government of Churches. In *Jeruſalem*, ſay they, *James*, the brother of our Lord, was made Biſhop by the Apoſtles: But whence doth that appear? it is ſaid from *Hegeſippus* in *Euſebius*: But what if he ſay no ſuch thing? his words are theſe, διαδέχεται τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μετὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων, which is there interpreted, *Eccleſiæ adminiſtrationem una cum cæteris Apoſtolis ſuſcepit*. And no more is thereby meant, but that this *James*, who is by the Ancients conceived to be only a Diſciple before, is now taken into a higher charge, and inveſted in a power of governing the Church as the Apoſtles were. His power it is plain was of the ſame nature with that of the Apoſtles themſelves; and who will go about to degrade them ſo much as to reduce them to the Office of ordinary Biſhops? *James* in probability did exerciſe his Apoſtleſhip the moſt at *Jeruſalem*, where by the Scriptures we find him *Reſident*, and from hence the Church afterwards, becauſe of his not travelling abroad, as the other Apoſtles did, according to the language of their own times, they fixed the title of Biſhop upon him. But greater difference we ſhall find in thoſe who are pleaded to be ſucceſſors of the Apoſtles. At *Antioch* ſome, as *Origen* and *Euſebius*, make *Ignatius* to ſucceed *Peter*; *Jerome* makes him the third Biſhop, and placeth *Evodius* before him; others therefore to ſolve that, make them cotemporary Biſhops, the one of the Church of the Jews, the other of the Gentiles; with what congruity to their *Hypotheſis* of a ſingle Biſhop and Deacons placed in every City, I know not, but that *Salvo* hath been diſcuſſed before. Come we therefore to *Rome*, and here the ſucceſſion is as muddy as the *Tiber* it ſelf; for here *Tertullian*, *Ruſinus*, and ſeveral others, place *Clement* next to *Peter*. *Irenæus* and *Euſebius*, ſet *Anacletus* before him: *Epiphanius* and *Optatus* both *Anacletus* and *Cletus*; *Auguſtinus* and *Damaſus*, with others, make *Anacletus*, *Cletus*, and *Linus* all

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Hiſt. Eccl. l. 2. cap. 22.

V. Magdeburg Cent. 1. l. 2. c. 10.

to precede him. What way ſhall we find to extricate our ſelves out of this Labyrinth, ſo as to reconcile it with the certainty of the form of Government in the Apoſtles times? Certainly, if the *Line of ſucceſſion* fail us here, when we moſt need it, we have little cauſe *to pin our faith* upon it, as to the certainty of any particular form of Church-Government ſetled in the Apoſtles times, which can be drawn from the help of the Records of the primitive Church; which muſt be firſt cleared of all *Defectiveneſs, Ambiguity, Partiality* and *Confuſion*; before the thing we enquire for, can be extracted out of them.

§. 19. Having thus far ſhewed that we have no abſolute certainty of what form of Government was ſetled by the Apoſtles in the ſeveral Churches of their plantation: The next *Conſideration* which follows to be ſpoken to, is, *That the Apoſtles, in probability, did not obſerve any one fixed courſe of ſetling the Government of Churches, but ſetled it according to the ſeveral circumſtances of places and perſons which they had to deal with.* This will be *ex abundanti* as to the thing by me deſigned, which would be ſufficiently cleared without this; and therefore I lay it not as the foundation of my *Theſis*, but only as a doctrine of probability, which may ſerve to reconcile the Controverſies on foot about Church-Government. For if this be made appear, then it may be both granted that the Apoſtles did ſettle the Government in the Church in a College of Preſbyters, and in a Biſhop and Deacons too, according to the diverſity of places, and the variety of circumſtances. It is eaſie to obſerve, that as to rites and cuſtoms in the Church, the original of moſt mens miſtakes is, concluding that to be the general practice of the Church, which they meet with in ſome places, whereas that is moſt true which *Firmilian* tells us, *In plurimis provinciis, multa pro locorum & nominum* (*l. hominum*) *diverſitate, variantur; nec tamen propter hoc Eccleſiæ Catholicæ pace atque unitate diſceſſum eſt. Thoſe rites varied in divers places, retaining ſtill the Unity of the Faith.* So as to matter of Government, mens miſtakes do ariſe from an univerſal concluſion deduced out of particular premiſes; and what they think was done in one place, they conclude muſt be done in all: Whereas theſe are the grounds inducing me probably to conclude, that they obſerved not the ſame courſe in all places. Which when an impartial Reader hath ſoberly conſidered, (with what hath gone before) I am in hopes, the *Novelty* of this opinion may not prejudicate its entertainment with him. My grounds are theſe, *Firſt, From the different ſtate, condition and quantity of the Churches planted by the Apoſtles. Secondly, From the multitude of unfixed officers in the Church then, which acted with authority over the Church where they were reſident. Thirdly, From the different cuſtoms obſerved in ſeveral Churches, as to their Government, after the Apoſtles deceaſe.* I begin with the *Firſt, The different ſtate, condition and quantity of the Churches planted by the Apoſtles:* For which we are to conſider theſe things; *Firſt*, That God did not give the Apoſtles alike ſucceſs of their labours in all places. *Secondly*, That a ſmall number of believers did not require the ſame number, which a great Church did, to teach and govern them. *Thirdly*, That the Apoſtles did ſettle Church-Officers according to the probability of increaſe of believers, and in order thereto, in ſome great places. *Firſt, That God did not give the Apoſtles equal ſucceſs to their labours in all places.* After God called them to be *Fiſhers of men*, it was not every draught which filled their net with whole ſhoals of fiſhes; ſometimes they might toil all night ſtill and catch nothing, or very little. It was not every Sermon of *Peter*'s which converted three thou-

Cypr. Ep. 75. n. 5.

ſand; the whole world might at that rate ſoon have become Chriſtian, although there had been but few Preachers beſides the Apoſtles. God gave them ſtrange ſucceſs at firſt, to encourage them the better to meet with difficulties afterwards: In ſome places God told them he had much people, in others, we read but of few that believed. *At* Corinth Paul *plants, and* Apollos *waters, and God gives an abundant increaſe*; but at *Athens*, (where if moral diſpoſitions had fitted men for grace, and the improvements of nature, we might have expected the greateſt number of Converts) yet here we read of many mocking, and others delaying,
Acts17.34. and but of very few believing: *Dionyſius* and *Damaris*, and ſome others with them. The plantations of the Apoſtles were very different, not from the nature of the ſoil they had to deal with, but from the different influence of the Divine Spirit upon their endeavours in ſeveral pla-
Rom.16.2. ces. We cannot think that the Church at *Cenchrea*, (for ſo it is called) was as well ſtockt with believers as that at *Corinth*. Nay the Churches generally in the Apoſtles times were not ſo filled with numbers, as men are apt to imagine them to be. I can as ſoon hope to find in the Apoſtolical times *Dioceſan* Churches, as *Claſſical* and *Provincial*; yet this doth
Par. 1. *c.* 6. not much advantage the Principles of the Congregational men, as I have
§. 8. *p.*129. already demonſtrated. Yet I do not think that all Churches in the Apoſtles times were but one Congregation; but as there was in Cities many Synagogues, ſo there might be many Churches out of thoſe Synagogues, enjoying their former liberties and privileges. And they that will ſhew me where five thouſand Jews, and more, did ordinarily meet in one of their Synagogues for publick worſhip, may gain ſomething upon me, in order to believing the Church of *Jeruſalem* to be one congregation, and yet not perſuade me, till they have made it appear, that the Chriſtians then had as publick ſolemn ſet meetings as the Jews had; which he that underſtands the ſtate of the Churches at that time, will hardly yield to the belief of. I confeſs, I cannot ſee any rule in Scripture laid down for diſtributing congregations; but this neceſſity would put them upon; and therefore it were needleſs to preſcribe them; and very little, if any reaſon, can I ſee on the other ſide, why, where there were ſo much people as to make diſtinct congregations, they muſt make diſtinct Churches from one another; but of that largely in the next Chapter. All Churches then we ſee were not of an equal extent. The *Second* premiſal reaſon will grant, *viz.* that a ſmall Church doth not require the ſame number of Officers to rule it, which a great one did. For the duty of Officers lying in reference to the people, where the people was but few, one conſtant ſetled Officer, with Deacons under him, might with as much eaſe diſcharge the work, as in a numerous Church, the joint help of many Officers was neceſſary to carry it on. The ſame reaſon that tells us that a large flock of ſheep, conſiſting of many thouſands, doth call for many Shepherds to attend them, doth likewiſe tell us that a ſmall flock may be governed with the care of one ſingle Shepherd watching continually over them. The *Third* premiſal was, that in great Cities the Apoſtles did not only reſpect the preſent guidance of thoſe that were converted, but eſtabliſhed ſuch as might be uſeful for the converting, and bringing in of others to the faith, who were as yet *ſtrangers to the Covenant of promiſe, and aliens from the* ϖολιτεία, *ſociety of Chriſtians.* And here I conceive a miſtake of ſome men lies, when they think the Apoſtles reſpected only the ruling of thoſe which were already converted; for though this were one part of their work, yet they had an eye

to the main deſign then on foot, the ſubjecting the world to the obedience of Faith, in order to which it was neceſſary in places of great reſort and extent, to place not only ſuch as might be ſufficient to ſuperintend the affairs of the Church, but ſuch as might lay out themſelves the moſt in preaching the Goſpel, in order to converting others. Having laid down theſe things by way of premiſal, we ſhall ſee what advantage we can make of them, in order to our purpoſe. *Firſt*, then, I ſay, *That in Churches conſiſting of a ſmall number of believers, where there was no great probability of a large increaſe afterwards, one ſingle Paſtor, with Deacons under him, were only conſtituted by the Apoſtles for the ruling of thoſe Churches.* Where the work was not ſo great, but a Paſtor and Deacons might do it, what need was there of having more? And in the great ſcarcity of fit perſons for ſettled rulers then, and the great multitude and neceſſity of unfixed Officers for preaching the Goſpel abroad, many perſons fit for that work could not be ſpared to be conſtantly reſident upon a place. Now that in ſome places at firſt there was none placed but only a Paſtor and Deacons, I ſhall confirm by theſe following Teſtimonies. The firſt is that of *Clement*, in his Epiſtle. Κατὰ χώρας οὖν καὶ πόλεις κηρύσσοντες, καθίστανον τὰς ἀπαρχὰς αὐτῶν, δοκιμάσαντες τῷ πνεύματι, εἰς ἐπισκόπους καὶ διακόνους τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν. *The Apoſtles therefore preaching abroad through Countries and Cities, ordained the Firſt-fruits of ſuch as believed, having proved them by the ſpirit to be Biſhops and Deacons for them that ſhould afterwards believe.* Whether by χώραι we underſtand *Villages*, or *Regions*, is not material; for it is certain here the Author takes it as diſtinct from Cities; and there is nothing, I grant, expreſſed where the Apoſtles did place Biſhops and Deacons excluſive of other places, *i. e.* whether only in Cities or Countries; but it is evident by this, that wherever they planted Churches, they ordained Biſhops and Deacons, whether thoſe Churches were in the City or Country. And here we find no other Officers ſettled in thoſe Churches but Biſhops and Deacons; and that there were no more in thoſe Churches than he ſpeaks of, appears from his deſign of parallelling the Church-Officers in the Goſpel, to thoſe under the Law; and therefore it was here neceſſary to enumerate all that were then in the Churches. The main controverſie is, what theſe Biſhops were; whether many in one place, or only one; and if but one, whether a Biſhop in the modern ſenſe or no. For the firſt, here is nothing implying any neceſſity of having more than one in a place, which will farther be made appear by and by, out of other Teſtimonies, which will help to explain this. As for the other thing, we muſt diſtinguiſh of the notion of a Biſhop: For he is either ſuch a one as hath none over him in the Church; or he is ſuch a one as hath a power over Preſbyters acting under him, and by authority derived from him. If we take it in the firſt ſenſe, ſo every Paſtor of a Church, having none exerciſing juriſdiction over him, is a Biſhop; and ſo every ſuch ſingle Paſtor in the Churches of the primitive times was a Biſhop in this ſenſe, as every Maſter of a Family before Societies for Government were introduced, might be called a King, becauſe he had none above him to command him: But if we take a Biſhop in the more proper ſenſe, for one that hath power over Preſbyters and people, ſuch a one theſe ſingle Paſtors were not, could not be. For it is ſuppoſed that theſe were only ſingle Paſtors; but then it is ſaid, that after other Preſbyters were appointed, then theſe ſingle Paſtors were properly Biſhops? But to that I anſwer, *Firſt*, They could not be proper Biſhops by vertue

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of their firſt conſtitution, or then they had no power over any Preſbyters, but only over the Deacons and People; and therefore it would be well worth conſidering how a power of juriſdiction over Preſbyters can be derived from thoſe ſingle Paſtors of Churches that had no Preſbyters joined with them. It muſt be then clearly and evidently proved that it was the Apoſtles intention that theſe ſingle Paſtors ſhould have the power over Preſbyters, when the Church's neceſſity did require their help; which intention muſt be manifeſted and declared by ſome manifeſtation of it as a Law of Chriſt, or nothing can thence be deduced of perpetual concernment to the Church of Chriſt. *Secondly.* Either they were Biſhops before, or only after the appointment of Preſbyters; if before, then a Biſhop, and a Presbyter having no Biſhop over him, are all one; if after only, then it was by his communicating power to Presbyters to be ſuch, or their choice which made him their Biſhop; if the firſt, then Presbyters, *quoad ordinem* are only a humane inſtitution, it being acknowledged that no evidence can be brought from Scripture for them; and for any act of the Apoſtles not recorded in Scripture for the conſtituting of them, it muſt go among unwritten Traditions; and if that be a Law ſtill binding the Church, then there are ſuch which occur not in the word of God, and ſo that muſt be an imperfect copy of divine Laws; if he were made Biſhop by an act of the Presbyters, then Presbyters have power to make a Biſhop, and ſo Epiſcopacy is an humane inſtitution, depending upon the voluntary act of Presbyters. But the cleareſt evidence for one ſingle Paſtor with Deacons in ſome Churches at the beginning of Chriſtianity, is that of *Epiphanius*, which though ſomewhat large, I ſhall recite, becauſe, if I miſtake not, the curtailing of this Teſtimony, hath made it ſpeak otherwiſe than ever *Epiphanius* meant. Καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν ὁ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀγνοήσας, καὶ ἱστορίας βαθυτάταις μὴ ἐντυχών, ὅτι νέου ὄντος κηρύγματος, πρὸς τὰ ὑποπίπτοντα ἔγραφεν ὁ ἅγιος ἀπόστολος· ὅπου μὲν ἦσαν ἐπίσκοποι ἤδη κατασταθέντες, ἔγραφεν ἐπισκόποις καὶ διακόνοις· οὐ γὰρ πάντα εὐθὺς ἐδυνήθησαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι καταστῆσαι. πρεσβυτέρων γὰρ ἐγίνετο χρεία καὶ διακόνων· διὰ γὰρ τῶν δύο τούτων τὰ ἐκκλησιαστικὰ δύναται πληροῦσθαι· ὅπου δὲ οὐκ εὑρέθη τις ἄξιος ἐπισκοπῆς, ἔμεινεν ὁ τόπος χωρὶς ἐπισκόπου· ὅπου δὲ γέγονε χρεία καὶ ἦσαν ἄξιοι ἐπισκοπῆς, κατεστάθησαν ἐπίσκοποι· πλήθους δὲ μὴ ὄντος, οὐχ εὑρέθησαν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρεσβύτεροι κατασταθῆναι, καὶ ἠρκέσθησαν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τόπων μόνῳ ἐπισκόπῳ· ἄνευ δὲ διακόνου ἐπίσκοπον ἀδύνατον εἶναι, &c. The ſenſe of *Epiphanius* is very intricate and obſcure; we ſhall endeavour to explain it: He is giving *Aerius* an account why *Paul* in his Epiſtle to *Timothy* mentions only Biſhops and Deacons, and paſſeth over Presbyters. His account is this, *firſt he chargeth* Aerius *with ignorance of the ſeries of hiſtory*, (which he calls ἀκολουθία τῆς ἀληθείας *and the profound and ancient records of the Church, wherein it is expreſſed that upon the firſt preaching the Goſpel, the Apoſtle writ according to the preſent ſtate of things. Where Biſhops were not yet appointed*, (for ſo certainly it ſhould be read ὅπου μὴ ἦσαν ἐπίσκοποι, not ὅπου μὲν, for then he muſt contradict himſelf? *the Apoſtle writes to Biſhops and Deacons*; (*for the Apoſtles could not ſettle all things at firſt*) *for there was a neceſſity of Preſbyters, and Deacons; for by theſe two orders all Eccleſiaſtical offices might be performed; for where* (ſo I read it ὅπου γὰρ, not ὅπου δὲ, as the ſenſe clearly carries it) *there was not found any worthy of being a Biſhop, the place remained without one: But where neceſſity required one, and there were ſome found fit for that Office, there ſome were ordained Biſhops; but for want of convenient number, there could be no Preſbyters found out to be ordained,* and

Epiph. c. Aerium hæreſ. 75. p. 905, &c. ed. Petav.

and in ſuch places they were contented with the Biſhop and Deacons; for without their miniſtry the Biſhop could not be. So that according to *Epiphanius*, there were three ſeveral ſtates of Churches in the Apoſtles times; firſt ſome Churches where there were only Presbyters and Deacons without a Biſhop. For if *Epiphanius* ſpeaks not at firſt of places where Presbyters were without a Biſhop, he muſt be guilty of a vain and empty *Tautology*, for he after tells us where the neceſſity of the Church required it; a Biſhop was made; therefore he ſpeaks of places only where Presbyters and Deacons were; and otherwiſe he would not anſwer *Aerius* about 1 *Tim.* 4. 14. which it is his deſign to do, about *The laying on of the hands of the Presbytery*; he grants then that at firſt in ſome places there were only Presbyters and Deacons, as when the Apoſtle writes to *Biſhops and Deacons* (where Biſhops at that time of the Church were only Presbyters) of which two orders, Presbyters and Deacons, there was an abſolute neceſſity; and the account he gives why they ſetled no higher orders above them is, οὐ γὰρ πάντα εὐθὺς ἠδυνήθησαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι καταστῆσαι, *The Apoſtles could not ſettle all things at firſt*; which words are to be read with a *Parenthesis*, giving an account why ſometimes only Biſhops and Deacons were ſettled, that is, Presbyters ſo called. But, ſaith he, where neceſſity called for a higher order of Biſhops above Presbyters, and any were found qualified for it, there ſuch were appointed; and if by reaſon of the want of Perſons of ſufficient abilities to be made Presbyters in thoſe places, there they were contented with ſuch a ſuperiour Biſhop and Deacons aſſiſting of him; Some Churches then according to his judgment, had a Company of Presbyters to rule them being aſſiſted with Deacons; others had only a ſingle Biſhop with Deacons, and after when the numbers were increaſed, and perſons qualified were found, there were both Biſhop, Presbyters and Deacons. For the account which he gives of the former want of ſome officers in ſome Churches, is this, οὔτω (Read οὔπω, as the learned Dr. well corrects it) τῆς ἐκκλησίας λαβούσης τοῦ πληρώματος τῆς οἰκονομίας, οὕτω κατ' ἐκείνου καιροῦ ἦσαν οἱ τόποι. οὐ γὰρ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα ἐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸ πάντα ἔσχεν, ἀλλὰ προβαίνοντος τοῦ χρόνου τὰ πρὸς τελείωσιν τῶν χρειῶν κατηρτίζετο. *For the Church not yet having all her offices filled, things were fain to remain in that ſtate. For nothing can be compleated at firſt, but in proceſs of time every thing receives its due perfection.* So that *Epiphanius* doth not (as it is thought by ſome) ſay, that in the firſt times of the Church, there were none but Biſhops and Deacons in all Churches, but in ſome Churches there were Presbyters and Deacons, in others Biſhops and Deacons, according to the ſtate, condition and neceſſity of the Churches. *Epiphanius* then fully and clearly expreſſeth my opinion in reference to the Apoſtles not obſerving any one conſtant courſe in all Churches, but letting ſometimes many Presbyters with Deacons, ſometimes only one Paſtor (who is therefore called a Biſhop) with Deacons, and ſo ſetling officers according to the particular occaſions of every Church. The next conſiderable teſtimony to our purpoſe is that of *Clemens Alexandrinus* in *Euſebius* concerning St. *John* after his return out of the Iſle of *Patmos* to *Epheſus*, upon the death of *Domitian*. Ἀπῄει παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ πλησιόχωρα τῶν ἐθνῶν, ὅπου μὲν Ἐπισκόπους καταστήσων, ὅπου δὲ ὅλας ἐκκλησίας ἁρμόσων, ὅπου δὲ γε κλῆρον ἕνα τινα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος σημαινομένων κληρώσων. *He went abroad upon invitation into the neighbour provinces, in ſome places conſtituting Biſhops, in ſome ſetting in order whole Churches, in o-*

Walo. Meſ. ſal. cap. 4. p. 224, &c.

thers chooſing out one from among the reſt of thoſe who were deſigned by the ſpirit of God, whom he ſet over the Church. So *Salmaſius* contends it muſt be tranſlated, κλῆρον ἕνα τίνα κληρώσων, *chooſing one into the Clergy*; for thoſe who were choſen Biſhops are ſaid κληρωθεὶς ἐπισκοπὴν and they that chooſe are ſaid κληρῶσαι. Whence *Salmaſius* gathers out of theſe words the very thing I am now upon. *In majoribus urbibus plures, in minoribus pauciores Preſbyteros ordinari ſolitos probabile eſt*; *In pagis autem aut vicis, vel puſillis oppidis, quales* κώμας *vel* κωμοπόλεις *vocabant Græci, unum aliquem Preſbyterum per illa præcipuè tempora quibus non magnus erat numerus fidelium, ſuffeciſſe veriſimile eſt. That the Apoſtles ſet a greater number of Preſbyters in great Cities, fewer in leſs, and in ſmall villages but one, when the number of believers was but ſmall.* We have yet one Author more who ſpeaks fully to our purpoſe. It is the Author of the *Commentaries* under *Ambroſe* his name, who frequently aſſerts this opinion I am now making good. Upon the *fourth of Epheſians* he largely diſcourſeth how things were ſettled at firſt, by the Apoſtles, by degrees, in the Church of God, evidently ſhewing that the Apoſtles did not at firſt obſerve any ſettled conſtant courſe, but acted according to the preſent conveniency, as they ſaw good, in order to the promoting and advancing the Churches intereſt. *Poſtquam omnibus locis Eccleſiæ ſunt conſtitutæ, & officia ordinata, aliter compoſita res eſt quam cæperat.* Thereby declaring his opinion that while Churches were conſtituting, no certain courſe was obſerved. For as he goes on, *Primum enim omnes docebant, & omnes baptizabant, quibuſcunque diebus vel temporibus fuiſſet occaſio*, &c. *Ut ergo creſceret plebs & multiplicaretur, Omnibus inter initia conceſſum eſt & evangelizare, & baptizare, & ſcripturas in Eccleſia explanare. At ubi omnia loca circumplexa eſt Eccleſia, conventicula conſtituta ſunt, & rectores & cætera officia in Eccleſiis ſunt ordinata*; *ut nullus de Clero auderet qui ordinatus non eſſet, præſumere officium quod ſciret non ſibi creditum vel conceſſum*; *& cæpit alio ordine & providentiâ gubernari Eccleſia*; *quia ſi omnes eadem poſſent, irrationabile eſſet, & vulgaris res, & viliſſima videretur*, &c. *Ideò non per omnia conveniunt ſcripta Apoſtoli ordinationi quæ nunc eſt in Eccleſia, quia hæc inter primordia ſunt ſcripta*; *Nam &* Timotheum, (*Preſbyterum à ſe creatum*) *Epiſcopum vocat*; *quia primum Preſbyteri Epiſcopi appellabantur, ut recedente uno ſequens ei ſuccederet*, &c. *At firſt* he ſaith, *all Church Offices lay open to all perſons, and every one did preach and baptize upon all occaſions*; *but afterwards when Congregations were eſtabliſhed and Churches ſetled, then none undertook that office but thoſe that were ordained to it. Thence it is that the Apoſtles writings are not ſuitable to the preſent ſtate of the Church, becauſe they were penned in the time when things were not fully ſetled. For he calls* Timothy, *who was made a Preſbyter by him, Biſhop*; *for ſo at firſt the Preſbyters were called, among whom this was the courſe of governing Churches, that as one withdrew, another took his place.* This opinion of his he takes occaſion to ſpeak of him in ſeveral other places. Upon Rom. 16. *Adhuc rectores Eccleſiæ paucis erant in locis, Governours of Churches were as yet ſet up but in few places.* And upon 1 Cor 1. *Proptereà Eccleſiæ ſcribit, quia adhuc ſingulis Eccleſiis rectores non erant inſtituti.* And on 1 *Cor.* 11. *Convenientibus Presbyteris, quia adhuc rectores Eccleſiis non omnibus locis erant conſtituti.* By all which it is moſt evident, that this both learned and ancient Author, cited with no ſmall reſpect by St. *Auſtin*, doth not conceive that the Apoſtles did obſerve any ſetled form in the governing

Churches, but acted according to principles of prudence, according to the neceſſities and occaſions of the ſeveral Churches by them planted: So that where there were ſmall Churches, one Paſtor with Deacons might ſuffice: in greater Churches ſome were governed by Preſbyters acting in Common Council: others, though very few at firſt, had Rectors placed over them, for ſuperintending the Affairs of the Church.

Secondly, In Churches conſiſting of a multitude of believers, or where there was a probability of great increaſe by preaching the Goſpel, the Apoſtles did ſettle a College of Preſbyters whoſe office was partly to govern the Church already formed, and partly to labour in the converting more. So that in all great Cities where either the work was already great, by the number of believers, in order to the diſcharging of Paſtoral duties to them; or where it was great in reference to the number they laboured in converting of, it ſeems moſt conſonant to reaſon and Scripture, that the work ſhould be carried on by the joynt aſſiſtance of many aſſociated in the ſame work. For, is it any ways probable that the Apoſtle ſhould ordain Biſhops τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν, as *Clement* ſpeaks, of ſuch as ſhould believe, and not ordain perſons in order to the making them believe? They have either a very low opinion of the work of a Goſpel Biſhop, or very little conſideration of the zeal, activity and diligence which was then uſed in preaching, reproving, exhorting, in ſeaſon, out of ſeaſon, that think one ſingle perſon was able to undergo it all. Diſcipline was a great deal more ſtrict then, preaching more diligent, men more apprehenſive of the weight of their function, than for any to undertake ſuch a care and charge of Souls, that it was impoſſible for them, ever to know, obſerve, or watch over, ſo as to give an account for them. Beſides, while we ſuppoſe this one perſon imployed in the duties of his flock, what leiſure or time could ſuch a one have to preach to the Gentiles and unbelieving Jews in order to their Converſion? The Apoſtles did not certainly aim at the ſetting up the honour of any one perſon, making the office of the Church a matter of State and Dignity more than imployment, but they choſe men for their activity in preaching the Goſpel, and for their uſefulneſs in labouring to add continually to the Church. Men that were imployed in the Church then, did not conſult for their eaſe or honour, and thought it not enough for them to ſit ſtill and bid others work; but they were of *Paul*'s mind, *Neceſſity was laid upon them, yea, Woe was unto them if they preached not the Goſpel.* 1 Cor.9.16. Publick prayers were not then looked on as the more principal end of Chriſtian Aſſemblies than preaching, nor conſequently that it was the more principal office of the *Stewards of the myſteries of God*, to read the publick prayers of the Church, than *to preach in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon.* And is it not great pity two ſuch excellent and neceſſary duties ſhould ever be ſet at variance, much leſs one ſo preferred before the other, that the one muſt be eſteem'd as *Sarah*, and the other almoſt undergo the hardſhip of *Hagar*, to be looked on as the Bond-woman of the Synagogue, and be turned out of doors? Praying and preaching are the *Jachin* and *Boaz* of the *Temple*, like *Rachel* and *Leah*, both which built up the houſe of *Iſrael:* but though *Rachel* be fair and beautiful, yet *Leah* is the more fruitful: though prayer be lovely and amiable in the ſight of God, when it comes from a heart ſeriouſly affected with what it ſpeaks, yet preaching tends more to the turning mens ſouls from ſin unto God. Were the Apoſtles commiſſioned by Chriſt to go pray or preach? and what is it wherein the Miniſters of the Goſpel ſucceeded the Apoſtles? is it in the office of praying, or preaching? Was *Paul* ſent not to baptize but to preach the Goſpel? and ſhall we think thoſe who ſucceed *Paul* in his office of preaching, are to look upon any thing elſe as more their work than that? Are Miniſters in their ordination ſent forth to be readers of publick prayers, or to be Diſpenſers of God's holy word? Are they ordained wholly to this, and ſhall this be the leſs principal part of their work? I, but the reaſon is unanſwerable, that praying is the more principal end of Chriſtian Aſſemblies than preaching; For the one is the end, and the other the means. If by end be meant the ultimate end of all Chriſtian duties, that cannot be prayer: for that is a means it ſelf in order to that; but the chief end is the fitting ſouls for eternal praiſes; if then this unanſwerable reaſon hold good, the principal end of Chriſtian Aſſemblies muſt be only praiſes of God, and not prayers; if by the end be meant the immediate end of preaching as that it refers to, that cannot be; for the immediate end of preaching, if the Apoſtle may be judge, is inſtruction and edification in the faith; Rather preaching is the end of praying, in as much as the bleſſings conveyed by preaching are the things which men pray for. But this is but one of thoſe unhappy conſequences which follows mens judging of the ſervice of God rather by the practices of the Church, when it came to enjoy eaſe and plenty, than by the ways and practices of the firſt and pureſt Apoſtolical times: when the Apoſtles who were beſt able to judge of their own duty, looked upon themſelves as moſt concerned in the preaching of the Goſpel. But to this it is commonly ſaid that *there was great reaſon for it then, becauſe the world was to be converted to Chriſtianity, and therefore preaching was the more neceſſary work at that time; but when a Nation is converted to the faith, that neceſſity ceaſeth.* It is granted that the preaching of the Goſpel, in regard of its univerſal extent was more neceſſary then, which was the foundation of Chriſt's inſtituting the Apoſtolical office with an unlimited Commiſſion: but if we take preaching as referring to particular Congregations, there is the ſame neceſſity now that there was then. People need as much inſtruction as ever, and ſo much the more in that they are apt to think now the name of Chriſtians will carry them to heaven. It is a too common and very dangerous deceit of men to look upon Religion more as a profeſſion, than matter of Life, more as a Notion than an inward temper. Men muſt be beat off from more things which they are apt to truſt to for Salvation now, than in thoſe times: Men could not think ſo much then, that diligence in publick Aſſemblies, and attendance at publick prayers was the main of Religion. Few would profeſs Chriſtianity in thoſe times, but ſuch as were reſolved before-hand rather to let go their lives than their profeſſion; but the more profeſs it now, without underſtanding the terms of ſalvation by it; the greater neceſſity of preaching to inſtruct men in it. But I think more need not be ſaid of this to thoſe that know it is another thing to be a Chriſtian than to be called ſo. But however it is granted, that in the Apoſtles times preaching was the great work; and if ſo, how can we think one ſingle perſon in a great City was ſufficient, both to preach to, and rule the Church, and to preach abroad in order to the converſion of more from their Gentiliſm to Chriſtianity? Eſpecially if the Church of every City was ſo large as ſome would make it, *viz.* to comprehend all the believers under the civil juriſdiction of the City, and ſo both City and Country the only charge of one ſingle Biſhop. I think the vaſtneſs of the work, and the Impoſſibility of a right diſcharge of it by one ſingle perſon, may be argument enough to make us interpret the places of Scripture which may be underſtood in that ſenſe, as of more than one Paſtor in every City; as when the Apoſtles are ſaid to ordain Elders in every City, and *Paul*'s calling for the Elders from *Epheſus*, and his writing to the Biſhops and Deacons of the Church of *Philippi*; this conſideration, I ſay, granting that the texts may be otherwiſe underſtood, will be enough to incline men to think that in greater Cities there was a Society of Preſbyters acting together for the carrying on the work of the Goſpel, in converting ſome to, and building up of others in the faith of Chriſt. And it ſeems not in the leaſt manner probable to me that the care of thoſe great Churches ſhould at firſt be intruſted in the hands of one ſingle Paſtor and Deacon, and afterwards a new order of Preſbyters erected under them, without any order or rule laid down in Scripture for it, or any mention in Eccleſiaſtical writers of any ſuch after Inſtitution. But inſtead of that in the moſt populous Churches we have many remaining footſteps of ſuch a College of Preſbyters there eſtabliſhed in Apoſtolical times. Thence *Ignatius* ſays the Preſbyters are ὡς συνέδριον θεοῦ ϗ ὡς σύνδεσμος Ἀποςόλων *the* Sanhedrin *of the Church appointed by God*; *and the Bench of Apoſtles ſitting together for ruling the affairs of the Church.* And *Origen* calls it σύςημα ἐν ἑκάςῃ πόλει κτισθὲν λόγῳ θεοῦ, *a College in every City of God's appointing*; and *Victor* Biſhop of *Rome*, *Collegium noſtrum*, and *Collegium fratrum*; *Pius*, *Pauperem Senatum Chriſti apud Romam conſtitutum.* *Tertullian*, *Probatos ſeniores*; *Cyprian*, *Cleri noſtri ſacrum venerandumque Conſeſſum*; and to *Cornelius* Biſhop of *Rome* and his Clergy, *Florentiſſimo Clero tecum præſidenti*; *Jerome*, *Senatum noſtrum, cœtum Preſbyterorum, & commune conſilium Preſbyterorum quo Eccleſiæ gubernabantur*; *Hilary*, *Seniores ſine quorum conſilio nihil agebatur in Eccleſia*; the Author *de ſeptem ordinibus ad Ruſticum*, calls the Preſbyters *nogotiorum judices.* *Eutychius* tells us there were twelve Preſbyters at *Alexandria* to govern the Church; and the author of the Itinerary of *Peter*, of as many conſtituted at *Cæſarea*, who though counterfeit, muſt be allowed to ſpeak, though not *vera*, yet *veri ſimilia*; though not true, yet likely things. Is it poſſible all theſe authors ſhould thus ſpeak of their ſeveral places, of a College of Preſbyters acting in power with the Biſhop, if at firſt Churches were governed only by a ſingle Biſhop, and afterwards by ſubject Preſbyters that had nothing to do in the rule of the Church; but were only deputed to ſome particular offices under him, which they were impowered to do only by his authority? But the joynt rule of Biſhop and Preſbyters in the Churches will be more largely deduced afterwards. Thus we ſee a Company of Preſbyters ſetled in great Churches; now we are not to imagine that all theſe did equally attend to one part of their work, but all of them according to their ſeveral abilities laid out themſelves; ſome in overſeeing and guiding the Church; but yet ſo as upon occaſion to diſcharge all paſtoral acts belonging to their function; others betook themſelves chiefly to the converſion of others to the faith, either in the Cities or the adjacent Countries. By which we come to a full, clear and eaſie underſtanding of that ſo much controverted place, 1 *Tim.* 5. 17. Οἱ καλῶς προεςῶτες πρεσβύτεροι διπλῆς τιμῆς ἀξιούσθωσαν, μάλιςα οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ ϗ διδασκαλίᾳ, *The Elders that rule well are counted worthy of double honour, eſpecially they that labour in the word and doctrine.* Not as though it implied a diſtinct ſort of Elders from the Paſtors of Churches, but among thoſe Elders that were ordained in the great Churches, ſome attended moſt to ruling

Ep. ad Tral.

Contra Celſ. l. 3. *p.* 129.

Pius ep ad Juſt Vien.

Apol. c. 39.

Cypri. ep. 550. *ſ.* 19. *ſ.* 21.

Hieronym. in Iſ. l. 2. *c.* 3.

Ep. ad. Evag. in 1 *Tim.* 5.

the flock already converted, others laboured moſt in converting others to the faith by preaching; though both theſe being entered into this peculiar function of laying themſelves forth for the benefit of the Church, did deſerve both reſpect and maintenance; yet eſpecially thoſe who imployed themſelves in converting others, in as much as their burden was greater, their labours more abundant, their ſuffering more; and their very office coming the neareſt to the Apoſtolical function. So *Chryſoſtome* reſolves it upon the fourth of the *Epheſians*, that thoſe who were κατὰ κώμας καὶ πόλεις ἀφωρισμένοι, as *Theodoret* expreſſeth it, the ποιμένες καὶ διδάσκαλοι, the fixed officers of particular Churches were inferior to thoſe who went abroad preaching the Goſpel; καὶ πάνυ, ſaith he, τῶν περιιόντων καὶ ἐυαγγελιζομένων οἱ καθήμενοι καὶ περὶ ἕνα τόπον ἠσχολημένοι. An evident argument that the Apoſtle doth not intend any ſort of Elders diſtinct from theſe ordained Preſbyters of the Cities, is from that very argument which the greateſt friends to Lay-Elders draw out of this Epiſtle, which is from the promiſcuous acception of the words πρεσβύτερος and ἐπίσκοπος in this very Epiſtle to *Timothy*: The argument runs thus: The Preſbyters ſpoken of by *Paul* in his Epiſtle to *Timothy*, are Scripture-Biſhops; but Lay-Elders are not Scripture-Biſhops; therefore theſe cannot here be meant. The *major* is their own, from 1 *Tim.* 3. 1. compared with 4. 14. Thoſe which are called Preſbyters in one place, are Biſhops in another; and the main force of the argument lies in the promiſcuous uſe of Biſhop and Preſbyter; now then if Lay-Elders be not ſuch Biſhops, then they are not *Paul*'s Presbyters; now *Paul*'s Biſhops muſt be διδακτικοὶ fit to teach, and therefore no Lay-Elders. Again we may conſider where *Timothy* now was, *viz.* at *Epheſus*, and therefore if ſuch Lay-Elders any-where, they ſhould be there; Let us ſee then whether any ſuch were here. It is earneſtly pleaded by all who are for Lay-Elders, that the *Elders* ſpoken of *Acts* 20. 17. were the particular *Elders* of the Church of *Epheſus*, to whom *Paul* ſpoke, *v.* 28. where we find their office at large deſcribed. *Take heed therefore unto your ſelves, and all the flock over which God hath made you* ἐπισκόπους *Biſhops or overſeers.* Here both we ſee the names *Elders* and *Biſhops* confounded again, ſo that he that was an *Elder* was a *Biſhop* too; and the office of ſuch *Elders* deſcribed to be a *Paſtoral charge over a flock*, which is inconſiſtent with the notion of a Lay-Elder. *Paul* ſent indefinitely for the *Elders of the Church* to come to him; if any ſuch then at *Epheſus*, they muſt come at this ſummons; all the *Elders* that came were ſuch as were *Paſtors* of Churches; therefore there could be no *Lay-Elders* there. I inſiſt not on the argument for maintenance implyed in double honour, which *Chryſoſtome* explains by τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων χορηγίαν a ſupply of neceſſaries to be given to them, as appears by *v.* 18. which argument *Blondel* ſaw ſuch ſtrength in, that it brought him quite off from Lay-Elders in that place of *Timothy*. And he that will remove the controverſy from the Scriptures, to the Primitive Church, (as we have no reaſon to think that if ſuch were appointed, they ſhould be ſo ſoon laid aſide) will find it the greateſt difficulty to trace the footſteps of a Lay-Elder, through the records of antiquity for the three firſt centuries eſpecially. The writers of the Church ſpeak of no Preſbyters but ſuch as preached, as appears by *Origen*, *Cyprian* and *Clement* of *Alexandria*; *Origen* ſaith, *Omnes Epiſcopi atque omnes Preſbyteri vel Diaconi erudiunt nos, & erudientes adhibent correptionem, & verbis auſterioribus increpant.* We ſee all Biſhops, Presbyters, and Dea-

Chryſoſt. in 4. *Eph.* *hom.* 11.

De jure plebis in regim. Eccleſ. p. 79. *&c.*

Orig. hom. 1. in *Pſal.* 37.

Deacons were in his time preachers. So *Cyprian*, *Et crediderам quidem Preſbyteros & Diaconos qui illic præſentes ſunt, monere vos & inſtruere pleniſſime circa Evangelii legem, ſicut ſemper ab anteceſſoribus noſtris factum eſt*; and in another Epiſtle about making *Numidicus* a Presbyter, he thus expreſſeth it, *ut aſcribatur Preſbyterorum Carthaginenſium numero, & nobiſcum ſedeat in Clero*; where to ſit as one of the Clergy, and to be a Presbyter, are all one. Again, had there been any ſuch Elders, it would have belonged to them to lay hands on thoſe that were reconciled to the Church after Cenſures; now hands were only laid on *ab Epiſcopo & Clero*, as the ſame *Cyprian* tells us. *Clemens Alexandrinus* deſcribing the Office of a Presbyter, hath theſe words, οὗτος πρεσβύτερος ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τῆς ἐκκλησίας, &c. ἐὰν ποιῇ καὶ διδάσκῃ τὰ τοῦ κυρίου, where teaching is looked on as his proper work; and elſewhere more fully and expreſly, diſcourſing of the ſervice of God, and diſtinguiſhing it according to the twofold ſervice of men, βελτιωτικὴ καὶ ὑπηρετικὴ, he applies theſe to the Church, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν μὲν βελτιωτικὴν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι σώζουσιν εἰκόνα τὴν ὑπηρετικὴν δὲ οἱ διάκονοι. The former he explains afterwards, ὅπως ἂν καὶ παιδεύειν ἢ τεταγμένος εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπανόρθωσιν. *A Preſbyter is one that is ordained or appointed for the inſtruction of others in order to their amendment*, implying thereby the Office of a Presbyter to be wholly converſant about teaching others, to whom, on that account, the art of making others better doth properly belong. So much may ſuffice for thoſe firſt times of the Church, that there were no Presbyters then, but ſuch as had the Office of teaching. And for the times afterwards of the Church, let it ſuffice at preſent to produce the teſtimony of a Council held in the beginning of the ſeventh Century, who abſolutely decree againſt all Lay-perſons medling in Church-affairs; *Nona actione didicimus, quoſdam ex noſtro Collegio contra mores Eccleſiaſticos, laicos habere in rebus divinis conſtitutos Œconomos. Proinde pariter tractantes eligimus ut unuſquiſque noſtrum ſecundum Chalcedonenſium Patrum decreta, ex proprio Clero Œconomum ſibi conſtituat. Indecorum eſt enim Laicum eſſe vicarium Epiſcopi, & ſeculares in Eccleſia judicare; in uno enim eodemq; officio non debet eſſe diſpar profeſſio.* A Canon directly level'd againſt all *Lay-Chancellors in Biſhops-Courts*, and ſuch *Officials:* But doth with the ſame force take away all Lay-Elders, as implying it to be wholly againſt the rule of the Church to have ſecular perſons to judge in the Church. But although I ſuppoſe this may be ſufficient to manifeſt the no divine right of Lay-Elders; yet I do not therefore abſolutely condemn all uſe of ſome perſons choſen by the people to be as their repreſentatives, for managing their intereſt in the affairs of the Church. For now the voice of the people, (which was uſed in the primitive times) is grown out of uſe: Such a conſtitution, whereby two or more of the people's choice might be preſent at Church debates, might be very uſeful; ſo they be looked upon only as a prudential humane conſtitution, and not as any thing founded on Divine right. So much may ſerve for the firſt ground of the probability of the Apoſtles not obſerving one ſetled form of Church-Government, which was from the different ſtate, quantity and condition of the Churches by them planted. The *ſecond* was *from the multitude of unfixed Officers reſiding in ſome places, who managed the affairs of the Church in chief during their Reſidence.* Such were the Apoſtles and Evangeliſts and all perſons almoſt of note in Scripture. They were but very few, and thoſe in probability not the ableſt, who were left at home to take care of the ſpoil;

the

Ep. 33.

Ep. 12.

Strom. l. 6. p. 667. ed. Heinſ.

Strom. l. 7. p. 700.

Concil. Hiſpal. 2. decret. 9.

the ſtrongeſt and ableſt like *Commanders in an Army*, were not ſetled in any *Troop*, but went up and down from this company to that, to order them, and draw them forth: and while they were, they had the chief authority among them; but as Commmanders of the Army, and not as Officers of the Troop. Such were Evangeliſts who were ſent ſometimes into this Country to put the Churches in order there, ſometimes into another; but where ever they were, they acted as Evangeliſts, and not as fixed Officers. And ſuch were *Timothy* and *Titus*, notwithſtanding all the oppoſition made againſt it, as will appear to any that will take an impartial ſurvey of the arguments on both ſides. Now where there were in ſome places Evangeliſts, in others not; and in many Churches it may be no other Officers but theſe, it will appear, that the Apoſtles did not obſerve one conſtant form, but were with the Evangeliſts, travelling abroad to the Churches, and ordering things in them as they ſaw cauſe. But as to this I have anticipated my ſelf already. The *laſt* ground was from the *different cuſtom obſerved in the Churches, after the Apoſtles times.* For no other rational account can be given of the different opinions of *Epiphanius*, *Jerome* and *Hilary*, but this, that one ſpeaks of the cuſtom of ſome Churches, and the other of others. In ſome, as at *Alexandria*, the Presbyters might chuſe their Biſhop; in other places it might be as *Hilary* ſaith, that when the firſt withdrew, another ſucceeded him. Not by a monthly or annual *rotation* of *Preſidents*, as ſome have imagined, but by a preſidency for Life of one, upon whoſe death another ſucceeded in his room. For the former opinion hath not any evidence at all for it in Scripture or Antiquity, or in the place brought to prove it. For according to this opinion, *Timothy* muſt have but his courſe in the *rotation of Elders at Epheſus*, which ſeems very incongruous to the Office of *Timothy*. I conclude then, that in all probability the Apoſtles tied not themſelves up to one certain courſe, but in ſome Churches ſetled more or fewer Officers, as they ſaw cauſe, and in others governed themſelves during Life; and that at their death they did not determine any form, is probably argued from the different cuſtoms of ſeveral Churches afterwards.

§. 20. The third Conſideration touching Apoſtolical practice, is concerning the obligatory force of it in reference to us; which I lay down in theſe terms, *That a mere Apoſtolical practice being ſuppoſed, is not ſufficient of it ſelf for the founding an unalterable and perpetual right, for that form of Government in the Church, which is ſuppoſed to be founded on that practice.* This is a propoſition, I am ſure, will not be yielded without proving it, and therefore I ſhall endeavour to do it by a fourfold argument. *Firſt*, Becauſe many things were done by the Apoſtles without any intention of obliging any who ſucceed them afterwards to do the ſame: As for inſtance, the twelve Apoſtles going abroad ſo unprovided as they did when Chriſt ſent them forth at firſt, which would argue no great wiſdom or reaſon in that man, that ſhould draw that practice into conſequence now. Of the like nature was *Paul*'s preaching ἀδάπανον εὐαγγέλιον to ſome Churches, receiving no maintenance at all from ſome Churches, as that at *Corinth*. Which inſtance is a manifeſt evidence of the monſtrous weakneſs of diſcourſe in thoſe who would make that example of *Paul* obligatory to all Miniſters of the Goſpel now. And while they would by this argument take away their Lands and Tythes, inſtead of them, they give them *Plauſtra convitiorum*, whole loads of the moſt reproachful ſpeeches that ever were given to any but Chriſt and his Apoſtles. For my part, I think the Miniſters of the Goſpel would want one of the badges of Honour belonging to their Office, were they not thus reproachfully uſed: It is part of the State which belongs to the true Miniſters of the Goſpel to be followed by ſuch black-mouthed Lacquies, who by their virulent ſpeeches are ſo far their friends, as to keep them from that curſe which our Saviour pronounceth, *Woe be unto you when all men ſpeak well of you.* But let us ſee how much wooll there is after all this cry; too little to cloath the backs of Miniſters, if ſuch perſons might be their Tythe-men; but it is well they are ſo little be-friended, yea ſo much oppoſed by the great Apoſtle, in that ſingular practice of his. For doth he ſay it was unlawful for him to receive a maintenance from the Churches he preached to? Nay, doth he not ſet himſelf to prove not only the lawfulneſs of Miniſters taking it, but the duty of the peoples giving it, 1 *Cor.* 9. from the ſeventh to the fifteenth verſe, giving many pregnant arguments to that purpoſe? Doth he not ſay that all the Apoſtles beſides him and *Barnabas*, did forbear working, and conſequently had all their neceſſities (1 Cor. 9. 6.) ſupplied by the Churches? Nay, doth not *Paul* himſelf ſay, *that he* (2 Cor. 11. 8.) *robbed other Churches, taking wages of them, to do ſervice to them?* What! *Paul* turned hireling, and in the plaineſt terms take wages of Churches? Yet ſo it is, and his forbearing it at *Corinth*, was apt to be interpreted as an argument that he did not love them, 2 *Cor.* 11. 11. So far were they from looking upon *Paul* as a hireling in doing it. *Paul* is ſtrong and earneſt in aſſerting his right; he might have done it at *Corinth*, as well as elſewhere; but from ſome prudent conſiderations of his own, mentioned 2 *Cor.* 11. 12. he forbore the exerciſe of his right among them, although at the ſame time he received maintenance (2 Cor. 11. 9.) from other places. As for any divine right of a particular way of maintenance, I am of the ſame opinion as to that which I am in reference to particular forms of Church-Government; and thoſe that are of another opinion, I would not wiſh them ſo much injury, as to want their maintenance till they prove it. But then, I ſay, theſe things are clear in themſelves, and, I think, ſufficient grounds for conſcience as to the duty of paying on the one ſide, and the lawfulneſs of receiving it on the other. Firſt, That a maintenance in general be given to Goſpel Miniſters, is of Divine right, *elſe the labourer was not worthy of his hire*; nor could that be true which *Paul* ſaith, *that our Lord hath ordained,* (1 Cor. 9. 14.) *that they which preach the Goſpel ſhould live of the Goſpel.* *Secondly*, A maintenance in general being due, lawful Authority may determine the particular way of raiſing it; the equity of which way may be beſt derived from what was the moſt ancient practice of the world in dedicating things to God, and was approved by God himſelf, among his own people the Jews: So that the way of maintenance by *Tythes* is the moſt juſt and equitable way. *Thirdly*, It being in the Magiſtrate's power to determine the way of maintenance, what is ſo determined, doth bind the conſciences of all ſubject to that power, to an obedience to it for conſcience ſake: In as much as all men are bound thus to obey the Magiſtrate in all things eſtabliſhed by him as Laws; and the very ſame reaſons any can plead for diſobedience as to this, may equally ſerve for diſobedience to any other Laws made by the ſupreme Magiſtrate. This I ſuppoſe is the cleareſt reſolution of that other more vexed than intricate controverſie about the right of Tythes; which I have here ſpoken of by occaſion of the mention of the Apoſtles practice, and becauſe it is reſolved upon the ſame principles with the ſubject I am upon. Mere Apoſtolical practice we ſee doth not bind, becauſe the Apoſtles did many things without intention of binding others. *Secondly*, The Apoſtles did many things upon particular occaſions, emergences and circumſtances, which things ſo done, cannot bind by virtue of their doing them, any farther than a parity of reaſon doth conclude the ſame things to be done in the ſame circumſtances. Thus *Paul's Cœlibate* is far from 1 Cor. 9. 5. binding the Church, it being no univerſal practice of the Apoſtles by a Law, but only a thing taken up by him upon ſome particular grounds, not of perpetual and univerſal concernment. So community of goods was uſed at firſt by the Church of *Jeruſalem*, as moſt ſuitable to the preſent ſtate of that Church; but as far as we can find, did neither per- 1 Cor. 6. 1. petually hold in that Church, nor univerſally obtain among other Chur- 11. 21, 22. ——16. 2. ches, as is moſt clear in the Church at *Corinth* by their Law-ſuits, by the different offerings of the rich and poor at the Lord's-Supper, and by their perſonal contributions. So the Apoſtles preaching from houſe to houſe, was for want of conveniency then of more publick places as free only for Chriſtians; although that practice binds now as far as the reaſon doth; *viz.* in its tendency to the promoting the work of Salvation of mens ſouls. Laying on hands for conferring the gifts of the Holy Ghoſt can never certainly bind where the reaſon of it is ceaſed, but may ſtill continue as a rite of ſolemn prayer, and not by virtue of that practice. Obſerving the Apoſtolical decrees of *abſtaining from blood, and things ſtrangled and offered to idols*, did hold as long as the ground of making them did, which was condeſcenſion to the Jews, although it muſt be withal acknowledged, that the primitive Chriſtians of the ſe- *Exercit. Theol. n.* 26. cond and third Centuries did generally obſerve them, and the Greek *Curcellæus de eſu ſanguinis*, &c. Church to this day, and ſome men of note and learning have pleaded for the neceſſary obſervation of them ſtill, as *Chriſt. Beoman*, *Steph. Curcellæus* in a *Diatriba* lately publiſhed to this purpoſe; to which *Grotius in* Acts 15. 29. *Grotius* is likewiſe very inclinable. Their arguments are too large here to examine, although I ſee not how poſſibly that place of *Paul* 1 Cor. 10. 25. can be avoided, *Whatever is ſet in the ſhambles eat, making no ſcruple for conſcience ſake.*

Part 1. *ch.* 1. §. 6. I conclude this with what I laid down at the entrance of this Treatiſe, that where any act or Law is founded upon a particular reaſon or occaſion as the ground of it, it doth no farther oblige, than the reaſon or occaſion of it doth continue. Therefore before an acknowledged Apoſtolical practice be looked on as obligatory, it muſt be made appear, that what they did, was not according as they ſaw reaſon and cauſe for the doing it, depending upon the ſeveral circumſtances of time, place, and perſons, but that they did from ſome unalterable Law of Chriſt, or from ſome ſuch indiſpenſable reaſons, as will equally hold in all times, places, and perſons. And ſo the obligation is taken off from Apoſtolical practice, and laid upon that Law and reaſon which was the ground of it. *Thirdly*, Offices that were of Apoſtolical appointment, are grown wholly out of uſe in the Church, 1 Tim. 5. 9. without mens looking upon themſelves as bound now to obſerve them. As the Widows of the Churches, afterwards from their Office called Rom. 16. 1. Deaconeſſes of the Church, of which number *Phebe* was one, whom *Paul* calls the Deaconeſs of the Church at *Cenchrea*: ſo both *Origen* and *Chryſoſtome* underſtand it. Of them and their continuance in the Church for ſome Centuries of years, much is ſpoken by ſeveral Writers, and reſolved by ſeveral Councils; and yet we ſee theſe are laid aſide by the pretenders to hold cloſe to Apoſtolical practice: If that binds, certainly it doth in its plain inſtitutions; if it doth not bind in them, how can it in that which is only gathered but by uncertain conjectures to have been ever their practice? So that in the iſſue, thoſe who plead ſo much for the obligatory nature of Apoſtolical practice, do not think it obligatory; for if they did, how comes this Office of Widows and Deaconeſſes to be neglected? If it be anſwered, that theſe are not uſeful now; then we muſt ſay, that we look upon Apoſtolical practice to be binding no farther than we judge it uſeful, or the reaſon of it holds, which is as much as to ſay, of its ſelf it binds not. *Fourthly*, rites and cuſtoms Apoſtolical are altered; therefore men do not think that Apoſtolical practice doth bind. For if it did, there could be no alteration of things agreeable thereunto. Now let any one conſider but theſe few particulars, and judge how far the pleaders for a divine right of Apoſtolical practice do look upon themſelves as bound now to obſerve them; as Dipping in Baptiſm, the uſe of Love-feaſts, Community of Goods, the Holy-kiſs, by * *Tertullian* called *ſignaculum orationis*: yet none look upon themſelves as bound to obſerve them now, and yet all acknowledge them to have been the practice of the Apoſtles; and therefore certainly though when it may ſerve for their purpoſe, men will make Apoſtolical practice to found a Divine right, yet when they are gone off from the matter in hand, they change their opinion with the matter, and can then think themſelves free as to the obſervation of things by themſelves acknowledged to be Apoſtolical. Thus we are at laſt come to the end of this Chapter, which we have been the longer upon, becauſe the main hinge of this controverſie did lie in the practice of the Apoſtles, which I ſuppoſe now ſo far cleared, as not to hinder our progreſs towards what remains; which we hope will admit of a quicker diſpatch. We come therefore from the Apoſtles, to the Primitive Church, to ſee whether by the practice of what we can find any thing whereby they looked on themſelves as obliged by an unalterable Law to obſerve any one particular form of Church-Government.

Plin. ep. l. 10. *ep.* 97. *Theod. l.* 3. *cap.* 14. *Sozom. l.* 4. *cap.* 24. *Codex.Theo. leg.* 27. *tit. de Epiſ. Con. Chal. c.* 14. *Conc. Normat. c.* 73. *Epiph. hær.* 79. *V. Juſtell. Not. in Can. Univerſ. Eccleſ. p.* 154, &c. *Voſſium in Plin. ep.* 97. *l.* 10. *Salmaſ. in Apparat. p.* 176.

* *De Orat.*

C h a p. VII.

The Church's Polity, in the ages after the Apoſtles, conſidered. Evidences thence, that no certain unalterable form of Church-Government was delivered to them. 1. *Becauſe Church power did enlarge as the Churches did. Whether any Metropolitan Churches eſtabliſhed by the Apoſtles. Seven Churches of* Aſia, *whether Metropolitical;* Philippi *no Metropolis, either in Civil or Eccleſiaſtical ſenſe. Several degrees of enlargement of Churches. Churches firſt the Chriſtians in whole Cities proved by ſeveral arguments; the Eulogiæ an evidence of it. Churches extended into the neighbour territories by the preaching there of City Preſbyters; thence comes the ſubordination between them. Churches by degrees enlarged to Dioceſes; from thence to Provinces. The original of Metropolitans and Patriarchs.* 2. *No certain form uſed in all Churches. Some Churches without Biſhops,* Scots, Goths. *Some with but one Biſhop in their whole Country.* Scythian, Æthiopian *Churches how governed.*

verned. Many Cities without Biſhops. Dioceſes much altered. Biſhops diſcontinued in ſeveral Churches for many years. 3. *Conforming Eccleſiaſtical Government to the Civil, in the extent of Dioceſes. The ſuburbicarian Churches what. Biſhops anſwerable to the civil Governours. Churches power riſe from the greatneſs of Cities.* 4. *Validity of ordination by Preſbyters in places where Biſhops were. The caſe of* Iſchyras *diſcuſſed; inſtances given of ordination by Preſbyters not pronounced null.* 5. *The Churches prudence in managing its affairs, by the ſeveral Canons, Provincial Synods,* Codex Canonum.

§. 1. HAving largely conſidered the actions of Chriſt, and the practice of the Apoſtles, ſo far as they are conceived to have reference to the determining the certain form of Government in the Church; our next Stage is, according to our propounded method, to examine what light the practice of the Church in the Ages ſucceeding the Apoſtles will caſt upon the controverſy we are upon. For although according to the principles eſtabliſhed and laid down by us, there can be nothing ſetled as an univerſal Law for the Church but what we find in Scriptures; yet becauſe the general practice of the Church is conceived to be of ſo great uſe for underſtanding what the Apoſtles *intentions* as well as *actions* were, we ſhall chearfully paſs over this *Rubicon*, becauſe not with an intent to increaſe diviſions, but to find out ſome farther evidence of a way to compoſe them. Our Inquiry then is whether the primitive Church did conceive its ſelf obliged to obſerve unalterably one individual form of Government, as delivered down to them either by a Law of Chriſt, or an univerſal conſtitution of the Apoſtles; or elſe did only ſettle and order things for Church Government, according as it judged them tend moſt to the peace and ſettlement of the Church, without any antecedent obligation, as neceſſarily binding to obſerve only one courſe. This latter I ſhall endeavour to make out to have been the only Rule and Law which the Primitive Church obſerved as to Church-Government, *viz.* the tendency of its conſtitutions to the peace and unity of the Church; and not any binding Law or practice of Chriſt or his Apoſtles. For the demonſtrating of which I have made choice of ſuch arguments as moſt immediately tend to the proving of it. For *if the power of the Church and its officers did increaſe merely from the inlargement of the bounds of Churches; if no one certain form were obſerved in all Churches; but great varieties as to officers and Dioceſes; if the courſe uſed in ſettling the power of the chief officers of the Church was from agreement with the civil government; if notwithſtanding the ſuperiority of Biſhops, the ordination of Preſbyters was owned as valid; if in all other things concerning the Churches Polity, the Churches prudence was looked on as a ſufficient ground to eſtabliſh things,* then we may with reaſon conclude that nothing can be inferred from the practice of the Primitive Church, Demonſtrative of any one fixed form of Church Government delivered from the Apoſtles to them. Having thus by a light σκιαγραφία drawn out the ſeveral lines of the pourtraicture of the Polity of the ancient Church, we now proceed to fill them up, though not with that *life* which it deſerves, yet ſo far as the model of this diſcourſe will permit. Our firſt argument then is *from the riſe of the extent of the power of Church Governours,* which I aſſert not to have been from any order of the Apoſtles, but from the gradual increaſe of the Churches committed to their charge. This will be beſt done by the obſervation of the growth of Churches, and how proportionably the power of the Governours did increaſe with it, As to that, there are four obſervable ſteps or periods as ſo many ages of growth in the Primitive Churches. *Firſt*, When Churches and Cities were of the ſame extent. *Secondly*, When Churches took in the adjoyning territories with the villages belonging to the Cities. *Thirdly*, When ſeveral Cities with their villages did aſſociate for Church-Government in the ſame province. *Fourthly*, When ſeveral provinces did aſſociate for Government in the *Roman* Empire. Of theſe in their Order.

§. 2. The firſt Period of Church-Government obſervable in the primitive Church, was *when Churches were the ſame with Chriſtians in whole Cities.* For the clearing of this, I ſhall *firſt* ſhew that the primitive conſtitution of Churches was in a ſociety of Chriſtians in the ſame City. *Secondly*, I ſhall conſider the form and manner of Government then obſerved among them. *Thirdly*, Conſider what relation the ſeveral Churches in Cities had to one another. *Firſt*, *That the Primitive Churches were Chriſtians of whole Cities.* It is but a late and novel acception of the word *Church*, whereby it is taken for ſtated fixed congregations for publick worſhip; and doubtleſs the original of it is only from the diſtinction of Churches in greater Cities into their ſeveral κυριακὰ or publick places for meeting, whence the Scotch *Kirk*, and our Engliſh *Church*; ſo that from calling the place *Church* they proceed to call the perſons there meeting by that name; and thence ſome think the name of Church ſo appropriated to ſuch a ſociety of Chriſtians as may meet at ſuch a place, that they make it a matter of religion not to call thoſe places *Churches*, from whence originally the very name, as we uſe it, was derived. But this may be pardoned among other the religious weakneſſes of well meaning but leſs knowing people. A Church in its primary ſenſe as it anſwers to the Greek ἐκκλησία, applied to Chriſtians, is a Society of Chriſtians living together in one City; whether meeting together in many Congregations or one, is not at all material; becauſe they were not called a Church as meeting together in one place, but as they were a ſociety of Chriſtians, inhabiting together in ſuch a City: not but that I think a ſociety of Chriſtians might be called a Church, where ever they were, whether in a City or Country, but becauſe the firſt and chief mention we meet with in Scripture of Churches, is of ſuch as did dwell together in the ſame Cities; as is evident from many pregnant places of Scripture to this purpoſe. As *Acts* 14. 23. compared with *Titus* 1. 5. κατ' ἐκκλησίαν in one place, is the ſame with κατὰ πόλιν in the other. *Ordaining Elders in every Church, and ordaining Elders in every City*; which implies that by Churches then were meant the body of Chriſtians reſiding in the Cities: over which the Apoſtles ordained Elders to rule them. So *Acts* 16. 4, 5. *As they went through the Cities*, &c. *and ſo were the Churches eſtabliſhed in the faith.* The Churches here were the Chriſtians of thoſe Cities which they went through. So *Act*. 20. 17. *He ſent to* Epheſus *and called the Elders of the Church.* If by the Elders we mean as all thoſe do we now deal with, the Elders of *Epheſus*, then it is here evident that the Elders of the Church and of the City are all one; but what is more obſervable, *verſ.* 28. he calls the Church of that City, τὸ ποίμνιον· προσέχετε οὖν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ παντὶ τῷ ποιμνίῳ ἐν ᾧ ὑμᾶς τὸ πνεῦμα ἔθετο ἐπισκόπους, ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ. *Take heed to your ſelves, and to the flock over which God hath made you overſeers, to feed the Church of God.* Where ſeveral things are obſervable to our purpoſe;

firſt, that the body of Chriſtians in *Epheſus* is called τὸ ποίμνιον and ἡ ἐκκλησία, the flock and the Church, and not the ſeveral flocks and Churches, over which God hath made you Biſhops. *Secondly*, That all theſe ſpoken to were ſuch as had a paſtoral charge of this one flock; *Paul* calls them ἐπισκόπȣς, and chargeth ποιμαίνειν, *to do the work of a Paſtor* towards it. So that either there muſt be ſeveral Paſtors taking the paſtoral charge of one congregation which is not very ſuitable with the principles of thoſe I now diſpute againſt; or elſe many congregations in one City are all called but one Church, and one flock, which is the thing I plead for. And therefore it is an obſervation of good uſe to the purpoſe in hand, that the New Teſtament ſpeaking of the Churches in a Province, always ſpeaks of them in the Plural number as *the Churches of Judæa*, 1 Gal. 22. 1 Theſ. 2. 14. *The Churches of* Samaria *and* Gallilee, Act. 9. 31. *The Churches of* Syria *and* Cilicia. Act. 15. 41. *The Churches of* Galatia, 1 Cor. 16. 1. Gal. 1. 1, 2. *The Churches of* Aſia. Rom. 16. 16. Rev. 1. 11. But when it ſpeaks of any particular City, then it is always uſed in the Singular number, *as the Church at* Jeruſalem. Act. 8. 1.———15. 4. 22. *The Church at* Antioch. Act. 11. 26.———13. 1. *The Church at* Corinth. 1 Cor. 1. 2. 2 Cor. 1. 1. and ſo of all *the ſeven Churches of* Aſia, *the Church of* Epheſus, Smyrna, *&c.* So that we cannot find in Scripture the leaſt footſtep of any difference between a Church and the Chriſtians of ſuch a City; whereas had the notion of a Church been reſtrained to a particular congregation, doubtleſs we ſhould have found ſome difference as to the Scriptures ſpeaking of the ſeveral places. For it is ſcarce imaginable that in all thoſe Cities ſpoken of, as for example *Epheſus*, where *Paul* was for above two years together, that there ſhould be no more converts than would make one Congregation. Accordingly in the times immediately after the Apoſtles, the ſame language and cuſtom continued ſtill. So *Clement* inſcribes his Epiſtle ἡ ἐκκλησία τȣ͂ θεȣ͂ παροικȣ͂σα Ῥώμην τῇ ἐκκλεσία τȣ͂ θεȣ͂ παροικȣ́σῃ Κόρινθον, *The Church of God which is at* Rome, *to the Church of God which is at* Corinth. So by that it is plain that all the believers at that time in *Rome*, made up but one Church, as likewiſe did they at *Corinth*. So *Polycarp* in the Epiſtle written by him from the Church at *Smyrna* to the Church at *Philomilium*, Ἡ ἐκκλησία τȣ͂ Θεȣ͂ ἡ παροικȣ͂σα Σμύρναν τῇ παροικȣ́σῃ ἐν Φιλομιλίῳ· and ſo in his Epiſtle to the *Philippians*, Πολύκαρπος καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ πρεσβύτεροι, τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ παροικȣ́σῃ Φιλίπποις. *Polycarp and the Elders with him to the Church which is at Philippi.* *Origen* compares the Church of God at *Athens*, *Corinth*, *Alexandria*, and other places with the people of thoſe ſeveral Cities; and ſo the Churches *Senate* with the peoples, and the Churches ἄρχων (that is his word) *chief ruler*, with the *Major* of thoſe Cities; implying thereby, that as there was one civil ſociety in ſuch places to make a City, ſo there was a ſociety of Chriſtians incorporated together to make a Church. So that a Church ſetled with a full power belonging to it, and exerciſing all acts of Church-Diſcipline within it ſelf, was anciently the ſame with the ſociety of Chriſtians in a City. Not but that the name Church is attributed ſometimes to families, in which ſenſe *Tertullian* ſpeaks, *ubi duo aut tres ſunt, ibi Eccleſia eſt, licet Laici:* And may on the ſame account be attributed to a ſmall place, ſuch as many imagine the Church of *Cenchrea* to be, it being a Port to *Corinth* on the *Sinus Saronicus*; but *Stephanus Byzantinus* calls it πόλις καὶ ἐπίνειον Κορίνθȣ. *Suidas* ſaith no more of it than that it is ὀνοματόπȣ. *Strabo* and *Pauſanias* only ſpeak of the ſituation of it, as

Euſeb. l. 4. *cap.* 13.

Uſſer. Ignat. ep. p. 13.

C. Celſum. l. 3. *p.* 128.

Exhort. ad caſtit.

Steph. de Urbibus.

Strabo Geogr. l. 8.

Pauſ. Corinth. p. 44, 45.

as one of the ports of *Corinth*, lying in the way from *Tegæa* to *Argos*; nor is any more ſaid of it by *Pliny*, than that it anſwers to *Lechæum* *Plin. Hiſt. l. 4. c. 4.* the port on the other ſide upon the *Sinus Corinthiacus*. *Ubbo Emmius* *Emmius de Græc. Vet. l. 2.* in his deſcription of old *Greece* calls both of them *oppidula duo cum duobus præclaris portubus in ora utriuſq; maris*, but withal adds, that they were *duo urbis emporia*, the two *Marts* of *Corinth*; therefore in probability, becauſe of the great Merchandiſe of that City, they were much frequented. *Cenchrea* was about twelve furlongs diſtance from *Corinth*; Where *Pareus* conjectures the place of the meeting of the *Pareus in* Rom. 16. 1. Church of *Corinth* was, becauſe of the troubles they met with in the City, and therefore they retired thither for greater conveniency and privacy: which conjecture will appear not to be altogether improbable, when we conſider the furious oppoſition made by the *Jews* againſt the *Chriſtians* at *Corinth*, *Acts* 18. 12. and withal how uſual it was both for Jews and Chriſtians to have their place of meeting at a diſtance from the City. As *Acts* 16. 13. *They went out from* Philippi *to the rivers* *V. Heinſ. Exercit. ſacr. l. 5. cap. 10.* *ſide, where there was a Proſeucha, or a place of prayer, where the Jews of* Philippi *accuſtomed to meet*. According to this interpretation the Church at *Cenchrea* is nothing elſe but the Church of *Corinth* there aſſembling: as the *Reformed Church* at *Paris* hath their meeting place at *Charenton*, which might be called the Church of *Charenton* from their publick Aſſemblies there, but the Church of *Paris* from the Reſidence of the chief officers and people in that City. So the Church of *Corinth* might be called the Church at *Cenchrea* upon the ſame account, there being no evidence at all of any ſettled Government there at *Cenchrea* diſtinct from that at *Corinth*. So that this place which is the only one brought againſt that poſition I have laid down, hath no force at all againſt it. I conclude then that Churches and Cities were originally of equal extent, and that the formal conſtitution of a Church lies not in their capacity of aſſembling in one place, but acting as a ſociety of Chriſtians imbodied together in one City, having Officers and Rulers among themſelves, equally reſpecting the whole number of believers: Which leads to the *ſecond* thing, *the way and manner then uſed for the modelling the government of theſe Churches:* Which may be conſidered in a double period of time, either before ſeveral Congregations in Churches were ſetled, or after thoſe we now call *Pariſhes*, were divided. Firſt, Before diſtinct Congregations were ſetled; and this as far as I can find, was not only during the Apoſtles times, but for a competent time after, generally during the perſecution of Churches. For we muſt diſtinguiſh between ſuch a number of believers as could not conveniently aſſemble in one place, and the diſtributing of believers into their ſeveral diſtinct Congregations. I cannot ſee any reaſon but to think that in the great Churches of *Jeruſalem*, *Antioch*, *Epheſus* and the like, there were more believers than could well meet together, conſidering the ſtate of thoſe times; but that they were then diſtributed into their ſeveral δῆμοι or *Centuries* (as the *Athenians*, and *Romans* divided their people) *i. e.* into ſeveral worſhipping Congregations with peculiar officers, I ſee no reaſon at all for it. They had no ſuch conveniencies then of ſetling ſeveral Congregations under their particular Paſtors: but all the Chriſtians in a City looked upon themſelves as one body, and met together as occaſion ſerved them, where either the chief of the Governours of the Church, the προεστῶς in *Juſtin Martyr*'s language, did perform the ſolemn part of divine worſhip, or ſome other of the *Elders* that were preſent with them. Is it not ſtrange for men to dream of ſet times, and Canonical hours, and publick places of Aſſemblies at that time, when their chief times of meeting were in the night, or very early in the morning, which *Pliny* calls *conventus antelucanos*, whence they were called *latebroſa & lucifugax natio*; and were fain to make uſe of wax-lights: (which from that cuſtom the Papiſts continue ſtill in their *Tapers* always burning upon the *Altar*, from what reaſon I know not, unleſs to ſhew the darkneſs of error and ſuperſtition which that Church lies under ſtill) and the places of the Chriſtians meetings were generally either ſome private rooms, or ſome *grotts* or *Cryptæ*, vaults under ground where they might be leaſt diſcerned or taken notice of; or in the *Cœmeteria*, the *Martyrum memoriæ*, as they called them, where their common aſſemblies were. Thence *Pontius Paulinus*, ſpeaking of the Edict of *Valerian* againſt the Chriſtians, *Juſſum eſt ut nulla conciliabula faciant, neque cœmeteria ingrediantur.* Indeed when they had any publick liberty granted them, they were ſo mindful of their duties of publick profeſſion of the faith, as to make uſe of publick places for the worſhip of God, as appears by *Lampridius* in the life of *Alexander Severus. Quum Chriſtiani quendam locum qui publicus fuerat occupaſſent, contra popinarii dicerent, ſibi eum deberi, reſcripſit melius eſſe ut quomodocunque illic Deus colatur, quam popinariis dedatur.* But in times of perſecution it is moſt improbable that there ſhould be any fixed Congregations and places, when the Chriſtians were ſo much hunted after, and inquired for, as appears by the former Epiſtle of *Pliny* and the known *Reſcript of Trajan* upon it, ſo much exagitated by *Tertullian*. They did meet often it is certain, *ad confœderandum diſciplinam*, at which meetings *Tertullian* tells us, *Præſident probati quique ſeniores*, which he elſewhere explains by *Conſeſſus ordinis*, *the bench of officers* in the Church, which did in common conſult for the good of the Church, without any *Cantonizing* the Chriſtians into ſeveral diſtinct and fixed Congregations. But after that believers were much increaſed, and any peace or liberty obtained, they then began to contrive the diſtribution of the work among the ſeveral Officers of the Church, and to ſettle the ſeveral bounds over which every Presbyter was to take his charge; but yet ſo, as that every Presbyter retained a double aſpect of his office, the one particular to his charge, the other general reſpecting the Church in common. For it is but a weak conceit to imagine that after the ſetling of Congregations, every one had a diſtinct Presbytery to rule it, which we find not any obſcure footſteps of in any of the ancient Churches; but there was ſtill one *Eccleſiaſtical Senate* which ruled all the ſeveral Congregations of thoſe Cities in common, of which the ſeveral Presbyters of the Congregations were members, and in which the *Biſhop* acted as the *Preſident* of the *Senate*, for the better governing the affairs of the Church. And thus we find *Cornelius* at *Rome* ſitting there *cum florentiſſimo Clero*: thus *Cyprian* at *Carthage*, one who pleads as much as any for obedience to Biſhops, and yet none more evident for the preſence and joint concurrence and aſſiſtance of the Clergy at all Church debates; whoſe reſolution from his firſt entrance into his Biſhoprick was to do all things *communi concilio Clericorum*, with the Common-Council of the Clergy; and ſays they were *cum Epiſcopo ſacerdotali honore conjuncti*. *Victor* at *Rome* decreed *Eaſter* to be kept on the Lord's day, *collatione facta cum Presbyteris & Diaconibus* (according as the Latin in that age) as *Damaſus* the ſuppoſed Author of the lives of the Popes tells us. In the proceedings againſt

Ep. 95. *l.* 10. *Tertul. de Cor. Militis. ad Uxor. l.* 2. *c.* 4. *V. Voſſium in Plin. ep. p.* 45.

V. Gerſom. Bucer. de gubern. eccl. p. 220, &c. *V. Juſtell. Not. in Cod. Can. Eccleſ. Un. p.* 200. *& Blondell Ap. ſ.* 3. *de Baſil. origine p.* 216. *p.* 243. *p.* 131. *ed. Cl. Salmaſ.*

Apol. c. 2.

Epigr. ep. l. 21.

Ep. 6. 10. 18, 24, 33, 34, 28, 32. *Ep.* 58.

Apud Bin. To. 1. *Conc. p.* 92.

gainſt *Novatus* at *Rome*, we have a clear teſtimony of the concurrence of Preſbyters: where a great Synod was called, as *Euſebius* expreſſeth *Eccleſ. hiſt. l.6. cap.43.* it, of *ſixty Biſhops*, but more *Preſbyters* and *Deacons*; and what is more full to our purpoſe, not only the ſeveral Preſbyters of the City, but the Country Paſtors (τῶν κατὰ χώραν ποιμένων διασκεψαμένων) did likewiſe give their advice about that buſineſs. At this time *Cornelius* tells us there were forty ſix Preſbyters in that one City of *Rome*, who concurred with him in condemning *Novatus*. So at *Antioch* in the caſe of *Paulus Samoſatenus* we find a Synod gathered, conſiſting of *Biſhops*, *Preſbyters*, and *Deacons*, and in their name the *Synodal* Epiſtle is penned and directed by the ſame in all the Catholick Church. *Eccleſ. hiſt. l.7. cap.30.* At the Council of *Eliberis* in *Spain*, were preſent but nineteen Biſhops and twenty ſix Preſbyters. The caſe between *Sylvanus* Biſhop of *Cirta* in *Africk*, and *Nundinarius* the Deacon, was referred by *Purpurius* to the Clergy to decide it. *Apud. Nun. ſub Zenoph. Conſul.* For the preſence of Preſbyters at Synods, inſtances are brought ὅλῳ τῷ συλλόγῳ by *Blondel* in his *Apology*. *P. 200.* And that they concurred in governing the Church, and not only by their *counſel* but *authority*, appears from the general ſenſe of the Church of God, even when Epiſcopacy was at the higheſt: *Nazianzen* ſpeaking of the office of Preſbyters, εἴτε λειτουργίαν χρὴ λέγειν εἴτε ἡγεμονίαν, he knew not whether to call it, *Miniſtry* or *Superintendency*, and thoſe who are made Preſbyters, ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀναβαίνουσι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι, *from being ruled, they aſcend to be rulers themſelves.* *Orat. p. 3.* And their power by him is in ſeveral places called Ψυχῶν ἡγεμονία, προστασία, προεδρία· they are called by him, ποιμένες, ἱερεῖς, πρεσβῦται, προστάται, ἄρχοντες. *P. 24. 37, 41. P. 29. 42.* *Chryſoſtome* gives this as the reaſon of *Paul*'s paſſing over from *Biſhops* to *Deacons* without naming Preſbyters, ὅτι οὐ πολὺ τὸ μέσον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ διδασκαλίαν εἰσὶν ἀναδεδεγμένοι, καὶ προστασίαν τῆς ἐκκλησίας. *In 1 Tim. hom. 11.* *Becauſe there is no great matter of difference between a Biſhop and Preſbyters, for theſe likewiſe have the inſtruction and charge of the Church committed to them*; which words *Theophylact*, *Chryſoſtome*'s *Eccho*, repeats after him, which the Council of *Aquen* thus expreſſeth, *Preſbyterorum vero qui præſunt Eccleſiæ Chriſti miniſterium eſſe videtur, ut in doctrina præſint populis & in officio prædicandi, nec in aliquo deſides inventi appareant.* *Con. Aquiſ. cap. 5.* *Clemens Alexandrinus* before all theſe, ſpeaking of himſelf and his fellow Preſbyters, Ποιμένες ἐσμὲν οἱ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν προηγούμενοι. *We are Paſtors and Rulers of the Churches.* *Pædag. l. 1. cap. 6.* And that proper acts of diſcipline were performed by them, appears both by the Epiſtles of the *Roman Clergy* about their preſerving diſcipline to *Cyprian*, and likewiſe by the act of that Clergy in excluding *Marcion* from communion with them. So the Preſbyters of the Church of *Epheſus* excommunicated *Noetus*; *Epiph. hær. 42.* for after they had cited him before them, and found him obſtinate in his hereſie, ἐξέωσαν αὐτὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἅμα τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δόγμα μεμαθητευμένοις, *Id. hæreſ. 57. c. 1.* they put both him and his Diſciples out of the Church together. Thus we ſee what the manner of Government in the Church was now: The Biſhop ſitting as in the נשיא in the *Sanhedrin*, and the Preſbyters ὡς συνεδρευταὶ τῶν ἐπισκόπων, as *Ignatius* expreſſeth it, acting as the *Common-council* of the Church to the Biſhop, the Biſhop being as the ἄρχων τῆς ἐκκλησίας, anſwering to the ἄρχων τῆς πόλεως and the Preſbytery as the βουλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, anſwering to the βουλὴ καθ' ἑκάστην πόλιν, as *Origen* compares them. *C. Celſum. l. 3. p. 129.* Whereby he fully deſcribes the form of Government in his time in the Church, which was by an *Eccleſiaſtical Senate*, and a *Preſident* in it, ruling the Society of Chriſtians in every City. So that the Preſbytery of a great City joyning together for government, were never accounted a *Provincial Aſſembly*, but only the *Senate* for government of the Church in the whole City. The erecting Preſbyteries for every particular congregation in a City, is a ſtranger to the ancient conſtitution of Churches, and hath given the greateſt riſe to the independency of particular congregations. For if every particular congregation be furniſhed with a government within its ſelf, then men are apt preſently to think that there is no neceſſity of ſubordination of it to any higher Church-power. Whereas if that primitive conſtitution of Churches be held, that they are ſocieties of Chriſtians under an *Eccleſiaſtical Senate* in a City, then it is evident that the congregations muſt *truckle* under the great body, as receiving their government by, and their officers from that Senate of the Church, which ſuperintends, and orders the affairs of that whole body of Chriſtians reſiding in ſuch a place. And this crumbling of Church power into every congregation is a thing abſolutely diſowned by the greateſt, and moſt learned *Patrons* of *Preſbytery* beyond the Seas: as may be ſeen both in *Calvin*, *Beza*, *Salmaſius*, *Blondel*, *Gerſome*, *Bucer* and others. It is much diſputed when the firſt diviſion of Parochial congregations in Cities began; *Platina* attributes it to *Evariſtus*, and ſo doth *Damaſus*, *Hic titulos in urbe Roma diviſit Preſbyteris. He divided the ſeveral Pariſh Churches to the Preſbyters*, theſe were called then *tituli*; *Baronius* gives a double reaſon of the name; either from goods belonging to the Prince's *Exchequer*, which have ſome ſign imprinted upon them that it may be known whoſe they are; ſo ſaith he, the ſign of the Croſs was put upon the Churches to make it known that they were devoted to God's ſervice; or elſe they are called *Tituli*, becauſe the ſeveral Preſbyters did receive their titles from them; but by the Leave of the great *Cardinal*, another reaſon may be given of the name more proper than either of theſe. It hath been obſerved by learned men, that the general meetings of the Chriſtians were in the *Cœmeteria* or dormitories of Chriſtians; ſo they called the Sepulchres then, which were great and capacious *vaults* fit to receive many people in them; two chief grounds of the Chriſtians meeting in thoſe places; the firſt was their own ſecurity, becauſe the Heathens looked on it as a matter of religion ——— *manes temerare ſepultos*, to diſturb the aſhes of the dead; but the chief reaſon was to encourage themſelves to ſuffer martyrdom by the examples of thoſe who had gone before them, and lay buried there; thence they were called *Martyrum memoriæ*, becauſe they did call to mind their actions and conſtancy in the faith. Now from theſe *Cœmeteria* was afterwards the original of Churches (whence perſons moſt reverenced for piety, were wont ſtill to be buried in Churches, not for any holineſs of the place, but becauſe in ſuch places the Martyrs lay buried) the Churches being raiſed over the vaults wherein the Martyrs lay intombed. Now Churches being raiſed from theſe *Cœmeteries*, which were called *memoriæ martyrum*, that they might ſtill retain ſomewhat intimating their former uſe, were called *Tituli*. For *Titulus* as *Santius* obſerves, is *ſignum aliquod aut monumentum, quod docet ibi latere aliquid aut accidiſſe, cujus nolumus perire memoriam*; thence ſtatues are called *Tituli*. So *Gen.* 35. 20. *erexit Jacob titulum ſuper ſepulchrum*, as the Vulg. Latin renders it: and Gen. 28. 18. *Surgeus ergo Jacob mane tulit lapidem quem ſuppoſuerat capiti ſuo, & erexit in Titulum.* So *Abſalom* 2 Sam. 18. 18. *erexit ſibi titulum.* So that what was erected to maintain and preſerve the memory of any thing, was called *Titulus*; and

A. Dom. 112. n. 4, 5, 6.

In Ezek. 39. 15.

and thence the Churches being built upon the *Cœmeteries* of the Martyrs, were on that account called *Tituli*, becauſe intended for the preſervation of their memories. This account of the original of the name I leave to the judgment of learned men; but to proceed, I confeſs it ſeems not probable to me, that theſe *tituli* were ſo ſoon divided as the time of *Evariſtus*, who lived in the time of *Trajan*, when the perſecution was hot againſt the Chriſtians; but *Damaſus* ſeems not to believe himſelf; for in the life of *Dionyſius*, he ſaith, *Hic Preſbyteris eccleſias diviſit, cœmeteria, parœcias, & diœceſes inſtituit*; but moſt probably it began as ſoon as the Churches enjoyed any eaſe and peace, it being ſo neceſſary for the convenient meeting of ſuch a multitude of Chriſtians as there was then. In the life of *Marcellus*, about forty years after *Dionyſius*, we read of twenty five *Titles* in the Church of *Rome*; of which number what uſe is made for interpreting the number 666, may be ſeen in Mr. *Potter*'s ingenious tract on that ſubject. But when afterwards theſe *titles* were much increaſed, thoſe Preſbyters that were placed in the ancient *titles* which were the chief among them, were called *Cardinales Preſbyteri*, which were then looked on as chief of the Clergy, and therefore were the chief members of the Council of Preſbyters to the Biſhop. So that at this day, the *Conclave* at *Rome*, and the Pope's *Conſiſtory*, is an evident argument in this great degeneracy of it, of the primitive conſtitution of the Government of the Church there, by a Biſhop acting with his College of Preſbyters. Neither was this proper to *Rome* alone, but to all other great Cities, which when the number of Preſbyters was grown ſo great, that they could not conveniently meet, and join with the Biſhop, for ordering the Government of the Church, there were ſome, as the chief of them, choſen out from the reſt, to be as the Biſhop's Council, and theſe in many places, as at *Milan*, *Ravenna*, *Naples*, &c. were called *Cardinales preſbyteri*, as well as at *Rome*; which were abrogated by *Pius Quintus*, 1568, but the memory of them is preſerved ſtill in Cathedral-Churches, in the *Chapter* there, where the *Dean* was nothing elſe but the *Archi-preſbyter*, and both Dean and Prebendaries were to be aſſiſtant to the Biſhop in the regulating the Church-affairs belonging to the City, while the Churches were contained therein. So much ſhall ſuffice for the model of Government in the Churches while they were contained within the ſame precincts with the City it ſelf.

V. Onuphrium de Epiſc. tit. & Div. Cardinalium.

§. 3. We come in the third place to conſider what relation theſe Churches in great Cities had one to another, and to the leſſer Cities which were under them. And here the grand queſtion to be diſcuſſed is this, Whether the Churches in greater Cities by Apoſtolical inſtitution, had the Government Eccleſiaſtical, not only of the leſſer Villages under them, but likewiſe of all leſſer Cities under the civil juriſdiction of the *Metropolis*. The affirmative is of late aſſerted by ſome perſons of great renown and learning. The firſt I find maintaining this *Hypotheſis* of the divine right of *Metropolitans*, is *Fregevilæus Gantius*, one of the Reformed Church of *France*, who hath ſpent a whole Chapter in his *Palma Chriſtiana* to that purpoſe, and hath made uſe of the ſame arguments which have been ſince improved by all the advantages which the learning of a *Reverend Doctor* could add to them. But becauſe this principle manifeſtly deſtroys the main foundation of this diſcourſe, it is here requiſite to examine the grounds on which it ſtands, that thereby it may be fully cleared whether the ſubordination of leſs Churches to

Palma Chriſtiana c. 4.

greater, did only ariſe from the mutual aſſociation of Churches among themſelves, or from Apoſtolical appointment and inſtitution. The two pillars which the divine right of *Metropolitans* is built upon, are theſe. Firſt, That the Cities ſpoken of in the New Teſtament, in which Churches were planted, were *Metropoles* in the civil ſenſe. *Secondly*, That the Apoſtles did ſo far follow the model of the civil Government as to plant *Metropolitan* Churches in thoſe Cities. If either of theſe prove infirm, the fabrick erected upon them, muſt needs fall; and I doubt not but to make it appear that both of them are. I begin with the firſt. The notion of a *Metropolis* is confeſſed to be this, a City wherein the Courts of a Civil Judicature were kept by the Roman Governours, under whoſe juriſdiction the whole Province was contained. The Cities chiefly inſiſted on, are the ſeven Cities of the *Lydian Aſia*, and *Philippi*, which is called πρώτη πόλις Μακεδονίας. As for the Cities of the *Proconſular Aſia*, although the bounds and limits of it are not ſo clear as certainly to know whether all theſe Cities were comprehended under it or no, *Strabo* telling us that *Phrygia*, *Lydia*, *Caria* and *Myſia* are δυσδιάκριτα παραπίπτοντα εἰς ἄλληλα very hard to be diſtinguiſhed from one another; it being true of all four which was ſaid of *Myſia* and *Phrygia*, Geogr. l.13.

Χωρὶς τὰ Μυσῶν καὶ Φρυγῶν ὁρίσματα
Τὸ γοῦν διορίζειν χαλεπόν.

The *Phrygian* and *Myſian* borders are diſtinct, but it is hard to find them out. For *Laodicea* is by *Ptolomy* referr'd to *Caria*, *Strabo* and many others place it in *Phrygia*, only *Stephanus Bizantinus* placeth it in *Lydia*; but granting all that is produced by the late moſt excellent Primate of *Armagh*, in his learned diſcourſe of the *Proconſular Aſia*, to prove all theſe ſeven Cities to be in the bounds of this *Lydian Aſia*, yet it is far from being evident that all theſe Cities were *Metropoles* in the civil ſenſe. For *Strabo* tells us, *that the Romans did not divide theſe places by Nations, but according to the Dioceſes wherein they kept their Courts and exerciſed judicature.* Geogr. l.13. p. 432. ed. Iſ. Caſaub. Theſe Cities wherein the Courts of judicature were kept, were the *Metropoles*, and mother Cities. Of five of them, *Laodicea*, *Smyrna*, *Sardis*, *Epheſus*, and *Pergamus*, *Pliny* ſaith that the *conventus*, the civil Courts, were kept in them; Nat. hiſt. l. 5. c. 29, & 30. and they had juriſdiction over the other places by him mentioned; but for the other two, *Thyatira* and *Philadelphia*, *Philadelphia* is expreſly mentioned as one of thoſe Cities which were under the *juriſdictio Sardiana*, ſo far was it from being a *Metropolis* of its ſelf, and *Thyatira* mentioned as one of the ordinary Cities, without any addition of honour at all to it. And for *Philadelphia*, it was ſo far unlikely to be a *Metropolis*, that *Strabo* tells us it was σεισμῶν πλήρης, very ſubject to earthquakes, and therefore had very few inhabitants, thoſe that are, live moſt part in the fields, where they have εὐδαίμονα γῆν, a very rich ſoil: but *Strabo*, for all that, wonders at the boldneſs of the men that durſt to venture their lives there; and moſt of all admires what was in thoſe mens heads who firſt built a City there. Is it then any ways probable that this ſhould be choſen for a *Metropolis*, in ſuch an abundance of fair and rich Cities as lay thereabout? But a *Salvo* is found out for *Pliny*'s not mentioning them as *Metropoles*, becauſe the addition of theſe two in other Cities, ſeemeth to have been made when *Veſpaſian* added thoſe many new *Provinces* to the old Government which *Suetonius* ſpeaks of; but this *Salvo* doth not reach the ſore; Sueton. in Veſpat. c. 8. for firſt *Pliny* wrote his natural Hiſtory, not in the beginning, but toward the latter end of the Empire of *Flavius Veſpaſianus*, when *Titus* had been ſix times *Conſul*, as he himſelf ſaith in his Preface; therefore if there had been any ſuch change, *Pliny* would have mentioned it. *Secondly*, The *Provinces* added by *Veſpaſian* are expreſly ſet down by *Suetonius*, viz. *Achaia*, *Lycia*, *Rhodus*, *Byzantium*, *Samos*, *Thracia*, *Cilicia*, *Comagena*; not the leaſt mention of the *Lydian* or *Proconſular Aſia*, or any alteration made in the *Metropolis* there. But yet there is a farther attempt made to make *Philadelphia* a *Metropolis*, which is from a ſubſcription of *Euſtathius* in the Council of *Conſtantinople ſub Menna*, *Act.* 5. who calls himſelf the Biſhop of the *Metropolis* of *Philadelphia*; but what validity there is in ſuch a ſubſcription in the time of the fifth Century, to prove a *Metropolis* in the firſt, let any one judge, that doth but conſider how common a thing it was to alter *Metropoles*, eſpecially after the new diſpoſition of the Roman Empire by *Conſtantine*: But if we do ſtand to the *Notitiæ* to determine this controverſie, which are certainly more to be valued than a ſingle ſubſcription, the *Metropolitanſhip* of theſe Cities of the *Lydian Aſia* will be irrecoverably overthrown. For in the old *Notitia* taken out of the *Vatican MS.* and ſet forth with the reſt by *Carolus à Sancto Paulo* in his *Appendix* to his *Geographia ſacra*, *Epheſus* is made the *Metropolis* of the Province of *Aſia*, *Sardis* of *Lydia*, *Laodicea* of *Phrygia Capatiana*, as it is there written for *Pacatiana*; but *Pergamus* placed in the Province of *Cæſarea Cappadocia*, *Philadelphia* under *Sardis*, with *Thyatyra*. In the *Notitia* attributed to *Hierocles* under the *Metropolis* of *Epheſus* is placed *Smyrna* and *Pergamus*, under *Sardis Thyatyra* and *Philadelphia*; ſo likewiſe in the *Notitia* of the *French* King's Library. So that neither in the Civil nor Eccleſiaſtical ſenſe can we find theſe ſeven Cities to be all *Metropoles*. We therefore obſerve St. *Paul*'s courſe, and leaving *Aſia*, we come into *Macedonia*, where we are told that *Philippi* was the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*: I know not whether with greater incongruity to the Civil or Eccleſiaſtical ſenſe; in both which I doubt not but to make it appear that *Philippi* was not the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, and therefore the Biſhops there mentioned could not be the Biſhops of the ſeveral Cities under the juriſdiction of *Philippi*, but muſt be underſtood Phil. 1. 1. of the Biſhops reſident in that City. We begin with it in the civil ſenſe, which is the foundation of the other: It is confeſſed not to have been a *Metropolis* during its being called Κρηνίδες and Δάτος, it being by *Pauſanias* called νεωτάτη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων· By *Theophylact* out Eliac. B. of an old Geographer, (as it is ſuppoſed) it is ſaid to be μικρὰ πόλις p. 182. ὑπὸ μητροπόλεως Θεσσαλονίκης τελοῦσα; and is it not very improbable that ſo ſmall a City as it is acknowledged to be by *Dio*, and others, ſhould Dio, l. 47. be the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, where were at leaſt one hundred and L. 4. c. 11. fifty Cities, as *Pliny* and *Pomponius Mela* tell us, by both whom *Philippi* L. 2. c. 2. is placed in *Thracia*, and not in *Macedonia*? But two arguments are brought to prove *Philippi* to have been a *Metropolis*; the firſt is from St. *Luke*, calling it πρώτην τῆς μερίδος Μακεδονίας πόλιν. Acts 16. 12. *The firſt City of that part of* Macedonia: but rendred by the learned Doctor, *the prime City of the Province of* Macedonia; but it would be worth knowing where μερίς, in all the *Notitiæ* of the *Roman* Empire, was tranſlated a *Province*: and it is evident that *Luke* calls it the firſt City, not *ratione dignitatis*, but *ratione ſitûs*, in regard of its ſituation, and not its dignity. So *Camerarius* underſtands *Luke*, *hanc eſſe primam coloniam partis ſeu Plagæ Macedonicæ*; *nimirum à Thraciæ vicinia iter in Macedoniam ordiens.* It is the firſt City of that part of *Macedonia* when one goes from *Thracia* into it. And ſo it appears by *Dio* Lib. 47. p. 397. deſcribing the ſituation of *Philippi*, that it was the next Town to *Neapolis*, only the mountain *Symbolon* coming between them, and *Neapolis* being upon the ſhore, and *Philippi* built up in the plain near the mountain *Pangæus*, where *Brutus* and *Caſſius* encamped themſelves: its being then the firſt City of entrance into *Macedonia*, proves no more that it was the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, than that *Calice* is of *France*, or *Dover* of *England*. But it is farther pleaded, that *Philippi* was a *Colony*, and therefore it is moſt probable that the ſeat of the *Roman* judicature was there. But to this I anſwer, firſt, that *Philippi* was not the only *Colony* in *Macedonia*, for *Pliny* reckons up *Caſſandria*, *Paria*, and others; Paterc. l. 2. c. 37. for which we muſt underſtand that *Macedonia* was long ſince made a *Province* by *Paulus*: And in the diviſion of the *Roman Provinces* by Geog. l. 17. *Auguſtus*, *Strabo* reckons it with *Illyricum*, among the Provinces belonging to the *Roman* people and Senate, and ſo likewiſe doth *Dio*. Hiſt. l. 53. But it appears by *Suetonius*, V. Claudii, cap. 25. that *Tiberius*, (according to the cuſtom of the *Roman* Emperors in the danger of war in the Provinces) took it into his own hands, but it was returned by *Claudius* to the *Senate* again, Hiſt. l. 57. together with *Achaia*; thence *Dio* ſpeaking of *Macedonia* in the time of *Tiberius*, ſaith it was governed ἀκληρωτὶ, that is, by thoſe who were ἄρχοντες αἱρετοὶ, the *præfecti Cæſaris*, ſuch as were ſent by the Emperor to be his *Preſidents* in the Provinces: the ἄρχοντες κληρωτοὶ were the *Proconſuls*, who were choſen by lot after their *Conſulſhip* into the ſeveral Provinces; and therefore *Dio* expreſſeth *Claudius* his returning *Macedonia* into the *Senates* hands by ἀπέδωκεν τότε τῷ κλήρῳ, *he put it to the choice of the Senate again.* Now *Macedonia* having been thus long a Province of the *Roman* Empire, what probability is there, becauſe *Philippi* was a *Colony*, therefore it muſt be the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*? *Secondly*, We find not the leaſt evidence, either in Scripture, or elſewhere, that the *Proconſul* of *Macedonia* had his reſidence at *Philippi*, yea we have ſome evidence againſt it out of Scripture, *Acts* 16. 20, 22. καὶ προσαγαγόντες αὐτοὺς τοῖς στρατηγοῖς *and brought them to the Magiſtrates*; if there had been the tribunal of a *Proconſul* here, we ſhould certainly have had it mentioned, as *Gallio Proconſul* of *Achaia* is mentioned in a V. Pancir. de Magiſt. Municipal. cap. 8. like caſe at *Corinth*, *Acts* 18. 12. Two ſorts of Magiſtrates are here expreſſed, the ἄρχοντες, which ſeem to be the rulers of the City, the στρατηγοὶ to be the *Duumviri* of the Colony, or elſe the Deputies of the *Proconſul* reſiding there: but I incline rather to the former, στρατηγὸς κολωνίας being only a *Duumvir*, Exerc. ſacr. l. 5. c. 10. but στρατηγὸς Ῥώμης is a *Prætor*, as *Heinſius* obſerves from the *Gloſſary* of *H. Stephens*. For every Colony had a *Duumvirate* to rule it, anſwering to the *Conſuls* and *Prætors* at *Rome*. But all this might have been ſpared, when we conſider how evident it is that *Theſſalonica* was the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia*, as appears by *Antipater* in the Greek Epigram.

Antholog. l. 1.
Σοί με Θρηϊκίης σκυληφόρε Θεσσαλονίκη
Μήτηρ ἡ πάσης πέμψε Μακεδονίης.

And the *Præfectus prætorio Illyrici* had his Reſidence at *Theſſalonica*, as *Theodoret* tells us, Θεσσαλονίκη πόλις ἐστὶ μεγίστη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος, &c.

ὅσα τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν τὸν ὕπαρχον ἡγούμενον ἔχει. *Theſſalonica* was a great populous City, where the *Lieutenant* of *Illyricum* did reſide: and ſo in probability did the *Vicarius Macedoniæ.* It is called the *Metropolis* of *Macedonia* likewiſe by *Socrates*, and in the Eccleſiaſtical ſenſe it is ſo called by *Ætius* the Biſhop thereof in the Council of *Sardica*; and *Carolus à Sancto Paulo* thinks it was not only the *Metropolis* of the *Province* of *Macedonia*, but of the whole *Dioceſe* (which in the Eaſt was much larger than the Province) I ſuppoſe he means that which anſwered to the *Vicarius Macedoniæ.* And thence in the Councils of *Epheſus* and *Chalcedon* the ſubſcription of the Biſhop of *Theſſolonica* was next to the Patriarchs. But for *Philippi* the ſame Author acknowlegeth it not to have been a *Metropolitan* Church in the firſt ſix Centuries; but after that *Macedonia* was divided into *prima* and *ſecunda* (which was after the diviſion of it in the Empire into *prima* and *ſalutaris*) then *Philippi* came to have the honorary title of a *Metropolitan:* although in *Hierocles* his *Notitia*, *Philippi* is placed as the twenty firſt City under the *Metropoles* of *Theſſalonica.* So much to evidence the weakneſs of the firſt pillar, *viz.* that theſe Cities were *Metropoles* in the Civil ſenſe: and this being taken away, the other falls of its ſelf; for if the Apoſtles did model the Eccleſiaſtical Government according to the Civil, then Metropolitan Churches were planted only in Metropolitan Cities, and theſe being cleared not to have been the latter, it is evident they were not the former. But however let us ſee what evidence is brought of ſuch a ſubordination of all other Churches to the Metropolitans, by the inſtitution of the Apoſtles. The only evidence produced out of Scripture for ſuch a ſubordination and dependence of the Churches of leſſer Cities upon the greater, is from *Act.* 16. 1, 4. compared with *Act.* 15. 23. the argument runs thus, The queſtion was ſtarted at *Antioch*, *Act.* 14. 26. with *Act.* 15. 2. from thence they ſent to *Jeruſalem* for a reſolution: the decree of the Council there concerns not only *Antioch*, but *Syria* and *Cilicia*, which were under the Juriſdiction of *Antioch:* and therefore Metropolitan Churches are *jure divino.* I am afraid the argument would ſcarce know its ſelf in the dreſs of a *Syllogiſm.* Thus it runs; If upon the occaſion of the queſtion at *Antioch*, the decree of the Apoſtles made at *Jeruſalem*, concern all the Churches of *Syria* and *Cilicia*, then all theſe Churches had a dependence upon the *Metropolis* of *Antioch*; but the *antecedent* is true, therefore the conſequent. Let us ſee how the argument will do in another form. If upon the occaſion of the queſtion of *Antioch*, the decree of the Apoſtles concerned all the Churches of Chriſtians converſing with Jews; then all theſe Churches had dependence upon the Church of *Antioch*; but, &c. How thankful would the *Papiſts* have been, if only *Rome* had been put inſtead of *Antioch!* and then the concluſion had been true, whatever the premiſes were. But in good earneſt, doth the Churches of *Syria* and *Cilicia* being bound by this decree, prove their ſubordination to *Antioch*, or to the Apoſtles? were they bound becauſe *Antioch* was ther *Metropolis*, or becauſe they were the Apoſtles who reſolved the queſtion? but were not the Churches of *Phrygia*, and *Galatia* bound to obſerve theſe decrees as well as others? For of theſe it is ſaid that the Apoſtles went through the Cities of them, delivering the decrees to keep, as it is expreſſed *Act.* 16. 4. compared with the 6 verſe. Or do the decrees of the Apoſtles concern only thoſe to whom they are inſcribed, and upon whoſe occaſion they are penned? Then by the ſame reaſon *Paul's* Epiſtles

Hiſt. Eccleſ. l. 1. *c.* 17.
V. Berter. Pithan. Dial. c. 2.
L. 2. *c.* 12.
Conc. Sard. cap. 16.
Geogr. ſacr. l. 8. *ſ.* 14.

piſtles being written many of them upon occaſion, as that to the *Corinthians* being directed to the *Metropolis* of *Corinth*, doth only concern the Church of that City, and thoſe of *Achaia* that were ſubject to the juriſdiction of the City; and ſo for the reſt of the Epiſtles. A fair way to make the word of God of no effect to us; becauſe forſooth, we live not in obedience to thoſe *Metropoles* to which the Epiſtles were directed! From whence we are told how many things we may underſtand by this notion of *Metropolitans:* Eſpecially why *Ignatius* ſuperſcribes his Epiſtle to the *Romans* ἐκκλησία ἥτις προκάθηται ἐν τόπῳ χωρίου Ρωμαίων, *to the Church which preſides in the place of the Roman region, or the ſuburbicarian Provinces.* But let us ſee whether this place may not Exercit.16. n. 150. be underſtood better without the help of this notion. *Caſaubon* calls it *locutionem barbaram*; *Vedelius* is more favourable to it, and thinks *ſi non* Exercit. in ep. Ignat. adRom.c.2. *elegans*, *ſaltem vitii libera eſt*, and explains it by the ſuburbicarian Provinces.: and makes the ſenſe of it to be ἐν τόπῳ ὅς ἐστι χωρίου τοῦ Ρωμαίων, *in the place which is the Roman region*, and parallels it with the τόπος πόλεως καλουμένης Βηθσαϊδά Luk. 9. 10. *Bellarmine* thinks he hath found the Pope's univerſal power in this τόπος, but methinks the χωρίον Ρωμαίων ſhould hardly be rendered *Orbis univerſus*, unleſs *Bellarmine* were no more skill'd in *Greek*, than *Caſaubon* thinks he was, whom he calls in the place forecited, *hominem Græcarum literarum prorſus* ἀμύητον. The moſt ingenuous conjecture concerning this place, is that of our Laws of the Chur. cap. 18. p. 164. learned Mr. *Thorndike*. *The word* τόπος, *ſaith he, is here uſed as many times beſides, ſpeaking of thoſe places which a man would neither call Cities nor Towns, as* Act. 27. 2. μέλλοντες πλεῖν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τόπους, *being to ſail by the places of* Aſia. χώρα, *it is plain it ſignifies the countrey,* τόπος χωρίου Ρωμαίων *then muſt neceſſarily ſignifie here the* Vatican *lying in the Fields as a ſuburb to* Rome, *and being the place where St.* Peter *was buried, and where the Jews of* Rome *then dwelt, as we learn by* Philo, *legatione ad Caium*, out of whom he produceth a large place to that purpoſe, and ſo makes this the Church of the Jewiſh Chriſtians, *the Vatican being then the Jewry of Rome*; but there being no clear evidence of any ſuch diſtinction of Churches there, and as little reaſon why *Ignatius* ſhould write to the Church of Jewiſh Chriſtians, and not to the Church of the Gentile Chriſtians, I therefore embrace his ſenſe of the τόπος χωρίου Ρωμαίων for the *Vatican*, but explain it in another way, *viz.* we have already ſhewed that the chief places of meeting for the Chriſtians in *Gentile Rome*, was in the *Cœmeteries* of the Martyrs; now theſe *Cœmeteria* were all of them without the City; and the *Cœmeteria* where *Peter*, *Linus*, *Cletus*, and ſome other of the Primitive Martyrs lay inter'd in the *Vatican*, beyond the river *Tiber*. So *Damaſus* in the life of *Cletus*, *Qui etiam ſepultus eſt juxta corpus B. Petri in Vaticano.* The Church then in the place of the region of the *Romans* is the Chriſtian Church of *Rome*, aſſembling chiefly in the *Cœmeteries* of the *Vatican*, or any other of thoſe vaults which were in the Fields at a good diſtance from the City. But yet there is one argument more for *Metropolitans*, and that is from the importance of the word παροικία, which is taken to ſignifie both the City and Countrey; and ſo the inſcription of *Clemens* his Epiſtle is explained ἐκκλησία θεοῦ ἡ παροικοῦσα Ρώμην, ἐκκλησίᾳ θεοῦ τῇ παροικούσῃ Κόρινθον, i. e. *the Church of God dwelling about* Rome *to the Church dwelling about* Corinth, whereby is ſuppoſed to be comprehended the whole territories, which (being theſe were *Metropoles*) takes in the whole Province. And ſo *Polycarp*, τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ παροι-

κούσῃ

κίᾳ Φιλίπποις, But all this ariſeth from a miſtake of the ſignification of the word παροικεῖν, which ſignifies not ſo much *accolere* as *incolere*: and therefore the old Latin verſion renders it *Eccleſiæ Dei quæ eſt Philippis.* Πάροικος is παρ' ἄλλης πόλεως ἄλλην οἰκῶν, one that removes from one City to ſojourn in other. And the ground of attributing that name to the Chriſtian Churches, was either becauſe that many of the firſt Chriſtians being Jews, they did truly παροικεῖν, being as ſtrangers out of their own countrey, or elſe among the Chriſtians, becauſe by reaſon of their continual perſecutions they were ſtill put in mind of their flitting uncertain condition in the world, their πολίτευμα, *countrey, citizenſhip* being in heaven. Of this the Apoſtles often tell them: from hence it came to ſignifie the ſociety of ſuch Chriſtians ſo living together; which as it increaſed ſo the notion of the word παροικία increaſed, and ſo went from the City into the countrey, and came not from the countrey into the City; for if παροικεῖν ſhould be taken for *accolere*, then it neceſſarily follows that ἐκκλησία παροικοῦσα Ῥώμην cannot ſignifie the Church of *Rome*, and the territories belonging to it, but the Church adjacent to *Rome*, diſtinct from the City, and the Church in it. For in that ſenſe παροικεῖν is oppoſed to living in the City, and ſo πάροικοι are diſtinct from the Citizens, as in *Thucydides* and others; but I believe no inſtance can poſſibly be produced wherein παροικία taken in that ſenſe doth comprehend in it both City and countrey. But being taken in the former ſenſe, it was firſt applied to the whole Church of the City: but when the Church of the City did ſpread its ſelf into the Countrey, then the word παροικία comprehended the Chriſtians both in City and Countrey adjoyning to it. Phil. 3. 20.

§. 4. Which leads me to the *ſecond ſtep* of Chriſtian Churches, *when Churches took in the Villages and Territories adjoyning to the Cities*: For which we muſt underſtand that the ground of the ſubordination of the Villages and Territories about, did primarily ariſe from hence, that the Goſpel was ſpread abroad from the ſeveral Cities into the Countries about. The Apoſtles themſelves preached, as we read moſt in Scripture, in the Cities, becauſe of the great reſort of people thither; there they planted Churches, and ſetled the Government of them in an *Eccleſiaſtical Senate*, which not only took care for the government of Churches already conſtituted, but for the gathering more. Now the perſons who were imployed in the converſion of the adjacent Territories, being of the *Clergy* of the City, the perſons by them converted were adjoyned to the Church of the City; and all the affairs of thoſe leſſer Churches were at firſt determined by the Governours of the City; Afterwards when theſe Churches increaſed, and had peculiar officers ſet over them by the Senate of the City Church, although theſe did rule and govern their flock, yet it always was with a ſubordination to, and dependence upon the government of the City Church. So that by this means, he that was Preſident of the Senate in the City, did likewiſe ſuperintend all the Churches planted in the adjoyning Territories, which was the original of that which the Greeks call παροικία, the Latins the *Dioceſe* of the Biſhop. The Church where the Biſhop was peculiarly reſident with the Clergy, was called *Matrix Eccleſia*, and *Cathedra principalis*, as the ſeveral Pariſhes which at firſt were divided according to the ſeveral *regions* of the City, were called *Tituli*, and thoſe planted in the Territories about the City, called *Parœcia*, when they were applied to the *Preſbyters*; but when to the Biſhop, it noted a Dioceſe: thoſe that were planted

Cod. Eccleſ. Afric. c. 33. *can.* 71.

piſtles being written many of them upon occaſion, as that to the *Corinthians* being directed to the *Metropolis* of *Corinth*; doth only concern the Church of that City, and thoſe of *Achaia* that were ſubject to the juriſdiction of the City; and ſo for the reſt of the Epiſtles. A fair way to make the word of God of no effect to us; becauſe forſooth, we live not in obedience to thoſe *Metropoles* to which the Epiſtles were directed! From whence we are told how many things we may underſtand by this notion of *Metropolitans*: Eſpecially why *Ignatius* ſuperſcribes his Epiſtle to the *Romans* ἐκκλησία ἥτις προκάθηται ἐν τόπῳ χωρίου Ῥωμαίων, *to the Church which preſides in the place of the Roman region, or the ſuburbicarian Provinces.* But let us ſee whether this place may not Exercit. 16. n. 150. be underſtood better without the help of this notion. *Caſaubon* calls it Exercit. in ep. Ignat. ad Rom. c. 2. *locutionem barbaram*; *Vedelius* is more favourable to it, and thinks *ſi non elegans*, *ſaltem vitii libera eſt*, and explains it by the ſuburbicarian Provinces.: and makes the ſenſe of it to be ἐν τόπῳ ὅς ἐστι χωρίων τοῦ Ῥωμαίων, *in the place which is the Roman region*, and parallels it with the τόπος πόλεως καλουμένης Βηθσαϊδά Luk. 9. 10. *Bellarmine* thinks he hath found the Pope's univerſal power in this τόπος, but methinks the χωρίου Ῥωμαίων ſhould hardly be rendered *Orbis univerſus*, unleſs *Bellarmine* were no more skill'd in *Greek*, than *Caſaubon* thinks he was, whom he calls in the place forecited, *hominem Græcarum literarum prorſus* ἀμύητον. The moſt ingenuous conjecture concerning this place, is that of our Laws of the Chur. cap. 18. p. 164. learned Mr. *Thorndike*. *The word* τόπος, *ſaith he, is here uſed as many times beſides, ſpeaking of thoſe places which a man would neither call Cities nor Towns, as* Act. 27. 2. μέλλοντες πλεῖν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τόπους, *being to ſail by the places of* Aſia. χώρα, *it is plain it ſignifies the countrey*, τόπος χωρίου Ῥωμάιων *then muſt neceſſarily ſignifie here the* Vatican *lying in the Fields as a ſuburb to* Rome, *and being the place where* St. Peter *was buried, and where the Jews of* Rome *then dwelt, as we learn by* Philo, *legatione ad Caium*, out of whom he produceth a large place to that purpoſe, and ſo makes this the Church of the Jewiſh Chriſtians, *the Vatican being then the Jewry of Rome*; but there being no clear evidence of any ſuch diſtinction of Churches there, and as little reaſon why *Ignatius* ſhould write to the Church of Jewiſh Chriſtians, and not to the Church of the Gentile Chriſtians, I therefore embrace his ſenſe of the τόπος χωρίου Ῥωμαίων for the *Vatican*, but explain it in another way, *viz.* we have already ſhewed that the chief places of meeting for the Chriſtians in *Gentile Rome*, was in the *Cœmeteries* of the Martyrs; now theſe *Cœmeteria* were all of them without the City; and the *Cœmeteria* where *Peter*, *Linus*, *Cletus*, and ſome other of the Primitive Martyrs lay inter'd in the *Vatican*, beyond the river *Tiber*. So *Damaſus* in the life of *Cletus*, *Qui etiam ſepultus eſt juxta corpus B. Petri in Vaticano.* The Church then in the place of the region of the *Romans* is the Chriſtian Church of *Rome*, aſſembling chiefly in the *Cæmeteries* of the *Vatican*, or any other of thoſe vaults which were in the Fields at a good diſtance from the City. But yet there is one argument more for *Metropolitans*, and that is from the importance of the word παροικία, which is taken to ſignifie both the City and Countrey; and ſo the inſcription of *Clemens* his Epiſtle is explained ἐκκλησία Θεοῦ ἡ παροικοῦσα Ῥώμην, ἐκκλησίᾳ θεοῦ τῇ παροικούσῃ Κόρινθον, i. e. *the Church of God dwelling about* Rome *to the Church dwelling about* Corinth, whereby is ſuppoſed to be comprehended the whole territories, which (being theſe were *Metropoles*) takes in the whole Province. And ſo *Polycarp*, τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ παροι-

κούσῃ

κύσῃ Φιλίπποις, But all this ariſeth from a miſtake of the ſignification of the word παροικεῖν, which ſignifies not ſo much *accolere* as *incolere:* and therefore the old Latin verſion renders it *Eccleſiæ Dei quæ eſt Philippis.* Πάροικος is παρ᾽ ἄλλης πόλεως ἄλλην οἰκῶν, one that removes from one City to ſojourn in other. And the ground of attributing that name to the Chriſtian Churches, was either becauſe that many of the firſt Chriſtians being Jews, they did truly παροικεῖν, being as ſtrangers out of their own countrey, or elſe among the Chriſtians, becauſe by reaſon of their continual perſecutions they were ſtill put in mind of their flitting uncertain condition in the world, their πολίτευμα, *countrey, citizenſhip* being in heaven. Phil. 3. 20. Of this the Apoſtles often tell them: from hence it came to ſignifie the ſociety of ſuch Chriſtians ſo living together; which as it increaſed ſo the notion of the word παροικία increaſed, and ſo went from the City into the countrey, and came not from the countrey into the City; for if παροικεῖν ſhould be taken for *accolere,* then it neceſſarily follows that ἐκκλησία παροικοῦσα Ῥώμην cannot ſignifie the Church of *Rome,* and the territories belonging to it, but the Church adjacent to *Rome,* diſtinct from the City, and the Church in it. For in that ſenſe παροικεῖν is oppoſed to living in the City, and ſo πάροικοι are diſtinct from the Citizens, as in *Thucydides* and others; but I believe no inſtance can poſſibly be produced wherein παροικία taken in that ſenſe doth comprehend in it both City and countrey. But being taken in the former ſenſe, it was firſt applied to the whole Church of the City: but when the Church of the City did ſpread its ſelf into the Countrey, then the word παροικία comprehended the Chriſtians both in City and Countrey adjoyning to it.

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Cod. Eccleſ. Afric. c. 33. can. 71.

planted in theſe countrey pariſhes, were called πρεσβύτεροι ἐπιχώριοι, οἱ ἐν χώραις by the Greeks, and by the Latins *Preſbyteri regionarii, conregionales, foraſtici, ruris agrorum Preſbyteri*; from whom the χωρεπίσκοποι were diſtinct, as evidently appears by the thirteenth Canon of the *Council* of *Neocæſarea: where the Country Preſbyters are forbidden to adminiſter the Lord's Supper in the preſence of the Biſhop or the Preſbyters of the City; but the Chorepiſcopi were allowed to do it.* *Salmaſius* think theſe χωρεπίσκοποι were ſo called as τῶν χωρῶν ἐπίσκοποι, the *Epiſcopi villani*, ſuch as were only Preſbyters, and were ſet over the Churches in Villages; but though they were originally Preſbyters, yet they were raiſed to ſome higher authority over the reſt of the Preſbyters; and the original of them ſeems to be, that when Churches were ſo much multiplyed in the Countries adjacent to the Cities, that the Biſhop in his own perſon could not be preſent to overſee the actions and carriages of the ſeveral Preſbyters of the Country Churches, then they ordained ſome of the fitteſt in their ſeveral *Dioceſes* to ſuper-intend the ſeveral Preſbyters lying remote from the City; from which Office of theirs they were called περιοδευταί, becauſe they did περιοδεύειν, go about, and viſit the ſeveral Churches. This is the account given of them by *Beza* and *Blondel* as well as others. All theſe ſeveral places that were conveyed to the Faith by the aſſiſtance of the Preſbyters of the City, did all make but one Church with the City. Whereof we have this two-fold evidence. *Firſt*, From the *Eulogiæ* which were at firſt parcels of the Bread conſecrated for the Lord's Supper, which were ſent by the *Deacons* or *Acoluthi* to thoſe that were abſent, in token of their Communion in the ſame Church. *Juſtin Martyr* is the firſt who acquaints us with this cuſtom of the Church; *After*, ſaith he, *the Preſident of the Aſſembly hath conſecrated the Bread and the Wine, the Deacons ſtand ready to diſtribute it to every one preſent,* καὶ τοῖς οὐ παροῦσιν ἀποφέρουσι, *and carry it to thoſe that are abſent.* *Damaſus* attributes the beginning of this cuſtom to *Miltiades* Biſhop of *Rome*. *Hic fecit ut oblationes conſecratæ per eccleſias ex conſecratione Epiſcopi dirigerentur: quod declaratur fermentum.* So *Innocentius ad Decentium*; *De fermento vero quod die Dominica per titulos mittimus*, &c. *ut ſe à noſtra communione maxime illa die non judicent ſeparatos.* Whereby it appears to have been the cuſtom at *Rome* and other places to ſend from the Cathedral Church the Bread conſecrated to the ſeveral Pariſh Churches, to note their joint-communion in the faith of the Goſpel. Neither was it ſent only to the ſeveral *tituli* in the City, but to the Villages round about, as appears by the *Queſtion* propounded by *Decentius*; although at *Rome* it ſeems they ſent it only to the Churches within the City, as appears by the Anſwer of *Innocentius*: but *Albaſpinæus* takes it for granted as a general cuſtom upon ſome ſet days to ſend theſe *Eulogiæ* through the whole *Dioceſe*. *Nam cum per vicos & agros ſparſi & diffuſi, ex eadem non poſſint ſumere communione, cuperentque ſemper unionis Chriſtianæ, & Chriſti corporis ſpeciem quam poſſint maximam retinere, ſolenniſſimis diebus & feſtivis ex matrice per parochias benedictus mittebatur panis, ex cujus perceptione communitas quæ inter omnes fideles ejuſdem Diœceſis intercedere debet, intelligebatur & repreſentabatur.* Surely then their Dioceſes were not very large; if all the ſeveral Pariſhes could communicate on the ſame Day with what was ſent from the Cathedral Church. Afterwards they ſent not part of the Bread of the Lord's Supper, but ſome other in Analogy to that, to denote their mutual conteſſeration in the faith and communion in the

Apparatus p. 240. *de primat. c.* 1. *p.* 10. *c.* 11. *p.* 164.

Beza de Miniſ. grad. c. 2. 24. *Blondel. Ap. p.* 94.

Apol. 2. *p.* 97.

Cap. 5.

Obſervat. l. 1. *c.* 8.

V. Caſaub. Exercit. 16. *ſ.* 33. *Salmaſ. App. p.* 243.

ſame Church. *Secondly*, It appears that ſtill they were of the ſame Church, by the preſence of the *Clergy* of the Country at the choice of the Biſhop of the City, and at Ordinations, and in Councils. So at the choice of *Boniface*, *Relictis ſinguli titulis ſuis Preſbyteri omnes aderunt qui voluntatem ſuam, hoc eſt Dei judicium proloquantur*; whereby it is evident that all the Clergy had their voices in the choice of the Biſhop. And therefore *Pope Leo* requires theſe things as neceſſary to the ordination of a Biſhop, *Subſcriptio clericorum, Honoratorum teſtimonium, ordinis conſenſus & plebis:* and in the ſame Chapter, ſpeaking of the choice of the Biſhop, he ſaith it was done *ſubſcribentibus plus minus ſeptuaginta Preſbyteris*. And therefore it is obſerved that all the Clergy concurred to the choice even of the Biſhop of *Rome*, till after the time of that *Hildebrand* called *Greg*. 7. in whoſe time *Popery* came to *Age:* thence *Caſaubon* calls it *Hereſin Hildebrandinam*. *Cornelius* Biſhop of *Rome* was choſen *Clericorum pene omnium teſtimonio*; and in the Council at *Rome* under *Sylveſter* it is decreed, that none of the Clergy ſhould be ordained, *niſi cum tota adunata Eccleſia*. Many inſtances are brought from the Councils of *Carthage* to the ſame purpoſe, which I paſs over as commonly known. It was accounted the matter of an accuſation againſt *Chryſoſtom* by his enemies, ὅτι ἄνευ συνεδρίου καὶ παρὰ γνώμην τοῦ κλήρου ποιεῖ τὰς χειροτονίας, *that he ordaineth without the Councel and Aſſiſtance of his Clergy*. The Preſence of the Clergy at Councils hath been already ſhewed. Thus we ſee how, when the Church of the City was enlarged into the Country, the power of the Governors of the Church in the City was extended with it.

Ep. ad Honor. à Preſbyt. Rom.

Ep. 90.

Cypr. ep. 52.

Concil. 3. *c.* 4. & 5. *Con.* 2. *c.* 10, 11.

Photius Cod. 59. *n.* 15.

§. 5. The next ſtep obſervable in the Churches increaſe, was *when ſeveral of theſe Churches lying together in one Province did aſſociate one with another*. The Primitive Church had a great eye to the preſerving unity among all the members of it, and thence they kept ſo ſtrict a correſpondency among the ſeveral Biſhops in the *Commercium Formatarum* (the *formula* of writing, which to prevent deceit, may be ſeen in *Juſtellus* his Notes on the *Codex Canonum Eccleſiæ Africanæ*) and for a maintaining of nearer correſpondency among the Biſhops themſelves of a Province, it was agreed among themſelves for the better carrying on of their common Work, to call a Provincial Synod twice every Year to debate all cauſes of concernment there among themſelves, and to agree upon ſuch ways as might moſt conduce to the advancing the common intereſt of Chriſtianity. Of theſe *Tertullian* ſpeaks, *Aguntur præcepta per Græcias illas certis in locis Concilia ex univerſis Eccleſiis, per quæ & altiora quæq; in communi tractantur, & ipſa repreſentatio nominis Chriſtiani magna veneratione celebratur*. Of theſe the *thirty eighth Canon Apoſtolical* (as it is called) expreſly ſpeaks (which Canons though not of authority ſufficient to ground any right upon, may yet be allowed the place of a Teſtimony of the practice of the Primitive Church, eſpecially towards the third Century) Δεύτερον τοῦ ἔτους σύνοδος γινέσθω τῶν ἐπισκόπων, καὶ ἀνακρινέτωσαν ἀλλήλως τὰ δόγματα τῆς εὐσεβείας καὶ τὰς ἐμπιπτούσας ἐκκλησιαστικὰς ἀντιλογίας διαλυέτωσαν. *Twice a year a Synod of Biſhops was to be kept for diſcuſſing matters of Faith, and reſolving matters of Practice*. To the ſame purpoſe the Council of *Antioch*, *A. D.* 343. Διὰ τὰς ἐκκλησιαστικὰς χρείας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων διαλύσεις, καλῶς ἔχειν ἔδοξε συνόδους καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐπαρχίαν τῶν ἐπισκόπων γίνεσθαι δεύτερον τοῦ ἔτους. To theſe Councils the Preſbyters and Deacons came, as appears by that Canon of the Council of *Antioch*; and in the ſeventh Canon of the *Nicene* Council by *Alphonſus Piſanus* the ſame cuſtom is decreed, but no

Pag. 127.

De jejunio adverſ. Pſych.

Can. Apoſt. cap. 18.

Can. 20. *in Cod. Can.* 99.

ſuch thing occurs in the *Codex Canonum*, either of *Tilius* or *Juſtellus* his Edition; and the *Arabick* Edition of that Council is conceived to have been compiled above Four hundred years after the Council ſet. But however we ſee evidence enough of this practice of celebrating Provincial Synods twice a year; now in the Aſſembling of theſe Biſhops together for mutual council in their affairs, there was a neceſſity of ſome order to be obſerved. There was no difference as to the power of the Biſhops themſelves, who had all equal authority in their ſeveral Churches, and none over one another. For *Epiſcopatus unus eſt cujus à ſingulis in ſolidum pars tenetur*, as *Cyprian* ſpeaks; and as *Jerome*, *Ubicunq; Epiſcopus* De veritate Eccleſ. *fuerit*, *ſive Romæ*, *ſive Eugubii*, *ſive Conſtantinopolis*, *ſive Rhegii*, *ſive Alexandriæ*, *ſive Tanis*, *ejuſdem eſt meriti*, *ejuſdem eſt Sacerdotii*. Ep. ad Evagrium. *Potentia divitiarum & paupertatis humilitas*, *vel ſublimiorem*, *vel inferiorem Epiſcopum non facit: Cæterum omnes Apoſtolorum ſucceſſores ſunt*. There being then no difference between them, no man calling himſelf *Epiſcopum Epiſcoporum*, as *Cyprian* elſewhere ſpeaks, ſome other way muſt be found out to preſerve order among them, and to moderate the affairs of the Councils; and therefore it was determined in the Council of *Antioch*, that he that was the Biſhop of the *Metropolis*, ſhould have the Can. 17. honour of Metropolitan among the Biſhops, Διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει πανταχόθεν συντρέχειν πάντας τȢς τὰ πράγματα ἔχοντας, ὅθεν ἔδοξε καὶ τῇ τιμῇ προηγεῖσθαι αὐτόν· *becauſe of the great confluence of the people to that City, therefore he ſhould have the preheminence above the reſt.* We ſee how far they are from attributing any Divine Right to *Metropolitans*; and therefore the Rights of Metropolitans are called by the ſixth *Canon* of the *Nicene Council*, τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἔθη, which had been a diſhonourable introduction for the Metropolitan rights, had they thought them grounded upon Apoſtolical inſtitution. Nothing more evident in Antiquity than the honour of *Metropolitans* depending upon their *Sees*; thence when any Cities were raiſed by the Emperor to the honour of *Metropoles*, their Biſhop became a Metropolitan, as is moſt evident in *Juſtiniana prima*, and for it there are *Canons* in the Councils decreeing it; but of this more afterwards. The chief Biſhop of *Africa* was only called *primæ ſedis Epiſcopus*: thence we have a *Canon* in the *Codex Eccleſiæ Africanæ*, Can 39. Ὥστε τὸν τῆς πρώτης καθέδρας ἐπίσκοπον μὴ λέγεσθαι ἔξαρχον τῶν ἱερέων ἢ ἄκρον ἱερέα, ἢ τοιουτότροπόν τι ποτε· ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐπίσκοπον τῆς πρώτης καθέδρας. *That the Biſhop of the chief See ſhould not be called the Exarch of the Prieſts, or chief Prieſt, or any thing of like nature, but only the Biſhop of the chief Seat.* Therefore it hath been well obſerved, that the *African* Churches did retain longeſt the Primitive ſimplicity and humility among them; and when the voice was ſaid to be heard in the Church upon the flowing in of Riches, *Hodie venenum effuſum eſt in Eccleſiam*, by the working of which poyſon the ſpirits of the Prelates began to ſwell with pride and ambition (as is too evident in Church-Hiſtory) only *Africa* eſcaped the infection moſt, and reſiſted the tyrannical incroachments of the *Roman* Biſhop, with the greateſt magnanimity and courage, as may be ſeen by the excellent Epiſtle of the *Council* of *Carthage*, to *Boniface* Biſhop of *Rome* in the *Codex Eccleſiæ Africanæ*. Pag. 341. So that however *Africa* hath been always fruitful of monſters; yet in that ambitious age it had no other wonder but only this, that it ſhould eſcape ſo free from that *typhus ſæcularis* (as then they called it) that monſtrous itch of pride and ambition. From whence we may well riſe to the laſt ſtep of the power of the Church, which was after the Empire grew Chriſtian, and many Provinces did aſſociate together, then the honour and power of *Patriarchs* came upon the ſtage. And now began the whole Chriſtian world to be the *Cock-pit*, wherein the two great *Prelates* of *Rome* and *Conſtantinople* ſtrive with their greateſt force for maſtery of one another, and the whole world with them; as may be ſeen in the actions of *Paſchaſinus* the *Roman Legat* in the *Council* of *Chalcedon*. From whence forward the great *Leviathan* by his tumbling in the Waves, endeavoured to get the Dominion of all into his hands: but God hath at laſt put a hook into his noſtrils, and raiſed up the great inſtruments of Reformation, who like the Sword-fiſh have ſo pierced into his Bowels, that by his tumbling he may only haſten his approaching ruine, and give the Church every day more hopes of ſeeing its ſelf freed from the tyranny of an uſurped power. By this ſcheme and draught now of the increaſe of the Churches power, nothing can be more evident, than that it roſe not from any divine inſtitution, but only from poſitive and Eccleſiaſtical Laws made according to the ſeveral ſtates and conditions wherein the Church was; which as it gradually grew up, ſo was the power of the Church by mutual conſent fitted to the ſtate of the Church in its ſeveral ages. Which was the firſt argument that the Primitive Church did not conceive it ſelf bound to obſerve any one unalterable form of Government. This being the chief, the reſt that follow, will ſooner be diſpatched.

§. 6.

The *ſecond* is from the great varieties as to Government which were in ſeveral Churches. What comes from Divine right is obſerved unalterably in one uniform and conſtant tenour: but what we find ſo much diverſified according to ſeveral places, we may have ground to look on only as an Eccleſiaſtical conſtitution, which was followed by every Church as it judged convenient. Now as to Church Government we may find ſome Churches without Biſhops for a long time, ſome but with one Biſhop in a whole Nation, many Cities without any, where Biſhops were common; many Churches diſcontinue Biſhops for a great while where they had been; no certain rule obſerved for modelling their Dioceſes where they were ſtill continued. Will not all theſe things make it ſeem very improbable that it ſhould be an Apoſtolical inſtitution, that no Church ſhould be without a Biſhop? Firſt then ſome whole Nations ſeem to have been without any Biſhops at all, if we may believe their own Hiſtorians. So if we may believe the great *Antiquaries* of the Church of *Scotland*, that Church was governed by their *Culdei*, as they called their Preſbyters, without any Biſhop over them, for a long time. *Johannes Major* ſpeaks of their inſtruction in the Faith, *Per Sacerdotes & Monachos ſine Epiſcopis Scoti in fide eruditi*; but leſt that ſhould be interpreted only of their converſion, *Johannes Fordonus* is clear and full as to their Government, from the time of their converſion about *A. D.* 263. to the coming of *Palladius A. D.* 430. that they were only governed by Preſbyters and Monks. *Ante Palladii adventum habebant Scoti fidei Doctores ac Sacramentorum Miniſtratores Preſbyteros ſolummodo, vel Monachos ritum ſequentes Eccleſiæ primitivæ.* So much miſtaken was that learned man, who ſaith, that neither *Bede* nor any other affirm that the *Scots* were formerly ruled by a Preſbytery, or ſo much as that they had any Preſbyter among them. Neither is it any ways ſufficient to ſay that theſe Preſbyters did derive their authority from ſome Biſhops: For however we ſee here a Church governed without ſuch, or if they had any, they were only choſen from their *Culdei*, much after the cuſtom

De geſtis Scot. lib. 1. *cap.* 2.

*Scot. chron. lib.*3. *c.* 8.

V. Blondel. Apol. ſ. 3, *pag.* 314.

of the Church of *Alexandria*, as *Hector Boethius* doth imply. And if we believe *Philoſtorgius*, the *Gothick* Churches were planted and governed by Preſbyters for above ſeventy years; for ſo long it was from their firſt converſion to the time of *Ulphilas*, whom he makes their firſt Biſhop. And great probability there is, that where Churches were planted by Preſbyters, as the Church of *France* by *Andochius* and *Inignus*, that afterwards upon the increaſe of Churches and Preſbyters to rule them, they did from among themſelves chuſe one to be as the Biſhop over them, as *Pothinus* was at *Lyons*. For we no where read in thoſe early plantations of Churches, that where there were Preſbyters already, they ſent to other Churches to derive Epiſcopal ordination from them. Now for whole Nations having but one Biſhop, we have the teſtimony of *Sozomen*, that in *Scythia*, which by the *Romans* was called *Maſia inferior*, πολλαὶ πόλεις ὄντες ἕνα πάντες ἐπίσκοπον ἔχουσιν. *Although there were many Cities they had but one Biſhop.* The like *Godignus* relates of the Abaſſine Churches, though their Territories be of vaſt extent, there is but only one Biſhop in all thoſe Dominions, who is the Biſhop of *Abuna*. And where Biſhops were moſt common, it is evident they looked not on it as an Apoſtolical rule for every City to have a Biſhop, which it muſt have if it was an Apoſtolical inſtitution for the Church to follow the Civil Government. *Theodoret* mentions 800 Churches under his charge, in whoſe *Dioceſe Ptolomy* placeth many other Cities of note beſides *Cyrus*, as *Ariſeria*, *Regia*, *Ruba*, *Heraclea*, &c. In the Province of *Tripoly* he reckons nine Cities which had but five Biſhops, as appears by the *Notitia Eccleſiæ Africanæ*. In *Thracia* every Biſhop had ſeveral Cities under him. The Biſhop of *Heraclea* that and *Panion*; the Biſhop of *Byze* had it and *Arcadiopolis*; of *Cæla* had it and *Callipolis*; *Sabſadia* had it and *Aphrodiſias*. It is needleſs to produce more inſtances of this nature, either ancient or modern, they being ſo common and obvious. But farther we find Biſhops diſcontinued for a long time in the greateſt Churches. For if there be no Church without a Biſhop, where was the Church of *Rome* when from the Martyrdom of *Fabian*, and the baniſhment of *Lucius*, the Church was governed only by the Clergy? So the Church of *Carthage* when *Cyprian* was baniſhed; the Church of the Eaſt, when *Meletius* of *Antioch*, *Euſebius*, *Samoſatenus*, *Pelagius* of *Laodicea*, and the reſt of the orthodox Biſhops were baniſhed for ten years ſpace, and *Flavianus* and *Diodorus*, two Preſbyters, ruled the Church of *Antioch* the mean while. The Church of *Carthage* was twenty four years without a Biſhop in the time of *Hunerik*, King of the *Vandals*; and when it was offered them that they might have a Biſhop upon admitting the *Arians* to a free exerciſe of their Religion among them, their anſwer was upon thoſe terms, *Eccleſia Epiſcopum non delectatur habere*; and *Balſamon* ſpeaking of the Chriſtian Churches in the Eaſt, determines it neither ſafe nor neceſſary in their preſent ſtate to have Biſhops ſet up over them. And laſtly, for their *Dioceſes*, it is evident there was no certain rule for modelling them. In ſome places they were far leſs than in others. Generally in the Primitive and Eaſtern Churches they were very ſmall and little, as far more convenient for the end of them in the Government of the Churches under the Biſhop's charge; it being obſerved out of *Walafridus Strabo* by a learned man, *Fertur in Orientis partibus per ſingulas urbes & præfecturas ſingulas eſſe Epiſcoporum gubernationes.* In *Africk*, if we look but into the writings of *Auguſtine*, we may find hundreds of Biſhops reſorting to one Council. In *Ireland* alone, St. *Patrick* is

Scot. hiſt. lib. 6.

Eclog. l. 2. *cap.* 5.

Hiſt. eccleſ. l. 7. *cap.* 19.

De rebus Abaſſin. l. 1. *c.* 32.

Ep. 113.

Geog. l. 5. *cap.* 15.

Epheſ. ſynod. 1. *ad fin.* Act. 7.

Cyprian. ep. 3. 26. 30, 31.

Theodoret. l. 4. *c.* 22.

Victor. l. 2. *de perſ. Vand.*

In Can. 57. *Laod.*

Thorndike's right of the Ch. *p.* 62.

De rebus Eccleſiaſt.

ſaid by *Ninius*, at the firſt Plantation of Chriſtianity, to have founded 365 Biſhopricks. So *Sozomen* tells us, that among the *Arabians* and *Cyprians*, *Novatians* and *Montaniſts*, Ἐν κώμαις ἐπίσκοποι ἱερῶνται, the very Villages had Biſhops among them.

Lib. 7. c. 19.

§. 7.

The next evidence that the Church did not look upon it ſelf as bound by a Divine Law to obſerve any one Model of Government, is the conforming the Eccleſiaſtical Government to the Civil. For if the obligation aroſe from a Law of God, that muſt not be altered according to civil Conſtitutions, which are variable according to the different ſtate and conditions of things. If then the Apoſtles did ſettle things by a ſtanding Law in their own times, how comes the Model of Church-Government to alter with the Civil Form? Now that the Church did generally follow the Civil Government, is freely acknowledged and inſiſted on by learned perſons of all ſides; eſpecially after the diviſion of the *Roman* Empire by *Conſtantine* the Great. The full making out of which is a work too large to be here undertaken, and hath been done to very good purpoſe already, by *Berterius*, *Salmaſius*, *Gothofred*, *Blondel*, and others, in their learned Diſcourſes of the *Suburbicarian Provinces*. Which whether by them we underſtand that which did correſpond to the Præfecture of the *Provoſt* of *Rome*, which was within a hundred miles compaſs of the City of *Rome*, or that which anſwered to the *Vicarius Urbis*, whoſe Juriſdiction was over the Ten Provinces diſtinct from *Italy*, properly ſo called, whoſe *Metropolis* was *Milan*; or, which is moſt probable, the Metropolitan Province anſwering to the Juriſdiction of the *Præfectus Urbis*, and the *Patriarchate* of the *Roman* Biſhop to the *Vicarius Urbis:* which way ſoever we take it, we ſee it anſwered to the Civil Government. I ſhall not here enter that debate, but only briefly at preſent ſet down the Scheme of both Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Government, as it is repreſented by our learned *Breerwood*. The whole Empire of *Rome* was divided into Thirteen Dioceſes, whereof ſeven belonged to the *Eaſt* Empire, and ſix (beſide the Præfecture of the City of *Rome*) to the *Weſt*. Thoſe Thirteen *Dioceſes*, together with that Præfecture, contained among them 120 Provinces, or thereabout; ſo that to every Dioceſe belonged the adminiſtration of ſundry Provinces: Laſtly, Every Province contained many Cities within their Territories. The Cities had for their Rulers thoſe inferior Judges, which in the Law are called *Defenſores Civitatum*; and their Seats were the Cities themſelves, to which all the Towns and Villages in their ſeveral Territories were to reſort for Juſtice. The Provinces had for theirs, either *Proconſules*, or *Conſulares*, or *Præſides*, or *Correctores*; four ſundry appellations, but almoſt all of equal Authority, and their Seats were the chiefeſt Cities or *Metropoles* of the Provinces, of which in every Province there was one, to which all inferior Cities for judgment in matters of importance did reſort. Laſtly, The Dioceſes had for theirs the Lieutenants called *Vicarii*, and their Seats were the *Metropoles* or principal Cities of the *Dioceſe*, whence the Edicts of the Emperour or other Laws were publiſhed and ſent abroad into all the Provinces of the *Dioceſe*, and where the *Prætorium* and chief Tribunal for Judgment was placed to determine Appeals, and miniſter Juſtice (as might be occaſion) to all the Provinces belonging to that Juriſdiction. And this was the diſpoſition of the *Roman* Governours.——— And truly it is wonderful, (ſaith that learned Author) how nearly and exactly the Church in her Government did imitate this civil Ordination of the

Berteri. Pithanῶν. Diatribæ. Salmaſ. ep. ad Am. Euchariſti. adver. Sirmond. De prim. Pan. Jac. Gothof. Conjectur. Vindiciæ Conjectur. Blondel. de la primauté en la egliſe, &c.

Diſcourſe of the Patriarchal Government of the ancient Churl q. 1.

the *Roman* Magiſtrates. For firſt in every City, as there was a *Defenſor Civitatis* for ſecular Government, ſo was there placed a Biſhop for Spiritual Regiment, (in every City of the Eaſt, and in every City of the Weſt, almoſt a ſeveral Biſhop) whoſe Juriſdiction extended but to the City, and the places within the Territory. For which cauſe the Juriſdiction of a Biſhop was anciently called Παρɛοικία, ſignifying not (as many ignorant Noveliſts think) *a Pariſh:* as now the word is taken, that is, the Places or Habitations near a Church, but the Towns and Villages near a City: all which, together with the City, the Biſhop had in charge. *Secondly*, In every Province, as there was a Preſident, ſo there was an Archbiſhop, and becauſe his Seat was the principal City of the *Province*, he was commonly known by the name of *Metropolitan*. *Laſtly*, In every *Dioceſe*, as there was a *Lieutenant-General*, ſo was there a Primate ſeated alſo in the principal City of the *Dioceſe*, as the *Lieutenant* was, to whom the laſt determining of *Appeals* from all the Provinces in differences of the Clergy, and the ſovereign care of all the *Dioceſes*, for ſundry points of Spiritual Government did belong. By this you may ſee that there were Eleven Primates beſides the Three Patriarchs for the Thirteen *Dioceſes*, (beſides the Præfecture of the City of *Rome*, which was adminiſtred by the Patriarch of *Rome*) that of *Egypt* was governed by the Patriarch of *Alexandria*, and that of the *Orient* by the Patriarch of *Antiochia*, and all the reſt by the *Primates*, between whom and the Patriarchs was no difference of Juriſdiction and Power, but only of ſome Honour which accrued to them by the dignity of their *Sees*; as is clearly expreſſed in the third *Canon* of the Council of *Conſtantinople*, Τὸν μὲν τοι Κωνςαντινοπόλεως ἐπίσκοπον ἔχειν τὰ πρεσβεῖα τῆς τιμῆς μετὰ τὸν τῆς Ῥώμης ἐπίσκοπον. διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν νέαν Ῥώμην, whereby *Conſtantinople is advanced to the Honorary Title of a Patriarchat next to* Rome, *becauſe it was New* Rome. In Cod. Can. 166. Whereby it is evident that the Honour belonging to the Biſhop of Old *Rome*, did ariſe from its being the Imperial City. The Honour of the Biſhop riſing, as *Auſtin* ſaith, that of the *Deacons* of *Rome* did, *propter magnificentiam Urbis Romanæ quæ caput eſſe videtur omnium Civitatum*. Queſt. ex utroq. Teſt. q. 101. Hereby now we fully ſee what the original was of the power of *Archbiſhops*, *Metropolitans* and *Patriarchs* in the Church, *viz.* the contemperating the Eccleſiaſtical Government to the Civil.

§. 8. The next evidence that the Church did not look upon its ſelf as bound by a Divine Law to a certain form of Government, but did order things its ſelf in order to peace and unity, is, that after Epiſcopal Government was ſetled in the Church, yet Ordination by Preſbyters was looked on as valid. For which theſe inſtances may ſuffice. About the year 390, *Johannes Caſſianus* reports, that one *Abbot Daniel*, inferior to none of thoſe who lived in the Deſart of *Scetis*, was made a Deacon, Collat. 4. c. 1. *à B. Paphnutio ſolitudinis ejuſdem Preſbytero: In tantum enim virtutibus ipſius adaugebat, ut quem vitæ meritis ſibi & gratiâ parem noverat, coæquare ſibi etiam Sacerdotii honore feſtinaret. Siquidem nequaquam ferens in inferiore eum miniſterio diutius immorari, optanſque ſibimet ſucceſſorem digniſſimum providere, ſuperſtes cum Preſbyterii honore provexit.* What more plain and evident, than that there a Preſbyter ordained a Preſbyter, which we no where read was pronounced null by *Theophilus*, then Biſhop of *Alexandria*, or any others at that time? It is a known inſtance, that in the ordination of *Pelagius*, firſt Biſhop of *Rome*, there were only two Biſhops concurred, and one Preſbyter, whereas, according to the fourth *Canon* of the *Nicene* Council, three Biſhops are abſolutely required for ordination of a Biſhop; either then *Pelagius* was no Canonical Biſhop, and ſo the point of Succeſſion thereby fails in the Church of *Rome*, or elſe a Preſbyter hath the ſame intrinſecal power of ordination which a Biſhop hath, but it is only reſtrained by Eccleſiaſtical Laws. In the time of *Euſtathius*, Biſhop of *Antioch*, which was done *A. D.* 328, as *Jacobus Gothofredus* proves, till the time of the ordination of *Paulinus*, *A. D.* 362. which was for thirty four years ſpace, when the Church was governed by *Paulinus* and his Colleagues withdrawing from the publick Aſſemblies; it will be hard to ſay by whom the ordinations were performed all this while, unleſs by *Paulinus* and his Colleagues. In the year 452, it appears by *Leo* in his Epiſtle to *Ruſticus Narbonenſis*, that ſome Preſbyters took upon them to ordain as Biſhops, about which he was conſulted by *Ruſticus* what was to be done in that caſe with thoſe ſo ordained: *Leo* his reſolution of that caſe is obſervable, *Si qui autem Clerici ab iſtis pſeudo-Epiſcopis in iis Eccleſiis ordinati ſunt, quæ ad proprios Epiſcopos pertinebant, & ordinatio eorum cum conſenſu & judicio præſidentium facta eſt, poteſt rata haberi, ita ut in ipſis Eccleſiis perſeverent.* “Thoſe Clergy-men who were ordained by ſuch as took upon them the Office of Biſhops, in Churches belonging to proper Biſhops, if the Ordination were performed by the conſent of the Biſhops, it may be looked on as valid, and thoſe Preſbyters remain in their Office in the Church. So that by the conſent *ex poſt facto* of the true Biſhops, thoſe Preſbyters thus ordained, were looked on as lawful Preſbyters, which could not be, unleſs their Ordainers had an intrinſecal power of Ordination, which was only reſtrained by the Laws of the Church; for if they have no power of Ordination, it is impoſſible they ſhould confer any thing by their ordination. If to this It be anſwered, that the validity of their ordination did not depend upon the conſent of the Biſhops, and that Preſbyters may ordain, if delegated thereto by Biſhops, as *Paulinus* might ordain on that account at *Antioch*. It is eaſily anſwered, that this very power of doing it by delegation, doth imply an intrinſecal power in themſelves of doing it. For if Preſbyters be forbidden ordaining others by Scriptures, then they can neither do it in their own perſons, nor by delegation from others. For *quod alicui ſuo nomine non licet, nec alieno licebit:* And that rule of *Cyprian* muſt hold true, *Non aliquid cuiquam largiri poteſt humana indulgentia, ubi intercedit & legem tribuit divina præſcriptio.* There can be no diſpenſing with Divine Laws, which muſt be, if that may be delegated to other perſons, which was required of men in the Office wherein they are. And if Preſbyters have power of conferring nothing by their Ordination, how can an after-conſent of Biſhops make that act of theirs valid, for conferring right and power by it? It appears then, that this power was reſtrained by the Laws of the Church, for preſerving Unity in its ſelf; but yet ſo, that in caſe of neceſſity, what was done by Preſbyters, was not looked on as invalid. But againſt this the caſe of *Iſchyras*, ordained, as it is ſaid, a Preſbyter by *Colluthus*, and pronounced null by the Council of *Alexandria*, is commonly pleaded. but there is no great difficulty in anſwering it. For, *Firſt*, The pronouncing ſuch an Ordination null, doth not evidence that they looked on the power of Ordination, as belonging of divine right only to Biſhops; for we find by many inſtances, that acting in a bare contempt of Eccleſiaſtical Canons was ſufficient to degrade any from being Preſbyters. *Secondly*, If *Iſchyras* had been or-

Anaſt. Bibl. vit. Pelag. Prim.

Diſſert. in Philoſt. l. 2. *cap.* 7.

Ep. 92. *c.* 1.

Reg. juris 67.

Epiſt. 68.

V. Blondel. Ap. p. 325.

dained by a Biſhop, there were circumſtances enough to induce the Council to pronounce it null. *Firſt*, As done out of the Dioceſe, in which caſe Ordinations were nulled by *Concil. Arel. c.* 13. *Secondly*, Done by open and pronouuced Schiſmaticks. *Thirdly*, Done *ſine titulo* ἀπολελυμένως, and ſo nulled by the Canons then. *Fourthly*, *Colluthus* did not act as a Preſbyter in ordaining, but as a Biſhop of the *Meletian* party in *Cynus*, as the Clergy of *Mareotis* ſpeaking of *Iſchyras* his Ordination, ὑπὸ Κολλȣ́θȣ τȣ͂ Πρεσβυτέρȣ φαντασθέντος Ἐπισκοπὴν by *Colluthus* a Preſbyter, making ſhew of being a Biſhop; and is ſuppoſed to have been ordained a *Apol. S.* 3. *à* 317. *ad.* 327. Biſhop by *Meletius*. More concerning this may be ſeen in *Blondel*, who fully clears all the particulars here mentioned. So that notwithſtanding this Inſtance, nothing appears, but that the power of Ordination was reſtrained only by Eccleſiaſtical Laws.

§. 9. The laſt thing to prove that the Church did act upon prudence in Church-Government, is, from the many reſtraints in other caſes made by the Church, for reſtraint of that liberty which was allowed by Divine Laws. He muſt be a ſtranger to the ancient Canons, and Conſtitutions of the Church, that takes not notice of ſuch reſtraints made by Canons, as in reference to obſervation of ſeveral Rites and Cuſtoms in the Churches, determined by the Provincial Synods of the ſeveral Churches; for which purpoſe their Provincial Synods were ſtill *Ep.* 75. kept up in the Eaſtern Church, as appears by the Teſtimony of *Firmilian* in his Epiſtle to *Cyprian*: *Quæ ex cauſa neceſſariò apud nos fit ut per ſingulos annos ſeniores & præpoſiti in unum conveniamus ad diſponenda ea quæ curæ noſtræ commiſſa ſunt. Ut ſi quæ graviora ſunt communi conſilio dirigantur, lapſis quoque fratribus, &c. medela quæratur, non quaſi à nobis remiſſionem peccatorum conſequantur; ſed ut per nos ad intelligentiam delictorum ſuorum convertantur, & Domino pleniùs ſatisfacere cogantur.* The ſeveral Orders about the Diſcipline of the Church were determined in theſe *Synods*; as to which, he that would find a command in Scripture for their Orders about the *Catechumeni*, and *Lapſi*, will take pains to no purpoſe, the Church ordering things it ſelf for the better regulating the ſeveral Churches they were placed over. A demonſtrative argument, that theſe things came not from Divine command, is, from the great diverſity of theſe cuſtoms in ſeveral places: *Hiſt. lib.* 7. *cap.* 19. *V. Juſtel. Præfat. in Cod. Canonum Univerſ. Eccl.* of which beſides *Socrates*, *Sozomen* largely ſpeaks, and may be eaſily gathered from the Hiſtory of the ſeveral Churches: When the Church began to enjoy eaſe and liberty, and thereby had opportunity of enjoying greater conveniency for Councils; we find what matters were determined by thoſe Councils, were entered into a *Codex Canonum* for that purpoſe, which was obſerved next to the Scriptures, not from any obligation of the things themſelves, but from the conduceableneſs of thoſe things (as they judged them) to the preſerving the peace and unity of the Church.

Chap. VIII.

An Inquiry into the Judgment of Reformed Divines concerning the unalterable Divine Right of particular Forms of Church-Government: wherein it is made appear, that the moſt eminent Divines of the Reformation did never conceive any one Form neceſſary; manifeſted by three Arguments. 1. *From the Judgment of thoſe who make the Form of Church-Government mutable, and to depend upon the Wiſdom of the Magiſtrate and Church. This cleared to have been the Judgment of moſt Divines of the* Church of England *ſince the Reformation. Archbiſhop* Cranmer'*s Judgment, with others of the Reformation in* Edward the Sixth'*s time, now firſt publiſhed from his authentick* M. S. *The ſame ground of ſetling* Epiſcopacy *in* Q. Elizabeth'*s time. The Judgment of Archbiſhop* Whitgift, *Biſhop* Bridges, *Dr.* Loe, *Mr.* Hooker, *largely to that purpoſe, in* King James *his time. The* King'*s own opinion. Dr.* Sutcliffe. *Since of* Crakenthorp, *Mr.* Hales, *Mr.* Chillingworth. *The Teſtimony of Foreign Divines to the ſame purpoſe.* Chemnitius, Zanchy. *French Divines,* Peter Moulin, Fregevil, Blondel, Bochartus, Amyraldus. *Other learned Men,* Grotius, *Lord* Bacon, &c. 2. *Thoſe who look upon Equality as the Primitive Form, yet judge Epiſcopacy lawful.* Auguſtane Confeſſion, Melanchton, Articuli Smalcaldici, *Prince of* Anhalt, Hyperius, Hemingius: *The practice of moſt Foreign Churches.* Calvin *and* Beza *both approving Epiſcopacy, and Dioceſan Churches.* Salmaſius, &c. 3. *Thoſe who judge Epiſcopacy to be the Primitive Form, yet look not on it as neceſſary. Biſhop* Jewel, Fulk, Field, *Biſhop* Downham, *Biſhop* Bancroft, *Biſhop* Morton, *Biſhop* Andrews. Saravia, Francis Maſon, *and others. The Concluſion hence laid in order to peace. Principles conducing thereto.* 1. *Prudence muſt be uſed in Church-Government, at laſt confeſſed by all parties. Independents in elective Synods, and Church Covenants, admiſſion of Members, number in Congregations. Preſbyterians in Claſſes and Synods, Lay-elders,* &c. *Epiſcopal in Dioceſes, Cauſes, Rites,* &c. 2. *That prudence beſt, which comes neareſt Primitive Practice. A Preſidency for life over an Eccleſiaſtical Senate ſhewed to be that form, in order to it. Preſbyteries to be reſtored. Dioceſes leſſened. Provincial Synods kept twice a year. The reaſonableneſs and eaſineſs of Accommodation ſhewed. The whole concluded.*

Having thus far proceeded, through Divine aſſiſtance, in our intended method, and having found nothing determining the neceſſity of any one Form of Government in the ſeveral Laws of Nature and Chriſt, nor in the practice of Apoſtles, or Primitive Church; the only thing poſſible to raiſe a ſuſpition of novelty in this opinion, is, that it is contrary to the judgment of the ſeveral Churches of the Reformation. I know it is the laſt *Aſylum* which many run to, when they are beaten off from their imaginary fancies, by pregnant teſtimonies of Scripture and Reaſon, to ſhelter themſelves under the Αὐτὸς ἔφη of ſome particu- §. 1.

lar perſons, to whom their underſtandings are bored in perpetual ſlavery: But if Men would but once think their Underſtandings at age to judge for themſelves, and not make them live under a continual Pupillage, and but take the pains to travel over the ſeveral Churches of the Reformation, they would find themſelves freed of many ſtrange miſpriſions they were poſſeſſed with before, and underſtand far better the ground and reaſon of their pitching upon their ſeveral Forms, than they ſeem to do, who found all things upon a Divine Right. I believe there will, upon the moſt impartial ſurvey, ſcarce be one Church of the Reformation brought, which doth imbrace any Form of Government, becuſe it looked upon that Form as only neceſſary by an unalterable ſtanding Law; but every one took up that Form of Government which was judged moſt ſuitable to the ſtate and condition of their ſeveral Churches: But that I may the better make this appear, I ſhall make uſe of ſome arguments whereby to demonſtrate, that the moſt eminent Divines that have lived ſince the Reformation, have been all of this mind, *That no one Form is determined as neceſſary for the Church of God in all Ages of the World.* For if many of them have *in theſi* aſſerted *the Form of Church-Government mutable*; if *thoſe who have thought an equality among Miniſters the Primitive Form, have yet thought a Government by Epiſcopacy lawful and uſeful:* If, laſtly, *thoſe who have been for Epiſcopacy, have not judged it neceſſary*, then I ſuppoſe it will be evident, that none of them have judged any one Form taken excluſively of others, to be founded upon an unalterable right: For whatſoever is ſo founded, is made a neceſſary duty in all Churches to obſerve it, and it is lawful to vary from it, or to change it according to the prudence of the Church, according to the ſtate and condition of it. I now therefore undertake to make theſe things out in their order.

§. 2. Firſt, I begin with thoſe who have *in theſi* aſſerted the mutability of the Form of Church Government. Herein I ſhall not follow the Engliſh humour, to be more acquainted with the ſtate of Foreign places than their own; but it being of greateſt concernment to know upon what accounts Epiſcopal Government was ſetled among our ſelves, in order to our ſubmiſſion to it; I ſhall therefore make enquiry into the judgment of thoſe perſons concerning it, who either have been inſtrumental in ſetling it, or the great defenders of it after its ſettlement. I doubt not but to make it evident, that before theſe late unhappy times, the main ground for ſetling Epiſcopal Government in this Nation, was not accounted any pretence of Divine Right, but the conveniency of that Form of Church Government to the ſtate and condition of this Church at the time of its Reformation: For which we are to conſider, that the Reformation of our Church was not wrought by the Torrent of a popular fury, nor the Inſurrection of one part of the Nation againſt another; but was wiſely, gravely, and maturely debated, and ſetled with a great deal of conſideration. I meddle not with the times of *Henry* 8. when I will not deny but the firſt *quickning* of the Reformation might be, but the matter of it was as yet rude and undigeſted; I date the birth of it from the firſt ſettlement of that moſt excellent Prince *Edward* 6. the *Phoſphorus* of our Reformation. Who *A. D.* 1547. was no ſooner entered upon his Throne, but ſome courſe was preſently taken in order to Reformation. Commiſſioners with Injunctions were diſpatched to the ſeveral parts of the Land; but the main buſineſs of the Reformation was referred to the Parliament call'd *November* 4. the ſame year, when all former Statutes about Religion were recall'd, as may be ſeen at large in Mr. *Fox*, and Liberty allowed for profeſſing the Goſpel according to the principles of Reformation, all baniſhed perſons for Religion being call'd home. Upon this, for the better eſtabliſhing of Religion, and the publick Order for the Service of God, an *Aſſembly* of ſelect Divines is call'd, by ſpecial order from the King's Majeſty, for debating of the ſetlement of things according to the Word of God, and the practice of the Primitive Church. Theſe ſate, as Mr. *Fox* tells us in *Windſor-Caſtle*; where, as he expreſſeth it, after long, learned, wiſe, and deliberate Adviſes, they did finally conclude and agree upon one uniform order, *&c.* No more is ſaid by him of it, and leſs by the late Hiſtorian. The proceedings then in order to Reformation, being ſo dark hitherto, and obſcure, by what is as yet extant, much light may accrue thereto by the help of ſome authentick MSS. which by a hand of Providence, have happily come into my hands; wherein the manner and method of the Reformation will be more evident to the World, and the grounds upon which they proceeded. In the *Convocation* that year ſitting with the Parliament, I find two Petitions made to the Archbiſhop and the Biſhops of the Upper Houſe, for the calling an Aſſembly of ſelect Divines, in order to the ſettling Church Affairs, and for the King's Grant for their acting in Convocation. Which not being yet to my knowledge extant in publick, and conducing to our preſent buſineſs, I ſhall now publiſh from the MS. of *Biſhop Cranmer's*.

Acts and. Mon. To m 2. p. 657.

Martyrol. in. Tom. 2. p. 658, 659.

They run thus:

Certeyne Petitions and Requeſts made by the Clergy of the Lower Houſe of the Convocation, to the moſt Reverend Father in God, the Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury'*s Grace, and the Reſidue of the Prelates of the Higher Houſe, for the furtherance of certeyne Articles following.*

Firſt, "That Eccleſiaſtical Laws may be made and eſtabliſhed in this "Realm, by xxxij. perſons, or ſo many as ſhall pleaſe the King's Ma-"jeſty to name and appoint, according to the effect of a late Statute "made in the Thirty fifth year of the moſt noble King, and of moſt "famous memory, King *Henry* the Eighth. So that all Judges Eccle-"ſiaſtical proceeding after thoſe Laws, may be without danger and "peril.

"Alſo that according to the ancient cuſtom of this Realm, and the "Tenor of the King's Writs for the ſummoning of the Parliament, "which be now and ever have been directed to the Biſhops of every "Dioceſe, the Clergy of the Lower Houſe of the Convocation may be "adjoined and aſſociate with the Lower Houſe of Parliament, or elſe "that all ſuch Statutes and Ordinances as ſhall be made concerning all "matters of Religion and Cauſes Eccleſiaſtical, may not paſs without "the ſight and aſſent of the ſaid Clergy.

“ Alſo that whereas by the commandment of King *Henry* the Eighth, certeyne Prelates and other Learned men were appointed to alter the Service in the Church, and to deviſe other convenient and uniform order therein, who according to the ſame appointment did make certeyne Books as they be enformed, their requeſt is that the ſaid Books may be ſeen and peruſed by them for a better expedition of Divine Service to be ſet furthe accordingly.

“ Alſo that Men being called to Spiritual Promotions or Benefices, may have ſome allowance for their neceſſary living, and other charges to be ſuſteyned and born concerning the ſaid Benefices in the firſt year wherein they pay the Firſt-Fruits.

The other is,

“ Where the Clergy in the preſent Convocation Aſſembled have made humble ſuite unto the moſt Reverend Father in God my Lord Arch-Biſhop of *Canterbury*, and all other Biſhops, That hit may pleaſe them to be a mean to the King's Majeſty, and the Lord Protector's Grace, that the ſaid Clergy, according to the tenor of the King's Will, and the auncient Laws and Cuſtoms of this noble Realm, might have their rowme and Place, and be aſſociated with the Communs in the nether Houſe of this preſent Parliament, as Members of the Communwealth, and the King's moſt humble Subjects, and if this may not be permitted and granted to them, that then no Laws concerning the Chriſtian Religion, or which ſhall concern eſpecially the perſons, poſſeſſions, rowmes, lyveings, juriſdictions, goods, or cattals of the ſaid Clergy may paſs nor be enacted, the ſaid Clergy not being made privy thereunto, and their anſwers and reaſons not heard. The ſaid Clergy do moſt humbly beſeech an anſwer and declaration to be made unto them, what the ſaid moſt Reverend Father in God, and all other the Biſhops have done in this their humble ſuit and requeſt, to the end that the ſaid Clergy, if nede be, may choſe of themſelf ſuch able and diſcrete perſons which ſhall effectually follow the ſame ſuite in name of them all.

“ And where in a Statute ordained and eſtabliſhed by auctorite of Parliament at *Weſtminſter*, in the twenty fifth year of the reign of the moſt excellent Prince, King *Henry* the Eighth, the Clergy of this Realm ſubmitting themſelf to the King's Highneſs, did knowledge and confeſs according to the truth, that the Convocations of the ſame Clergy hath ben and ought to be aſſembled by the King's Writ; And did promiſe further *in verbo ſacerdotii*, that they never from thence forth wolde preſume to attempt, allege, clayme, or put in ure or enact, promulge or execute any new Canons, Conſtitutions, Ordinances, Provincials, or other, or by whatſoever other name they ſhall be called in the Convocation, oneleſs the Kings moſt Royal Aſſent and Liſence may to them be had, to make, promulge, and execute the ſame. And his Majeſty to give his moſt Royal Aſſent and Auctorite in that behalf

“ half upon peyne of every one of the Cleregie doeing the contrary,
“ and beinge thereof convict, to ſuffre empriſonment, and make Fine at
“ the Kings Will. And that noe Canons, Conſtitutions, or Ordinances
“ ſhall be made or put in execution within this Realm by auctorite of
“ the Convocation of the Clergy, which ſhall be repugnant to the
“ Kings Prerogative Royal, or the Cuſtomes, Laws or Satutes of this
“ Realm. Which Statute is eſtſoon renewed and eſtabliſhed in the xxvij.
“ yere of the Reign of the ſaid moſt noble Kinge, as by the tenor of
“ both Statutes more at large will appear, the ſaid Clergie being pre-
“ ſently aſſembled in Convocation by auctority of the Kings Writ, doe
“ deſire that the Kings Majeſties licence in writeing may be for them ob-
“ tained and granted according to the effect of the ſaid Statutes aucto-
“ riſeing them to attempt, entreate, and commune of ſuch matters, and
“ therein freely to give their conſents, which otherwiſe they may not
“ do, upon paine and peril premiſed.

“ Alſo the ſaid Clergie deſireth that ſuch matters as concerneth Re-
“ ligione which be diſputable, may be quietly, and in good order rea-
“ ſond and diſputed amongſt them in this howſe, whereby the verites
“ of ſuch matters ſhall the better appear. And the dowbtes being open-
“ ed and reſolutely diſcuſſed, men may be fully perſuaded with the quy-
“ etneſs of their Conſciences, and the time well ſpent.

Thus far thoſe Petitions, containing ſome excellent propoſals for a through Reformation. Soon after were called together by the King's ſpecial order, the former ſelect Aſſembly at *Windſor* Caſtle, where met (as far as I can gueſs by the ſeveral Papers delivered in by every one of them ſingly, and ſubſcribed with their own hands, all which I have peruſed) theſe following perſons. *Thomas* Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, *Edward* Archbiſhop of *Yorke*, the Biſhop of *Rocheſter*, *Edmund* Biſhop of *London*, *Robert* Biſhop of *Carliſle*, Dr. *George Day*, Dr. *Thomas Robertſon*, Dr. *I. Redmayne*, Dr. *Edward Leighton*, Dr. *Symon Matthew*, Dr. *William Treſham*, Dr. *Richard Cozen*, Dr. *Edgeworth*, Dr. *Owen Oglethorp*, Dr. *Thyrleby*. Theſe all gave in their ſeveral reſolution in papers, to the Queſtions propounded, with their names ſubſcribed, (a far more prudent way then the confuſion of verbal and tedious diſputes) all whoſe judgments are accurately ſummed up, and ſet down by the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury* himſelf. Their reſolutions contain diſtinct anſwers to ſeveral ſets of queſtions propounded to them. The firſt Set contained ſeveral queſtions about the Maſs, about the inſtituting, receiving, nature, celebration of it; and whether in the Maſs it be convenient to uſe ſuch ſpeech as the people may underſtand, whether the whole were fit to be tranſlated, or only ſome part of it; with ſeveral other queſtions of the ſame nature. The ſecond Set is more pertinent to our purpoſe, wherein are 17 Queſtions propoſed to be reſolved; Ten of them belong to the number of Sacraments, the other 7 concern Church-Government. The Queſtions are theſe.

“ Whether the Apoſtells lacking a higher Power, as in not having a Q. 9.
“ Chriſtian King among them, made Biſhoppes by that neceſſity, or by
“ auctorite given them of God?

“ Whether

10. " Whether Biſhops or Prieſts were firſt; and if the Prieſts were firſt
" then the Prieſt made the Biſhop?

11. " Whether a Biſhop hath auctorite to make a Prieſt by the Scrip-
" tureor no, and whether any other but only a Biſhop may make a
" Prieſt?

12. " Whether in the New-Teſtament be required any Conſecration of a
" Biſhop and Prieſt, or only appointeinge to the Office be ſufficient?

13. " Whether (if it be fortuned a Prince Chriſten learned to conquer
" certen domynyons of Infidells, having non but the Temporal lerned
" men with him) it be defended by Gods Law, that he and they ſhould
" preche and teche the Word of God there or no, and alſo make and
" conſtitute Prieſts or no?

14. " Whether it be forfended by Goddes Law, that if it ſo fortuned
" that all the Biſhopps and Prieſts were dedde, and that the Word of
" God ſhuld there unpreached, the Sacrament of Baptiſme and others
" unminiſtred, then the King of that Region ſhulde make Biſhoppes and
" Prieſts to ſupply the ſame or noe?

16. " Whether a Biſhop or a Prieſt may excommunicate, and for what
" Crimes, and whether they only may excommunicate by Goddes
" Law?

Archbiſh. Cranmer's anſw. *ex ipſo ejus autographo.*

Theſe are the Queſtions, to which the Anſwers are ſeverally returned in diſtinct Papers, all of them bound together in a large Volume by Archbiſhop *Cranmer*; and every one ſubſcribed their Names, and ſome their Seals, to the Papers delivered in. It would be too tedious a work to ſet down their ſeveral opinions at large; only for the deſerved reverence all bear to the name and memory of that moſt worthy Prelate, and glorious Martyr, *Archbiſhop Cranmer*, I ſhall ſet down his Anſwer diſtinctly to every one of theſe Queſtions, and the Anſwers of ſome others to the more material queſtions to our purpoſe.

To the 9. Q. " All Chriſtian Princes have committed unto them im-
" mediately of God the holle cure of all their ſubjects, as well concerning
" the adminiſtration of Goddes Word for the cure of Soul, as concern-
" ing the miniſtration of things Political, and civil Governaunce.

" And in both theis Miniſtrations thei muſt have ſondry Miniſters
" under them to ſupply that which is appointed to their ſeveral Office.

" The Cyvile Miniſters under the Kings Majeſty in this Realm of
" *England*, be thoſe whom yt ſhall pleaſe his Highneſs for the tyme to
" put in auctorite under him; as for example, the Lord Chancellor,
" Lord Treaſurer, Lord Greate Maſter, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Admy-
" rall, Mayres, Shryves, *&c.*

“ The Miniſters of Gods Wourde under His Majeſty be the Biſhops, Parſons, Vicars, and ſuch other Prieſts as be appointed by his Highneſs, to that Miniſtration; as for example, the Biſhop of *Canterbury*, the Biſhop of *Dureſme*, the Biſhop of *Wincheſter*, the Parſon of *Wynwicke*, &c.

“ All the ſaid Officers and Miniſters, as well of th'one ſorte as the other, be appointed, aſſigned, and elected in every place, by the Laws and Orders of Kings and Princes.

“ In the admiſſion of many of theſe Officers bee divers comely Ceremonies and Solemnities uſed, which be not of neceſſity, but only for a goodly order and ſemely faſhion. For if ſuch Offices and Miniſtrations were committed without ſuch ſolemnitye, thei were nevertheles truely committed.

“ And there is no more promiſe of God, that Grace is given in the committing of the Eccleſiaſtical Office, then it is the committing of the Cyvile. In the Apoſtles time, when there was no Chriſtien Princes by whoſe authority Miniſters of Gods Word might be appointed, nor ſynnes by the ſword corrected; there was no remedy then for the correction of Vice, or appointeinge of Miniſters, but only the conſent of Chriſtien multitude amonge themſelfe, by an uniform conſent to follow the advice and perſwaſion of ſuch perſons whom God had moſt endued with the ſpirit of Wiſdom and Counſaile. And at that time, for as much as Chriſtien people had no Sword nor Governour among them, thei were conſtrained of neceſſity to take ſuch Curates and Prieſts, as either they knew themſelfes to be meet thereunto, or elſe as were commended unto them by other, that were ſo replete with the Spirit of God, with ſuch knowledge in the profeſſion of Chriſt, ſuch Wiſdom, ſuch Converſation and Councell, that they ought even of very Conſcience to give credit unto them, and to accept ſuch as by theym were preſented. And ſo ſome tyme the Apoſtles and other unto whom God had given abundantly his Spirit, ſent or appointed Miniſters of Gods Word, ſometime the people did choſe ſuch as they thought meet thereunto. And when any were appointed or ſent by the Apoſtles or other, the People of their awne voluntary will with thanks did accept them; not for the Supremitie, Imperie, or Dominion, that the Apoſtells had over them to command as their Princes, or Maſters: but as good people, ready to obey the advice of good Counſellors, and to accept, any thing that was neceſſary for their edification and benefit.

“ The Biſhops and Prieſts were at one time, and were not two things, but both one Office in the beginning of Chriſts Religion. Anſwer to the 16 Q.

11. “ A Biſhop may make a Prieſt by the Scriptures, and ſo may Princes and Governors alſoe, and that by the auctority of God committed them, and the People alſoe by their Election. For as we reade that Biſhops have done it, ſo Chriſtien Emperors and Princes uſually have

10. " Whether Biſhops or Prieſts were firſt; and if the Prieſts were firſt
" then the Prieſt made the Biſhop?

11. " Whether a Biſhop hath auctorite to make a Prieſt by the Scrip-
" tureor no, and whether any other but only a Biſhop may make a
" Prieſt?

12. " Whether in the New-Teſtament be required any Conſecration of a
" Biſhop and Prieſt, or only appointeinge to the Office be ſufficient?

13. " Whether (if it be fortuned a Prince Chriſten learned to conquer
" certen domynyons of Infidells, having non but the Temporal lerned
" men with him) it be defended by Gods Law, that he and they ſhould
" preche and teche the Word of God there or no, and alſo make and
" conſtitute Prieſts or no?

14. " Whether it be forfended by Goddes Law, that if it ſo fortuned
" that all the Biſhopps and Prieſts were dedde, and that the Word of
" God ſhuld there unpreached, the Sacrament of Baptiſme and others
" unminiſtred, then the King of that Region ſhulde make Biſhoppes and
" Prieſts to ſupply the ſame or noe?

16. " Whether a Biſhop or a Prieſt may excommunicate, and for what
" Crimes, and whether they only may excommunicate by Goddes
" Law?

Archbiſh. Cranmer's anſw. *ex ipſo ejus autographo.*

Theſe are the Queſtions, to which the Anſwers are ſeverally returned in diſtinct Papers, all of them bound together in a large Volume by Archbiſhop *Cranmer*; and every one ſubſcribed their Names, and ſome their Seals, to the Papers delivered in. It would be too tedious a work to ſet down their ſeveral opinions at large; only for the deſerved reverence all bear to the name and memory of that moſt worthy Prelate, and glorious Martyr, *Archbiſhop Cranmer*, I ſhall ſet down his Anſwer diſtinctly to every one of theſe Queſtions, and the Anſwers of ſome others to the more material queſtions to our purpoſe.

To the 9. Q. " All Chriſtian Princes have committed unto them im-
" mediately of God the holle cure of all their ſubjects, as well concerning
" the adminiſtration of Goddes Word for the cure of Soul, as concern-
" ing the miniſtration of things Political, and civil Governaunce.

" And in both theis Miniſtrations thei muſt have ſondry Miniſters
" under them to ſupply that which is appointed to their ſeveral Office.

" The Cyvile Miniſters under the Kings Majeſty in this Realm of
" *England*, be thoſe whom yt ſhall pleaſe his Highneſs for the tyme to
" put in auctorite under him; as for example, the Lord Chancellor,
" Lord Treaſurer, Lord Greate Maſter, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Admy-
" rall, Mayres, Shryves, *&c.*

“ The Miniſters of Gods Wourde under His Majeſty be the Biſhops, Parſons, Vicars, and ſuch other Prieſts as be appointed by his Highneſs, to that Miniſtration; as for example, the Biſhop of *Canterbury*, the Biſhop of *Dureſme*, the Biſhop of *Wincheſter*, the Parſon of *Wynwicke*, &c.

“ All the ſaid Officers and Miniſters, as well of th'one ſorte as the other, be appointed, aſſigned, and elected in every place, by the Laws and Orders of Kings and Princes.

“ In the admiſſion of many of theſe Officers bee divers comely Ceremonies and Solemnities uſed, which be not of neceſſity, but only for a goodly order and ſemely faſhion. For if ſuch Offices and Miniſtrations were committed without ſuch ſolemnitye, thei were nevertheles truely committed.

“ And there is no more promiſe of God, that Grace is given in the committing of the Eccleſiaſtical Office, then it is the committing of the Cyvile. In the Apoſtles time, when there was no Chriſtien Princes by whoſe authority Miniſters of Gods Word might be appointed, nor ſynnes by the ſword corrected; there was no remedy then for the correction of Vice, or appointeinge of Miniſters, but only the conſent of Chriſtien multitude amonge themſelfe, by an uniform conſent to follow the advice and perſwaſion of ſuch perſons whom God had moſt endued with the ſpirit of Wiſdom and Counſaile. And at that time, for as much as Chriſtien people had no Sword nor Governour among them, thei were conſtrained of neceſſity to take ſuch Curates and Prieſts, as either they knew themſelfes to be meet thereunto, or elſe as were commended unto them by other, that were ſo replete with the Spirit of God, with ſuch knowledge in the profeſſion of Chriſt, ſuch Wiſdom, ſuch Converſation and Councell, that they ought even of very Conſcience to give credit unto them, and to accept ſuch as by theym were preſented. And ſo ſome tyme the Apoſtles and other unto whom God had given abundantly his Spirit, ſent or appointed Miniſters of Gods Word, ſometime the people did choſe ſuch as they thought meet thereunto. And when any were appointed or ſent by the Apoſtles or other, the People of their awne voluntary will with thanks did accept them; not for the Supremitie, Imperie, or Dominion, that the Apoſtells had over them to command as their Princes, or Maſters: but as good people, ready to obey the advice of good Counſellors, and to accept any thing that was neceſſary for their edification and benefit.

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“ done it. And the people before Chriſtien Princes were, commonly
“ did elect their Biſhops and Prieſts.

12. “ In the New Teſtament, he that is appointed to be a Biſhop or a
“ Prieſt, needeth no conſecration by the Scripture; for election or ap-
“ pointing thereto is ſufficient.

13. “ It is not againſt Gods Law, but contrary they ought indede ſo to
“ do, and there be hiſtoryes that witneſſeth, that ſome Chriſtien Princes
“ and other Lay-men unconſecrate have done the ſame.

14. “ It is not forbidden by Gods Law.

16. “ A Byſhop or a Prieſt by the Scripture, is neither commanded nor
“ forbidden to excommunicate. But where the Laws of any Region
“ giveth him authoritie to excommunicate, there thei ought to uſe the
“ ſame, in ſuch crimes as the Laws have ſuch authoritie in. And
“ where the Laws of the Region forbiddeth them, there they have none
“ authoritie at all. And thei that be no Prieſts may alſo excommuni-
“ cate, if the Law allow thereunto. Thus far that excellent perſon, in whoſe judgment nothing is more clear, than his aſcribing the particular form of Government in the Church to the determination of the Supreme Magiſtrate. This judgment of his, is thus ſubſcribed by him with his own hand.

T. Cantuarienſ. *This is mine opinion and ſentence at this preſent, which I do not temerariouſly define, but do remitt the judgment thereof holly to your Majeſty.*

Which I have exactly tranſcribed out of the Original, and have obſerved generally the form of writing at that time uſed. In the ſame MS. it appears, that the *Biſhop of St. Aſaph*, *Therleby*, *Redman*, and *Cox*, were all of the ſame opinion with the Archbiſhop, that at firſt Biſhops and Preſbyters were the ſame; and the two latter expreſly cite the opinion of *Jerome* with approbation. Thus we ſee by the teſtimony, chiefly of him who was inſtrumental in our Reformation, that he owned not Epiſcopacy as a diſtinct order from Preſbytery of Divine Right, but only as a prudent conſtitution of the Civil Magiſtrate for the better governing in the Church.

§. 3. We now proceed to the re-eſtabliſhment of Church-Government under our moſt happy Queen *Elizabeth*. After our Reformation had truly undergone the fiery tryal in Queen *Mary*'s days, and by thoſe flames was made much more refined and pure, as well as ſplendid and illuſtrious: In the articles of Religion agreed upon, our Engliſh Form of Church-Government was only determined to be agreeable to God's Holy Word, which had been a very low and diminiſhing expreſſion, had they looked on it as abſolutely preſcribed and determined in Scripture, as the only neceſſary Form to be obſerved in the Church. The firſt who ſolemnly appeared in vindication of the Engliſh *Hierarchy* was *Arch-Biſhop Whitgiſt*, a ſage and prudent perſon, whom we cannot ſuppoſe

either ignorant of the ſenſe of the Church of *England*, or afraid or
unwilling to defend it. Yet he frequently againſt *Cartwright* aſſerts, Pag. 3.
that the form of diſcipline is not particularly and by name ſet down in Pag. 77.
Scripture: And again, *No kind of Government is expreſſed in the word,* Pag. 81, 82, 83, 84.
or can neceſſarily be concluded from thence, which he repeats over
again. *No form of Church-Government is by the Scriptures preſcribed* Pag. 658.
to, or commanded the Church of God. And ſo Dr. *Coſins* his *Chancellor,*
in *Anſwer to the Abſtract. All Churches have not the ſame form of Diſcipline,* Pag. 58.
neither is it neceſſary that they ſhould, ſeeing it cannot be
proved that any certain particular form of Church-Government is commended
to us by the Word of God. To the ſame purpoſe Dr. *Loe,*
Complaint of the Church. No certain form of Government is preſcribed P. 64, 66.
in the Word, only general Rules laid down for it. Biſhop *Bridges,* Church Gov. pag. 164.
God hath not expreſſed the form of Church-Government, at leaſt not
ſo as to bind us to it. They who pleaſe but to conſult the *third*
Book of learned and judicious Mr. *Hooker*'s *Eccleſiaſtical Polity,* may
ſee the mutability of the form of Church-Government largely aſſerted
and fully proved. Yea this is ſo plain and evident to have been
the chief opinion of the Divines of the Church of *England,* that
Parker looks on it as one of the main foundations of the *Hierarchy,* De Polit.
and ſets himſelf might and main to oppoſe it, but with what ſucceſs, Eccleſ. l. 2.
we have already ſeen. If we come lower, to the time of King c. 39, &c.
James, His Majeſty himſelf declared it in print, as his judgment;
Chriſtiano cuiq; Regi, Principi ac Reipublicæ conceſſum, externam in
rebus Eccleſiaſticis regiminis formam ſuis præſcribere, quæ ad civilis adminiſtrationis
formam quam proximè accedat. That the Civil power in
any Nation, hath the right of preſcribing what external form of
Church-Government it pleaſe, which doth moſt agree to the Civil
Form of Government in the State. Dr. *Sutcliffe de Preſbyterio* largely C. 11. p. 66.
diſputes againſt thoſe who aſſert that Chriſt hath laid down certain
immutable Laws for Government in the Church. *Crakanthorpe*
againſt *Spalatenſis* doth aſſert the mutability of ſuch things
as are founded upon Apoſtolical tradition; *Traditum igitur ab* Defen. Eccl.
Apoſtolis, ſed traditum & mutabile, & pro uſu ac arbitrio Eccleſiæ Angl. c. 28.
mutandum. To the like purpoſe ſpeak the forecited Authors, as §. 12.
their teſtimonies are extant in *Parker, Biſhop Bridges, Num unumquodq;* De Polit.
exemplum Eccleſiæ Primitivæ præceptum aut mandatum faciat? Eccleſ. l. 2.
And again, *Forte rerum nonnullarum in Primitiva Eccleſia exemplum* c. 42.
aliquod oſtendere poſſunt, ſed nec id ipſum generale, ne ejuſdem
perpetuam regulam aliquam, quæ omnes Eccleſias & ætates omnes
ad illud exemplum aſtringat. So *Archbiſhop Whitgift. Ex facto aut*
exemplo legem facere iniquum eſt. Nunquam licet, inquit Zuinglius,
à facto ad jus argumentari. By which principles the Divine Right
of Epiſcopacy as founded upon Apoſtolical practice, is quite ſubverted
and deſtroyed. To come nearer to our own unhappy times:
Not long before the breaking forth of thoſe never ſufficiently to be
lamented inteſtine Broils, we have the judgment of two learned, judicious,
rational Authors fully diſcovered as to the point in queſtion.
The firſt is that incomparable man, Mr. *Hales,* in his often cited
Tract of Schiſm, whoſe words are theſe: *But that other head of Epiſcopal* Page 13.
Ambition concerning Supremacy of Biſhops in divers Sees, one claiming

ming Supremacy over another, as it hath been from time to time a great treſpaſs againſt the Church's peace, ſo it is now the final ruin of it: The Eaſt and Weſt through the fury of the two prime Biſhops, being irremediably ſeparated without all hope of reconcilement. And beſides all this miſchief, it is founded on a Vice contrary to all Chriſtian humility, without which no man ſhall ſee his Saviour. For they do but abaſe themſelves and others, that would perſuade us, that Biſhops by Chriſt's inſtitution have any ſuperiority over men, farther than of Reverence, or that any Biſhop is ſuperior to another, farther than poſitive order agreed upon among Chriſtians hath preſcribed: for we have believed him that hath told us, that in Jeſus Chriſt there is neither high nor low: and that in giving honours every man ſhould be ready to prefer another before himſelf: which ſaying cuts off all claim certainly of ſuperiority, by title of Chriſtianity, except men think that theſe things were ſpoken only to poor and private men. Nature and Religion agree in this, that neither of them hath a hand in this Heraldry of ſecundum ſub & ſupra; *all this comes from compoſition and agreement of men among themſelves; wherefore this abuſe of Chriſtianity to make it a Lacquey to Ambition, is a Vice for which I have no extraordinary name of ignominy, and an ordinary I will not give it, leſt you ſhould take ſo tranſcendent a Vice to be but trivial.* Thus that grave and wiſe perſon, whoſe words ſavour of a more than ordinary tincture of a true ſpirit of Chriſtianity, that ſcorns to make Religion a footſtool to pride and ambition. We ſee plainly he makes all difference between Church-Officers to ariſe from conſent of parties, and not from any Divine Law. To the ſame purpoſe Mr. *Chillingworth* propounds this Queſtion among many others to his Adverſary: *Whether any one kind of theſe external Forms and Orders and Government be ſo neceſſary to the being of a Church, but that they may be diverſe in diverſe places, and that a good and peaceable Chriſtian may and ought to ſubmit himſelf to the Government of the place where he lives, whoſoever he be?* Which Queſtion according to the tenour of the reſt to which it is joined, muſt as to the former part be reſolved in the Negative, and as to the latter in the *Affirmative*. Which is the very thing I have been ſo long in proving of, *viz.* that no one form of Church-Government is ſo neceſſary to the being of a Church, but that a good and peaceable Chriſtian may and ought to conform himſelf to the Government of that place where he lives. So much I ſuppoſe may ſuffice to ſhew that the opinion which I have aſſerted, is no ſtranger in our own Nation, no not among thoſe who have been profeſſed defenders of the Eccleſiaſtical Government of this Church.

Chillingw. Ep. 1. *ch.* 6. §. 39.

§. 4. Having thus far acquainted our ſelves with the ſtate and cuſtoms of our own Country, we may be allowed the liberty of viſiting forreign Churches, to ſee how far they concur with us in the matter in queſtion. The firſt perſon whoſe judgment we ſhall produce aſſerting the mutability of the form of Church-Government, is that great light of the *German* Church, *Chemnitius*, whom *Brightman* had ſo high an opinion of as to make him to be one of the Angels in the Churches of the *Revelation*. He diſcourſing about the Sacrament of Order, as the *Papiſts* call it, lays down theſe following

Hypotheſes

Exam. Con. Trid. cap. 2. de ſacram. ord. can. 1. 413, 414.

Hypotheſes as certain truths. 1. *Non eſſe Dei verbo mandatum qui vel quot tales gradus ſeu ordines eſſe debent.* 2. *Non fuiſſe tempore Apoſtolorum in omnibus Eccleſiis & ſemper eoſdem & totidem gradus ſeu ordines, id quod ex Epiſtolis Pauli ad diverſas Eccleſias ſcriptis manifeſtè colligitur.* 3. *Non fuit tempore Apoſtolorum talis diſtributio graduum illorum, quin ſæpius unus & idem omnia illa officia, quæ ad miniſterium pertinent, ſuſtineret. Liberæ igitur fuerunt Apoſtolorum tempore tales ordinationes habitâ ratione ordinis, decori & ædificationis, &c. Illud Apoſtolorum exemplum Primitiva Eccleſia eadem ratione & ſimili libertate imitata eſt. Gradus enim officiorum miniſterii diſtributi fuerunt: non autem eadem plane ratione ſicut in Corinthiaca vel Epheſina Eccleſia, ſed pro ratione circumſtantiarum cujuſq; Eccleſiæ, unde colligitur quæ fuerit in diſtributione illorum graduum libertas.* The main thing he aſſerts, is, the Churches freedom and liberty as to the orders and degrees of thoſe who ſuperintend the affairs of the Church, which he builds on a threefold foundation, 1. *That the word of God no where commands, what or how many degrees and orders of Miniſters there ſhall be.* 2. *That in the Apoſtles times, there was not the like number in all Churches, as is evident from* Paul's *Epiſtles.* 3. *That in the Apoſtles times, in ſome places, one perſon did manage the ſeveral Offices belonging to a Church.* Which three Propoſitions of this *learned Divine*, are the very baſis and foundation of all our foregoing diſcourſe, wherein we have endeavoured to prove theſe ſeveral things at large. The ſame learned perſon hath a ſet diſcourſe to ſhew how by degrees the offices in the Church did riſe, not from any ſet or ſtanding Law, but for the convenient managery of the Church's affairs, and concludes his diſcourſe thus, *Et hæc prima graduum ſeu ordinum origo in Eccleſia Apoſtolica oſtendit quæ cauſa, quæ ratio, quis uſus & finis eſſe debeat hujuſmodi ſeu graduum, ſeu ordinum; ut ſcilicet pro ratione cœtûs Eccleſiaſtici, ſingula officia qua ad miniſterium pertinent, commodius, rectius, diligentius, & ordine cum aliqua gravitate ad ædificationem obeantur.* The ſum is, *It appears by the practice of the Apoſtolical Church, that the ſtate, condition and neceſſity of every particular Church, ought to be the Standard and Meaſure what Offices and degree of perſons ought to be in it.* As to the uncertain number of Officers in the Churches in Apoſtolical times, we have a full and expreſs teſtimony of the famous *Centuriators* of *Magdeburge. Quot vero in qualibet Eccleſia perſonæ Miniſterio functæ ſint, non eſt in hiſtoriis annotatum, nec uſquam eſt præceptum, ut æque multi in ſingulis eſſent, ſed prout paucitas aut multitudo cœtus poſtulavit, ita pauciores aut plures ad miniſterium eccleſiæ ſunt adhibiti.* We ſee by them there is no other certain rule laid down in Scripture, what number of perſons ſhall act in the governing every Church; only general prudence according to the Churches neceſſity, was the ground of determining the number then, and muſt be ſo ſtill. The next perſon whoſe judgment is fully on our ſide, is a perſon both of learning and moderation, and an earneſt reſtorer of Diſcipline as well as Doctrine in the Church. I mean *Hieron Zanchy*, who in ſeveral places hath expreſſed his judgment to the purpoſe we are now upon. The fulleſt place is in his *Confeſſion of Faith*, penned

Pag. 413.

Cent. 1. l. 2. cap. 7.

Confeſſ. fidei cap. 25. *ſ.* 10, 11. *Tom.* 7. *op. Miſcel.*

penned by him in the ſeventieth year of his age; and if ever a man ſpeaks his mind, it muſt be certainly when he profeſſeth his judgment in a ſolemn manner by way of his laſt Will and Teſtament to the world (that when the *Soul* is going into another world, he may leave his *mind* behind him.) Thus doth *Zanchy* in that Confeſſion, in which he declares this to be his judgment as to the form of Church-Government; That in the Apoſtles times there were but two orders under them, *viz.* of Paſtors and Teachers: but preſently ſubjoyns theſe words, *Interea tamen non improbamus Patres, quod juxta variam, tum verbi diſpenſandi, tum regendæ Eccleſiæ rationem, varios quoque ordines miniſtrorum multiplicârint, quando id iis liberum fuit, ſicut, & nobis; & quando conſtat id ab illis factum honeſtis de cauſis, ad ordinem, ad decorum & ad ædificationem eccleſiæ pro eo tempore pertinentibus.* And in the next Section, *Novimus enim Deum noſtrum Deum eſſe ordinis non confuſionis, & eccleſiam ſervari ordine, perdi autem* ἀταξία, *qua de cauſa multos etiam & diverſos, non ſolum olim in Iſraele, verum etiam poſt in eccleſia ex Judæis & Gentibus collecta, miniſtrorum ordines inſtituit; & eandem etiam ob cauſam, liberum reliquit Eccleſiis, ut plures adderent vel non adderent, modo ad ædificationem fieret.* He aſſerts it to be in the Church's power and liberty to add ſeveral orders of Miniſters according as it judgeth them to tend to edification; and ſaith, he is far from condemning the Courſe of the Primitive Church in erecting one as Biſhop over the Preſbyters, for better managing Church affairs; yea Arch-Biſhops, Metropolitans, and Patriarchs as inſtituted by the Primitive Church before the *Nicene Council*, he thinks may be both excuſed and defended, although afterward they degenerated into Tyranny and Ambition. And in his *obſervations* upon his *confeſſion*, penned chiefly upon the occaſion of the exceptions of *Magnus quidem Vir* (ſome will gueſs who that was) taken at the free delivery of his mind concerning the Polity of the Primitive Church, he hath expreſſions to this purpoſe: That what was unanimouſly determined by the Primitive Church without any contradiction to Scripture, did come from the Holy Spirit. *Hinc ſit*, ſaith he, *ut quæ ſint hujuſcemodi, ea ego improbare nec velim, nec audeam bona conſcientia. Quis autem ego ſim, qui, quod tota eccleſia approbabit, improbem?* Such things, ſaith he, as are ſo determined, I neither will nor can with a ſafe conſcience condemn. For who am I, that I ſhould condemn that which the whole Church of God hath approved? A ſentence as full of judgment as modeſty. And that he might ſhew he was not alone in this opinion, he produceth two large and excellent diſcourſes of *Martin Bucer* concerning the Polity of the ancient Church, which he recites with approbation; the one out of his Commentaries on the *Epheſians*, the other *de diſciplina Clericali*, whereby we have gained another teſtimony of that famous and peaceable Divine, whoſe judgment is too large to be here inſerted. The ſame opinion of *Zanchy* may be ſeen in his Commentaries upon the fourth Command, wherein he aſſerts no particular form to be preſcribed, but only general rules laid down in Scripture, that all be done to edification; ſpeaking of the original of Epiſcopacy which came not *diſpoſitione Divina*,

Tom. 4. *op. l.* 1. *in* 4. *præcept. q.* 2.

but *conſuetudine Eccleſiaſtica, atque ea quidem minime improbanda; neque enim hunc ordinem prohibuit Chriſtus, ſed potius regulam generalem reliquit per Apoſtolum, ut in Eccleſia omnia fiant ad ædificationem.* It is then moſt clear and evident that neither *Bucer, Chemnitius* or *Zanchy* did look upon the Church as ſo bound up by any immutable form of Church-Government laid down in Scripture, but it might lawfully and laudably alter it for better edification of the Church. For theſe learned Divines conceiving that at firſt in the Church there was no difference between Biſhop and Preſbyter, and commending the Polity of the Church when Epiſcopacy was ſet in a higher order, they muſt of neceſſity hold that there was no obligation to obſerve that Form which was uſed in Apoſtolical times.

Our next enquiry is into the opinion of the *French Church* and the eminent Divines therein. For *Calvin* and *Beza*, we have deſigned them under another rank. At preſent we ſpeak of thoſe who in *theſi* aſſert the form of Church-Government mutable. The firſt we meet with here who fully lays down his opinion as to this matter, is, *Joh. Fregevil*, who although in his *Palma Chriſtiana* he ſeems to aſſert the Divine right of primacy in the Church, yet in his *Politick Reformer*, he aſſerts both forms of Government by equality and inequality, to be lawful. And we ſhall the rather produce his teſtimony, becauſe of the high character given of him by the late *Rev. Biſhop* Hall. *Wiſe* Fregevil, *a deep head, and one that was able to cut even betwixt the League, the Church and State*; His words are theſe, *As for the Engliſh-Government, I ſay it is grounded upon God's word ſo far forth as it keepeth the ſtate of the Clergy inſtituted in the Old Teſtament, and confirmed in the New. And concerning the Government of the French Church, ſo far as concerneth the equality of Miniſters, it hath the like foundation in God's Word: namely in the example of the Apoſtles; which may ſuffice to authorize both theſe Forms of eſtate; albeit in ſeveral times and places none can deny but that the Apoſtles among themſelves were equal, as concerning authority, albeit there were an order for their precedency. When the Apoſtles firſt planted Churches, the ſame being ſmall and in affliction, there were not as yet any other Biſhops, Prieſts, or Deacons but themſelves; they were the Biſhops and Deacons, and together ſerved the Tables. Theſe men therefore whom God raiſeth up to plant a Church, can do no better, than after the examples of the Apoſtles to bear themſelves in equal authority. For this cauſe have the French Miniſters, planters of the Reformed Church in* France *uſurped it, howbeit proviſionally —— reſerving liberty to alter it, according to the occurrences. But the equality that reſted among the Biſhops of the Primitive Church, did increaſe as the Churches increaſed; and thence proceeded the Creation of Deacons, and afterwards of other Biſhops and Prieſts; yet ceaſed not the Apoſtles equality in authority; but they that were created, had not like authority with the Apoſtles; but the Apoſtles remained as Sovereign Biſhops, neither were any greater than they. Hereof I do infer that in the ſtate of a mighty and peaceable Church, as is the Church of* England, *or as the Church of* France *(or ſuch might be if God ſhould*

P. 70. &c.

Epiſcopacy by Divine right ſ. 5. p. 20.

call it to reformation) the ſtate of the Clergy ought to be preſerved. For equality will be hurtful to the State, and in time breed confuſion. But as the Apoſtles continued Churches in their equality ſo long as the Churches by them planted were ſmall; ſo ſhould equality be applied in the planting of a Church, or ſo long as the Church continueth ſmall, or under perſecution; yet may it alſo be admitted as not repugnant to God's Word in thoſe places where already it is received, rather than to innovate any thing. I ſay therefore that even in the Apoſtles times the ſtate of the Clergy increaſed as the Church increaſed. Neither was the Government under the Bondage of Egypt, *and during the peace of the Land of* Canaan *alike; for* Iſraelites *had firſt Judes, and after their ſtate increaſed, Kings.* Thus far that *Politique Reformer.* Whoſe words are ſo full and pertinent to the ſcope and drift of this whole Treatiſe, that there is no need of any Commentary to draw them to my ſenſe. The next I ſhall pitch upon in the French Church, is, a *Triumvirate* of three as learned perſons in their ſeveral ways as moſt that Church or any ſince the Reformation hath bred; they are *Blondel*, *Bochartus*, and *Amyraldus.* The firſt is that Church Antiquary *Blondel*, the known and learned Aſſertor of *Jerome*'s opinion concerning the Primitive equality of Preſbyters, who was likewiſe of *Jerome*'s mind as to the mutability of that form, if the Church ſaw fit, as appears by theſe words of his, ſpeaking of that form of Eccleſiaſtical Polity which *Hilary* ſpeaks of, *viz.* the eldeſt Preſbyters having the Primacy of Order above the reſt. *Fac tamen*, ſaith he, *Apoſtolis non modo non improbantibus, ſed palam, laudantibus ortam, ego ſanè liberè ab initio obſervatam, Chriſtianiſque, ſive ab Apoſtolis, ſive ab eorum diſcipulis traditam, ſed ut mutabilem & pro uſu ac arbitrio Eccleſiæ mutandam (prout in cauſâ conſimili piæ memoriæ* Crakanthorpius *ſenſit) crediderim:* and not long after, *Nec conſeſſus capite carentes, aut multipliciter minùs horremus, quàm fervidiores Hierarchici; quibus indagandum curatiùs incumbit; An paſtorum cuiquam quocunque titulo nunc gaudeat, divino jure* προστασία *eaque perpetua decreta ſit; An verò in Arbitrio Eccleſiæ, ipſe (qui præeſt Eccleſiæ) ſpiritus reliquerit, ut quocunque modo liberet, ſibi de capite* ἰσοτίμων *collegia providerent.* Whereby that moſt learned Writer for Preſbytery (as ſome have called him) evidently aſſerts the mutability of the particular Form of Church-Government, and that it is left to the prudence and arbitrement of the Church, to conclude and determine, in what way and manner the Rulers of the Church ſhall act, for moderating the common concernments of the Church. The next is the learned and ingenuous *Bochartus*, who *ex profeſſo*, doth aſſert the opinion I have been pleading thus long in the behalf of, in his Epiſtle to Dr. *Morley*. He having declared himſelf to be of *Jerome*'s mind, as to the Apoſtles times, that the Churches were governed *communi conſilio Preſbyterorum*; and withal, aſſerting the great antiquity of Epiſcopacy, as ariſing ſoon after the Apoſtles times, and that *magno cum fructu*, as a very uſeful form of Government: He ſubjoins theſe words directly, overthrowing the Divine Right of either form of Government, by Epiſcopacy or Preſbytery. *Nec Apoſtolorum praxim puto vim habuiſſe legis, in rebus ſuâ naturâ* ἀδιαφόροις. *Proinde tam qui Preſbyteralem,*

Apol. pro Hieron. ſ. 2. p. 53.

Ad. q. 1. p. 5.

Preſbyteralem, quam Epiſcopalem ordinem juris divini eſſe aſſerunt, videntur τῆς ἀνθολκῆς ἀμετρίᾳ τοῦ μέσου διαμαρτεῖν. And therefore aſſerts, that the Form of Government muſt be determined, as that in the State is, according to the ſuitableneſs of it to the ſtate, temper and condition of the People it is intended for. The laſt is, judicious *Amyraldus*, whom one deſervedly calls, *one of the greateſt wits of this Age*, in his propoſals for peace with the *Lutherans*, ſpeaking of the different Forms of Church Government in the ſeveral Churches of the Reformation, he lays down this for a foundation of union among the ſeveral Churches. *Quando igitur Chriſtus quidem & Apoſtoli hoc diſertè conſtituerunt, debere particulares Eccleſias omnes gubernari à Paſtoribus, & aliquâ regiminis formâ temperari, quod ipſa rei neceſſitas flagitat; quæ verò regiminis iſta forma potiſſimùm eſſe debeat, utrum alii aliis auctoritate præcellant, necne, neque rei natura definivit, neque à Chriſto aut Apoſtolis æque diſertè conſtitutum eſt; id primò in pacificatione ſtatuendum eſſe videtur, ut quo jure hactenus fuerunt Eccleſiarum Evangelicarum Paſtores, eodem porrò eſſe pergant, neque aliæ aliarum ſtatum convellere nitantur.* "That every Church be permitted freely to enjoy its "own Form, ſince ſome kind of Government is neceſſary in all "Churches, but no one Form is preſcribed by Chriſt or his Apoſtles; and more fully afterwards to the ſame purpoſe. *Quemadmodum etſi igitur Politiarum formæ aliæ aliis aptiores ad finem illum Politicum obtinendum, & accommodatiores eſſe videntur; Deus tamen qui omnis ſocietatis auctor eſt atque cuſtos, noluit omnes hominum cœtus eodem jure teneri, ſed cuique communitati poteſtatem eſſe voluit ſuas leges ſibi condendi, quas ipſe Divinâ ſuâ auctoritate ſancit; ſic dubitandum quidem non eſt quin ex variis illis adminiſtrandarum Eccleſiarum rationibus, nonnullæ ſint aliquanto quam aliæ conducibiliores ad eum finem adipiſcendum quem religio conſtitutum habet: At voluit tamen ſapientiſſimus indulgentiſſimuſque Deus, cuiq; Eccleſiæ jus eſſe ſibi leges eas ferendi quæ ad diſciplinam ſpectant, & ad ordinem conſervandum.* Whereby he "grants as much freedom and liberty to every Church, to preſcribe "Laws to its ſelf, for the regulating the affairs of the Church, as "to any State to pitch upon its particular rules and ways of Govern-"ment; ſo the Church doth in its orders but obſerve the general rules laid down in Scripture. Having thus fully ſhewed how many of the moſt eminent Divines of the Reformation have embraced this opinion of the mutability of the Form of Church-Government, both in our own and foreign Churches, who were far from being the *Proſelytes* of *Eraſtus*; it were eaſie to add *Mantiſſæ loco* the concurrent judgment of many very learned Men, as the excellent *Hugo Grotius*, my *Lord Bacon*, Sir *Will. Morrice*, and others, who have in print delivered this as their judgment; but ſeeing ſuch is the temper of many, as to caſt by their judgments with an opinion of their partiality towards the Government of the Church; I have therefore contented my ſelf with the judgment of *Divines*, moſt of them of the higheſt rank ſince the Reformation: whoſe judgments certainly will be ſufficient to remove that prejudice, wherewith this opinion hath been entertained among the blind followers of the ſeveral parties. So much for thoſe, who in terms aſſert the Form of Church-Government not

to

De ſucceſſione ab Eccleſiâ Rom. Deq; pace cum Evang. conſt. p. 29, &c.

De Imperio ſumm. Poteſt. circa ſacra c. 11.

L. *Bacon* Conſiderat. touching Ch. Gov.

Sir *Will. Morrice* of the Sacrament, in ſect. 9.

Mr. *Pryn*'s 12 queries to the Aſſembly.

to depend upon an unalterable Law, but to be left to the prudence and diſcretion of every particular Church, to determine it according to its ſuitableneſs to the ſtate, condition, and temper of the people whereof it conſiſts, and conduceableneſs to the ends for which it is inſtituted.

§. 6. We come now in the ſecond place to thoſe, who though they look upon equality of Miniſters as the Primitive Form, yet do allow Epiſcopal Government in the Church as a very lawful and uſeful conſtitution. By which it is evident, that they did not judge the Primitive Form to carry an univerſal obligation along with it, over all Churches, Ages, and Places. Upon this account our learned *Crakanthorp* frees all the Reformed Churches from the charge of *Aërianiſm*, laid upon them by the *Archbiſhop* of *Spalato* (when he licked up his former vomit in his *Conſilium reditûs*) *Crakanthorp*'s words are theſe, ſpeaking of *Luther*, *Calvin*, *Beza*, and all the Reformed Churches; *Non habent illi ſcio, diſtinctos à Preſbyteris, eiſque in ordinandi & excommunicandi poteſtate ſuperiores Epiſcopos. At Imparitatem iſtam quod fecit Aërius, non verbo Dei repugnare docent; non damnant eam vel in noſtrâ, vel in univerſali per annos ſuper mille quingentos Eccleſiâ. Per verbum Dei & Jus Divinum, liberum & licitum utrumvis cenſent, vel Imparitatem iſtam admittere vel Paritatem; In Arbitrio hoc eſſe ac poteſtate cujuſvis Eccleſiæ cenſent, utrum Paritatem ordinum admittunt, an Imparitatem.* So that according to the opinion of this learned Divine, all the *Reformed* Churches were free from the Imputation of *Aërianiſm*, becauſe they aſſerted not an *Imparity* among the Miniſters of the Goſpel to be unlawful; but thought it was wholly in the Churches *liberty*, to ſettle either a *Parity* or *Imparity* among them, as they judged convenient. But to deſcend more particularly to the *Heroes* of the Reformation, we have a whole *Conſtellation* of them together in the *Auguſtane Confeſſion*, where they fully expreſs their minds to this purpoſe; *Hâc de re in hoc conventu ſæpe teſtati ſumus nos ſummâ voluntate cupere, conſervare Politiam Eccleſiaſticam, & gradus in Eccleſiâ factos etiam humanâ authoritate. Scimus enim bono & utili conſilio à Patribus Eccleſiaſticam diſciplinam, hoc modo, ut veteres Canones deſcribunt, conſtitutam eſſe.* And afterwards, *Sævitia Epiſcoporum in causâ eſt, quare alicubi diſſolvitur illa Canonica Politia, quam magnopere cupiebamus conſervare.* And again, *Hic iterum volumus teſtatum, nos libentèr conſervaturos eſſe Eccleſiaſticam & Canonicam Politiam, ſi modo Epiſcopi deſinant in Eccleſias noſtras ſævire. Hac noſtra voluntas, & coram Deo & apud omnes gentes ad omnem poſteritatem excuſabit nos, nè nobis imputari poſſit, quod Epiſcoporum authoritas labefactetur.* And yet farther, *Sæpe jam teſtati ſumus, nos non ſolum poteſtatem Eccleſiaſticam, quæ in Evangelio inſtituta eſt, ſummâ pietate venerari, ſed etiam Eccleſiaſticam Politiam, & gradus in Eccleſiâ magnoperè probare, & quantùm in nobis eſt conſervare cupere.* We ſee with what induſtry they purge and clear themſelves from the imputation of bearing any ill will to the ſeveral degrees that were inſtituted by the Church; nay they profeſs themſelves deſirous of retaining them, ſo the Biſhops would not force

Defenſ. Eccleſ. Angl. cap. 42. ſ. 6.

Apolog. Confeſſ. Aug. ad art. 14.

Confeſſ. Aug. ter Chry. p. 365.

force them to do any thing againſt their Conſciences. To the ſame purpoſe they ſpeak in the *Smaraldian* Articles. None ſpeaks more fully of the agreeableneſs of the Form of Government uſed in the Ages after the Apoſtles to the Word of God, then that excellent ſervant of God, as Biſhop *Downam* often calls him, *Calvin* doth: For in his *Inſtitutions* he ſpeaks thus of the Polity of the Primitive Church; *Tametſi enim multos Canones ediderunt illorum temporum Epiſcopi quibus plus viderentur exprimere quàm ſacris literis expreſſum eſſet; ea tamen cautione totam ſuam Œconomiam compoſuerunt ad unicam illam verbi Dei normam, ut facile videas nihil fere hâc parte habuiſſe à verbo Dei alienum.* Although the Biſhops of thoſe times did make many Canons, wherein they did ſeem to expreſs more than was in the Word of God; yet they uſed ſuch caution and prudence in the eſtabliſhing the Church's Polity according to the Word of God, that hardly will any thing be found in it diſagreeing to God's holy Word. And afterwards ſpeaking of the Inſtitution of Archbiſhops and Patriarchs, he ſaith it was *ad Diſciplinæ conſervationem*, for preſerving the Church's Diſcipline: and again, *Si rem omiſſo vocabulo intuemur, reperiemus veteres Epiſcopos non aliam regendæ Eccleſiæ formam voluiſſe fingere, ab ea quam Deus verbo ſuo præſcripſit.* If we conſider the matter it ſelf of the Church's Polity, we ſhall find nothing in it deſcrepant from, or repugnant to that Form which is laid down in the Word of God. *Calvin* then, whatever Form of Government he judged moſt ſuitable to the ſtate and temper of the Church wherein he was placed, was far from condemning that Polity which was uſed in the Primitive Church by a difference as to degrees among the Miniſters of the Goſpel. He did not then judge any form of Government to be ſo deliver'd in Scriptures as unalterably to oblige all Churches and Ages to obſerve it. *Beza* ſaith, *he was ſo far from thinking that the humane order of Epiſcopacy was brought into the Church through raſhneſs or ambition, that none can deny it to have been very uſeful as long as Biſhops were good. And thoſe that both will and can, let them enjoy it ſtill.* His words are theſe, *Abſit autem ut hunc ordinem, etſi Apoſtolica & mere divina diſpoſitione non conſtitutum, tamen ut temere aut ſuperbe invectum reprehendam; cujus potius magnum uſum fuiſſe quamdiu boni & ſancti Epiſcopi Eccleſiis præfuerunt, quis inficiari poſſit? Fruantur igitur illo qui volent & poterunt.* And elſewhere profeſſeth *all reverence, eſteem, and honour to be due to all ſuch modern Biſhops, who ſtrive to imitate the example of the Primitive Biſhops in a due reformation of the Church of God, according to the rule of the Word. And looks on it as a moſt falſe and impudent Calumny of ſome that ſaid as though they intended to preſcribe their form of Government to all other Churches; as though they were like ſome ignorant fellows who think nothing good but what they do themſelves:* How this is reconcileable with a novel pretence of a *jus divinum*, I cannot underſtand. For certainly if *Beza* had judged that only Form to be preſcribed in the Word which was uſed in *Geneva*, it had been but his duty to have deſired all other Churches to conform to that. Neither ought *Beza* then to be looked on as out-going his Maſter *Calvin* in the opinion about the right of Church-Government. For we ſee he goes no farther in it than *Calvin* did. All that either of them maintained, was, that the form of Government in uſe among them,

Inſtitut. lib. 4. *cap.* 4. *ſ.* 1.

Sect. 4.

De Miniſtr. gradibus. c. 23. p. 144.

Cap. 21. p. 126, 127.

was more agreeable to the Primitive form, than the modern Epiſcopacy was, and that Epiſcopacy lay more open to Pride, Lazineſs, Ambition, and Tyranny, as they had ſeen and felt in the Church of *Rome*. Therefore not to give occaſion to ſuch incroachments upon the liberty of mens Conſciences, as were introduced by the tyranny of the *Roman* Biſhops, they thought it the ſafeſt way to reduce the Primitive parity; but yet ſo, as to have an Eccleſiaſtical Senate for one Church containing Cities and Territories, as is evident at *Geneva*, and that Senate to have a Preſident in it; and whether that Preſident ſhould be for life, or only by courſe, they judged it an accidental and mutable thing; but that there ſhould be one, eſſential and neceſſary. This is expreſly and fully the judgment of that moſt Reverend and

De Miniſtr. gradibus, cap. 23. *p.* 153.

Learned man, *Th. Beza*, as he declares it himſelf. *Eſſentiale fuit in eo de quo hic agimus, quod ex Dei Ordinatione perpetua neceſſe fuit, eſt, & erit, ut in Preſbyterio quiſpiam & loco & dignitate primus actioni gubernandæ præſit, cum eo quod ipſi divinitus attributum eſt jure. Accidentale autem fuit, quod Preſbyteri in hac* ϖροστασία *alii aliis per vices initio ſuccedebant; qui* ϖροστασίας *modus paulatim poſtea viſus eſt mutandus, ut unus quiſpiam judicio cæterorum compreſbyterorum delectus, Preſbyterio* ϖροεστὼς *eſſet, & permaneret.* It will be worth our while truly to ſtate the Queſtion of Church-Government between the *Church* of *England*, and that of *Geneva*, in the time of Queen *Elizabeth*, and thereby we ſhall ſee how ſmall the difference was between them. That the Churches in the Primitive times, did take in the Chriſtians in whole Cities, and adjoining Territories, is acknowledged on both ſides; *Calvin* and *Beza* being both expreſs in it, and the Conſtitution of the Church of *Geneva* ſpeaks as much.

Inſtit. l. 4. *c.* 4. *ſ.* 2. *De Miniſtr. grad. cap.* 24. *p.* 167.

Unicuique civitati (ſaith *Calvin*) *erat attributa certa regio, quæ Preſbyteros inde ſumeret, & velut corpori Eccleſiæ illius accenſerentur. In oppido cujuſque Diæceſeos,* (ſaith *Beza*) *præcipuo primus Preſbyter,* &c. *in quotidiana commum juriſdictione præerat cæteris tum urbanis, tum aliis ejus Regionis cum Preſbyteris,* i. e. *toti Diæceſi.* That the Government of the City did take in the City and Territories, is likewiſe acknowledged by them. That for more convenient order, there was one to preſide over the Eccleſiaſtical Senate, is confeſſed as eſſential by *Beza*; and *Calvin* acknowledgeth that even in Apoſtolical

In Tit. 1. 5.

times, *non eam fuiſſe tunc æqualitatem inter Eccleſiæ miniſtros, quin unus aliquis authoritate & conſilio præeſſet.* There was no ſuch equality among the Miniſters of the Church, but that ſome one was over the reſt in Authority and Counſel. Wherein then lay the difference? For we have already ſeen that our Great Divines then, did not look upon their form of Government as neceſſary, but only lawful; and *Calvin* and *Beza* would not be thought to preſcribe their form to other Churches. All the difference then was, not whether their form of Government was founded on Divine Right? not whether Epiſcopacy in the Church was lawful or no? not whether Dioceſan Churches were unlawful? or whether every Congregation ſhould have an Eccleſiaſtical Senate? But whether it were more agreeable to the Primitive form, that the Preſident of the Eccleſiaſtical Senate ſhould have only an order among, or a degree above the Senate its ſelf? But chiefly it was, whether in the preſent ſtate of the *Reformed*

Churches it were more convenient wholly to lay aſide the form of Government by *Biſhops*, which hath been ſo much abuſed in the *Roman Church*; and to reduce all Miniſters of the Goſpel to an equality, with only a precedency of order, thereby to free *themſelves* from the imputation of Ambition, and to prevent it in *others*; or elſe it were more prudent only to retrench the abuſes of *Epiſcopacy* under the *Papacy*, and to reduce it to that form wherein it was practiſed in the *Church*, before the *tyranny* and *uſurpation* of the *Roman Biſhop* had engroſſed all *Eccleſiaſtical power* into his own hands? The former part was embraced generally by the *Reformed Churches*, the latter by our *Church of England*; ſo that the Queſtion was not about Divine Right, but about a matter of Prudence; not what form was ſetled by a Law of Chriſt, but what form was ſuitable to the preſent ſtate of the Churches of the Reformation. Therefore we ſee none of the foreign Divines did charge the Government of this Church with *unlawfulneſs* but *inconveniency*, as it was a ſtep to pride and ambition, and an occaſion whereby men might do the Church injury by the exceſs of their power, if they were not men of an excellent temper and moderation. Thence that prediction of *Padre Paulo*, that the Church of *England* would then find the inconveniency of Epiſcopacy, when a high-ſpirited Biſhop ſhould once come to rule that Church; and ſo *Beza*, when he had freed the Biſhops of the Reformation from that imputation, of *Lording it over their Brethren*, which he had charged the Roman Biſhops with, yet he adds, that he would beg them rather to lay down their power, than to tranſmit that power to thoſe after them, *hanc ipſorum moderationem & æquitatem minime forſan ſequturis*, who it may be were not like to ſucceed them in their meekneſs and moderation. What juſt reaſon were there was for ſuch fears, or may be ſtill, let thoſe judge who are fitteſt to do it; thoſe I mean who have the power not only to redreſs, but prevent abuſes encroaching by an irregular power. It was not then any unlawfulneſs in the Government of Epiſcopacy it ſelf, but its liableneſs to abuſes, which made the Reformed Churches reduce modern Epiſcopacy into a mere Preſidency of Order, which was not ſo liable to the ſame inconveniencies. A clear evidence that they judged not the Government unlawful, is, their often profeſſion of a ready and chearful obedience to Biſhops, if they would embrace the Goſpel, and ſtand up in defence of the true Doctrine. For which we have the teſtimony of *George* Prince of *Anhalt*, in the Preface to his Sermon about falſe Prophets, ſpeaking of Biſhops and Archbiſhops: "Utinam ſicut nomina gerunt & titulos, ita ſe reipſa præſta-
" rent Epiſcopos Eccleſiæ. Utinam Evangelio docerent conſona, ip-
" ſoque Eccleſias fideliter regerent. O quam libentèr, quantaque
" cum cordis lætitia, pro Epiſcopis ipſos habere, revereri, morem
" gerere, debitam juriſdictionem, & ordinationem eis tribuere, eaque
" ſine recuſatione frui vellemus: id quod nos ſemper, & *D. Lutherus*
" etiam ſæpiſſime tam ore quam ſcriptis, imo & in concione publica
" in Cathedrali Templo Marſburgenſi conteſtati promiſimus. He profeſſeth it to be both his own judgment and *Luther*'s, that if Biſhops would but teach and rule their Churches, according to the

De Miniſtr. grad. p. 158.

Super Mat. tit. de Ordinat.

Word of God, they would obey them with all chearfulneſs and joy of heart. To the ſame purpoſe *Melancthon* writing to *Camerarius*: “ By what Right or Law may we diſſolve the Eccleſiaſtical Polity, if “ the Biſhops will grant us that which in reaſon they ought to grant? “ and though it were lawful for us ſo to do, yet ſurely it were not “ expedient. *Luther* was ever of this opinion. The ſame is profeſſed by *Calvin*, and that according to his temper in a higher manner; “ Verum autem nobis ſi contribuant Hierarchiam in qua emineant Epiſcopi, ut Chriſto ſubeſſe non recuſent, ut ab illo tanquam “ ab unico capite pendeant, & ad ipſum referantur, in qua ſi fraternam charitatem inter ſe colant & non alio modo quam ejus veritate “ colligati, tum vero nullo non Anathemate dignos fatemur, ſi qui “ erunt, qui eam non reverentèr & ſumma cum obedientia obſervent. If Biſhops would but ſubmit themſelves to Chriſt, thoſe that would not then ſubmit themſelves to them, he thinks there is no *Anathema* of which they are not worthy. *Jacobus Heerbrandus*, Divinity-Profeſſor at *Tübinge*, profeſſeth it to be the moſt ſound Conſtitution of Church-Government, wherein every Dioceſe had its Biſhops, and every Province an Archbiſhop. *Saluberrimum eſſet ſi ſingulæ Provinciæ ſuos Epiſcopos, & Epiſcopi ſuos Archiepiſcopos haberent. Hemingius* acknowledgeth a diſparity among Church-Officers, and accounts it a piece of barbariſm to remove it. “ Quanquam enim poteſtas “ omnium eadem eſt miniſtrorum quantum ad ſpiritualem juriſdictionem attinet; tamen diſpares dignitatis ordines & gradus ſunt; “ idq; partim jure divino, partim Eccleſiæ approbatione. But he qualifies what he had ſaid of *Jus divinum* by his following words; “ Eccleſia cui Dominus poteſtatem dedit in ædificationem, ordinem “ miniſtrorum inſtituit pro commodo ſuo, ut omnia ſint ritè ordinata “ ad inſtaurationem corporis Chriſti. Hinc Eccleſia purior ſecuta “ tempora Apoſtolorum, fecit alios Patriarchas, alios Chorepiſcopos, alios Paſtores & Catechetas; *and afterwards*, Inter miniſtros agnoſcit etiam Eccleſia noſtra gradus dignitatis, & ordines “ pro diverſitate donorum, laborum magnitudine, ac vocationum “ diverſitate ac judicat Barbaricum eſſe de Eccleſia hunc ordinem “ tollere velle. Three things he placeth a ſuperiority of dignity in; *Excellency of Gifts*, *Greatneſs of Labours*, *Difference of Calling:* And the truth is, the two former ought to be the meaſure of dignity in the Church, the Eminence of mens abilities, and the abundance of their labours above others. The neceſſity of a *Superintendent*, or an *Inſpector* over other Miniſters, is largely diſcovered by *Zepper de Politia Eccleſiaſtica*, who likewiſe agrees with the former Divines in his judgment of the firſt inſtitution of Epiſcopacy. “ Eadem officia “ in primitiva etiam Eccleſia, poſt Apoſtolorum tempora in uſu manſerunt, paucis quibuſdam gradibus, pro illorum temporum neceſſitate additis, qui tamen nihil fere à mente D. Pauli & verbi divini “ alienum habuerunt. Whereby he both aſſerts it to be in the power of the Church to add diſtinct degrees from what were in the primitive Church; and that ſuch ſo added, are no ways repugnant to the Word of God. According to this judgment of their Divines is the practice of the Foreign Proteſtant Churches; in *Sweden* there is one

Archbiſhop,

Ep. ad Camer. A. D. 1530.

Tom. 7. *ad Sadoletum. & de neceſ. Reform. Eccl. p.* 69.

In loc. com. de Eccl. p. 767.

Opuſcul. Theol. Claſ. 3. *cap.* 10. *p.* 439.

Lib. 2. *c.* 10.

De Politi. Eccleſ. l. 2. *cap.* 1.

Archbiſhop, and ſeven *Biſhops*; and ſo in *Denmark*, though not with ſo great authority in *Holſtein*, *Pomeren*, *Mecklenburgh*, *Brunſwick*, *Luneburgh*, *Bremen*, *Oldenburgh*, *Eaſt-Friezeland*, *Heſſen*, *Saxony*, and all the upper part of *Germany*, and the Proteſtant Imperial Cities, Church-Government is in the hands of *Superintendents*. In the *Palatinate* they had *Inſpectores* and *Præpoſiti*, over which was the Eccleſiaſtical Conſiſtory of three Clergy-men, and three Counſellors of State with their Preſident; and ſo they have their *Præpoſitos* in *Wetteraw*, *Heſſen*, and *Anhalt*. In *Tranſylvania*, *Polonia*, and *Bohemia*, they have their *Seniores* enjoying the ſame power with ancient Biſhops. So that we ſee all theſe *Reformed Churches* and *Divines*, although they acknowledge no ſuch thing as a Divine right of *Epiſcopacy*, but ſtiffly maintain *Jerome*'s opinion of the primitive equality of Goſpel Miniſters; yet they are ſo far from accounting it unlawful to have ſome Church-Officers, acting in a higher degree above others, that they themſelves embrace it under different names and titles, in order to the Peace, Unity and Government of their ſeveral Churches; whereby they give us an evident demonſtration, that they looked not upon the Primitive Form to be immutable, but that the orders and degrees of Miniſters is only a prudential thing, and left in the liberty of every particular Church, to be determined according to their tendency to preſerve the peace and ſettlement of a Church.

See Mr. *Duree*, the Government of Proteſtant Churches beyond the Seas.

§. 7.

We come in the laſt place to thoſe who hold Epiſcopacy to be the Primitive Form, yet not unalterably binding all Churches and places, but that thoſe Churches who are without it, are truly conſtituted Churches; and Miniſters are lawfully ordained by mere Preſbyters. This is largely proved by Mr. *Francis Maſon*, in his excellent *Defence of the Ordination of Miniſters beyond the Seas*: to which I refer the Reader. Only I ſhall ſhew out of him how the ſtate of the Queſtion about the *Jus divinum* of Epiſcopacy is formed: “First, If by *jure divino* you mean that which is according to Scripture, then the preheminence of Biſhops is *jure divino*; for it hath been already proved to be according to Scripture. Secondly, If by *jure divino* you mean the Ordinance of God, in this ſenſe alſo it may be ſaid to be *jure divino*. For it is an Ordinance of the Apoſtles, whereunto they were directed by God's Spirit, even by the Spirit of Prophecy, and conſequently the Ordinance of God. But if by *jure divino* you underſtand a Law and Commandment of God, binding all Chriſtian Churches univerſally, perpetually, unchangably, and with ſuch abſolute neceſſity, that no other form of Regiment may in any caſe be admitted; in this ſenſe neither may we grant it, nor yet can you prove it to be *jure divino*.

Certain brief treatiſes, &c. *Oxford*, 1641. *Sect.* 18.

Whereby we ſee this learned and moderate man was far from unchurching all who wanted Biſhops; and abſolutely declares, that though he looks on Epiſcopacy as an Apoſtolical Inſtitution, yet that no unalterable divine right is founded thereupon. So before him the both learned and pious Biſhop, *G. Downam*, explains pimſelf concerning the right of *Epiſcopacy*, in theſe remakable words; “Though

Defence of Sermon, *l.* 4. *cap.* 6. *p.* 139.

“ in reſpect of the firſt Inſtitution, there is ſmall difference between an Apoſtolical and Divine Ordinance, becauſe what was ordained by the Apoſtles, proceeded from God, (in which ſenſe, and no other, I do hold the Epiſcopal Function to be a Divine Ordinance, I mean in reſpect of the firſt Inſtitution) yet in reſpect of perpetuity, difference by ſome is made between thoſe things which be *divini*, and thoſe which be *Apoſtolici juris*; the former in their underſtanding being perpetually, generally, and immutably neceſſary, the latter not ſo. So that the meaning of my defence plainly is, that the Epiſcopal Government hath this commendation above other forms of *Eccleſiaſtical Government*, that in reſpect of the firſt Inſtitution, it is a Divine Ordinance; but that it ſhould be ſuch a Divine Ordinance as ſhould be generally, perpetually, immutably, neceſſarily obſerved, ſo as no other form of Government may in no caſe be admitted, I did not take upon me to maintain: With more to the ſame purpoſe in ſeveral places of that defence. And from hence it is acknowledged by the ſtouteſt Champions for Epiſcopacy, before theſe late unhappy diviſions, that Ordination performed by Preſbyters, in caſes of neceſſity, is valid; which I have already ſhewed doth evidently prove that Epiſcopal Government is not founded upon any unalterable Divine Right: For which purpoſe many evidences are produced from *Dr. Field of the Church*, *lib.* 3. *c.* 39. *B. Downam*, *l.* 3. *c.* 4. *B. Jewel*, *P.* 2. *p.* 131. *Saravia*, *cap.* 2. *p.* 10, 11. *B. Alley*, *Prælect.* 3. *&* 6. *B. Pilkington*, *B. Bridges*, *B. Bilſon*, *D. Nowel*, *B. Davenant*, *B. Prideaux*, *B. Andrews*, and others; by our Reverend and Learned Mr. *Baxter* in his *Chriſtian Concord*, to whom may be added the late moſt Reverend and Eminent the Biſhop of *Durham*, *Apol. Cathol. p.* 1. *l.* 1. *c.* 21. and the *Primate of Armagh*, whoſe Judgment is well known as to the point of Ordinanation. So much may ſuffice to ſhew, that both thoſe who hold an equality among Miniſters to be the Apoſtolical form, and thoſe that do hold Epiſcopacy to have been it, do yet both of them agree at laſt in this, that no one form is ſetled by an unalterable Law of Chriſt, nor conſequently founded upon Divine Right. For the former, notwithſtanding their opinion of the Primitive Form, do hold Epiſcopacy lawful; and the latter, who hold Epiſcopacy to have been the Primitive Form, do not hold it perpetually and immutably neceſſary, but that Preſbyters, (where Biſhops cannot be had) may lawfully diſcharge the Offices belonging to Biſhops; both which Conceſſions do neceſſarily deſtroy the perpetual Divine Right of that Form of Government they aſſert; which is the thing I have been ſo long in proving, and I hope made it evident to any unprejudicated mind.

L. 4. *c.* 7. *p.* 146.

From *p.* 53. to *p.* 63.

Having laid down this now as a ſure foundation for peace and union, it were a very eaſie matter to improve it in order to an Accommodation of our preſent differences about Church-Government. I ſhall only lay down three general Principles deducible from hence, and leave the whole to the mature conſideration of the Lovers of Truth and Peace. The firſt Principle is, *That Prudence muſt be uſed in ſetling the Government of the Church.* This hath been the whole deſign of this Treatiſe, to prove that the Form of Church-Government is a mere matter of prudence, regulated by the Word of God. But I need not inſiſt on the Arguments already brought to prove it: for as far as I can find, although the ſeveral parties in their contentions with one another plead for Divine Right, yet when any one of them comes to ſettle their own particular Form, they are fain to call in the help of Prudence, even in things ſuppoſed by the ſeveral parties, as neceſſary to the eſtabliſhment of their own Form. The *Congregational* men may deſpair of ever finding *Elective Synods*, *an explicite Church-Covenant*, or *poſitive ſigns of Grace* in admiſſion of Church-Members in any Law of Chriſt: nay, they will not generally plead for any more for them, than general rules of Scriptures, fine Similitudes, and Analogies, and evidence of natural reaſon; and what are all theſe at laſt to an expreſs Law of Chriſt, without which it was pretended nothing was to be done in the Church of God? The *Preſbyterians* ſeem more generally to own the uſe of General Rules, and the Light of Nature; in order to the Form of Church-Government, as in the *Subordination of Courts*, *Claſſical Aſſemblies*, and the more moderate ſort, as to *Lay-Elders*. The *Epiſcopal* men will hardly find any evidence in Scripture, or the practice of the Apoſtles, for *Churches conſiſting of many fixed Congregations for Worſhip, under the charge of one Perſon*, nor in the Primitive Church, for *the Ordination of a Biſhop without the preceding election of the Clergy, and at leaſt conſent and approbation of the People*; and neither in Scripture, nor Antiquity, the leaſt footſtep of a *delegation of Church-power*. So that upon the matter at laſt, all of them make uſe of thoſe things in Church Government, which have no other foundation but the Principles of *Humane Prudence*, guided by the Scriptures; and it were well if that were obſerved ſtill. The ſecond Principle is, *That Form of Government is the beſt according to Principles of Chriſtian Prudence, which comes the neareſt to Apoſtolical practice, and tends moſt to the advancing the peace and unity of the Church of God.* What that Form is, I preſume not to define and determine, but leave it to be gather'd from the evidence of Scripture and Antiquity, as to the Primitive practice, and from the nature, ſtate and condition of that Church wherein it is to be ſetled, as to its tendency to the advancement of peace and unity in it. In order to the finding out of which, that Propoſal of his late moſt excellent Majeſty of glorious memory, is moſt highly juſt and reaſonable. *His Majeſty thinketh it well worthy the ſtudies and endeavours of Divines of both Opinions, laying aſide emulation and private intereſts, to reduce Epiſcopacy and Preſbytery into ſuch a well-proportion'd Form of Superiority and Subordination, as may beſt reſemble the Apoſtolical and Primitive times, ſo far forth as the different condition of the times, and the exigences of all conſiderable circumſtances will admit.*

His Majeſty's ſecond Paper to the Miniſters at *New-port. ad fin.*

If this Propoſal be embraced, as there is no reaſon why it ſhould not; then, all ſuch things muſt be retrieved which were unqueſtionably of the Primitive practice, but have been grown out of uſe through the length and corruption of times. Such are the *reſtoring* *of the Preſbyteries of the ſeveral Churches*, as the *Senate* to the Biſhop, with whoſe council and advice all things were done in the Primitive Church. *The contracting of Dioceſes into ſuch a compaſs as may be fitted for the perſonal inſpection of the Biſhop, and care of himſelf and the* Senate; *the placing of Biſhops in all great Towns of reſort*, eſpecially *County Towns*; that according to the ancient courſe of the Church, its Government may be proportioned to the Civil Government. *The conſtant preaching of the Biſhop in ſome Churches of his charge, and reſidence in his Dioceſe*; *The ſolemnity of Ordinations, with the conſent of the People*; *The obſerving Provincial Synods twice every Year. The imploying of none in judging Church-Matters but the Clergy.* Theſe are things unqueſtionably of the Primitive practice, and no argument can be drawn from the preſent ſtate of things, why they are not as much, if not more neceſſary than ever. And therefore all who appeal to the practice of the Primitive Church, muſt condemn themſelves, if they juſtifie the neglect of them. But I only touch at theſe things, my deſign being only to lay a foundation for a happy union. *Laſtly, What Form of Government is determined by lawful Authority in the Church of God, ought ſo far to be ſubmitted to, as it contains nothing repugnant to the Word of God.* So that let mens judgments be what they will concerning the Primitive Form, ſeeing it hath been proved, that that Form doth not bind unalterably and neceſſarily, it remains that the determining of the Form of Government is a matter of liberty in the Church; and what is ſo, may be determined by lawful Authority; and what is ſo determined by that Authority, doth bind men to obedience, as hath been proved by the 5 *Hypotheſis*, in the entrance of this Treatiſe. I conclude all with this earneſt deſire, *That the Wiſe and Gracious God would ſend us one heart and one way, that he would be the Compoſer of our differences, and the Repairer of our breaches, that of our ſtrange diviſions and unchriſtian animoſities, while we pretend to ſerve the Prince of Peace, we may at laſt ſee*

V. Biſhop *Uſher's* reduction of Epiſcopacy, *&c.*

Par. 1. *ch.* 2. *ſ.* 12.

THE END.

Glory to God on high, on earth peace, good will towards men, Luke 2.14.

A

A
DISCOURSE
Concerning the
Power of Excommunication
IN A
Chriſtian Church.

109: 2: F.

The Name of Power in a Church explained. The miſtake of which, the Foundation of Eraſtianiſm. The Notion of the Church opened, as it is the ſubject of Power. The Church proved to be a Society diſtinct from the Commonwealth; by reaſon of its different Nature, and Divine Inſtitution; diſtinct Officers, different Rights, and Ends, and peculiar Offences. The Power of the Church doth not ariſe from mere confederation. The Church's Power founded on the nature of the Chriſtian Society, and not on particular Precepts. The Power of Church-Officers not merely Doctrinal, proved by ſeveral Arguments. Church Power as to particular perſons antecedent to confederation. The Power of the Keys relates to Baptiſm. The Church's Power extends to Excommunication; what it is, and what grounds it had under the Law. No excluſion from Temple-worſhip among the Jews. Excommunication neceſſary in a Chriſtian Church, becauſe of the conditions ſuppoſed to communion in it. Of the Inceſtuous perſon, and the Grounds of the Apoſtolical Cenſure. Objections againſt Excommunication anſwered. The fundamental Rights of the Church continue after its being incorporated into the Civil State. The Magiſtrate's Power, as to Excommunication cleared.

Append. to c. 8. part. 8. §. 1.

IT is a matter of daily obſervation and experience in the World, how hard it is to keep the *eyes* of the underſtanding *clear* in its judgment of things, when it is too far engaged in the *duſt* of Controverſie. It being ſo very difficult to well *manage* an impetuous *purſuit* after any Opinion; nothing being more common than to ſee men *out-run* their *mark*, and through the *force* of their ſpeed to be carried as far *beyond it*, as others in their Opinion *fall ſhort* of it. There is certainly a kind of *ebriety* of the mind, as well as of the body, which makes it ſo *unſtable* and *pendulous*, that it oft times *reels* from one extream unto the quite contrary. This as it is obvious in moſt eager *controvertiſts* of all Ages, ſo eſpecially in ſuch, who have diſcovered the falſity of an opinion they were once confident of, which they think they can never after run far enough from: So that while they *ſtart* at an *apparition* they ſo much dread, they run into thoſe *untrodden paths*, wherein they *loſe* both themſelves and the *Truth* they ſought for.

§. 2. Thus we find it to be in the preſent *controverſie*, for many out of their juſt *zeal* againſt the *extravagancies* of thoſe who ſcrued up *Church-Power* to ſo high a peg, that it was thought to make perpetual diſcord with the *Commonwealth*, could never think themſelves free from ſo great an inconvenience, till they had *melted down* all *Spiritual Power* into the *Civil State*, and diſſolved the *Church* into the *Commonwealth*. But that the World may ſee I have not been more forward to aſſert the juſt power of the *Magiſtrate* in *Eccleſiaſticals*, as well as *Civils*, than to defend the Fundamental *Rights* of the *Church*, I have taken this opportunity more fully to explain and vindicate that part of the *Church's Power*, which lies in reference to *Offenders*; it being the main think ſtruck at by thoſe who are the followers of that noted *Phyſitian*, who handled the Church ſo ill, as to deprive her of her expulſive faculty of *Noxious humours*, and ſo left her under a *Miſerere mei.*

§. 3. I ſhall therefore endeavour to give the *Church* her due, as well as *Caſar* his, by making good this following *Principle* or *Hypotheſis*, upon which the whole hinge of this Controverſie *turns*, viz. *That the power of inflicting Cenſure, upon Offenders in a Chriſtian Church, is a fundamental Right, reſulting from the conſtitution of the Church, as a Society by Jeſus Chriſt; and that the ſeat of this Power is in thoſe Officers of the Church, who have derived their power originally from the Founder of this Society, and act by vertue of the Laws of it.*

§. 4. For the clear *ſtating* of this *Controverſie*, it will be neceſſary to explain, what that *Power* is, which I attribute to the *Church*, and in what notion the *Church* is to be conſidered as it *exerciſeth* this Power. *Firſt*, concerning the proper notion of *Power*, by it I cannot ſee any thing elſe to be underſtood, than a *right of governing or ordering things which belong to a Society.* And ſo *Power* implies only a *moral faculty* in the perſon enjoying it, to take care *ne quid civitas detrimenti capiat*, whereby it is evident that every well conſtituted Society muſt ſuppoſe a Power within its ſelf of ordering things belonging to its welfare, or elſe it were impoſſible, either the *being*, or the *rights* and *privileges* of a *Society* could be long preſerved. *Power* then in its general and abſtracted notion, doth not neceſſarily import either *meer Authority*, or *proper Coaction*; for theſe, to any impartial judgment, will appear to be rather the ſeveral *modes* whereby power is exerciſed, than any proper ingredients of the *ſpecifick Nature* of it: which in general, imports no more than *a right to govern a conſtituted Society*; but how that right ſhall be exerciſed, muſt be reſolved not from the notion of Power, but from the *nature* and *conſtitution* of that particular Society in which it is *lodged* and *inherent.*

§. 5. It appears then from hence to be a great *miſtake* and abuſe of well-natured Readers, when all power is neceſſarily reſtrained, either to that which is *properly Coercive*, or to *that* which is *merely Arbitrary*, and only from conſent. The Original of which miſtake is, the ſtating the Notion of *Power* from the uſe of the *Word*, either in ancient *Roman Authors*, or elſe in the *Civil Laws*, both which are freely acknowleged to be ſtrangers to the exerciſe of any other *Power*, than that which is *merely authoritative* and *perſwaſive*, or that which is *Coactive* and *Penal.* The ground of which is, becauſe they were ignorant of any other way of *conveyance* of *Power*, beſides *external force*, and *arbitrary conſent*; the one in thoſe called *Legal Societies*, or *Civitates*, the other *Collegia* and *Hæteriæ.* But ſo as that do acknowledge that *God* hath a *right* of *commanding* men to what Duty he pleaſe himſelf, and *appointing* a *Society* upon what terms beſt pleaſe him, and giving a *Power* to *particular perſons* to *govern* that *Society*, in what *way* ſhall tend moſt *to advance* the Honour of ſuch a *Society*, may eaſily be *made appear*, that there is a kind of *Power* neither properly *Co-active*, nor merely *Arbitrary*, viz. ſuch a one as *immediately reſults* from Divine *Inſtitution*, and doth ſuppoſe *conſent* to ſubmit to it as a *neceſſary Duty* in all the *Members* of this Society.

§. 6. This *Power*, it is evident, is not *merely Arbitrary* either in the *Governours* or *Members*; for the *Governours* derive their *Power* or Right of Governing from the *Inſtitution of Chriſt*, and are to be *regulated* by his *Laws* in the Execution of it, and the *Members*, though their *conſent* be *neceſſarily ſuppoſed*, yet that *conſent* is a *Duty* in them, and that Duty doth imply their *ſubmiſſion* to the *Rulers* of this Society: Neither can this Power be called *Co-active*, in the ſenſe it is commonly taken; for *co-active power*, and *external force* are neceſſary *correlates* to each other, but we ſuppoſe no ſuch thing as a power of outward force to be given to the *Church* as ſuch, for that properly belongs to a *Commonwealth*. But the power which I ſuppoſe to be lodged in the *Church*, is ſuch a power as *depends* upon a *Law* of a *Superiour*, *giving right to Govern, to particular Perſons over ſuch a Society, and making it the Duty of all Members of it to ſubmit unto it, upon no other Penalties, than the excluſion of them from the Privileges, which that Society enjoys.* So that ſuppoſing ſuch a *Society* as the *Church* is, to be of Divine Inſtitution, and that *Chriſt* hath appointed *Officers* to rule it, it neceſſarily follows, that thoſe *Officers* muſt derive their *power*, i. e. their right of Governing this Society, not merely from *conſent* and *confederation* of Parties, but from that Divine Inſtitution, on which the Society depends. The want of underſtanding the right Notion of Power in the ſenſe here ſet down, is certainly the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of *Eraſtianiſm*, and that which hath given occaſion to ſo many to queſtion any ſuch thing as *Power* in the *Church*, eſpecially, when the more *zealous* than *judicious* Defenders of it have rather choſen to hang it upon ſome *doubtful places* of *Scripture*, than on the very *Nature* and *Conſtitution* of the *Chriſtian Church*, as a Society inſtituted by *Jeſus Chriſt*.

§. 7. This being then the nature of *power* in general, it is I ſuppoſe clear, that an outward co-active *force* is not *neceſſary* in order to it, for if ſome may have a *Right* to *Govern* and others may be obliged to Obedience to thoſe *Perſons antecedently*, to any Civil Conſtitution; then ſuch *Perſons* have a *juſt power* to *inflict cenſures* upon ſuch as tranſgreſs the Rules of the Society, without any outward force. It is here very impertinent to diſpute, what *effects* ſuch *cenſures* can have upon wilful Perſons without a *Co-active power*; If I can prove, that there is a right to inflict them in *Church-Offices*, and an *Obligation* to *ſubmit* to them in all Offenders; I am not to trouble my ſelf with the Event of ſuch things as depend upon *Divine Inſtitutions*. I know it is the great *Objection* of the Followers of *Eraſtus*, that *Church-cenſures* are inflicted upon *Perſons* unwilling to receive them, and therefore muſt imply *external co-active force*, which is repugnant to the Nature of a *Church*. But this admits (according to the Principles here eſtabliſhed) of a very eaſie ſolution; for I deny not that *Church Power* goes upon *conſent*, but then it's very plain here was an *antecedent conſent* to *ſubmit* to *cenſures* in the very *entrance* into this *Society*, which is ſufficient to denominate it a *voluntary act* of the Perſons undergoing it; and my reaſon is this, every Perſon entring into a Society, parts

with

with his own *freedom* and *liberyy*, as to *matters* concerning the *governing* of it, and *profeſſeth ſubmiſſion* to the *Rules* and *Orders* of it: Now a Man having *parted* with his freedom already, cannot *re-aſſume it* when he pleaſe, for then, he is under an *Obligation* to *ſtand* to the *Covenants* made at his *entrance*; and conſequently his *undergoing* what ſhall be laid upon him by the *Laws* of this *Society*, muſt be ſuppoſed to be *voluntary*, as depending upon his *conſent* at firſt entrance, which in all Societies muſt be ſuppoſed to hold ſtill, elſe there would follow nothing but *confuſion* in all Societies in the World, if every Man were at liberty to *break* his *Covenants*, when any thing comes to lie upon him according to the Rules of the Society, which he out of ſome private *deſign* would be *unwilling* to *undergo*. Thus much may ſerve to ſettle a-right the *Notion* of *Power*; the want of underſtanding which hath cauſed all the confuſion of this Controverſie.

§. 8. The next thing is, In what Notion we are to conſider the *Church*, which is made the *ſubject* of this *Power*. As to which we are to conſider this *Power*; either as to its *right*, or *in actu primo*; or as to its *exerciſe*, or *in actu ſecundo*: Now if we take this *Power* as to the *fundamental Right* of it; then it belongs to the *Univerſal Church* of *Chriſt*, which *ſubſiſts* as a viſible *Society*, by vertue of that *Law* of *Chriſt*, which makes an *owning* the *Profeſſion* of *Chriſtianity* the *Duty* of all *Church-members*. If we conſider this *Power* in the *exerciſe* of it, then (it being impoſſible that the Univerſal Church ſhould perform the *executive* part of this power relating to Offences) I ſuppoſe it *lodged* in that *particular Society* of Chriſtians, which are united together in one *body* in the *community* of the ſame *Government*; but yet, ſo, as that the *adminiſtration* of this *Power*, doth not belong to the body of the Society conſidered *complexly*, but to thoſe *Officers* in it, whoſe care and charge it is, to have a *peculiar overſight* and *inſpection* over the Church, and to *redreſs* all *diſorders* in it. Thus the *viſive faculty* is fundamentally *lodged* in the *Soul*, yet all *exterior acts of ſight* are performed by the *Eyes*, which are the ἐπίσκοποι *Overſeers* of the *Body*, as the other are of the *Church*, ſo that the *exerciſe* and *adminiſtration* of this *power*, belongs to the ſpecial *Officers* and *Governours* of the Church; none elſe being capable of exerciſing this *Power* of the Church as ſuch, but they on whom it is *ſetled* by the *Founder* of the Church it ſelf.

§. 9. This *Society* of the *Church* may be again conſidered, either as *ſubſiſting* without any *influence* from the *civil Power*, or as it is *owned by*, and *incorporated into* a *Chriſtian State*. I therefore demand, Whether it be abſolutely neceſſary for the *ſubſiſtance* of this *Chriſtian Society*, to be upheld by the *Civil Power*, or *no*? And certainly none who conſider the *firſt* and *pureſt Ages* of the *Chriſtian Church*, can give any *entertainment* to the *Affirmative*, becauſe then the *Church* flouriſhed in its greateſt *purity*, not only when not *upheld*, but when moſt violently *oppoſed* by the *Civil Power*; If ſo then its being *united* with the *Civil State* is only accidental as to the *conſtitution* of a *Church*; and if this be only accidental, then it muſt be ſuppoſed *furniſhed* with every thing *requiſite* to its well ordering accidentally to any ſuch *Union*, and *abſtractly* from it. For can we imagine our *Bleſſed Saviour* ſhould *inſtitute* a *Society*, and leave it *deſtitute* of *Means* to *uphold* its *ſelf*, unleſs it fell into the *Hands* of the *Civil Power*? or that he left every thing tending thereto, merely to *Prudence*, and the *Arbitrary Conſtitutions* of the

Perſons joining together in this *Society?* Did our *Saviour* take care there ſhould be a *Society*, and not provide for *Means* to *uphold* it? Nay, it is evident, he not only *appointed* a *Society*, but *Officers* to rule it. Had thoſe *Officers* then a *Right* to *Govern* it or *no*, by vertue of *Chriſt's inſtitution* of them? if not, they were rather *Bibuli* than *Cæſares*, *Cyphers* than *Conſules* in the *Church of God*. If they had a *power* to *Govern*, doth not that neceſſarily imply a *Right* to inflict *Cenſures* on *Offenders*, unleſs we will ſuppoſe that either there can be no *Offenders* in a *Chriſtian Church*, or that thoſe *Offenders* do not *violate* the *Laws* of the Society, or there be ſome *Prohibition* for them to exerciſe their power over them (which is to give power with one Hand, and take it away with the other) or that this power cannot *extend* ſo far as to *exclude* any from the *Privileges* of the Church: Which is the thing to be diſcuſſed.

§. 10. Having thus cleared our way, I now come to the *Reſolution* of the *Queſtion* it ſelf, in order to which I ſhall endeavour to *demonſtrate*, with what *Evidence* the *Subject* is *capable* of, theſe following things. Firſt, *That the Church is a peculiar Society in its own Nature, diſtinct from the Commonwealth.* Secondly, *That the power of the Church over its Members doth not ariſe from mere confederation or conſent of Parties.* Thirdly, *That this Power of the Church doth extend to the Excluſion of Offenders from the Privileges of it.* Fourthly, *That the Fundamental Rights of the Church do not eſcheat to the Commonwealth upon their being* united *in a Chriſtian State.* If theſe *Principles* be eſtabliſhed, the *Churches Power* will ſtand upon them, as on a *firm* and *unmoveable Baſis.*

§. 11. I begin with the *firſt. That the Church is a peculiar Society in its own Nature*, diſtinct *from the Commonwealth*, which I prove by theſe Arguments.

1. Thoſe Societies, which are *capable* of *ſubſiſting apart* from *each other*, are *really*, and in their own *Nature* diſtinct from one another; but ſo it is with the *Church* and *Commonwealth*. For there can be no greater Evidence of a *Real* Diſtinction than *Mutual Separation*; and I think the proving the *poſſibility* of the *Souls exiſting, ſeparate* from the *body*, is one of the ſtrongeſt *Arguments* to prove it to be a *ſubſtance really diſtinct* from the *body*, to which it is united; although we are often fain to go the other way to work, and to prove *poſſibility* of *Separation* from other Arguments evincing the Soul to be a *diſtinct ſubſtance*; but the reaſon of that is for want of evidence as to the *ſtate* of *ſeparate Souls*, and their *viſible exiſtence*, which is *repugnant* to the *immateriality* of their *Natures*. But now, as to the matter in hand, we have all *evidence* deſirable; for we are not put to prove *poſſibility* of *Separation*, merely from the *different conſtitution* of the things united, but we have evidence to Senſe of it, that the *Church* hath *ſubſiſted* when it hath been not only *ſeparated* from, but *perſecuted* by all *Civil Power*. It is with many Men as to the Union of *Church* and *State*, as it is with others, as to the Union of the *Soul* and *Body*; when they obſerve how *cloſe* the *Union* is, and how much the *Soul* makes *uſe* of the *Animal Spirits* in moſt of its *Operations*, and how great a *Sympathy* there is between them, that, like *Hippocrates* his *Twins*, they *laugh* and *weep* together, they are ſhrewdly put to it, how to *fancy* the *Soul* to be any thing elſe than a more *vigorous mode* of *matter*; ſo theſe obſerving how cloſe an *Union* and *Dependence* there is between the *Church*

and *State* in a *Chriſtian Commonwealth*, and how much the *Church* is beholding to the *Civil Power* in the *Adminiſtration* of its *Functions*, are apt to think that the *Church* is nothing but a *higher mode* of a *Commonwealth*, conſidered as *Chriſtian*. But when it is ſo evident that the *Church* hath, and may *ſubſiſt*, ſuppoſing it abſtracted from all *Civil Power*, it may be a ſufficient *demonſtration* that however *near* they may be when *united*, yet they are *really*, and in their own *nature*, diſtinct from each other. Which was the thing to be proved.

§. 12. 2. Thoſe are diſtinct *Societies*, which have every thing diſtinct in their *nature* from each other, which belong to the *Conſtitution* or *Government* of them; but this is evident, as to the *Church* and *Commonwealth*, which will appear, becauſe their *Charter* is diſtinct, or that which gives them their Being as a Society: *Civil Societies* are *founded* upon the *neceſſity* of particular Mens *parting* with their peculiar *Rights*, for the *preſervation* of themſelves, which was the *impulſive cauſe* of their *entring* into *Societies*; but that which actually ſpeaks them to be a *Society*, is the *mutual conſent* of the *ſeveral Parties* joining together, whereby they make themſelves to be *one Body*; and to have one *common Intereſt*. So *Cicero de Repub.* defines *Populus*, to be *cœtus multitudinis, juris conſenſu & utilitatis communione ſociatus*. There is no doubt, but *God's* general *providence* is as evidently ſeen in bringing the *World* into *Societies*, and making them live under *Government*, as in diſpoſing all particular *Events* which happen in thoſe *Societies*; but yet the *way*, which Providence uſed in the *conſtitution* of theſe *Societies*, is by *inclining Men* to *conſent* to *aſſociate* for their *mutual benefit* and *advantage:* So that natural *Reaſon* conſulting for the *good* of *Mankind*, as to thoſe *Rights* which Men enjoy in common with each other, was the main foundation upon which all *Civil Societies* were erected. We find no poſitive *Law* enacting the *being* of *Civil Societies*, becauſe Nature its ſelf would prompt Men for their own Conveniences to enter into them. But the ground and foundation of that Society, which we call a *Church*, is a matter which *natural Reaſon* and *common Notions* can never reach to: And therefore an aſſociating for the preſerving of ſuch, may be a *Philoſophical Society*, but a *Chriſtian* it cannot be: And they that would make a *Chriſtian Church* to be nothing elſe but a *Society* of *Eſſens*, or an ὁμακοεῖον of *Pythagoreans*, do either not underſtand, or not conſider whereon this *Chriſtian Society* is founded; for it is evident they look on it as a merely voluntary thing, that is not at all ſetled by any *Divine poſitive Law*.

Apud. Auguſt. de Civit. Dei l. 2. c. 21.

§. 13. The truth is, there is no *principle* more conſiſtent with the Opinion of thoſe who deny any *Chriſtian power* in a *Chriſtian ſtate*, than this is, and it is that, which every one, who will make good his ground muſt be driven to; for it is evident, that in matters merely voluntary, and depending only on *confederation*, ſuch things being liable to a *Magiſtrate's power*, there can be no *plea* from mutual conſent, to juſtifie any oppoſition to *ſupream Authority* in a *Commonwealth*. But then, how ſuch perſons can be *Chriſtians*, when the *Magiſtrates* would have them to be otherwiſe, I cannot underſtand; nor how the *primitive Martyrs* were any other than a company of Fools or Madmen, who would hazard their Lives for that which was a mere Arbitrary thing, and which they had no neceſſary Obligation upon them to profeſs. Miſtake me not, I ſpeak not here of mere acts of Diſcipline, but of the Duty of outward profeſſing *Chriſtianity*; if this be a Duty, then a Chriſtian

Society is ſetled by a *poſitive Law*; if it be not a Duty, then they are Fools who ſuffer for it: So that this Queſtion reſolved into its Principles, leads us higher than we think for, and the main thing in debate muſt be, Whether there be an *Obligation* upon *Conſcience* for Men to aſſociate in the Profeſſion of *Chriſtianity*, or no? If there be, then the *Church*, which is nothing elſe but ſuch an *aſſociation*, is eſtabliſhed upon a *Poſitive Law of Chriſt*; if there be not, then thoſe Inconveniences follow, which are already mention'd.

§. 14. We are told indeed by the *Leviathan* with confidence enough, that no Precepts of the *Goſpel* are *Law*, till *enacted* by *Civil Authority*; but it is little wonder, that he, who thinks an immaterial ſubſtance implies a contradiction, ſhould think as much of calling any thing a *Law*, but what hath a Civil Sanction. But I ſuppoſe all thoſe who dare freely own a ſupream and infinite Eſſence to have been the Creator, and to be the Ruler of the *World*, will acknowledge his Power to oblige *Conſcience*, without being beholding to his own Creature to *Enact* his *Laws*, that Men might be bound to obey them. Was the great God fain to be beholding to the *Civil Authority* he had over the *Jewiſh Commonwealth* (their Government being a Θεοκρατία) to make his *Laws* obligatory to the *Conſciences* of the *Jews*? What, had not they their Beings from God? and can there be any greater ground of obligation to Obedience, than from thence? Whence comes *Civil Power* to have any Right to *oblige* Men more, than *God*, conſidered as *Governour* of the *World*, can have? Can there be indeed no other *Laws* according to the *Leviathan's Hypotheſis*, but only the *Law* of *Nature* and *Civil Laws*? But I pray whence comes the Obligation to either of theſe, that theſe are not as Arbitrary as all other Agreements are? And is it not as ſtrong a dictate of Nature as any can be (ſuppoſing that there is a *God*) that a Creature which receives its Being from another, ſhould be bound to obey him, not only in the Reſultancies of his own Nature, but with the arbitrary Conſtitutions of his Will: Was *Adam* bound to obey *God* or no, as to that poſitive Precept of eating the Forbidden Fruit, if no *Civil Sanction* had been added to that *Law*? The truth is, ſuch *Hypotheſes* as theſe are, when they are followed cloſe home, will be found to kennel in that black Den, from whence they are loath to be thought to have proceeded.

§. 15. And now, ſuppoſing that every full Declaration of the Will of *Chriſt*, as to any poſitive Inſtitution, hath the force and power of a Law upon the Conſciences of all, to whom it is ſufficiently propoſed: I proceed to make appear, that ſuch a divine poſitive Law there is, for the exiſtence of a Church, as a viſible Body and Society in the World: By which I am far from meaning ſuch a conſpicuous Society, that muſt continue in a perpetual viſibility in the ſame place; I find not the leaſt intimation of any ſuch thing in *Scripture*; but that there ſhall always be ſome where or other, in the World, a *Society owning* and *profeſſing Chriſtianity*, may be eaſily deduced from thence; and eſpecially on this account, that our *Saviour* hath required this, as one of the Conditions in order to eternal Felicity, that all thoſe who believe in their Hearts, that *Jeſus* is the *Chriſt*, muſt likewiſe confeſs him with their *Mouths* to the World: And therefore, as long as there are Men to believe in *Chriſt*, there muſt be Men that will not be *aſhamed* to aſſociate, on the account of the *Doctrine* he hath promulged to the World. That one *Phraſe* in the *New Teſtament*, ſo frequently uſed by our Bleſſed Saviour, of *the Kingdom of Heaven* (importing a *Goſpel-ſtate*) doth evidently declare a Society, which was conſtituted by him, on the *principles* of the *Goſpel-Covenant*. Wherefore ſhould our *Saviour* call *Diſciples*, and make *Apoſtles*, and ſend them abroad with full *commiſſion* to gather and initiate *Diſciples* by *Baptiſm*; did he not intend a *viſible ſociety* for his *Church?* Had it not been enough for Men to have *cordially believed* the Truth of the *Goſpel*, but they muſt be entred in a *ſolemm viſible way*, and join in *participation* of *viſible Symbols of Bread and Wine*, but that our *Saviour* required *external profeſſion* and *Society* in the *Goſpel* as a neceſſary *duty*, in order to *obtaining* the *privileges* conveyed by his *Magna Charta* in the *Goſpel.* I *would fain know by what argument we can prove, that any humane Legiſlator, did ever intend a Commonwealth to be governed according to his mode,* by which we cannot prove that *Chriſt by a poſitive Law, did command ſuch a ſociety, as ſhould be governed in a viſible manner, as other ſocieties are?* Did he not appoint Officers himſelf in the *Church*, and that of many ranks and degrees? Did he not inveſt thoſe Officers with authority to rule his *Church?* Is it not laid as a charge on them, *to take heed to that flock, over which God had made them Overſeers?* Are there not *Rules* laid down for the peculiar exerciſe of their *Government* over the *Church* in all the parts of it? Were not theſe *Officers* admitted into their function by a moſt ſolemn viſible Rite of Impoſition of Hands? And are all theſe ſolemn tranſactions a mere piece of *ſacred Pageantry?* And they will appear to be little more, if the *Society* of the *Church* be a mere *Arbitrary* thing, depending only upon conſent and confederation, and not ſubſiſting by vertue of any *Charter* from *Chriſt*, or ſome *poſitive Law*, requiring all *Chriſtians* to join in *Church ſociety* together.

§. 16. But if now from hence it appears (as certainly it cannot but appear) that this *Society* of the *Church* doth ſubſiſt by vertue of a *Divine poſitive Law*, then it muſt of neceſſity be diſtinct from a *Civil Society*, and that on theſe *Accounts: Firſt*, becauſe there is an antecedent obligation on Conſcience to aſſociate on the account of *Chriſtianity*, whether *Humane Laws prohibit* or *command* it. From whence, of neceſſity it follows, that the conſtitution of the *Church* is really different from that of the *Commonwealth*; becauſe whether the *Commonwealth* be for, or againſt this *Society*, all that own it are bound to profeſs it openly, and declare themſelves Members of it. Whereas, were the *Church* and *Commonwealth* really and formally the ſame, all obligation to *Church ſociety*, would ariſe merely from the *Legiſlative Power* of the *Commonwealth*. But now there being a *Divine Law*, binding in Conſcience, whoſe obligation cannot be ſuperſeded by any *Humane Law*, it is plain and evident, where are ſuch vaſtly different obligations, there are different Powers; and in this ſenſe I know no incongruity, in admitting *Imperium in Imperio*, if by it we underſtand no *external coactive power*, but an *internal power laying obligation on Conſcience*, diſtinct from the power lodged in a *Commonweatlh* conſidered as ſuch. An *outward coactive power* was always diſowned by *Chriſt*, but certainly not an *internal Power* over *Conſcience* to oblige all his *Diſciples* to what Duties he thought fit.

Secondly, I argue from thoſe Officers, whoſe rights to govern this Society are founded on that *Charter*, whereby the *Society* it ſelf ſubſiſts. Now I would willingly know why, when our *Saviour* diſowned all *outward power* in the World, yet he ſhould conſtitute a *Society*, and appoint Officers in it, did he not intend a peculiar diſtinct *Society*, from the other *Societies* of the World. And therefore the argument frequently uſed againſt *Church-power*, becauſe it hath no outward force with it by the conſtitution of *Chriſt*, is a ſtrong argument to me of the peculiarity of a *Chriſtian Society* from a *Commonwealth*; becauſe *Chriſt* ſo inſtituted it, as not to have it ruled at firſt by any outward force or power. When *Chriſt* ſaith his *Kingdom was not of this World*; he implies, that he had a *Society* that was governed by his *Laws* in the World, yet diſtinct from all *mundane Societies*: had not our *Saviour* intended his *Church* to have been a peculiar *Society* diſtinct from a *Commonwealth*, it is hard to conceive why our *Saviour* ſhould *interdict* the *Apoſtles* the uſe of a *civil coactive power*: Or why inſtead of ſending abroad *Apoſtles* to *preach* the *Goſpel*, he did not employ the Governors of Commonwealths to have enforced *Chriſtianity* by *Laws* and *temporal Edicts*, and the ſeveral *Magiſtrates* to have impowered ſeveral perſons under them to preach the *Goſpel* in their ſeveral *Territories*? And can any thing be more plain, by our *Saviour*'s taking a contrary courſe, than that he intended a *Church Society* to be diſtinct from *Civil*, and the power belonging to it (as well as the *Officers*) to be of a different nature from that which is ſetled in a *Commonwealth*. I here ſuppoſe, that *Chriſt* hath by a *poſitive Law* eſtabliſhed the Government of his *Church* upon Officers of his own appointment; which I have largely proved elſewhere, and therefore ſuppoſe it now. *Thirdly*, I argue from the peculiar rights belonging to theſe *Societies*: For if every one born in the *Commonwealth*, have not thereby a right to the privileges of the *Church*; nor every one by being of the *Church*, any right to the benefits of the *Commonwealth*; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that theſe are diſtinct from one another. If any one by being of the *Commonwealth*, hath right to *Church-privileges*, then every one born in a *Commonwealth* may challenge a right to the *Lord's-Supper* without *Baptiſm*, or open *profeſſing Chriſtianity*, which I cannot think any will be very ready to grant. Now there being by *Divine appointment* the ſeveral rights of *Baptiſm* and the *Lord's-Supper*, as peculiar Badges of the Church as a viſible Society, it is evident, *Chriſt* did intend it a Society diſtinct from the Commonwealth.

Iren. p. 2. cap. 2.

Fourthly, I argue from the different ends of theſe Societies. A Commonwealth is conſtituted for civil ends, and the Church for ſpiritual: for ends are to be judged by the primary conſtitution, but now it is plain, the end of civil ſociety is for preſervation of mens rights as men (therefore *Magiſtracy* is called by St. *Peter* ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις:) but this Chriſtian Society doth not reſpect men under the connotation of Men, but as *Chriſtians*. The anſwer given to this is very ſhort and inſufficient, when it is ſaid, that every man in a Commonwealth, is to act upon ſpiritual accounts and ends: For there is a great deal of difference between *Chriſtianities* having an influence upon mens actings in a Common-wealth, and making a ſociety the ſame with a Commonwealth. To argue therefore from one to another, is a ſhortneſs of diſcourſe I cannot but wonder at: unleſs it could be proved, that *Chriſtianity* aimed at nothing elſe but regulating Men in the affairs of a Commonwealth, which is a task I ſuppoſe will not be undertaken.

Laſtly, I argue from the peculiar offences againſt this Society, which are, or may be diſtinct from thoſe againſt a Commonwealth. I deny not, but moſt times they are the ſame, but frequently they differ, and when they are the ſame, yet the conſideration of them is different in the Church and

Commonwealth, for which I ſhall ſuppoſe the Six Arguments produced in the laſt *chapter* of the firſt part to ſtand good, which will ſtrongly hold to *excommunication* in the *Chriſtian Church*, though there produced only for the *Jewiſh*. I would fain know what is to be done in many *Offences*, known to be againſt the *Laws* of *Chriſt*, and which tend to the Diſhonour of the *Chriſtian Society*, which the Civil and *Municipal Laws*, either do not, or may not take cognizance of? Thus much may ſerve, as I think, to make evident, that the *Church* in its own Nature, is a Peculiar Society diſtinct from a Commonwealth, which was the firſt Propoſition to be proved. *Iren. p.* 1. *c.* 8.

§. 17. The *Second* is, *That the power of the Church over its Members in caſe of Offences, doth not ariſe merely from confederation and conſent, though it doth ſuppoſe it.* This Church power may be conſidered two ways. Either, *firſt*, as it implies the *Right in ſome Inflicting Cenſures.* Or, *ſecondly*, as it implies in *others*, *the Duty of ſubmitting to cenſures inflicted*; now as to both theſe, I ſhall prove that their original is higher than mere Confederation.

1. *As to the Right of inflicting Cenſures* on theſe accounts. *Firſt*, What ever Society doth ſubſiſt by vertue of a Divine Conſtitution, doth by vertue thereof derive all power for its Preſervation, in peace, unity, and purity; but it is plain, that a power of cenſuring Offenders, is neceſſary for the Churches preſervation in peace and purity; and it is already proved, that the Church hath its Charter from *Chriſt*, and therefore from him it hath a power to inflict Puniſhments on Offenders, ſuitable to the Nature of the Society they are of. I am very prone to think, that the ground of all the Miſtakes on this Subject have riſen from hence, that ſome, imprudently enough, have fixt the Original of this Power on ſome ambiguous places of Scripture, which may, and it may be, ought to be taken in a different ſenſe; and their Adverſaries, finding thoſe places weak and inſufficient proofs of ſuch a power, have from thence rejected any ſuch kind of power at all; But certainly, if we ſhould reject every Truth that is weakly proved by ſome who have undertaken it, I know no Opinion would bid ſo fair for acceptance as *Scepticiſm*, and that in reference to many weighty and important Truths; for how weakly have ſome proved the Exiſtence of a *Deity*, the Immortality of the *Soul*, and the Truth of the *Scriptures* by ſuch Arguments, that if it were enough to overthrow an Opinion to be able to anſwer ſome *Arguments* brought for it, *Atheiſm* it ſelf would become plauſible. It can be then no Evidence, that a thing is not true, becauſe ſome *Arguments* will not prove it; and truly, as to the matter in hand, I am fully of the Opinion of the excellent *H. Grotius*, ſpeaking of *Excommunication* in the *Chriſtian Church: Neque ad eam rem peculiare præceptum deſideratur, cum Eccleſiæ cœtu à Chriſto ſemel conſtituto, omnia illa imperata cenſeri debent, ſine quibus ejus cœtus puritas retineri non poteſt.* And therefore Men ſpend needleſs pains to prove an *Inſtitution* of this *power* by ſome poſitive *Precept*, when *Chriſt*'s founding his *Church* as a peculiar *Society*, is ſufficient proof he hath endowed it with this fundamental *Right*, without which the *Society* were *arena ſine calce*, a company of Perſons without any common tye of Union among them; for if there be any ſuch Union, it muſt depend on ſome Conditions, to be performed by the Members of that Society, which how could they require from them, if they have not power to exclude them upon *non performance*? In *Luc.* 6. 22.

2. I prove the Divine Original of this power from the *ſpecial appointment* and *deſignation* of particular *Officers* by *Jeſus Chriſt*, for the ruling of this *Society*. Now I ſay, that *Law* which provides there ſhall be *Officers* to *govern*, doth give them power to govern, ſuitable to the nature of their *Society:* Either then you muſt deny, that *Chriſt* hath by an *unalterable Inſtitution* appointed a *Goſpel Miniſtry*, or that this *Miniſtry* hath no Power in the *Church*, or that their Power extends not to *Excommunication*. The firſt I have already proved, the ſecond follows from their appointment: For by all the Titles given to *Church-Officers* in Scripture, it appears they had a power over the *Church*, (as ἐπίσκοποι, προεστῶτες, ἡγούμενοι, ποιμένες.) All which, as you well know, do import a right to govern the Society over which they are ſet. And that this power ſhould not extend to a power to exclude convict Offenders, ſeems very ſtrange, when no other Puniſhment can be more ſuitable to the nature of the Society than this is; which is a debarring him from the Privileges of that Society, which the Offender hath ſo much diſhonoured. Can there be any Puniſhment leſs imagined towards contumacious Offenders than this is, or that carries in it leſs of outward and co-active force, it implying nothing but what the Offender himſelf freely yielded to at his entrance into this Society.

§. 18. All that I can find replied by any of the Adverſaries of the Opinion I here aſſert, to the Argument drawn from the Inſtitution and Titles of the Officers of the Church, is, that all thoſe Titles which are given to the Miniſters of the Goſpel in the *New Teſtament*, that do import *Rule* and *Government*, are all to be taken in a *Spiritual Senſe*, as they are *Chriſt's Miniſters* and *Ambaſſadors* to preach his *Word* and *declare his Will* to his Church. So that all power ſuch Perſons conceive to lye in thoſe Titles, is only *Doctrinal* and *Declarative*; but how true that is, let any one judge that conſiders theſe things.

1. That there was certainly a power of *Diſcipline* then in the *Churches conſtituted* by the *Apoſtles*, which is moſt evident, not only from the Paſſages relating to Offenders in Saint *Paul*'s *Epiſtles*, eſpecially to the *Corinthians* and *Theſſalonians*, but from the continued Practice of ſucceeding Ages manifeſted by *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, and many others. There being then a power of *Diſcipline* in *Apoſtolical Churches*, there was a *Neceſſity* it ſhould be adminiſtred by ſome *Perſons* who had the care of thoſe *Churches*; and who were they but the ſeveral *Paſtors* of them? It being then evident that there was ſuch a Power, doth it not ſtand to common ſenſe it ſhould be implied in ſuch *Titles*, which in their natural Importance do ſignifie a Right to govern, as the names of *Paſtors* and *Rulers* do?

2. There is a *diverſity* in Scripture made between *Paſtors* and *Teachers*, *Epheſ.* 4. 11. Tho' this may not (as it doth not) imply a *neceſſity* of *Two diſtinct Offices* in the *Church*, yet it doth a *different reſpect* and *connotation* in the ſame Perſon, and ſo imports that *Ruling* carries in it ſomewhat more than mere Teaching, and ſo the power implied in *Paſtors* to be more than merely *Doctrinal*, which is all I contend for, *viz.* a Right to govern the Flock committed to their charge.

3. What poſſible difference can be aſſigned between the *Elders that Rule well, and thoſe which labour in the Word and Doctrine*, (1 Tim. 5. 17.) if all their *Ruling* were merely *labouring in the Word and Doctrine?* and all their *Governing* nothing but *Teaching?* I intend not

to prove an Office of Rulers diſtinct from Teachers from hence (which I know neither this place nor any other will do) but that the *formal Conception* of *Ruling*, is different from that of *Teaching*.

4. I argue from the *Analogy* between the Primitive *Churches* and the *Synagogues*, that as many of the names were taken from thence where they carried a *power* of *Diſcipline* with them, ſo they muſt do in ſome *proportion* in the *Church*; or it were not eaſie underſtanding them. It is moſt certain the *Preſbyters* of the *Synagogue* had a *power* of *Ruling*, and can you conceive the *Biſhops* and *Preſbyters* of the Church had none, when the *Societies* were much of the ſame Conſtitution, and the *Government* of the one was tranſcribed from the other, as hath been already largely proved?

5. The *acts* attributed to *Paſtor* in *Scripture*, imply a *power* of *Governing*, diſtinct from mere *Teaching*; ſuch are ποιμαίνειν, uſed for a *Right to Govern*, Matth. 2. 6. Revel. 12. 5. ——— 19. 15. which Word is attributed to *Paſtors of Churches* in reference to their Flocks, *Acts*, 20. 28. 1 Pet. 5. 2. and προστασία, is applied to Miniſters, when they are ſo frequently called προεστῶτες, which notes *præſidentiam cum poteſtate*; for *Heſychius* renders it by κυβέρνησιν, and the προστάται at *Athens* had certainly a power of Government in them.

6. The very word κυβερνήσεις, is attributed to thoſe who have *overſight of Churches*, 1 Cor. 12. 8. by which it is certainly evident, that a power more than *Doctrinal* is underſtood, as that it could not then be *underſtood of* a *power merely civil.* And this I ſuppoſe may ſuffice to *vindicate* this *Argument* from the *Titles of Church-Officers*, in the *New Teſtament*, that they are not *inſignificant things*; but the Perſons who enjoyed them had a *Right to govern* the Society over which the *Holy Ghoſt* hath made them *Overſeers*.

§. 19. 3. I argue that the *Church-Power* ariſeth not merely from *conſent*, becauſe the *Church* may *exerciſe* her *Power* on ſuch, who have not *actually confederated* with her; which is in admitting Members into the Church: For if the *Church-Officers* have power to *judge* whether *Perſons* are *fit* to be *admitted*, they have *power* to *exclude* from *admiſſion* ſuch whom they judge unfit, and ſo their *power* is *exerciſed* on thoſe who are not *confederated.* To this it may be anſwered, *That the conſent to be judged, gives the Church power over the Perſon ſuing for admiſſion.* I grant it doth, as to that particular *perſon*; but the *Right* in general of *judging concerning Admiſſion*, doth argue an *antecedent* power to an *actual confederation.* For I will ſuppoſe that *Chriſt* ſhould now appoint ſome *Officers* to found a *Church*, and gather a *Society* of *Chriſtians* together, where there hath been none before: I now aſk Whether theſe “ Officers have power to admit any into the
“ Church or no? This I ſuppoſe cannot be denied, for to what End
“ elſe were they appointed? If it be granted they have power to admit
“ perſons, and thereby make a Church, then they had power antece-
“ dently to any Confederation, for the Confederation was ſubſequent
“ to their Admiſſion: And therefore they who had power to admit,
“ could not derive their power from Confederation. This Argument,
“ to me, puts the Caſe out of diſpute, that all Church power cannot a-
“ riſe from mere Confederation.

And that which farther evidenceth that the *Power* of the *Church* doth not ariſe from mere *conſent*, is that *Deed* of *Gift* whereby our *Bleſſed Saviour* did confer the *Power* of the *Keys* on the *Apoſtle Peter*, as the *repreſentative* in that Action of the whole *College* of the *Apoſtles* and *Governours* of the *Church*, of which power all the *Apoſtles* were actually *infeoffed*, John 20. 23. By which *Power* of the *Keys* is certainly meant ſome *Adminiſtration* in the *Church*, which doth reſpect it as a viſible *Society*, in which Senſe the *Church* is ſo frequently called, as in that place, *the Kingdom of Heaven*; and in all probability the *Adminiſtration* intended here by the *Power* of the *Keys*, is that we are now diſcourſing of, *viz.* the *Power* of *Admiſſion* into the *Church* of *Chriſt*, in order to the Pardon of the Sins of all *penitent Believers*, and the *ſhutting out* of ſuch who were manifeſtly *unworthy* of ſo holy a *Communion*. So that the *power* of the *Keys* doth not *primarily* reſpect *excluſion* out of the *Church*, and *receiving* into it again upon *Abſolution*, but it chiefly reſpects the *power* of *Admiſſion* into the *Church*, though by way of *connotation* and *anology of Reaſon* it will carry the other along with it. For if the *Apoſtles*, as *Governours* of the *Church*, were *inveſted* with a *power* of *judging* of Men's *fitneſs* for *Admiſſion* into the *Church* as *Members* of it, it ſtands to the *higheſt Reaſon* that they ſhould have thereby likewiſe a *power* conveyed to them, of *excluding* ſuch as are *unworthy* after their *Admiſſion*; to maintain *communion* with the *Church*. So that this Interpretation of the *Power of the Keys*, is far from *invalidating the Power of the Church*, as to its *cenſuring Offenders*; all that it pretends to, is only giving a more natural and genuine Senſe of the *Power of the Keys*, which will appear ſo to be, if we conſider theſe things. 1. That this *Power* was given to Saint *Peter*, before any *Chriſtian Church* was actually *formed*, which (as I have elſewhere made manifeſt) was not done till after *Chriſt's Reſurrection*; when *Chriſt* had given the *Apoſtles* their Commiſſion *to go to Preach and Baptize*, &c. *Matth.* 28. 10. Is it not therefore far more *rational*, *that the Power of the Keys* here given, ſhould reſpect the *founding* of a *Church*, and *admiſſion* into it, than *ejection* out of it (before it was in being) and receiving into it again? And this we find likewiſe remarkably fulfilled in the Perſon of the *Apoſtle Peter*, who opened *the Door of admiſſion into the Chriſtian Church*, both to *Jews* and *Gentiles*. To the *Jews* by his *Sermon* at *Pentecoſt*, when about 3000 *Souls* were brought into the *Church of Chriſt*; to the *Gentiles*, as is moſt evident in the Story of *Cornelius*, Acts, 10. 28. who was *the firſt Fruits of the Gentiles*. So that if we ſhould yield ſo far to the great *Inhancers* of Saint *Peter's Power*, that ſomething was intended *peculiar* to his *Perſon* in the *Keys* given him by our *Saviour*, we hereby ſee how *rationally* it may be underſtood without the leaſt Advantage to the extravagant Pretenſions of Saint *Peter's* pretended Succeſſors. 2. The *pardon of ſin in Scripture* is moſt annexed to *Baptiſm* and *Admiſſion into the Church*, and thence it ſeems evident, *that the looſing of ſin* ſhould be by *admitting into the Church* by *Baptiſm*, in the ſame ſenſe by which *Baptiſm* is ſaid *to ſave us*, and it is called the *waſhing of Regeneration*; reſpecting the Spiritual *Advantages* which come by *Admiſſion into the Church of Chriſt*; and ſo they are ſaid to have their *Sins bound* upon them, who continue *refractory* in their *Sins*, as *Simon Magus* is ſaid *to be in the bond of iniquity*. 3. *The Metaphor of the Keys* refers moſt to *admiſſion* into the Houſe, and *excluding* out of it, rather than *ejecting* any out of it, and *re-admitting* them. Thus when *Eliakim* is ſaid to have *the Keys of the Houſe of* David, it was in regard of his *Power* to *open* and *ſhut* upon whom he pleaſed. And thus *Cyprian*, as our learned Mr. *Thorndike* obſerves, under-

Mat. 16. 19.

Iren. p. 2. ch. 5. ſſ. 5. p. 212.

Act. 2. 41.

1 Pet. 3. 21. Tit. 3. 5.

Acts 8. 33.

Iſa. 22. 20. *Cypr.* Ep. 73. Sect. 6.

underſtands the *power of binding and looſing* in this ſenſe, in his *Epiſtle* to *Jubaianus*, where ſpeaking of the *Remiſſion of ſins* in *Baptiſm*, he brings theſe very words of our *Saviour to Peter* as the evidence of it; *That what he ſhould looſe on Earth, ſhould be looſed in Heaven:* and concludes with this Sentence, *Unde intelligimus non niſi in Eccleſiâ præpoſitis & in Evangelicâ lege ac Dominicâ ordinatione fundatis, licere baptizare, & remiſſionem peccatorum dare; foris autem nec ligari aliquid poſſe nec ſolvi, ubi non ſit qui ligare poſſit aut ſolvere.* That which I now infer from this diſcourſe is, that the *power* of the *Church* doth not ariſe from mere *conſent* and *confederation*, both becauſe this *power doth reſpect* thoſe who have not actually conſented to it, and becauſe it is ſetled upon the *Governors of the Church* by *Divine Inſtitution.* Thus it appears that the *right of inflicting cenſures* doth not reſult merely *ex confederatâ Diſciplinâ*, which was the thing to be proved.

§. 20. (2.) The like evidence may be given, for *the duty of ſubmitting to penalties or Church-cenſures in the Members of the Church:* which that it ariſeth not from mere conſent of parties, will appear on theſe accounts.

1. Every perſon who enters this *Society is bound to conſent* before he doth it, becauſe of the *Obligation* lying upon Conſcience to an open *profeſſion of Chriſtianity*, preſently upon *conviction* of the *underſtanding of the truth* and *certainty of Chriſtian Religion.* For when once the mind of any *rational* man is ſo far wrought upon by the influence of the *Divine Spirit*, as to diſcover the moſt *rational and undoubted evidences*, which there are of the *truth of Chriſtianity*, he is preſently *obliged to profeſs Chriſt openly*, to *worſhip him ſolemnly*, to *aſſemble* with others for *instruction* and *participation* of *Goſpel Ordinances*; and thence it follows, that there is an *antecedent Obligation* upon *Conſcience* to *aſſociate* with others, and *conſequently to conſent* to be governed by the *Rulers* of the *Society* which he enters into. So that this *ſubmiſſion to the power of Church-Officers* in the *exerciſe of Diſcipline* upon *Offenders*, is implied in the very *conditions* of *Chriſtianity*, and the *ſolemn profeſſing* and *undertaking* of it. 2. It were *impoſſible* any *Society* ſhould be upheld, if it be not *laid* by the *founder* of the *Society* as the neceſſary *Duty* of all *members* to *undergo* the *penalties* which ſhall be inflicted by thoſe who have the care of governing that Society, ſo they be not contrary to the *Laws, Nature* and *Conſtitution* of it. Elſe there would be no *proviſion* made for *preventing diviſions* and *confuſions* which will happen upon any *breach* made upon the Laws of the Society. Now this *Obligation* to *ſubmiſſion* to *cenſures*, doth ſpeak ſomething antecedentally to the *confederation*, although the *expreſſion* of it lies in the *confederation* its ſelf. By this I hope we have made it evident that it is nothing elſe but a *miſtake* in thoſe otherwiſe Learned perſons, who make the *power* of *cenſures* in the *Chriſtian Church* to be nothing elſe but a *Lex confederatæ Diſciplinæ*, whereas this *power* hath been made appear to be derived from a *higher Original* than the mere *Arbitrary conſent* of the ſeveral *Members* of the *Church aſſociating* together: And how far the examples of the *Synagogues* under the *Law*, are from reaching that of *Chriſtian Churches* in reference to this, becauſe in theſe the *power* is conveyed by the *Founder* of the *Society*, and not left to any Arbitrary *Conſtitutions*, as it was among the *Jews* in their *Synagogues.* It cannot be denied but *conſent* is *ſuppoſed*, and *confederation neceſſary* in order to *Church power*; but that is rather in regard of the *exerciſe*, than the original of it; For although I affirm the original of this *power* to be of *Divine Inſtitution*, yet in or-

der to the *exerciſe* of it in reference to *particular perſons* (who are not mentioned in the Charter of the *power* its ſelf) it is *neceſſary* that the *perſons* on whom it is exerted, ſhould *declare* their conſent and ſubmiſſion either by *words* or *actions*, to the *Rules* and *Orders* of this Society.

Having now proved that the *Power* of the *Church* doth not ariſe from mere conſent of parties, the next grand Inquiry is concerning the *extent* of this *power*, Whether it doth reach ſo far as to *Excommunication?* For ſome men who will not ſeem wholly to deny all Power in the Church over Offenders, nor that the Church doth ſubſiſt by Divine Inſtitution, yet do wholly deny any ſuch Power as that of *Excommunication*, and ſeem rather to ſay that Church-Officers may far more congruouſly to their Office inflict any other mulct upon Offenders, than exclude them from participation of Communion with others in the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Goſpel: In order therefore to the clearing of this, I come to the third Propoſition. §. 21.

That the power which Chriſt hath given to the Officers of his Church, doth extend to the excluſion of contumacious Offenders from the privileges which this Society enjoys. In theſe terms I rather chooſe to fix it, than in thoſe crude expreſſions, wherein *Eraſtus* and ſome of his *followers* would *ſtate* the *queſtion*, and ſome of their *imprudent adverſaries* have accepted it, *viz.* Whether *Church-Officers* have *power* to exclude any from the *Euchariſt*, *ob moralem impuritatem?* and the reaſons why I wave thoſe terms, are,

1. I muſt confeſs my ſelf yet unſatisfied as to any convincing *Argument*, whereby it can be *proved* that any were denied *admiſſion* to the *Lord's Supper*, who were *admitted* to all other *parts* of *Church-Society*, and owned as *Members* in them. I cannot yet ſee any particular *Reaſon* drawn from the *Nature* of the *Lord's Supper* above all other *parts* of *Divine Worſhip*, which ſhould confine the *cenſures* of the *Church* merely to that *Ordinance*; and ſo to make the *Euchariſt* bear the ſame *Office* in the *Body* of the *Church*, which our *new Anatomiſts* tell us the *parenchyme* of the *Liver*, doth in the *natural Body*, viz. to be *colum ſanguinis*, to ſerve as a kind of *ſtrainer* to *ſeparate* the more *groſs* and *fæculent* parts of the *Blood* from the more *pure* and *ſpirituous*; ſo the *Lord's Supper* to *ſtrain* out the more *impure* members of the *Church* from the more *Holy* and *Spiritual*. My judgment then is, that Excommunication relates immediately to the *cutting* a *perſon* off from *Communion* with the *Churches viſible Society*, conſtituted upon the ends it is; but becauſe *Communion* is not viſibly diſcerned but in *Adminiſtration* and *Participation* of *Goſpel Ordinances*, therefore Excluſion doth chiefly refer to theſe: and becauſe the *Lord's Supper* is *one* of the *higheſt privileges* which the *Church* enjoys; therefore it ſtands to reaſon that Cenſures ſhould begin there. And in that ſenſe *ſuſpenſion* from the *Lord's Supper* of Perſons apparently unworthy, may be embraced as a prudent, lawful, and convenient abatement of the greater penalty of Excommunication, and ſo to ſtand on the ſame general grounds that the other doth; for *Qui poteſt majus, poteſt etiam minus*, which will hold as well in *moral* as *natural* power, if there be no *prohibition* to the *contrary*, nor *peculiar reaſon* as to the one more than to the other. 1.

2. I diſlike the terms *ob moralem impuritatem*, on this account, Becauſe I ſuppoſe they were taken up by *Eraſtus*, and from him by others as the *Controverſy* was managed concerning *Excommunication* among the *Jews*, *viz.* whether it were merely becauſe of *Ceremonial*, or elſe like- 2.

wiſe becauſe of *moral impurity*. As to which I muſt ingenuouſly acknowledge *Eraſtus* hath very much the advantage of his adverſaries, clearly proving that no perſons under the *Law*, were excluded the *Temple Worſhip* becauſe of *moral impurity*. But then withal I think he hath gained little advantage to his *cauſe* by the great and ſucceſsful pains he hath taken in the proving of that; My reaſon is, becauſe the *Temple-Worſhip* or the *Sacrifices* under the *Law* were in ſome ſenſe *propitiatory*, as they were the *adumbrations* of that grand *Sacrifice* which was to be offered up for the *appeaſing* of *God's wrath*, viz. *The Blood of Chriſt*; therefore to have excluded any from *participation* of them, had been to *exclude* them from the *viſible way of obtaining pardon of ſin* (which was not to be had *without ſhedding of Blood*, as the *Apoſtle* tells Heb. 9.23. us) and from *teſtifying their faith towards God* and *Repentance from dead works*. But now under the Goſpel thoſe *Ordinances*, which ſuppoſe *admiſſion* into the *Church* by *Baptiſm*, do thereby ſuppoſe an *all-ſufficient Sacrifice* offered for the *expiation of ſin*, and conſequently the *ſubſequent privileges* do not immediately *Relate to the obtaining of that*, but a *grateful commemoration* of *the Death of Chriſt*, and a *celebration of the infinite mercy* and *goodneſs of God* in the way of *Redemption* found out by the death of his *Son*. And thererefore it ſtands to great reaſon that ſuch *Perſons*, who by their *profane* and *unworthy lives* diſhonour ſo Holy a *profeſſion*, ſhould not be *owned* to be as *good* and *ſound Members* of the *Society*, founded on ſo Sacred a *Foundation*, as the moſt *Chriſtian* and *Religious* Perſons. To this I know nothing can be objected, but that, firſt, The *Paſſover was commemorative among the Jews*; and *Secondly, That the privileges of that people were then very great above other people, and therefore if God had intended any ſuch thing as Excommunication among his people, it would have been in uſe then.* To theſe I anſwer.

1. I grant, the Paſſover was commemorative as to the occaſion of its Inſtitution: but then it was withal Typical and Annunciative of that *Lamb of God who was to take away the Sins of the World*; therefore no perſon who deſired expiation of ſins, was to be debarred from it; but the *Lord's Supper* under the Goſpel hath nothing in it propitiatory, but is intended as a Feaſt upon a Sacrifice and a Federal Rite, as hath been fully cleared by a very learned Perſon in his diſcourſe about the true notion of the Lord's Supper.

2. I grant the Jews had very many privileges above other Nations: Nay ſo far, that the whole body of the people were looked upon as God's choſen, and peculiar and holy people; and from thence I juſtly infer, that whatever excluſion was among the people of the Jews from their Society, will far better hold as an argument for Excommunication under the Chriſtian Church, than if it had been a mere *debarring* from their Levitical Worſhip. And that I ſhould far ſooner inſiſt upon, from the reaſon aſſigned, as the ground of Excommunication, than the other infirm and profligated Argument; and ſo the Excluſion out of the Camp of *Iſrael* and the *Cerith* among the *Jews*, (whatever we underſtand by it) may *à pari* hold to be a ground of excluſion from the Chriſtian Society: In Imitation of which, I rather ſuppoſe that excluſion out of the Synagogues was after taken up, rather than as a meer *Outlawry*, when they were deprived of Civil Power.

The Queſtion then being thus clearly ſtated, it amounts to this, whether under the Goſpel, there be any power in the Officers of the Church by virtue of divine Inſtitution to exclude any Offenders out of the Chriſtian Society, for tranſgreſſing the Laws of it? And according to our former Propoſitions, I ſuppoſe it will be ſufficient to prove that *power* to be of divine Inſtitution, if I prove it to be fundamentally and intrinſecally reſident in the Society its ſelf. For whatever doth immediately reſult from the Society its ſelf, muſt have the ſame Original which the ſubject hath, becauſe this hath the nature of an inſeparable property reſulting from its Conſtitution. For the clearing of which, I ſhall lay down my thoughts of it as clearly and methodically as I can; and that in theſe following *Hypotheſes.*

1. *Where there is a power of declaring any Perſon to be no true member of the Society he is in, there is a formal power of Excommunication:* For this is all which I intend by it, *viz.* An Authoritative pronouncing *virtute officii,* any Convict Offender to have forfeited his intereſt in the Church as a Chriſtian Society: and to loſe all the Privileges of it: So that if this power be lodged in any *Church Officer,* then he hath power formally to *Excommunicate.*

2. *Where the enjoyment of the privileges of a Society is not abſolute and neceſſary, but depends upon conditions to be performed by every Member, of which the Society is Judge, there is a power in the Rulers of that Society to debar any perſon from ſuch privileges, upon non-performance of the Conditions.* As ſuppoſing the *jus Civitatis* to depend upon defending the Rights of the City; upon a *failing* in reference to this, in any perſon admitted to *Citizen-ſhip,* the *Rulers* of the *City* have the ſame *power* to take that *Right* away, which they had at firſt to give it; becauſe that Right was never abſolutely given, but upon ſuppoſition that the perſon did not overthrow the ends for which it was beſtowed upon him.

3. *The Church is ſuch a Society, in which Communion is not abſolute and neceſſary, but it doth depend upon the performance of ſome Conditions, of which the Governours of it are the competent Judges:* And that appears,

1. Becauſe the admiſſion into the Church, depends upon conditions to be judged by Paſtors, as in caſe of *adult perſons* requiring *Baptiſm,* and the Children of *Infidels* being *Baptized:* in both which caſes it is evident, that Conditions are pre-requiſite, of which the *Paſtors* are *Judges.*

2. Becauſe the Privileges of this Society do require a Separation from other Societies in the World, and call for greater holineſs and purity of life; and thoſe very Privileges are pledges of greater benefits which belong only to perſons qualified with ſuitable conditions; it would therefore be a very great diſhonor to this Society, if it lay as common and open as other Societies in the World do, and no more *qualifications* required from the Members of it.

3. We have inſtances in the ſacred Records of Apoſtolical times, of ſuch ſcandals which have been the ground of the excluſion of the perſons guilty of them from the privileges of the Chriſtian ſociety. And here I ſuppoſe we may (notwithſtanding all the little evaſions which have been found out) fix on the inceſtuous perſon in the Church of *Corinth.* As to which, I lay not the force of the argument upon the manner of execution of the cenſure then, *viz.* by delegation from an Apoſtle, or the Apoſtolical Rod, or *delivering to Satan;* for I freely grant

that

that theſe did then import an extraordinary power in the Apoſtles over Offenders; but I ſay, the ground and reaſon of the exerciſe of that power in ſuch an extraordinary manner at that time, doth ſtill continue, although not in that viſible extraordinary effect which it then had. And whatever practice is founded upon grounds perpetual and common, that practice muſt continue as long as the grounds of it do, and the Churches capacity will admit; (which Hypotheſis is the only rational Foundation on which Epiſcopal Government in the Church doth ſtand firm and unſhaken, and which in the former Diſcourſe I am far from undermining of, as an intelligent Reader may perceive;) now I ſay that it is evident, that the reaſons of the Apoſtles cenſure of that perſon, are not *fetched* from the want of Chriſtian Magiſtrates, but from ſuch things which will hold as long as any Chriſtian Church: which are the diſhonour of the Society, 1 *Cor.* 4. 1. *the ſpreading of ſuch corruptions farther*, if they paſs uncenſured, 1 *Cor.* 5. 6. and *amendment of the perſon*, 1 Cor. 5. 5. Upon theſe Pillars the *power of cenſures reſts it ſelf in the Church of God*, which are the main grounds *of penalties* in all Societies whatſoever, *viz. the preſervation of the honour of them, and preventing of farther miſchief, and doing good to the offending party.* And that which ſeems to add a great deal of weight to this inſtance, is, that the Apoſtle checks the *Corinthians*, that before the exerciſe *of* the Apoſtolical Rod, they were not *of* themſelves ſenſible *of* ſo great diſhonour to the Church as that was, and had not uſed ſome means *for* the *removing* ſuch a perſon *from* their Society; *And ye are puffed up, and have not rather mourned, that he that hath done this deed, may be taken away from among you*, 1 Corinth. 5. 2. Therein implying, that whether there had been ſuch a thing in the Church, or no, as the Apoſtolical Rod, it had been the duty of a Chriſtian Society to have done their endeavour in order to the removing ſuch a perſon from their number. But farther, I cannot underſtand how it ſhould be a duty in Chriſtians to *withdraw from every brother who walketh diſorderly*, and Church-Officers not to have power to pronounce ſuch a perſon to be withdrawn from, which amounts to Excommunication. It is not to me at all material, whether they did immediately relate to ci-
2 Cor. 5. 11. vil or ſacred converſe, (concerning which there is ſo much diſpute) for
2 Theſſ. 3. 14. in which ſoever we place it, if Church-Officers have a power to pronounce ſuch a perſon to be withdrawn from, they have a power of Excommunication; ſo we conſider this penalty as inflicted on the perſon in his relation to the Society as a Chriſtian; and withal, how nearly conjoined their civil and ſpiritual eating were together, 1 *Corinth.* 11. 20, 21. and how ſtrongly the Argument will hold from Civil to Sacred, viz. *à remotione unius ad remotionem alterius*, not from any fancied *pollution in Sacris* from the company of wicked men, but from the diſhonour reflecting on the Society from ſuch unworthy perſons partaking of the higheſt privileges of it. Thus from theſe three *Hypotheſes* this *Corollary* follows, that where any perſons in a Church do by their open and contumacious offences, declare to the World that they are far from being the perſons they were ſuppoſed to be in their admiſſion into the Church, there is a power reſident in the Paſtors of the Church to debar ſuch perſons from the privileges of it; and conſequently from Communion in the Lord's Supper. 1. Becauſe this expreſſeth the neareſt union, and cloſeſt confederation, as the Συσσίτια among the *Grecians* Commonwealth did. 2. Becauſe this hath been always looked on with greateſt veneration in the Church of God; and therefore it is leaſt of

all fit thoſe perſons ſhould be admitted to the higheſt privileges of the Church, which are unworthy of the loweſt of them.

§. 23. There remain only ſome few Objections which are levelled againſt this opinion concerning the power of Excommunication, which from the Queſtion being thus ſtated and proved, will be ſoon removed. The *firſt* is, *that this Excommunication is an outward puniſhment, and therefore belongs not to Church-Officers, but to the Magiſtrate.* 2. *Becauſe it neither is, nor ever was in the power of any Church-Officer to debar any offending member from publick Worſhip, becauſe any Heathens may come to it.* 3. *It cannot lie as to excluſion from the Lord's Supper, becauſe Chriſt is offered as ſpiritual food as well in the Word preached as in the Sacrament.* To theſe I anſwer, 1. I do not well underſtand what the Objectors mean by an outward puniſhment; for there can be no puniſhment belonging to a viſible Society, (ſuch as the Church is here conſidered to be) but it muſt be viſible, *i. e.* outward, or a thing to be taken notice of in the World; and in this ſenſe I deny that all viſible puniſhment belongs only to the Magiſtrate; but if by outward, be meant forcible puniſhment, then I grant that all coactive power belongs to the Magiſtrate; but I deny that Excommunication formally conſidered, is a forcible puniſhment. 1. Becauſe every perſon at his entrance into this Society, is ſuppoſed to declare his ſubmiſſion to the rules of the Society; and therefore whatever he after undergoes by way of penalty in this Society, doth depend upon that conſent. 2. A perſon ſtands Excommunicate legally and *de jure*, who is declared authoritatively to be no Member of the Society, though he may be preſent at the acts of it, as a defranchiſed perſon may be at thoſe of a Corporation. 3. A perſon falling into thoſe offences which merit Excommunication, is ſuppoſed in ſo doing, voluntarily to renounce his intereſt in thoſe privileges, the enjoyment of which doth depend upon abſtaining from thoſe offences which he wilfully falls into, eſpecially if contumacy be joyned with them, as it is before Excommunication; for then nothing is done forcibly towards him; for he firſt relinquiſheth his right, before the Church-Governor declares him excluded the Society. So that the offendor doth meritoriouſly excommunicate himſelf, the Paſtor doth it formally, by declaring that he hath made himſelf no member by his offences and contumacy joyned with them. To the ſecond I anſwer, That I do not place the formality of Excommunication in excluſion from hearing the Word, but in debarring the perſon from hearing *tanquam pars Eccleſiæ*, as a member of the Church, and ſo his hearing may be well joyned with that of Heathens and Infidels, and not of Members of the Church. To the third I anſwer, That excluſion from the Lord's Supper is not on the accounts mentioned in the Objection, but becauſe it is one of the chiefeſt privileges of the Church, as it is a viſible Society.

Having thus cleared and aſſerted the power of Excommunication in a Chriſtian Church, there remains only one enquiry more, which is, Whether this power doth remain formally in the Church, after its being incorporated into the Commonwealth, or elſe doth it then eſcheat wholly into the civil Power? The reſolution of which queſtion mainly depends on another ſpoken to already, *viz.* Whether this power was only a kind of Widows Eſtate, which belonged to it only during its ſeparation from the civil Power, or was the Church abſolutely infeoffed of it as its perpetual Right, belonging to it in all conditions whatſoever it ſhould be in? Now that muſt appear by the Tenure of it, and the

Grounds on which it was conveyed, which having been proved already to be perpetual and univerſal, it from thence appears that no acceſſion to the Church can invalidate its former Title. But then as in caſe of Marriage, the right of diſpoſal and well management of the Eſtate coming by the Wife, belongs to the Huſband; ſo after the Church is married into the Commonwealth, the right of ſupream management of this power in an external way doth fall into the Magiſtrates hands. Which may conſiſt in theſe following things. 1. A right of preſcribing Laws for the due management of Church-cenſures. 2. A right of bounding the manner of proceeding in cenſures, that in a ſetled Chriſtian-ſtate, matters of ſo great weight be not left to the Arbitrary pleaſure of any Church-Officers, nor ſuch cenſures inflicted but upon an evident conviction of ſuch great offences which tend to the diſhonour of the Chriſtian Church, and that in order to the amendment of the Offenders life. 3. The right of adding temporal and civil Sanctions to Church cenſures, and ſo enforcing the ſpiritual Weapons of the Church, with the more keen and ſharp ones of the Civil State. Thus I aſſert the force and efficacy of all Church cenſures *in foro humano* to flow from the Civil Power, and that there is no proper effect following any of them as to Civil Rights, but from the Magiſtrates Sanction. 4. To the Magiſtrate belongs the Right of appeals in caſe of unjuſt cenſures, not that the Magiſtrate can repeal a juſt cenſure in the Church, as to its ſpiritual effect; but he may ſuſpend the temporal effect of it: in which caſe it is the duty of Paſtors to diſcharge their office and acquieſce. But this power of the Magiſtrate in the ſupreme ordering of Eccleſiaſtical as well as Civil Cauſes, I have fully aſſerted and cleared already. From which it follows, That as to any outward effects of the power of Excommunication, the perſon of the ſupreme Magiſtrate muſt be exempted, both becauſe the *force* of theſe cenſures both flow from him in a Chriſtian State, and that there otherwiſe would be a *progreſs in infinitum*, to know whether the cenſure of the Magiſtrate were juſt or no. I conclude then, that though the Magiſtrate hath the main care of ordering things in the Church, yet (the Magiſtrates power in the Church being cumulative, and not privative) the Church and her Officers retain the Fundamental Right of inflicting cenſures on offenders: Which was the thing to be proved.

Iren. p. 1. c. 2. ſect. 7.

Dedit Deus his quoque finem.

The Unreaſonableneſs of Separation:

OR, AN

IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT
OF THE
Hiſtory, Nature, and *Pleas*
OF THE
# Preſent Separation
FROM THE
COMMUNION
OF THE
CHURCH of *ENGLAND*.

To which, ſeveral late LETTERS are Annexed, of Eminent *Proteſtant Divines* Abroad, concerning the *Nature* of our *Differences*, and the *Way* to *Compoſe Them*.

The PREFACE.

It is reported by Perſons of unqueſtionable credit, that after all the Service B. Jewel *had done againſt the* Papiſts, *upon his preaching a Sermon at St.* Paul's*-Croſs, in defence of the* Orders *of this* Church, *and of Obedience to them, he was ſo* ungratefully and ſpitefully uſed *by the* Diſſenters *of that Time, that for his own Vindication he made a ſolemn Proteſtation on his Death-bed,* That what he then ſaid, was neither to pleaſe ſome, nor to diſpleaſe others, but to promote Peace and Unity among Brethren. *I am far from the vanity of thinking, any thing I have been able to do, in the ſame* Cauſe, *fit to be compared with the excellent Labours of that Great Light, and Ornament of this Church, (whoſe Memory is preſerved to this day, with due Veneration in all the* Proteſtant Churches;) *but the hard Uſage I have met with, upon the like occaſion, hath made ſuch an Example more obſervable to me; eſpecially when I can make the ſame Proteſtation, with the ſame ſincerity as he did. For, however it hath been maliciouſly ſuggeſted by ſome, and too eaſily believed by others, that I was put upon that* Work, *with a deſign to inflame our Differences, and to raiſe a freſh perſecution againſt* Diſſenting Proteſtants; *I was*

Arch-Biſhop Whitgift's *Defence of the* Anſwer *to the* Admonition. *p.* 423.
Life of Biſhop Jewel *before his* Works, *n.* 34.
Vita Juelli *per* Humfred. *p.* 255.

I was ſo far from any thought tending that way, that the only Motive *I had to undertake it, was, my juſt Apprehenſion, that the Deſtruction of the* Church *of* England, *under a Pretence of Zeal againſt* Popery, *was one of the moſt likely ways to bring it in. And I have hitherto ſeen no cauſe (and I believe I ſhall not) to alter my opinion in this matter; which was not raſhly taken up, but formed in my mind from many years obſervation of the Proceedings of that* Reſtleſs Party *(I mean the* Papiſts*) among us; which hath always aimed at the Ruin of this* Church, *as one of the moſt probable Means, if others failed, to compaſs their Ends. As to their ſecret and more compendious ways of doing Miſchief, they lie too far out of our view, till the* Providence *of* God, *at the ſame time, diſcovers and diſappoints them; but this was more open and viſible, and although it ſeemed the farther way about, yet they promiſed themſelves no ſmall ſucceſs by it. Many Inſtruments and Engines they made uſe of in this deſign; many ways and times they ſet about it, and although they met with ſeveral diſappointments, yet they never gave it over; but, would it not be very ſtrange, that when they can appear no longer in it, others, out of mere Zeal againſt* Popery, *ſhould carry on the Work for them?*

This ſeems to be a great Paradox *to unthinking People, who are carried away with mere Noiſe and Pretences, and hope thoſe will ſecure them moſt againſt the* Fears *of* Popery, *who talk with moſt Paſſion, and with leaſt Underſtanding againſt it; whereas no perſons do really give them greater advantages than theſe do. For, where they meet only with intemperate* Railings, *and groſs Miſunderſtandings of the* State *of the* Controverſies *between them and us (which commonly go together) the more ſubtle Prieſts let ſuch alone to ſpend their Rage and Fury; and when the heat is over, they will calmly endeavour to let them ſee, how groſly they have been deceived in ſome things, and ſo will more eaſily make them believe, they are as much deceived in all the reſt. And thus the* Eaſt *and* Weſt *may meet at laſt; and the moſt furious* Antagoniſts *may become ſome of the eaſieſt* Converts. *This I do really fear will be the caſe of many thouſands among us, who now paſs for moſt* zealous Proteſtants; *if ever, which* God *forbid, that* Religion *ſhould come to be uppermoſt in* England. *It is therefore of mighty conſequence for preventing the* Return *of* Popery, *that men rightly underſtand what it is. For, when they are as much afraid of an* innocent Ceremony, *as of real* Idolatry; *and think they can* worſhip Images, *and* adore *the* Hoſt *on the ſame grounds, that they may* uſe the Sign of the Croſs, *or* kneel at the Communion; *when they are brought to ſee their miſtake in one caſe, they will ſuſpect themſelves deceived in the other alſo. For they who took that to be* Popery *which is not, will be apt to think* Popery *it ſelf not ſo bad as it was repreſented, and ſo from want of right underſtanding the* Differences *between us, may be eaſily carried from one* Extreme *to the other. For, when they find the undoubted* Practices *of the* Ancient Church *condemned as* Popiſh *and* Antichriſtian *by their* Teachers, *they muſt conclude* Popery *to be of much greater* Antiquity *than really it is; and when they can trace it ſo very near the* Apoſtles *times, they will ſoon believe it ſettled by the* Apoſtles *themſelves. For, it will be very hard to perſuade any conſidering Men that the* Chriſtian Church *ſhould degenerate ſo ſoon, ſo unanimouſly, ſo univerſally, as it muſt do, if* Epiſcopal Government, *and the uſe of ſome* ſignificant Ceremonies *were any parts of that* Apoſtacy. *Will it not ſeem ſtrange to them, that when ſome human* Polities *have preſerved their* firſt Conſtitution *ſo long, without any conſiderable Alteration, that the* Government *inſtituted by* Chriſt, *and ſetled by his* Apoſtles, *ſhould ſo ſoon after be changed into another kind,* *and that ſo eaſily, ſo inſenſibly, that all the* Chriſtian Churches *believed, they had ſtill the very* ſame Government *which the* Apoſtles *left them? Which is a matter ſo incredible, that thoſe who can believe ſuch a part of* Popery *could prevail ſo ſoon in the* Chriſtian Church, *may be brought upon the like grounds to believe, that many others did. So mighty a prejudice doth the Principles of our* Churches Enemies, *bring upon the* Cauſe *of the* Reformation. *And thoſe who forego the* Teſtimony *of* Antiquity, *as all the Oppoſers of the* Church *of* England *muſt do, muſt unavoidably run into inſuperable* difficulties *in dealing with the* Papiſts, *which the* Principles *of our* Church *do lead us through. For we can juſtly charge* Popery *as an unreaſonable* Innovation, *when we allow the undoubted* Practices *and* Government *of the* Ancient Church, *for many* Ages *after* Chriſt. *But it is obſerved by Biſhop* Sanderſon, *That thoſe who reject the* Uſages *of our* Church *as* Popiſh *and* Antichriſtian, *when aſſaulted by* Papiſts, *will be apt to conclude* Popery to be the old Religion, which in the pureſt and primitive Times was profeſſed in all Chriſtian Churches throughout the World. Whereas the ſober Engliſh Proteſtant, is able, by the Grace of God, with much evidence of Truth, and without forſaking his Old Principles, to juſtifie the Church of *England* from all imputation of Hereſie or Schiſm, and the Religion thereof, as it ſtood by Law eſtabliſhed, from the like imputation of Novelty. Wherein *he profeſſes* to lay open the inmoſt thoughts of his heart in this ſad buſineſs before God and the World. *I might ſhew, by particular Inſtances, from my preſent* Adverſaries, *that to defend their own* practices *they are driven to maintain ſuch* Principles, *as by evident* conſequences *from them, do overthrow the* Juſtice *and* Equity *of the* Reformation; *but I leave thoſe things to be obſerved in their proper places: Yet I do not queſtion the* Sincerity *of many Mens* Zeal *againſt* Popery, *who, out of a too eager a deſire of upholding ſome particular Fancies of their own, may give too great advantage to our common Enemies.*

Preface to 2d Vol. of Serm. Sect. 11.

Preface to the Firſt Volume, Sect. 18.

Three ways Biſhop Sanderſon *obſerves, our* Diſſenting Brethren, tho' not intentionally and purpoſely, yet really and eventually have been the great Promoters of the Roman Intereſt among us. (1.) By putting to their helping hand to the pulling down of Epiſcopacy. And, *ſaith he*, it is very well known to many what rejoycing that Vote brought to the Romiſh Party: How even in *Rome* it ſelf they ſung their Iö-Pæans upon the Tidings thereof, and ſaid triumphantly, Now the day is ours; Now is the Fatal-Blow given to the Proteſtant Religion in *England*. (2) By oppoſing the Intereſt of *Rome* with more violence than reaſon. (3) By frequent miſtaking the Queſtion; but eſpecially through the neceſſity of ſome falſe Principle or other, which, having once imbibed, they think themſelves bound to maintain: *whatever becomes of the common* Cauſe *of our* Reformation. *Which may at laſt ſuffer as much through ſome Mens folly and indiſcretion, who pretend to be the moſt* Zealous Proteſtants, *as by all the Arts and Deſigns of our open Enemies. For, as the ſame learned and judicious Biſhop, hath ſaid in this caſe,* Many a man, when he thought moſt to make it ſure, hath quite marred a good buſineſs, by over-doing it. *Thus when the* Papiſts *of late years, have not been able to hinder the taking many things into conſideration, againſt their intereſt, it hath been obſerved, that their Inſtruments have been for the moſt violent Counſels, knowing, that either they would be wholly ineffectual, or if they were purſued, they might in the end bring more advantage than prejudice to their Cauſe. And it is to be feared, they may ſtill hope to do* *their buſineſs, as* Divines *obſerve the* Devil *doth*; *who, when he finds one extreme will not do, he tries whether he can compaſs his end by the other: And no doubt they will extremely rejoyce, if they can make ſome Mens fears of* Popery, *prove at laſt an effectual means to bring it about. As ſome of the* Jews *of old, out of a raſh and violent zeal for the preſervation of the* purity *of their* Religion *(as they pretended) by oppoſing the Sacrifices offer'd by Strangers, and denying the uſe of the lawful Cuſtoms of their Country, brought the* Roman *Power upon them, and ſo haſten'd the deſtruction both of their* Religion *and* Country *too. I do not mention this, as though we could take too great care by good and wholſome Laws to ſtrengthen the* Proteſtant Intereſt, *and by that means, to keep out* Popery; *but only to ſhew, what mighty prejudice an indiſcreet Zeal at this time may bring upon us*; *if Men ſuffer themſelves to be tranſported ſo far as to think that overthrowing the* Conſtitution *of this* Church *will be any Means to ſecure the* Proteſtant Religion *among us.*

For, What is it which the Papiſts *have more envied and maligned than the* Church *of* England? *What is it they have more wiſhed to ſee broken in pieces? As the late* Cardinal Barberini *ſaid in the hearing of a* Gentleman *who told it me.* He could be contented there were no Prieſts in *England*, ſo there were no Biſhops; *for then he ſuppoſed their Work would do it ſelf. What is it they have uſed more Arts and Inſtruments to deſtroy, than the* Conſtitution *and* Government *of this* Church? *Did not* Cranmer *and* Ridley, *and* Hooper, *and* Farrar, *and* Latimer, *all* Biſhops *of this* Church, *ſuffer* Martyrdom *by their means? Had not they the ſame* kind of Epiſcopacy *which is now among us*; *and which ſome now are ſo buſie in ſeeking to deſtroy*; *by publiſhing one Book after another, on purpoſe to repreſent it as* unlawful *and* inconſiſtent *with the* Primitive Inſtitution? *Is all this done for the* honour *of our* Reformation? *Is this the way to preſerve the* Proteſtant Religion *among us*; *to fill Mens minds with ſuch prejudices againſt the firſt ſettlement of it*; *as to go about to make the World believe that the* Church-Government *then eſtabliſhed was repugnant to the* Inſtitution *of* Chriſt; *and that our* Martyr-Biſhops *exerciſed an unlawful Authority over* Dioceſan Churches? *But, Whither will not Mens indiſcreet Zeal, and lovers of their own Fancies carry them, eſpecially after* 40 years preſcription? *I do not ſay ſuch Men are ſet on by the* Jeſuits, *but I ſay, they do their Work as effectually, in blaſting the credit of the* Reformation, *as if they were. And yet after all theſe pains, and* forty *years meditations, I do not queſtion but I ſhall make it appear, that our preſent* Epiſcopacy, *is agreeable to the* Inſtitution *of* Chriſt, *and the beſt and moſt flouriſhing Churches. And, wherein doth our* Church *differ from its firſt Eſtabliſhment? Were not the ſame* Ceremonies *then appointed? the ſame* Liturgy *in Subſtance then uſed? concerning which* Dr. Taylor *who then ſuffered* Martyrdom, *publickly declared*; That the whole Church-Service was ſet forth in King *Edward*'s days, with great deliberation, by the Advice of the beſt learned Men in the Realm, and authorized by the whole Parliament, and received and publiſhed gladly through the whole Realm; which Book was never reformed but once, and yet by that one Reformation, it was ſo fully perfected, according to the Rules of our Chriſtian Religion in every behalf, that no Chriſtian Conſcience could be offended with any thing therein contained, I mean, *ſaith he*, of that Book reformed. *Yet this is that Book, whoſe* conſtant uſe *is now pleaded by ſome, together with our* Ceremonies, *as a ground for the neceſſity of* Separation *from our* Churches *Communion.*

Acts and Monuments Tom. 3. p. 171.

But if we trace the Footſteps of this Separation *as far as we can, we may find ſtrong probabilities, that the* Jeſuitical Party *had a great influence on the very firſt beginnings of it. For which, we muſt conſider, that when the* Church *of* England *was reſtored in Queen* Elizabeth'*s Reign, there was no open* Separation *from the* Communion *of it, for ſeveral years, neither by* Papiſts, *nor* Non-conformiſts. *At laſt, the more Zealous Party of the Foreign* Prieſts *and* Jeſuits, *finding this Compliance would in the end utterly deſtroy the* Popiſh Intereſt *in* England, *they began to draw off the ſecret* Papiſts *from all* Conformity *with our* Church, *which the old Queen* Mary'*s Prieſts allowed them in: this raiſed ſome heat among themſelves, but at laſt the way of* Separation *prevailed, as the more* pure *and* perfect way. *But this was not thought ſufficient by theſe buſie Factors for the Church of* Rome, *unleſs they could, under the ſame pretence of* purity *and* perfection, *draw off* Proteſtants *from the* Communion *of this* Church *too. To this purpoſe Perſons were imployed under the diſguiſe of* more zealous Proteſtants, *to ſet up the way of* more ſpiritual Prayer, *and greater* Purity *of* Worſhip *than was obſerved in the* Church *of* England: *that ſo the People, under theſe Pretences, might be drawn into* Separate Meetings. *Of this we have a conſiderable Evidence lately offer'd to the World, in the* Examination *of a* Prieſt *ſo employ'd at the* Council-Table, *A. D.* 1567. *being the 9th of Q.* Elizabeth, *which is publiſhed from the* Lord Burleigh's *Papers, which were in the hands of* Arch-Biſhop Uſher, *and from him came to Sir* James Ware, *whoſe Son brought them into* England, *and lately cauſed them to be Printed. Two years after, one* Heath *a* Jeſuit *was ſummon'd before the* Biſhop *of* Rocheſter *on a like account, for diſparaging the* Prayers *of the* Church, *and ſetting up* Spiritual Prayers *above them; and he declared to the Biſhop,* That he had been ſix years in *England*, and that he had laboured to refine the Proteſtants, and to take off all ſmacks of Ceremonies, and to make the Church purer. *When he was ſeized on, a* Letter *was found about him from a* Jeſuit *in* Spain, *wherein he takes notice,* how he was admired by his Flock; *and tells him, they looked on this way of* dividing Proteſtants *as the moſt effectual to bring them all back to the* Church *of* Rome; *and in his Chamber, they found a* Bull *from* Pius V. *to follow the* Inſtructions *of the* Society *for* dividing the Proteſtants in England; *and the* Licenſe *from his* Fraternity. *There is one thing in the* Jeſuit's Letter *deſerves our farther conſideration, which the Publiſher of it did not underſtand: which is, that* Hallingham, Coleman, *and* Benſon *are there mentioned, as Perſons imploy'd* to ſow a Faction among the German Hereticks; *which he takes to be ſpoken of the* Sects in Germany; *but by the* German Hereticks *the* Engliſh Proteſtants *are meant,* i. e. Lutherans: *and theſe very Men are mentioned by our Hiſtorians, without knowing of this* Letter, *as the moſt active and buſie in the beginning of the* Separation. Of theſe (*ſaith Fuller*) Coleman, Button, Hallingham and Benſon were the chief. At which time (*ſaith* Heylin) Benſon, Button, Hallingham, and Coleman, and others taking upon them to be of more ardent Zeal then others, *&c. That time is* 1568, *which agrees exactly with the Date of that* Letter *at* Madrid, October 26. 1568. *And both theſe had it from a much better Author than either of them;* Camden *I mean; who ſaith,* That while Harding, Sanders, and others attacked our Church on one ſide; Coleman, Button, Hallingham, Benſon, and others were as buſie on the other; who, under pretence of a purer Reformation, oppoſed the Diſcipline, Liturgy, and Calling of our Biſhops, as approaching too near to the Church of Rome. *And he makes*

Foxes and Firebrands, 1680.

Church Hiſtory, l. 9. p. 81.

Hiſtory of Presbyter, l. 6. p. 257

Annales Elizabethæ. A.D. 1568.

theſe the Beginners *of thoſe* Quarrels *which afterwards brake out with great violence. Now, that there is no improbability in the thing, will appear by the ſuitableneſs of theſe Pretences about* Spiritual Prayer, *to the* Doctrine *and* Practices *of the* Jeſuits. *For they are profeſſed deſpiſers of the* Cathedral Service, *and are excuſed from their attendance on it by the* Conſtitutions *of their* Order; *and are as great admirers of* Spiritual Prayer, *and an* Enthuſiaſtick way *of* Preaching, *as appears by the Hiſtory of the firſt Inſtitution of their Order, by* Orlandinus *and* Maffeius. *They who are acquainted with their* Doctrine *of* Spiritual Prayer, *will find that which is admired and ſet up here, as ſo much above* Set-Forms, *to be one of the loweſt of* three ſorts *among them. That* Gift of Prayer *which Men have, but requires the* Exerciſe *of their* own Gifts *to ſtir it up, they call* Oratio acquiſita, acquired Prayer; *although they ſay, the* Principle *of it is* infuſed. *The Second is, by a* ſpecial immediate influence of the Holy Ghoſt upon the Mind, with the concurrence of infuſed habits. *The Third is far above either of theſe, which they call the* Prayer *of* Contemplation, *and is never given by way of* habit *to any; but lies in* immediate *and* unexpreſſible unions. *All theſe I could eaſily ſhew to be the Doctrine received and magnified in the* Roman *Church, eſpecially by thoſe who pretend to greater* Purity *and* Spirituality *than others. But this is ſufficient to my purpoſe, to prove, that there is no improbability that they ſhould be the firſt ſetters up of this way in* England. *And it is obſervable, that it was never known here, or in any other* Reformed Church *before this time: and therefore the beginning of it is unjuſtly father'd by ſome on* T. C. *But by whomſoever it was begun, it met with ſuch great ſucceſs in the zeal and warmth of devotion which appeared in it, that no* Charm *hath been more effectual, to draw injudicious* People *into a contempt of our* Liturgy, *and admiring the* Way *of* Separation. *When by ſuch Arts the People were poſſeſſed with an Opinion of a more* pure *and* Spiritual Way of Worſhip *than was uſed in our* Church, *they were eaſily drawn into the admiration of thoſe, who found fault with the* Liturgy *and* Ceremonies *that were uſed among us; and ſo the* Diviſions *wonderfully increaſed in a very ſhort time. And the* Papiſts *could not but pleaſe themſelves to ſee that other Men did their Work ſo effectually for them. For the Authors of the* Admonition 14 Elizab. *declared,* They would have neither Papiſts nor others conſtrained to Communicate: which although, *as* Arch-Biſhop Whitgift *ſaith,* they intended as a Plea for their own Separation from the Church, yet, *ſaith he,* the Papiſts could not have met with better Proctors. *And elſewhere he tells them,* That they did the Pope very good ſervice, and that he would not miſs them for any thing. For what is his deſire but to have this Church of *England* (which he hath Accuſed) utterly defaced and diſcredited, to have it by any means overthrown, if not by Foreign Enemies, yet by Domeſtical Diſſention. And, What fitter and apter Inſtruments could he have had for that purpoſe than you, who under pretence of zeal, overthrow that which other Men have builded, under colour of Purity ſeek to bring in Deformity, and under the Cloke of Equality and Humility, would uſurp as great Tyranny and lofty Lordlineſs over your Pariſhes, as ever the Pope did over the whole Church? *And in another place, he ſaith,* They were made the Engines of the Roman Conclave, whereby they intend to overthrow this Church by our own Folly, which they cannot compaſs by all their Policy. *Arch-Biſhop* Grindal *(as I find in a* Letter *of his)* expreſſed his great fear of two things, Atheiſm and Popery, and both ariſing out of our needleſs Diviſions and Differences, fomented,

V. Thom. à Jeſu, de natura divinæ Orationis.

Defence of the Anſwer, p. 605.

Page 55.

Fair warning ſecond Part Printed by H. March. 1663.

fomented, he doubts not by Satan the Enemy of Mankind, and the Pope the Enemy of Chriſtendom. By theſe differences, the Enemies of our Religion gain this, That nothing can be eſtabliſhed by Law in the Proteſtant Religion, whoſe every part is oppoſed by one or other of her own Profeſſors; ſo that things continuing looſe and confuſed, the Papiſts have their opportunity to urge their way, which is attended with Order and Government, and our Religion continuing thus diſtracted and divided, ſome vile Wretches lay hold of the Arguments on one ſide to confute the other, and ſo hope at laſt to deſtroy all. *Dr.* Sutcliffe *ſaid long ago*, That Wiſe Men apprehended theſe unhappy Queſtions about indifferent things to be managed by the ſubtle Jeſuits, thereby to diſturb the Peace and Settlement of our Church, until at laſt they enjoy their long expected opportunity to ſet up themſelves, and reſtore the exploded Tyranny and Idolatry of the Church of *Rome*. *Among Mr.* Selden's MSS. *there is mentioned an odd* Prophecy, That Popery ſhould decay about 1500, and be reſtored about 1700, which is there ſaid to be moſt likely by means of our Diviſions, which threaten the Reformation, upon the Intereſt of Religion, and open advantages to the Enemies of it, and nothing is there ſaid to be ſo likely to prevent it as a firm eſtabliſhment of ſound Doctrine, Diſcipline, and Worſhip in this Church.

Among the Jeſuit Contzen's *directions for* reducing Popery into a Country, *the moſt conſiderable are*, *Contzen Politic. l. 2. c. 18. Sect. 6.*

(1.) That it be done under a pretence of eaſe to tender Conſciences, which will gain a reputation to the Prince, and not ſeem to be done from his own Inclination, but out of kindneſs to his People.

(2.) That when Liberty is granted, then the parties be forbid to contend with each other, for that will make way the more eaſily for one ſide to prevail, and the Prince will be commended for his love of Peace.

(3.) That thoſe, who ſuſpect the Deſign, and preach againſt it, be traduced as Men that Preach very unſeaſonable Doctrine, that they are Proud, Self-opiniators, and Enemies to Peace and Union.

But, the ſpecial Advice he gives to a Catholick Prince, is,

(4.) To make as much uſe of the Diviſions of his Enemies, as of the Agreement of his Friends. *How much the* Popiſh Party *here hath followed theſe Counſels, will eaſily appear by reflection upon their behaviour theſe laſt twenty years.* *Sect. 9.*

But that which more particularly reaches to our own caſe, is, the Letter *of* Advice *given to* F. Young, *by* Seignior Ballarini, *concerning* the beſt way of managing the Popiſh Intereſt in *England*, upon His Majeſty's Reſtauration, *wherein are ſeveral very remarkable things. This Letter was found in* F. Young's *Study, after his death, and was tranſlated out of* Italian, *and printed in the Collection before mention'd*;

The Firſt Advice *is*, To make the Obſtruction of Settlement their great deſign, eſpecially upon the fundamental Conſtitutions of the Kingdom, whereunto if things ſhould fall, they would be more firm than ever.

(2.) *The next thing is*, To remove the jealouſies raiſed by *Prin*, *Baxter*, *&c.* of their deſign upon the late Factions; and to ſet up the proſperous way of Fears and Jealouſies of the King and Biſhops.

(3.) To make it appear under-hand, how near the Doctrine, Worſhip, and Diſcipline of *England* comes to us: at how little diſtance their Common-Prayer is from our Maſs; and that the wiſeſt and ableſt Men of that way are ſo moderate, that they would willingly come over to us, or at leaſt meet us half way; hereby the more ſtayed Men will become more odious, and others will run out of all Religion for fear of Popery.

(4.) Let there be an Indulgence promoted by the Factious, and ſeconded by you.

(5.) That the Trade and Treaſure of the Nation may be engroſſed between themſelves and other diſcontented Parties.

(6.) That the Biſhops and Miniſters of the Church of *England* be aſperſed, as either worldly and careleſs on the one hand; or ſo factious on the other, that it were well they were removed.

Theſe are ſome of thoſe excellent Advices *then given, and how well they have been followed we all know.*

For, according to this Counſel, when they could not hinder the Settlement *then, The great thing they aimed at for many years, was, the* breaking in pieces *the* Conſtitution *of this* Church *by a* General Toleration. *This* Coleman *owned at his* Tryal, *and after Sentence, declared,* That poſſibly he might be of an opinion, that Popery might come in, if Liberty of Conſcience had been granted. *The Author of the* Two Conferences between *L'Cheſe* and the four Jeſuits, *owns* the Declaration *of* Indulgence, 167½, to be of the Papiſts procuring; *but he ſaith,* the Preſbyterians preſently ſuſpected the Kindneſs, and like wiſe Men cloſed with the Conformiſts; and refuſed the Bait, however ſpecious it ſeemed, when they ſaw the Hook that lay under it. *It was ſo far from this, that when one of the furious Diſſenters, ſuſpected the kindneſs, and made* Queries *upon the* Declaration, *wherein he repreſented it* as a Stratagem to introduce Popery, and Arbitrary Government; *one of the more moderate Party among them, Wrote a Publick* Vindication of their accepting the Licences, *wherein he declared to the World, in their Name,* That they were not concerned what the ſecret deſign might be, ſo long as the thing was good. And why, *ſaith he,* do you inſinuate Jealouſies? Have not we publick, and the Papiſts only private, Allowance? In fine, we are thankful for the honor put upon us to be publick in our Meetings. *Was this the Suſpicion they had of the* Kindneſs, *and their* Wiſdom *in joyning with the* Conformiſts? *If ſuch bold and notorious Untruths are publiſhed now, when every one that can remember but eight years backward, can diſprove them, what account may we expect will be given to Poſterity of the Paſſages of theſe Times, if others do not take care to ſet them right? And I am ſo far from believing that they then cloſed with the* Conformiſts, *that I date* Preſbyterian Separation *chiefly from that time. For, did not they take out* Indulgences, build Meeting Places, *and* keep up ſeparate Congregations *ever ſince? And did not thoſe, who before ſeem'd moſt inclinable to hold Communion with our Churches, then undertake in Print to defend the* lawfulneſs *of theſe* ſeparate Meetings *upon ſuch* Principles *as will juſtifie any* Separation? *Upon this, many of thoſe who frequented our* Churches *before, withdrew themſelves; and ſince they have formed and continued* ſeparate Bodies; *and upon the death of one* Miniſter *have choſen another in his room. And, what is a* formal Separation *if this be not? Then the Ejected* Miniſters *reſorted to* Cities *and* Corporations, *not to ſupply the neceſſities of thoſe who wanted them, but to* gather Churches *among them. For a very credible Perſon informs us,* That in the City he lived in, where there were not above 30 or 40 that ordinarily refuſed the publick, and met privately before the Indulgence; there were ten Non-conformiſt

Coleman's *Tryal, p.* 101.

Vindiciæ libertatis Evangelii; Or a Juſtification of our preſent Indulgence and acceptance of Licences, 1672. *p.* 12.

Sacrilegious deſertion rebuked, and Tolerated Preaching Vindicated, 1672.

Anſwer to Sacrileg. deſert. p. 171. 1672.

miſt Miniſters that came into their City. *And, What could this be for, but to draw People from their* Churches, *to make up* Separate Congregations? *And ever ſince that time, they have been hammering out* Principles, *ſuch as they are, to juſtifie their own practices.* But the Presbyterians did not join with the Papiſts for a General Toleration. *I grant ſome of them did not, although very powerful* Charms *were at that time uſed to draw them in: and not a few ſwallowed the* Specious Bait, *although ſome had the* Skill *to diſentangle themſelves from the Hook which went along with it. But that this honour doth not belong univerſally to them, I ſhall thus evidently prove.*

In A. D. 1675. *there was a* Book *Printed, Entituled,* The Peaceable Deſign, or an account of the Non-conformiſts Meetings, by ſome Miniſters of *London. In it an* Objection *is thus put*; But What ſhall we ſay then to the Papiſts? *The Anſwer is,* The Papiſt in our account is but one ſort of Recuſants, and the conſcientious and peaceable among them, muſt be held in the ſame Predicament with thoſe among our ſelves, that likewiſe refuſe to come to Common Prayer. *What is this, but joining for a* Toleration of Popery? *If this be not plain enough, theſe words follow,* But as for the common Papiſt, who lives innocently in his way, he is to us as other Separatiſts, and ſo comes under the like Toleration.

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This notable Book, *with ſome few Additions and Alterations, hath been ſince Printed, and with great ſincerity called,* An Anſwer to my Sermon. *And the Times being changed ſince, the former Paſſage is thus alter'd,* The Papiſt is one, whoſe Worſhip to us is Idolatry, and we cannot therefore allow them the liberty of publick Aſſembling themſelves, as others of the Separation. *Is it* Idolatry, *and not to be* tolerated *in* 1680? *And was it* Idolatry *and to be* tolerated *in* 1675? *Or was it* no Idolatry *then, but is become ſo now, and* intolerable Idolatry *too? The latter paſſage hath theſe Alterations*; *in ſtead of,* He is to us as other Separatiſts, and ſo comes under the like Toleration; *theſe are put in,* He is to us, in regard of what he doth in private, in the matter of his God, as others who likewiſe refuſe to come to Common Prayer. *Now we ſee* Toleration *ſtruck out for the* Papiſts; *but it was not only viſible enough before, but that very* Book *was Printed with a Deſign to preſent it to the* Parliament, *which was the higheſt way of owning their* Concurrence *with the* Papiſts *for a general* Toleration. *And the true reaſon of this alteration is, that then was then, and now is now.*

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And to ſhew yet farther, what influence the Jeſuitical Councils *have had upon their* People, *as to the* Courſe *of* Separation; *I ſhall produce the* Teſtimony *of a very conſiderable Perſon among them, who underſtood thoſe affairs as well as any Man, viz. Mr.* Ph. Nye. *Who, not long before his Death, foreſeeing the miſchievous conſequence of thoſe extravagant Heats, the People were running into, wrote a* Diſcourſe *on purpoſe,* to prove it lawful to hear the Conforming Miniſters, *and anſwers all the common Objections againſt it*; *towards the Concluſion he wonders,* how the differing Parties came to be ſo agreed, in thinking it unlawful to hear us preach; *but he ſaith,* He is perſuaded it is one conſtant deſign of Satan in the variety of ways of Religion he hath ſet on foot by Jeſuits among us. Let us therefore be more aware of whatſoever tends that way. *Here we have a plain Confeſſion of a Leading Man among the* Diſſenters, *That the* Jeſuits *were very buſie among them, and that* they and the Devil joined together *in ſetting them at the greateſt diſtance*

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poſſible from the Church *of* England; *and that thoſe who would countermine the* Devil and the Jeſuits, *muſt avoid whatever tends to that height of* Separation *the* People *were run into. And Mr.* Baxter, *in thoſe days,* viz. *but a little before the* Indulgence *came out, was ſo ſenſible of the* Miſchief *of* Separation, *that he ſaith,* Our Diviſion gratifieth the Papiſts, and greatly hazardeth the Proteſtant Religion, and that more than moſt of you ſeem to believe, or to regard. *Where he ſpeaks to the* Separating People. *And among other great inconveniences of* Separation, *which he mentions, this is one,* That Popery will get by it ſo great advantage as may hazard us all, and we may loſe that, which the ſeveral Parties do contend about.

Preface to the Defence of the Cure, p. 17.

Defence of the Cure of Diviſions, Introduction p. 52, &c.

Two ways eſpecially Popery will grow out of our Diviſions.

(1.) By the odium and ſcorn of our diſagreements, inconſiſtency, and multiplied Sects: They will perſuade People, that we muſt come for Unity to them, or elſe run mad, and crumble into duſt and individuals. Thouſands have been drawn to Popery, or confirmed in it by this Argument already; and I am perſuaded, that all the Arguments elſe in *Bellarmin*, and all other Books that ever were written, have not done ſo much to make Papiſts in *England*, as the Multitude of Sects among our ſelves. Yea, ſome Profeſſors of religious ſtrictneſs, of great eſteem for Godlineſs, have turned Papiſts themſelves, when they were giddy and wearied with turnings; and when they had run from Sect to Sect, and found no conſiſtency in any.

(2.) Either the Papiſts by increaſing the Diviſions, would make them be accounted ſeditious, rebellious, dangerous to the publick Peace; or elſe when ſo many Parties are conſtrained to beg and wait for liberty, the Papiſts may not be ſhut out alone, but have Toleration with the reſt. And, *ſaith he,* Shall they uſe our hands to do their Works, and pull their Freedom out of the Fire? We have already unſpeakably ſerved them, both in this, and in abating the Odium of the Gun-powder Plot, and their other Treaſons, Inſurrections, and Spaniſh Invaſion.

Thus freely did Mr. Baxter *write at that time; and even after the* Indulgence, *he hath theſe paſſages, concerning the* ſeparating *and* dividing Humour *of their* People; It ſhameth, it grieveth us to ſee and hear from *England*, and from *New England* this common cry, We are endanger'd by Diviſions, principally becauſe the Self-conceited part of the religious People, will not be ruled by their Paſtors, but muſt have their way, and will needs be Rulers of the Church and them. *And ſoon after he ſaith to them,* You have made more Papiſts than ever you or we are like to recover. Nothing is any whit conſiderable that a Papiſt hath to ſay, till he cometh to your caſe, and ſaith, Doth not experience tell you, that without Papal unity and force, theſe People will never be ruled, or united? It is you that tempt them to uſe Fire and Faggot, that will not be ruled or kept in concord, by the wiſeſt, and holieſt, and moſt ſelf-denying Miniſters upon Earth. (*Are not theſe kind words for themſelves, conſidering what he gives to others?*) And muſt you, even you, that ſhould be our comfort, become our ſhame, and break our hearts, and make Men Papiſts by your Temptation? Wo to the World becauſe of offences, and wo to ſome by whom they come.

Sacrilegious deſertion, p. 103, 104.

Let now any impartial Reader judge, who did moſt effectually ſerve the Papiſts Deſigns, *thoſe who kept to the* Communion *of the* Church *of* England, *or thoſe who fell into the* Courſe *of* Separation? *I will allow, what Mr.* Baxter *ſaith,* That they might uſe their endeavours to exaſperate the

Defence of the Cure, p. 53.

the ſeveral Parties againſt each other; *and might ſometimes preſs the more rigorous execution of* Laws *againſt them; but then it was to ſet them at the greater diſtance from us, and to make them more pliable to a* General Toleration. *And they ſometimes complained, that thoſe who were moſt adverſe to this found themſelves under the ſeverity of the Law, when more tractable men eſcaped; which they have weakly imputed to the* implacable temper *of the* Biſhops, *when they might eaſily underſtand the true cauſe of ſuch a diſcrimination: But from the whole it appears, that the* grand Deſign *of the* Papiſts *for many years, was to break in pieces the* Conſtitution *of the* Church *of* England; *which being done, they flatter'd themſelves with the hopes of great Acceſſions to their ſtrength and party; and in order to this, they inflamed the differences among us to the utmoſt height, on purpoſe to make all the* Diſſenting Parties *to join with them for a* General Toleration; *which they did not queſtion would deſtroy this* Church, *and advance their Intereſt. Whether they did judge truly in this, I am not to determine; it is ſufficient that they went upon the greateſt Probabilities. But, is it poſſible to imagine ſuch skilful* Engineers *ſhould uſe ſo much art and induſtry to undermine and blow up a* Bulwark, *unleſs they hoped to gain the place, or at leaſt ſome very conſiderable advantage to themſelves by it? And it is a moſt unfortunate condition our* Church *is in, if thoſe who deſign to bring in* Popery, *and thoſe who deſign to keep it out, ſhould both conſpire towards its deſtruction.*

This, which I have repreſented, was the poſture of our Church-Affairs, *when the late horrible* Plot *of the* Papiſts, *for* Deſtruction *of the* King's Perſon, *and* Subverſion *of our* Religion *came to be diſcover'd. It ſeems, they found the other methods tedious and uncertain; and they met with many croſs accidents, many rubs and diſappointments in their way; and therefore they reſolved upon a* Summary way *of* Proceeding, *and to do their buſineſs by one blow. Which, in regard of the circumſtances of our Affairs, is ſo far from being incredible, that if they* had *no ſuch deſign, it is rather a Wonder, they had not; eſpecially conſidering the allowed Principles and Practices in the* Church *of* Rome. *Upon the diſcovery of the* Plot, *and the means the* Papiſts *uſed to confirm the* Truth *of it (knowing our great proneneſs to* Infidelity) *by the Murder of a worthy Gentleman who received the* Depoſitions, *the Nation was extremely alarm'd with the apprehenſions of* Popery, *and provoked to the utmoſt deteſtation of it. Thoſe who had been long apprehenſive of their reſtleſs deſigns, were glad to ſee others awaken'd; but they ſeemed like Men rouſed out of a deep ſleep, being amazed and confounded, fearful of every thing, and apt to miſtruſt all perſons who were not in ſuch a* Conſternation *as themſelves. During this heat, ſome of us, both in private, and publick, endeavour'd to bring the* Diſſenters *to the ſenſe of the neceſſity of* Union *among* Proteſtants, *hoping the apprehenſion of preſent danger, common to us all, would have diſpoſed them to a better inclination to* the things which belong to our Peace: *But finding the Nation thus vehemently bent againſt* Popery, *thoſe who had formerly carried it ſo ſmoothly and fairly towards the* common *and* innocent Papiſts (*as they then ſtiled them*) *and thought them* equally capable of Toleration with themſelves, *now they fly out into the utmoſt rage againſt them; and others were apt, by* ſly inſinuations, *to repreſent thoſe of the* Church *of* England (*ſome of whom had appeared with vigour and reſolution againſt* Popery, *when they were trucking underhand for* Toleration *with them*) *as* Papiſts *in* Maſquerade. *But now they*

they tack about, and ſtrike in with the violent Rage *of the* People, *and none ſo fierce againſt* Popery *as they. What influence it hath had upon others I know not, but I confeſs it did not leſſen my eſteem of the Integrity of thoſe of the* Church *of* England, *that they were not ſo much tranſported by ſudden heats, beyond the juſt bounds of* Prudence, *and* Decency, *and* Humanity, *towards their greateſt* Enemies, *having learnt from the Apoſtle, That,* the wrath of Man worketh not the righteouſneſs of God. *They expected as little favour from them as any, if they had prevailed, and I doubt not but ſome of them had been made the firſt Examples of their* Cruelty. *However, this was interpreted to be want of Zeal, by thoſe who think there is no Fire in the Houſe, unleſs it flame out at the Windows; and this advantage was taken by the inveterate Enemies of our* Church, *to repreſent us all as ſecret friends to the* Papiſts *(ſo improbable a Lie, that the Devil himſelf would bluſh at the telling of it, not for the Malice, but the Folly and ill Contrivance of it) and thoſe who were more* moderate, *were content to allow* 3 *or* 4 *among the* Biſhops *to be* Proteſtants, *and about* 4 *or* 5 *among the* Clergy *of* London. *To feed this humour (which wonderfully ſpread among more of the* People *than we could have believed to have been ſo weak) moſt of the Malicious Libels againſt the* Church *of* England *were reprinted and diſperſed, and new ones added to them. Among the reſt, one tranſlated out of* French, *to prove the* Advances of the Church of England towards Popery; *but ſo unhappily managed, that thoſe Perſons are chiefly mention'd, who had appeared with moſt zeal againſt* Popery. *Yet, ſo much had the Arts of ſome men prevailed over the Judgment of others, that even this Diſcourſe was greedily ſwallowed by them. But I muſt do the* Author *of it that Right, to declare, that before his Death, he was very ſenſible of the injury he had done to ſome worthy* Divines *of our* Church *therein; and begged God and them pardon for it. Wherein, as he followed the Example of ſome others, who were great Enemies to our* Church *while they lived, but repented of it when they came to die; ſo, I hope, others, upon better conſideration, will ſee reaſon to follow his. But this was but an inconſiderable trifle in compariſon of what follows. We were ſtill in hopes, that Men* ſo Wiſe, ſo Self-denying, *as the* Non-conformiſt Miniſters *repreſent themſelves to the World, would, in ſo* Critical *a time, have made ſome ſteps or advances towards an* Union *with us; at leaſt to have let us known their Senſe of the preſent ſtate of things, and their readineſs to join with us as far as they could, againſt the* Aſſaults *of a* Common Enemy. *Inſtead of this, thoſe we diſcourſed with, ſeemed farther off than before; and when we leaſt expected ſuch a Blow, under the Name of a* Plea *for* Peace, *out comes a* Book, *which far better deſerved the Title of a* Plea for Diſorder and Separation, *not without frequent, ſharp, and bitter Reflections on the* Conſtitution *of our* Church, *and the* Conformity *required by* Law; *as though it had been deſigned on purpoſe, to repreſent the* Clergy *of our* Church *as a Company of notorious,* lying *and* perjured Villains; *for conforming to the* Laws *of the* Land, *and* Orders *eſtabliſhed among us; for there are no fewer than* 30 tremendous Aggravations of the Sin of Conformity *ſet down in it. And all this done, without the leaſt Provocation given on our ſide; when all our Diſcourſes that touched them, tended only to* Union, *and the* Deſirableneſs *of* Accommodation. *If this had been the ſingle work of one Man, his Paſſion and Infirmities might have been ſome tolerable excuſe for the* indiſcretion *of it; but he writes in the Name of a whole* Party *of Men, and delivers* *the* Senſe of all his Acquaintance; *and if thoſe* Principles *be owned, and allowed by them, there can hardly be expected any ſuch thing as a* National Settlement, *but all* Churches *muſt be heaps of Sand, which may lie together till a puff of wind diſperſes them; having no firmer Bond of Union, than the* preſent humour *and* good will *of the* People. *But of the Principles of that Book, I have diſcourſed at large, as far as concerns the buſineſs of* Separation *in the Second and Third* Parts *of the following* Treatiſe.

But, as though this had not been enough, to ſhew what Enemies to Peace *Men may be under a pretence of it; not long after, the ſame* Author *ſets forth another* Book, *with this* Title, The true and only way of Concord of all the Chriſtian Churches. *As though he had been* Chriſt's Plenipotentiary *upon Earth, and were to ſet the* Terms *of* Peace *and* War *among all* Chriſtians; *but I wiſh he had ſhewed himſelf ſuch a Pattern of Meekneſs, Humility, Patience, and a peaceable Diſpoſition, that we might not have ſo much reaſon to diſpute his* Credentials. *But this is likewiſe fraught with ſuch impracticable Notions, and dividing Principles, as though his whole deſign had been, to prove that there is* No true way of Concord among Chriſtians; *for if there be no other than what he allows, all the* Chriſtian Churches *this day in the World are in a mighty miſtake. When I looked into theſe* Books, *and ſaw the deſign of them, I was mightily concerned, and infinitely ſurprized, that a Perſon of his Reputation for Piety, of his Age and Experience in the World, and ſuch a* Lover of Peace, *as he had always profeſſed himſelf, and one who tells the* World *ſo often of* his dying, and of the Day of Judgment, *ſhould think of leaving two ſuch* Firebrands *behind him, as both theſe* Books *will appear to any one who duely conſiders them, which have been ſince followed by four or five more to the ſame purpoſe, ſo that he ſeems reſolved to leave his* Life *and* Sting *together in the Wounds of this Church. And it made me extremely pity the caſe of this poor Church, when even thoſe who pretend to* plead *for* Peace, *and to bring* Water *to quench her* Flames, *do but add more Fuel to them. This gave the firſt occaſion to thoſe Thoughts, which I afterwards delivered in my Sermon; for ſince by the means of ſuch* Books, *the zeal of ſo many* People *was turned off from the* Papiſts *againſt thoſe of our* Church, *I ſaw a plain neceſſity, that either we muſt be run down by the impetuous violence of an enraged, but unprovoked company of Men, or we muſt venture our ſelves to try, whether we could ſtem that* Tide *which we ſaw coming upon us. And it falling to my Lot to preach in the moſt publick* Auditory *of the* City, *at a more than uſual Appearance, being the firſt* Sunday *in the Term, I conſidered the relation I ſtood in under our Honoured* Dioceſan, *to the* Clergy *of the* City, *and therefore thought my ſelf more obliged to take notice of what concerned* the Peace and Welfare *of the* Churches *therein. Upon theſe Conſiderations, I thought fit to take that opportunity, to lay open the due ſenſe I had of the* Unreaſonableneſs *and* Miſchief *of the preſent* Separation. *Wherein I was ſo far from intending to reflect on Mr.* B. as preaching in the neighbourhood of my Pariſh, *that to my beſt remembrance, I never once thought of it, either in the making or preaching of that Sermon. And yet throughout his* Anſwer *he would inſinuate,* That I had ſcarce any one in my eye but himſelf. *His* Books *indeed had made too great an Impreſſion on my Mind for me eaſily to forget them: But it was the great, the dangerous, the unaccountable* Separation, *which I knew to be in and about the* City, *without regard to the Greatneſs or Smallneſs of Pariſhes, to the Abilities or Piety of their Miniſters,*

ſters, or to the Peace and Order of the Church we live in, which made me fix upon that Subject, although I knew it to be ſo ſore a place, that the Parties moſt concerned, could hardly endure to have it touched, tho' with a ſoft and gentle hand. However, I conſidered the duty which I owe to God, *and this* Church, *above the eſteem and good words of peeviſh and partial Men; as I had before done in my dealing with the* Papiſts; *and I reſolved to give them no juſt provocation by reproachful Language, or perſonal Reflections; but if* Truth *and* Reaſon *would anger them, I did not hold my ſelf obliged to ſtudy to pleaſe them.*

But, againſt this whole Undertaking, there have been two common Objections.

Firſt, That it was Unſeaſonable.
Secondly, That it was too Sharp and Severe.
To both theſe I ſhall anſwer:

Firſt, *As to the* Unſeaſonableneſs *of it. What! Was it* Unſeaſonable *to perſuade* Proteſtants *to* Peace and Unity? *That ſurely is very ſeaſonable at any time, and much more then. And I appeal to any one that reads it, whether this were not the chief, and only deſign of my* Sermon. *And, to ſay,* This was Unſeaſonable, *is juſt as if a Garriſon were beſieg'd by an Enemy, and in great danger of being ſurprized, and although they had frequent notice of it given them, yet many of the Soldiers were reſolved not to join in a common Body, under command of their Officers, but would run into corners, a few in a company, and do what they liſt, and one ſhould undertake to perſuade them to return to their due obedience, and to mind the common Intereſt, and ſome grave By-ſtanders ſhould ſay,* It is true, this is good Counſel at another time, but at this preſent it is very Unſeaſonable. *When could it be more* ſeaſonable, *than when the ſenſe of their danger is greateſt upon them? At another time it might have been leſs neceſſary; but when the common danger is apparent to all, Men of Senſe, or common Ingenuity, could not but take ſuch Advice moſt kindly at ſuch a* ſeaſon. But this Advice was not given to themſelves, but to the Magiſtrates and Judges, and that made it look like a deſign to ſtir them up to a perſecution of them. *There had been ſome colour for this, if there had been the leaſt word tending that way through the whole* Sermon. *But this Objection is generally made by thoſe who never read the* Sermon, *and never intend to read it; and ſuch I have found have ſpoken with the greateſt bitterneſs againſt it. They reſolved to condemn it, and therefore would ſee nothing that might have alter'd their Sentence. It is enough,* it was preach'd before the Magiſtrates and Judges, and therefore it muſt be for perſecution of Diſſenters. *None are ſo incapable of conviction, as thoſe who preſently determine what a thing muſt be, without conſidering what it is. Is it not poſſible for a Man to ſpeak of* Peace *before* Hannibal, *or of* Obedience *to* Government *before* Julius Cæſar? *Muſt one ſpeak of nothing but* Drums *and* Trumpets *before great* Generals? *Which is juſt as reaſonable as to ſuppoſe, that a Man cannot preach about* Diſſenters *before* Judges *and* Magiſtrates, *but he muſt deſign to ſtir them up to the ſevere* Execution *of* Laws? *But it is to no purpoſe for me to think to convince thoſe by any* Vindication, *who will not be at the pains to read the* Sermon *it ſelf, for their own ſatisfaction.* But the Diſſenters themſelves were not there to hear it. *And muſt we never preach againſt the* Papiſts *but when they are* preſent? *It ſeems they ſoon heard enough of it, by the noiſe and clamour they made about it.* Yet ſtill this gives advantage to the Papiſts for us to quarrel among our ſelves. *Would to God this advantage had* *never been given them! And* Woe be to them by whom theſe offences come. *And what muſt we do? Muſt we ſtand ſtill with open Arms, and naked Breaſts to receive all the Wounds they are willing to give us? Muſt we ſuffer our ſelves to be run down with a popular Fury, raiſed by reviling Books, and* Pamphlets, *and not open our Mouths for our own Vindication, leſt the* Papiſts *ſhould overhear us? Which is, as if the unruly Soldiers in an Army muſt be let alone in a Mutiny, for fear the Enemy ſhould take notice, and make ſome advantage to him, but which will be the greater advantage to him, to ſee it ſpread and increaſe, or care taken in time to ſuppreſs it? If our* Diſſenters *had not appeared more active and buſie than formerly; if they had not both by publick Writings, and ſecret Inſinuations, gone about to blaſt the Reputation of this* Church, *and the* Members *of it, ſo diſingenuouſly, as they have done, there might have been ſome pretence for the* Unſeaſonableneſs *of my* Sermon. *But when thoſe things were notorious, to ſay it was* Unſeaſonable *to preach ſuch a* Sermon *then, or now to defend it; is in effect to tell us, they may ſay and do what they will againſt us, at all ſeaſons; but whatever we ſay or do for our own Vindication is* Unſeaſonable; *which, under favour, ſeems to be little leſs than a* State *of* Perſecution *on our ſide, for it is like ſetting us in the* Pillory, *for them to throw* Dirt *at us, without allowing us any means to defend our ſelves.*

But ſome complain of the two great Sharpneſs and Severity *of it. But, Wherein doth it lie? Not in raking into old Sores, or looking back to the proceedings of former Times? Not in expoſing the particular Faults of ſome Men, and laying them to the charge of the whole Party? Not in ſharp and provoking Reflections on Mens Perſons? All theſe I purpoſely, and with care declined. My deſign being not to exaſperate any; but to perſuade and argue them into a better diſpoſition to* Union, *by laying open the common danger we are in, and the great* Miſchief *of the preſent* Separation. *But I am told by one,* There are ſevere Reflections upon the Sincerity and Honeſty of the Deſigns of the Non-conformiſts; *by another,* that indeed I do not beſpeak for them, Gibbets, Whipping-poſts, and Dungeons, nor (directly) any thing grievous to their Fleſh; but I do not paſs any gentle Doom upon them, in reſpect of their everlaſting State. *God forbid, that I ſhould judge any one among them, as to their preſent Sincerity, or final Condition;* to their own Maſter they muſt ſtand or fall; *but, my buſineſs was to conſider, the nature and tendency of their Actions. My Judgment being, that a cauſeleſs breaking the* Peace *of the* Church *we live in, is really as great and as dangerous a* Sin *as* Murder, *and in ſome reſpects aggravated beyond it; and herein having the concurrence of the* Divines *of greateſt reputation both ancient and modern: Would they have had me repreſented that as no Sin, which I think to be ſo great a one; or thoſe as not guilty, whom in my Conſcience I thought to be guilty of it? Would they have had me ſuffered this* Sin *to have* lain upon them *without* reproving it; *or would they have had me found out all the ſoft and palliating conſiderations to have leſſen'd their ſenſe of it? No, I had ſeen too much of this already; and a mighty prejudice done thereby to Men otherwiſe ſcrupulous and conſcientious, that ſeem to have loſt all* Senſe *of this* Sin; *as if there neither were, nor could be any ſuch thing; unleſs perhaps they ſhould happen to quarrel among themſelves in a particular Congregation. Which is ſo mean, ſo jejune, ſo narrow a Notion of* Schiſm, *ſo much ſhort of that* Care *of the* Church'*s* Peace, *which* Chriſt *hath made ſo great a* Duty *of his Followers, that I cannot but wonder that Men of underſtanding ſhould be ſatisfy'd with it, unleſs they thought there was no other way*

Dr. O. *Vindication, p.* 4.
Letter out of the Country, p. 7.

to excuſe their own actings. And that I confeſs, is a ſhrewd temptation. But, ſo far as I can judge, as far as the Obligation to preſerve the Church*'s* Peace extends, *ſo far doth the* Sin *of* Schiſm *reach*; *and the* Obligation *to* preſerve the Peace of the Church *extends to all lawful* Conſtitutions *in order to it*; *or elſe it would fall ſhort of the* Obligation *to* Civil Peace, *which is* as far as is poſſible, *and* as much as lies in us. *Therefore to break the* Peace *of the* Church *we live in, for the ſake of any* lawful Orders *and* Conſtitutions *made to preſerve it, is directly the* Sin *of* Schiſm, *or an unlawful breach of the* Peace *of the* Church. *And this is not to be determined by Mens Fancies, and preſent Apprehenſions*; *which they call the* Dictates *of* Conſcience; *but upon plain and evident grounds, manifeſting the repugnancy of the things required to the* Laws *and* Inſtitutions *of* Chriſt, *and that they are of that importance that he allows Men rather to divide from ſuch a* Communion, *than join in the practice of ſuch things. We were in a lamentable caſe, as to the* Defence *of the* Reformation, *if we had nothing more to plead againſt the Impoſitions of the* Church *of* Rome, *than they have againſt ours*; *and I think it impoſſible to defend the* lawfulneſs *of our* Separation *from them, if we had no better grounds to proceed upon, than they have againſt our* Church. *For the proof of this, I refer the* Reader *to the* BOOK *it ſelf. This then being my opinion concerning their Practices: Was this a fault in me, to ſhew ſome reaſon for it? And how could I do that without proving thoſe Practices to be ſinful? and if they were ſinful, how could they who knowingly and deliberately continue in the Practice of them be innocent? What influence the prejudices of Education, the authority of Teachers, the almoſt invincible Ignorance of ſome weaker People, and the uncurable Byaſs of ſome Mens Minds may have to leſſen their Guilt, I meddle not with*; *but the* Nature *of the* Actions, *and the* Tendency *of them which I then declared to be* ſinful; *and I am ſo far from being alter'd in my Judgment by any of the* Anſwers *I have ſeen, (and I have read all that have been publiſhed) that I am much more confirmed in it. But Dr.* O. *ſaith,* He had ſeen a Collection of ſevere Reflections by the hand of a Perſon of Honour, with his Judgment upon them. *I wiſh the Doctor had favour'd me with a ſight of them*; *but at preſent it is ſomewhat hard for me to make the* Objections *and* Anſwers *too. And it was not ſo fairly done to mention them unleſs he had produced them. Therefore to the* unknown Objections, *I hope no* Anſwer *is expected.*

Page 4.

Miſchief of Impoſ. end of the Preface.

But there is one expreſſion wherein I am charged with a ſcurrilous Sarcaſm, or a very unchriſtian judging Mens Hearts, or a ridiculous Piece of Nonſenſe, *viz. when I ſay,* That the moſt godly People among them can the leaſt endure to be told of their Faults: *Now, ſaith Mr.* A. How can they be moſt godly, who cannot bear reproof of their Faults, which is a main part of Godlineſs. *I am really ſorry, ſome of my* Anſwerers *have ſo much made good the truth of that Saying in its plaineſt ſenſe. But there needs no more to clear my Intention in it, but to conſider of whom it is ſpoken,* viz. *of thoſe, who will not bear being told of the* Sin *of* Separation by their own Teachers. *For my Words are,* "*Is it that they fear the Reproaches of the People? which ſome few of the moſt eminent Perſons among them, have found they muſt undergo, if they touch upon this Subject (for I know not how it comes to paſs, that the moſt godly People among them can the leaſt endure to be told of their Faults.)* *In all which words I had a particular reſpect to the* Caſe *of Mr.* Baxter, *who after he had, with great honeſty, publiſhed his* Cure *of* Diviſions, *and therein ſharply rebuked the* ſeparating, dividing Humour of the People, *who pretended moſt to* religious Strictneſs, *he met with bitter Reproaches from them for the ſake of this Freedom, that he was forced to publiſh a* Defence *of his* Cure, *in Vindication of himſelf from them, wherein he ſaith,* He was judged by them to be too cenſorious of them, and too Pref. p. 11, ſharp in telling them of that which he did not doubt to be their Sin: 13. And *again,* If I be miſtaken, ſhould you be ſo impatient, as not to bear with one, that in ſuch an opinion differeth from you? And why ſhould you not bear with my diſſent, as well as I do with yours? *Again,* Why ſhould not you bear with leſſer contradiction, when others Page 15. muſt bear with far greater from you? Will you proclaim your ſelves to be the more impatient? You will then make Men think, you are the moſt guilty——— *And a little after,* And yet you that ſhould be moſt patient, take it for a heinous crime and injury, to be told, that you wrong them, and that you judge too hardly of them; and that their Communion is not unlawful. *And when we join to this, what he ſaith elſewhere, that they are the* moſt ſelf-conceited Profeſſors who will not be ruled by their Miniſters, but are moſt given to diviſion and ſeparation: *In a Paſſage before-mention'd, there needs no more to vindicate the truth of this ſaying, than to ſhew, that the* moſt ſelf-conceited *do often paſs for* the moſt godly *among them; which is a* figure *ſo common, ſo eaſie to be underſtood, that it needs no more Apology, than our* Saviour's *calling the* Phariſees righteous Men, *and ſaying, they were* ſo whole, *as* to need no Phyſician. *And I cannot think ſuch* figures *which were uſed by our* Saviour, *unfit for a Pulpit.*

But notwithſtanding all the care I took to prevent giving any juſt occaſion of offence, my Sermon *had not been long abroad, but I heard of great Clamours againſt it. At firſt it went down quietly enough, and many of the People began to read and conſider it, being pleaſed to find ſo weighty and ſo neceſſary a Point debated, with ſo much Calmneſs, and freedom from Paſſion. Which being diſcerned by the Leaders and Managers of the Parties, it was ſoon reſolved, that the* Sermon *muſt be cried down, and the People diſſuaded, by all means, from reading it. If any of them were talked with about it, they ſhrunk up their Shoulders, and looked ſternly, and ſhook their Heads, and hardly forbore ſome bitter Words, both of the* Author *and the* Sermon. *Upon this followed a great Cry and Noiſe, both in* City *and* Country, *againſt it; and ſome honeſt Perſons really pitied me, thinking I had done ſome very ill thing; ſo* many People were of a ſudden ſo ſet againſt me, *and* ſpoke ſo bitterly of my Sermon. *I aſked what the matter was? What falſe Doctrine I had preached? Did they ſuſpect I was turn'd* Papiſt, *at ſuch a Time when all the* Nation *was ſet againſt* Popery? *who had written ſo much againſt it, when others, who are now ſo fierce, were afraid to appear?* It was ſomething they ſaid, had angred them ſorely, but they could not tell what; *which made me read my* Sermon *over again, to ſee what offenſive Paſſages there might be in it; after all, I could ſee no juſt cauſe for any offence, unleſs it were, that I perſuaded the Diſſenters to* ſubmit *to the* Church *of* England, *and not the* Church *of* England *to* ſubmit *to them. And this, I believe, lay at the bottom of many Mens Stomachs. They would have had me humour'd the growing Faction, which, under a Pretence of* Zeal *againſt* Popery, *deſign'd to overthrow the* Church *of* England; *or, at leaſt, have preach'd for* Alterations *and* Abatements, *and taking away* Ceremonies *and* Subſcriptions, *and leaving them full liberty to do what they pleaſed; and then I might have gained their good opinion, and been thought to have* *preached a very* Seaſonable Sermon. *But ſuppoſing my own private opinion were never ſo much for ſome* Abatements *to be made, that might tend to ſtrengthen and unite* Proteſtants, *and were conſiſtent with our* National Settlement: *Had it been ſeaſonable to have ſpoken of the* Alteration *of* Laws *before* Magiſtrates *and* Judges, *who are tied up to the* Laws *in being? Is it fit for private Perſons, when* Laws *are in force, to take upon them to judge what* Laws *are fit to continue, and what not? I think the alteration of eſtabliſhed* Laws, *which concern the* preſervation *of our* Church *and* Religion, *one of the weightieſt things that can be taken into conſideration. And although the Arguments are very plauſible one way, yet the Objections are very ſtrong another. The* union *of* Proteſtants, *the* eaſe *of* ſcrupulous Conſciences, *the* providing for ſo many poor Families of ejected Miniſters, *are great* Motives *on one ſide: But,*

1. *The Impoſſibility of ſatisfying all Diſſenters.*
2. *The Uncertainty of gaining any conſiderable number by Relaxations.*
3. *The Difficulty of keeping Factions out of the Church, conſidering the ungovernableneſs of ſome Mens Tempers and Principles.*
4. *The Danger of breaking all in pieces by* Toleration.
5. *The Expoſing our ſelves to the* Papiſts, *and others, by receding too far from the firſt* Principles *and* Frame *of our* Reformation.

And 6. *The Difficulty of keeping out* Prieſts, *pretending to be allowed Diſſenters, are very weighty* Conſiderations *on the other ſide.*

So that, whatever Men talk of the eaſineſs of taking away the preſent Impoſitions, *it is a ſign they look no farther than their own caſe, and do not conſider the* Strength *and* Union *of a* National Settlement, *and the* neceſſity *thereof to keep out* Popery, *and how much eaſier it is to break things in pieces, than to ſet them in order again; for new Objections will ſtill be raiſed againſt any* Settlement, *and ſo the reſult may be nothing but* Diſorder *and* Confuſion. *Of what moment theſe things may be thought to other Perſons, I know not, but they were great enough to me, to make me think it very* unſeaſonable *to meddle with* eſtabliſh'd Laws; *but on the other hand, I could not but think it* ſeaſonable *to endeavour to remove ſuch* Scruples *and* Prejudices, *as hindred the People moſt from* Communion *with our* Churches; *for, as I ſaid in the* Epiſtle *before the* Sermon, "*If the People be brought to underſtand and practiſe their duty, as to* "*Communion with our Churches, other difficulties, which obſtruct our* "*Union, will more eaſily be removed.* This Paſſage *Mr.* A. *tells me,* was the Sport and Entertainment of the **Coffee-Houſes**. *I confeſs, I am a great Stranger to the* Wiſdom *of thoſe places; but I ſee Mr.* A. *is able to give me an account of the ſage Diſcourſes upon Points of* Divinity *there. But if thoſe pleaſant Gentlemen would have underſtood the difference between* Lay-Communion, and Miniſterial Conformity, *they might have apprehended the meaning of that Paſſage. For, I am of opinion, if the* People *once thought themſelves bound to do, what they may lawfully do, towards* Communion *with us; many of the* Miniſters *who ſeem now moſt forward to defend the* Separation, *would think of putting a fairer Conſtruction upon many things than now they do. And therefore I thought it fitteſt to handle the* Caſe *of the* People, *who are either over-violent in theſe matters, without ever conſidering them, or have met with ill Inſtructors, who have not faithfully let them know what the* Terms *of* Communion, *as to themſelves were. For the* Scruple *of the* Surplice *ſeems to be worn out;* Kneeling at the Sacrament *is generally allowed by the more judicious* Nonconformiſts; *and the only Scruple, as to them, about* the Sign of the Croſs,

Miſchief of Impoſition, Preface, towards the end.

Croſs, *is not, whether it be lawful for the Miniſter to uſe it, but* whether it be lawful for them to offer their Children to be baptized where it is uſed; *and as Mr.* Baxter *reſolves the caſe*; Baptiſm is God's Ordinance, and his privilege, and the Sin (if it be one) is the Miniſters, and not his. Another Man's ſinful Mode will not juſtifie the neglect of our Duty; elſe we might not joyn in any Prayer or Sacrament in which the Miniſter modally ſinneth: that is with none. *As to the* Uſe of the Liturgy, *Mr.* Baxter *ſaith*, he that ſeparateth from all Churches among us, on the account of the unlawfulneſs of our Liturgy, doth ſeparate from them on a Reaſon common to all, or almoſt all Chriſtian Churches upon Earth; the thoughts of which he is not able to bear. And although the new Impoſitions, *he ſaith*, makes their Miniſterial Conformity harder than formerly; yet the Peoples Conformity is the ſame (if not eaſier, by ſome Amendments of the Liturgy) as when Separation was fully confuted by the old Non-conformiſts. And the moſt learned and worthy of them, *he ſaith*, wrote more againſt Separation, than the Conformiſts: and the preſent Non-conformiſts have not more Wiſdom, Learning, or Holineſs than they. But, *he ſaith*, they did not only urge the People againſt Separation, but to come to the very beginning of the publick Worſhip, preferring it before their private Duties. *What ground was there now, to make ſuch a hideous Out-cry about a* Sermon, *which perſuaded Men to no more, than the old pious, and peaceable* Nonconformiſts *would have done; who talked more ſharply againſt the* Sin, *and* Miſchief *of* Separation, *than I have done; as may be ſeen in the* firſt Part *of the following Treatiſe?*

Chriſtian Direct. Caſes Ec. p. 49.

Defence of Cure of Diviſ. Introd. p. 55.

Ib. & p. 88.

But as if they had been the Papiſts *Inſtruments, to execute the fury of their Wrath and Diſpleaſure againſt me, they Summon in the Power of their Party, and reſolve, with their full might, to fall upon me. And, as if it had not been enough to deal with me by open Force, which is more Manly, and Generous; they made uſe of mean and baſe Arts, by ſcurrilous* Rimes, *by virulent and malicious* Libels *ſent to me without Names; by idle Stories, and falſe Suggeſtions, to rob me at once, of my reputation, and the Tranquillity of my Mind. But I thank* God, *I deſpiſed ſuch pitiful Artifices, and ſuch unmanly and barbarous Uſage; which made no other Impreſſion on my mind, but to make me underſtand, that other Men could uſe me, as bad, or worſe, than the* Papiſts. *But this brought to my Mind a Paſſage of* Arch-Biſhop Whitgift, *concerning their Predeceſſor's uſage of* Biſhop Jewel; *after he had ſo ſtoutly defended this* Church *againſt the* Papiſts. But, *ſaith he*, it is their manner, except you pleaſe their humor in all things, though you otherwiſe deſerve never ſo well, all is nothing with them, but they will deprave you, rail on you, backbite you, invent Lies of you, and ſpread falſe Rumors, as though you were the vileſt Perſons upon Earth. *I could hardly have believed ſo ill a Character of Men pretending to any kind of* Religion, *had I not found ſo juſt a parallel; abating only the due allowances that muſt be made as to my Caſe, with reſpect to the far greater deſerts of that incomparable* Biſhop, *But notwithſtanding all their hard Cenſures of me, I do aſſure them, I am as firm a* Proteſtant *as ever I was, and ſhould be ſtill as ready to promote the* Intereſt *of the* Proteſtant Religion, *yea, and to do any real Kindneſs to the* Diſſenters *themſelves, that may be conſiſtent with the* National Settlement *of our* Church, *and the* Honor *of our* Reformation.

Arch-Biſhop Whitgift's Defence, &c. *p.* 423.

After a while, they thought fit to draw their Strength into open Field and the Firſt *who appeared againſt me, was Dr.* Owen, *who treated me* *with that Civility, and decent Language, that I cannot but return him Thanks for it; however, I was far from being ſatisfied with his* Reaſoning, *as will appear in the* Book *it ſelf. The next was Mr.* Baxter, *who appeared with ſo much Anger, and unbecoming Paſſion; that I truly pitied him; and was ſo far from being tranſported by it, that it was enough to cure an inclination to an indecent paſſion, to ſee how ill it became a Man of his Age, Profeſſion, and Reputation. At firſt he ſent me ſome captious Queſtions for a Trial of Skill; I returned him Anſwer,* They were not to the buſineſs; but if he intended to anſwer my Sermon (*as I perceived by his* Letter *he was put upon it, and I knew how hardly he could abſtain from Writing however*) I deſired him not to make too haſty a Reply. *But he, who ſeldom takes the Advice of his Friends, was, I ſuppoſe, the more provoked by this good Counſel, and ſeems to have written his whole* Book *in one continued fit of Anger; and by ſome* Rules *of* Civility *peculiar to himſelf, he publiſhed my private* Letter, *without ſo much as letting me know that he intended it. Whatever injurious and ſpiteful Reflections he hath made upon me through his* Book, *I can more eaſily forgive him, than he can forgive himſelf, when he looks them over again with a better mind. And therefore I paſs over the* Scurrility *of his* Preface, *wherein, after he hath in* 20 Particulars *deſcribed, the* moſt unſkilful, proud, partial, obſtinate, cruel, impertinent Adverſaries *he could think of* places of Scripture, *or* Similitudes *for, he then concludes;* But although all this be not the caſe of the Reverend Doctor. *What a malicious way of reproaching is this? To name ſo many very ill things, and to leave it to the* Reader *to apply as much as he pleaſes; and when he is charged with any one to ſay, he meant not that, for he added,* although all this be not the caſe of R. Dr. *If this be the* Juſtice, *the* Charity, *and* Ingenuity *of Mr.* B. *and his* Brethren, *who put him upon* Writing, *they muſt give me leave to think, there are ſome* Non-conformiſt Miniſters, *that are not* the Wiſeſt, the Meekeſt, *nor* the moſt Self-denying Men upon Earth. *He ſeems much concerned about* my being likely to have the laſt Word: *Which I am very willing to let him have, hoping he will come to himſelf before he dies; and may live to* repent *of the* Injuries *he hath done his* Brethren *and the* Miſchiefs *he hath done to the* Church *of* God, *by ſo induſtriouſly expoſing the* Governors *of it, and laying the* Foundation *for* endleſs Separation, *as will appear in the following* Diſcourſe.

The Third who entred the Liſts, was one, who ſeemed to write more like a well-diſpoſed Gentleman, *than like a* Divine; *he* wiſhes *very well to the* Cauſe *he undertakes; he diſcourſes gravely and piouſly, without Bitterneſs and Rancor, or any ſharp Reflections, and ſometimes with a great mixture of Kindneſs towards me; for which, and his* Prayers for me, *I do heartily thank him. What I find material to the buſineſs in his* Book, *I have conſider'd in its due place.*

The Fourth comes forth with a more than ordinary briſkneſs; *and ſeems to ſet up rather for a ſort of* Wit, *than a* grave Divine. *His* Book *reſembled the* Bird *of* Athens, *for it ſeems to be made up of* Face *and* Feathers: *For, ſetting aſide his bold Sayings, his impertinent Triflings, his hunting up and down for any occaſion of venting his little Stories and Similitudes, there is very little of* Subſtance *left in him; but what he hath borrowed from Dr. O. or Mr. B. Methinks, ſuch a light, vain, ſcurrilous Way of Writing, doth not become ſuch a* Tenderneſs of Conſcience *as our* Diſſenting Brethren *pretend to. There is a ſort of pleaſantneſs of Wit which ſerves to entertain the Reader in the rough and deep Way of Controverſies;*

verſies; *but certainly there is a difference between the Railery and good Humor of Gentlemen, and the Jeſts of Porters and Watermen. But this* Author *ſeems to be ambitious of the honor of a* ſecond Martin, *whoſe way he imitates, and whoſe Wit he equals. Yet this is not his greateſt Fault, for he deals with me as a Man that was by any means to be run down, without regard to common Ingenuity. For, ſuppoſe* I had miſtaken the Senſe of my Text, *which I am certain I did not*; *yet I am not the only Perſon in the World that talks impertinently. Suppoſe* there had been a a Fault in my Reaſoning, *methinks the ſenſe of humane Frailty ſhould make Men not grow inſolent upon ſuch a Diſcovery: and yet I do not know one thing which he hath made it in*; *as will appear hereafter. But, will nothing ſerve but to repreſent me to the World as a kind of* Atheiſtical Hypocrite; *i. e. as a ſecret underminer of the* proof of a Deity, *under the pretence of proving it? Yet, this he doth more than once: which was ſo remote from his Buſineſs, that nothing but a wretched, malicious Deſign of expoſing me, could make him draw it in: He gives a gentle Touch at it in his* Preface, *to prepare the Reader's Appetite*; *but p. 70. he charges me* with proceeding upon ſuch Principles, as plainly render it impoſſible by any certain Argument to prove the exiſtence of a Deity. *Mr.* B. *had unhappily ſaid, and without the leaſt ground,* that my Principles overthrow all Religion; *and Mr.* A. *vouches it, and undertakes to prove it for him. Mr.* B. *begins his Plea for Peace with a ſaying of St.* Auſtin, (*he meant St.* Hierom) that no Man ought to be patient under the accuſation of Hereſy: *What ſhould a Man then be under the accuſation of* being guilty of overthrowing all Religion, and rendring it impoſſible, by any certain Argument, to prove that there is a God? *According to all Rules of Juſtice, a Charge of ſo high a nature ought not to be brought againſt any Man, without ſuch evidence, as appears clear and convincing to him that brings it. But I very much miſtruſt in this caſe, that Mr.* A. *in his Conſcience knew, his Proofs to be weak and inſufficient*; *What then can we think of him that charges another with ſo high a Crime, when he knows that he cannot prove it? His firſt Proof, he takes from my* Popiſh Adverſaries, about the inconſiſtency of proving a Deity, by ſuch infallible Arguments, as muſt ſuppoſe the exiſtence of what we prove; *as all* infallibility *from* divine Aſſiſtance *muſt do. But did I ever ſay, there was no Certainty without infallible Aſſiſtance? And yet this whole matter about* Certainty, *as to the* Proof of a God, and the Chriſtian Religion, *I had ſo lately cleared in my laſt Anſwer to the* Papiſts, *which he refers to in this very place, that he could not but be convinced of the Impertinency of it. His main Argument he pretends to bring from a Principle of my own*; *for his words are,* He lays down this for a Principle, that the Foundation of all Certainty lies in the neceſſary Exiſtence of a being abſolutely perfect; how then, *ſaith he,* ſhall we come to prove his Exiſtence by ſuch demonſtration, Cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum? *And then he adds,* That I have excluded all Demonſtration from the Works of God, becauſe we muſt firſt know, that there is an inviſible God, before we can certainly know, that there is a viſible World. *But if I make it evident, that I lay down no ſuch* Principles *of my own*; *and that I do particularly inſiſt upon the* certainty of proving a God from his Works, *What doth this Man deſerve for his Calumnies?*

Several Conferences p. 258. &c.

First, *That which he ſaith I lay down for a* Principle, *I only propoſe as an inference from the* Hypotheſis *of other Men. For my words are,* And if that Principle be ſuppoſed, as the foundation of all Phyſical Certainty, as

Orig. Sacr. l. 2. ch. 8. p. 220.

as to the Being of things, that there is a God: I ſay, if that Principle be ſuppoſed. *From hence appears a double Falſification.*

1. *That I make it* the Principle of all certainty, *whereas I expreſly ſet down in their Hypotheſis* Phyſical Certainty as to the being of things; *but, Is there no* certainty *but what is* Phyſical? *What thinks he of* Mathematical, *or* Metaphyſical Certainty? *ſo that there might be a* Mathematical *or* Metaphyſical Certainty *of the* Being of a God, *though this* Principle *were allowed. How then doth this prove, that* I render it impoſſible, by any certain Argument, to prove the Exiſtence of a Deity?

2. *That I make it* a Principle of my own, *whereas I only ſuppoſe it as following from a* Principle *of others. To clear this, it will be neceſſary to lay down the* ſcope *of that* Diſcourſe, *which was to prove, that there is* a certainty of Faith, as well as of Senſe; *and to that end I ſhewed from the nature of the* certainty of ſenſe, *that it doth fall ſhort of* Mathematical Demonſtrations; *which having done from other Arguments, I then conſider their* Hypotheſis, *who derive* all Phyſical Certainty from the knowledge of God, who will not ſuffer Mens Minds to be deceived in clear perceptions; *then from this Principle being ſuppoſed, I infer ſeveral things for the advantage of the* certainty of Faith. 1. That the Foundation of all Certainty, *i. e. ſuch as was before ſpoken of,* lies in the neceſſary Exiſtence of a being abſolutely perfect *which I deduce as a* juſt inference *from the former* Hypotheſis; *and therefore on this* Suppoſition, *ſomething above our* Comprehenſion, *viz.* Abſolute perfection, *muſt be made the* foundation *of our* certain knowledge of things, *and ſo the* difficulty *of our* conception *of* matters of Faith, *ought to be no hindrance to the* certainty *of* Faith. 2. *That we have as great, or greater reaſon to believe, that* God *will not ſuffer us to be deceived in* matters *of* Faith, *as in the* objects *of our* Senſes; *becauſe as I there argue, there is no ſuch great danger of being deceived, or in being deceived in the* objects *of* Senſe, *as in the* matters *of* Faith. *Let any Man now judge, whether this be the diſcourſe of one* that rendred it impoſſible, by any certain Argument, to prove the Exiſtence of a Deity? *or that I laid down that as a* Principle of my own, *from which being ſuppoſed, I deduce ſuch* inferences *as prove the* certainty *of* Faith *hath no greater difficulties, than the* certainty *of* Senſe.

Secondly, *I am ſo far from excluding the* certainty *of the* Argument *from* the Works of God to prove his Being, *that I particularly and largely inſiſt upon it from* p. 401. *to* p. 411. *but he pretends* that I bring no Argument but from the Idea of God in our minds, *which is ſo falſe, that*

Orig. Sacr. p. 367, 368.

(1.) *I make uſe of that* Argument *only to ſhew,* that the notion of a God hath no inconſiſtency in it, nothing repugnant to the faculties of our Minds: *as appears by that very place he quotes:*

(2.) *The main Arguments I inſiſt upon, are,* That the things in the World are the manifeſt effects of divine Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power: and that there be ſuch things in the World which are unacceptable without a Deity.

Let any Man now judge, with what Conſcience *or* Ingenuity, *this Man hath managed ſuch an* Accuſation *againſt me,* as that I go upon ſuch Principles, as plainly render it impoſſible, by any certain Argument, to prove the Exiſtence of a Deity.

But it may be he will pretend, that he did not deſign to prove me Atheiſtical *but only to ſhew,* that I acted very unreaſonably, in requiring a greater certainty in them, as to the Principles of Separation, than I do allow in far greater things. *As to his deſign, I leave the* Reader *to judge by his way of proceeding in it. As to the colour he hath to bring it in, on the account of the* Grounds *of* Separation *it is only this*; The Sub-Committee of the Aſſembly arguing againſt the diſſenting Brethren, *ſaith he,* I ſay, That ſuch tenderneſs of Conſcience, as ariſeth out of an opinion, (cui poteſt ſubeſſe falſum) which may be falſe, is not a ſufficient ground, *&c.* to juſtifie Separation. *But here is a dangerous* &c. *in the middle of a Sentence, which made me look again into the* Papers, *and there I find ſuch words left out, as fully explain and determine the ſenſe; for the whole Sentence runs thus.* We much doubt, whether ſuch tenderneſs of Conſcience, as ariſeth out of an opinion, *Cui poteſt ſubeſſe falſum,* when the Conſcience is ſo tender, as that it may be withal an erring Conſcience, can be a ſufficient ground to juſtifie ſuch a material Separation as our Brethren plead for. *Where we ſee, the force is not laid upon the* bare poſſibility of deception, *(for then no* Separation *could be allowed in any caſe, ſince all Men are* fallible*) but upon the* ſuppoſition *of an* actual deception, *which an* erroneous Conſcience *ſuppoſes. For it is ſuch a* deception *as doth ſuppoſe* Tenderneſs of Conſcience, *which doth not ariſe from a* poſſibility *of* being deceived, *but from an* error of Conſcience. *The Plea is,* Tenderneſs of Conſcience; *the Queſtion is,* Whether this Plea be ſufficient to juſtifie Separation? We much doubt it, *ſay they, Why ſo? the other reply:* Our Reaſon is, Becauſe this Tenderneſs may ariſe from an erroneous Conſcience. *But why ſhould you ſuſpect an erroneous Conſcience in the Caſe?* Becauſe Perſons are liable to be deceived in the Dictates of Conſcience: eſpecially when they go merely upon their own Apprehenſions, without producing Arguments ex Naturâ rei. *For all the debate between them about* Tenderneſs of Conſcience *proceeded upon this. So that their meaning is not here to be taken as to the bare* poſſibility of deception, *but of ſuch an Opinion, as carried a great* probability *along with it, that they were* actually deceived. *And what coherence is there now between this, and the Proof that I bring for the* Exiſtence of a Deity? *ſo that, it is apparent, that this was an occaſion ſought after, to lay as much load upon me as he could. And by this taſte let the* Reader *judge, what* Ingenuity *I am to expect from this Man.*

Papers of Accommodation, p. 51.

The Laſt who appeared againſt my Sermon, *is called,* The Author of the Chriſtian Temper. *I was glad to find an* Adverſary *pretending to that; having found ſo little of it in the* Anſwers *of Mr.* B. *and Mr,* A. *His buſineſs is,* To commit the Rector of Sutton, with the Dean of St. Paul'*s*; *which was enough to make the common People imagine, this was ſome buſie* Juſtice *of* Peace, *who had taken them both at a* Conventicle. *The whole deſign of that* Book *doth not ſeem very agreeable to* the Chriſtian Temper *which the* Author *pretends to. For it is to pick up all the Paſſages he could meet with, (in a Book written twenty years ſince) with great tenderneſs towards the* Diſſenters, *before the* Laws *were* eſtabliſh'd. As though, *as Mr.* Cotton *once anſwered in a like caſe,* there were no weighty Argument to be found, but what might be gather'd from the weakneſs or unwarineſs of my Expreſſions. *And, have you not very well requited the* Author *of that* Book, *for the tenderneſs and pity he had for you, and the concernment he then expreſſed, to have brought*

Anſwer to R. Williams, p. 129.

you in, upon eaſier Terms *than were ſince required? And hath he now deſerved this at your hands, to have them all* thrown in his face, *and to be thus upbraided with his former kindneſs? Is this your* Ingenuity, *your* Gratitude, *your* Chriſtian Temper? *Are you afraid of having too many* Friends, *that you thus uſe thoſe, whom you once took to be ſuch?*

Methinks herein you appear very Self-denying, *but I cannot take you to be any of* the Wiſeſt Men upon Earth. *When you think it reaſonable, that upon longer time, and farther conſideration, thoſe* Divines *of the* Aſſembly, *who then oppoſed* Separation, *ſhould change their Opinions: Will you not allow one* ſingle Perſon, *who happen'd to write about theſe matters when he was* very young, *in* twenty years *time, of the moſt buſie and thoughtful part of his Life, to ſee reaſon to alter his Judgment? But after all this, wherein is it that he hath thus contradicted himſelf? Is it in the Point of* Separation, *which is the preſent buſineſs? No, ſo far from it, that in that very* Book, *he ſpeaks as fully concerning the* Unlawfulneſs *of* Separation, *as in this* Sermon. *Which will appear by theſe* Particulars *in it.*

Iren. p. 123. (1.) That it is unlawful to ſet up new Churches, becauſe they cannot conform to ſuch practices which they ſuſpect to be unlawful.

(2.) Thoſe are new Churches, when Men erect diſtinct Societies for worſhip, under diſtinct and peculiar Officers, governing by Laws, and Church Rules, different from that Form they ſeparate from.

Page 124. (3.) As to things in the Judgment of the Primitive and Reformed
Churches left undetermin'd by the Law of God, and in matters of meer
order and decency, and wholly as to the Form of Government, every
one, notwithſtanding what his private Judgment may be of them, is
bound for the peace of the Church of God, to ſubmit to the determination
of the lawful Governours of the Church. *Allow but theſe three*
Concluſions, *and defend the preſent* Separation *if you can. Why then do*
you make ſuch a ſtir about other Paſſages in that Book, *and take ſo little*
notice of theſe, which are moſt pertinent and material? Was it not
poſſible for you to eſpy them, when you ranſacked every corner of that
Book, *to find out ſome thing which might ſeem to make to your purpoſe?*
Page 5. *And yet the very firſt* Paſſage *you quote, is within two Leaves of theſe;*
Page 6, 7. *and two Paſſages more you ſoon after quote, are within a* Page *of them,*
Page 8. *and another in the very* ſame Page; *and ſo many up and down ſo very*
near them, that it is impoſſible you ſhould not ſee and conſider them?
Yes, he hath at laſt found ſomething very near them, *for he quotes the*
very Pages where they are. And, *he ſaith,* he will do me no wrong,
for I do diſtinguiſh, *he confeſſes,* between Non-communion in unlawful
or ſuſpected Rites or Practices in a Church, and entering into diſtinct
Societies for worſhip. *This is doing me ſome right however, although he*
doth not fully ſet down my meaning. But he urges another Paſſage in the
ſame place, viz. That if others caſt them wholly out of Communion,
their Separation is neceſſary——— *That is no more, than hath been always*
ſaid by our Divines *in reſpect to the* Church *of* Rome. But, will
not this equally hold againſt our Church, if it excommunicates thoſe
who cannot conform? *I anſwer,* (1.) *Our* Church *doth not caſt any*
wholly out of Communion *for meer* ſcrupulous Non-conformity *in ſome*
particular Rites. For, it allows them to Communicate *in other* Parts of
worſhip, *as appeared by all the* Non-conformiſts *of former times, who*
conſtantly joined in Prayers *and other* Acts of worſhip, *although they ſcrupled*
ſome particular Ceremonies. (2.) *The caſe is vaſtly different, as to*

the neceſſity *of our* Separation, *upon being* wholly caſt out *of* Communion *by the* Church of Rome; *and the neceſſity of others* ſeparating from us, ſuppoſing a general Excommunication ipſo facto *againſt thoſe* who publickly defame the Orders of this Church. *For that is all which can be inferred from the* Canons. *For, in the former caſe, it is not a* leſſer Excommunication *denounced, as it is only in our caſe againſt* publick and ſcandalous Offenders, *(which is no more than is allowed in all* Churches; *and is generally ſuppoſed to lay no obligation, till it be duly executed, tho' it be* latæ ſententiæ & ipſo facto*) but in the* Church *of* Rome *we are caſt out with an* Anathema, *ſo as to pronounce us* uncapable of Salvation, *if we do not return to, and continue in their Communion; and this was it which that* Author *meant, by being* wholly caſt out of Communion, *i. e. with the greateſt and higheſt* Church Cenſure. (3.) *That* Author *could not poſſibly mean, that there was an equal reaſon in theſe caſes, when he expreſly determines, that in the caſe of our* Church, Men are bound in Conſcience to ſubmit to the Orders of it; *being only about matters of* Decency *and* Order, *and ſuch things which in the* Judgment *of the* Primitive *and* Reformed Churches *are left undetermined by the* Law of God. *Although therefore he might allow a ſcrupulous forbearance of ſome* Acts *of* Communion, *as to ſome* ſuſpected Rites, *yet upon the Principles there aſſerted, he could never allow Mens proceedings to a* poſitive Separation *from the* Communion *of our* Church. *And ſo much ſhall ſerve to clear the agreement between the* Rector *of* Sutton, *and the* Dean *of* St. Paul'*s*. *But if any thing in the following* Treatiſe *be found different from the ſenſe of that* Book, *I do entreat them to allow me that which I heartily wiſh to them, viz. that in* Twenty years *time we may arrive to ſuch maturity of Thoughts, as to ſee reaſon to change our opinion of* ſome things; *and I wiſh I had not cauſe to add, of* ſome Perſons *too.*

There is one thing more which this Author *takes notice of, and the reſt do not, (for elſe he offers little or nothing but what is in the others) which is, that when I ſay our differences are condemned by the wiſer Proteſtants abroad, he ſaith,* if it be ſo, they may thank their Friends at home, that have miſrepreſented them to the World. *Therefore to give ſatisfaction, as to the Judgment of ſome of the moſt eminent and learned* Proteſtant Divines *abroad now living, I have ſubjoined to the* following Treatiſe, *ſome late* Letters *of theirs, to a* Perſon *of great* Honour and Dignity *in our* Church, *to ſhew the* Unlawfulneſs *of* Separation *from the* Communion *of the* Church of England. *Which were not written by ſuch who had only a partial repreſentation from others at a diſtance, but two of them by thoſe who have been among us, and have been curious obſervers both of the* ſeparate Meetings, *and of the* Cuſtoms *of our* Churches; *and the Third by the Famous and Excellent* Monſieur Claude. *And if a* Council *could be called of all the* Proteſtant Churches *in* Chriſtendom, *we ſhould not doubt of their determination of the* Unlawfulneſs *of the* preſent Separation.

But before I conclude this Preface, *there is a great* Objection *yet to be removed, which concerns* the Time of publiſhing this Treatiſe, which ſome do ſeem to think, to be very unſeaſonable; when there is ſo much talk of Union among Proteſtants, and there appears a more general Inclination to it than formerly. And what, *ſay they,* can the laying open the Weakneſs of Diſſenters tend to, but to provoke and exaſperate them, and conſequently, to obſtruct the Union ſo much deſired? In ſo doing, I ſhall appear to reſent more the Injuries done to my Self, than the miſchief which may come to the Proteſtant Religion, if this opportunity be not embraced for making an Union among Proteſtants. *This is the force of the* Objection. *To which I anſwer.*

God forbid that I ſhould either deſign, or do any thing which tended to obſtruct ſo bleſſed a Work, as a firm and laſting Union among Proteſtants would be. But my buſineſs is, to ſhew the Unreaſonableneſs of thoſe Principles and Practices, which hinder Men from ſuch an Union, and lay a Foundation for perpetual and endleſs Separations. For upon the Principles laid down by ſome of our Diſſenting Brethren, *let the Conſtitutions be made never ſo eaſie to themſelves, yet others may make uſe of their grounds, and carry on the Differences as high as ever. Which will render all Attempts of Union vain, and leave the ſame Weapons ready to be taken up by others. If the Union ſo much talked of, be ſuch as tends to the leſſening, and not to the increaſing of our Differences; if it be for ſtrengthening and ſupporting the Proteſtant Religion, and not rather for weakning and betraying it, by laying it more open to the aſſaults of our Enemies; no Man ſhall be more ready to promote it than I; no Man will rejoice more in the accompliſhment of it.*

But univerſal liberty is quite another thing from Union; as much as looſing is from binding up; and it is ſtrange if that which the Papiſts, *not long ſince, thought the beſt means to bring in* Popery, *ſhould now be looked on as the moſt effectual way to keep it out. But ſuppoſe the* Indulgence *be at preſent ſtrictly limited to* Diſſenting Proteſtants, *are we ſure it ſhall always ſo continue? Will not the ſame Reaſons, as to ſcruple of Conſcience, ſuffering for Religion,* &c. *extend farther when occaſion ſerves, and the* Popiſh Religion *get footing on the* Diſſenters grounds? *Where hath the* Church *of* Rome *more Labourers, and a greater Harveſt, than under the greateſt liberty of Conſcience? Let the ſtate of the* Northern Kingdoms, *as to this matter, be compared with the number of* Papiſts *in the* United Provinces. *And it will be found impoſſible to root out* Popery *where Toleration is allowed.* (1.) *Becauſe of the various ways of creeping in under ſeveral diſguiſes, which the* Prieſts *and* Jeſuits *have; and can never be prevented, where there is a general Indulgence for* Diſſenters, *and an unaccountable* Church Power *is allowed to ſeparate* Congregations. (2.) *Becauſe it will be thought great hardſhip, when Mens heats are over, for them only to be deprived of the liberty of their Conſciences, when the wildeſt Fanaticks are allowed it.* (3.) *Becauſe the diverſity of Sects which will be kept up by this means, will be always thought a plauſible argument to draw Men to the* popiſh Pretences *of* Unity. (4.) *Becauſe the allowed Sects will in probability grow more inſolent upon a* legal Indulgence, *and bid defiance to the ſettled Conſtitution; as we have ſeen already by the yet viſible effects of the former* Indulgence. *If Laws would alter the temper of Mens minds, and make proud, ſelf-willed, froward and paſſionate Men, become meek and humble, gentle and peaceable, then it were great pity, ſome Men had not had the Law on their ſide long ago. But is this to be looked for? are we to expect the Laws of Men ſhould work more upon them than the Grace of God? If ſuch then continue peeviſh and quarrelſome, full of wrath and bitterneſs againſt all that are not of their minds; and they meet with Men as froward and contentious as themſelves; will this look like the* Union *of* Proteſtants? *And By-ſtanders will be apt to ſay, if this be all that you mean by* Union *of* Proteſtants, viz. *a liberty to* pray *and* preach, *and to* write *and* diſpute *one againſt another, there ſeems to be much more of ſenſe and reaſon in the* papal *Pretence to* Unity *and* Infallibility.

But what then? Is there nothing to be done for diſſenting Proteſtants, who agree with us in all Doctrinal Articles of our Church, and only ſcruple the uſe of a few Ceremonies, and ſome late Impoſitions? ſhall theſe differences ſtill be continued, when they may be ſo eaſily removed? And ſo many uſeful Men be encouraged, and taken into the Conſtitution? Do we value a few indifferent Ceremonies, and ſome late Declarations, and doubtful Expreſſions, beyond the ſatisfaction of Mens Conſciences, and the Peace and Stability of this Church?

As to this material Queſtion, I ſhall crave leave to deliver my opinion freely and impartially; *and that,*

I. *With reſpect to the Caſe of the People, the Terms of whoſe* Union *with us, is acknowledged by our Brethren to be ſo much eaſier than their own. But theſe are of two ſorts:*

1. Some allow the uſe of the Liturgy, but ſay they cannot join in Communion with us, becauſe the participiation of the Sacraments hath ſuch Rites and Ceremonies annexed to it, which they think unlawful; and therefore till theſe be removed, or left indifferent, they dare not join with us in Baptiſm, or the Lord's-Supper, becauſe in the one the Croſs is uſed, and in the other Kneeling is required. *As to theſe I anſwer,*

(1.) *Upon the moſt diligent ſearch I could make into theſe things, I find no good ground for any ſcruple of Conſcience, as to the uſe of theſe Ceremonies, and as little as any as to the Sign of the Croſs, as it is uſed in our* Church; *notwithſtanding all the noiſe that hath been made about its being a* new Sacrament, *and I know not what, but of this at large in the following Treatiſe.*

(2.) *I ſee no ground for the Peoples ſeparation from other Acts of Communion, on the account of ſome Rites they ſuſpect to be unlawful. And eſpecially when the uſe of ſuch Rites is none of their own Act, as the* Croſs *in* Baptiſm *is not*; *and when ſuch an Explication is annexed concerning the intention of* Kneeling at the Lord's-Supper, *as is in the* Rubrick *after the* Communion.

(3.) *Notwithſtanding, becauſe the uſe of* Sacraments *in a* Chriſtian Church *ought to be the moſt free from all exceptions, and they ought to be ſo adminiſtred, as rather to invite than diſcourage ſcrupulous Perſons from joining in them*; *I do think it would be a part of* Chriſtian Wiſdom *and Condeſcenſion in the Governours of our* Church, *to remove thoſe Bars from a freedom in joining in full Communion with us, which may be done, either by wholly taking away* the Sign of the Croſs; *or if that may give offence to others, by confining the uſe of it to the publick adminiſtration of* Baptiſm; *or by leaving it indifferent, as the Parents deſire it. As to* Kneeling at the Lord's-Supper, *ſince ſome Poſture is neceſſary, and many devout People ſcruple any other, and the* Primitive Church *did in ancient Times, receive it in the poſture of adoration*; *there is no reaſon to take this away, even in Parochial Churches*; *provided, that thoſe who ſcruple Kneeling do receive it, with the leaſt offence to others, and rather ſtanding than ſitting, becauſe the former is moſt agreeable to the practice of Antiquity, and of our Neighbour Reformed Churches. As to the* Surplice *in* Parochial Churches, *it is not of that conſequence, as to bear a diſpute one way or other. And as to Cathedral Churches, there is no neceſſity of alteration. But there is another thing which ſeems to be of late much ſcrupled in Baptiſm,* viz. the uſe of God-fathers and God-mothers excluding the Parents. *Although I do not queſtion but the Practice of our Church may be juſtified, (as I have*

have done it towards the end of the following Treatiſe) yet I ſee no neceſſity of adhering ſo ſtrictly to the Canon *herein, but that a little alteration may prevent theſe Scruples, either by permitting the Parents to join with the Sponſors, or by the Parents publickly deſiring the Sponſors to repreſent them in offering the Child to Baptiſm; or, which ſeems moſt agreeable to Reaſon, that the Parents offer the Child to Baptiſm, and then the Sponſors perform the Covenanting part, repreſenting the Child; and the Charge after Baptiſm be given in common, to the Parents and Sponſors.*

Theſe things being allowed, I ſee no Obſtruction remaining, as to a full Union *of the Body of ſuch Diſſenters with us, in all Acts of Divine Worſhip, and Chriſtian* Communion, *as do not reject all* Communion *with us as unlawful.*

2. *But becauſe there are many of thoſe, who are become zealous Proteſtants,* and plead much their Communion with us in Faith and Doctrine, although they cannot join with us in worſhip, becauſe they deny the lawfulneſs of Liturgies, and the right Conſtitution of our Churches; *their Caſe deſerves ſome conſideration, whether and how far they are capable of being made ſerviceable to the common Intereſt, and to the ſupport of the Proteſtant Religion among us?*

To their Caſe *I anſwer,*

Firſt, That a general unlimited Toleration *to* diſſenting Proteſtants, *will ſoon bring* Confuſion *among us, and in the end* Popery, *as I have ſhewed already; and a ſuſpenſion of all the penal Laws that relate to Diſſenters is the ſame thing with a* boundleſs Toleration.

Secondly, If any preſent Favours be granted to ſuch, in conſideration of our circumſtances, and to prevent their conjunction with the Papiſts, *for a* general Toleration, *(for if ever the* Papiſts *obtain it, it muſt be under their Name) if, I ſay, ſuch favour be thought fit to be ſhewed them, it ought to be with ſuch reſtrictions and limitations, as may prevent the miſchief which may eaſily follow upon it. For all ſuch Meetings are a perpetual reproach to our Churches, by their declaring, that* our Churches are no true Churches, *that* our manner of worſhip is unlawful, *and that* our Church-Government is Anti-chriſtian; *and that* on theſe accounts they ſeparate from us, and worſhip God by themſelves. *But if ſuch an* Indulgence *be thought fit to be granted, I humbly offer theſe things to conſideration.*

1. *That none be permitted to enjoy the privilege of it, who do not declare* that they do hold Communion with our Churches to be unlawful. *For it ſeems unreaſonable to allow it to others, and will give countenance to endleſs and cauſeleſs Separations.*

2. *That all who enjoy it, beſides taking the* Teſt *againſt* Popery, *do ſubſcribe the* Thirty ſix Articles *of our Faith, becauſe the pretence of this Liberty is joining with us in* Points *of* Faith; *aud this may more probably prevent* Papiſts *getting in amongſt them.*

3. *That all ſuch as enjoy it, muſt declare the particular Congregations they are of, and enter their Names before ſuch* Commiſſioners *as ſhall be authoriſed for that purpoſe; that ſo this may be no pretence for idle, looſe, and profane Perſons, never going to any Church at all.*

4. *That both Preachers and Congregations be liable to ſevere Penalties, if they uſe any bitter or reproachful words, either in Sermons or Writings, againſt the eſtabliſhed Conſtitution of our Churches; becauſe they deſire only the freedom of their own Conſciences; and the uſing this liberty will diſcover it is not Conſcience, but a turbulent factious Humour, which makes them ſeparate from our Communion.*

5. *That all indulged Perſons be particularly obliged to pay all legal Duties to the parochial Churches, (leſt mere covetouſneſs tempt Men to run among them) and no Perſons ſo indulged be capable of any publick Office. It not being reaſonable, that ſuch ſhould be truſted with Government, who look upon the Worſhip eſtabliſhed by Law as unlawful.*

6. *That no other Penalty be laid on ſuch indulged Perſons, but that of* Twelve-pence *a Sunday for their abſence from the* Parochial Churches, *which ought to be duly collected for the uſe of the Poor, and cannot be complained of as an heavy burden, conſidering the* liberty *they do enjoy by it.*

7. *That the* Biſhops, *as* Viſitors *appointed by Law, have an exact Account given to them, of the Rule of their* Worſhip *and* Diſcipline, *and of all the Perſons belonging to the indulged Congregations, with their Qualities, and Places of abode; and that none be admitted a Member of any ſuch Congregation, without acquainting their* Viſitor *with it, that ſo means may be uſed to prevent their leaving our* Communion, *by giving ſatisfaction to their Scruples. This* Power *of the* Biſhops *cannot be ſcrupled by them, ſince herein they are conſidered as* Commiſſioners *appointed by* Law.

8. *That no indulged Perſons preſume under ſevere Penalties, to breed up* Scholars, *or to teach Gentlemens Sons* Univerſity Learning; *becauſe this may be juſtly looked on as a deſign to propagate* Schiſm *to* Poſterity, *and to lay a* Foundation *for the diſturbance of* future Generations.

II. *As to the* Caſe *of the* ejected Miniſters, *I have theſe things to offer,*

1. *That bare* ſubſcription *of the* Thirty ſix Articles, *concerning* Doctrinal Points, *be not allowed as ſufficient to qualifie any Man for a* Living, *or any* Church-preferment, *for theſe Reaſons,*

Firſt, *Any* Lay-man, *upon theſe Terms, may not only be capable of a* Living, *but may take upon him to* adminiſter the Sacraments; *which was never allowed in any well-conſtituted* Church *in the* Chriſtian World. *And ſuch an allowance among us, inſtead of ſetling and uniting us, will immediately bring things into great* confuſion, *and give mighty advantage to the* Papiſts *againſt our* Church. *And we have reaſon to fear, a deſign of this Nature, under a pretence of* Union of Proteſtants, *tends to the ſubverſion of this* Church, *and throwing all things into* confuſion, *which at laſt will end in* Popery.

Secondly, *This will bring a* Faction *into the* Church, *which will more endanger it than external oppoſition. For ſuch Men will come in triumphantly, having beaten down* Three *of the* Thirty nine Articles, *and being in legal poſſeſſion of their Places, will be ready to defie and contemn thoſe who ſubmitted to the reſt, and to glory in their Conqueſts, and draw Followers after them, as the victorious Confeſſors againſt* Prelacy *and* Ceremonies. *And can they imagine thoſe of the* Church *of* England *will ſee the reputation of the* Church, *or their* own, *to ſuffer ſo much, and not appear in their own* Vindication? *Things are not come to that paſs, nor will they ſuddenly be, that the* Friends *of the* Church *of* England *will be either afraid,* or *aſhamed to own her Cauſe. We do heartily and ſincerely deſire* Union *with our Brethren, if it may be had on juſt and reaſonable Terms; but they muſt not think, that we will give up the* Cauſe of the Church *for it, ſo as to condemn its* Conſtitution, *or make the* Ceremonies unlawful, *which have been hitherto obſerved and practiſed in it. If any Expedient can be found out for the eaſe of other Mens Conſciences, without reflecting on our own; if they can be taken in, without reproach or diſhonour* *to the* Reformation *of the* Church; *I hope no true Son of the* Church *of* England *will oppoſe it. But if the deſign be to bring them in as a* Faction *to bridle and control the* Epiſcopal Power, *by ſetting up* forty Biſhops *in a Dioceſe againſt* one; *if it be for them to trample upon the* Church *of* England, *and not to ſubmit to its* Order *and* Government *upon fair and moderate terms, let them not call this a deſign of* Union, *but the giving* Law *to a* Party, *to oppoſe the* Church *of* England. *And what the ſucceſs of this will be, let wiſe Men judge.*

Thirdly, *If a* ſubſcription *to* Thirty ſix Articles *were ſufficient by the Statute* 13 El. c. 12. *I do not underſtand how by virtue of that Statute a Man is bound publickly to read the* Thirty nine Articles in the Church, and the Teſtimonial of his Subſcription, on pain of being deprived *ipſo facto*, if he do not. *For the Lord Chief Juſtice* Coke *ſaith*, That ſubſcription to the Thirty nine Articles is required by force of the Act of Parliament, 13 Eliz. c. 12. *And he adds*, That the Delinquent is diſabled and deprived *ipſo facto*; and that a conditional ſubſcription to them was not ſufficient, was reſolved by all the Judges in *England*. *But how a Man ſhould be deprived* ipſo facto, *for not ſubſcribing, and reading the Thirty nine Articles, as appears by the Caſes mentioned in* Coke; *and yet be required only to ſubſcribe to Thirty ſix, by the ſame* Statute, *is a thing too hard for me to conceive.*

Co. *Inſt.* 4. *Part* 323, 324.

2. *But notwithſtanding this, if any temper can be found out, as to the* manner *of* Subſcription, *that may give eaſe to the* Scruples *of our Brethren, and ſecure the* Peace *of the* Church, *the deſired* Union *may be attained without that apparent danger of increaſing the Factions among us.*

And this I ſuppoſe may be done, by an abſolute ſubſcription to all thoſe Articles *which concern* the Doctrine of the true Chriſtian Faith, and the uſe of the Sacraments; *and a* ſolemn Promiſe under their hand, or Subſcription of peaceable ſubmiſſion, *as to the reſt, ſo as not to oppoſe or contradict them, either in* Preaching *or* Writing; *upon the ſame penalty as if they had not ſubſcribed to the Thirty ſix. Which may be a more probable means to keep the* Church *in quiet, than forcing a more rigorous* Subſcription *upon them, or leaving them at their full liberty.*

3. *As to the other* Subſcription *required*, 1 Jac. *to the Three* Articles. *The firſt is provided for, by* the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. *The third is the ſame with the* Subſcription *to the* Thirty nine Articles. *And as to the ſecond*, about the Book of Common-Prayer, *&c. it ought to be conſidered,*

(1.) *Whether, for the ſatisfaction of the ſcrupulous, ſome more doubtful and obſcure Paſſages may not yet be explained or amended? Whether the* New Tranſlation *of the* Pſalms *were not fitter to be uſed, at leaſt in* Parochial Churches? *Whether* Portions *of* Canonical Scripture *were not better put inſtead of* Apocrypha Leſſons? *Whether the* Rubrick *about* Salvation of Infants, *might not be reſtored to its former place, in the* Office of Confirmation, *and ſo the preſent exceptions againſt it be removed? Whether thoſe expreſſions which ſuppoſe the ſtrict exerciſe of* Diſcipline, *in* burying the Dead, *were not better left at liberty in our preſent Caſe? Such a* Review *made by* wiſe *and* peaceable Men, *not given to* wrath *and* diſputing, *may be ſo far from being a diſhonour to this Church, that it may add to the glory of it.*

(2.) *Upon ſuch a* Review, *whether it be not great* Reaſon *that all Perſons who officiate in the Church, be not only tied to a conſtant* uſe *of it in* all publick Offices, *(as often as they adminiſter them) which they ought* *in Perſon frequently to do, but to declare at their firſt entrance upon a* Parochial Charge, *their* approbation *of the* uſe *of it, after their own* reading *of it, that ſo the* People *may not ſuſpect them to carry on a factious Deſign, under an outward pretence of* Conformity *to the* Rules *of the* Church *they live in.*

(3.) *Whether ſuch a ſolemn* uſing *the* Liturgy, *and* Approbation *and* Promiſe *of the* uſe *of it, may not be ſufficient, inſtead of the late* Form *of declaring* their Aſſent and Conſent, *which hath been ſo much* ſcrupled *by our Brethren?*

Theſe are all the things which appear to me reaſonable to be allowed in order to an Union, *and which I ſuppoſe may be granted without detriment or diſhonour to our* Church. *There are other things very deſirable towards the* happineſs *and* flouriſhing *of this* Church, *as the exerciſe of* Diſcipline *in* Parochial Churches, *in a due ſubordination to the* Biſhop; *the* reforming *the* Eccleſiaſtical Courts *as to* Excommunication, *without prejudice to the excellent* Profeſſion *of the* Civil Law; *the building of more* Churches *in great* Pariſhes, *eſpecially about the* City *of* London; *the retrenching* Pluralities; *the ſtrictneſs and ſolemnity of* Ordinations; *the making a* Book *of* Canons *ſuitable to this Age, for the better regulating the* Converſations *of the* Clergy. *Such things as theſe, might facilitate our* Union, *and make our* Church, *in ſpite of all its Enemies, become* a praiſe in the whole earth.

The Zeal I have for the true Proteſtant Religion, *for the* Honour *of this* Church, *and for a firm* Union *among* Brethren, *hath tranſported me beyond the bounds of a* Preface; *which I do now conclude with my hearty Prayers to* Almighty God, *that he, who is* the God of Peace, *and the* Fountain of Wiſdom, *would ſo direct the Counſels of thoſe in authority, and incline the hearts of the People, that we may neither run into a* Wilderneſs *of* Confuſion, *nor be driven into the* Abyſs *of* Popery; *but that the* true Religion *being preſerved among us, we may with one heart and mind ſerve the* only true God, *through his only Son* Jeſus Chriſt the Prince of Peace, *and our* alone Advocate and Mediator. Amen.

THE
UNREASONABLENESS
OF
SEPARATION.

PART I.

An Hiſtorical Account of the Riſe and Progreſs of Separation.

§ 1. *No Separation in the beginning of the Reformation, although there were then the ſame Reaſons which are now pleaded.* § 2. *Our Terms of Communion being the ſame which were required by the Martyrs in Queen* Mary's *days.* §. 3. *A true account of the Troubles of* Francford. *Mr.* B's *miſtake about them.* §. 4. *The firſt cauſes of the diſlike of our Ceremonies.* § 5. *The Reaſons of retaining them at the time of Reformation.* § 6. *The Tendencies to Separation checked by* Beza *and other Reformed Divines abroad.* § 7. *The Heats of the Nonconformiſts gave occaſion to Separation.* § 8. *Their zeal againſt it notwithſtanding; their repreſenting the ſinfulneſs and miſchief of it.* § 9, 10. *The true ſtate of the Controverſie between the Separatiſts and Nonconformiſts.* § 11. *Their Anſwers to the Separatiſts Reaſons.* § 12. *The progreſs of Separation. The Schiſms and Diviſions among the Separatiſts the occaſion of Independency. That makes Separation more inexcuſable, by owning ſome of our Churches to be true Churches.* § 13. *The miſchiefs which followed Independency both abroad, and* § 14. *hither into* England. § 15. *The Controverſie ſtated between the Divines of the Aſſembly and the Diſſenting Brethren.* § 16. *The Cauſe of the Aſſembly given up by the preſent Diſſenters.* § 17. *The old Nonconformiſts Judgment of the unlawfulneſs of mens preaching here, when forbidden by Laws, fully cleared from ſome late Objections.*

Sect. I. FOR our better underſtanding the *State* of this *Controverſie*, it will be neceſſary to premiſe theſe two Things.

1. *That although the preſent Reaſons for Separation would have held from the beginning of our Reformation, yet no ſuch thing was then practiſed, or allowed, by thoſe who were then moſt zealous for Reformation.*

2. *That when Separation began, it was moſt vehemently oppoſed by thoſe Non-conformiſts who diſliked many things in our Church, and wiſhed for a farther Reformation.* And from a *true Account of the State* of the *Controverſie* then, it will appear, that the *Principles* owned by them, do overthrow the preſent practice of *Separation* among us.

In the making out of theſe, I ſhall give a full account of the *Riſe* and *Progreſs* of this *Controverſie* about *Separation* from the *Communion* of our *Church.*

I. *That although the preſent Reaſons for Separation would have held from the beginning of the Reformation, yet no ſuch thing was then practiſed, or allowed by thoſe who were then moſt zealous for Reformation.* By *Separation* we mean nothing elſe, but *Withdrawing from the conſtant Communion of our Church, and joyning with ſeparate Congregations for greater Purity of Worſhip, and better means of Edification.* By *the preſent Reaſons for Separation* we underſtand ſuch as are at this day inſiſted on, by thoſe who pretend to juſtifie theſe Practices; and thoſe are ſuch, as make the *Terms of Communion* with our *Church* to *be unlawful.* And not one of all thoſe, which my Adverſaries at this time hope to juſtifie the *preſent Separation* by, but would have had as much force in the beginning of the *Reformation.* For our *Church* ſtands on the ſame Grounds; uſeth the ſame Ceremonies (only fewer;) preſcribes the ſame Liturgy (only more corrected;) hath the ſame conſtitution and frame of Government; the ſame defect of Diſcipline; the ſame manner of appointing parochial Miniſters; and at leaſt as effectual means of Edification, as there were when the *Reformation* was firſt eſtabliſhed. And what advantage there is, in our preſent circumſtances, as to the Number, Diligence and Learning of our allowed Preachers; as to the retrenching of ſome Ceremonies, and the Explication of the meaning of others; as to the Miſchiefs we have ſeen follow the practice of *Separation*, do all make it much more unreaſonable now, than it had been then.

Sect. II. It cannot be denied, that there were different apprehenſions concerning ſome few things required by our *Church* in the beginning of the *Reformation*; but they were ſuch things, as are the leaſt ſcrupled now. *Rogers* refuſed the wearing of *a ſquare Cap, and Tippet,* &c. *unleſs a Difference were made between the Popiſh Prieſts and ours. Hooper* at firſt ſcrupled the *Epiſcopal Habits*, but he ſubmitted afterwards to the uſe of them. *Bucer*, and ſome others, diſliked ſome things in the firſt *Common-Prayer-Book* of *Edward* the Sixth, which were corrected in the Second: So that upon the *Review* of the *Liturgy* there ſeemed to be little or no diſſatisfaction left in the Members of our Church; at leaſt, as to thoſe things which are now made the *grounds* of *Separation.* For we read of none, who [illegible] *the conſtant uſe of the Liturgy*, or to comply with thoſe very few Ceremonies which were retained, as *the Croſs in Baptiſm, and Kneeling at the Communion*, which are now thought ſuch *Bugbears* to ſcare People from our *Communion*, and make them cry out in ſuch a dreadful manner of the *Miſchief of Impoſitions*; as though the Church muſt unavoidably be broken in pieces by the weight and burden of two or three ſuch inſupportable Ceremonies. Now we are told, *That it is unreaſonable that any ſhould create a neceſſity of Separation, and then complain of an Impoſſibility of Union.* By whom? At what time? In what manner was *this neceſſity of Separation created?* Hath our *Church* made any new *Terms* of *Communion*, or alter'd the old ones? No: the ſame

Acts and *Monuments* Vol. 3. p. 131.

Miſchief of Impoſitions *Preface.*

ſame Author ſaith, *It is perpetuating the old Conditions*, *and venturing our Peace in an old Worm-eaten Bottom*, *wherein it muſt certainly miſcarry.*

Not to inſiſt on his way of Expreſſion, in calling the Reformation *an old Worm-eaten Bottom*; which ill becomes them that would now be held the moſt zealous *Proteſtants*. I would only know, if thoſe *Terms* of *Communion* which were impoſed by the Martyrs, and other Reformers, and which are only continued by us, do, as this *Author* ſaith, *Create a Neceſſity of Separation*; how then it came to paſs, that in all King *Edward*'s Days, there was no ſuch thing as Diviſion in our Church about them?

Freſh ſuit againſt Ceremonies, p. 467.

And even Dr. *Ames*, who ſearched as carefully as any into this matter, can bring no other Inſtances of any differences then, but thoſe of *Rogers* and *Hooper:* he adds indeed, *That* Ridley *and others agreed with* Hooper. Wherein? What, in oppoſing our Ceremonies, when *Hooper* himſelf yielded in that which he at firſt ſcrupled? *No, but there was a perfect reconciliation between them, before they ſuffered.* And what then? Is there any the leaſt colour of Evidence, that before that Reconciliation, either *Hooper* or *Rogers* held ſeparate Aſſembles from the Conformiſts, or that *Ridley* ever receded from his ſtedfaſt adhering to the *Orders* of this *Church?* This is then a very mean Artifice, and diſingenuous Inſinuation. For although *Ridley*, in his Letter to *Hooper*, out of his great Modeſty and Humility, ſeems to take the blame upon himſelf, by attributing the greater *Wiſdom* to *Hooper* in that difference; yet he doth not retract his Opinion, but only declares the hearty love that he bore to him, for his conſtancy in the Truth. Neither do we find that ever *Hooper*, repented of his Submiſſion, to which he was ſo earneſtly perſuaded, both by *Peter Martyr*, and *Martin Bucer*; and *Peter Martyr* in his *Letter* to *Bucer* condemns his *frowardneſs*, and ſaith, *That this cauſe was by no means approved by the wiſer and better ſort of Men.* But *Ames* ſaith, Mr. Bradford *might have been added*, *who calleth forked Caps and Tippets*, *Antichriſtian Pelf and Baggage.* Suppoſe this were true, it proves no more than that a good Man had an unreaſonable Scruple, and ſuch as is thought ſo by our Brethren themſelves at this day. But did he ever divide the Church on ſuch an account as this? Did he ſet up *ſeparate Congregations*, becauſe *a ſquare Cap and a Tippet* would not go down with him? No, he was a far better Man than to do ſo. But if the whole words had been ſet down, the ſeeming force of theſe words had been taken away, for they are theſe; *The cognizance of the Lord ſtandeth not in forked Caps*, *Tippets*, *ſhaven Crowns*, *or ſuch other Baggage and Antichriſtian pelf*, *but in ſuffering for the Lord's ſake*; *i. e.* it is more a Mark of God's Service to ſuffer Martyrdom as a *Prote*[illegible]*nt*, than to be at eaſe as a *Romiſh Prieſt*, for he puts them althogether, *Caps*, *Tippets*, *and ſhaven Crowns*. And what is this to the *Impoſitions* of our *Church*, or *Separation* on the account of them? Dr. *Ames* knew too much, to pretend to any think like that in thoſe Times; for there was no ſuch thing as *Separation* from our *Church* then heard of, on the account of theſe *dividing Impoſitions*. Some furious *Anabaptiſts* it may be, or *ſecret Papiſts* then had *ſeparate Meetings*, of which *Ridley* bids *enquiry* to be made in his *Articles of Viſitation*; but no *Proteſtants*, none that joined in the *Articles of our Faith, and Subſtantials of Religion with our Church*, as Dr. O. ſpeaks, did then apprehend *any neceſſity of Separation* from it; *not for the*

Pet. Martyr, *Epiſt. Theolog. Hoopero*, *Bucer. Script. Anglic.* p. 708.

Acts and *Mon.* Vol. 3. p. 319.

Ridley's Articles of Viſitation, 1550.

Vindicat of *Nonconf.* p. 13.

the ſake of the aerial Sign of the Croſs; *nor kneeling at the Communion*; *nor the religious obſervation of Holy-days*; *nor the conſtant uſe of the Liturgy*; nor any one of all the particulars mentioned by Dr. O. *which*, he ſaith, *makes our Communion unlawful, and ſeparation from it to be neceſſary.* How come theſe Terms to be ſo unlawful now, which were then approved by ſuch holy, learned, and excellent Men as our firſt *Reformers?* Were they not arrived *to that meaſure of Attainments*, or *Comprehenſion of the Truths of the Goſpel*, that Men in our Age are come to? Is it credible, that Men of ſo great integrity, ſuch indefatigable induſtry, ſuch profound judgment, as *Cranmer* and *Ridley*, who were the *Heads* of the *Reformation*, ſhould diſcern no ſuch *ſinfulneſs* in theſe things, which now every diſſenting Artificer can cry out upon as *unlawful?* Is it poſſible, that Men that ſifted every thing with ſo much care themſelves, and made uſe of the beſt help from others, and begg'd the Divine Aſſiſtance, ſhould ſo fatally miſcarry in a matter of ſuch mighty importance to the Souls of Men? Could not *Latimer*, or *Bradford*, or ſuch holy and mortified Men as they, diſcern ſo much as a *Mote* of *unlawfulneſs* in thoſe Times, which others eſpy ſuch *Beams* in now? What makes this wonderful difference of eye-ſight? Were they under a cloudy, and dark, and *Jewiſh* Diſpenſation; and all the clear Goſpel Light of *Diviſion* and *Separation* reſerved for our Times? Did they want warmth and zeal for Religion, who burnt at the Stake for it? Doth God reveal his Will to the meek, the humble, the inquiſitive, the reſolute Minds? And would he conceal ſuch weighty things from thoſe who were ſo deſirous to find the Truth, and ſo reſolved to adhere to it? If *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy*, and the *Conſtitution of our Church* were ſuch an *unlawful thing*, as ſome now make it, it is ſtrange ſuch Men ſhould have no ſuſpicion of it, no not when they went to ſuffer? For as *H. Jacob*, the old *Nonconformiſt*, ſaith, in anſwer to *Johnſon* the *Separatiſt*, *Did not* M. Cranmer, *hold himſelf for Arch-Biſhop ſtill, and that he was by the Pope unjuſtly and unſufficiently depoſed, and by Queen* Mary *forcibly reſtrained from it? Did he ever repent of holding that Office to his death? Alſo did not* Ridley *ſtand upon his Right to the Biſhoprick of* London, *though ready to die?* Latimer, *though he renounced his Biſhoprick, yet he kept his Miniſtry, and never repented him of it.* Philpot *never diſliked his Archdeaconry; yea, when he refuſed bloody* Bonner, *yet he appealed to his Ordinary, the Biſhop of* Wincheſter. *The like mind is to be ſeen in Biſhop* Farrar. *And generally, whoſoever were Miniſters then of the Prelats Ordination, they never renounced it, though they died Martyrs. Johnſon* indeed quotes ſome Paſſages of *Bradford*, *Hooper* and *Bale* againſt the *Hierarchy*; but he notoriouſly miſapplies the words of *Bradford*, which are, *The time was, when the Pope was out of* England, *but not all Popery*; which he would have underſtood of the Times of *Reformation*, under *Edward* VI. whereas he ſpeaks them *expreſly* of *King Henry*'s *days*. And it is not credible, *Hooper* ſhould think the *Hierarchy* unlawful, who (as it is generally believed) had the adminiſtration of two Biſhopricks at once. *Bale*'s words were ſpoken in *Henry* VIII. his time, and could not be meant of a Proteſtant Hierarchy, for he was after a *Biſhop* himſelf. But *H. Jacob* anſwers to them all, *That ſuppoſing theſe Men diſliked the Hierarchy, it made the ſtronger againſt the Principles of Separation: Seeing for all that, they did not refuſe to communicate and partake with them then as true Chriſtians.* And that not only *occaſionally*,

P. 35, 37.

Jacob's Anſwer to *Johnſon*, p. 20, 21.

Johnſon's Defence of his ninth Reaſon.

Bradford's Confer. with the BB. *Acts* and *Mon.* Vol. 3. p. 298.

Jacob's Anſwer, p. 82.

and at *certain ſeaſons*, but they maintained *conſtant* and *fixed Communion* with our *Church*, as the Members of it.

Sect. 3. Thus matters ſtood as to *communion* with our *Church* in the days of *Edward* VI. but as ſoon as the Perſecution began in Queen *Mary*'s time, great numbers were forced to betake themſelves to foreign parts, whereof ſome went to *Zurick*, others to *Baſil*, others to *Straſburg*, and others to *Frankford*. *Grindal*, in a Letter to *B. Ridley*, ſaith, *they were nigh an hundred Students and Miniſters then in exile:* Theſe, with the People in all other Places, *Geneva* excepted, kept to the *Orders* eſtabliſhed in our *Church*; but at *Frankford* ſome began to be very buſie in *reforming* our *Liturgy*, leaving out many things, and adding others, which occaſioned the following *Troubles of Frankford*. The true ground whereof is commonly much miſ-repreſented. Mr. *Baxter* ſaith, *The difference was between thoſe which ſtrove for the* Engliſh *Liturgy, and others that were for a free way of praying*, i. e. as he explains it, *from the preſent ſenſe and habit of the Speaker*; but that this is a great miſtake, will appear from the account publiſhed of them, *A. D.* 1575. by one that was a Friend to the Diſſenting Party. From which it appears, that no ſooner were the *Engliſh* arriv'd at *Frankford*, but the Miniſter of the *French Congregation* there, came to them, and told them, he had obtained from the Magiſtrates the freedom of a Church for thoſe who came out of *England*, but eſpecially for the *French*; they thanked him and the *Magiſtrates* for ſo much kindneſs, but withal let them underſtand this would be little benefit to the *Engliſh*, unleſs they might have the liberty of performing all the Offices of Religion in their own Tongue. Upon an Addreſs made to the Senate, this requeſt was granted them; and they were to make uſe of the *French Church* at different times, as the *French* and they could agree, but with this expreſs *Proviſo, that they ſhould not diſſent from the French in Doctrine, or Ceremonies, leſt they ſhould thereby miniſter occaſion of offence.* But afterwards, it ſeems, the Magiſtrates did not require them to be ſtrictly tied up *to the French Ceremonies, ſo they did mutually agree.* Upon this, they peruſed the *Engliſh Order*, and endeavour'd to bring it as near as they could to the *French Model*, by leaving out the *Reſponſes*, the *Litany*, *Surplice*, and many other things, and adding a larger *Confeſſion*, *more ſuitable to the State and Time*; after which a *Pſalm* was ſung; then the *Miniſter*, after a ſhort Prayer for Divine Aſſiſtance, (according to *Calvin*'s *Cuſtom*) was to proceed to the *Sermon*, which being ended, then followed a *general Prayer for all Eſtates*, particularly for *England*, ending with the *Lord's Prayer*; and ſo repeating the *Articles of the Creed*, and another *Pſalm* ſung, the People were diſmiſſed with the Bleſſing. By which we ſee, here was not the leaſt controverſie, *whether a Liturgy or not*; but whether the *Order of Service* was not to be accommodated, as much as might be, to the *French Model.* However, when they ſent to the *Engliſh* in other Places to reſort thither, by reaſon of the great Conveniencies they enjoy'd, and acquainted them with what they had done; it gave great offence to them, which they expreſſed in their Letters. Thoſe of *Zurick* ſent them word, *They determined to uſe no other Order, than that which was laſt eſtabliſhed in* England; and in another Letter, *They deſire to be aſſured from them, that if they removed thither, they ſhould all join in the ſame Order of Service concerning Religion, which was in* England, *laſt ſet forth by King* Edward. To this the *Congregation* of

Letters of the Martyrs, *p.* 50.

Plea for Peace, *p.* 120.

Frankford returned anſwer, *That they could not, in all points, warrant the full uſe of the Book of Service, which they impute to their preſent Circumſtances, in which they ſuppoſe ſuch Alterations would be allowed; but they intended not hereby to deface the worthy Laws and Ordinances of King* Edward. Theſe learned Men of *Straſburg*, underſtanding their reſolutions, ſend *Grindal* to them, with a *Letter* ſubſcribed by Sixteen, wherein they intreat them, *To reduce the Engliſh Church there, as much as poſſible, to the Order lately ſet forth in* England, *leſt*, ſay they, *by much altering of the ſame, they ſhould ſeem to condemn the chief Authors thereof, who, as they now ſuffer, ſo are they moſt ready to confirm that fact with the price of their Bloods; and ſhould alſo both give occaſion to our Adverſaries to accuſe our Doctrine of imperfection, and us of mutability; and the godly to doubt of that truth wherein before they were perſuaded, and to hinder their coming thither, which before they had purpoſed.* And to obtain their deſire, they tell them, *They had ſent Perſons for that end, to negotiate this Affair with the Magiſtrates, and, in caſe they obtained their Requeſt, they promiſed to come and join with them; and they did not queſtion the Engliſh in other Places would do the ſame.* Notwithſtanding the weight of theſe Reaſons, and the deſireableneſs of their Brethrens company in that time of exile, they perſiſt in their former Reſolutions, not to have the *entire Engliſh Liturgy*; for by this time *Knox* was come from *Geneva*, being choſen *Miniſter of the Congregation:* However, they returned this anſwer to *Straſburg*, *That they made* Page 19. *as little alteration as was poſſible; for, certain Ceremonies the Country would not bear; and they did not diſſent from thoſe which lie at the ranſom of their Bloods for the Doctrine, whereof they have made a moſt worthy Confeſſion.* About this time, ſome ſuggeſted, that they ſhould take Page 21. the *Order* of *Geneva*, *as fartheſt from ſuperſtition*; but *Knox* declined this, till they had adviſed with the learned Men at *Straſburg*, *Zurick*, *Emden*, &c. knowing, that the *Odium* of it would be thrown upon him. But finding their Zeal and Concernment for the *Engliſh Liturgy*, he, with *Whittingham*, and ſome others, drew up an *Abſtract* of it, and ſent it to *Calvin*, deſiring his Judgment of it. Who, upon peruſal of it, Calvin, Ep. being throughly heated in a Cauſe that ſo nearly concerned him, writes 164. a very ſharp Letter, directed to the *Brethren at Frankford*; gently rebuking them for their *unſeaſonable Contentions about theſe matters*, but ſeverely reproving the *Engliſh Divines*, who ſtood up for the *Engliſh Liturgy*, when the *Model* of *Geneva* ſtood in competition with it. And yet, after all his Cenſures of it, he confeſſes, the things he thought *moſt unfit*, were *tolerable*; but he blames them, *if they did not chuſe a better, when they might chuſe*; but he gives not the leaſt encouragement to *Separation* if it were continued; and he declares for his own part, *how eaſie he was to yield in all indifferent things, ſuch as external Rites are.* And he was ſo far, in his Judgment, from being for *free Prayer*, or making *the conſtant uſe of a Liturgy a ground of Separation*, as Dr. *O.* doth, that when he delivered his Opinion, with the greateſt freedom, to the then *Protector*, about the beſt method of *Reformation*, he declares, *That* Ep. 55. *he did mightily approve a certain Form, from which Men ought not to vary, both to prevent the inconveniencies which ſome Mens folly would betray them to,* in the free way of praying; *and to manifeſt the general conſent of the Churches in their Prayers; and to ſtop the vain affectation of ſome, who love to be ſhewing ſome new things.* Let Mr. *Br.* now judge, whether it were likely that the *Controverſie* then at *Frankford*, was, as he ſaith,

ſaith, between them that were for the *Engliſh Liturgy*, and others that were for a *free way of praying*; when *Calvin*, to whom the *Diſſenters* appealed, was ſo much, in his Judgment, againſt the latter. And it appears, by *Calvin*'s Letter to *Cox*, *and his Brethren*, that the State of the Caſe at *Frankford* had not been truly repreſented to him; which made him write with greater ſharpneſs than otherwiſe he would have done; and he expreſſes his ſatisfaction, that the matter was ſo compoſed among them, when by Dr. *Cox* his means, the *Engliſh-Liturgy* was brought into uſe at *Frankford*. And to excuſe himſelf for his liberal Cenſures before, he mentions *Lights*, as required by the Book, which were not in the ſecond *Liturgy* of *Edward* the Sixth. So that either they deceived him, who ſent him the *Abſtract*; or he was put to this miſerable ſhift to defend himſelf; the matter being ended contrary to his expectation. For, although upon the receipt of *Calvin*'s Letter, the *Order* of *Geneva* had like to have been preſently voted in, yet there being ſtill ſome faſt Friends to the *Engliſh-Service*, they were fain to compromiſe the matter, and to make uſe of a mixt Form for the preſent. But, Dr. *Cox*, and others, coming thither from *England*, and miſliking theſe Alterations, declared, That they were for having *the face of an Engliſh Church* there; and ſo they began the *Litany* next *Sunday*; which put *Knox* into ſo great a rage, that inſtead of purſuing his *Text*, (which was directly contrary) he made it his buſineſs, *to lay open the nakedneſs of our Church*, as far as his Wit and Ill-Will would carry him. He charged the *Service-Book* with *Superſtition*, *Impurity*, and *Imperfection*; and the *Governors of our Church with ſlackneſs in Reformation*, *want of Diſcipline*, with the buſineſs of *Hooper*, allowing *Pluralities*; all the ill things he could think on. When *Cox* and his *Party*, (with whom, at this time, was our excellent *Jewel*) were admitted among them, they preſently forbad *Knox* having any thing farther to do in that Congregation; who being complained of ſoon after for *Treaſon* againſt the *Emperor*, in a Book by him publiſhed, he was forced to leave the City, and to retire to *Geneva*, whither moſt of his Party followed him. And thus ſaith *Grindal*, in his Letter to Biſhop *Ridley*, *The Church at* Frankford *was well quieted by the Prudence of Mr.* Cox, *and others, which met there for that purpoſe.*

Ep. 165.

Tr. of Fr. p. 30.

Page 31.

Sect. 4. It is obſerved by the *Author* of the *Life of Biſhop* Jewel, (before his Works) *that this Controverſie was not carried with them out of* England, *but they received new impreſſions from the places whither they went.* For as thoſe who were Exiles in *Henry* the Eighth's time, (as particularly *Hooper*, who lived many years in *Switzerland*) brought home with them a greater liking of the Church's Model, where they had lived, (which being ſuch as their Country would bear, they ſuppoſed to be nearer *Apoſtolical Simplicity*, being far enough from any thing of *Pomp*, or *Ceremony*) which created in them an averſion to the *Ornaments* and *Veſtments* here uſed: So now, upon this new Perſecution, thoſe who had friendſhip at *Geneva*, as *Knox* and *Whittingham*, or were otherwiſe much obliged by thoſe of that way, as the other *Engliſh* were, who came firſt to *Frankford*, were ſoon poſſeſſed with a greater liking of their Model of *Divine Service*, than of our own. And when Men are once engaged in Parties, and ſeveral Intereſts, it is a very hard matter to remove the Prejudices which they have taken in, eſpecially when they have great Abettors, and ſuch, whoſe Authority goes beyond any Reaſon with them. This is the true Foundation of thoſe unhappy Dif-

Letters of the Martyrs, p. 60.

ferences which have ſo long continued among us, about the *Orders* and *Ceremonies* of our Church. For when *Calvin* and ſome others found, that their Counſel was not like to be followed in our *Reformation*, our *Biſhops* proceeding more out of reverence to the *ancient Church*, than *mere oppoſition to Popery*, (which ſome other Reformers made their Rules) they did not ceaſe, by Letters, and other ways, to inſinuate, that our *Reformation* was imperfect, as long as any of the *Dregs of Popery* remained. So they called the *uſe* of thoſe *Ceremonies*, which they could not deny to have been far more *ancient* than the great *Apoſtaſie* of the *Roman Church*. *Calvin*, in his Letter to the *Protector*, avows this to be the beſt Rule of *Reformation*, *To go as far from Popery as they could*; and therefore *what Habits and Ceremonies had been abuſed in the time of Popery were to be removed, leſt others were hardned in their Superſtition thereby*: but at laſt he yields to this *moderation* in the caſe, *That ſuch Ceremonies might be retained as were eaſie, and fitted to the Capacities of the People, provided they were not ſuch, as had their beginning from the Devil, or Antichriſt*, i. e. were not firſt begun in the time of *Popery*. Now by this *Rule* of *Moderation* our *Church* did proceed; for it took away all thoſe *Ceremonies* which were of late invention. As in *Baptiſm*, of all the multitude of *Rites* in the *Roman Church*, it reſerved, in the *Second Liturgy*, only *the Croſs after Baptiſm*, which was not ſo uſed in the *Roman Church*, for there the *Sign of the Croſs* is uſed in the *Scrutinies* before *Baptiſm*; and the *anointing* with the *Chryſm in vertice* after it; inſtead of theſe, our *Church* made choice of *the Sign of the Croſs after Baptiſm* being of uncontrolable Antiquity, and not uſed till the *Child* is *baptized*. In the *Euchariſt*, inſtead of fifteen Ceremonies required in the *Church* of *Rome*, our Church hath only appointed *Kneeling*. I ſay *appointed*, for although Kneeling at the *elevation* of the *Hoſt*, be ſtrictly required by the *Roman Church*, yet in the *Act* of *receiving* it is not; (as manifeſtly appears by the *Pope*'s manner of receiving, which is not *Kneeling*, but either *Sitting*, as it was in *Bonaventure*'s time; or *after the faſhion of Sitting*, or a *little leaning upon his Throne*, as he doth at this day) therefore our *Church* taking away the *adoration* at the *elevation*, leſt it ſhould ſeem to recede from the practice of *Antiquity*, which received the *Euchariſt* in the *poſture* of *adoration* then uſed, hath appointed *Kneeling* to be obſerved of all *Communicants*. Inſtead of the great number of *conſecrated Veſtments* in the *Roman Church*, it only retained a *plain linen Garment*, which was unqueſtionably uſed in the Times of St. *Hierome*, and St. *Auguſtin*. And laſtly, As to the *Epiſcopal Habits*, they are retained only as a Mark of diſtinction of a certain *Order* of Men; the colour of the *Chimere* being changed from *ſcarlet* to *black*. Theſe are now the *Ceremonies*, about which all the noiſe and ſtir hath been made in our Church; and any ſober, conſidering Man, free from paſſion and prejudice, would ſtand amazed at the clamour and diſturbance which hath been made in this *Church*, and is at this Day, about the intolerable *Miſchief* of theſe *Impoſitions*.

Bonavent. *in Pſ.* 21.

Angel. Roccha de Solemni Communione Summi Pontificis, p. 33, 38.

Sect. 5. But the moſt material Queſtion they ever aſk, is, *Why were theſe few retained by our Reformers, which were then diſtaſtful to ſome Proteſtants, and were like to prove the occaſion of future Contentions?*

I will here give a juſt and true account of the Reaſons which induced our *Reformers* either to retain or to appoint theſe *Ceremonies*, and then proceed.

I. One

I. *Out of a due reverence to antiquity.* They would hereby convince the *Papiſts* they did put a difference between the groſs and intolerable *Superſtitions* of *Popery*, and the innocent *Rites* and *Practices* which were obſerved in the *Church* before. And what could more harden the *Papiſts*, than to ſee Men put no difference between theſe? It is an unſpeakable advantage which thoſe do give to the *Papiſts*, who are for reforming 1600 years backward, and when they are pinch'd with a *Teſtimony* of *Antiquity*, preſently cry out of the *Myſtery of Iniquity working in the Apoſtles times*; as though every thing which they diſliked, were a part of it. Next to *the taking up Arms for Religion*, which made Men look on it as a *Faction* and *Deſign*, there was ſcarce any thing gave ſo great a check to the *Progreſs* of the *Reformation* in *France*, eſpecially among learned and moderate Men, as the putting no difference between the *Corruptions* of *Popery*, and the innocent *Cuſtoms* of the *ancient Church*. For the time was when many great Men there, were very inclinable to a *Reformation*; but when they ſaw the *Reformers* oppoſe the undoubted Practices of *Antiquity*, equally with the *modern Corruptions*, they caſt them off, as Men guilty of an unreaſonable humour of *Innovation*; as may be ſeen in *Thuanus*, and *Fran. Baldwin*'s *Eccleſiaſtical Commentaries*, and his Anſwers to *Calvin* and *Beza*. But our Reformers, altho' they made the *Scripture* the only *Rule of Faith*, and rejected all things *repugnant* thereto, yet they deſigned not to make a *Transformation* of a *Church*, but a *Reformation* of it; by reducing it as near as they could, to that ſtate it was in, under the firſt *Chriſtian Emperors*, that were ſound in Religion; and therefore they retained theſe few *Ceremonies*, as *Badges* of the reſpect they bore to the *ancient Church*.

II. *To manifeſt the Juſtice and Equity of the Reformation*, by letting their Enemies ſee, they did not break *Communion* with them for *mere indifferent things*. For ſome of the *popiſh Biſhops* of that time were ſubtle and learned Men, as *Gardiner*, *Heath*, *Tonſtall*, &c. and nothing would have rejoiced them more, than to have ſeen our *Reformers* boggle at ſuch *Ceremonies* as theſe; and they would have made mighty advantage of it among the People. Of which we have a clear inſtance in the caſe of *Biſhop Hooper*'s ſcrupling the *Epiſcopal Veſtments*. *Peter Martyr*, tells him plainly, *That ſuch needleſs ſcrupuloſity would be a great hindrance to the Reformation.* For, ſaith he, *ſince the People are with difficulty enough brought to things neceſſary, if we once declare things indifferent to be unlawful, they will have no patience to hear us any longer. And withal, hereby we condemn other reformed Churches, and thoſe ancient Churches, which have hitherto been in great eſteem.*

III. *To ſhew their conſent with other Proteſtant Churches*, which did allow and practice the ſame, or more Ceremonies, as the *Lutheran Churches* generally did. And even *Calvin* himſelf, in his *Epiſtle* to *Sadolet*, declared, *That he was for reſtoring the face of the ancient Church*; and in his *Book of the true way of Reformation*, he ſaith, *He would not contend about Ceremonies, not only thoſe which are for decency, but thoſe that are ſymbolical.* *Œcolampadius* looked *on the geſture at the Sacrament as indifferent.* *Bucer* thought *the uſe of the Sign of the Croſs after Baptiſm neither indecent nor unprofitable.* Since therefore, ſo great a number of *Proteſtant Churches* uſed the ſame Ceremonies; and the chief *Leaders* of other *reformed Churches* thought them *not unlawful*, our firſt *Reformers* for this, and the foregoing *Reaſons*, thought it fit to *retain* them, as long as they were ſo few, ſo eaſie both to be practiſed and underſtood.

Calvin. *Ep. ad Sadolet. De verâ Eccleſ. Reformat.* c. 16. Oecolamp. *Ep.* f. 177. Bucer. *Script. Ang.* p. 479.

Sect. 6. But the impreſſions which had been made on ſome of our *Divines* abroad, did not wear off at their return home, in the beginning of Queen *Elizabeth*'s Reign. For they retained a ſecret diſlike of many things in our *Church*; but the *Act* of *Uniformity* being paſſed, and the *uſe* of the *Liturgy* ſtrictly enjoined; I do not find any *Separation* made then on the account of it; no, not by *the diſſenting Brethren*, that withdrew from *Frankford* to *Geneva*. *Knox* was forbidden to preach here, becauſe of ſome perſonal Reflections on the *Queen*; but *Whittingham*, *Sampſon*, *Gilby*, and others accepted of Preferment and Employment in the Church. The Biſhops, at firſt, ſhewed kindneſs to them, on the account of their forward and zealous *preaching*, which, at that time was very needful, and therefore many of them were placed in *London*. Where, having gained the People by their zeal and diligence in preaching, they took occaſion to let fall at firſt their *diſlike* of the *Ceremonies*, and a deſire of a farther *Reformation* of our *Liturgy*; but finding that they had gained ground, they never ceaſed, till by inveighing againſt *the Livery of Antichriſt*, as they called *the Veſtments and Ceremonies*, they had inflamed the People to that degree, that *Gilby* himſelf inſinuates, *That if they had been let alone a little longer, they would have ſhaken the Conſtitution of this Church.* This was the firſt *occaſion* of preſſing *Uniformity* with any rigor, and therefore ſome examples were thought fit to be made for the warning of others. But as kindneſs made them preſumptuous, ſo this ſeverity made them clamorous, and they ſent bitter complaints to *Geneva*. *Beza*, after much importunity, undertook to give an anſwer to them; which being of great conſequence to our preſent buſineſs, I ſhall here give a fuller account of it. We are then to underſtand, that about this time, the *diſſenting Party* being exaſperated, by the *ſilencing* ſome of their moſt buſie *Preachers*, began to have *ſeparate Meetings:* This *Beza* takes notice of in his *Epiſtle* to *Grindal*, Biſhop of *London*; and it appears, by an *Examination* taken before him, 20th of *June*, 1567, of certain Perſons, *who were accuſed not only for abſenting themſelves from their Pariſh-Churches, but for gathering together, and making Aſſemblies, uſing Prayers and Preachings, and miniſtring Sacraments among themſelves, and hiring a Hall in* London, *under pretence of a Wedding, for that purpoſe.*

Dialogue between a Soldier of Barwick, *and an Engliſh Chaplain.* p. 5,6.

Beza *Epiſt.* 13.

Part of a Regiſter, p. 23.

The *Biſhop* of *London* firſt rebuked them for their *lying Pretences*, and then told them, *That in this ſevering themſelves from the Society of other Chriſtians, they not only condemned them, but alſo the whole ſtate of the Church reformed in King* Edward*'s days, which was well reformed according to the word of God; yea, and many good Men have ſhed their blood for the ſame, which your doings condemn. Have ye not*, ſaith he, *the Goſpel truly preached, and the Sacraments miniſtred accordingly, and good order kept, although we differ from other Churches in Ceremonies, and in indifferent things, which lie in the Prince's power to command for order ſake?* To which one of them anſwered, *That as long as they might have the Word freely preached, and the Sacraments adminiſtred, without the preferring of idolatrous Gear about it, they never aſſembled together in Houſes: but their Preachers being diſplaced by Law for their Nonconformity, they be-thought themſelves what was beſt for them to do; and calling to mind, there was a Congregation there in the days of Queen* Mary, *which followed the Order of* Geneva, *they took up that, and this Book and Order*, ſaith he, *we hold.* Another anſwered, *That they did not refuſe Communion for preaching the Word, but becauſe they had tied* *the Ceremonies of Antichriſt to it, and ſet them up before it, ſo that no Man may preach, or miniſter the Sacraments without them.* Things being come to this height, and *Separation* beginning to break out, the wiſer Brethren thought not fit to proceed any farther, till they had conſulted their *Oracle* at *Geneva*. *Beza* being often ſolicited by them, *with doleful Complaints of their hard uſage, and the different Opinions among themſelves, what they were to do,* at laſt reſolves to anſwer, but firſt he declares, *How unwilling he was to interpoſe in the Differences of another Church, eſpecially when but one Party was heard; and he was afraid, this was only the way to exaſperate and provoke more, rather than cure this evil, which he thought was not otherwiſe to be cured,* but *Precibus & Patientiâ, by Prayers and Patience.* After this general Advice, *Beza* freely declares his own Judgment, as to the *Reformation* of ſeveral things he thought amiſs in our *Church*; but as to the caſe of the *ſilenced Preachers,* and the *Peoples Separation,* he expreſſes his mind in that manner, that the *Diſſenters* at this day, would have publiſhed their Invectives againſt him, one upon the back of another. For, (1.) *As to the ſilenced Miniſters,* he ſaith, *That if the preſſing Subſcription continued, he perſuades them rather to live privately, than to yield to it. For, they muſt either act againſt their Conſciences, or they muſt quit their Employments*; *for,* ſaith he, *the third thing that may be ſuppoſed,* viz. *That they ſhould exerciſe their Function againſt the Will of the Queen and the Biſhops, we tremble at the thoughts of it, for ſuch reaſons, as may be eaſily underſtood, though we ſay never a word of them.* What! is *Beza* for *ſilencing,* and ſtopping the Mouths of ſuch a number of faithful and able Miniſters, and at ſuch a time, when the *Church* was in ſo great *neceſſity* of preaching, and ſo many *Souls* like to be *famiſhed* for the want of it? when St. *Antholins,* St. *Peters,* St. *Bartholomews,* at which *Gilby* ſaith their great *preaching* then was, were like to be left deſtitute of ſuch Men? Would *Beza,* even *Beza,* at ſuch a time as that, be for *ſilencing* ſo many *Preachers,* i. e. for their *ſitting quiet,* when the Law had done it: And would not he ſuffer them to preach, when they ought to have done it, though againſt the Will of the *Queen* and the *Biſhops*? It appears, that *Beza* was not of the mind of our *Adverſaries*; but that he was of the contrary, it appears plainly by this, That before he perſuades the *Diſſenting Miniſters rather to live privately, than to ſubſcribe*; and that he expreſſes no ſuch terrible apprehenſions at their *quitting their Places,* as he doth at *their preaching in oppoſition to the Laws.* (2.) As to the caſe of the *People,* his Advice was, *As long as the Doctrine was ſound, that they ſhould diligently attend upon it, and receive the Sacraments devoutly, and to join amendment of Life with their Prayers, that by thoſe means they might obtain a through Reformation.* So that nothing can be more expreſs againſt *Separation,* than what is here ſaid by *Beza,* for, even as to the *Miniſters,* he ſaith, *Though he did not approve the Ceremonies, yet ſince they are not of the nature of things evil in themſelves, he doth not think them of that moment, that they ſhould leave their Functions for the ſake of them, or that the People ſhould forſake the Ordinances, rather than hear thoſe who did conform.* Than which words, nothing can be plainer againſt *Separation.* And it farther appears, by *Beza*'s reſolution of a caſe concerning a *Schiſm* in the *French Church,* then in *London, That he looked on it as a Sin, for any one to ſeparate from a Church wherein ſound Doctrine, and a holy Life, and the right uſe of the Sacraments is kept up. And, by Separation,* he ſaith, he means, *not merely*

Beza *Epiſt.* 24. p. 148.

going from one Church to another, but the diſcontinuing Communion with the publick Aſſemblies, as though one were no Member of them.

Beza's Authority being ſo great with the *Diſſenting Brethren* at that time, ſeems to have put an effectual *Stop* to the *Courſe* of *Separation*, which they were many of them, then inclined to. But, he was not alone among the Foreign *Divines*, who, about that time, expreſſed themſelves againſt *Separation* from the *Communion* of our *Church*, notwithſtanding the *Rites* and *Ceremonies* herein uſed. For *Gualter*, a Divine of good Reputation in the *Helvetian Churches*, takes an occaſion in an *Epiſtle* to ſeveral of our *Biſhops*, to talk of the Difference then about theſe things; and he extremely blames *the moroſe humor of thoſe, who diſturbed the Church for the ſake of ſuch things, and gave an occaſion thereby to endleſs Separations.* And in an *Epiſtle* to Cox *Biſhop of* Ely, 1572, he tells him, *How much they had diſſuaded them from making ſuch a ſtir in the Church, about Matters of no moment: and he complains grievouſly of the Lies and Prejudices againſt our Church, which they had ſent Men on purpoſe to poſſeſs them with, both at* Geneva *and other places.*

Gualter. *Ep. ded. ad Hom. in* 1 *Ep. ad Corinth.*

Zanchy, upon great Sollicitation, wrote an earneſt Letter to the *Queen to remove the Ceremonies*; but withal he ſent another to *Biſhop Jewel*, to perſuade the *Nonconformiſts, if the Queen could not be moved, not to leave their Churches on ſuch accounts, which, for his part, he did not underſtand how any could lawfully do; as long as they had otherwiſe liberty to preach the Goſpel, and adminiſter the Sacraments, although they were forced to do ſomething therein, which did not pleaſe them; as long as the things were of that kind, which in themſelves were neither good nor evil.* And the ſame Reaſon will much more hold againſt the *Peoples Separation.*

Zanchii, *Epiſt.* l. 2. p. 391.

Sect. 7. But about this time, *the diſſenting Party* much increaſing, and moſt of the old and peaceable *Non-conformiſts* being dead or unfit for buſineſs; the management of their affairs fell into the hands of younger and fiercer Men. Who thought their Predeceſſors too cold in theſe matters; inſomuch, that honeſt *John Fox* complained of the *factious and turbulent Spirit which had then poſſeſſed that Party*, although himſelf a moderate Non-conformiſt; and he ſaith, *They deſpiſed him, becauſe he could not rail againſt Biſhops, and Archbiſhops as they did; but if he could be as mad as they, they would be kinder to him. And therefore he ſoberly adviſeth the Governors of the Church to look well after this ſort of Men*; for, ſaith he, *if they prevail, it is not to be imagin'd, what Miſchief and Diſturbance they will bring; whoſe Hypocriſie is more ſubtle and pernicious than that of the old Monks; for under a Pretence of greater Purity, they will never give over, till they have brought Men under a Jewiſh Slavery.* Theſe new Men, full of bitter zeal, deſpiſed the old trifling Controverſie about *Garments* and *Ceremonies*; they complained, *That all was out of order in the Church*, and nothing but a *new* and *thorough Reformation* would pleaſe them. For, in the *Admonition* preſented to the *Parliament*, 14 *Eliz.* they complain for want of *a right Miniſtry, a right Government in the Church according to the Scriptures, without which* (they ſay) *there could be no right Religion. The Liturgy* they deride, *as culled and picked out of the Popiſh Dunghil, the Portuſe and Maſs-Book; the Government of the Church by Arch-Biſhops and Biſhops they call Deviliſh and Antichriſtian; and condemn the Vocation of the Clergy, as Popiſh and Unlawful*; and add, *That the Sacraments are mangled, and profaned, that Baptiſm is full of childiſh and ſuperſtitious Toys.* All which, and many

See his Letter in Fuller's Church-*Hiſtory*, l. 9. p. 106.

ny more expreſſions of a like Nature, are extant in the *Firſt and Second Admonitions.* Which bold and groundleſs aſſertions, being ſo openly avowed to the World, by the *Leaders* of the *Diſſenting Party*, gave the true *Occaſion* to the following practice of *Separation.* For when theſe things were not only publiſhed in the name of the *Party*, being the *Pleas for Peace* at that time, but ſtifly maintained with greater Heat than Learning. It is eaſie to imagine, what *Impreſſions* ſuch things would make on the common ſort of *People*; who have ſtill a good Inclination to find fault with their *Governors*, eſpecially in the *Church*, and to admire thoſe that oppoſe them. And theſe they courted moſt, having their *Opinions* ſo ſuited to *vulgar Capacities*, that they apprehended their *Intereſt* carried on together with that of Purity of *Reformation.* Hence they pleaded then, as others do at this day, for the *Peoples right to chooſe their Biſhops and Paſtors againſt the Uſurpations*, as they accounted them, of *Princes* and *Patrons*; hence they railed againſt the *Pomp and Greatneſs of the Clergy*, which is always a popular Theme; and ſo would the expoſing the inequality of Mens *Eſtates* be, if Men durſt undertake it, with as great hopes of Impunity. Beſides, it was not a little pleaſant to the *People*, to think, what a ſhare they ſhould come to in the new *Seigniory*, as they called it, or *Preſbytery*, to be erected in every *Pariſh*; and what Authority they ſhould exerciſe over their *Neighbours*, and over their *Miniſter* too by their double Votes. By ſuch Arts as theſe, they complied with the natural Humors of the *People*, and ſo gained a mighty Intereſt amongſt them; as the *Anabaptiſts* in *Germany* and *Switzerland* at firſt did, upon the like Grounds. Which made *Bullinger*, in an *Epiſtle* to *Robert Biſhop of Wincheſter*, parallel the Proceedings of this *Party* here, with that of the *Anabaptiſts* with them in thoſe Countries; *For*, ſaith he, *we had a ſort of People here, to whom nothing ſeemed pure enough in our Reformation, from whence they brake out into Separation, and had their Conventicles among us, upon which followed Sects and Schiſms, which made great entertainment to our Common Enemies, the Papiſts.* Juſt thus it happened here, theſe hot *Reformers* deſigned no *Separation* at preſent; which they knew would unavoidably bring confuſion along with it; for that was laying the Reins on the Peoples necks, and they would run whither they pleaſed, without any poſſibility of being well managed by them; but ſince theſe Men would *Refine* upon the preſent *Conſtitution* of our *Church*, there ſoon aroſe another ſort of Men, who thought it as fit to *Refine* upon *them.* They acknowledged they had good *Principles* among them, but they did not *practiſe* according to them: If our *Church* were ſo bad as they ſaid, that there was neither *right Miniſtery*, nor *right Government*, nor *right Sacraments*, nor *right Diſcipline*; What follows, ſay they, from hence, *but that we ought to ſeparate from the Communion of ſo corrupt a Church, and joyn together to make up new Churches for the pure adminiſtration of all Goſpel Ordinances?* The *Leaders* of the *Non-conformiſts* finding this Party growing up under them, were quickly apprehenſive of the danger of them; becauſe the *Conſequence* ſeemed ſo *natural* from their *own Principles*; and the People were ſo ready to believe, that nothing but worldly Conſiderations of *Intereſt* and *Safety* kept them from practiſing according to them. Which was a mighty prejudice againſt them in the Minds of the *Separatiſts*, as appears by *Robinſon's Preface* to his *Book* of *Communion.*

Bullinger, *Ep. ad* Robert Winton. *in the Appendix to Biſhop* Whitgift's *firſt Book.*

Sect. 8, II. The *Separation* being now begun, the *Non-conformiſts* ſet themſelves againſt it, with the greateſt Vehemency. Which is the ſecond thing I am to make out. *As for thoſe of the Separation,* ſaith *Parker* a noted *Non-conformiſt, who have confuted them more than we? or, Who have written more againſt them?* And in a Letter of his, he expreſſeth the greateſt Deteſtation of them. *Now it grieved me not a little, at this time,* ſaith he, *that Satan ſhould be ſo impudent, as to fling the dung of that Sect into my Face, which, with all my Power, I had ſo vehemently reſiſted, during the whole courſe of my Miniſtery in* England: *I think no other, but that many of them love the Lord, and fear his Name; howbeit their Error being Enemy to that Breaſt of Charity, wherewith* Cyprian *covered his,* Qui ab Eccleſiâ nunquam receſſit, *as* Auguſtin *ſpeaketh; they cannot ſtand before his Tribunal, but by the Interceſſion of our bleſſed Saviour. Father forgive them for they know not what they do. Think not theſe words are applied to their Sect amiſs; for, in effect, what doth it leſs than even perſecute the Lord* Jeſus *in his Hoſt, which it revileth; in his Ordinances, which it diſhonoureth; and in his Servants laſt of all, whoſe Graces it blaſphemeth, whoſe Footſteps it ſlandereth, and whoſe Perſons it deſpiſeth.* And two Characters he gives of the Men of that way, viz, *That their Spirits were bitter above meaſure, and their hearts puffed up with the Leaven of Pride.* How far theſe Characters ſtill agree to the *Defenders* of the preſent *Separation,* I leave others to judge. When *Brown* and *Harriſon* openly declared for *Separation, T. C.* himſelf undertook to anſwer them, in a *Letter* to *Harriſon.* His example was ſoon followed by others of his *Brethren,* who wrote the *Admonition to the Followers of* Brown, and the *Defence of that Admonition.* When *Barrow* and *Greenwood* publiſhed their *four Reaſons* for *Separation,* three of which they took out of the *Admonition to the Parliament,* viz. *Unlawful Miniſtry, Antichriſtian Government,* and *falſe Worſhip; Gifford,* a *Non-conformiſt* at *Maldon* in *Eſſex,* undertook to anſwer them in ſeveral Treatiſes. And it is obſervable, that theſe *Non-conformiſts* charge the *Browniſts* with making a *vile, notorious,* and *damnable Schiſm,* becauſe they withdrew from the *Communion* of our *Churches,* and ſet up *new Ones* of their own. *Gifford* not only calls them *Schiſmaticks,* but ſaith, *They make a vile Schiſm, rending themſelves from the Church of* England; *and condemning by their Aſſertions, the whole viſible Church in the World, even as the* Donatiſts *did of old time:* and he adds, *That the end of* Browniſm, *as it was then called, is infinite Schiſms, Hereſies, Atheiſm* and *Barbariſm.* And the ſame Author, in his ſecond *Book,* reckoning up the ill effects of this *Separation* among the *People,* hath theſe remarkable words. *Now look alſo on the People, where we may ſee very many, who not regarding the chief Chriſtian Virtues, and Godly Duties, as namely, to be Meek, to be Patient, to be Lowly, to be full of Love and Mercy, to deal uprightly and juſtly, to guide their Families in the Fear of God, with wholeſome Inſtructions, and to ſtand faſt in the Calling in which God hath ſet them, give themſelves wholly to this, even as if it were the Sum and Pith of Religion, namely, to argue and talk continually againſt Matters in the Church, againſt Biſhops and Miniſters, and one againſt another on both ſides. Some are proceeded to this, that they will come to the Aſſemblies to hear the Sermons and Prayers of the Preacher, but not to the Prayers of the Book, which I take to be a more grievous ſin than many do ſuppoſe. But yet this is not the worſt, for ſundry are gone farther, and fallen into a dammable Schiſm; and the ſame ſo much the more fearful and dangerous, in that many do not*

Parker on *the Croſs, Part.* 2, *cap.* 9. *Sect.* 2.

Vide *Profane Schiſm of the* Browniſts, *Ch.* 12.

Gifford's *firſt Treatiſe againſt the* Donatiſts *of* England, *Preface.*

Gifford's *Second Treatiſe. Preface.*

ſee the foulneſs of it, but rather hold them as Godly Chriſtians, and but a little over-ſhot in theſe matters. But that this Man went upon the Principles of the *Non-conformiſts*, appears, by his ſtating the Queſtion, in the ſame Preface, *For, I ſhewed,* ſaith he, *in expreſs words, that I do not meddle at all in theſe Queſtions, whether there be corruptions and faults in our Church, condemned by God's Word; whether they be many or few; whether they be ſmall or great; but only thus far, whether they be ſuch, or ſo great, as make our Churches Antichriſtian. Barrow* ſaith, *That this* Gifford *was one that joyned with the reſt of the Faction in the Petition to the Parliament againſt the Engliſh Hierarchy:* and it appears by ſeveral paſſages of his *Books* that he was a *Non-conformiſt*; and he is joyned with *Cartwright*, *Hilderſham*, *Brightman*, and other *Nonconformiſts*, by the *Prefacer* to the *Defence* of *Bradſhaw* againſt *Johnſon*: and I find his Name in one of the *Claſſes* in *Eſſex* at that time. The *Author* of the *ſecond Anſwer for Communicating*, who defends *T. C's* Letter to *Harriſon*, *Brown's* Colleague againſt *Separation*, proves *joyning with the Church a Duty neceſſarily enjoyned him of God by his Providence, through his being and placing in a particular Church, and juſtly required of him by the Church, or ſpiritual Body, through that ſame inforcing Law of the coherence, and being together of the parts and members, which is the expreſs Ordinance of God. So that,* ſaith he, *unleſs I hold the Congregation, whereof I am now, diſanulled, and become no Church of Chriſt, for the not ſeparating an unworthy Member, I cannot voluntarily either abſent my ſelf from their Aſſemblies to holy Exerciſes, or yet depart away being come together, without Breach of the Bond of Peace, ſundring the Cement of Love, empairing the growth of the Body of* Chriſt, *and incurring the guilt of Schiſm and Diviſion.* To the ſame purpoſe he ſpeaks elſewhere. *Richard Bernard* calls it, *An uncharitable and lewd Schiſm which they were guilty of.* But I need not mention more particular *Authors*, *ſince in the grave Confutation of the Errors of the Separatiſts, in the Name of the Nonconformiſts*, it is ſaid, *That becauſe we have a true Church, conſiſting of a lawful Miniſtry, and a faithful People, therefore they cannot ſeparate themſelves from us, but they muſt needs incur the moſt ſhameful and odious Reproach of manifeſt Schiſm.* And concerning the *State* of the Perſons who lived in *Separation*, they ſay, *We hold them all to be in a dangerous Eſtate, (we are loth to ſay in a damnable Eſtate) as long as they continue in this Schiſm.*

Anſwer to Gifford's *Preface.*

Dangerous Poſitions, &c. *l.* 3. *c.* 5.

The ſecond Anſwer for Communicating, *p.* 20. *Printed by* John Windet, *A. D.* 1588.

Page 46.

Anſwer to Ainſworth, *p.* 13.

Page 57.

Preface to the Reader, p. 17.

Sect. 9. But, for our farther underſtanding the full *State* of this *Controverſie*, we muſt conſider, what things were agreed on both ſides, and where the main Points of Difference lay.

1. The *Separatiſts* did yield *the Doctrine, or Faith of the Church of* England *true and ſound, and a Poſſibility of Salvation in the Communion of it.* In their *Apology* preſented to *King James*, thus they ſpeak; *We teſtifie by theſe preſents unto all Men, and deſire them to take knowledge hereof, that we have not forſaken any One Point of the true ancient Catholick and Apoſtolick Faith profeſſed in our Land; but hold the ſame Grounds of Chriſtian Religion with them ſtill.* And the Publiſher of the Diſpute about *Separation*, between *Johnſon* and *Jacob*, ſaith, *That the firſt Separatiſts never denied, that the Doctrine and Profeſſion of the Churches of* England, *was ſufficient to make thoſe that believed and obeyed them, to be true Chriſtians, and in the ſtate of Salvation, but always held, profeſſed, and acknowledged the contrary. Barrow* ſaith, *That they commended the Faith of the Engliſh Martyrs, and deemed them ſaved, notwithſtanding the*

falſe

Browniſt's *Apology, p.* 7. *A. D.* 1604.

A Defence of the Churches and Miniſtry of England. Middleburgh, *p.* 3. *A.D.* 1599.

Barrow's *Obſervations on* Gifford's *laſt Reply, n.* 4. *p.* 240.

falſe Offices, and great corruptions in the Worſhip exerciſed: And in the *Letter* to a *Lady* a little before his Death, he ſaith, *he had reverend Eſtimation of ſundry, and good hope of many hundred thouſands in* England; *though he utterly diſliked the preſent Conſtitution of this Church, in the preſent Communion, Miniſtry, Worſhip, Government, and Ordinances Eccleſiaſtical of theſe Cathedral and Pariſhional Aſſemblies.*

Browniſt's *Apol. p.* 92.

2. The *Separatiſts* granted, That *Separation* was not juſtifiable from a *Church, for all Blemiſhes and Corruptions in it.* Thus they expreſs themſelves in their *Apology, Neither count we it lawful for any Member to forſake the Fellowſhip of the Church, for blemiſhes and imperfections, which every one, according to his Calling, ſhould ſtudiouſly ſeek to cure, and to expect and farther it, until either there follow redreſs, or the Diſeaſe be grown incurable,* And in the 36 *Article* of the *Confeſſion* of their *Faith*, written by *Johnſon* and *Ainſworth*, they have theſe words. *None is to ſeparate from a Church rightly gathered and eſtabliſhed, for faults and Corruptions, which may, and ſo long as the Church conſiſteth of mortal Men, will fall out and ariſe among them, even in true conſtituted Churches, but by due order to ſeek the redreſs thereof.* But in the caſe of our Church they pleaded, that the Corruptions were ſo many and great, as to overthrow the very Conſtitution of a Church. So *Barrow* ſaith, *They do not cut off the members of our Church from God's Election, or from Chriſt, but from being Members of a true conſtituted Church.*

Browniſt's *Apol. p.* 7.

Barrow, *ib.*

On the other ſide, the *Non-conformiſts* granted there were many and great Corruptions in our *Church*, but not ſuch as did overthrow the *Conſtitution* of it, or make *Separation* from our *Parochial Aſſemblies* to be neceſſary, or lawful. So that the force of all their Reaſonings againſt *Separation* lay in theſe two *Suppoſitions.*

1. That nothing could juſtifie *Separation* from our Church, but ſuch *Corruptions* which overthrew the *being*, or *conſtitution* of it.
2. That the *Corruptions* in our *Church* were not ſuch, as did overthrow the *Conſtitution* of it.

The making out of theſe two will tend very much to the clear *ſtating* of this preſent Controverſie.

1. *That nothing could juſtifie Separation from our Church, but ſuch Corruptions which overthrow the being or conſtitution of it.* Barrow and his Brethren, did not think they could ſatisfie their Conſciences in *Separation*, unleſs they proved our *Churches* to be *no true Churches.* For, here they aſſign the four Cauſes of their *Separation* to be; *Want of a right gathering our Churches* at *firſt*; *Falſe Worſhip*; *Antichriſtian Miniſtery* and *Government: Theſe Reaſons*, ſay they, *all Men may ſee prove directly theſe Pariſh Aſſemblies not to be the true eſtabliſhed Churches of Chriſt, to which any faithful Chriſtian may joyn himſelf in this eſtate*; *eſpecially, when all Reformation unto the rules of* Chriſt's *Teſtament is not only denied, but reſiſted, blaſphemed, perſecuted.* Theſe are the words of the *firſt*, and *chiefeſt Separatiſts*, who ſuffered death rather than they would foregoe theſe Principles. *We condemn not*, ſay they, *their Aſſemblies, barely for a mixture of good and bad, which will always be, but for want of an orderly gathering, or conſtitution at firſt: we condemn them not for ſome faults in the Calling of the Miniſtry, but for having and retaining a falſe Antichriſtian Miniſtry impoſed upon them: we forſake not their Aſſemblies for ſome faults in their Government, or Diſcipline, but for ſtanding ſubject to a Popiſh and Antichriſtian Government. Neither refrain we their Worſhip for ſome light imperfections, but becauſe their Worſhip is ſuperſtitious,*

Barrow's *Refutation of* Giffard. *Preface to the Reader. Sum of the Cauſes of Separation.*

ſtitious, deviſed by Men idolatrous, according to that patched Popiſh Portuiſe their Service Book; according unto which their Sacraments, and whole Adminiſtration is performed, and not by the Rules of Chriſt's *Teſtament.* So that theſe poor deluded Creatures ſaw very well, that nothing but ſuch a Charge, which overthrew the very being and conſtitution of our Churches (the Doctrine of Faith being allowed to be ſound) could juſtifie their *Separation:* not mere promiſcuous *Congregations*, nor mixt *Communions*; not defect in the *Exerciſe* of *Diſcipline*; not ſome *Corruptions* in the *Miniſtry* or *Worſhip*; but ſuch groſs Corruptions as took away the *Life* and *Being* of a *Church*; as they ſuppoſed *idolatrous Worſhip*, and an *Antichriſtian Miniſtry* to do. *If Mr.* Gifford, *ſaith* Barrow, *can prove the Pariſh Aſſemblies in this eſtate true and eſtabliſhed Churches, then we would ſhew him how free we are from Schiſm.* The ſame four Reaſons are inſiſted on as the *Grounds* of their *Separation* in the *Browniſt's Apology to King James*, by *Ainſworth*, *Johnſon*, and the reſt of them. *Ainſworth* frames his *Argument* for *Separation* thus. *That Church which is not the true Church of* Chriſt *and of God, ought not, by any true Chriſtian, to be continued, or communicated with; but muſt be forſaken, and ſeparated from; and a true Church ſought, and joyned unto,* &c. *But the Church of* England *is before proved, not to be the true Church of* Chriſt, *and of God, therefore it ought to be ſeparated from,* &c. By which we ſee, the greateſt *Separatiſts* that were then, never thought it *lawful* to *ſeparate* from our *Churches*, if they were true. On the other ſide, thoſe who oppoſed the *Separation*, with greateſt zeal, thought nothing more was neceſſary for them, to diſprove the *Separation*, then to prove *our Churches to be true Churches. R. Brown* (from whom the Party received their denomination) thought he had a great advantage againſt *Cartwright* (the *Ringleader* of the *Non-conformiſts*) to prove the *Neceſſity* of *Separation*, becauſe he ſeemed to *make Diſcipline Eſſential to a Church*; and therefore ſince he complained of the *want* of *Diſcipline* here, he made *our Church* not to be a *true Church*, and conſeqnently *that Separation was neceſſary.* T. C. Anſwers, *That Church Aſſemblies are builded by Faith only on* Chriſt *the Foundation, the which Faith ſo being, whatſoever is wanting of that which is commanded, or remaining of that which is forbidden, is not able to put that Aſſembly from the right and title of ſo being the Church of* Chriſt. *For that Faith can admit no ſuch thing, as giveth an utter overthrow, and turning upſide down of the truth.* His meaning is, wherever the *true Doctrine of Faith* is received and profeſſed, there no *defects* or *corruptions* can overthrow the *being* of a *true Church*, or *juſtifie Separation* from it. *For,* he addeth, *although beſides Faith in the Son of God, there be many things neceſſary for every Aſſembly; yet be they neceſſary to the comely and ſtable being, and not ſimply to the being of the Church. And in this reſpect,* ſaith he, *the Lutheran Churches,* (which he there calls *the Dutch Aſſemblies*) *which beſide the maym of Diſcipline, which is common to our Churches, are groſly deceived in the matter of the Supper, are notwithſtanding holden in the Roll of the Churches of God. Was not* Jeruſalem, ſaith he, *after the return from* Babylon, *the City of the great King, until ſuch time as* Nehemias *came and builded on the Walls of the City? To ſay therefore it is none of the Church, becauſe it hath not received this Diſcipline, methinks is all one with this, as if a Man would ſay, It is no City, becauſe it hath no Wall: or that it is no Vineyard, becauſe it hath neither Hedge, nor Ditch. It is not, I grant, ſo ſightly a City, or Vineyard, nor yet ſo ſafe againſt the Inva-*

Ibid.

Browniſt's *Apology*, p. 7, 8, 9. *Ainſworth's Counter-poyſon*, p. 3. *Ib.* p. 87.

T. C's *Letter to* Harriſon *againſt* Separation, *in Defence of the Admonition to the followers of* Brown p. 98, 99.

Page 106.

Page 107.

ſion of their ſeveral Enemies which lie in wait for them; but yet they are truly both Cities and Vineyards. And whereas *T. C.* ſeemed to make *Diſcipline eſſential to the Church,* his Defender ſaith. *He did not take Diſcipline there ſtrictly for the political guiding of the Church, with reſpect to Cenſures, but as comprehending all the behaviour concerning a Church in outward Duties,* i. e. *the Duties of Paſtor and People.*

Page 91.

Afterwards, as often as the *Non-conformiſts* ſet themſelves to diſprove the *Separation,* their main buſineſs was, *to prove our Churches to be true Churches.* As in a Book entituled, *Certain Poſitions held and maintained by ſome godly Miniſters of the Goſpel, againſt thoſe of the Separation*; which was part of that Book, afterwards publiſhed by *W. R.* and called, *A grave and modeſt Confutation of the Separatiſts.* The *Ground-work whereof,* as Mr. *Ainſworth* calls it, is thus laid.

That the Church of England *is a true Church of* Chriſt, *and ſuch a one, as from which whoſoever wittingly and continually ſeparateth himſelf, cutteth himſelf off from* Chriſt.

Counterpoyſon, p. 117.

If this was *the Ground-work* of the *Non-conformiſts* in thoſe days, thoſe who live in ours, ought well to conſider it, if they regard their *Salvation.*

And, for this Aſſertion of theirs, they bring Three *Reaſons.*

1. *For that they enjoy, and join together in the uſe of theſe outward Means, which God in his Word hath ordained for the gathering of an inviſible Church*; i. e. *preaching of the Goſpel, and adminiſtration of the Sacraments.*

2. *For that their whole Church maketh profeſſion of the true Faith, and hold and teach,* &c. *all Truths fundamental.* So we put their Two *Reaſons* into One, becauſe they both relate *to the profeſſion of the true Faith*; which, ſay they, *is that which giveth life and being to a viſible Church; and upon this profeſſion we find many that have been incorporated into the viſible Church, and admitted to the privileges thereof, even by the Apoſtles themſelves. So the Church of* Pergamus, *though it did tolerate groſs Corruptions in it, yet becauſe it kept the Faith of* Chriſt, *was ſtill called the Church of God.*

3. *For that all the known Churches in the world acknowledge that Church for their Siſter, and give unto her the Right-hand of Fellowſhip.*

When H. *Jacob* undertook *Fr. Johnſon* upon this Point of *Separation,* the Poſition he laid down was this,

That the Churches of England *are the true Churches of God.* Which he proved by this *Argument.*

Whatſoever is ſufficient to make a particular Man a true Chriſtian, and in ſtate of Salvation; that is ſufficient to make a company of Men, ſo gathered together, to be a true Church.

But the whole Doctrine, as it is publickly profeſſed, and practiſed, by Law in England, *is ſufficient to make a particular Man a true Chriſtian, and in ſtate of Salvation, and our publick Aſſemblies are therein gathered together.*

Therefore it is ſufficient to make the publick Aſſemblies true Churches.

And in the defence of this Argument, againſt the *Reaſons* and *Exceptions* of *Johnſon,* that whole *Diſputation is ſpent.* And, in latter times, the Diſpute between *Ball* and *Can,* about *the neceſſity of Separation,* runs into this, *Whether our Church be a true Church or not*; concerning which, *Ball* thus delivers his Judgment. *True Doctrine, in the main Grounds and Articles of Faith, though mixt with Defects and Errors in other matters, not concerning the Life and Soul of Religion, and the right Adminiſtration*

Ball againſt Can, p. 77.

ſtration of Sacraments for ſubſtance, though in the manner of Diſpenſation, ſome things be not ſo well ordered, as they might and ought, are Notes and Marks of a true and ſound Church, though ſomewhat craſed in health and ſoundneſs, by Errors in Doctrine, Corruptions in the Worſhip of God, and Evils in Life and Manners.

The Second Suppoſition which the *Non-conformiſts* proceeded on, was, *Sect.* 11. (2.) *That the Corruptions in our Church were not ſuch as did overthrow the being and conſtitution of it.*

This will beſt appear, by the Anſwers they gave to the main *Grounds* of *Separation.*

Gifford's *Anſwer to the* Browniſts, *p.* 55.

I. *That our Church was not rightly gathered at the time of our Reformation from Popery.* To which *Gifford* thus anſwers, *The Church of* England, *in the time of Popery, was a Member of the Univerſal Church, and had not the being of a Church of* Chriſt *from* Rome, *nor took not her beginning of being a Church, by ſeparating her ſelf from that* Romiſh *Synagogue; but having her Spirits revived, and her Eyes opened, by the light of the heavenly Word, did caſt forth that tyranny of Antichriſt, with his abominable Idolatry, Hereſies, and falſe Worſhip, and ſought to bring all her Children unto the right Faith, and true Service of God, and ſo is a purer, and more faithful Church than before.* Others add, *That the Laws of Chriſtian Princes have been a means to bring Men to the outward Society of the Church, and ſo to make a viſible Church: Neither were ſufficient means wanting, in our caſe, for the due conviction of Mens Minds;* but then they add, *That the Queſtion muſt not be, Whether the means uſed were the right means, for the calling and converting a People to the Faith; but, whether Queen* Elizabeth *took a lawful courſe for re-calling, and re-uniting of Her Subjects unto thoſe true Profeſſors, whoſe fellowſhip they had forſaken; which they juſtifie by the Examples of* Jehoſhaphat, *and* Joſiah, Aſa, *and* Hezekiah.

Grave Confutation, &c. *p.* 9, 10, 11.

II. *That we communicate together in a falſe and idolatrous Worſhip of God, which is polluted with reading ſtinted Prayers, uſing popiſh Ceremonies,* &c.

To this they anſwer,

Grave Confutation, &c. *p.* 12, 13, 15.

1. *That it is evident by the Word, That the Church hath uſed, and might lawfully uſe, in God's Worſhip, and Prayer, a ſtinted Form of Words; and that not only upon ordinary, but extraordinary occaſions, which requires an extraordinary and ſpecial fervency of Spirit. Nay,* they ſay, *They are ſo far from thinking them unlawful, that in the ordinary and general occaſions of the Church, they are many times more fit, than thoſe which are called conceived Prayers.*

Ibid.

2. *If Forms, thus deviſed by Men be lawful and profitable, what ſin can it be for the Governours of the Church, to command that ſuch Forms be uſed; or, for us, that are perſuaded of the lawfulneſs of them to uſe them? unleſs they will ſay, That therefore it is unlawful for us to hear the Word, receive the Sacraments, believe the Trinity, and all other Articles of Faith, becauſe we are commanded by the Magiſtrates ſo to do; whereas indeed, we ought the rather to do good things, that are agreeable unto the Word, when we know them alſo to be commanded by the Magiſtrate.*

Ball *againſt* Can, *Part* 2. *p.* 8.

3. *It is true,* the Non-conformiſts ſay, *The Liturgy is in great part picked and culled out of the Maſs-Book; but it followeth not thence, that either it is, or was eſteemed by them a deviſed or falſe Worſhip; for many things contained in the Maſs-Book it ſelf are good and holy. A Pearl may be found upon a Dunghil; we cannot more credit the Man of Sin, than*

to ſay, That every thing in the Maſs-Book is Deviliſh and Antichriſtian, for then it would be Antichriſtian to pray unto God in the mediation of Jeſus Chriſt, *to read the Scriptures, to profeſs many fundamental Truths neceſſary to Salvation. Our Service might be picked and culled out of the Maſs-Book, and yet be free from all fault and tincture, from all ſhew and appearance of evil; though the Maſs-Book it ſelf was fraught with all manner of abominations——— But if it be wholly taken out of the Maſs-Book, how comes it to have thoſe things which are ſo directly contrary to the Maſs, that both cannot poſſibly ſtand together? Yea, ſo many Points,* ſaith Ball, *are there taught directly contrary to the foundation of Popery, that it is not poſſible Popery ſhould ſtand, if they take place. And,* ſaith he, *it is more proper to ſay, the Maſs was added to our Common-Prayer, than that our Common-Prayer was taken out of the Maſs-Book; for moſt things in our Common-Prayer, were to be found in the Liturgies of the Church, long before the Maſs was heard of in the world.*

4. As to the *Faſts*, and *Feaſts*, and *Ceremonies* retained, they anſwer, *That what was Antichriſtian in them, was the Doctrine upon which thoſe practices were built in the Church of* Rome, *which being taken away by the Reformation, the things themſelves are not Antichriſtian. As namely,* ſaith Gifford, *the remiſſion of Sins, and merit of eternal Life by faſting, which is the Doctrine of the Romiſh Church; the worſhip and invocation of Saints and Angels; the power of expelling Devils by the ſign of the Croſs, and ſuch like things, which the Papacy is full of, but rejected by us.*

Gifford's *Plain Declaration*, &c. *Preface. Anſwer to the* Browniſts, p. 10, 11.

III. *That our Miniſtry was Antichriſtian.* To this they anſwer.

1. *That Antichriſt is deſcribed in Scripture, not by his unlawful outward Calling, or Office, that he ſhould exerciſe in the Church; but,* Firſt, *by the falſe Doctrine he ſhould teach; and,* Secondly, *by the Authority he ſhould uſurp, to give Laws to Mens Conſciences, and to rule in the Hearts of Men as God. Which two Marks of* Antichriſt, *as they may evidently be diſcerned in the Papacy, ſo admit all the outward Callings and Offices in the Church of* England *exerciſed, were faulty, and unwarrantable by the Word, yet you in your own Conſcience know, that theſe Marks of* Antichriſt *cannot be found among the worſt of our Miniſters. For neither do the Laws of our Church allow any to teach falſe Doctrine; and we all profeſs* Chriſt *to be the only Law-giver to Conſcience; neither is any thing among us urged to be done, upon pain of damnation, but only the Word and Law of God.*

Mr. Arthur Hilderſham's *Letter againſt Separation*, §. 2. *highly commended by Mr.* J. Cotton, *in his Preface before his Commentaries on* 4 John.

2. *That the Office, which our Laws call the Office of Prieſthood, is the very ſame in ſubſtance with the Paſtor's Office deſcribed in the Word; and the manner of outward Calling unto that Office, which the Law alloweth, is the very ſame in ſubſtance which is ſet down in the Word. Doth the Word enjoin the Miniſter to teach diligently? ſo, by our Laws, he is expreſly charged at his Ordination to do, and forbidden to teach any thing, as required of neceſſity to ſalvation, but that which he is perſuaded may be concluded and proved by the Scripture; yea, it commandeth him, with all faithful diligence, to baniſh and drive away all erroneous and ſtrange Doctrines, that are contrary to God's Word. Doth the Word authoriſe him to adminiſter the Sacraments? So doth our Law. Doth the Word require that the Miniſter ſhould not only publickly teach, but alſo overſee, and look to the Peoples Converſation; exhorting, admoniſhing, reproving, comforting them as well privately as publickly? So doth our Law. Laſtly, Doth the Word authoriſe the Miniſter to execute the Cenſures and Diſcipline of* Chriſt? *our Law doth alſo command the ſame. So that, although many,*

Id. §. 6, 7, 8. *V.* Bradſhaw's *Anſwer to* Johnſon.

to whom the execution of theſe things appertain, do grievouſly fail in the practice thereof, yet you ſee the Office which the Law enjoineth to the Miniſter, is the ſame in ſubſtance, with that which the Word layeth upon him. Tell us not then, That the ſame name is given to our Office, as to the Popiſh Sacrificers. Do you think the worſe of your ſelf, becauſe you are called Browniſts? *And, ſhall the holy Office and Calling, which is ſo agreeable to the Word, be miſliked, becauſe it is called a Prieſthood? conſidering, that though it agree in name, yet it differeth in nature and ſubſtance, as much from the Romiſh Prieſthood, as Light doth from Darkneſs.*

IV. *That Diſcipline is wanting in our Church.* To which they anſwer.

Hilderſham's *Letter*, §. 3. 1. *That the want or neglect of ſome of thoſe Ordinances of* Chriſt, *which concern the Diſcipline of his Church, and the outward calling of his Miniſters, is no ſuch ſin, as can make either the Miniſters, or Governours of our Church* Antichriſt, *or our Church an* Antichriſtian *and falſe Church.* And Mr. *H.* adds, *That no one place of Scripture can be found, wherein he is called an* Antichriſt, *or* Antichriſtian, *who holding the truth of Doctrine, and profeſſing thoſe Articles of Religion that are fundamental, as we do, doth ſwerve either in Judgment or Practice, from that Rule, which* Chriſt hath given for the *Diſcipline of his Church. Neither can you find any* Antichriſt *mentioned in Scripture, whoſe Doctrine is ſound. If then the Doctrine of our Church be ſound, what warrant have you to call us* Antichriſts? *If our Paſtors offer to lead you unto ſalvation, through no other door than* Chriſt, *how dare you, that ſay you are* Chriſt'*s, refuſe to be guided by them? If our Aſſemblies be built upon that Rock, how can you deny them to be true Churches?*

Grave Confutation, &c. *p.* 17. 2. *That the Subſtance of Diſcipline is preſerved among us, in which they reckon preaching of the Word, and adminiſtration of Sacraments, as well as the Cenſures of Admonition, Suſpenſion, Excommunication, and Proviſion for the neceſſity of the Poor*; *which,* ſay they, *by Law, ought to be in all our Aſſemblies, and therefore we cannot juſtly be ſaid to be without the Diſcipline of* Chriſt; *but rather, that we having the Diſcipline of* Chriſt, *which is moſt ſubſtantial, do want the other, and ſo exerciſe it not rightly, that is to ſay, not by thoſe Officers which* Chriſt *hath appointed.* And farther they add, *That the Laws of our Land do authoriſe the Miniſter to ſtay from the Lord's-Table, all ſuch as are uncatechiſed, and out of Charity, or any otherwiſe publick offenders, as appeareth in the Rubrick before the Communion, and in that which is after Confirmation.*

Gifford's *Anſwer to the* Brow-niſts, *p.* 47.

Grave Confutation, &c. *p.* 18. 3. *That although it were granted, That we wanted both the exerciſe of the Church's Cenſures, and ſome of thoſe Officers which* Chriſt *hath appointed to exerciſe them by, yet might we be a true Church notwithſtanding; as there was a true Church in* Judah *all the days of* Aſa *and* Jehoſaphat, *yet was not the Diſcipline reformed there till the latter end of* Jehoſhaphat'*s Reign. The Church of* Corinth *was a true Church, even when the Apoſtle blamed them for want of Diſcipline. The Congregation* at Samaria *is called a Church, before the Diſcipline was eſtabliſhed there. And even in* Jeruſalem *there was a famous viſible Church of* Chriſt *long before ſundry parts of the Diſcipline, (for want whereof they condemn us) were eſtabliſhed there; yea, it is evident, that by the Apoſtles themſelves, divers Churches were gathered, ſome good ſpace of time, before the Diſcipline was ſettled, or exerciſed; by all which it is manifeſt, that how neceſſary ſoever thoſe parts of the Diſcipline (which we want) be, to the beauty, and well-being, or preſervation of the Church, yet are they not neceſſary to the being thereof, but a true Church may be without them.*

Acts 8. 12, 19, 31.

4. *That it doth not belong to private Perſons to ſet up the Diſcipline of the Church, againſt the will and conſent of the Chriſtian Magiſtrate, and Governours of the Church: Nay, they declare, that in ſo doing, they ſhould highly offend God. Giffard* ſaith, *That the Fetters and Chains can no faſter bind the hands and feet of* Browniſts, *than the hands of private Men are bound with the bands of Conſcience, and the fear of God, from preſuming to take upon them publick Authority. And if all the* Browniſts *in the Land ſhould come together, and chuſe a Miniſter, and ordain him, it would make him no more a Miniſter before God, than if all the Apprentices in* London, *taking upon them to chuſe a Lord Mayor, and miniſter an Oath unto him, ſhould make him a Lord Mayor.* But of this, more afterwards.

Grave Confutation, &c. p. 51, 52.
Giffard's *Anſwer*, p. 59, 95, 100, 101, 102.

V. *That the Miniſters of our Church ſtand under* (as they ſpeak) *an Antichriſtian Hierarchy.* To which they anſwer,

Firſt, *They deny that our Biſhops can be called Antichriſtian, ſince they do, and by the Laws of the Land ought to hold and teach all Doctrines that are fundamental; yea, ſome of them have learnedly and ſoundly maintained the Truth againſt* Hereticks, *that have gainſay'd it; ſome have not only by their Doctrine and Miniſtry converted many to the Truth, but have ſuffered perſecution for the Goſpel.*

Grave Confutation, &c. p. 19.

Secondly, *Suppoſing it were an Antichriſtian Yoke, which they deny; yet this doth not deſtroy the being of a true Church, or Miniſtry under it. Since both the* Jewiſh *and* Chriſtian *Churches, have frequently born ſuch a Yoke, and yet have been the true Churches of God ſtill.*

Thirdly, *That there is nothing unlawful, or Antichriſtian in the Office of Biſhops, if they conſider them as the King's Viſitors and Commiſſioners, to ſee that the Paſtors do their duties. And that this cannot deſtroy the nature of a viſible Church, to caſt many particular Churches, under one Provincial, or Dioceſan Government.* Yea, Mr. *Bradſhaw* undertakes to prove this, not only *lawful*, but *expedient*, *to that degree, that he thinks the Magiſtrate cannot well diſcharge his duty, as to the Overſight and Government of the Churches within his dominions, without it*, as is implied in the ſeven *Quæries* he propounds to *Fr. Johnſon* about it. *But ſuppoſing them to be Paſtors of the Churches under them, this,* ſaith he, *doth not overthrow the Office of Paſtors to particular Congregations, ſo long as under them they perform the main and ſubſtantial duties of true Paſtors, which all the Miniſters of our Church-Aſſemblies do, and by the Laws ought to do.*

Bradſhaw's *Anſwer to* Johnſon, p. 65. *Ed.* 1642.
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Theſe Particulars I have laid together with all poſſible brevity and clearneſs, from the *Authors* of beſt reputation on both ſides, that we might have a diſtinct view of the *State* of the *Controverſie* about *Separation*, between the old *Non-conformiſts*, and the *Separatiſts* of that time.

Sect. 12. But before we come to our preſent Times, we muſt conſider the *alteration* that was made in the *State* of this *Controverſie*, by thoſe who were called *Independents*, and pretended to come off from the Principles of *Browniſm*, or *rigid Separation*.

And here I ſhall give an account of the Progreſs of the *Courſe* of *Separation*, or the Steps by which it was carried on, and how it came at laſt to ſettle in the *Congregational Way*, and what the *true State* of the difference was, between the *Aſſembly* of *Divines*, and the *Diſſenting Brethren*, and how far the *Reaſons*, then uſed, will hold againſt the preſent *Separation*.

Stephen Offwood's *Advertiſement to* John Decleluſe *and* H. May, *p.* 10, 39.

When thoſe who were called *Browniſts*, for the freer exerciſe of their *new Church way*, withdrew into the *Low-Countries*, they immediately fell into ſtrange Factions and Diviſions among themſelves, *A. D.* 1582. *Robert Brown*, accompanied with *Harriſon*, a *School-Maſter*, and about fifty or ſixty Perſons, went over to *Middleburgh*, and there they choſe *Harriſon Paſtor*, and *Brown Teacher*. They had not been there *three Months*, but upon the falling out between *Brown* and *Harriſon*, *Brown* forſakes them, and returns for *England*, and ſubſcribes, promiſing to the *Archbiſhop*, *to live obediently to his Commands*. Concerning whom, *Harriſon* writes to a *Friend* in *London*, in theſe words, *Indeed the Lord hath made a breach among us for our ſins, which hath made us unworthy to bear his great and worthy Cauſe. Mr.* Brown *hath caſt us off, and that with open, manifeſt, and notable Treacheries; and if I ſhould declare them, you could not believe me. Only this I teſtifie unto you, that I am well able to prove, that* Cain *dealt not ſo ill with his Brother* Abel, *as he hath dealt with me.*

Defence of the Admon. to the Followers of Brown, *p.* 127.

Some of the words *of* Brown's *Subſcription* were theſe, *I do humbly ſubmit my ſelf to be at my Lord of* Canterbury's *Commandment, whoſe Authority, under Her Majeſty, I will never reſiſt, or deprave, by the Grace of God*, &c. But, being a Man of a reſtleſs and factious Temper, no Promiſes, or *Subſcriptions* could keep him within due bounds, as one who lived at that time hath fully diſcovered.

Page 133. *Page* 135. *Page* 134. *Page* 140.

For, although he promiſed *to frequent our Churches, and to come to Prayers and Sacraments*, yet, living *School-Maſter* at St. *Olave*'s in *Southwark* for two years, in all that time he never did it; and when he was like to have been queſtion'd for it, he withdrew into another Pariſh. Sometimes he would go *to hear Sermons*, but that he accounted *no act of Communion*; and declared to his Friends, That he thought it *not unlawful to hear our Sermons*, and therefore perſuaded his Followers in *London* ſo to do. Notwithſtanding this he *preached in private Meetings*, and that in *the time of pubick Aſſemblies*, when he thought fit; which this *Author*, though a *Non-conformiſt*, and Friend of *T. C*'s, calls a *curſed Conventicle*; who ſets forth at large his *ſtrange Jugglings*, and *Jeſuitical Equivocations* in his *Subſcription*.

Page 141. *Page* 138, &c.

By the *Biſhop*'s *Authority*, he ſaid he meant only his *Civil Authority*; by *declaring the Church of* England *to be the Church of God*, he underſtood the *Church of his own ſetting up*; by *frequenting our Aſſemblies according to Law*, he meant, *the Law of God*, and not of the *Land*; he declared, *his Child was baptized according to Law*, but then told his Followers, *it was done without his conſent*.

Counterpoyſon, p. 25. Cotton's *Anſwer to* R. Williams, *p.* 122.

Mr. *Cotton*, of *New England*, hath this Paſſage concerning *Brown*. *The firſt Inventor of that way which is called* **Browniſm**, *from whom the Sect took its Name, fell back from his own way, to take a Parſonage called* **Achurch**, *God ſo, in a ſtrange (yet wiſe) Providence, ordering it, that he, who had utterly renounced all the Churches in* England, *as no Church, ſhould afterwards accept of one Pariſh-Church among them, and it called* **A Church**. But upon the Diſſention at *Middleburgh*, between *Brown* and *Harriſon*, that Congregation ſoon broke to pieces. *Ainſworth* cannot deny the early Diſſentions between *Brown* and *Harriſon*, *Brown* and *Barrow*, *Barrow* and *Fr. Johnſon*; but he reckons up all the *differences* in *Scripture*, from *Cain* and *Abel* downwards to juſtifie theirs; notwithſtanding, as Dr. *O.* well obſerves, *We are to diſtinguiſh between what falls out through the Paſſions of Men, and what follows from the nature of the thing*.

Offwood's *Advertiſement, p.* 15.

But one of their own Party at *Amſterdam* takes notice of a *third Cauſe* of theſe *Diſſentions*, viz. *the Judgment of God upon them. I do ſee*, ſaith he, *the* *hand of God is heavy upon them, blinding their Minds, and hardening their Hearts, that they do not ſee his Truth, ſo that they are at wars among themſelves, and they are far from that true peace of God which followeth Holineſs.*

There were two great Signs of *this hand of God upon them.*

Firſt, Their *invincible Obſtinacy*.

Secondly, The *ſcandalous Breaches* which followed ſtill one upon the other, as long as the courſe of *Separation* continued, and were only ſometimes hindred from ſhewing themſelves, by their not being let looſe upon each other, for then the *Firebrands* ſoon *appear*, which at other times they endeavour to cover.

Their great *Obſtinacy* appears, by the execution of *Barrow* and *Greenwood*, who being condemned for *ſeditious Books*, could no ways be reclaimed; rather chuſing to die, than to renounce the Principles of *Separation*. But *Penry*, who ſuffered on the ſame account about that time, had more relenting in him, as to the buſineſs of *Separation*. For Mr. *J. Cotton*, of *New-England*, relates this Story of him, from the Mouth of Mr. *Hilderſham*, an eminent Non-conformiſt, that he confeſſed, *He deſerved death at the Queen's hand, for that he had ſeduced many of Her loyal Subjects to a ſeparation, from hearing the word of Life in the Pariſh Churches; which though himſelf had learned to diſcover the evil of, yet he could never prevail to recover divers of Her Subjects, whom he had ſeduced, and therefore the Blood of their Souls was now juſtly required at his hands.* Theſe are Mr. *Cotton*'s own words. Concerning *Barrow*, he reports, from Mr. *Dod*'s Mouth, that when he ſtood under the Gibbet, he lift up his eyes, and ſaid, *Lord, if I be deceived, thou haſt deceived me. And ſo being ſtopt by the hand of God, he was not able to proceed to ſpeak any thing to purpoſe more, either to the glory of God, or edification of the People.* Theſe Executions extremely ſtartled the Party, and away goes *Francis Johnſon* with his Company to *Amſterdam*; *Johnſon* chargeth *Ainſworth* and his Party with *Anabaptiſm, and want of Humility and due Obedience to Government*. In ſhort, they fell to pieces, ſeparating from each others *Communion*; ſome ſay, *they formally excommunicated each other*; but Mr. *Cotton* will not allow that, *but*, he ſaith, *they only withdrew:* Yet thoſe who were Members of the Church do ſay, *that Mr.* Johnſon, *and his company were accurſed and avoided by Mr.* Ainſworth *and his company, and Mr. A. and his company, were rejected and avoided by Mr.* Johnſon *and his:* And one Church received the Perſons excommunicated by the other, and ſo became ridiculous to Spectators, as ſome of themſelves confeſſed. *Johnſon*, and his Party, charged the other with *Schiſm in ſeparating from them:* But, as others ſaid, who returned to our Church, *Is it a greater Sin in them to leave the Communion of Mr.* Johnſon, *than for him to refuſe and avoid the communion of all true Churches beſide?* But the difference went ſo high, that *Johnſon* would admit none of *Ainſworth*'s company without *Re-baptizing* them; *Ainſworth*, on the other ſide, charged them with *woful Apoſtaſie:* And one of his own company ſaid, *That he lived and died in contentions.* When *Robinſon* went from *Leyden*, on purpoſe to end theſe Differences, he complained very much of the *diſorderly and tumultuous carriage of the People*; which, with Mr. *Ainſworth*'s maintenance, was an early diſcovery of the great excellency of *popular Church-Government*. *Smith*, who ſet up another *ſeparate Congregation*, was *Johnſon*'s Pupil, and went over, *in hopes*, ſaith Mr. *Cotton*, *to have gained his Tutor from the Errors of his rigid ſeparation*;

Cotton's *Anſwer to* R. Williams, p. 17.

Ibid.

Clifton's *Advertiſement*, p. 22, 26.

Way of Congregational Churches cleared, p. 6.

Profane Schiſm of the Browniſts, p. 63.

Ib. ch. 2. p. 9.

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Offwood's *Advertiſement*, p. 43.

Schiſm of the Browniſts, p. 87.

tion; but he was ſo far from that, that he ſoon outwent him; and he charges the other *ſeparate Congregations* with ſome of the very ſame Faults which they had found in the *Church of England*, viz. (1.) *Idolatrous Worſhip*, for if they charged the *Church* of *England* with *Idolatry, in reading of Prayers*, he thought them equally guilty *in looking on their Bibles, in preaching and ſinging*. (2.) *Antichriſtian Government*, in adding the human Inventions of *Doctors, and ruling Elders*; *which was pulling down one Antichriſt, to ſet up another*; *and if one was the Beaſt, the other was the Image of the Beaſt*. Being therefore unſatisfied with all Churches, he began one wholly new, and therefore baptiz'd himſelf. For, he declared, *There was no one true Ordinance with the other Separatiſts*. But this new Church was of ſhort continuance, for, upon his death, it dwindled away, or was ſwallowed up in the common Gulf of *Anabaptiſm*. And now one would have thought here had been an end of *Separation*; and ſo in all probability there had, had not Mr. *Robinſon* of *Leyden* abated much of the *Rigor* of it, for he aſſerted, *The lawfulneſs of communicating with the Church of* England *in the Word and Prayer, but not in Sacraments and Diſcipline*. The former he defended in a *Diſcourſe* between *Ainſworth* and him. So that the preſent *Separatiſts*, who deny that, are gone beyond him, and are fallen back to the *Principles* of the *Rigid Separation*. *Robinſon* ſucceeded (though not immediately) *Jacob*, in his *Congregation* at *Leyden*, whom ſome make the *Father of Independency*. But from part of Mr. *Robinſon*'s *Church*, it ſpread into *New-England*; for Mr. *Cotton* ſaith, *They went over thither, in their Church-State to* Plymouth; and that *Model was followed by other Churches there*; *at* Salem, Boſton, Watertown, *&c.* Yet Mr. *Cotton* profeſſeth, *That* Robinſon's *denial of the Pariſhional Churches in* England *to be true Churches, (either by reaſon of their mixt corrupt matter, or for defect in their Covenant, or for exceſs in their Epiſcopal Government) was never received into any heart, from thence to infer a nullity of their Church-State.* And in his Anſwer to Mr. *Roger Williams*, he hath theſe words, *That upon due conſideration he cannot find, that the Principles and Grounds of Reformation do neceſſarily conclude a Separation from the Engliſh Churches, as falſe Churches; from their Miniſtry as a falſe Miniſtry; from their Worſhip as a falſe Worſhip; from all their Profeſſors as no viſible Saints: Nor can I find, that they do either neceſſarily, or probably conclude a Separation from hearing the Word preached by godly Miniſters in the Pariſh Churches in* England. Mr. *R. Williams* urged Mr. *Cotton* with an apparent inconſiſtency between theſe Principles and his own Practice; for although he pretended to *own the Pariſh Churches as true Churches*, yet by his *actual Separation from them*, he ſhewed that really he did not; and he adds, that *Separation* did naturally follow from the old *Puritan Principles*, ſaying, *That Mr.* Can *hath unanſwerably proved, That the Grounds and Principles of the Puritans againſt Biſhops and Ceremonies, and profaneneſs of People profeſſing* Chriſt, *and the neceſſity of* Chriſt's *Flock and Diſciples, muſt neceſſarily, if truly followed, lead on to, and inforce a ſeparation.* Notwithſtanding all this, Mr. *Cotton* doth aſſert the *lawfulneſs of hearing Engliſh Preachers in our Pariſh Churches*; but then, he ſaith, *there is no Church communion in hearing, but only in giving the Seals.* Mr. *Williams* urgeth, *That there is communion in Doctrine, and fellowſhip of the Goſpel.* Upon which, Mr. *Cotton* grants, *That though a Man may join in hearing, and prayer, before and after Sermon, yet not as in a Church-ſtate.* Yet, after all, he will not deny our *Churches* to be *true Churches.*

Way of Congregational Churches, p. 7. *See* Smith's *Reaſons in* Bernard *againſt* Browniſts, *called Plain Evidences*, p. 5, 6, 7.

Smith's *Ep. to the Character.*

Cotton's *Way cleared*, p. 8.

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R. William's *Anſwer to* Cotton's *Letter*, p. 36.

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Cotton's *Anſwer to* William's, p. 129, 132.

But, if they remain *true Churches*, it appears from the former Diſcourſe, they can never juſtifie *Separation* from them, upon the *Principles* of either Party. So that though thoſe of the *Congregational Way* ſeem to be more moderate, ~~as to~~ ſome of their *Principles*, than the old *rigid Separatiſts*; yet they do not conſider, that by this means they make their *Separation* more *inexcuſable*. The *Diſſenting Brethren*, in their *Apologetical Narration*, to avoid the imputation of *Browniſm*, deliver this as their Judgment, concerning our *Parochial Churches*. *And for our own Congregations*, viz. *of* England, *we have this ſincere Profeſſion to make before God, and all the World, that all that Conſcience of the Defilements, we conceived to cleave to the true Worſhip of God in them, or of the unwarranted Power in Church Governours exerciſed therein, did never work in us any other thought, much leſs opinion, but that multitudes of the Aſſemblies, and Parochial Congregations thereof, were the true Churches and Body of* Chriſt, *and the Miniſtery thereof a true Miniſtery; much leſs did it ever enter into our hearts, to judge them Antichriſtian; we ſaw, and cannot but ſee, that by the ſame reaſon, the Churches abroad in* Scotland, Holland, *&c. (though more reformed) yet for their mixture, muſt be in like manner judged no Churches alſo; which, to imagine, or conceive, is, and hath ever been an horror to our thoughts. Yea, we have always profeſſed, and that in thoſe times when the Churches of* England *were the moſt, either actually overſpread with defilements, or in the greateſt danger thereof; and when our ſelves had leaſt, yea no hopes of ever ſo much as viſiting our own Land again in peace and ſafety to our Perſons, that we both did and would hold communion with them as the Church of* Chriſt. This is a very fair Confeſſing from the *Diſſenting Brethren*; but then the difficulty returns with greater force, *How comes Separation from theſe Churches to be lawful?* If they had gone upon the *Browniſts Principles*, all the Diſpute had been about the truth or falſhood of them; but their truth being ſuppoſed, the neceſſity of *Separation* followed; whereas now, upon altering the *State* of the *Controverſie* by the *Independents*, though their *Principles* ſeem more moderate, yet their *Practice* is more unreaſonable. It is therefore a vain pretence uſed at this day, to juſtifie the *Separation*, that *they do not deny our Churches to be true Churches, and that therein they differ from the old Separatiſts:* It is true, in that opinion they do, but in *Separation* they agree, which is the more unjuſtifiable in them, ſince they yield ſo much to our *Churches*. And yet herein, whatever they pretend, they do not exceed their *Independent Brethren*, whoſe *Separation* themſelves condemned. But the *Presbyterians* were then unſatisfied with this *Declaration* of the *Diſſenting Brethren*, and thought it did not ſufficiently clear them from the charge of *Browniſm*, becauſe, (1.) They agreed with the old *Separatiſts* in the main Principle of *popular Church Government, which*, they ſay, *is inconſiſtent with the civil Peace, as may be ſeen*, ſay they, *in the Quarrels both at* Amſterdam, *and* Rotterdam, *and the Law-Suits depending before the Magiſtrates there.* (2.) They overthrow the Bounds of *Parochial Churches*, as the *Separatiſts* did, and think ſuch a Confinement unlawful. (3.) They make *true Saintſhip* the neceſſary Qualification of *Church Members*, as the *Separatiſts* did: *Whereby*, ſay they, *they confound the viſible and inviſible Church, and make the ſame eſſential form of both.* (4.) They renounce the *Ordination* received in our *Church*, but all the allowance they make of a *true Miniſtery*, is, by vertue of an *explicit or implicit Call*, grounded on the Peoples *explicit or implicit Covenant* with ſuch a Man as their Paſtor.

Apologet. Narrative, p. 5, 6.

Anatomy of Independency, p. 18, 19, 20, &c.

For when they firſt began to ſet up a *Congregational Church,* after the new Model, at *Rotterdam, Ward* was choſen *Paſtor*, and *Bridge Teacher*, but they both renounced their *Ordination* in *England*; and ſome ſay, *They ordained one another*; others, *That they had no other Ordination, than what the Congregation gave them.*

Sect. 13. And now, new *Congregations* began to ſet up in *Holland*, upon theſe *Principles*; but they again fell into *Diviſions* as great as the former. *Simpſon* renouncing his *Ordination*, was admitted a *private Member* of the *Church* at *Rotterdam*; but he grew ſoon unſatisfied with the *Orders* of that *Church*, and thought too great a Reſtraint was laid upon the private Members, as to the *exerciſe* of *Propheſying*; and ſo he, and thoſe who joyned with him, complaining of the *Miſchief* of *Impoſitions*, were ready for a *Separation*, if that reſtraint were not ſpeedily removed. Mr. *Bridge* yields to the thing, but not as to the time, viz. *On the Lord's Day after Sermon*; this gives no ſatisfaction, for they muſt have their will in every thing, or elſe they will never ceaſe complaining of the *Miſchief of Impoſitions*. And ſo Mr. *Simpſon*, and his Party, ſet up a *new Church* of their own: Which *J. Goodwin* doth not deny; for *Mr.* Simpſon, ſaith he, *upon diſlike of ſome perſons and things in that Church, whereof Mr.* Bridge *was Paſtor, might ſeek and make a departure from it. But were theſe Churches quiet, after this Separation made?* So far from it, *that the contentions and ſlanders were no leſs grievous*, ſaith Baylie, *than thoſe of* Amſterdam, *betwixt* Ainſworth *and* Johnſon's *followers. But did not Mr.* Bridge's *Church continue in great quietneſs?* No, but inſtead of that, *they were ſo full of Bitterneſs, Reproaches, and hard Cenſures, that Mr.* Bridge *often declared, if he had known at firſt, what he met with afterwards, he would never have come amongſt them, nor being amongſt them, have given them ſuch ſcope and liberty, as he had.* It ſeems at laſt, he came to apprehend the *neceſſity* of *Impoſitions*, and the *miſchief* of a *ſeparating dividing humor*. But the People having the *Power* in their hands, were reſolved to ſhew, that they *held it not in vain*: for Mr. *Ward*, had it ſeems given Offence to ſome of the *Congregation, by preaching the ſame Sermons there, which he had preached before at* Norwich; this, and ſome other frivolous things, were thought intolerable *Impoſitions*; and therefore againſt the *Will* of Mr. *Bridge*, they depoſe Mr. *Ward* from his Miniſtery. This being a freſh diſcovery of the great inconveniency of *popular Church Government*, gave a mighty alarm to the Brethren: which occaſion'd a Meeting of *the Meſſengers from other Churches* (as they called them) for cloſing up of this wound; but they durſt not ſearch deep into it, but only ſkinn'd it over, to prevent the great reproach and ſcandal of it. From theſe things, the *Preſbyterians* inferred the neceſſity of *civil Authorities* interpoſing, and of not leaving all to *Conſcience*. *For*, ſay they, *Conſcience hath been long urging the taking away that Scandal occaſion'd at* Rotterdam *by that Schiſm, where divers Members left the one Church, and joyned to the other ſo diſorderly, wherein even the Rulers of one Church had a deep Charge; yet as that could not then be prevented, ſo there had been many Meetings, Sermons, and all means uſed to preſs the Conſcience of taking it off, by a Re-union of the Churches, and yet the way to do it could never be found, till the Magiſtrates Authority and Command found it.* Theſe things I have more fully deduced; not as though bare Diſſentions in a Church were an Argument of it ſelf againſt it; but, to ſhew (1.) That popular Church Government naturally leads to Diviſions, and leaves them without Remedy;

Anſwer to the Antapologia, *p.* 245.

Diſſuaſive from the Errors of the Times, p. 76.

Anatomy of Independ. *p. 6.*

Anatomy of Independ. *p.* 49.

dy; and (2.) That humerous and factious people will always complain of the *Miſchief of Impoſitions*, though the things be never ſo juſt and reaſonable; and (3.) That this Principle of *Liberty of Conſcience*, will unavoidably lead Men into *confuſion:* For when Men once break the *Rules* of *Order* and *Government in a Church*, they run down the Hill, and tumble down all before them. If Men complain of the *Miſchief* of our *Impoſitions*, the Members of their own *Churches*, may on the ſame grounds, complain of theirs; and as the *Preſbyterians* cannot anſwer the *Independents*, as to the *Pretence of Conſcience*; ſo it is impoſſible for either, or both of them, to anſwer the *Anabaptiſts*, who have as juſt a *Plea* for *Separation* from them, as they can have from the *Church* of *England*.

Sect. 14. From hence we find, that, although the Pretence of the *Diſſenting Brethren* ſeemed very modeſt, as to themſelves; yet they going upon a common Principle of *Liberty of Conſcience*, the *Preſbyterians* charged them with being the *Occaſion* of that horrible Inundation of *Errors* and *Schiſms*, which immediately overſpread this *City* and *Nation*: which I ſhall briefly repreſent in the words of the moſt eminent *Preſbyterians* of that time. Thence Dr. *A. Stuart*, a zealous Scotch *Preſbyterian*. ſaid, *That he verily believed,* Independency *cannot but prove the Root of all Schiſms and Hereſies: Yea, I add,* ſaith he, *That by conſequence, it is much worſe than Popery.*

Duply to M.S. p. 53.

Thence the *Scotch Commiſſioners*, in the firſt place, preſſed, *Uniformity in Religion, as the only means to preſerve Peace, and to prevent many Diviſions and Troubles; a thing very becoming the King to promote, according to the practice of the good Kings of* Judah; *and a thing which,* they ſay, *all ſound Divines and Politicians are for.*

***Arguments of the Scotch Commiſſ.* p. 3, 4.**

Dr. Corn. Burgeſs *told the* Houſe *of* Commons, *That our Church was laid waſte, and expoſed to confuſion, under the plauſible Pretence of not forcing Mens Conſciences: and that, to put all Men into a courſe of Order and Uniformity, in God's way, is not to force the Conſcience; but to ſet up God in his due place, and to bring all his People into the paths of righteouſneſs and life.*

***Serm.* Nov. 8. 1641.**

The Errors and Innovations, under which we groaned ſo much of later years, ſaith Mr. *Caſe*, *were but* Tolerabiles ineptiæ, *Tolerable Trifles, Childrens Play, compared with theſe damnable Doctrines, Doctrines of Devils, as the Apoſtle calls them: Polygamy, Arbitrary Divorce, Mortality of the Soul; no Miniſtry, no Churches, no Ordinances, no Scripture,* &c. *And the very foundation of all theſe laid in ſuch a Schiſm of boundleſs Liberty of Conſcience, and ſuch Lawleſs Separation of Churches,* &c.

***Serm. before the Com.* Feb. 19. 1645.**

The famous City of London *is become an* Amſterdam, ſaith Mr. *Calamy*, *Separation from our Churches is countenanced, Toleration is cried up, Authority aſleep. It would ſeem a wonder, if I ſhould reckon how many ſeparate Congregations, or rather Segregations there are in the City; what Churches againſt Churches,* &c. *Hereby the hearts of the People are mightily diſtracted, many are hindred from Converſion, and even the Godly themſelves have loſt much of the Power of Godlineſs in their Lives. The Lord keep us,* ſaith he, *from being poyſoned with ſuch an Error as that of an unlimited Toleration. A Doctrine that overthroweth all Church-Government, bringeth in Confuſion, and openeth a wide door unto all Irreligion and Atheiſm.*

***Serm. before the Lord Mayor,* Jan. 14. 1645.**

Serm. before the Parliament, Sept. 12. 1644.

Diverſity of Religion, ſaith Mr. *Matthew Newcomen, diſjoynts and diſtracts the Minds of Men, and is the Seminary of perpetual Hatreds, Jealouſies, Seditions, Wars, if any thing in the World be*; *and in a little time, either a Schiſm in the State begets a Schiſm in the Church, or a Schiſm in the Church begets a Schiſm in the State*: i. e. *either Religion in the Church is prejudiced by civil Contentions, or Church-Controverſies and Diſputes about Opinions break out into civil Wars. Men will at laſt take up Swords and Spears in ſtead of Pens*; *and defend that by Arms which they cannot do by Arguments.*

Theſe may ſerve for a Taſte of the Senſe of ſome of the moſt eminent *Preſbyterian Divines* at that time, concerning the dangerous effects of that *Toleration* which their *independent Brethren* deſired.

The *diſſenting Brethren* finding themſelves thus loaden with ſo many reproaches, and particularly with being the *Occaſion* of ſo many *Errors* and *Schiſms*, publiſhed their *Apologetical Narration* in *Vindication* of themſelves, wherein (as is ſaid before) they endeavour to purge themſelves from the Imputation of *Browniſm*; declaring, *That they looked on ſome of our Churches as true Churches, and our Miniſtery, as a true Miniſtery*; but yet they earneſtly deſire liberty, as to the *peaceable practice of their own way.*

Obſervations and Annotations on the Apologetical Narration, p. 17.

To this the *Preſbyterians* anſwered,

Firſt, That they did not underſtand by them, in what Senſe they allowed *our Churches to be true Churches.*

Secondly, If they did, what Neceſſity there was for any *Separation*, or what need of *Toleration*.

As to the Senſe in which they owned *our Churches to be true Churches*; *either they underſtood it of a bare Metaphyſical Verity, as many of our Divines*, ſay they, *grant it to the Romiſh Church*; *that ſhe is a true Church, as a rotten infectious Strumpet is a true Woman*; *and then they thank them for their Favour, that they hold our Churches in the ſame Category with* Rome: *or elſe they underſtand it in a moral ſenſe for ſound and pure Churches, and then*, ſay they, *Why do ye not joyn with us, and Communicate as Brethren? Why deſire ye a Toleration? Yes*, ſay the *Diſſenting Brethren, we own you to be true Churches, and Communicate with you in Doctrine.* To which the others reply'd, *If you own it by external Act of Communion, ye muſt Communicate with us in Sacraments:* but this ye refuſe; therefore ye muſt return to the old *Principles* of *Separation.* For where there was ſuch a refuſal of *Communion*, as there was in them towards all Churches beſides their own, there muſt lie at the bottom the ſame Principle of Separation which was in the *Browniſts*. And, as Mr. *Newcomen urged them, their agreeing with us in Doctrines that are fundamental, their holding one Head, and one Faith, doth not excuſe them from being guilty of breach of Unity, and downright Schiſm, as long as they hold not one Body, one Baptiſm. For when Men make different Aſſemblies, and Congregations, and draw Men into Parties, it is not their owning the ſame Doctrine doth excuſe them from Schiſm, as he proves from St.* Auguſtin *and* Beza. Of which afterwards.

Sermon at St. Paul's, Feb. 8. 1645. p. 41.

But ſtill they denied themſelves to be *Browniſts, or rigid Separatiſts, becauſe they ſeparated from our Congregations as no Churches, and from the Ordinances diſpenſed as Antichriſtians and from our People as no viſible Chriſtians.*

To which the other replyed, *That there was always a Difference among the Separatiſts themſelves, ſome being more rigid than others*; and as to the *laſt Clauſe*, none ſince *Barrow had owned it.* But, for the reſt, only putting *Unlawful* for *Antichriſtian*; and by *Ordinances*, underſtanding *Church-Ordinances*, they own the very ſame Principles as the others did. And although in words they ſeem to own *our Parochial Congregations to be true Churches*; yet having the ſame Opinions with the more moderate *Browniſts*, touching *Church-Conſtitution, Matter, Form, Power, Government, Communion, Corruptions*, &c. *The conſequence muſt be*, ſay they, *that we have no true Churches, and that our Ordinances are all unlawful.* And the leſs cauſe they have to plead for their *Separation*, *by acknowledging our Churches to be true Churches, their Separation is ſo much the more culpable, and the groſſer and more inexcuſable the Schiſm. For, it is a greater ſin*, ſaith *Bayly*, *to depart from a Church, which I profeſs to be true, and whoſe Miniſtry I acknowledge to be ſaving, than from a Church which I conceive to be falſe, and whoſe Miniſters I take to have no calling from God; nor any Bleſſing from his hand.*

Narrative of New-England, &c. Poſt-ſcript, p. 52.

Bayly's *Diſſuaſive*, p. 104.

So that the *Independents* were then charged with *Schiſm* for theſe two things.

Firſt, For *refuſing Communion with thoſe Churches*, which they confeſſed to *be true Churches*. For, ſay the *Members* of the *Aſſembly*, *Thus to depart from true Churches, is not to hold Communion with them as ſuch; but rather by departing, to declare them not to be ſuch.*

Papers for Accommod. p. 47.

Secondly, For ſetting up *different Congregations*, where they confeſſed there was *an Agreement in Doctrine*.

Sect. 15. But becauſe ſome Men are ſo unwilling to underſtand the *true State* of this *Controverſie* about *Separation*, between the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly*, and the *Independents*, I ſhall here give a fuller account of it from the *Debates* between them.

The deſire of the *Independents*, as it was propoſed by themſelves at the *Committee* for *Accommodation*, Dec. 4. 1645. was this,

That they may not be forced to Communicate as Members in thoſe Pariſhes where they dwell; but may have liberty to have Congregations of ſuch Perſons who give good Teſtimonies of their Godlineſs, and yet out of tenderneſs of Conſcience, cannot Communicate in their Pariſhes, but do voluntarily offer themſelves to joyn in ſuch Congregations.

To which the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly* anſwered, *Decemb.* 15.

This Deſire is not to be granted them, for theſe Reaſons.

1. Becauſe it holds out a *plain and total Separation from the Rule*; as if in nothing it were to be complied with; nor *our Churches* to be communicated with in any thing, which ſhould argue Church-Communion. More could not be ſaid, or done, againſt *falſe Churches*.

2. It plainly holds out, *The lawfulneſs of gathering Churches out of true Churches*, yea out of ſuch *true Churches*, which are endeavouring farther to reform according to the word of God; whereof we are aſſured, there is not the leaſt hint of any Example in all the Book of God.

3. This would give Countenance to *A perpetual Schiſm and Diviſion in the Church*, ſtill drawing away ſome from the *Churches* under the *Rule*, which alſo would breed many irritations among the Parties going away, and thoſe whom they leave; and again, between the *Church* that ſhould be forſaken, and that to which they ſhould go.

December 23. The *Diſſenting Brethren* put in their *Reply* to theſe *Reaſons.*

To the *Firſt Reaſon*, they ſay, (1.) *That gathering into other Congregations ſuch, who cannot, out of tenderneſs of Conſcience, partake as Members in their Churches, for the purer enjoyment (as to their Conſciences) of all Ordinances yet ſtill maintaining Communion with them as Churches, is far from Separation, much leſs a plain and total Separation. And this is not ſetting up Churches againſt Churches, but Neighbour Siſter Churches of a different Judgment.* For, ſay they, *if the pureſt Churches in the World (unto our Judgment, in all other reſpects) ſhould impoſe as a Condition of receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, any one thing, that ſuch tender Conſciences cannot joyn in (as ſuppoſe kneeling in the* Act *of Receiving, which was the caſe of* Scotland *and* England) *if they remove from theſe Churches, and have Liberty from a* State *to gather into other Churches, to enjoy this and other Ordinances, this is no Separation.*

(2.) *That it is not a plain and total Separation from the Rule, unleſs they wholly in all things differ, by ſetting up altogether different Rules of Conſtitution, Worſhip and Government; but they ſhall practice the moſt of the ſame things; and theſe the moſt ſubſtantial, which are found in the* Rule *it ſelf.*

(3.) *That they would maintain Occaſional Communion with their Churches, not only in hearing and preaching, but Occaſionally, in Baptizing their Children in their Churches, and receiving the Lord's Supper there*, &c.

And, would not all this clear them from the *Imputation* of *Schiſm?* Not *agreeing in the main things?* Not *owning their Churches to be true?* Not maintaining *Occaſional Communion* with them? Let us hear, what the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly* think of all this.

Thus they *Anſwer*,

Firſt, That although *Tenderneſs of Conſcience* may bind Men to *forbear*, or *ſuſpend the Act of Communion* in that Particular, wherein Men conceive they cannot *hold Communion* without ſin, yet it doth not bind to follow ſuch a poſitive Preſcript, as poſſibly may be divers from the Will and Counſel of God, of which kind we conceive this of *gathering ſeparate Churches out of the true Churches*, to be one.

Secondly, It is one thing to remove to a *Congregation* which is under *the ſame Rule*, another to a *Congregation* of a *different Conſtitution* from the *Rule*; in the former caſe a Man retains his Memberſhip; in the latter he renounceth his Memberſhip upon difference of Judgment, touching the very *Conſtitution* of the *Churches*, from and unto which he removes.

Thirdly, If a *Church* do require that which is evil of any Member, he muſt forbear to do it, yet *without Separation*. They who thought *kneeling* in the *Act* of *Communion*, to be unlawful, either in *England*, or *Scotland*, did not *ſeparate*, or renounce *Memberſhip*, but did, ſome of them, with Zeal and Learning, defend *our Church* againſt thoſe of the *Separation*.

Fourthly, The Notion of *Separation* is not to be meaſured by civil *Acts* of *State*, but by the *Word of God*.

Fifthly, To leave all *Ordinary Communion* in any Church with diſlike, when Oppoſition or Offence offers it ſelf, is to *ſeparate* from ſuch a *Church* in the Scripture Senſe.

Sixthly, A *total difference* from *Churches* is not neceſſary to make a *total Separation*; for the moſt *rigid Separatiſts* hold the ſame rule of *Worſhip*, and *Government* with our *Brethren*; and under this pretence, *Novatians*, *Donatiſts*, all that ever were thought to ſeparate, might ſhelter themſelves.

Seventhly, If they may *occaſionally* exerciſe theſe *Acts* of *Communion* with us once, a ſecond, or third time, without ſin, we know no reaſon why it may not be ordinarily without ſin; and then *Separation*, and *Church-Gathering* would have been needleſs. To *Separate* from thoſe Churches ordinarily and viſibly, with whom occaſionally you may joyn without ſin, ſeemeth to be a moſt unjuſt Separation.

To the Second Reaſon, *The Diſſenting Brethren* gave the Anſwers.

1. *That it was founded upon this ſuppoſition, That nothing is to be tolerated which is unlawful in the Judgment of thoſe who are to tolerate:* Which the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly* denied; and ſaid, It was upon the ſuppoſition of the *unlawfulneſs*, *to tolerate gathering of Churches out of true Churches:* which they do not once endeavour to prove lawful.

2. *That if after all endeavours,* Mens Conſciences *are* unſatisfied, *as to Communion with a Church, they have no Obligation lying upon them to continue in that* Communion; *or on the Churches to withold them from removing to purer Churches; or if there be none ſuch to gather into* Churches.

To which the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly* replied.

I. That this opened a *Gap* for all *Sects* to challenge ſuch a Liberty as their due.

II. This *Liberty* was denied by the *Churches* of *New-England*; and they have as juſt ground to deny it as they.

To the third *Reaſon* they anſwered.

Firſt, *That the abuſe of the word Schiſm hath done much hurt in the Churches; that the ſignification of it was not yet agreed upon by the State, nor debated by the Aſſembly.*

To which the others reply;

That if the word *Schiſm* had been left out, the Reaſon would have remained ſtrong, *viz.* That this would give countenance to *perpetual Diviſion* in the *Church*, ſtill drawing away *Churches* from under the *Rule*. And to give countenance to an unjuſt, and cauſleſs *Separation* from lawful *Church-Communion*, is not far from giving countenance to a *Schiſm*; eſpecially when the grounds, upon which this *Separation* is deſired, are ſuch, upon which all other poſſible ſcruples, which erring Conſciences may, in any other caſe, be ſubject unto, may claim the privilege of a like *Indulgence*, and ſo this Toleration being the firſt, ſhall indeed but lay the foundation, and open the Gap, whereat as many *Diviſions* in the *Church*, as there may be Scruples in the Minds of Men, ſhall, upon the ſelf-ſame Equity be let in.

Secondly, *This will give* Countenance *only to* Godly Peoples *joyning in other* Congregations *for their greater Edification, who cannot otherwiſe, without ſin, enjoy all the Ordinances of* Chriſt; *yet ſo, as not condemning thoſe Churches, they joyn not with, as falſe; but ſtill preſerving all Chriſtian Communion with the Saints, as Members of the Body of* Chriſt, *of the Church Catholick; and joyn alſo with them in all duties of* Worſhip, *which belong to* particular Churches, ſo far as they are able; *and if this be called* Schiſm, *or* Countenance *of* Schiſm, *it is more than we have yet learned from Scriptures, or any approved Authors.*

To this, the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly* replied.

1. This deſired forbearance is a perpetual *Diviſion* in the *Church*, and a perpetual drawing away from the Churches under the *Rule*. For, upon the ſame pretence, thoſe who ſcruple *Infant-Baptiſm*, may withdraw from *their Churches*, and ſo ſeparate into another *Congregation*; and ſo in that ſome practice may be ſcrupled, and they ſeparate again: Are theſe Diviſions, and Sub-diviſions, ſay they, as lawful as they may be infinite? or, muſt we give that reſpect to the Errors of Mens Conſciences, as to ſatisfie their *Scruples*, by allowance of this liberty to them? And, doth it not plainly ſignifie, that Errors of Conſcience is a protection againſt Schiſm?

2. The not condemning of *our Churches as falſe*, doth little extenuate the *Separation*; for divers of the *Browniſts*, who have *totally ſeparated* in former times, have not condemned *theſe Churches as falſe*; though they do not pronounce an affirmative Judgment againſt us, yet the very *ſeparating* is a tacit and practical condemning of our *Churches*, if not *as falſe*, yet *as impure*, *eouſq*; as that in ſuch Adminiſtrations, they cannot be by them, as Members communicated with, without ſin. And when they ſpeak of Communion with us, as *Members* of the *Church Catholick*, it is as full a declining of *Communion* with us as *Churches*, as if we were *falſe Churches*.

3. We do not think differences in Judgment, in this or that Point, to be *Schiſm*, or that every inconformity unto every thing uſed or enjoined is *Schiſm*, ſo that *Communion* be preſerved; or that *Separation* from *idolatrous Communion*, or *Worſhip*, *ex ſe*, unlawful, is *Schiſm*; but to join in *ſeparate Congregations* of another Communion, which ſeceſſion of our Members is a manifeſt rupture of our *Societies* into others, and is therefore a *Schiſm* in the *Body*; and if the Apoſtle do call thoſe *Diviſions* of the *Church*, wherein *Chriſtians* did not ſeparate into divers *formed Congregations*, of ſeveral Communion in the *Sacrament* of the *Lord's-Supper Schiſms*, much more may ſuch *Separation* as this deſired, be ſo called.

4. *Scruple* of *Conſcience* is no cauſe of *ſeparating*, nor doth it take off *cauſeleſs ſeparation* from being *Schiſm*, which may ariſe from *Errors* of *Conſcience*, as well as carnal and corrupt reaſons; therefore we conceive the Cauſes of Separation muſt be ſhewn to be ſuch *ex naturâ rei*, as will bear it out, and therefore we ſay, that the granting the liberty deſired will give countenance to *Schiſm*.

5. We cannot but take it for granted, upon evidence of Reaſon and Experience of all Ages, that this *Separation* will be the *Mother* and *Nurſe* of *Contentions*, *Strifes*, *Envyings*, *Confuſions*, and ſo draw with it that breach of Love, which may endanger the heightning of it into formal *Schiſm*, even in the ſenſe of our *Brethren*.

6. What is it that approved Authors do call *Schiſm*, but the breaking off *Members* from their *Churches*, which are lawfully conſtituted *Churches*, and from *Communion* in *Ordinances*, &c. without juſt and ſufficient cauſe, *ex naturâ rei*, to juſtifie ſuch ſeceſſion, and to join in other Congregations of ſeparate Communion, either becauſe of perſonal Failings in the Officers, or Members of the *Congregation* from which they ſeparate, or becauſe of cauſeleſs ſcruple of their own Conſcience, which hath been called ſetting up *altare contra altare*; for which they quote St. *Auguſtin* and *Cameron*.

Thus I have faithfully laid down the *State* of this *Controverſie* about *Separation*, as it hath been managed in former times among us. From whence there are theſe things to be conſidered by us, which may be of ſome uſe in our following Diſcourſe.

(1.) That all the old *Non-conformiſts* did think themſelves bound in Conſcience to communicate with the *Church* of *England*, and did look upon *Separation* from it to be ſin, notwithſtanding the Corruptions they ſuppoſed to be in it. This I have proved with ſo great evidence in the foregoing Diſcourſe, that thoſe who deny it, may, with the help of the ſame *Metaphyſicks*, deny that the *Sun* ſhines.

(2.) That all Men were bound in Conſcience towards preſerving the *Union* of the *Church*, *to go as far as they were able*. This was not only aſſerted by the *Non-conformiſts*, but by the moſt *rigid Separatiſts* of former times, and by the *Diſſenting Brethren* themſelves. So that the *lawfulneſs* of *Separation*, where *Communion is lawful*, and thought ſo to be by the Perſons who *ſeparate*, is one of the neweſt Inventions of this Age; but what new Reaſons they have for it, beſides noiſe and clamour, I am yet to ſeek.

(3.) That bare *ſcruple* of *Conſcience* doth not juſtifie *Separation*, although it may excuſe *Non-communion* in the particulars which are ſcrupled, provided that they have uſed the beſt means for a right information.

(4.) That where *occaſional Communion is lawful*, *conſtant Communion is a Duty*. Which follows from the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly* blaming *the Diſſenting Brethren* for allowing the lawfulneſs of *occaſional Communion* with our *Churches*, and yet forbearing ordinary Communion with them. For, ſay they, *to ſeparate from thoſe Churches ordinarily and viſibly, with whom occaſionally you may join, ſeemeth to be a moſt unjuſt Separation.*

(5.) That withdrawing from the *Communion* of a *true Church*, and ſetting up *Congregations for purer Worſhip*, or under *another Rule*, is *plain and down-right Separation*, as is moſt evident from the *Anſwer* of the *Divines* of the *Aſſembly* to the *Diſſenting Brethren*.

Sect. 16. From all this it appears, that the preſent *practice* of *Separation* can never be juſtified, by the old *Non-conformiſts Principles*; nor by the Doctrine of the *Aſſembly* of *Divines*. The former is clear from undeniable Evidence, and the latter is in effect confeſſed by all my Adverſaries. For, although they endeavour all they can, to blind the Reader's Judgment, with finding out *the diſparity of ſome circumſtances*, which was never denied; yet not one of them can deny, that it was their Judgment, *That the holding of ſeparate Congregations for Worſhip, where there was an agreement in Doctrine, and the Subſtantials of Religion was unlawful and ſchiſmatical.* And this was the point for which I produced their Teſtimony in my Sermon; and it ſtill ſtands good againſt them. For their reſolution of the caſe, doth not depend upon the particular circumſtances of that time, but upon general Reaſons drawn from the Obligations to preſerve *Unity* in Churches; which muſt have equal force at all times, although there happen a great variety, as to ſome circumſtances. For whether the greater purity of Worſhip be pleaded, as to one circumſtance, or another, the general caſe, as to Separation, is the ſame; whether the Scruples do relate to ſome Ceremonies required, or to other Impoſitions, as to Order and Diſcipline, if they be ſuch as they pretend to, a neceſſity of Separation on their account, it comes at laſt to the ſame point. Was it unlawful to deſire a liberty of *ſeparate*

Baxter's *Anſwer*, *p.* 89.
Dr. O. *p.* 50.

Congregations, as *the Diſſenting Brethren* did, becauſe of *ſome Scruples of Conſcience in them?* and is it not equally unlawful in others, who have no more but *Scruples* of *Conſcience* to plead, although they relate to different things? I will put this caſe as plain as poſſible, to prevent all ſubterfuges and ſlight evaſions. Suppoſe five Diſſenting Brethren now, ſhould plead the neceſſity of having *ſeparate Congregations*, on the account of very different *Scruples* of *Conſcience*; one of them pleads, that his company ſcruple the *uſe of an impoſed Liturgy*; another ſaith, His People do not ſcruple that, but they cannot bear *the Sign of the Croſs*, *or Kneeling at the Communion*; a third ſaith, If all theſe were away, yet if their *Church* be not *rightly gather'd* and *conſtituted*, as to *matter* and *form*, they muſt have a *Congregation* of their own; a fourth goes yet farther, and ſaith, Let their *Congregation* be *conſtituted* how it will, if they allow *Infant-Baptiſm*, they can never join with them; nor, ſaith a fifth, can we, as long as you allow Preaching by *ſet forms*, and your Miniſters ſtint themſelves by *Hour-glaſſes*, and ſuch like human Inventions: Here are now very different *Scruples of Conſcience*; but doth the nature of the caſe vary, according to the bare difference of the *Scruples?* One Congregation ſcruples any kind of *Order*, as an unreaſonable impoſition and reſtraint of the *Spirit*, is *Separation* on that account *lawful?* No, ſay all other Parties againſt the *Quakers*; becauſe their *Scruples* are *unreaſonable*. But is it lawful for a *Congregation* to ſeparate on the account of *Infant-Baptiſm?* No, ſay the *Preſbyterians* and *Independents*, that is an *unreaſonable Scruple*. Is it lawful for Men to ſeparate to have greater *purity* in the frame and order of *Churches*, although they may *occaſionally join* in the duties of *Worſhip?* No, ſaith the *Preſbyterians*, this makes way for all manner of *Schiſms* and *Diviſions*, if mere *ſcruple* of *Conſcience* be a ſufficient ground for *Separation*; and if they can join *occaſionally* with us, they are bound to do it *conſtantly*; or elſe the obligation to Peace and Unity in the Church ſignifies little: *No Man's erroneous Conſcience can excuſe him from Schiſm.* If they alledge grounds to juſtifie themſelves, they muſt be ſuch as can do it *ex naturâ rei*, and not from the mere error or miſtake of *Conſcience*. But, at laſt, the *Preſbyterians* themſelves come to be required to join with their Companies in Communion with the *Church* of *England*, and if they do not, either they muſt deſire a *ſeparate Congregation*, on the account of their Scruples, as to the *Ceremonies*, and then the former Arguments unavoidably return upon them. (For the *Church* of *England* hath as much occaſion to account thoſe *Scruples unreaſonable*, as they do thoſe of the *Independents*, *Anabaptiſts*, and *Quakers*) or elſe they declare, they can join *occaſionally* in *Communion* with our Church, but yet hold it lawful to have *ſeparate Congregations* for *greater Purity* of *Worſhip*; and then the obligation to *Peace and Unity* ought to have as much force on them, with reſpect to our *Church*, as ever they thought it ought to have on the *diſſenting Brethren*, with reſpect to themſelves. For no *diſparity*, as to other *Circumſtances*, can alter the nature of this Caſe, *viz.* That as far as Men judge *Communion lawful*, it becomes a *Duty*, and Separation a Sin, under what denomination ſoever the Perſons paſs. For the fault doth not lie in the *Circumſtances*, but in the nature of the Act; becauſe then *Separation* appears moſt unreaſonable, when *occaſional Communion* is confeſſed to be *lawful*. As will fully appear by the following Diſcourſe. Thoſe Men therefore ſpeak moſt agreeably to their preſent practice, although leaſt for the *honour* of the *Aſſembly*, who confeſs, *That*

That they were tranſported with undue heats and animoſities againſt their Brethren; which deſerve to be lamented, and not to be imitated; that they are not obliged to vindicate all they ſaid, nor to be concluded by their Determinations: that it is to be hoped, the Party is become wiſer ſince. This is plain dealing, and giving up the *Cauſe* to the *diſſenting Brethren*, and that in a matter wherein they happened to have the ſtrongeſt reaſon of their ſide. But hereby we ſee, that thoſe who juſtifie the *preſent Separation*, have forſaken the *Principles* and *Practices* of the old *Non-conformiſts*, as to this Point of *Separation*.

Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 58, 68, 69.

Letter out of the Country, p. 28.

Sect. 17. It remains now, that I ſhew how far they are likewiſe gone off from the peaceable Principles of their Predeceſſors, *as to private Perſons undertaking to reform the Diſcipline of the Church, and ſetting up new Churches, againſt the conſent of the Magiſtrate, in a reformed Church; and particularly, as to the preaching of their Miniſters, when ſilenced by our Laws.* This I am the more obliged to do, becauſe when I ſaid, That I was certain, that preaching in oppoſition to our eſtabliſhed Laws, is contrary to the Doctrine of all the Non-conformiſts of former Times, Mr. *B.* is pleaſed to ſay, *That my Aſſertion is ſo raſh and falſe, in matters of notorious Fact, that it weakeneth his Reverence of my Judgment, in matters of Right.* I ſhould deſire no better Terms from Mr. *B.* as to the *matter of Right*, in this preſent Controverſie, than that he would be determin'd by the plain evidence of the Fact; and if what I ſay be *true*, and *notoriouſly true*, I leave him to conſider on whoſe ſide the *Raſhneſs* lies.

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 21.

Gifford makes this one principal part of *Browniſm, That Churches are to be ſet up, and Diſcipline reformed, without the conſent of the Chriſtian Magiſtrate:* Brown *maketh many Arguments*, ſaith he, *to prove, that Princes are not to be ſtayed for, nor yet to have to do, by publick Power, to eſtabliſh Religion. Which Opinion of his, is ſuch abridging the ſacred Power of Princes, and ſuch horrible injury to the Church, contrary to the manifeſt Word of God, that if there were nothing elſe, it is enough to make him an odious and deteſtable Heretick, until he ſhew Repentance.* But to clear this matter, he diſtinguiſhes, (1.) *Of Princes that are enemies to Chriſtianity*, as they were in the time of the *Apoſtles*; *to what end*, ſaith he, *ſhould they, having authority from* Chriſt, *to eſtabliſh Diſcipline, ſue unto the Courts of ſuch Princes, or attend their pleaſure.* (2.) Of ſuch who profeſs *Chriſtianity*, but are *Idolaters. In this caſe*, he ſaith, *they are neither bound to forbear preaching, nor ſetting up Diſcipline if they do oppoſe it.* (3.) Of ſuch *Princes*, who own the *true Doctrine of Chriſtianity*, but the *Churches* in their Dominions are corrupt in *Diſcipline.* In this caſe he determines, *That though every Man is to take care to keep a good Conſcience, yet no private Perſons are to break the Unity and Peace of the Faithful, or to take upon them publick Authority to reform*; which he there proves, and concludes it to be a *wicked and dangerous Principle in the* Browniſts *to hold the contrary.*

Gifford's *Anſwer to the* Browniſts, *p.*104.

In anſwer to this, *Barrow* ſaith, *That the Servants of God ought not to be ſtayed from doing the Commandments of God, upon any reſtraint, or perſecution of any mortal Man whatſoever*; *and for this he quotes the example of the Apoſtles, who then had been guilty of the ſame diſobedience and rebellion, if Princes had been to be ſtayed for, or their reſtraint been a ſufficient let:* And adds, *That they only, according to God's Commandment, refrained from their Idolatry, and other publick Evils, and aſſembled together in all holy and peaceable manner, to worſhip the* Lord *our* God,

Barrow *againſt* Gifford, *p.* 105.

and to join our ſelves together in the Faith, unto mutual Duties, and to ſeek that Government which Chriſt *left to his Church, and for the Church to erect the ſame.*

To the Inſtance of the Apoſtles, Gifford had anſwered, *That they were furniſhed with an extraordinary Authority and Commiſſion by* Chriſt, *to ſet up his Kingdom; but ye have no Commiſſion from God, it is the Devil that hath ſet you forward: And will ye, in ſuch vile and wretched manner, pretend the examples of the primitive Churches?* *Barrow* replies, *If the Commandment of God were ſufficient warrant to the Apoſtles to do their work, though all the Princes of the world reſiſted, then muſt the Commandment of the ſame God, be of the ſame effect to all other Inſtruments, whom it pleaſeth the Lord to uſe in their callings to his Service alſo, though all the Princes in the world ſhould withſtand and forbid the ſame.* By this, we ſee, this was a great Point in controverſie between the *Browniſts* and *Non-conformiſts.* Which will more appear by the diſpute between *Fr. Johnſon* and *Jacob.* For among the Points of falſe Doctrine, which he charges the *Non-conformiſts* with, whom they called the forward Preachers, theſe are two. **Page 70, 72.**

1. *That the planting, or reforming of* Chriſt's *Church muſt tarry for the* Civil Magiſtrate, *and may not otherwiſe be brought in by the Word and Spirit of God in the Mouths of his weakeſt Servants, except they have Authority from earthly Princes; which Doctrine,* ſaith he, *is againſt the Kingly Power of* Chriſt, *and* three whole Lines of *Scripture, which he there puts together.*

2. *That it is lawful for a Miniſter of* Chriſt *to ceaſe preaching, and to forſake his Flock, at the commandment of a Lord Biſhop: Which Doctrine,* he ſaith, *is contrary* to two Lines of Scripture *more,* with the bare numbers of Chapter and Verſe. But, leſt it ſhould be ſuppoſed, that theſe *two* were among thoſe which *Jacob* ſaith, *he falſly laid to their charge,* we find both theſe Doctrines owned by the ſeveral *Non conformiſts,* who joined together in a *Confutation* of the *Browniſts.* *For,* ſay they, *as to the Peoples power of reforming,* **Confut. of the Brown. p. 51.**

Firſt, *We cannot find any Warrant in Holy Scripture, for them that are private Members of any Church, to erect the Diſcipline, no not though the Magiſtrate and Miniſters, who ſhould deal in this work, were altogether profane and ungodly.*

Secondly, *We eſteem our Prince to be a moſt Lawful and Chriſtian Magiſtrate, and our Miniſters to be true Miniſters of* Chriſt, *and therefore we are juſtly afraid, that by enterpriſing a publick Reformation, not only without, but contrary to the direction and liking of them, who by God's word ought to have, if not the only, yet the principal hand in that work, we ſhould highly offend God.*

Thirdly, *That for the want of publick Reformation, the Magiſtrate is every where blamed, and no where the Church, for ought we can find: Oft are the Prieſts and People blamed for erecting and practiſing Idolatry, but never for that they plucked it not down, when their Princes had ſet it up; neither can we find, whether ever the Church, under a Chriſtian Magiſtrate, was by any Prophet, either commanded to deal (otherwiſe than by perſuaſion) in publick Reformation, when the Magiſtrate neglected it, or reproved for the contrary.* **Page 22.**

Fourthly, To the *Inſtance of the Apoſtles* they anſwer two things.

I. *That though they ſet up Church-Government without the Magiſtrate's leave, yet not contrary to his liking; or when he oppoſed his Authority directly,*

rectly, and inhibited it, they never erected the Diſcipline, when there was ſo direct an oppoſition made againſt it by the Civil Magiſtrates.

II. *If it could be proved, that the Apoſtles did ſo then, yet would it not follow, that we may do ſo now; for neither was the Heathen Magiſtrate altogether ſo much to be reſpected by the Church, as the Chriſtian Magiſtrate is; neither have our Miniſters and People now ſo full and abſolute a power, to pull down, and ſet up Orders in the Church, as the Apoſtles (thoſe wiſe Maſter-builders) had.*

Fifthly, As to *their Miniſters preaching being ſilenced*, they declare,

Page 41. 1. *So long as the Biſhops ſuſpend, and deprive, according to the Law of the Land, we account of the Action herein, as of the Act of the Church, which we may and ought to reverence, and yield unto; if they do otherwiſe, we have liberty given us by the Law, to appeal from them. If it be ſaid,* the Church is not to be obey'd when it ſuſpends and deprives us, for ſuch cauſes as we in our Conſciences know to be inſufficient. *We anſwer, That it lieth on them to depoſe, who may ordain; and they may ſhut that may open. And as he may, with a good Conſcience execute a Miniſtery, by the Ordination and Calling of the Church, who is privy to himſelf of ſome unfitneſs, (if the Church will preſs him to it) ſo may he who is privy to himſelf, of no fault that deſerveth deprivation, ceaſe from the execution of his Miniſtery, when he is preſſed thereunto by the Church. And if a guiltleſs Perſon, put out of his charge by the Church's Authority, may yet continue in it, what proceedings can there be againſt guilty Perſons, who, in their own conceit, are always guiltleſs, or will at leaſt pretend ſo to be; ſeeing they will be ready always to object againſt the Church's Judgment, That they are called of God, and may not therefore give over the execution of their Miniſtery at the will of Biſhops?* The Second Quære.

2. *That the caſe of the Apoſtles was very different from theirs in three reſpects.*

Firſt, *They that inhibited the Apoſtles were known and profeſſed enemies to the Goſpel.*

Secondly, *The Apoſtles were charged not to teach in the Name of* Chriſt, *nor to publiſh any part of the Goſpel, which Commandment might more hardly be yielded unto, than this of our Biſhops, who, though they cannot endure them which teach that part of the Truth that concerneth the good Government, and Reformation of the Church, yet are they not only content that the Goſpel ſhould be preached, but are alſo Preachers of it themſelves.*

Thirdly, *The Apoſtles received not their Calling and Authority from Men, nor by the hands of Men, but immediately from God himſelf, and therefore alſo might not be reſtrain'd or depoſed by Men; whereas we, though we exerciſe a Function, whereof God is the Author, and we are alſo called of God to it, yet are we called and ordained by the hands and miniſtery of Men, and may therefore by the miniſtery of Men be alſo depoſed, and reſtrained from the exerciſe of our Miniſtery.*

To this which I had referred Mr. *B.* to, he gives this Anſwer, *If* Mr. Rathband *hath denied this, it had been no proof.* Did I ever mention Mr. *Rathband*'s Teſtimony as a ſufficient proof? My words are, That I was certain their Practice was contrary to the Doctrine of all the Nonconformiſts, as you may ſee in the Book publiſhed in their Name, by Mr. *Rathband.* Can any thing be plainer, than that the Book was written by the *Non-conformiſts*, and that Mr. *Rathband* was only the Publiſher of it? This way of anſwering is juſt as if one ſhould quote a Paſſage out of *Curcellæus* his *Greek Teſtament*, and another ſhould reply, if *Cur-* *Anſwer to Letter, p. 22.*

cellaus ſaid ſo, it had been no proof. Can Mr. *B.* ſatisfie his Mind with ſuch Anſwers?

Unreaſonableneſs of Separation, p. 89.

When Fr. *Johnſon* ſaid, *That our Miniſters ought not to ſuffer themſelves to be ſilenced and depoſed from their publick Miniſtery, no not by lawful Magiſtrates.* Mr. *Bradſhaw* anſwered, *This Aſſertion is falſe and ſeditious.* And when *Johnſon ſaith, That the Apoſtles did not make their immediate Calling from God the ground of their refuſal; but this, that they ought to obey God rather than Man; which is a Duty required of all Miniſters and Chriſtians. Bradſhaw* (a Perſon formerly in great eſteem with Mr. *Baxter*, and highly commended by the *Author* of the *Vindication* of his Diſpute with *Johnſon*) gives this Anſwer.

1. *Though the Apoſtles did not aſſign their immediate Calling from God, as the Ground of their refuſal, in ſo many Letters and Syllables, yet that which they do aſſign, is by implication, and in effect the ſame with it. For it is as much as if they had ſaid, God himſelf hath impoſed this Calling upon us, and not Man; and therefore except we ſhould rather obey Man than God, we may not forbear this Office which he hath impoſed upon us. For, oppoſing the Obedience of God to the obedience of Man, they therein plead a Calling from God, and not from Man; otherwiſe, if they had received a Calling from Man, there had been incongruity in the Anſwer; conſidering, that in common ſenſe and reaſon, they ought ſo far forth to obey Men, forbidding them to exerciſe a Calling, as they exerciſe the ſame by vertue of that Calling. Elſe, by this reaſon, a Miniſter ſhould not ceaſe to preach, upon the Commandment of the Church, that hath choſen him; but ſhould be bound, to give them alſo the ſame Anſwer, which the Apoſtles gave, which were abſurd. So that by this groſs conceit of* Mr. Johnſon, *there ſhould be no Power in any ſort of Man whoſoever, to depoſe a Miniſter from his Miniſtery; but that notwithſtanding any Commandment of Church or State, the Miniſter is to continue in his Miniſtery.*

2. *For the farther Anſwer of this his ignorant conceit, plainly tending to Sedition, we are to know, that though the Apoſtles, Prophets, and Evangeliſts, preached publickly, where they were not hindred by open violence; and did not, nor might not leave their Miniſtery upon any human Authority, or Commandment whatſoever, becauſe they did not enter into, or exerciſe the ſame upon the will and pleaſure of any Man whatſoever; yet they never erected and planted publick Churches and Miniſteries in the Face of the Magiſtrate, whether they would or no; or in deſpite of them; but ſuch, in reſpect of the Eye of the Magiſtrate, were as private and inviſible as might be.*

3. *Neither were ſome of the Apoſtles only forbidden, ſo as others ſhould be ſuffered to preach the ſame Goſpel in their places; but the utter aboliſhing of Chriſtian Religion was manifeſtly intended in ſilencing of them. But our Churches whereof we are Miniſters, are no private and ſecret Aſſemblies, ſuch as hide themſelves from the Face of a perſecuting Magiſtrate and State; but are publick, profeſſing the Worſhip, and doing their Religion in the face of the Magiſtrate and State; yea, and by his Countenance, Authority and Protection; and we are ſet over thoſe Churches, not only by a Calling of our People, but alſo by the Authority of the Magiſtrate, who hath an armed Power to hinder any publick action; who is willing alſo to permit and maintain other true Miniſters of the Goſpel, in thoſe places where he forbiddeth ſome. If therefore after our publick calling, to Miniſter to ſuch a known and publick Church, not by the Church only, but by the Magiſtrate alſo, the Magiſtrate ſhall have matter againſt us (whether juſt or unjuſt it ſkilleth not) and ſhall in that regard forbid us to Miniſter to our Church; I ſee not by what*

Warrant in God's Word, we ſhould think our ſelves bound notwithſtanding to exerciſe our Miniſtery ſtill; except we ſhould think ſuch a Law of Miniſtery to lie upon us, that we ſhould judge our ſelves bound to run upon the Swords point of the Magiſtrate, or to oppoſe Sword to Sword. And ſuppoſe the Magiſtrate ſhould do it unjuſtly, and againſt the will of the Church, and ſhould therein ſin; yet doth not the Church in that regard ceaſe to be a Church, nor ought ſhe therein to reſiſt the Will of the Magiſtrate; neither doth ſhe ſtand bound, in regard of her affection to her Miniſter (how great and deſerving ſoever) to deprive her ſelf of the Protection of the Magiſtrate, by leaving her publick ſtanding, to follow his Miniſtery in private, and in the dark; refuſing the benefit of all other publick Miniſtery, which with the leave and liking of the Magiſtrate ſhe may enjoy.

4. Neither do I know what warrant any ordinary Miniſter hath, by God's Word, in ſuch a caſe, ſo to draw any ſuch Church or People to his private Miniſtery, that thereby they ſhould hazard their outward ſtate and quiet in the Common-wealth where they live; when in ſome competent meaſure they may publickly, with the grace and favour of the Magiſtrate, enjoy the ordinary means of Salvation by another: and (except he have a calling to Miniſter in ſome Church) he is to be content to live as a private Member, till it ſhall pleaſe God to reconcile the Magiſtrate to him, and to call him again to his own Church; labouring mean while privately, upon particular occaſions offered, to ſtrengthen and confirm in the ways of God, thoſe People that are deprived of his publick Labour. And I take it to be the duty of the People, in ſuch a Caſe, if they will approve themſelves faithful Chriſtians, and good Subjects, ſo to ſubmit to the Miniſtery of another, as that by Prayer, and all other good, dutiful, and loyal means, they may do their beſt endeavour to obtain him, of whom, againſt their will, they have been deprived, and ſtill to affect and love him as their Paſtor: now, if the People do thus, then is that Miniſter called to be ſilent, not only by the Magiſtrate, but by them alſo, though with much grief.

To this Teſtimony of Mr. *Bradſhaw*, all that Mr. *B.* ſaith, is, *That* Bradſhaw *thought, we ſhould ſubmit to a ſilencing Law, where our Miniſtery was unneceſſary, and ſo doth he.* If Mr. *B.* did allow himſelf any time to conſider what he writes, he would never have given ſuch an Anſwer as this. For, Mr. *Bradſhaw* never puts the caſe upon the *neceſſity*, or *no neceſſity* of their *preaching*, but upon the *allowance*, or *diſallowance* of the *Chriſtian Magiſtrate.* And if it had been reſolved upon the point of *neceſſity*, Is it poſſible for Mr. *B.* to think there was *leſs neceſſity* of preaching at that time, than there is now, when himſelf confeſſeth ſeveral years ſince, *That thirty years ago, there were many bare reading, not preaching Miniſters, for one that there is now?* And what was there, which the old Non-conformiſts more complained of, than *the want of a more preaching Miniſtery?* This then, could not be Mr. *Bradſhaw*'s Reaſon; and Mr. *Baxter*, upon ſecond thoughts, cannot be of that opinion.

Anſwer to Serm. p. 99.

Defence of the Cure of Diviſions, p. 55.

I have yet one Argument more, to prove this to have been the general ſenſe of the *Non-conformiſts*; which is Mr. *Sprint*'s Argument for *Conformity in the caſe of Deprivation*; Which is, that where two Duties do meet, a greater, and a leſs, whereof both cannot be done at the ſame time, the leſſer duty muſt yield unto the greater; but this Doctrine of ſuffering Deprivation for not conforming, teacheth, and the practice thereof cauſeth, to neglect a greater duty for performing of a leſs; therefore it ſeemeth to be an Error in Doctrine, and a Sin in Practice. The

Caſſand. Anglic. p. 2.

force of which Argument doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe, That Miniſters, deprived by Law, are not to exerciſe their Miniſterial Function in oppoſition to the Laws. And to confirm this, ſeveral *Non-conformiſts* undertook to anſwer this Argument, and to give an account of the diſparity of the caſe as to the *Apoſtles* times, and ours. For Mr. *Sprint* had urged the inſtance of the *Apoſtles* to this purpoſe, ſince they ſubmitted to *Jewiſh Ceremonies* rather than loſe the liberty of their Miniſtery, they ought to yield to our *Ceremonies* on the ſame ground; to which they anſwer; Page 232. *that the Apoſtles had far greater reaſon ſo to do; becauſe their Miniſtery was of far greater excellency, and uſefulneſs, and therefore the Argument was of much greater weight with the Apoſtles, than it could be with them.* For, ſay they, *What one Miniſter of the Goſpel is there, that dare be ſo preſumptuous, as to ſay, That his Preaching and Miniſtery can be of that neceſſity, and uſe for the Glory of God, and good of his Church; as was the Miniſtery of his Apoſtles? The work whereunto the Lord called and ſeparated the Apoſtles* (viz. *the planting of the Church, and the preaching the Goſpel to all Nations*) *was ſuch, as could not have been performed by any other, but the Apoſtles alone; but in deprivation of our Miniſters that refuſe conformity, there is no ſuch danger, and of their preaching there can be no ſuch neceſſity imagined; though they preach not, the Goſpel is preached ſtill, and that ſoundly, and fruitfully.* Did theſe Men think, the *Apoſtles Woe be unto me if I preach not the Goſpel,* did reach to their caſe? Can Mr. *B.* imagine, that ſuch Men thought themſelves ſtill bound to preach, although they were ſilenced by our Laws?

And now, I hope, I have proved that to be *evidently* true, which Mr. *B.* ſaith was *notoriouſly falſe.* But if after all this, Mr. *B.* will perſiſt, in ſaying, *That he knew thoſe who did otherwiſe;* all that I have to ſay to it, is, That I hope Mr. *B's* Acquaintance, both of the one, and the other Party (if they were ſuch, as he repreſents) are not to be the Standard for all the reſt; for, it ſeems, he was not very happy in either.

The

The Unreaſonableneſs of Separation.

PART II.

Of the Nature *of the preſent* Separation.

§. 1. *The different Principles of Separation laid down. The things agreed on with reſpect to our Church.* § 2. *The largeneſs of Pariſhes a mere Colour and Pretence; ſhewed from Mr.* B'*s own words.* § 3. *The Myſtery of the* Preſbyterian Separation *opened.* § 4. *The Principles of it as to the People. Of occaſional Communion, how far owned, and of what force in this matter, ſhewed from parallel Caſes.* § 5. *The reaſons for this occaſional Communion examined.* § 6. *Of the pretence of greater Edification in ſeparate Meetings, never allowed by the Separatiſts or Independents as a reaſon for Separation. No reaſon for this pretence ſhewed from Mr.* B'*s words.* § 7. *The Principles of Separation as to the Miniſtry of our Churches. Of joyning with our Churches as Oratories.* § 8. *Of the Peoples judging of the worthineſs and competency of their Miniſters. Mr.* B'*s Character of the People. The impertinency of this Plea as to the* London Separation. § 9. *The abſurdity of allowing this liberty to ſeparate from Mr.* B'*s own words.* § 10. *The allowance he gives for Separation on the account of Conformity. What publick Worſhip may be forbidden.* § 11. *The Miniſtry of our Church charged with Uſurpation in many caſes, and Separation allowed on that account.* § 12. *Of Separation from Ithacian Prelatiſts.* § 13. *That the Schiſm doth not always lie on the Impoſers ſide, where the terms of Communion are thought ſinful.* § 14. *The Principles of the* Independent Separation, *or of thoſe who hold all Communion with our Church unlawful.* § 15. *The nature of Separation ſtated and explained.* § 16. *The charge of Separation made good againſt thoſe who hold Occaſional Communion lawful.* § 17. *The obligation to conſtant Communion, where Occaſional Communion is allowed to be lawful, at large proved.* § 18. *The Objection from our Saviour's practice anſwered.* § 19. *The text* Phil. 3. 16. *cleared from all Objections.* § 20. *A new Expoſition of that text ſhewed to be impertinent.* § 21. *The charge of Separation proved againſt thoſe who hold all Communion with us unlawful.* § 22, 23. *The miſchief brought upon the Cauſe of the Reformation by it. The teſtimonies of foreign Proteſtant Divines to that purpoſe.* § 24. *No poſſibility of Union among the Proteſtant Churches upon their grounds, which hath been much wiſhed for and deſired by the beſt Proteſtants.* § 25. *All the ancient Schiſms juſtifiable on the ſame pretences.* § 26. *There can be no end of Separation on the like grounds. Mr.* A'*s Plea for Schiſm at large conſidered.* § 27. *The Obligation on Chriſtians to preſerve the Peace and Unity of the Church. The Caſes mentioned wherein Separation is allowed by the Scripture. In all others it is proved to be a great ſin.*

Sect. 1. HAVING made it my buſineſs, in the foregoing *Diſcourſe*, to ſhew, how far the *preſent Diſſenters* are gone off from the Principles of the *old Non-conformiſts*; I come to conſider, what thoſe *Principles* are, which they now proceed upon;

And thoſe are of two ſorts.

Firſt, Of ſuch as hold *partial, and occaſional Communion with our Churches to be lawful, but not total and conſtant*, i. e. they judge it lawful at *ſome times* to be preſent in *ſome part* of our *Worſhip*, and upon particular occaſions to partake of *ſome Acts of Communion* with us; but yet, they apprehend *greater purity and edification in ſeparate Congregations, and when they are to chuſe, they think themſelves bound to chuſe theſe*, altho' at *certain ſeaſons* they may think it *lawful* to ſubmit to *occaſional Communion* with our *Church*, as it is now eſtabliſhed.

Secondly, Of ſuch as hold *any Communion with our Church to be unlawful*, becauſe they believe *the Terms of its Communion unlawful*, for which they inſtance, *in the conſtant uſe of the Liturgy; the Aereal ſign of the Croſs; kneeling at the Communion; the obſervation of Holy-days; renouncing other Aſſemblies; want of Diſcipline in our Churches; and depriving the People of their Right in chuſing their own Paſtors.*

To proceed with all poſſible clearneſs in this matter, we muſt conſider theſe three things, 1. What things are to be taken for granted by the ſeveral Parties, with reſpect to our *Church*. 2. Wherein they *differ* among themſelves, about the nature and degrees of *Separation* from it. 3. What the true ſtate of the preſent *Controverſie* about *Separation* is.

I. In general, they cannot deny theſe *three* things.

1. That there is *no Reaſon* of *Separation*, becauſe of the *Doctrine* of our *Church*.
2. That there is *no other Reaſon* of *Separation* becauſe of the Terms of our Communion, than what was from the beginning of the *Reformation*.
3. That *Communion* with our Church hath been ſtill allowed by the *Reformed Churches* abroad.

1. That there is no *Reaſon* of *Separation*, becauſe of the *Doctrine* of our *Church*. This was confeſſed by the *Browniſts*, and moſt *rigid Separatiſts*, as is proved already; and our preſent *Adverſaries* agree herein. Dr. *Owen* ſaith, *We agree with our Brethren in the Faith of the Goſpel; and we are firmly united with the main Body of Proteſtants in this Nation, in confeſſion of the ſame Faith:* And again, *The Parties at difference do agree in all ſubſtantial Parts of Religion, and in a common Intereſt, as unto the preſervation and defence of the Proteſtant Religion.* Mr. *Baxter* ſaith, *That they agree with us in the Doctrine of the Thirty nine Articles, as diſtinct from the Form of Government, and impoſed Abuſes.* And more fully elſewhere, *Is not the Non-conformiſts Doctrine the ſame with that of the Church of* England, *when they ſubſcribe to it, and offer ſo to do? The Independents, as well as Preſbyterians offer to ſubſcribe to the Doctrine of the Thirty nine Articles, as diſtinct from Prelacy and Ceremony. We agree with them in the Doctrine of Faith, and the Subſtance of God's Worſhip*, ſaith the *Author* of the laſt *Anſwer*. And again, *we are one with the Church of* England *in all the neceſſary Points of Faith, and Chriſtian Practice. We are one with the Church of* England, *as to the Subſtance, and all neceſſary Parts of God's Worſhip.* And even Mr. *A.* after many trifling Cavils, acknowledges, *That*

Vindication of Non-conformiſts, p. 8, 9.

Page 22.

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 27.

Defence of the Cure of Diviſions, p. 64.

Rector of Sutton, *p.* 15.

Page 30.

That the Diſſenters generally agree with that Book which is commonly called the Thirty nine Articles, which was compiled above a hundred years ago; and this Book ſome Men call the Church of England. I know not who thoſe Men are, nor by what Figure they ſpeak, who call a *Book* a *Church*; but this we all ſay, That the *Doctrine of the Church of England* is contained therein; and whatever the Opinions of private Perſons may be, this is the *Standard* by which the *Senſe* of our *Church* is to be taken: And that no objection ought to be made, againſt *Communion* with our *Church*, upon account of the *Doctrine* of it; but what reaches to ſuch *Articles* as are owned and received by this *Church*.

Miſchief of Impoſitions, Preface.

2. That there are, in effect, no *new Terms* of *Communion* with this *Church*, but the ſame, which our firſt *Reformers* owned, and ſuffered *Martyrdom* for, in Q. *Mary*'s days. Not, but that ſome *Alterations* have been made ſince, but not ſuch as do, in the Judgment of our Brethren, make the Terms of *Communion* harder than before. Mr. *Baxter* grants, that the Terms of *Lay-Communion* are rather made eaſier by ſuch *Alterations*, even ſince the *additional Conformity*, with reſpect to the late Troubles. The ſame *Reaſons* then, which would now make the *Terms* of our *Communion unlawful*, muſt have held againſt *Cranmer*, *Ridley*, &c. who laid down their Lives for the *Reformation* of this *Church*. And this the *old Non-conformiſts* thought a conſiderable Argument againſt *ſeparating* from the *Communion* of our *Church*, becauſe *it reflected much on the honour of our Martyrs*; who not only lived and died in the *Communion* of this *Church*, and in the practice of thoſe things, which ſome are now moſt offended at, but were themſelves the great Inſtruments in ſetling the *Terms* of our *Communion*.

Jacob *againſt* Johnſon, *p.* 21, 23, 29, 32, 33, 37, 40, 42, 47, 54, 68, 79, 82. Bradſhaw's *Anſwer to* Johnſon's *Third Reaſon.* *Sect.* 2.

3. That *Communion* with our *Church* hath ſtill been owned by the *Proteſtant* and *Reformed Churches* abroad. Which they have not only manifeſted, by receiving the *Apology* and *Articles* of our *Church* into the *Harmony* of *Confeſſions*, but by the *Teſtimony* and *Approbation* which hath been given to it by the moſt eſteemed and learned *Writers* of thoſe *Churches*, and by the diſcountenance which they have ſtill given to *Separation* from the *Communion* of it. This Argument was often objected againſt the *Separatiſts*, by the *Non-conformiſts*; and *Ainſworth* attempts to anſwer it no leſs than four times in one *Book*; but the beſt Anſwer he gives, is, *That if it prove any thing, it proves more than they would have. For*, ſaith he, *the Reformed Churches have diſcerned the National Church of* England *to be a true Church; they have diſcerned the Dioceſan Biſhops of* England, *as well as the Pariſh-Prieſts to be true Miniſters, and rejoice as well for their Sees, as for your Pariſhes, having joined theſe all alike in their Harmony.* As to the good opinion of the *Reformed Church*, and *Proteſtant Divines* abroad, concerning the *Conſtitution* and *Orders* of our Church, ſo much hath been proved already by Dr. *Durel*, and ſo little or nothing hath been ſaid to diſprove his evidence, that this ought to be taken as a thing granted; but, if occaſion be given, both he and others are able to produce much more from the *Teſtimony* of *foreign Divines*, in juſtification of the *Communion* of our *Church* againſt all pretences of *Separation* from it.

Gifford *againſt* Brown. *p.* 97, 98, 100.

Counterpoyſon, p. 9, 10, 27, 51, 92.

Sect. 2. We now come to the ſeveral *Hypotheſes* and *Principles* of *Separation*, which are at this day among the *Diſſenters* from our *Church*.

Some do ſeem to allow *ſeparate Congregations* only *in ſuch places where the Churches are not capable to receive the Inhabitants.* For this I find inſiſted on, by almoſt all my Anſwerers: *Some Pariſhes*, ſaith one,

Letter out of the Country, p. 34.

cannot

Miſchief of Impoſition. Preface. Rector of Sutton, *&c. p.* 35.

cannot receive a tenth part, ſome not half the People belonging to them, few can receive all. The Parochial Teacher, ſaith another, *is overlaid with a numerous throng of People. The Pariſh-Miniſters are not near ſufficient for ſo populous a City*, ſaith a third. And yet not one of theſe, but aſſigns ſuch reaſons, for *the neceſſity of ſeparate Congregations*, as would equally hold, if there were never a *Church* in *London*, but what would hold all the *Inhabitants* together. This is therefore but a *colour*, and *pretence*, and no *real Cauſe*. Any one would think, by Mr. *Baxter*'s inſiſting ſo very much, *on the greatneſs and largeneſs of our Pariſhes, as the reaſon of his preaching in ſeparate Congregations*, this were his opinion, *that ſuch Congregations are only allowable in ſuch vaſt Pariſhes, where they are helps to the parochial Churches:* And no Man denies, that more Places for Worſhip are deſireable, and would be very uſeful, where they may be had, and the ſame way of Worſhip and Order obſerved in them, as in our *Parochial Churches*, where they may be under the ſame Inſpection, and Eccleſiaſtical Government; where, upon pretence of greater *purity of Worſhip*, and *better means of Edification*, the People are not drawn into *Separation*. But, is it poſſible that Mr. *Baxter* ſhould think the caſe alike, where the *Orders* of our *Church* are conſtantly neglected, the *Authority* of the *Biſhops* is ſlighted and contemned; and ſuch *Meetings* are kept up in affront to them, and the Laws? Would Mr. *B.* have thought this a ſufficient reaſon for Mr. *Tombs* to have ſet up a *Meeting* of *Anabaptiſts* in *Kidderminſter*, becauſe it is *a very large Pariſh?* Or for *R. Williams* in *New-England* to have ſet up a *ſeparate Congregation* at *Boſton*, becauſe there were but *three Churches* there, to receive all the numerous Inhabitants? If ſuch a number of *Churches* could be built, as were ſuitable to the *greatneſs* and *extent* of *Pariſhes*, we ſhould be ſo far from oppoſing it, that we ſhould be very *thankful* to thoſe who would accompliſh ſo excellent a Work; but, in the mean time, is this juſt and reaſonable, to draw away the *People*, who come to our *Churches*, under the pretence of *preaching* to thoſe who cannot come? For, upon conſideration, we ſhall find,

Anſwer to Let. p. 24.

Anſ. to Letter, p. 17. *Anſwer to Serm. p.* 57.

(1.) That this is Mr. *Baxter*'s own caſe. For, if we obſerve him, although he ſometimes pretends *only to preach to ſome of many thouſands, that cannot come into the Temples, many of which never heard a Sermon of many years*; and to this purpoſe he put ſo many Quæres to me, concerning *the largeneſs of Pariſhes, and the neceſſity of more Aſſiſtants*, thereby to inſinuate, *That what he did, was only to preach to ſuch, as could not come to our Churches*; yet, when he is pinch'd with the point of *Separation*, then he declares, *That his hearers are the ſame with ours; at leaſt ten or twenty for one; and that he knows not many, (if any) who uſe to hear him, that ſeparate from us.* If this be true, as no doubt Mr. *B.* believes it, then what ſuch mighty *help*, or *aſſiſtance* is this to our *great Pariſhes?* What colour, or pretence is there from the *largeneſs* of them, that he ſhould preach to the *very ſame Perſons*, who come to our *Churches?* And if ſuch *Meetings* as theirs be only lawful *in great Pariſhes, where they preach to ſome of many thouſands who cannot come into the Churches*, then how come they to be lawful, where few or none of thoſe *many thouſands* ever come at all, but they are filled with the very ſame Perſons, who come to our *Pariſh-Churches?* Theſe two pretences then are inconſiſtent with each other; and one of them cannot hold. For if he doth preach *to thoſe who come to our Churches, and ſcarce to any elſe (if any*, as Mr. *B.* ſuppoſes) then all the pretence from the *largeneſs of our*

Pariſhes, and the many thouſands who cannot come to our Churches, is vain and impertinent; and, to ſpeak ſoftly, not becoming Mr. *Baxter*'s ſincerity.

(2.) That if this were Mr. *Baxter*'s own caſe, *viz. That he preached only to ſuch, as could not come to our Churches*, it would be no defence of the *general practice* of *Diſſenters*, who expreſs no regard at all to the *greatneſs* or *ſmallneſs of Pariſhes.* As, if it were neceſſary, might be proved by an *Induction* of the particular *Congregations* within the *City*; and in the *adjacent Pariſhes.* Either thoſe *ſeparate Meetings* are *lawful* or not; if not, why doth not Mr. *Baxter* diſown them? if they be, why doth he pretend the *greatneſs* of *Pariſhes* to juſtifie *ſeparate Meetings*; when, if they were never ſo ſmall, they would be lawful however? This therefore muſt be ſet aſide, as a mere *colour* and *pretence*, which he thought plauſible for himſelf, and invidious to us, though the bounds of our Pariſhes were neither of our own making, nor is it in our power to alter them. And we ſhall find, that Mr. *B.* doth juſtifie them upon other grounds, which have no relation at all to the *extent* of *Pariſhes*, or *capacity* of *Churches.* I come therefore to the real grounds which they proceed upon.

Sect. 3. Some do allow *Communion* with *ſome Parochial Churches, in ſome Duties, at ſome Seaſons*; but not *with all Churches, in all Duties, or at all times.* Theſe things muſt be more particularly explained, for a right underſtanding the *Myſtery* of the *preſent Separation.* Which proceeds not ſo openly and plainly, as the *old Separation* did, but hath ſuch artificial windings and turnings in it, that a Man thinks they are very near our *Church*, when they are at a great diſtance from it. If we charge them with following the *Steps* of the *old Separatiſts*, we utterly deny it, ſay they, *For they ſeparated from your Churches as no true Churches; they diſowned your Miniſtery and Hierarchy as Antichriſtian, and looked on your Worſhip as idolatrous*, but we do none of theſe things, and therefore you charge us unjuſtly with *Separation.* To which I anſwer,

(1.) There are many ſtill, eſpecially of the People, who purſue the Principles of the *old Separatiſts*; of whom Mr. *B.* hath ſpoken very well in his *Cure of Diviſions*, and the *Defence* of it, and elſewhere. Where he complains, *of their Violence and Cenſoriouſneſs*; *their Contempt of the graveſt and wiſeſt Paſtors*; *and forcing others to forſake their own Judgments to comply with their humours.* And, he ſaith, *A ſinful humouring of raſh Profeſſors, is as great a temptation to them, as a ſinful compliance with the great ones of the World.* In another place he ſaith, *The People will not endure any Forms of Prayers among them, but they declare they would be gone from them, if they do uſe them.* And he doth not diſſemble, that they do comply with them, in theſe remarkable words, *Should the Miniſters in* London, *that have ſuffer'd ſo long, but uſe any part of the Liturgy and Scripture-Forms, though without any motive but the pleaſing God, and the Church's good; what muttering and cenſuring would then be among them? And woe to thoſe few Teachers that make up their Deſigns by cheriſhing theſe Diſtempers. One would think, that their warning had been fair; but,* Si nati ſint ad bis perdendam Angliam; *The Lord have mercy upon us.*

Cure of Diviſ. p. 393.

Sacrileg. deſertion, p. 102, &c.

(2.) When the matter is throughly examined, the difference between their *Teachers*, and the *old Separatiſts*, will be found not near ſo great as is pretended. For what matter is it, as to the *nature* of *Separation*, whether the *Terms* of our *Communion* be called *idolatrous*, or *unlawful*; whether the *Miniſtery* of our *Church* be called a *falſe Miniſtery*, or *inſufficient*,

ficient, *ſcandalous*, *Uſurpers*, and *Perſecutors*; whether our *Hierarchy* be called *Antichriſtian*, or *repugnant to the Inſtitution of Chriſt*. Now theſe are the very ſame Arguments which the *old Separatiſts* uſed, only they are diſguiſed under another appearance, and put into a more faſhionable dreſs, as will be manifeſt by Particulars.

(1.) As to the *People*.

(2.) As to the *Miniſtry* of our *Church*.

Sect. 4. (1.) Our preſent Diſſenters, who diſown the *old Separation*, yet make the Terms of *Lay-Communion* for Perſons, as *Members of our Church*, to be *unlawful*. For, Mr. *B.* in his late *Plea for Peace*, hath a whole *Chapter* of *Reaſons* againſt *the Communion of Lay-men with our Church*. And in the ſame Book, he ſaith, *It is ſchiſmatical in a Church to deny Baptiſm, without the tranſient Sign of the Croſs, or for want of Godfathers*, &c. *or to deny the Communion to ſuch who ſcruple kneeling*. Now if the *Church* be *ſchiſmatical*, then thoſe who ſeparate in theſe things are not. For, ſaith Mr. *B. When the Laity cannot have their Children baptized without ſuch uſe of the tranſient dedicating Image of the Croſs; and ſuch uſe of entitling and covenanting Godfathers, which they take to be no ſmall ſin: Is it Separation to join with Paſtors that will otherwiſe baptize them?* We ſee the *Church* is *ſchiſmatical* in requiring theſe things, and Mr. *B.* thinks *the People bound to join with other Paſtors that will not uſe them*: And what is this but *formal Separation? But for all this, Mr.* B. *may hold, that total renouncing of Communion with our Church may be ſchiſmatical; for,* he ſaith, *it may be Schiſm to ſeparate from a Church that hath ſome ſchiſmatical Principles, Practices, and Perſons, if thoſe be not ſuch, and ſo great, as to neceſſitate our departure from them.* But here Mr. *B.* ſaith, *There is a neceſſity of departure, and to join with other Paſtors*; and therefore he muſt hold a *formal Separation*: And as to *the renouncing total Communion with our Church*, that was never done by the greateſt *Separatiſt*. For they all held *Communion* in *Faith* with it: And even *Brown*, the *Head* of the *old Separatiſts*, thought it *lawful* to join with our *Church* in *ſome Acts of Worſhip*; and others thought they might join in *Acts* of *private* and *Chriſtian-Communion*, but not *in Acts of Church Communion*; others thought it *lawful* to join *in hearing Sermons*, and *Pulpit-Prayers*, though not in others; and yet were charged with *Separation* by the *old Non-conformiſts*. And if our *preſent Diſſenters* do hold the *Terms of Communion* with our *Church* to be *unlawful*, they muſt hold a *neceſſity* of *Separation*, or that Perſons may be good *Chriſtians*, and yet be no *Members* of any *Church*. For, if it be unlawful to *communicate* as *Members of our Church*, they muſt either not *communicate* at all, as *Members* of any *Church*, or as *Members* of a *diſtinct* and *ſeparate Church* from ours. If they declare themſelves *Members* of *another Church*, they own as plain a *Separation*, as the *old Separatiſts* ever did; if they do not, and yet hold it *unlawful* to *communicate* with our *Churches* as *Members*, then they are *Members* of no *Church* at all. So that, if they hold the *Terms* of our *Communion unlawful*; they muſt either be *Separatiſts*, or *no good Chriſtians* upon their own Principles. For, ſaith the *Author* of *the Letter out of the Country*; *this were to exchange viſible Chriſtianity, for viſible (at leaſt negative) Paganiſm.* Now that our *preſent Diſſenters* do hold the *Terms of our Communion unlawful*, they are more forward to declare, than I could have imagined. In my *Sermon* I mentioned ſome Paſſages, wherein it ſeemed clear to me, that ſome conſiderable Perſons among them *did allow Lay-communion with our*

Firſt Plea, §. 9. p. 141.

Page 45.

Anſwer to Serm. p. 49.

Plea for Peace, p. 47.

Letter out of the Country, &c. p. 9.

our Church to be lawful: But they have taken a great deal of pains to undeceive me; ſome declaring in expreſs terms, *That they look on the terms of our Communion as unlawful, and that there is a neceſſity of Separation from our Parochial Churches, and of joyning to other Congregations.* And others ſaying, *That ſuch a Conceſſion*, viz. *That they hold Communion with our Churches to be lawful, taken in their own ſenſe, will neither do them any harm, nor us any ſervice.* For, as Mr. *A.* hath ſummed up the ſenſe of theſe Men. 1. *Many of them declare ſo, and many declare otherwiſe,—— And it's as good an Argument to prove Communion unlawful, becauſe many declare againſt it, as 'tis to prove it lawful, becauſe many declare for it.* 2. *They declare Communion lawful, but, do they declare total Communion lawful? The ſame Perſons will tell us, that both theſe Propoſitions are true, Communion is lawful, and Communion is unlawful; Communion in ſome parts of Worſhip is ſo, in others not: And,* 3. *They will farther tell us, That Communion with ſome Pariſh Churches is lawful, with others unlawful; that there are not the ſame Doctrines preached, the ſame Ceremonies urged, the ſame rigid terms of Communion in all Churches exacted. And laſtly, that occaſional Communion is, or may be lawful, where a ſtated and fixed Communion is not ſo; and they give this Reaſon for their Judgment and Practice, becauſe to hold Communion with one Church, or ſort of Chriſtians, excluſively to all others, is contrary to their true Catholick Principles, which teach them to hold Communion, though not equally, with all tolerable Churches; and that there are ſome things tolerable, which are not eligible, wherein they can bear with much for Peace ſake, but chuſe rather to ſit down ordinarily with purer Adminiſtrations.* Here we have the *Principles* of the *new Separation* laid together.

Dr. O. Vindication, &c. p. 35.

Miſchief of Impoſitions, &c. p. 36.

1. Many of them *hold Communion with our Church unlawful*; and that muſt be underſtood of any *kind* of *Communion*; for the ſecond ſort, from whom they are diſtinguiſhed, hold *total Communion unlawful*; and therefore this firſt ſort muſt hold *Communion in any parts of Worſhip unlawful.* And ſo they exceed the more moderate *Separatiſts* of *Robinſon*'s, and the *New-England* way; and muſt fall into the way of the moſt *rigid Separatiſts.*

2. Thoſe that *do hold Communion lawful*, do it with ſo many *reſtrictions* and *limitations*, that in practice it amounts to little more than the other. For *firſt*, It is only with *ſome Churches*; and thoſe it ſeems muſt be ſuch, as do not hold to our *Conſtitution*; for he ſaith, *The ſame Ceremonies are not urged in all Churches, nor the ſame rigid terms of Communion exacted*, i. e. If any *Churches* among us comply with them, they can *Communicate* with them, *i. e.* if *they break their own Rules*, they can joyn with them. Is not this an admirable way of *Communicating* with our *Churches?* But, if our *Churches* hold to their *Rule*, and obſerve the *Orders* preſcribed, then it ſeems they renounce all *Communion* with them as *unlawful.* And what is this but to deny *Communion* with the *Church* of *England?* For unleſs *Parochial Churches* depart from the *terms* of *Communion* required by it, they will have no *Communion* with them.

And Mr. *A.* delivers this, not only as his own Opinion, but as the Senſe of the Party, *That if moſt of the Preachers in the ſeparate Meetings were aſked their Judgments, about the lawfulneſs of joyning with the parochial Churches in all the parts of Worſhip, or in any excluſive to their joyning with other Aſſemblies, where the Goſpel Rule is more ſtrictly obſerved, they would flatly deny it.* And he goes yet farther, when he ſaith, *That the People cannot lawfully ſeparate from thoſe Churches whereof they are regu-*

Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 65.

larly Members, and from thoſe Paſtors, under whoſe Miniſterial Conduct their own free Election hath placed them, to joyn ordinarily and conſtantly with any other particular Churches. This is owning a plain and downright *Separation*, in as clear and diſtinct words as ever *Johnſon* or *Ainſworth* did. For, 1. He makes it to be their general ſenſe, *That it is unlawful to communicate with our Churches ordinarily and conſtantly*, or to be *Members* of our *Churches:* Which is the ſame thing which they ſaid, 2. He owns the ſetting up new and diſtinct Churches in plain oppoſition to ours. For he owns *other Paſtors*, *other People*, and a new *Relation between* theſe, by the *choice* of the one, and the *conduct* of the other. This is no mincing the matter, as Mr. *B.* often doth; but he ſpeaks it boldly, and with great aſſurance; and uſhers it in with, *I have confidence contrary to his.* I think no Man doubts of his *Confidence*, that ever looked into his Book; but in this matter he is ſo briſk, that he ſaith, *He doth not queſtion that he ſhould carry it by the Poll.* And is withal ſo indiſcreet as on this occaſion to triumph *in the Poll of Non-conformiſts at Guidhall:* as though all who gave their Votes there, had owned theſe Principles of *Separation*, for which, many of thoſe Gentlemen will give him little thanks, and is a very unſeaſonable boaſting of their Numbers.

(II.) All the difference then that ſeems to be left, is about the lawfulneſs of that which they call *occaſional Communion.* As to which, theſe things are to be obſerved. (1.) That it is practiſed by *very few*; eſpecially if Mr. *A*'s *Poll* be allowed. (2.) That it ſignifies little, as to this matter, if Men be fixed *Members* of other Churches. For the denomination of their *Communion* is to be taken from thence, and not from an *occaſional* and *accidental Preſence.* For *Communion* with a *Church*, is joyning with a *Church* as a *Member* of that *Church:* And it is not *occaſional Preſence* at *ſome parts of Worſhip*, which makes a Man a *Member* of a *Church.* I ſuppoſe there are many *occaſionally Preſent* at Mr. *A*'s, or Mr. *B*'s *Meetings*, who renounce all *Communion* with them. A *Proteſtant* may be *occaſionally preſent* at *ſome parts of Worſhip* in the *Roman Church*, and that frequently too, *to hear Sermons*, &c. but, doth this make a Man to have *Communion* with the *Church* of *Rome?* Moſt of our *Gentlemen* who have travelled abroad, have been thus *occaſionally preſent* in *ſome parts of the Romiſh Worſhip*, at *Rome* and *Paris*; but they would think themſelves hardly dealt with, to be charged to have had *Communion* with the *Church* of *Rome.* And if they be urged with it, they will plead ſtill, *They were of the Proteſtant Communion*; and the Reaſon they will give, is, becauſe they did not joyn with them *in all parts* of their *Worſhip*; not in *adoration of the Hoſt*, or *Worſhip* of *Images*; and therefore they remained ſtill of the *Proteſtant Communion*, although they were *occaſionally preſent* at *ſome parts* of the *Popiſh Service.* And is it not the ſame caſe here, if Men only afford an *occaſional Preſence*, at *ſome parts of our Worſhip?* How comes this to make them more to have *Communion* with our *Church*, than the like preſence would make them to have *Communion* with the *Roman Church?* In the beginning of Queen *Elizabeth*'s Reign, moſt of the *Papiſts* in *England* did offer an *Occaſional Preſence* at our *Churches*, in *ſome parts of our Worſhip*; and yet all that time were Members of the *Roman Church*, becauſe they kept their *Prieſts*, and had *Maſs* in private, and declared, That though they looked on our *Service* as *tolerable*, yet they thought the Roman *more eligible*; and ſo having *full Communion* with that, and being only *occaſionally preſent* at our *Service*, they thought themſelves good *Catholicks.* So, if Men do look on the *ſeparate Meet-*

ings as *more eligible*, and *a better way of Worſhip*; with which they *conſtantly joyn*, and *always chooſe* to do it, their *occaſional Preſence* at our Aſſemblies, doth not make them *Members* of our *Churches*, but they ſtill remain *Members* of the *ſeparate Congregations*, if they maintain full and conſtant Communion with them. And none of the formed *ſeparate Churches* will look on any one as having *Communion* with them, for being *occaſionally preſent at ſome parts of their Worſhip*; for they ſay, That *Heathens* and *Indians* may have ſuch *occaſional Communion* with them; but they require from *Perſons* that are admitted to *Communion* with their *Churches*, a *Submiſſion* to *all the Rules* and *Orders* among them. The *New-England Churches* will ſuffer no Man to continue a *Member* of their *Communion*, that ſcruples *Infant Baptiſm*, or *refuſes to be preſent at the Adminiſtration of it*; although he be never ſo willing to be *occaſionally preſent* at all other parts of *Worſhip* with them. For not only *openly condemning and oppoſing Infant-Baptiſm, but going about ſecretly to ſeduce others from the approbation or uſe thereof, or purpoſely departing the Congregation at the Adminiſtration of that Ordinance*, is liable, by their *Laws*, to the *Sentence* of *Baniſhment*. And they have found it ſo neceſſary to twiſt the *Civil* and *Eccleſiaſtical Intereſts* together, that as none but *Church Members* are *Freemen* among them; ſo none that are *baniſhed* can retain their *Church-Memberſhip*. From all this, it appears, that this *new Notion* of *Occaſional Communion, in ſome parts of Worſhip*, excluſively to others, is diſowned by all ſorts of *Churches*; and is a late fancy taken up on purpoſe to avoid the charge of *Separation*.

Sect. 5. But we here meet with an excellent Reaſon for the *lawfulneſs* of this *Occaſional Communion* with our *Churches*; viz. *becauſe to hold Communion with one Church excluſively to all others, is contrary to their true Catholick Principles, which teach them to hold Communion, though not equally, with all tolerable Churches*, Or as Mr. *B.* expreſſes it, *The benefit of Chriſtian Love and Concord may make it beſt, for certain ſeaſons, to joyn even in defective Modes of Worſhip, as* Chriſt *did in the Synagogues and Temple in his time: though the leaſt defective muſt be choſen, when no ſuch accidental Reaſons ſway the other way.* From whence we may take notice, (1.) That no obligation to the *Peace* and *Unity* of this Church, as they are *Members* of it, doth bring them to this *occaſional Communion* with it, but a certain Romantick Fancy of *Catholick Unity*; by which theſe *Catholick Gentlemen* think themſelves no more obliged to the *Communion* of this *Church*, than of the *Armenian* or *Abiſſine Churches*. Only it happens, that our *Church* is ſo much nearer to them, than the others are, and therefore they can afford it more *occaſional Communion*. But I would ſuppoſe one of theſe Men of *Catholick Principles* to be at *Jeruſalem*, where he might have *occaſional Communion* with all ſorts of the *Eaſtern Churches*; and ſome of the *Members* of thoſe *Churches* ſhould aſk him, what *Church he is Member of?* If he ſhould anſwer, he could have *occaſional Communion* with all *tolerable Churches*, but was a *fixed Member* of none: Would they take ſuch a Man for a *Chriſtian?* What, a Chriſtian and a *Member* of no *Church!* That, they would all agree, was no *part* of *Catholick Chriſtianity*. And I much doubt, whether any of them would admit ſuch a *one* to *occaſional Communion*, that could not tell what *Church* he was Member of. For, as to the *Church* of *England*, he declares, *That he holds only occaſional Communion with that*, as he would do with any other *tolerable Churches*. But, were they not *baptized* in this *Church*, and received into *Communion* with it as *Members* of it? if ſo, then if they Commu-

Sacrileg. deſertion, p. 16

Communicate no otherwiſe with it, than as a *tolerable defective Church*, they muſt renounce their former *Memberſhip*; for that did oblige them to *fixed* and *conſtant Communion* with it. And if they do renounce their *Memberſhip* in this *Church*, their *occaſional Preſence at ſome duties of Worſhip* can never excuſe them from Separation. We thank them, that they are pleaſed to account *our Churches tolerable*, but we cannot ſee, how in any *tolerable ſenſe* they can be accounted *Members* of our *Church*; ſo that this great favour of *occaſional Communion*, which they do not chuſe but ſubmit to *for ſome accidental reaſons*, and ſome very good *occaſions*, is not worth the ſpeaking of among Friends; and ſo far from looking like *Communion*, that it hath hardly the face of a *Civility*.

(2.) That, *if the leaſt defective way of Worſhip is to be choſen*, as they ſay, then this *occaſional Communion* cannot be *lawful* above *once* or *twice* in a Man's Life: For that is ſufficient to ſhew their *true Catholick Principles*; and Mr. *B.* ſaith, *When no ſuch accidental Reaſons do ſway, they are to chooſe the leaſt defective way of Worſhip*; or as Mr. *A.* ſpeaks, *To ſit down ordinarily with purer Adminiſtrations.* If then a Man be bound, *out of love to his Soul, to prefer the beſt way of Worſhip*, and he judges the *way of the ſeparate Congregations* to be *ſuch*, there will ariſe a difficult caſe of Conſcience, concerning the *lawfulneſs* of this *occaſional Communion.* For the ſame *Reaſons*, which moved him to prefer one *Communion* above the other, will likewiſe induce him to think himſelf bound to adhere *conſtantly* to the one, and to forſake the other. And why ſhould a Man, that is acquainted with *purer Adminiſtrations*, give ſo much countenance to a *defective way of Worſhip*, and have any Communion with a Church which *walks ſo diſorderly*, and contrary to the Rules of the Goſpel; and *not reprove her rather*, by a total forbearance of her *Communion?* And why ſhould not thoſe general Rules of *approving the things that are more excellent*, and *holding faſt that which is good, and not forſaking the Aſſembling themſelves together*, perſuade ſuch a Man, that it is not *lawful* to leave the *beſt Communion*, merely to ſhew, what *defective, and tolerable Church he can communicate with?* Which is, as if a Man ſhould forſake his *Muſkmelons*, to let others ſee what *Pumpions* he can ſwallow; or to leave wholeſome Diet to feed on *Muſhroms*, and *Traſh*.

(3.) That here are no bounds ſet to the *Peoples Fancies* of *purer Adminiſtrations*, and *leſs defective ways of Worſhip.* So that there can be no *ſtop* to *Separation* in this way. Suppoſe ſome think our *Churches tolerable*, and Mr. *B*'s or Mr. *A*'s *Meetings more eligible*; but after a while, when the firſt reliſh is over, they afford *occaſional Communion* to the *Anabaptiſts* or *Quakers*, and then think their way *more eligible*, and the other *only tolerable*; are not theſe Men bound to forſake them, for the ſame Reaſons, by which they were firſt moved to leave our *Communion*, and joyn with them, unleſs they be ſecure, that the abſolute perfection of their way of Worſhip is ſo glaringly viſible to all Mankind, that it is
Defence of the Cure of Diviſ. Introd. p. 50. impoſſible for them, either to find or fancy any defect in it? Mr. *Baxter* once very well ſaid, *Separation will ruin the ſeparated Churches themſelves at laſt*; *it will admit of no conſiſtency. Parties will ariſe in the ſeparated Churches, and ſeparate again from them, till they are diſſolved.*
Ibid. p. 170. Why might not *R. Williams* of *New-England* (mention'd by Mr. *B.*) proceed in his courſe of *Separation* from the *Church* of *Salem*, becauſe he thought he had found out a *purer and leſs defective way of Worſhip than theirs*; as well as they might withdraw from our *Churches* on the like

pretence? Why might he not go on ſtill refining of *Churches*, till at laſt he diſſolved his Society, and declared, *That every one ſhould have liberty to worſhip God according to the light of his own Conſcience?* By which remarkable Inſtance, we ſee, that this Principle, when purſued, will carry Men at laſt to the diſſolution of all Churches.

Sect. 6. This I had objected to Mr. *B.* in my *Letter*, that upon his Principles the *People* might leave him to morrow, and go to Dr. O. and leave *him* next week, and go to the Anabaptiſts, and from *them* to the Quakers. To which Mr. *B.* anſwers; *What harm will it do me or them, if any hearers go from me, as you ſay, to* Dr. O. None, that I know. For, as Dr. O. ſaith, *Since your practice is one and the ſame, your Principles muſt be ſo alſo, although you chuſe ſeveral ways of expreſſing them.* But, did the whole force of my Argument lie there? Did I not mention *their going from him to the Anabaptiſts and Quakers*, upon the very ſame ground? And, is this a good way of anſwering, to diſſemble the main force of an Argument, that ſomething may ſeem to be ſaid to it? I ſuppoſe Mr. *B*'s great haſte made him leave the beſt part of the Argument behind him. But I deſire him calmly to weigh and conſider it better; whether he doth think it reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that ſince the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church* is a thing of ſuch great importance, and *Separation ſo miſchievous* (as he hath repreſented it) that the *Peoples* apprehenſion of a *leſs defective way of Worſhip*, ſhall be ſufficient ground for them to break a Church in pieces, and to run into ways of *Separation?* Hath not Mr. *Baxter* repreſented (and no Man better) *the Ignorance, Injudiciouſneſs, Pride, Conceitedneſs, and Unpeaceableneſs of the ordinary ſort of zealous Profeſſors of Religion?* And after all this, muſt they, upon a conceit of *purer Adminiſtrations, and leſs defective ways of worſhip*, be at liberty to rend and tear a Church into pieces; and run from one *ſeparate Congregation* to another, till they have run themſelves out of breath, and left the beſt parts of their Religion behind them? How fully hath Mr. *B.* ſet forth the *ungovernable and factious Humour of this ſort of People*, and the pernicious *conſequences of complying with them?* and muſt the Reins be laid in their Necks, that they may run whither they pleaſe? *Becauſe, forſooth, they know better, what is good for their Souls, than the King doth; and they love their Souls better than the King doth; and the King cannot bind them to hurt, or famiſh, or endanger their Souls.* But why muſt the *King* bear all the blame, if Mens Souls be not provided for according to their own wiſhes? Doth the *King* pretend to do any thing in this matter, but according to the *eſtabliſh'd Laws* and *Orders* of this *Church?* Why did he not keep to the good old Phraſe of *King and Parliament?* And why did he not put it as it ought to have been, that they know what makes better for their own *Edification*, than the *Wiſdom* of the whole *Nation* in *Parliament*, and the *Governours* of this *Church* do? and let them make what *Laws* and *Orders* they will, if the *People*, even *the raſh and injudicious Profeſſors*, as Mr. *B.* calls them, do think other means of *Edification* better, and other *ways* of *Worſhip leſs defective*, they are bound to break through all Laws, and to *run* into *Separation*. And, how is it poſſible, upon theſe Terms, to have any *Peace*, or *Order*, or any *eſtabliſh'd Church?* I do not remember that any of the *old Separatiſts*, no not *Barrow*, or *Johnſon*, did ever lay down ſuch looſe Principles of *Separation*, as theſe are. The *Browniſts* declare, in their Apology, *That none are to ſeparate for Faults and Corruptions, which may, and will fall out among Men, even in true conſtituted Churches, but by*

Anſw. p. 23.

Dr. O. *Vindicat. p.* 20.

Chriſtian Directory, Part 3. *p.* 739, 741.

Sacrileg. deſert. p. 102, &c.

Cure of Diviſ. p. 393.

Anſwer to my Letter, p. 23.

Apology of the Browniſts, *n.* 36.

by due order to ſeek the redreſs thereof. Where a *Church* is *rightly conſtituted*, here is no allowance of *Separation* for *Defects and Corruptions of Men*, although they might apprehend *Smith* or *Jacob* to be more *edifying Preachers*, than either *Johnſon* or *Ainſworth*. The ground of *Separation* with them, was the want of a *right conſtituted Church*; if that were once ſuppoſed, other *Defects* were never till now thought to be Chap. 13. good grounds of *Separation*. In the *Platform* of the *Diſcipline* of *New-England*, it is ſaid, *That Church-Members may not depart from the Church as they pleaſe, nor without juſt and weighty cauſe, becauſe ſuch departure tends to the diſſolution of the Body.*

Thoſe juſt Reaſons are,

1. *If a Man cannot continue without ſin.*
2. *In caſe of perſecution.*

Not one word of *better means of Edification*. For the *Independents* have wiſely taken care to ſecure their *Members* to their own *Congregations*, and not ſuffer them to wander abroad upon ſuch pretences, leſt ſuch liberty ſhould break them into diſorder and confuſion. So in their *Declaration* at the *Savoy*, they ſay, *That Perſons joined in Church-fellowſhip, ought not lightly, or without juſt cauſe, to withdraw themſelves from the Communion of the Church, whereunto they are joined.* Order of Congregational Churches, n. 28.

And they reckon up thoſe which they allow for *juſt cauſes*.

1. *Where any Perſon cannot continue in any Church without his ſin*, and that in three caſes.

First, *Want of Ordinances.*

Secondly, *Being deprived of due Privileges.*

Thirdly, *Being compelled to any thing in practice, not warranted by the word.*

2. *In caſe of perſecution.*
3. *Upon the account of conveniency of habitation.*

And in theſe caſes, the Church or Officers are to be conſulted, and then they may peaceably depart from the Communion of the Church. No allowance here made of *forſaking a Church*, merely for *greater means of edification*. And how juſt ſoever the reaſon were, they are civilly to take leave of the Church, and her Officers, and to tell them why they depart. Irenic. c.22. And Mr. *Burroughs* condemns it, *as the direct way to bring in all kind of diſorder and confuſion into the Church.* Yet this is now the main ſupport of the *preſent Separation*; and mere neceſſity hath driven them to it, for either they muſt own the Principles of the *old Separatiſts*, which they are unwilling to do, or find out others to ſerve their turn; but they are ſuch, as no Man, who hath any regard to the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church*, can ever think fit to maintain, ſince they apparently tend to nothing but *diſorder* and *confuſion*, as Mr. *Burroughs* truly obſerved. But what ground is there to ſuppoſe ſo much *greater means of edification* in the *ſeparate Congregations*? Anſwer to Letter, p. 18. ſince Mr. *B.* is pleaſed to give this *Teſtimony* to the *preaching* in our *Pariſh-Churches*; *That, for his part, he hath ſeldom heard any, but very good, well ſtudied Sermons, in the Pariſh-Churches in London, where he hath been; but moſt of them are more fitted to well bred Scholars, or judicious Hearers, than to ſuch as need more practical Subjects, and a more plain, familiar, eaſie method.* Is this the truth of the caſe indeed? then, for all that I can ſee, the *King* is excuſed from all blame in this matter, unleſs it be a fault to provide too well for them. And, is this a *good ground* for *Separation*, that the *preaching* is *too good* for the *People*? Some Men may want

Cauſes to defend, but at this rate they can never want Arguments. Yet, methinks, the ſame Men ſhould not complain of *ſtarving, and famiſhing Souls*, when the only fault is, that the Meat is *too good*, and *too well dreſſed* for them. And on the other ſide, hath not Mr. *B.* complained publickly of *the weakneſs and injudiciouſneſs* of *too many of the Non-conformiſt Preachers? and that he really fears, leſt mere Non-conformiſts have brought ſome into reputation as conſcientious, who, by weak preaching, will loſe the reputation of being judicious, more than their ſilence loſt it.* And again, *But verily the injudiciouſneſs of too many is for a lamentation.* To which he adds, *But the grand calamity is, that the moſt injudicious are uſually the moſt confident and ſelf-conceited, and none ſo commonly give way to their ignorant Zeal, to cenſure, backbite and reproach others, as thoſe that know not what they talk of.* Let now any Reader judge, whether upon the ſtating of the caſe by Mr. *B.* himſelf, their having *better means of edification*, can be the ground of leaving *our Churches*, to go to *ſeparate Congregations*, unleſs *injudiciouſneſs, and ſelf-conceited confidence and an ignorant Zeal* may perhaps be more edifying to ſome capacities, and to ſome purpoſes, than *judicious and well-ſtudied Sermons.*

Sacrileg. deſert. p. 86

This Argument muſt therefore be quitted, and they who will defend the *preſent Separation*, muſt return to the *old Principles* of the *Separatiſts*, if they will juſtifie their own *practices*. And ſo I find Mr. *B.* is forced to do; for diſcerning that the pretence of *greater edification* would not hold of it ſelf, he adds more weight to it, and that comes home to the buſineſs, *viz. That the People doubt of the Calling of the obtruded Men.* This is indeed an Argument for *Separation*, and the very ſame, which *Barrow*, and *Greenwood*, and *Johnſon*, and *Smith*, and *Can* uſed. Now we are come to the old Point of defending the *Calling of our Miniſtry*, but we are miſtaken, if we think they now manage it after the ſame manner. We do not hear ſo much the old Terms of a *Falſe and Antichriſtian Miniſtry*; but if they do ſubſtitute others in their room, as effectual to make a *Separation*, but leſs fit to juſtifie it, the difference will not appear to be at all to their advantage.

Anſw. p. 18.

Sect. 7. 2. I come therefore to conſider the *Principles* of our *new Separatiſts, as to the Miniſtry of our Church*, and to diſcover, how little they differ from the *old Separatiſts*, when this matter is throughly enquired into, as to the Argument for *Separation.*

I. In general, they declare, *That they only look on thoſe as true Churches, which have ſuch Paſtors whom they approve. How oft have I told you*, ſaith Mr. *B. that I diſtinguiſh, and take thoſe for true Churches, that have true Paſtors. But I take thoſe for no true Churches, that have,*

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 63.

1. *Men uncapable of the Paſtoral Office.*
2. *Or not truly called to it.*
3. *Or that deny themſelves to have the power eſſential to a Paſtor.*

And one or other of theſe he thinks moſt, if not all the *Parochial Churches* in *England* fall under.

You will ſay then, Mr. *B. is a Rigid Separatiſt; and thinks it not lawful to join with any of our Parochial Congregations, but this is contradicted by his own practice.*

There lies therefore a farther ſubtilty in this matter, for he declares in the ſame place, *he can join with them* notwithſtanding. But how? *as true Churches, though he ſaith they are not:* No, but as *Chappels and Oratories, although they be not Churches, as wanting an eſſential part.* This will bring the matter to a very good paſs, the *Pariſh-Churches* of

England ſhall only be *Chappels of Eaſe* to thoſe of the *Non-conformiſts*. This, I confeſs, is a Subtilty beyond the reach of the old *Browniſts*, and *Non-conformiſts*, for they both took it for granted, that there was ſufficient ground for *Separation, if our Churches were not true Churches*, and the proof of that depended on the *Truth* of our *Miniſtry*. Now, ſaith Mr. *B. Although our Parochial Congregations be not true Churches, becauſe they want an eſſential part*, viz. *a true Miniſtry, yet he can join with them occaſionally, as Chappels or Oratories.* From whence it appears, that he accounts not our *Parochial-Churches as true Churches*, nor doth communicate with them *as ſuch*, but only looks on them as *publick Places of Prayer*, to which a Man may reſort upon occaſion, without owning any relation to the *Miniſter*, or looking on the *Congregation* as a *Church*, For, where he ſpeaks more fully, he declares, That he looks *on none as true Churches, but ſuch as have the power of the Keys within themſelves, and hath a Biſhop or Paſtor over them with that Power, and any parochial Church* that hath ſuch a one, and owns it ſelf to be *independent*, he allows to be *a true Church*, and none elſe. So that unleſs our *Parochial-Churches, and Miniſters* aſſume to themſelves *Epiſcopal Power*, in oppoſition to the preſent *Conſtitution* of our *Church*, as he apprehends, he at once diſcards them all from being *true Churches:* But I ſhall afterwards diſcover his miſtake as to the *nature* of our *Parochial Churches*; that which I only inſiſt on now is, That he looks on none of them as *truly conſtituted Churches*, or, as he calls it, *of the political organized Form*, as wanting *an eſſential part*, viz. a *true Paſtor*. From hence it neceſſarily follows, either that Mr. *B.* communicates with *no true Church at all*; or it muſt be *a ſeparate Church*; or, if he thinks himſelf bound to be *a Member of a true Church*, he muſt proceed to as great a *Separation* as the old *Browniſts* did, by ſetting up *new Churches*, in oppoſition to ours. It is no ſufficient Anſwer in this caſe, to ſay, *That Mr.* B. *doth it not*, for we are only to ſhew, what he is obliged to do by vertue of his *own Principles*, which tend to as much *Separation*, as was practiſed in former Times, and hath been ſo often condemned by Mr. *B.*

Sacrileg. deſert. p. 34. *True way of Concord, Ch.* 10.

Sect. 8. II. Suppoſe they ſhould allow *our Parochial Churches* in their *Conſtitution* to be *true Churches*, yet the *Exceptions* they make againſt the *Miniſtens* of our *Churches* are ſo many, that they ſcarce allow any, from whom they may not *lawfully ſeparate.*

1. If the People judge their *Miniſters unworthy*, or *incompetent*, they allow them liberty to *withdraw*, and to *ſeparate* from them. This I ſhall prove from many Paſſages in ſeveral *Books* of Mr. *B.* and others.

Firſt, They leave it in the *Peoples power*, notwithſtanding all legal Eſtabliſhments, *to own or diſown whom they judg fit.* Mr. *B.* ſpeaks his Mind very freely againſt the *Rights* and *Patronage*, and the *Power* of *Magiſtrates* in theſe caſes, and pleads for the unalterable *Rights* of *the People*, as the old *Separatiſts* did. *God*, ſaith Mr. *B. in Nature and Scripture, hath given the People that conſenting power, antecedent to the Prince's determination, which none can take from them.* Mr. *A.* ſaith, *Every particular Church has an inherent right to chuſe its own Paſtors.* D. O. makes *the depriving the People of this Right, one of his grounds of Separation.* So that although our Miniſters have been long in poſſeſſion of their Places, yet *if the People have not owned them*, they are at liberty *to chuſe whom they pleaſe. How many hundred Congregations*, ſaith Mr. *B. have Incumbents, whom the People never conſented to, but take them for their hinderers and burden!* So many hundred *Congregations* it ſeems are in readineſs for *Separation.*

Anſw. p. 15, 50.

Plea for Peace, p. 55.

Browniſts *Apology*, Sect. 23.

Miſchief of Impoſition. Preface.

Dr. O's. *Vindic.* p. 36.

Anſw. p. 50.

Secondly, The *People* are made *Judges* of the *worthineſs* and *competency* of their *Miniſters*. This follows from the former. *In caſe incompetent Paſtors be ſet over the People*, ſaith Mr. *B.* *though it be half the Pariſhes in a Kingdom, or only the tenth part, it is no Schiſm*, ſaith he, *but a Duty, for thoſe that are deſtitute, to get the beſt ſupply they can*, i. e. to *chuſe* thoſe whom they judge more *competent*; *and it is no Schiſm, but a Duty, for faithful Miniſters, though forbidden by Superiors, to perform their Office to ſuch People that deſire it.* This is plain-dealing. But ſuppoſe the *Magiſtrate* ſhould *caſt* out ſome, and *put in others*; *in that caſe* he ſaith, *If they be Men of untried and ſuſpected parts of fidelity*, (of which the People are to be Judges) the *Princes impoſition doth not make ſuch true Paſtors of the Church before, or without the Peoples conſent, nor doth it always bind the People to conſent, and to forſake their former Paſtors, nor prove them Schiſmaticks, becauſe they do it not.*

Plea for Peace, p. 83.

Thirdly, They give particular *Directions* to the *People*, what ſort of *Miniſters* they ſhould *own*, and what not. Mr. *B.* bids *the People not think that he is perſuading them to make no difference*; but after he had ſet aſide the *utterly inſufficient*, and the *heretical*, (of which the People are admirable Judges) he lays down this general Rule, *Any one whoſe Miniſtry is ſuch, as tendeth to deſtruction more than to edification, and to do more harm than good, is not to be owned.* And if not to be *owned* ſo, then he is to be *ſeparated* from; and although he *adviſeth* the *People to lay aſide partiality and paſſion*; yet whether they will or not, they are left *ſole Judges* in this matter. And that we may not think all this to be only a *Romantick* Scheme, or Fiction, he tells us elſewhere, *That they are not able to confute the People, in too many places, who tell them, that their publick Prieſts are ſo defective in their neceſſary Qualifications for their Office, as that they hold it unlawful to own ſuch for true Miniſters, and to encourage them by their preſence, or commit the care of their Souls to ſuch*, i. e. in plain Terms, they are encouraged to *Separation* on this account, which is directly contrary to the Principles of the *old Non-conformiſts*, as appears at large by Mr. *Ball*, *If*, ſaith he, *Can's meaning be, that it is not lawful to communicate in the Worſhip of God with Miniſters not fitly qualified, diſorderly called, or careleſly executing their Office and Function, then it is directly contrary to the word of Truth, ſound Reaſon, and conſent of all the Learned.* With much more to that purpoſe. And even Mr. *B.* himſelf, when he takes upon him, as a *Caſuiſt*, to determine theſe things, doth then declare his Mind.

Cure of Diviſions, Direct. 36.

Sacrileg. deſert. p. 10.

Ball againſt Can, p. 1, 4, 5, &c.

Pag. 15, 42, 56.

Tryal of New Church *way*, p. 11.

Chriſtian Directory, Part 3. p. 747.

1. *That a Miniſter's perſonal Faults do not allow People to ſeparate from the Worſhip of God.*
2. *Nor all miniſterial Faults, but only thoſe that prove him or his Miniſtration utterly intolerable.*

But now, if Mr. *B.* may be believed, *the People need not be told, how great a number of Caſes there are among us, where the Miniſters are uncapable of the miniſterial Office, and therefore it is no ſin in them to judge him no Miniſter*, and, conſequently, to *ſeparate* from him. Hath not Mr. *B.* fully ſet forth the *Pride, Ignorance, Cenſoriouſneſs, Headineſs, Raſhneſs*, of *raw and injudicious Zealots?* and after all this, is it fit or reaſonable, that the Opinion of ſuch Perſons be taken, concerning the Qualifications of their *Miniſters?* Hath not Mr. *B.* complained with more than ordinary reſentment, *that they are ready to ſcorn, and vilifie the graveſt wiſeſt Paſtors?* And, muſt ſuch Mens Judgments be taken, concerning the *Abilities* and *Competency* of their *Miniſters?* Either Mr. *B.*

Anſw. p. 50.

Cure of Diviſ. p. 393.

hath extremely *wronged* them in the *Characters* he hath given of ſuch *People*; or he hath taken away all the reputation of their Judgment in ſuch Caſes: When *they ſcorn and contemn the graveſt wiſeſt Paſtors*, are they fit to judge of *Miniſterial Abilities? But there are graver and wiſer among the People.* Suppoſe that; but doth not Mr. *B.* ſay, *That the raweſt and raſheſt Profeſſors are commonly the moſt violent and cenſorious?* Theſe are the bold and forward Men, that will judge in ſpite of the reſt; theſe are the Men *that need not be told, what numbers of uncapable Miniſters there are among us.* And it doth not become Mr. *B.*'s *Gravity* or *Wiſdom* to hearken to all the *Cenſures* and *malicious Reports* of ſuch *ignorant and heady Zealots*, (as he calls them) about the *unworthineſs* or *incapacity* of their Miniſters. Are they only *the grave and wiſe Paſtors* among themſelves, which are ſcorned by ſuch Men? It is poſſible, that thoſe may be *grave* and *wiſe* among us too, whom they cenſure for *incompetent* Men; or muſt the ſame *People* which are *raw* and *injudicious, ignorant and cenſorious, proud and ſelf-conceited*, when they make their Judgment of them, be of a ſudden turned into *grave and wiſe Men*, when they paſs their Judgment upon the *Abilities* and *Fitneſs* of our *Preachers?* This doth not look like fair and equal dealing. I pray let our Miniſters have a fair hearing, and let the matter be well examined, before the *People* be thus encouraged to *ſeparate* from their *Miniſters* for their *Diſabilities*, or *Unworthineſs*. But ſuppoſe there be too great a number of *young, raw, injudicious Preachers*, as Mr. *B.* ſaith, *no Man can deny, that knoweth* England, *and hath any modeſty.* Is there no way, but *to your Tents, O Iſrael?* Will nothing but *Separation* ſerve your turn? Is this the way to mend the matter, and to make them *grave and wiſe?* Doth not Mr. *B.* confeſs, *That they have too many ſuch among themſelves?* Muſt they *ſeparate* from them too? What endleſs confuſions do ſuch Principles tend to? But the bottom of all is, this *Separation* muſt be juſtified one way or other; and ſuch Principles found out, which may ſeem to do it. Yet, after all, what is this to the preſent caſe of *Separation* in this *City?* for here the charge was laid, and to this the *Anſwer* muſt be given, or it is to no purpoſe. Is it any reaſon, that near half of ſome *Pariſhes* in *London*, ſhould ſeparate from their *grave and wiſe Paſtors*, ſuch as I know ſome to be, where this caſe is; becauſe in *Cornwal*, or *Yorkſhire*, or *Northumberland*, there are *many raw and injudicious, beſides ſcandalous Prieſts*, as Mr. *B.* ſpeaks? We urge you particularly with the *London Separation*, you tell us what the People ſay of the *Inſufficiency* and *Unworthineſs* of the *Clergy* in other Parts of *England*; ſuppoſe it true, what is all this to the buſineſs? If you perſiſt in this way, we can name the Pariſhes to you in *London*, where the *Miniſters* are Men of unexceptionable Learning and Piety; where the *Churches* are large enough to receive the *People* that *ſeparate*; as well as thoſe that come, and yet they forſake the *Church's Communion*, and adhere to the *ſeparate Congregations*: Tell us plainly in this caſe, is this *Separation lawful* or not? If it be *lawful*, to what purpoſe do you make uſe of ſo many ſhifts and evaſions, as to *great Pariſhes, and inſufficient and ſcandalous Prieſts, in other parts of the Nation?* Anſwer to the caſe propoſed, and to the place where the *charge* was laid, and think not to eſcape by ſuch apparent evaſions, and impertinencies as theſe. If you think ſuch a *Separation unlawful*, then why do you pretend to confute my *Sermon*, which was deſigned purpoſely againſt it?

Anſw. p. 54.

Sect. 9. But while you plead for this liberty of the *Peoples ſeparating* upon their *Judgment* of their *Miniſters Abilities and Fitneſs*, you can never ſecure them from *Separation* from any *Church* or *Miniſters* whatſoever. And no ſetled Church in the World could ever ſubſiſt long, without infinite diſorder and confuſion, if this were allow'd. For Mr. *B.* thinks them uncapable of the *Miniſterial Office* in the *Peoples* Judgment.

1. *Who have not tolerable Miniſterial Knowledge, or Utterance.* *Anſw.p.*50.
2. *Who are Heretical.*
3. *Who malignantly oppoſe ſerious Religion as Hypocriſie, or a needleſs thing.*
4. *Who by their wicked Lives do more hurt than they do good. From ſuch*, ſaith he, *St.* Paul *bids them turn away.*

And of all theſe things the *People* are to be *Judges*, and ſo may *ſeparate*, (1.) When they are unſatiſfied about *the Miniſterial Knowledge, or Utterance of their Miniſters.* As for their *Utterance*, we may allow them to be Judges of that; but I never heard before, that St. *Paul* did bid People *turn away* from their *Miniſters*, if their *Utterance* were not thought to be *tolerable.* For he intimates, that ſome complained of *his* Utterance, and had him in contempt for it. But as to *Abilities* and *Knowledge fit for Miniſters*, are not the *People* admirable Judges? How few, how very few, even of thoſe of the People who pretend moſt to *Knowledge* in *Religion*, have any tolerable underſtanding of the *true Principles*, and *right notion* of it? I do not ſpeak only of *Artificers* and *Tradeſmen*, but of thoſe of better education, who either by Prejudices, or want of due application of their Minds to ſuch things, are ſubject to great Miſtakes about *Religion*, and yet may be very good Men: If ſuch as theſe are ſo unfit to judge of *Miniſterial Knowledge*, and the *Doctrines* of *Religion*, what ſhall we ſay to the common ſort of *raw and injudicious Profeſſors of Religion?* Mr. *B.*'s experience in the World is not ſo little, as not to know and be ſenſible of the truth of this, among the *People* moſt apt to divide and ſeparate. Is it not then a ſtrange thing he ſhould thus ſubject the Judgment of *Miniſterial Knowledge* to ſuch a *company* of *Triers* as theſe? But ſuppoſe they do allow their *Miniſters* to paſs for Men of tolerable *Abilities*, and reaſonable *good Utterance*, there is a harder Taſk yet behind, and that is, to approve themſelves to the *People*, to be *Sound and Orthodox:* For, ſaith Mr. *B.* (2.) *If they be Heretical*, they may, without ſin, ſeparate from them. But how ſhall a Man eſcape being thought *Heretical* by the *People*, if they have a mind to make him ſo, *i. e.* if he croſſeth their humour, and delivers ſuch Doctrine as doth not pleaſe them, for that is generally their *Standard* for *Hereſie?* And they cannot well have any other, unleſs you will ſuppoſe all the People to be learned Divines, and every Man obliged to read and underſtand *Epiphanius* and *Binius*, and then perhaps they may be competent *Judges* of *Hereſie*, and come at laſt to be even with the *Divines* for having been their Judges ſo long in that matter. Let us now ſuppoſe a Perſon of great value and eſteem among them for his other *Miniſterial Abilities*, ſhould happen to be thought *unſound* in the Point of *Juſtification*, and to draw too near to the *Papiſts* in it! and this not only be ſaid by the *common People*, but they are abetted and encouraged in it, by the greateſt part of their *Teachers*, who tell them, this is a *fundamental Point*, *Articulus ſtantis & cadentis Eccleſiæ*; *that they had as good give up the Cauſe of Reformation, as yield in that matter*, as ſome have ſaid; I would fain know in this Caſe, whether upon Mr. *B.*'s Principles, the *People* are not bound to *ſeparate* from ſuch a Man, notwithſtanding his other *Abilities?*

The like may happen as to many other *Doctrines*, which the *People* are as incompetent *Judges* of, as they are in this matter. Let us yet ſuppoſe that ſuch a Man may paſs for *ſound in the main* among the *People*; what ſhall we ſay to him, if under pretence of *curing Diviſions* he expoſes good People, and lays open with great freedom and plainneſs their *factious*, *turbulent*, *cenſorious*, *ungovernable* humor; not omitting their *Injudiciouſneſs*, but forgetting all the while that theſe ſame *injudicious People* (with all their other faults) were once his *Electors*, and are ſtill his *Judges*; ſuppoſe, that he tells the World, *That for their Ignorance, Injudiciouſneſs, Pride and Self-conceitedneſs, they are their grief and their ſhame; that they are endanger'd by Diviſions, principally becauſe the ſelf-conceited part of the religious People will not be ruled by their Paſtors; that it is they that tempt the Papiſts to uſe Fire and Faggot that will not be ruled, nor kept in concord by the wiſeſt, and holieſt, and moſt ſelf-denying Miniſters upon earth.* Notwithſtanding all theſe very kind words of themſelves, do not we think ſuch *People* would call all this *reviling*, and *reproaching the People of God*, and ſay, That ſuch Men *do malignantly oppoſe ſerious Godlineſs as Hypocriſie*; and let their Lives be what they will, *they do more hurt than good*; and therefore by Mr. *B.*'s own Rules, they are bound to ſeparate from the *wiſeſt, the holieſt, the moſt ſelf-denying Miniſters upon earth.* Which I think is ſufficient for the preſent to ſhew the miſchievous conſequence of putting ſo great a power of Judgment, and *Separation* upon it, into the hands of the People.

Sect. 10. But this is not all the encouragement to *Separation*, which is given to the *People*, by their power of *judging*, and *withdrawing* from their *Miniſters*, for,

2. They inſinuate, That the *whole Body of the conforming Clergy* is *guilty* of ſuch *Faults*, as the *People may lawfully ſeparate* from them, as will appear by theſe Particulars.

Firſt, They make *Conformity* it ſelf to be a *very ſcandalous thing*, and then tell the People over and over, *It is no ſin to ſeparate from ſcandalous Prieſts*; eſpecially when the *Scandal is notorious*, as it is in this caſe, Mr. *B.* goes about to prove this by many Arguments, when he writes in the Name of the *Party*; now let us ſee what Judgment they paſs upon *Conformity*. In one place he ſaith, *That the love of Peace, and the fear of frightning any farther from Pariſh-Communion than I deſire,* (as though ſuch Suggeſtions did not do it enough) *do oblige me to forbear ſo much as to deſcribe or name the additional Conformity; and that ſin which Non-conformiſts fear, and fly from, which maketh it harder to us that deſire it to draw many good People to Communion with the Conformiſts than it was of old.* No doubt of it, if you give ſuch broad intimations as theſe are, what a horrible ſcandalous ſin *Conformity* is. Nay, he maketh it an *inexcuſable ſin*, when he ſaith, in the Preface to his *Plea*, *That more like truth hath been ſaid for the lawfulneſs of Anabaptiſtry, Poligamy, Drunkenneſs, Stealing, and Lying, in caſe of neceſſity, than any thing he ever yet read of all that he hath there deſcribed*, i. e. full *Conformity*. He chargeth us down-right with *Lying*, and by conſequence, with *Perjury*, and tells me of *thirty tremendous Aggravations of the ſin of Conformity*, among which are *Lying and Perjury*, and not only that, *but drawing on our ſelves the guilt of many thouſand Perjuries*, (by declaring,

Plea for Peace, p. 108.

Sacrileg. deſert. p. 43.

Anſwer to Serm. p. 46. *Plea for Peace, p.* 220, 223, 226, 339.

claring, That the *Covenant* doth not oblige.) But I do not queſtion, if Mr. *B.* pleaſed, he could find out *forty* or *fifty* as *tremendous Aggravations* of the *ſin of Separation.* For never did any Man lay more load than he, upon whatever he oppoſes, without conſidering how it may fall upon himſelf at laſt; and how eaſie it is to return ſuch heaps of *Aggravations.* And it was well ſaid by one of Mr. *B.*'s *Adverſaries* concerning him, *That be the Controverſie what it will, he can make his Adverſary differ with him about the exiſtence of God and Chriſt, a Heaven and Hell.* Anſwer to Sacrileg. deſertion, p. 13. Which I have found too true, by my experience in this caſe, for without any colour or pretence in the World that I know of, but only by declaring againſt *Separation,* he tells me, *That he is ſo far paſt doubt, on the other ſide, as that he thinks I overthrow all Religion, and ſet up Man in rebellion againſt God.* Anſw. p. 19. But the worſt is, that he would make me ſay, which I never ſaid or thought, *That all publick Worſhip is ſinful, when forbidden*; and then on he runs with a mighty torrent, *Daniel may go to the Lions; the Martyrs, Fathers, Counſels, the univerſal Church are all fooliſher than the meaneſt of his Auditors.* I wonder he did not give me *thirty tremendous Aggravations* of *Atheiſm* and *Hobbiſm.* For he doth in effect charge me with them; for it follows, *It's ſtrange that he can be ſure, God's Word is true, and yet be ſo ſure, that Mens Laws are above it, and may ſuſpend it.* Did I ever in my Life ſay the leaſt thing tending that way? I abhor and deteſt ſuch *Principles,* as ſet *Man's Laws above God's.* And when I gave him the *State* of the *Controverſie* about *Separation,* I ſuppoſed *an Agreement in all the Subſtantials of Religion, between the diſſenting Parties and our Church.* How then could he poſſibly infer from hence, that I ſet *Man's Laws above God's?* The Queſtion is not, whether *all publick Worſhip be ſinful, when forbidden?* but whether in a Nation profeſſing *true Religion,* ſome *publick Worſhip* may not be *forbidden?* If not, then an univerſal, unlimited Toleration of *Turks, Jews, Papiſts, Socinians, Ranters,* &c. muſt follow. If *ſome* may be *forbidden,* then another Queſtion follows, *viz.* Whether ſuch *publick Worſhip,* as may have an evil in it, antecedent to that *Prohibition,* may not be forbidden? *viz.* ſuch as tends to *Idolatry, Sedition, Schiſm,* &c. and if this be allowed, then it comes to this at laſt, whether ſuch *Meetings* are guilty of any of theſe *faults,* and if they be, whether the *Magiſtrate,* ſo judging, may not juſtly forbid them? And this is the utmoſt that matter can be driven to; which I here mention, to let the Reader underſtand, what little cauſe there is to dread Mr. *B.*'s *thirty Aggravations of the ſin of Conformity*; which are built on as ſlight grounds as this heavy charge againſt me; for the ſake of which I ſhall hardly ever dread his *Aggravations* more. But the ſting of theſe *Aggravations* follows. *If the People think, (though they ſhould miſtake) that all the Conformiſts are guilty of the like, can you wonder, if they prefer leſs guilty Paſtors to truſt the conduct of their Souls with?* Anſw. p. 50. Now the true *Reaſon* of *Separation* is come out at laſt. Our *Conformity* is a *horrible ſcandalous ſin* with them, and therefore they muſt chuſe *better Paſtors.* Is not this juſt the old *Browniſts* Argument? *The Miniſtery of the Church of* England *is a corrupt and ſinful Miniſtery, and therefore we muſt not communicate with them, but chuſe more honeſt and faithful Guides:* But let me aſk Mr. *B.* ſuppoſing all this to be true, Is it *lawful* to communicate with *Conformiſts* or not? If it be not *lawful,* then he condemns his own practice, and takes away *occaſional Communion*; if it be lawful, how comes *Separation* to be *lawful,* ſince that is never *lawful,* but when it is *neceſſary?* as it will be proved afterwards.

Sect. 11. 2. They make moſt of the *preſent Miniſters of the Church of England* to be *Uſurpers*; and from ſuch they ſay, they may *lawfully* Anſw.p.49. *ſeparate. Is it Separation,* ſaith Mr. *B. to refuſe Paſtors that are Uſurpers, and have no true Power over them?* But who are theſe *Uſurpers* among us, ſince we have a *legal Eſtabliſhment*, and we thought *Law* and *Uſurpation* contrary to each other? But notwithſtanding *Law*, it is determin'd,

Firſt, All that come into the *places of ejected Miniſters* are *Uſurpers*, at Anſw.p.54. leaſt to as many of the *People*, as do not *conſent* to their coming in: *How prove you*, ſaith Mr. *B. that the relation of the ejected* London-*Miniſters and their Flocks, was diſſolved, and that the ſucceeders, were true Paſtors* Plea for Peace, p.55. *to the Non-conſenting Flock? When faithful Paſtors*, ſaith he in *his Plea*, Anſw.p.44. (written in the name of the Party, *and by conſent, as* he ſaith, *of many of his Acquaintance*) *are in poſſeſſion, if a lawful Magiſtrate caſt them out, and put others in their places, of untried or ſuſpected Parts or Fidelity.*

I. *The Prince's Impoſition maketh not ſuch true Paſtors of that Church, before, or without the Peoples conſent.*

II. *Nor will it always bind the People to conſent, and to forſake their former Paſtors, nor prove them Schiſmaticks, becauſe they do it not.*

The bottom of all this, is, they are *Uſurpers*, to whom the People do not *conſent* in any particular Pariſh, although the whole Nation in *Parliament* conſented to the paſſing of a *Law* for removal of ſome *Paſtors*, and putting in of others. And what dangerous conſequences there may be of ſuch Principles as theſe, I leave others to judge. For upon theſe 1 Kings, 2. 35. grounds, when *Salomon* deprived *Abiathar*, and put **Zadock** in his room, any part of the People might have pleaded, *They never conſented to* Zadok*'s coming in, and therefore he was their High-Prieſt ſtill*; *let* Salomon *do what he would*; *he could not diſſolve the relation between them,* without *their own conſent.* For the Queſtion is not, whether *Abiathar* did not deſerve to be put out, but to whom it belonged to do it, whether to the *King*, or the *People?* And whether any part of the *People* might ſtill own that *relation* which he had before to them, without palpable *diſobedience* and *contempt* of *Autority?* Eſpecially if the *People* had given their *own conſent*, and the thing had been done not only by *Salomon*, but by the *States* of *Iſrael*, as it was in our caſe. They who diſcern not the ill conſequences of ſuch Aſſertions as to our *Government*, have very little inſight into Affairs. For it follows, that a ſmall part of the People may diſown the *publick Acts of Parliament*, and *chuſe* other *Governours* to themſelves, in oppoſition to thoſe eſtabliſhed by *Law*; and why they ſhould not do it, upon an equal pretence in other caſes, I do not underſtand. For there is no more colour for the *Peoples* reſuming their *right*, eſpecially a *ſmall part* againſt the whole, in one caſe then in the other. Which makes we wonder at thoſe who dare call them *Uſurpers*, who enjoy their places by the ſame *Laws*, that any Men do enjoy their Eſtates. And they who aſſert, That the *People* are bound, notwithſtanding the Miſchief of Impoſitions, Preface. *Laws*, to *adhere* to their former *Paſtors*, *as* Mr. *A.* doth, who ſaith, *They judge it their unqueſtionable duty to abide in that relation to their ejected Paſtors*, do not only aſſert a *power* in a handful of *People* to act againſt *eſtabliſhed Laws*, paſſed by general conſent in *Parliament*, but overthrow the ſettlement of our *Church* upon the *Reformation.* For, the *Papiſts* then had the very ſame *Plea*, that theſe Men have now, *viz.*

That the Magiſtrate could not diſſolve the relation between their former Church Guides and them; and therefore notwithſtanding Acts of Parliament, they were ſtill bound to adhere to them. For the Magiſtrate had no power in ſuch matters, and the real Schiſm was to withdraw from thoſe Guides; juſt as Mr. *A.* ſpeaks concerning *the ejected Miniſters.* So much do theſe Men, in purſuing the Intereſts of their Parties, overthrow the *Principles* of the *Reformation.* For either the *Magiſtrate* hath a *Power* to *ſilence* ſome *Miniſters,* and to put others in their places, or he hath none: if he hath none, then, what becomes of the *Juſtice* of the *Reformation,* when the *Popiſh Biſhops* and *Prieſts* were ejected, and others put into their places? If they ſay, *He hath a juſt power in ſome caſes, but not in theirs.* Is not this a *Plea* common to all? For whoever thought themſelves *juſtly ejected?* Or that they did any thing which deſerved ſo ſevere a puniſhment? What then is to be done in this caſe, if Men think themſelves unjuſtly caſt out? The old *Non-conformiſts* ſaid, *They ought to ſit down quietly, with this ſatisfaction, that there were others to preach the word of God ſoundly, although they did not.* They might by joining in their private Capacities in *Communion* with our *Churches,* and drawing the People to it by their example and encouragement, have done more good both to the *People,* and to this *Church,* than I fear their *publick preaching* in oppoſition to the *Laws* hath done to either. But if they go upon ſuch *principles* as theſe, *That the Magiſtrate had no rightful power to eject them, that others are Uſurpers who come in their places, that the People are ſtill bound to own them in their former relation notwithſtanding the Laws; and that 'tis Schiſm to ſeparate from them,* notwithſtanding that they confeſs *the true Religion is maintained and preached in our publick Aſſemblies,* I leave it to others to determine how conſiſtent ſuch Principles are with the *ſubmiſſion* Men owe to *Government,* or that *peaceable behaviour* which becometh Chriſtians. This I the rather inſiſt upon, becauſe I find not only Mr. *B.* and Mr. *A.* aſſerting it, but that it is made the *ſtanding Plea* for the *neceſſity* of the *preſent Separation,* among thoſe who do not hold all *Communion* with our *Churches unlawful.* So the lateſt of my *Anſwerers* makes a *Queſtion, Whether they can be ſaid to erect new Churches, or proceed to the forming of ſeparate Congregations, who were true Miniſters, and had their Congregations before others came into their places? If they had done nothing worthy of ejection, or excluſion from their Miniſtry, whether they have not ſtill a right to exerciſe their Function. And conſequently, whether others may not as juſtly be ſaid to draw away their People from them, as they are charged with the ſame practice?* There is not one word in all this *Plea* but might have equally ſerved the *Papiſts* in the *beginning* of the *Reformation.* For the Law ſignifies nothing with them in any caſe where themſelves are concerned, if Miniſters be ejected without or againſt Law, they who come into their places are no Uſurpers; and if they are caſt out by Law, they that ſucceed them are Uſurpers; ſo that the Law is always the leaſt thing in their conſideration.

Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 26.

Secondly, All thoſe who come into any *Paſtoral Charge,* whether *Biſhops* by virtue of the *King's Nomination,* or others by the *Preſentation* of *Patrons,* are *Uſurpers,* unleſs the *People* be pleaſed to give their *free conſent;* and if they do it not, they may *lawfully withdraw* from them. *For,* ſaith Mr. *B. the People have an antecedent Right to conſent, which none can take from them.* And he ſaith, *he hath proved it by many Canons, that he was no Biſhop, that was not choſen by the Clergy and the*

Plea, p. 55.
Anſw. p. 9.

the People; *or came in without the Peoples conſent*. Nay, if they have
the conſent of *ſome*, and not of the greater part, thoſe who did not conſent,
may proceed to chooſe *another Biſhop*, if Mr. *B.* ſay true. For
theſe are his words. *If a Dioceſs have a Thouſand or 600, or 300 Pariſh*
Plea, p. 81, 82. *Paſtors, and a Hundred thouſand or a Million of People (or 50000 or
20000, as ye will ſuppoſe) and if only a dozen or 20 Preſbyters, and a
thouſand People (or none) chuſe the Biſhop, this is not the Election or Conſent
of the Dioceſan Church; nor is it Schiſm for twenty thouſand to go
againſt the Votes of two thouſand.* Therefore if they have ſo much
the advantage in *polling*, as Mr. *A.* ſuggeſts, there is nothing hinders
them, but that in ſpite of Laws, they may proceed to the choice of *new
Biſhops*, and *new Paſtors of Churches*, wherever they think they
can make the *Majority*. For this is *an inherent and unalterable right in
the People*, ſay they, *to chooſe their own Paſtors*. Again, ſaith Mr. *B.* in
Ibid. the name of the Party in his Plea, *If Biſhops that have no better a Foundation*,
i. e. that come in by the King's Nomination, and not by the Majority
of the People, *ſhall impoſe inferior Paſtors or Preſbyters on the Pariſh
Churches, and command the Peoples acceptance and obedience*, i. e. if they
give them Inſtitution upon a Patron's preſentation, *the People are not
bound to accept and obey them by any Authority that is in that command as
ſuch; nor is it Schiſm to diſobey it, no more than it is Treaſon to reject the
Uſurper of a Kingdom.* It is plain then, all *Biſhops* of the *King*'s *Nomination*,
all *Miniſters* preſented by *Patrons* are mere *Uſurpers*: the *People*
may give them a good *Title* if they pleaſe; but they are not to blame
Anſw. p. 49. if they do it not. *For in them*, Mr. *B.* ſaith, *the chief Power is*, and
ſometimes he tells them, *they are bound to ſeparate*; however, *while they*
Plea, p. 82. *do not conſent, they are no Churches, which they are ſet over; and it is no
Schiſm ſo to pronounce them; nor to deny them Communion proper to a Church.*
Is not this an excellent *Plea for Peace*; and the *true and only way of
Concord*, which lays the foundation for all imaginable Diſorders and
Confuſions, only that they might have ſome pretence for their preſent
Separation?

Sect. 12. 3. Suppoſe the Biſhops and Clergy have gained the conſent
(*implicit* at leaſt) of the People, and ſo are no *Uſurpers*, yet if they be
Perſecutors, or *Ithacian Prelatiſts*, i. e. if they either act towards, or approve
of the *ſilencing Non-conformiſts*, the *People* may *Separate* from them.
When Mr. *B.* wrote the *Defence* of his *Book*, called, *The Cure of Diviſions*,
to ſatisfie the *People* who were much diſpleaſed with him for it;
Preface to Defence of his Cure, p 9. one of the material Queſtions, he aſks about his Book, is, *Is there a word
to perſuade you to Communion with Perſecutors?* As though that had been
an unpardonable Crime. In the *Plea* he ſaith, *If any Excommunicate perſons*
Plea, p. 42. *for not complying with them in ſin*, i. e. Conformity, *but alſo proſecute
them with Mulcts, Impriſonments, Baniſhments, or other Proſecution,
to force them to tranſgreſs, this were yet more heinouſly aggravated Schiſm:
and therefore it is no ſin to ſeparate from ſuch.* And how eaſily Men are
drawn in to the guilt of this *perſecution*, appears by the example he makes
of me, for although I expreſly ſet aſide *the caſe of Miniſters*, and declared,
Anſw. p. 61. *I intended only to ſpeak of Lay-communion*; yet he charges me *with engaging
my ſelf in the ſilencing deſign.* And by ſuch conſequences, all
that ſpeak againſt *Separation* may be ſeparated from, as *Proſecutors*, and
Ithacian Prelatiſts.

Sect. 13. 4. As long as they ſuppoſe *the terms of our Communion to be ſinful*, they ſay, *the Schiſm doth not lye on thoſe that ſeparate, but on thoſe that do impoſe ſuch terms*; and therefore they may *lawfully ſeparate* from ſuch *impoſers*. This is the moſt *colourable Plea* hath been yet uſed by them. But in this caſe, we muſt diſtinguiſh between *terms of Communion* plainly and *in themſelves ſinful*; and ſuch which are only *fancied* to be ſo through *prejudice*, or *wilful Ignorance*, or *Error of Conſcience*. That there is a real diſtinction between theſe two, is evident; and that it ought to be conſidered in this caſe, appears from hence, that elſe there can be no *ſinful Separation* under an *erroneous Conſcience*. As ſuppoſe ſome Men ſhould think that *Preaching by an Hour-glaſs, and much more praying by one, was a ſtinting of the Spirit in point of Time, as praying by a Form was in point of words; and all Men ſhould be required to begin the publick Worſhip at ſuch an Hour, and ſo end at ſuch an Hour*; *time* being a *neceſſary circumſtance*, our Brethren grant, that the *Magiſtrate* or *Church* may *lawfully* determine it. Here is then *a lawful Impoſition*; and yet the *Quakers* may *really judge it to be ſinful*; and declare they cannot communicate unleſs this *ſinful Impoſition* be removed; for it is againſt their *Conſciences* to have *the Spirit limited to any certain time?* on whoſe ſide doth the *Schiſm* lie in this caſe? Not *on the Impoſers*, becauſe they grant ſuch an *impoſition lawful*; therefore it muſt lie on thoſe that *ſeparate*, although they judge *ſuch terms of Communion ſinful*. If therefore the determination of other things not forbidden be really as much in the *Magiſtrates* and *Churches Power*, as the neceſſary *circumſtances of time and place*, &c. then Mens apprehending ſuch *terms of Communion to be ſinful* will not hinder the *guilt* of *Separation* from *lying* on their ſide, and not on the *impoſers*. Becauſe it is to be ſuppoſed, that where there is no *plain prohibition*, Men may with ordinary care and judgment, ſatisfie themſelves of the *lawfulneſs* of things required. As for inſtance, when the *Church* of *Rome* impoſeth the *Worſhip* of *Images*, we have the *plain prohibition* of the *Second Commandment* to prove that it is really a *ſinful Condition of Communion*; but when our *Church* requireth the *conſtant uſe of a Liturgy*, and *Ceremonies*, which are now pleaded as *ſinful Conditions of Communion*, where is the *prohibition? In the ſame Second Commandment* ſay ſome. I deſire them to read it over to me. They do ſo. Where, ſay I, are the words that forbid a *Liturgy*, or *Ceremonies? I am miſtaken*, they tell me, *it is not in the words, but in the ſenſe*. I aſk, how we ſhould come by the ſenſe, but from the words? *Yes*, they ſay, *there are certain Rules for interpreting the Commandments*. Are they *divine* or *human?* Where are they to be found? What are thoſe *Rules? One*, they ſay, is, *that where any thing is forbidden, ſomething is commanded*. So ſay I, there is here a Command to worſhip God without an Image. What is there more? *Yes*, ſay they, (1.) *That we muſt not worſhip God with our own Inventions; now Liturgies and Ceremonies are Mens Inventions*. But, I ſay, no *Inventions are condemned* in the *Worſhip* of *God*, but ſuch as *God* himſelf hath *ſomewhere forbidden*; but he hath no where forbidden theſe. And *human Inventions* are forbidden in this *Commandment* in the *Worſhip* of *God*; but then (1.) They are ſuch *inventions* which go about to *repreſent God*, and ſo to diſparage him; and no other *inventions* are to be underſtood, than the *Reaſon* of the *Law* doth extend to, *i. e.* not ſuch which are conſiſtent with the ſpiritual and inviſible Nature of God. (2.) They are not ſuch as do relate to the *manner* or *form* of *Worſhip*, ſuppoſing the *Worſhip* it ſelf be performed in a way *agreeable* to the *divine Nature* and

Plea, p. 42.

Law. For otherwiſe all uſe of Mens Inventions, as to *preaching*, or *reading*, or *interpreting Scripture*, would be forbidden. And then this *Interpretation* of the *Second Commandment* would be *unlawful*, becauſe it is a *mere Invention of Men*; as much as *Liturgies*, or *Ceremonies*.

By this we ſee, what *ſtretching* and *forcing* of *Scripture* there muſt be, to make *Liturgies* or *Ceremonies unlawful terms* of *Communion*; and that Men muſt firſt blind and fetter their Minds by certain *prejudices* of *Education*, or *Reading* only one ſort of *Books*, and taking ſome things for granted which they ought not, before they can eſteem the *terms of Communion* required by our *Church* to be *ſinful:* and therefore the *Schiſm* doth not lye on the *Impoſers* ſide, but upon thoſe who ſuffer themſelves firſt to be ſo eaſily deluded, and then ſeparate from our *Church* upon it. But there is another plain inſtance in this caſe, wherein our *Brethren* themſelves will not allow the *Schiſm* to lie on the *impoſers ſide*; and that is of thoſe who deny the *lawfulneſs* of *Infant-baptiſm*. Many of whom pretend to do it with as much *ſincerity* and *impartiality*, as any of our *Brethren* can deny the *lawfulneſs* of *Liturgy* or *Ceremonies:* if they break *Communion* rather than allow what they judge to be *ſinful*, on whoſe ſide doth the *Schiſm* lie, on theirs that require the allowance of it, as a *condition* of *Communion*, or not? If on the *Impoſer's ſide*, they muſt condemn themſelves, who blame the *Anabaptiſts* for their *Separation*. And ſo did *Fr. Johnſon*, and ſo did the *New-England Churches*. From whence it appears, that they do all agree, that where Men through *miſtake* do judge thoſe to be *ſinful terms of Communion* which are not, the guilt of *Schiſm* doth not lie *on the Impoſer's ſide*, but on thoſe that *ſeparate*. Therefore, this matter of *Schiſm* cannot be ended by the *Plea* of *Conſcience* judging the *conditions to be ſinful*, but by evident and convincing Proofs that they are ſo; but till theſe are brought forth, which never yet were, or ever will be, they muſt bear the *blame* of the *Schiſm*, if they *ſeparate* on theſe accounts.

Thus I have faithfully repreſented the *Principles* of thoſe who allow *occaſional Preſence* in our *Churches*, rather than *Communion* with them; which I have diſcover'd to be of that Nature, as leads Men to the greateſt *Separation*.

Sect. 14. There are others who deal more openly and ingenuouſly, and ſo need the leſs pains to diſcover their minds, and thoſe are,

II. Such who do in terms aſſert all *Acts of Communion* with our *Churches* to be *unlawful*. But there is a difference among theſe; For,

Firſt, Some allow *hearing Sermons* in our *publick Aſſemblies*, and joyning in the *Pulpit Prayers*; but not in the *Liturgy*, or any proper *Act* of *Church-Communion*. This I have ſhewed, was the Opinion of *Robinſon*, and the *New-England Churches*; and was lately owned by Mr. *Ph. Nye*, who wrote a Diſcourſe about it, and anſwered all Objections. Yea, he goes ſo far, as to own *the publick preaching*, *as a great bleſſing to the Nation*; and he thinks, *the Diſſenters and their Families are bound to frequent*, (*as they have liberty and opportunity*) *the more publick and National Miniſtry*. But towards the end of his Treatiſe he confeſſes the *generality of their People*, *to be of another opinion*; which he imputes to the *activity* of the *Jeſuits* among them; and he was a very ſagacious Man.

Secondly, Others hold it unlawful to joyn with our *Churches* in any *Acts* of *publick Worſhip*. And ſome are arrived to that height, that one of my *Anſwerers* confeſſeth, *That they refuſe to hear him, becauſe he owns* many

Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 25.

many Parochial Churches to be true Churches, It ſeems then, they not only think it *unlawful* to hear us, but to *hear* thoſe who think it *lawful*; and the next ſtep will be to ſeparate from thoſe who do not ſeparate from them, that *own many Parochial Churches to be true Churches*.

Several *Books* have been publiſhed to prove it *unlawful* to hear our Miniſters preach: and theſe proceed upon the old Arguments of the former *Separatiſts*; as may be ſeen at large in a *Book* called *Jerubbaal*: whoſe Author goes about to prove *our Worſhip Idolatry, and our Miniſters Antichriſtian*; which Mr. *Nye* was ſo far from owning, that he grants *our Miniſtry to be true and lawful*, and utterly denies it *to be Anti-chriſtian*; *becauſe the Articles of our Religion, to which our Miniſters are to conform their Inſtructions, are Orthodox, and framed for the caſting and keeping out of Popery*.

Sect. 15. The ſeveral Principles of our *Diſſenters* being thus laid down, the *State* of the *preſent Controverſie*, as to *Separation* from our *Communion*, will ſoon appear. And any one may now diſcern,

1. That I do not mean bare *local Separation*. For Mr. *B.* puts this in the front of his *Quære's*; *do you think, that he is a Separatiſt that meeteth not in the ſame Pariſh Church with you?* No; I do aſſure him, provided that he elſewhere joyns with our *Churches* as a *Member* of them; and doth not think himſelf bound to prefer the *ſeparate Meetings*, as having a *purer way of Worſhip*, and ordinarily to frequent them for more *Goſpel-adminiſtrations*. And ſo much may ſatisfie Mr. *A.* too, who, after his trifling manner, talks of a *bellum Parochiale*, as though Men were ſo weak to charge one another with *Separation* becauſe they meet in *different Pariſhes*; but as to the Gird he gives about a *Bellum Epiſcopale*, I deſire him only to look into the *Evangelium armatum* for an Anſwer to it.

Anſw, p.46.

Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 48.

2. I do not mean by Separation any *difference in Doctrine*, not determin'd by our Church, upon which Men do not proceed to divide from the *Communion* of it: And I wonder, who ever did. But Mr. *B.* is pleaſed to make another *Quære* about it. To this I ſhall anſwer him in Mr. *Hales* his words: *While the Controverſies in* Holland *about Prædeſtination, went no farther than the Pen-combats, the Schiſm was all that while unhatcht; but aſſoon as one party ſwept an old Cloyſter, and by a pretty art made it a Church, by putting a new Pulpit in it for the ſeparating Party there to meet, that which was before a Controverſie became a formal Schiſm.*

Tract of Schiſm, p.3.

3. By *Separation* I do not mean any *difference in Modes of Worſhip* allowed by the *Church* in whoſe *Communion* we live. This is to anſwer Mr. *B*'s Quære concerning *the difference between Cathedral and Parochial Churches; and publick and private adminiſtrations of Sacraments.* But this ſticks much with Mr. *A.* who takes his hints from Mr. *B.* which he cooks and dreſſes after his facetious manner, that they may go off the better with the common people. And a very pleaſant repreſentation he endeavours to make of the difference of the *Cathedral Service* from that in *Country Pariſhes*. But what is all this to the purpoſe? If the ſame Man puts on finer Clothes at *London*, than he wears in the *Country*, is he not the ſame Man for all that? Are not *David's Pſalms the ſame*, whether they be *Sung*, or *Said?* Or whether *Sung* in a *Cathedral Tune*, or as ſet by a *Pariſh Clerk?* That which only looks like Argument (and my buſineſs is to mind nothing elſe; poſſibly others may call him to an account for his unbecoming way of Writing) That I ſay which looks like

Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 48, 49.

Miſchief of Impoſ. p. 53. like Argument is, *That ſome things are done without Rules in our Pariſh Churches, as the univerſal practice of ſinging Pſalms in* Hopkin's *and* Sternhold's *Metre*; and therefore they may do things without *Rules* and yet not be *guilty* of *Separation.* This proceeds upon a miſtake, for in the firſt eſtabliſhment of the *Liturgy* upon the *Reformation* under *Edward* VI. allowance was made for the *uſe* of the *Pſalms*, as they were to be ſung in *Churches* diſtinct from the *uſe* of them as *part* of the *Liturgy*; and from thence that cuſtom hath been ſo univerſally practiſed. But ſuppoſe there are ſome Cuſtoms receiv'd without *Rules*; ſuppoſe there are ſome different *Cuſtoms* among us; what is this, *to the denying the lawfulneſs of conſtant Communion with our Churches? To the chooſing of new Paſtors?* and ſitting *down*, as he ſpeaks, *with purer Adminiſtrations?* All which this Man owns in his Book, as their avowed Principles and Practices; and yet hath the confidence to parallel their *Separation* from our *Church*, with the *different Modes* of *Worſhip* among our ſelves. He muſt have a very mean opinion of Mens underſtandings, that thinks to deceive them in ſo groſs a manner.

4. By *Separation* I do not underſtand a *mere difference as to the way of Worſhip, which the Members of foreign Churches are here permitted to enjoy.* For they do not break off from the *Communion* of our *Churches*; but have certain privileges allowed them, as acting under the *Rules* of thoſe *Churches* from whence they came. But what have we to do to judge the Members of other Reformed Churches? Our buſineſs is with thoſe who being baptized in this *Church*, and living under the *Rules and Government* of it; either renounce *the Memberſhip* they once had in it, or *avoid Communion* with it as *Members*, and joyn with other *So-* *Anſw. p.* 46. 60, 87. *cieties* ſet up in oppoſition to this *Communion*. Yet this matter about *the Foreign Churches* Mr. *B.* mentions again and again; as though their caſe could be thought alike, who never departed from ours, but only continue in the Communion of their own Churches.

5. I do not charge *every diſobedience to the King and Laws and Canons in matters of Religion, Government and Worſhip with the Guilt of Sepa-* *Anſw. p.* 47. *ration.* For although a Man may be guilty of culpable diſobedience in breaking the *Commands* of *Authority*, and the *Orders* of the *Church* he lives in; yet if he continues in all *Acts* of *Communion* with our *Church*, and draws not others from it upon mere pretence of *greater Purity of Worſhip, and better means of Edification*, I do not charge ſuch a one with *Schiſm*.

6. I do not charge thoſe with *Separation*, who under *Idolatrous*, or *Arian Princes* did keep up the Exerciſe of true Religion though againſt the *Will* of the *Magiſtrate*. But what is this to our caſe, where the *true Religion* is acknowledged, and the *true Doctrine of Faith* owned by the *Diſſenters themſelves*, who break off *Communion* with our *Churches*. *Anſw.* 15, 52, 53, 84. Wherefore then doth Mr. *B.* make ſo many Quæres, *about the caſe of thoſe who lived under Heathen Perſecutors? or the Arian Emperors, or Idolatrous Princes?* I hope, he did not mean to Parallel their own Caſe with theirs; for, what horrible reflection would this be upon our *Go-* *Anſw. p.* 21. *vernment*, and the *Proteſtant Religion* eſtabliſhed among us? To what end doth he mention *Valens* and *Humericus that cut out the Preacher's Tongues*, and ſeveral other unbecoming Inſinuations? when God be thanked, we live under a moſt merciful Prince, and have the *true Doctrine of the Goſpel* among us, and may have it ſtill continued, if Mens great *Ingratitude*, as well as other crying Sins, do not provoke

God juſtly to deprive us of it. What need was there, of letting fall any paſſages tending this way? when I told him in the very State of the *Queſtion*, that all our *Diſpute* was, *Whether the upholding ſeparate Meetings for divine Worſhip, where the Doctrine eſtabliſhed, and the ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip are acknowledged to be agreeable to the Word of God, be a ſinful Separation or not?* Why is this diſſembled and paſſed over? And the worſt caſes imaginable ſuppoſed, inſtead of that which is really theirs? If I could defend a Cauſe by no other means, I think common Ingenuity, the Honour of our Prince and Nation, and of the *Proteſtant Religion* profeſſed among us, would make me give it over.

Sect. 16. And for the ſame *Reaſons*, in the management of this debate, I reſolve to keep to the *true State* of the *Queſtion*, as it is laid down; and to make good the charge of *Separation*,

I. Againſt thoſe who hold *occaſional Communion* with our Church to be *lawful in ſome parts of Worſhip*; but deny *conſtant Communion* to be a Duty.

II. Againſt thoſe who deny *any Communion with our Church to be lawful*; although *they agree with us in the Subſtantials of Religion*.

I. Againſt thoſe who hold *occaſional Communion* to be *lawful* with our *Church* in ſome *parts* of *Worſhip*, but deny *conſtant Communion* to be a *Duty*.

To overthrow this Principle, I ſhall prove theſe two things,

1. That bare *occaſional Communion* doth not *excuſe* from the *guilt* of *Separation*.
2. That as far as *occaſional Communion* with our *Church* is *allowed* to be *lawful*, *conſtant Communion* is a *Duty*.

1. That bare *occaſional Communion* doth not excuſe from *guilt* of *Separation*. Which will appear by theſe things,

Firſt, Bare *occaſional Communion* makes no Man the *Member* of a *Church*. This term of *occaſional Communion*, as far as I can find, was invented by the *Diſſenting Brethren* to give ſatisfaction to the *Preſbyterians*, who charged them with *Browniſm*: to avoid this charge, they declared, *That the Browniſts held all Communion with our Parochial Churches unlawful, which they did not*; *for*, ſaid they, *we can occaſionally Communicate with you*; but this gave no manner of ſatisfaction to the other Party, as long as they upheld *ſeparate Congregations*, with whom they would *conſtantly Communicate*; and accounted thoſe their *Churches*, with whom they did joyn as *Members* of the ſame Body. But notwithſtanding this *lawfulneſs* of *occaſional Communion* with our *Churches*, they joyned with other *ſocieties* in *ſtrict* and *conſtant Communion*; it was a plain Argument they apprehended ſomething ſo bad or defective in our *Churches*, that they could not joyn as *Members* with them; and becauſe they ſaw a neceſſity of joyning with ſome *Churches* as *Members*, they pleaded for *ſeparate Congregations*. And ſo muſt all thoſe do, who think it their *duty* to be members of any *Churches* at all; and not follow *Grotius* his Example, in ſuſpending *Communion* from all *Churches*. Which is a principle I do not find any of our *diſſenting Brethren* willing to own. Although Mr. *B.* declares,
That he and ſome others own themſelves to be Paſtors to no Churches; *Anſw.p.*64.
That he never gather'd a Church; *that he baptized none in 20 years*; *and* *Page* 24.
gave the Lord's Supper to none in 18 years. I deſire to know, what *Page* 62.
Church Mr. *B.* hath been of all this time. For as to *our Churches*, he *Page* 86.
declares, That he thinks it *lawful* to Communicate with us *occaſionally*; but

but not as *Churches* (for he thinks we want an *eſſential part*, viz. *a Paſtor with Epiſcopal Power*, as appears before) *but as Oratories*; and ſo he renounces Communion with our *Churches* as *Churches*; and for other *Churches*, he ſaith *he hath gathered none, he hath adminiſtred Sacraments to none in* 18 *years*; and if he hath not joyned as a *Member* in conſtant *Communion* with any *ſeparate Church*, he hath been ſo long a *Member* of no *Church* at all. It is true, he hath *pray'd occaſionally*, and *receiv'd the Sacrament occaſionally* in our *Oratories*, but not as a *Member* of our *Churches*; he hath *preached occaſionally to ſeparate Congregations*, but *he hath gather'd no Church, he hath adminiſtred no Sacraments for* 18 *years together*. So that he hath *prayed occaſionally in one place*, and *preached occaſionally* in another, but hath had no *Communion* as a *Member* of a *Church* any where. But I wonder, how any Man could think ſuch a *neceſſity lay upon him to preach*, that *Woe was unto him if he did not*; and yet apprehend none *to adminiſter the Sacraments* for ſo long together; none, to joyn himſelf as *a Member to any Church*. Is it poſſible for him *to think it Sacrilege not to preach*; and to think it no fault, not to give the *Sacraments* to others, nor to receive *one* of them himſelf as a *Communicant* with a *Church*? Was there not the *ſame devotedneſs*, in Ordination to the *faithful Adminiſtration of Sacraments*, as *to preaching the Goſpel*? Was not the *ſame Authority*, the *ſame charge* as to both of them? Was there not the *ſame promiſe* and *engagement to give faithful diligence to Miniſter the Doctrine and Sacraments*? Is there an indiſpenſable obligation to do one part of your duty, and none at all to the other? Is this poſſible, to perſuade impartial Men, that for 18 years together you thought your ſelf bound *to preach againſt the Laws*; and yet never thought your ſelf bound to do that, which you were as ſolemnly obliged to do as the other? Mr. *B.* knows very well in *Church-Hiſtory*, that *Preſbyters* were rarely allowed to preach, and not without leave from the *Biſhop*, and that in ſome of the *Churches* he moſt eſteems too, *viz.* the *African*; but they were conſtantly bound to adminiſter the *Sacraments*; ſo that, if one obligation were ſtricter than the other, that was ſo which Mr. *B.* diſpenſed with himſelf in, *for* 18 *years together*; and why he might not as well in the other, is not eaſie to underſtand. However, why all this while, no *conſtant Communicant* with any *Church*? What, no *Church* among us fit for him to be a *Member* of? No Obligation upon a *Chriſtian* to that, equal to the *neceſſity* of *Preaching*?

Theſe things muſt ſeem very ſtrange, to thoſe who judge of Chriſtian Obligations, by the *Scripture*, and the *univerſal Senſe* and *practice* of the *Chriſtian Church* in the *beſt* and *pureſt Ages*. To what purpoſe is it to diſpute about the *true notion* of *an Inſtituted Church for perſonal preſential Communion*; if Men can live *for* 18 *years together* without joyning in *Communion* with any ſuch *Church*? What was this *Communion* intended for? The antient *Churches* at this rate, might eaſily be capacious enough for their Members, if ſome never joyned with them in ſo long a time. *But he hath communicated occaſionally with us:* Yes, to ſhew, what *defective and tolerable Churches he can communicate with*, but not *as a Member*, as himſelf declares; and this *occaſional Communion* makes him none. *Miſchief of Impoſitions, p.* 85. For Mr. *A.* ſaith, *Their occaſional Communion with us, is but like any of our occaſional Communion with them: or occaſional hearing of a weak Preacher; or occaſional going to a Popiſh Chappel*; which no one imagines makes the Perſons Members of ſuch Congregations. If therefore Men uſe this *occaſional Communion* more than once or twice, or ten or twenty times, as long as they declare it is only *occaſional Communion*, it makes them no *Members* of our *Churches*; [illegible] that obliges them to fixed and conſtant Communion.

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Sect. 17. 2. That as far as *occaſinal Communion* is *lawful*, conſtant *Communion* is a *Duty*. This the former *Gentleman wonders at me if I think a good conſequence.* Mr. *A.* brings ſeveral inſtances to prove, *that we allow occaſional Communion to be lawful, where conſtant is no duty*; *as with other Pariſh Churches, upon a Journey, at a Lecture*; &c. but who ever queſtion'd the lawfulneſs of *occaſional Communion* with *Churches* of the ſame conſtitution; or thought a Man was bound to be always of that *Church*, where he goes to hear a Lecture, *&c.* but the queſtion is, about the *lawfulneſs* of *Separation*, where *occaſional Communion* is allowed to be *lawful*. For a Man is not ſaid to ſeparate from every Church, where he forbears or ceaſes to have Communion; but only from that Church, with which he is obliged to hold Communion, and yet withdraws from it. And it is a wonder to me, none of my *Friends* (my *Adverſaries* I am loth to call them) could diſcern this. *It is lawful*, ſaith Mr. *B.* *to have Communion with the French, Dutch, or Greek Church, muſt conſtant Communion therefore with them be a duty?* Yes, if he were obliged to be a *Member* of thoſe *Churches*, and thought it lawful to communicate ſome times, conſtant Communion would be a Duty. But becauſe this ſeems ſo hard to be underſtood, I will therefore undertake to prove it, by theſe two Arguments.

Page 50. Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 84.

Anſwer, p. 105.

Firſt, From the general Obligation upon *Chriſtians* to uſe all *lawful Means* for preſerving the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church*.

Secondly, From the particular force of that Text, Philipp. 3. 16. *As far as you have already attained walk by the ſame Rule*, &c.

Firſt, From the general Obligation upon *Chriſtians* to uſe all *lawful means* for preſerving the Peace and Unity of the Church. *If it be poſſible*, ſaith St. *Paul*, *as much as lies in you live peaceably with all Men.* Now I aſk, if there be not as great an Obligation at leaſt, upon *Chriſtians* to preſerve *Peace* in the *Church*, as with *all Men?* and they are bound to that, *as far as poſſible, and as much as lies in them.* And is not that *poſſible and lies in them* to do, which they acknowledge *lawful to be done*, and *can do at ſome times?* What admirable Arguments are there to *Peace* and *Unity* among *Chriſtians?* What divine Enforcements of them on the Conſciences of Men in the Writings of *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles?* And cannot theſe prevail with Men to do that, which they think in their Conſciences they may lawfully do, towards joyning in *Communion* with us? This I am perſuaded, is one of the provoking Sins of the *Non-conformiſts*, that they have been ſo backward in doing, what they were convinced they might have done, with a *good Conſcience*. When they were earneſtly preſſed to it by thoſe in *Authority*, they refuſed it; and they have been more and more backward ever ſince, till now they ſeem generally reſolved, either to break all in pieces, or to perſiſt in *Separation*. Mr. *B.* indeed very honeſtly moved them 1663. to conſider *how far it was lawful, or their duty to communicate with the Pariſh Churches in the Liturgy and Sacraments*; and brought many Arguments to prove it *lawful*; *and no one of the Brethren ſeemed to diſſent:* but obſerve the Anſwer Mr. *A.* makes to this; *i.e.* ſaith he, *They did not enter their ſeveral Proteſtations, nor formally declare againſt the Reaſons of their Brother; like wiſe and wary perſons they would adviſe upon them.* And ſo they have been *adviſing* and *conſidering* ever ſince, till with great Wiſdom and Warineſs they are dropt into *Separation* before they were aware of it; and the mere *neceſſity* of defending their own *practices*, makes them eſpouſe theſe *Principles*. *Such another Meeting* Mr. *B.* ſaith, *they had after the Plague and Fire, at which*

Rom. 12. 18.

Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 39.

which they agreed, That Communion with our Church was in it ſelf lawful and good. Here Mr. *A.* charges me *for being tardy, and wronging the Relator, by leaving out the moſt conſiderable words of the ſentence,* viz. *When it would not do more harm than good.* And upon this he expatiates about the ways when it *may do more harm than good*; whereas if the Reader pleaſe to examine the place, he will find, I did conſider the force of thoſe words; when I put it, *that they reſolved it to be lawful in it ſelf*; although ſome *Circumſtances* might hinder their preſent doing it. For they declared, *That it was in it ſelf lawful and meet*; but the *Circumſtances* of that time, did make them think *it might do more harm than good*; and therefore it is ſaid, *They delaid for a fitter opportunity*, which makes it clear, they were then reſolved upon the *lawfulneſs* of the thing. But that *opportunity* hath never hapned ſince; and ſo they are now come to plead againſt the *Practice* of it; as Mr. *A.* plainly doth; by ſuch reaſons as theſe. *Communion with our Churches will then do more harm than good,*

Ibid.

Plea, p. 240.

1. *When ſuch Communion ſhall perſuade the Pariſh Churches, that their frame is eligible and not only tolerable.* As though *Separation* were more *eligible*, than a *Communion* that is *lawful* and *tolerable*; and Schiſm were not more intolerable, than Communion with a tolerable Church. What will not Men ſay in defence of their own practice? Was ever *Schiſm* made ſo light a matter of, and the *Peace* and *Unity* of *Chriſtians* valued at ſo low a rate; that for the prevention of the one, and the preſervation of the other, a thing that is *lawful* may not be done, if there be any danger that what is only *tolerable* ſhould be miſtaken for more *eligible?* As if all the *Miſchiefs* of *Schiſm* and *Diviſion* in the Church, were not fit to be put in the ballance, againſt ſuch a horrible and monſtrous inconvenience. Methinks, it were better ſometimes to be wiſe and conſiderate, than always thus ſubtle and witty againſt the common ſenſe, and reaſon of Mankind.

Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 40.

2. *When others ſhall thereby be thought obliged to ſeparate from purer Churches*, i. e. be drawn off from their Separation.

3. *When it will harden the Papiſts.* As though their *Diviſions* did not do it ten thouſand times more.

4. *When it ſhall notably prejudice the Chriſtian Religion in general.* Yes, no doubt the *Cure* of *Diviſions* would do ſo.

By theſe particulars, it appears, that he thinks them not obliged to do *what lawfully they can do.* Yet at laſt, he ſaith, *he tells us, as much is done, as their Conſciences will permit them.* Say you ſo? Is it indeed come to this? Will none of your Conſciences now permit you either to *come to the Liturgy*, or to make uſe of *any parts* of it, in your own *Meetings?* How often hath Mr. *B.* told the World, That you ſtuck not at *Set-Forms*, nor at the *Uſe of the Liturgy*, provided ſome exceptionable paſſages were alter'd in it? Did not Mr. *B.* declare at his *Meeting*, publickly, in a *Writing* on purpoſe, *That they did not meet under any colour, or pretence of any religious Exerciſe in other manner, than according to the Liturgy and Practice of the Church of* England, *and were he able he would accordingly read himſelf?* Is this obſerved in any one *Meeting* in *London*, or through *England?* Then certainly, there are ſome who do not, what they think they lawfully may do towards *Communion* with us. And Mr. *B.* ſaith in the beginning of his late *Plea, That they never made one Motion for Preſbytery, or againſt Liturgies*; and theſe words are ſpoken in the Name of the whole *Party* called *Preſbyterians.* And ſince

Anſw. p. 64. that, Mr. *B.* ſaith, *They did come to an Agreement, wherein the conſtant Uſe of the Liturgy*, with ſome *Alterations*, was required. And are we now told, *That all that can lawfully be done is done?* Mr. *B.* indeed acts agreeably to his Principles, in coming to our *Liturgy*; but where are all the reſt? And, which of them *reads* what they think *lawful* at their own *Aſſemblies?* Do they not hereby diſcover, that they are more afraid of loſing their People, who force them to comply with their *humours*, than careful to do, what they judge *lawful*, towards *Communion* with our *Church?*

Sect. 18. But whence comes it to paſs, that any who think *occaſional Communion* with us to be *lawful*, ſhould not think themſelves obliged to *conſtant Communion?* From what grounds come they to practiſe *occaſional Communion?* Is it *from the Love of Peace and Concord*, as Mr. *B.* ſaith? That is a good ground ſo far, as it goes, but will it not carry a Man farther, if he purſue it, as he ought to do? What *love of Concord* is this to be *occaſionally preſent at our Churches*, and at the ſame time to declare, That there is *greater purity of Worſhip, and better means of Edification in ſeparate Congregations?* The one can never draw Men ſo much to the *love of Concord*, as the other doth encourage them in the *Principles* of *Separation*. But, if there be an Obligation upon Men to Communicate with the *Church* they live in, notwithſtanding the *Defects* and *Corruptions* of it, that *Obligation* can never be diſcharged by meer *occaſional Preſence* at *ſome times*, and *in ſome Acts of Worſhip*; for, ſaith Mr. *Ball*, *To uſe one Ordinance, and not another, is to make a Schiſm in the Church.*

Trial of Grounds of Separation. Chap. 10. *p.* 791.

The only Example produced to juſtify ſuch *occaſional Communion with defective Churches*, is that, *our bleſſed Saviour did communicate after that manner in the Jewiſh Synagogues and Temple.* But this is ſo far from being true, that the *old Separatiſts* granted, That *our Lord Communicated with the Jewiſh Church in God's Ordinances, living and dying a Member thereof*; and from thence they prove, *That the Jewiſh Church had a right Conſtitution in our Saviour's time.*

Robinſon's *Treatiſe, p.* 11.

And did not he declare, That *he came not to diſſolve the Law, but to fulfil it?* And that he complied with *John*'s *Baptiſm*, *becauſe he was to fulfil all righteouſneſs?* Did he not go up to *the Feaſts at Jeruſalem*, as a *Member* of the *Jewiſh Church*, and frequent the *Synagogues?* Even at the *Feaſt* of *Dedication*, though not inſtituted by the Law, he was preſent, as other *Jews* were. Yea, did he not expreſs more than ordinary zeal, for *purifying* the *outward parts of the Temple*, becauſe it was *to be a Houſe of Prayer for all Nations?* Was not this to ſhew Mens *Obligation* to *come* and *Worſhip* there, as well, as that the *place* was to be kept *ſacred* for that uſe? And, doth not the *Apoſtle* expreſly ſay, *That he was made under the Law?* Where is there the leaſt ground in *Scripture*, to intimate, that *Chriſt* only kept *occaſional, and not conſtant communion* with the *Jewiſh Church?* What *part* of Worſhip did he ever withdraw from? Did he not command his *Diſciples to go hear the Scribes and Phariſees*, becauſe *they ſate in* Moſes's *Chair?* Where did he ever bid them go thither, when they could have *no better*; but when they could to be ſure to prefer the *purer way of Worſhip, and better Means of Edification?* Was not his own *Doctrine* incomparably beyond theirs? Is there any pretence for *greater Edification* now, to be mention'd with what the *Diſciples* had, to forſake the *Jewiſh Aſſemblies*, for the love of *Chriſt's own Teaching?* Yet he would

Ainſworth's Conſider. examin'd. p. 5.

John 10, 22, 23.

Mat. 23. 2.

not have them to do that, out of the regard he had to the *publick Worſhip and Teaching*. Our *Saviour* himſelf did only teach his Diſciples *occaſionally*, and at *certain Seaſons*; but their *conſtant Communion* was with the *Jewiſh Aſſemblies*. And ſo it was after his *Paſſion*, till the Luk. 24,53. *Holy Ghoſt* fell upon them, and they were then imploy'd to gather and form a new Church; which was not done before; and thence the *Author* of the *Ordinary Gloſs* obſerves; *That we never read of* Chriſt's *Praying together, with his Diſciples* (unleſs perhaps at his Transfiguration with three of his Diſciples) although we often read of his praying alone. So that no Example can be mention'd, which is more directly contrary to the *Practice* of *Separation* upon the preſent grounds, than that of our bleſſed *Saviour*'s; which ought to be inſtead of all others to us.

Sect. 19. 2. I argue, *from the particular force of that Text,* Phil. 3. 16. *As far, as we have already attained, let us walk by the ſame Rule, let us mind the ſame things.* From whence it appears evident, that Men ought to go as far as they can, towards *Uniformity*; and not to forbear doing any thing, which they *lawfully* may do towards *Peace* and *Unity*.

To take off the force of the Argument from this place, ſeveral *Anſwers* have been given, which I ſhall now remove; ſo that the ſtrength of it may appear to remain, notwithſtanding all the attempts which have been made to weaken it.

Some ſay, *That the Apoſtles words are to be underſtood of the different attainments Chriſtians had in knowledge, and the different Conceptions and Opinions which they had concerning the Truths of the Goſpel.* Thus Dr. O. underſtands the *Text*; whoſe ſenſe is ſomewhat obſcurely and intricately expreſſed; but as far as I can apprehend his meaning, he makes this to be the *Apoſtles:* viz. *Vindication of Non-con formiſts,* p. 25, 30.

I. *That although the beſt Chriſtians in this life cannot attain to a full meaſure and perfection in the comprehenſion of the Truths of the Goſpel, or the enjoyment of the things contained in them; yet they ought to be preſſing continually after it.*

II. *That in the common purſuit of this deſign, it is not to be ſuppoſed, but that Men will come to different attainments, have different meaſures of light and knowledge, yea and different conceptions, or opinions about theſe things.*

III. *That in this difference of opinions, thoſe who differ'd from others ſhould wait on the Teachings of God, in that uſe of the means of Inſtruction which they enjoy'd.*

IV. *That as to their Duty in common to each other, as far as they had attained, they ſhould walk by the ſame Rule, namely, which he had now laid down, and mind the ſame things as he had enjoyned them.*

From whence he infers, *That theſe words are ſo far from being a Foundation to charge them with Schiſm, who agreeing in the ſubſtance of the Doctrine of the Goſpel, do yet diſſent from others, in ſome things; that it enjoyns a mutual forbearance towards thoſe who are differently minded.* And again, he ſaith, *The advice St.* Paul *gives to both Parties, is, that whereunto they have attained, wherein they do agree, which were all thoſe Principles of Faith and Obedience which were neceſſary to their acceptance with God, they ſhould walk by the ſame Rule, and mind the ſame things, that is, forbearing one another in the things wherein they differ; which,* ſaith he, *is the ſubſtance of what is pleaded for by the Nonconformiſts.*

For the clearing of this matter, there are Three things to be debated.

1. Whether the *Apoſtle* ſpeaks of *different Opinions*, or *different Practices?*
2. Whether the *Rule* he gives be *mutual forbearance?*
3. How far the *Apoſtle's Rule*, hath an *influence* on our preſent *caſe?*

Firſt, Whether the *Apoſtle* ſpeaks of *different Opinions*, or of *different Practices?* For the right underſtanding of this, we muſt ſtrictly attend to the *Apoſtle*'s ſcope and deſign. It is moſt evident that the *Apoſtle* began this *Diſcourſe* with a *Caution* againſt the *Teachers* of the *Circumciſion*, Verſ. 2. *Beware of Dogs, beware of evil Workers, beware of the Conciſion.* But ſpeaking ſo reproachfully of them, he ſhews in the next words, that every thing that was excellent in the deſign of the Law, was accompliſhed in the Goſpel; and ſo he proceeds to declare, how juſtly he was brought to a *diſeſteem* of the *greateſt privileges* of the *Law*, in compariſon with the things revealed by the Goſpel, which ſhews, that the Apoſtle had ſtill an Eye to theſe *falſe Teachers*, who were very buſie in diſturbing the *Peace* of the *Churches*, and drawing Diſciples after them, pleading the *neceſſity* of obſerving the *Law*; and dividing the *Chriſtians* into *different Communions* on that account, as appears by their proceedings at *Antioch*, where they did ſeparate themſelves from the *Gentile Chriſtians*, and St. *Peter* for a time complied with them. Act. 16. 13. If ſuch as theſe had not been buſie at *Philippi* (where it appears that *Jews* inhabited) What need St. *Paul* give ſo much *caution* againſt them? What need all this diſpute concerning the *Privileges* of the *Law?* If it be allowed, that they were there carrying on the ſame deſigns, which they did in other *Churches*, then it follows, he had great reaſon to perſuade them to *Unity* ſo earneſtly, as he doth, *Philip.* 2. 1, 2. and to give ſo much *caution* againſt them; and to repreſent the great *excellencies* of the *Goſpel* above the *Law*; which being done, the *Apoſtle* after his uſual method, makes a *digreſſion*, concerning himſelf, viz. *How far ſhort he thought himſelf of what he aimed at*, and yet with *what earneſtneſs he preſſed forward, toward Chriſtian perfection*; making no longer any account of *legal privileges*. Which I take to be his meaning, when he ſaith, *Forgetting the things which are behind I preſs forward*, &c. So St. *Hierome* underſtands it, *Legis obliviſcens ad perfecta Evangelii præcepta me teneo. Forgetting the Law, I keep to the Precepts of the Goſpel.* This being underſtood, the *Apoſtles* ſence naturally follows, according to his former deſign; *Let us therefore, as many as are arrived to this height of Chriſtianity* (ſo the word τέλειοι is uſed, 1 *Cor.* 14. 20. *Epheſ.* 4. 13. *Coloſs.* 4. 12. *Heb.* 5. 14.) *agree in purſuing our main end.* But then comes the caſe of *thoſe*, who were not ſo fully ſatisfied in this *matter* of the *Law*; there being many and plauſible Arguments on their ſide; well, ſaith the Apoſtle, if they are doubtful, I adviſe them however, not to hearken to *theſe falſe Teachers*, for they make nothing but *Faction* and *Diviſions* among you, wait patiently upon God, which is the beſt means, for your Satisfaction. *If any be otherwiſe minded, God ſhall reveal even this unto you*, i. e. ſaith *Beza* in his *Paraphraſe*, *If any yet doubt of the laying aſide of the Law, let them make no diſturbance in the Church about it.* And ſo *Eraſmus* ſaith, *It ought to be underſtood of the judaizing Chriſtians, who did not yet diſcern, that the Ceremonial Law was to be aboliſhed, however*, ſaith he, *they ought not to break the Peace of the Church for it.* But, What ſence can Dr. *O.* here put upon the *being otherwiſe minded:* *Otherwiſe* than what? *As many as be perfect be thus minded*, to purſue your main end; but, *if any be otherwiſe minded*; did any think they ought not to mind chiefly their great end? that is incredible; therefore the *Apoſtle* muſt be underſtood of ſomewhat, about which there were then very *different apprehenſions*; and that is certain there were about the *Law* among the *Chriſtians* then. The *Apoſtle* therefore doth not ſpeak of any kind of *different apprehenſions* Chriſtians might fall into; but of ſuch as were at that time among them; and ſo one Copy reads it, εἴτι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε. *If hitherto ye have been otherwiſe minded*; they had no difference concerning the τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, *the things before them*, viz. the *happineſs* of the *Goſpel*, but they had concerning the τὰ ὀπίσω, *the things behind*, viz. the *force* and *obligation* of the *Law*. And ſince this *difference* did not reſt barely in opinion, but was carried on ſo far, as to break the *Peace* of the *Church* about it; it appears to have been no bare *difference* of *Opinions*, but ſuch as related to the *Peace* and *Communion* of *Chriſtians*.

Secondly, Whether the Rule which the Apoſtle lays down, be only a *Rule* of *mutual forbearance*? *Nevertheleſs, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the ſame Rule, let us mind the ſame things.* The ſence according to Dr. O. is this, *That thoſe who are agreed in the Subſtantials of Religion, ſhould go on and do their duty without regarding leſſer differences.* Which is a *ſence* very uncertain, and doth not reach to the *differences* then among them. It is very uncertain, becauſe it ſets no bounds to *differences*; and ſuppoſes the continuance of ſuch *differences* among them, which he deſigned to prevent, by perſuading them ſo often in this *Epiſtle* to be *of one mind, of one ſoul*; as well as *to mind the* Phil. i. 27. *ſame things*. Beſides, the difference then on foot, was none of the *ſmal-* 2. 2. *ler differences of opinions*, but that about which they differ'd was urged on one ſide, *as neceſſary to Salvation*, by the *falſe Apoſtles*; and oppoſed Act. 15. 1. on the other, *as pernicious and deſtructive to it.* One of my *Anſwerers* ſaith, *That the judaizing Chriſtians were leaven'd with ſuch a corrupt* Rector of *Opinion, as was by no means to be born with; which would have made* Sutton, Chriſt *and his Death in vain, And that the Apoſtle ſets himſelf againſt* p. 15, 16. *it might and main, ſhewing the dreadful conſequences of it.* And is it probable the *Apoſtle* ſhould preſcribe a *Rule* of *mutual forbearance*, in ſuch Gal. 5. 2. a caſe as this? eſpecially, when in the ſame *Chapter*, he gives ſo great a *caution* againſt them, with ſo much unuſual ſharpneſs of expreſſion; *Beware of Dogs, beware of Evil Workers, beware of the Conciſion.* Doth this look like a *Precept* of *mutual forbearance, as to the differences then among them?* theſe we know there were, let Dr. O. name any other ſmaller *differences* of *Opinion*, which might be an occaſion of the *Apoſtles* giving ſuch a *Rule* of *mutual forbearance.* But now, if we ſuppoſe the *Apoſtle* to ſpeak to the *difference* about the *Law*, about which the *Churches* were then divided, the ſence is plain, eaſie, and pertinent. For ſo, either (1.) It takes in thoſe who hitherto differ'd about the *Law*; and then the ſence is, although you are not come up to ſo great ſatisfaction as others have, yet go as far as you can with the Body of Chriſtians, you live with; *keep within one Rule*; break not the *bounds* of *Peace* and *Unity* which *Chriſt* hath ſet you; run not with the *falſe Teachers* into *ſeparating dividing Courſes.* (2.) It is directed to thoſe who have *got the ſtart of others*, and then it contains the *Obligation* that lies upon them, eſpecially to have a mighty regard to the *Peace* and *Unity* of *Chriſtians*; not to break the common Ties and Bonds on the account of their *greater attainments*, nor to *ſeparate* from others, as meaner and lower Chriſtians, becauſe they are not come up to that *perfection*, which you have attained to. And ſo either way, it contains an excellent *Rule*, and of admirable uſe to the *Chriſtian Church*, not only at that time, but in all Ages of the World, *viz.* That thoſe who cannot be fully ſatisfied in all things, ſhould *go as far as they can* towards preſerving *Peace* and *Communion* among *Chriſtians*; and not peeviſhly ſeparate and divide the Church, becauſe they cannot in all things think as others do; nor others on the account of *greater ſanctity and perfection*, deſpiſe the inferior ſort of *Chriſtians*, and *forſake* their *Communion*, but they ought all to do what lies poſſibly in them to preſerve the *bonds* of *Peace*, and the *Unity* of the *Church*.

Thirdly, How far this *Rule* hath an *influence* on our caſe? (1.) It follows from hence, that *as far as Communion is lawful, it is a duty*, ſince, as far as they have attained they are to walk by the ſame Rule. And ſo much Dr. O. doth not deny; when he ſaith, *Thoſe who are agreed in the Subſtantials of Religion, or in the Principles of Faith and Obedience, ſhould walk by the ſame Rule, and mind the ſame things, forbearing one another in the things wherein they differ.* Then as far as they agree, they are bound to joyn together, whether it be as to Opinion, or Communion. Becauſe the obligation to *Peace* and *Unity* muſt eſpecially reach to *Acts* of *Chriſtian Communion*, as far as that is judged to be *lawful.* (2.) That the *beſt Chriſtians* are bound to *Unite* with others, though of *lower attainments*, and to keep within the *ſame Rule*; which is a general expreſſion relating to the *bounds* of a *Race*, and ſo takes in all ſuch *Orders* which are *lawful* and judged neceſſary to hold the *Members* of a *Chriſtian Society* together. But, ſaith Dr. O. *Let the Apoſtles Rule be produced with any probability of proof to be his, and they are all ready to ſubſcribe and conform unto it.* This is the *Apoſtle's Rule*, to *go as far as they can*; and if they can go no farther, *to ſit down quietly, and wait for farther inſtruction*, and not to *break the Peace of the Church*, upon preſent diſſatisfaction, nor to gather *new Churches* out of others upon ſuppoſition of *higher attainments*. *Vindication of Non-conformiſts, p. 26.*

Page 27. *If the Rule reach our Caſe*, ſaith he again, *it muſt be ſuch as requires things to be obſerved, as were never divinely appointed, as National Churches, Ceremonies and Modes of Worſhip.* And ſo this *Rule* doth in order to *Peace*, require the obſervation of ſuch things, which although they be not particularly appointed by God, yet are enjoyned by lawful Authority, provided, they be not unlawful in themſelves, nor repugnant to the Word of God.

Page 28. *But the Apoſtles never gave any ſuch Rules themſelves, about outward Modes of Worſhip with Ceremonies, Feaſts, Faſts, Liturgies*, &c. What then? It is ſufficient that they gave this general Rule, *That all lawful things are to be done for the Churches Peace:* And without this no *Unity*, or *Order* can be preſerved in *Churches*. *The Apoſtles*, ſaith he, *gave Rules inconſiſtent with any determining Rule*, viz. *of mutual forbearance*, Rom. 14. *And herein the Apoſtle acted not upon mere Rules of Prudence, but as a Teacher divinely inſpired.* That he was divinely inſpired, I do not queſtion, but even ſuch a one may determine a caſe upon *preſent Circumſtances*, which reſolution may not always bind, when the *Circumſtances* are changed. For then, the meaning of the *Apoſtle* muſt be, that whatever *differences* happen among *Chriſtians*, there muſt be no determination either way. But the direct contrary to this, we find in the *Decree* of the *Apoſtles* at *Jeruſalem*, upon the difference that *P. 28, 31.*

happened in the *Chriſtian Churches*. And although there was a very plauſible pretence of the *obligation* of *Conſcience* one way; yet the *Apoſtles* made a determination in the caſe, contrary to their Judgment. Which ſhews, that the *Rule* of *Forbearance*, where *Conſcience* is alledged both ways, is no *ſtanding Rule* to the *Chriſtian Church*; but that the *Governors* of it from *Parity* of *Reaſon* may determine thoſe things which they judge to conduce moſt to the *Peace* and *Welfare* of that *Church*, which they are bound to preſerve. And from hence it appears how little *Reaſon* there is for Dr. O's Inſinuation, *as though the falſe Apoſtles were the only Impoſers:* whereas, it is moſt evident, that the true *Apoſtles* made this peremptory *Decree*, in a matter of great *conſequence*, and againſt the pretence of *Conſcience* on the other ſide. **Act. 15. 28.**

But ſaith Dr. O. farther, *The Jewiſh Chriſtians were left to their own liberty, provided they did not impoſe on others; and the Diſſenters at this day, deſire no more, than the Gentile Churches did, viz. not to be impoſed upon to obſerve thoſe things which they are not ſatisfied, it is the mind of* Chriſt *ſhould be impoſed upon them. I Anſwer*, 1. It was agreed by all the *Governors* of the *Chriſtian Church*, that the *Jewiſh Chriſtians* ſhould be left to their own liberty, out of reſpect to the *Law* of *Moſes*; and out of regard to the *Peace* of the *Chriſtian Church*, which might have been extremely hazarded, if the *Apoſtles* had preſently ſet themſelves againſt the obſerving the *Jewiſh Cuſtoms* among the *Jews* themſelves. 2. The *falſe Apoſtles impoſing* on the *Gentile Chriſtians* had two *Circumſtances* in it, which extremely alter their caſe from that of our *preſent Diſſenters*. For, (1.) They were none of their *lawful Governors*, but went about as *Seducers* drawing away the *Diſciples* of the *Apoſtles* from them. (2.) They impoſed the *Jewiſh Rites as neceſſary to Salvation*, and not as *merely indifferent things*. And therefore the caſe of our *Diſſenters* is very different from that of the *Gentile Chriſtians*, as to the *Impoſitions* of the *falſe Apoſtles*. Thus I have conſidered every thing material in Dr. O. which ſeems to take off the force of the Argument drawn from this Text. **Page 7, 8.**

The *Author* of the *Letter* ſaith, (1.) *That I ought to have proved, that the Apoſtles meant ſome Rule ſuperadded to the Scriptures; and,* (2.) *That other Church-Guides had the ſame Power, as the Apoſtles had.* But what need all this? If it appear (1.) That the *Apoſtles* did give *binding Rules* to particular *Churches*, which are not extant in Scriptures, as appears by 1 *Cor.* 7. 17. So that either the *Scripture* is an *imperfect Rule*, for omitting ſome *Divine Rules*; or elſe theſe were only *Prudential Rules* of *Order* and *Government*. (2.) That it is a ſtanding *Rule* of *Scripture*, that *Men are bound to do all lawful things* for the *Peace of the Church*. And this I have ſhewed, was the *Apoſtles* deſign in the *words* of this *Text*. ***Letter out of the Country, p. 24.***

Sect. 20. Others pretend, that the *Apoſtle* means no more by theſe words, *but that Chriſtians muſt live up to their knowledge, and mind that one thing*. This is a very *new Expoſition*; and the *Author* of it intends to ſet up for a *Critick* upon the credit of it. It is pity therefore it ſhould paſs, without ſome conſideration. But, I paſs by the Childiſh triflings about Κανόνι, a *Canon*, viz. *that is not taken in a Military notion, becauſe great Guns were not then invented; that it is an Eccleſiaſtical Canon mounted upon a platform of Moderation*; which are things fit only for *Boys* in the *Schools*; unleſs, perhaps, they might have been deſigned for an *Artillery-Sermon* on this *Text*; but however, methinks they come not in very ſutably in a weighty and ſerious debate. ***Miſchief of Impoſit. p. 6, 7.***

I come therefore to examine the New-Light that is given to this Controverted Text. Κανόνι he obſerves *from* Grotius, *is left out in one MS.* (it may be the *Alexandrian*) but, What is one *MS.* to the general conſent of *Greek Copies?* not only the Modern, but thoſe which St. *Chryſoſtom, Theodoret, Photius, Œcumenius,* and *Theophylact* had, who all keep it in. But ſuppoſe it be left out, the ſence is the very ſame to my purpoſe. No, ſaith he, Τῷ αὐτῷ ϛοιχεῖν, *To walk by the ſame muſt be referred to the antecedent* Εἰς ὅ. And what then? *Then,* ſaith he, *the ſenſe is, What we have attained let us walk up to the ſame; Which comes to no more than this, unto whatſoever meaſure or degree of knowledge we have reached, let us walk ſuitably to it.*

But the *Apoſtle* doth not here ſpeak of the *improvement* of *knowledge*; but of the *union* and *conjunction* of *Chriſtians,* as appears by the next words τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, *to mind the ſame thing.* No ſuch matter, ſaith Mr. *A. that phraſe implies no more than to mind that thing,* viz. *or that very thing,* V. 14. *preſſing towards the mark.* But if he had pleaſed to have read on, but to *Phil.* 4. 2. he would have found τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, to ſigniſie *Unanimity.* And St. *Paul,* 1 *Cor.* 12. 25. oppoſes the τὸ αὐτὸ to σχίσμα. *That there be no Schiſm in the Body, but that all the Members ſhould take care of* τὸ αὐτὸ, *one for another:* and therefore the τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, *minding the ſame things,* is very aptly uſed againſt *Schiſms* and *Diviſions.* I ſhould think St. *Chryſoſtom, Theodoret,* and *Theophylact,* all underſtood the importance of a *Greek Phraſe,* as well as our *Author,* and they all make no ſcruple of interpreting it of the *Peace* and *Concord* of *Chriſtians.* Although St. *Auguſtin* did not underſtand much *Greek,* yet he knew the general ſenſe of the *Chriſtian Church* about this place; and he particularly *De Baptiſmo, c. Donat. l. 2. c.* 4, 5. applies it to the *Peace* of the *Church,* in St. *Cyprian*'s caſe. By this taſte, let any Man judge of the depth of that Man's Learning, or rather the height of his Confidence, who dares to tell the World, *That the Univerſal Current and Stream of all Expoſitors is againſt my ſenſe of this Text.* And for this *univerſal Stream and Current,* beſides Grotius, who ſpeaks exactly to the ſame ſenſe with mine, viz. *That thoſe who differ'd about the legal Ceremonies, ſhould join with other Chriſtians in what they agreed to be Divine;* he mentions only *Tirinus* and *Zanchy,* and then cries, *In a word, they all conſpire againſt my Interpretation.* If he be no better at *Polling Non-conformiſts* than *Expoſitors,* he will have no ſuch reaſon to boaſt of his *Numbers.* Had it not been fairer dealing, in one word, to have referred us to Mr. *Pool*'s *Synopſis?* For, if he had looked into *Zanchy* himſelf, he would have found, how he applyed it ſharply againſt *Anſw. p.* 28. *Diſſentions* in the *Church.* Mr. *B.* ſaith, *That the Text ſpeaketh for Unity and Concord is paſt Queſtion; and that to all Chriſtians, though of different attainments; and therefore requireth all to live in Concord that are Chriſtians, notwithſtanding other differences.* And if he will but allow, that by vertue of this *Rule,* Men are bound *to do all things lawful for preſerving the Peace of the Church,* we have no farther difference about this matter: For then, I am ſure, it will follow, that if *occaſional Communion* be *lawful conſtant Communiou* will be *a Duty.*

And ſo much for the firſt ſort of *Diſſenters,* who allow ſome kind of *Communion* with our *Church* to be *lawful.*

Sect. 21. II. I come now to conſider the charge of *Schiſm,* or *Sinful Separation,* againſt Thoſe, who, *though they agree with us in the Subſtantials of Religion, yet deny any Communion with our Church to be lawful.* I do not ſpeak of any improper Acts of Communion, which Dr. O. calls

Communion in Faith and Love, this they do allow to the *Church* of *England*, but no otherwiſe, than as they believe us to be *Orthodox Chriſtians*; Vindicat. p. 14. yet he ſeems to go farther, as *to ſome at leaſt of our Parochial Churches, that they are true Churches:* But in what ſenſe? Are they *Churches rightly conſtituted*, with whom they may join in *Communion* as *Members*? No; that he doth not ſay. But his meaning is, *that they are not guilty of any ſuch heinous Errors in Doctrine, or Idolatrous Practice in Worſhip, as ſhould utterly deprive them of the Being and Nature of Churches.* And doth this Kindneſs only belong to *ſome of our Parochial Churches?* I had thought, every *Parochial Church* was *true*, or *falſe*, according to its *frame and conſtitution*; which among us ſuppoſeth the owning the *Doctrine* and *Worſhip* received and practiſed in the *Church* of *England*, as it is eſtabliſhed by Law; and if no ſuch *Errors in Doctrine*, *nor Idolatrous Practices* be allowed by the *Church* of *England*, then every *Parochial Church* which is conſtituted according to it, is *a true Church.* But all this amounts to no more, than what they call a *Metaphyſical Truth*; for he doth not mean, that they are *Churches* with which they may lawfully have *Communion*. And he pleads, *for the neceſſity of having Separate Congregations*, from *the neceſſity of Separating from our Communion:* (altho' the time was, when the bare want of a *right Conſtitution* of *Churches*, was thought a ſufficient ground for ſetting up *new Churches*, or for withdrawing from the Communion of a *Parochial Church*; and I do not think the *Dr.* is of another mind now.) But however, I ſhall take things as I find them; and he inſiſts on, *as the grounds of this neceſſity of Separation, the things enjoined by the Laws of the Land, or by the Canons and Orders of the Church; as Signing Children Baptized with the Sign of the Croſs; Kneeling at the Communion; Obſervation of Holy-days; Conſtant Uſe of the Liturgy; Renouncing other Aſſemblies, and the Peoples Right in choice of their own Paſtors; Neglect of the Duties of Church-members; ſubmitting to an Eccleſiaſtical Rule and Diſcipline, which not one of a Thouſand can apprehend to have any thing in it, of the Authority of* Chriſt, *or Rule of the Goſpel.* This is the ſhort account of the *Reaſons* of *Separation* from our *Churches Communion.*

That which I am now to inquire into is, Whether ſuch *Reaſons* as theſe be ſufficient ground for *Separation* from a *Church*, wherein it is confeſſed *there are no heinous Errors in Doctrine, or Idolatrous Practice in Worſhip*; for if they be not, ſuch *Separation* muſt be a *formal Schiſm*; becauſe ſuch perſons not only withdraw from *Communion* with our *Church*, but ſet up other *Churches* of their own.

Now the way I ſhall take to ſhew the inſufficiency of theſe *Cauſes* of *Separation*, ſhall be, by ſhewing the great Abſurdities, that follow upon the allowance of them.

Theſe *Five* eſpecially, I ſhall inſiſt upon.

(1.) That it weakens the *Cauſe* of *Reformation.*

(2.) That it hinders all *Union* between the *Proteſtant Churches.*

(3.) That it juſtifies the *ancient Schiſms*, which have been always condemned by the Chriſtian Church.

(4.) That it makes *Separation* endleſs.

(5.) That it is contrary to the Obligation which lies on all *Chriſtians*, to preſerve the *Peace* and *Unity* of the *Church.*

Sect. 22. (1.) *The prejudice it brings upon the Cauſe of the Reformation.* Which I ſhall make appear, not from the *Teſtimonies* of our own *Writers*, who may be ſuſpected by the *Diſſenters* of too much kindneſs to our *Church*; but, from the eminent and learned *Defenders* of the *Reformation* in *France*, who can be the leaſt ſuſpected of partiality to our *Church*. Inſtit. l. 4. c. 1. n. 9. I begin with *Calvin*; againſt whom I hope no exceptions will be taken.

(1.) In the General, *He aſſigns two marks of the Viſible Church, the Word of God truly preached, and Sacraments adminiſtred according to* Chriſt'*s Inſtitution.*

(2.) He ſaith, *Wherever theſe Marks are to be found in particular Societies, thoſe are true Churches, howſoever they are diſtributed according to humane conveniencies.*

(3.) *That although thoſe ſtand as Members of particular Churches, (who may not be thought worthy of that Society) till they are duly caſt out; yet the Churches themſelves having theſe Marks, do ſtill retain the true Nature and Conſtitution of Churches, and ought to be ſo eſteemed.*

(4.) *Men ought not to Separate from, or break the Unity of ſuch Churches.* Numb. 10. And he hath this notable ſaying upon it: *God ſets ſuch a value upon the Communion of his Church, that he looks upon him as an Apoſtate from his Religion, who doth wilfully ſeparate himſelf from any Chriſtian Society, which hath the true Miniſtery of the Word and Sacraments.* And a little after, he calls *Separation a Denial of God and* Chriſt, *a deſtruction of his Truth, a mighty provocation of his Anger, a crime ſo great that we can hardly imagine a worſe, it being a Sacrilegious* Numb. 11. *and perfidious breach of the Marriage betwixt* Chriſt *and his People.* In the next *Section* he makes it a very *dangerous and miſchievous temptation ſo much as to think of Separation from a Church that hath theſe Marks.*

(5.) *That although there be many Faults and Corruptions in ſuch a Church, yet as long as it retains thoſe Marks, Separation from it, is not juſtifiable: nay, although ſome of thoſe faults be about Preaching the Word, and Adminiſtration of Sacraments:* for, ſaith he, *all truths are not of equal moment: but as long as the Doctrine according to Godlineſs, and the true Uſe of Sacraments is kept up, Men ought not to ſeparate upon leſſer differences; but they ought to ſeek the amending what is amiſs, continuing in the Communion of the Church; and without diſturbing the Peace and Order of it.* And he at large proves, what great allowance is to be made, Numb. 13, 14, 15, 16. *as to the corruption of Members* from the *Examples* of the *Apoſtolical Churches:* and he ſaith, *Mens moroſeneſs in this Matter, although it ſeems to flow from zeal, yet it much rather comes from Spiritual Pride, and a falſe opinion of their own holineſs above others. Although,* ſaith he, *there were ſuch univerſal corruptions in the Jewiſh Church, that the Pro-* Numb. 18. *phets compare it to* Sodom *and* Gomorrah; *yet they never ſet up new Churches, nor erected other Altars, whereat they might offer ſeparate Sacrifices: but whatever the People were, as long as God's Word and Ordinances were among them, they lifted up pure hands to God, although in ſuch an impure Society.* The ſame he proves, *as to* Chriſt *and his Apoſtles.* From whence he concludes, *That Separation from ſuch Churches,* Numb. 19. *where the true Word of God and Sacraments are, is an inexcuſable fault.* But how then comes he to juſtifie the *Separation* from the *Church* of Cap. 2. n. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. *Rome? Becauſe in that Church the true Doctrine of* Chriſt *is ſo much ſuppreſſed, and ſo many Errors obtruded on Mens Minds inſtead of it; and the Worſhip of God ſo corrupted, that the Publick Aſſemblies are Schools of Idolatry and Wickedneſs. And the truth of the Goſpel, being the Foundation of the Churches Unity, it can be no culpable Separation to withdraw from the Communion of a Church which hath ſo notoriouſly corrupted his Doctrine and Inſtitutions; eſpecially, when they anathematize thoſe who will*

not

Numb. 9, 10, 11, 12.

not comply with them? But doth he mean any *indifferent Rites*, or *Ceremonies*, where the *Doctrine* is *ſound?* No; but *Falſe Doctrine, and Idolatrous Worſhip*; as he frequently declares. And therefore he that would go about to defend Separation from a Church, on the account of ſome *Ceremonies* preſcribed, and ſome *Corruptions* remaining in it, muſt overthrow the fundamental grounds of the Reformation, as they are explained by *Calvin* himſelf.

Sect. 23. Among their later Writers, no Man hath vindicated the *Cauſe* of the *Reformation* with greater *ſucceſs* and *reputation* than Mr. *Daille* in his *Apology*. And the *Grounds* he goes upon are theſe.

Apology, c. 3.

(1.) *That we are bound to avoid the Communion of thoſe, who go about to deſtroy and ruin Chriſtianity.*

Cap. 4.

(2.) *If the Church of* Rome *hath not required any thing from us which deſtroys our Faith, offends our Conſciences, and overthrows the ſervice which we believe* ~~*due to*~~ *God; if the differences have been ſmall, and ſuch as we might ſafely have yielded unto; then he will grant, that their Separation was raſh and unjuſt, and they guilty of the Schiſm.*

Cap. 5. Cap. 7. Cap. 8.

(3.) He proves, *that they had weighty reaſons for their Separation*; which are theſe, (1.) *Impoſing new Doctrines as neceſſary Articles of Faith: and yet, not all errors in Doctrine do afford ſufficient ground for Separation; but ſuch as are pernicious and deſtructive to Salvation:* for which he inſtanceth in the *Lutherans opinion of* Chriſt's *Bodily Preſence in the Sacrament, which overthrows not the uſe of the Sacraments, nor requires the adoring it, it neither divides nor mutilates it, nor makes it an expiatory Sacrifice for Sin; all which follows from the Popiſh Doctrine.* From whence he concludes, *That to ſeparate from a Church for tolerable Errors, is an unjuſt Separation.* (2.) *Requiring ſuch Worſhip, as overthrows the Foundations of Chriſtianity; which,* ſaith he, *proves the neceſſity of our Separation;* and for this he inſtances in *Adoration of the Hoſt; which the Church of* Rome *ſtrictly requiring, and the Proteſtants believing it to be a mere Creature, they cannot give it without Idolatry: from whence* he concludes *our Separation to be juſt, becauſe it was neceſſary.* Beſides this he gives inſtances *in the Worſhip of Images, Invocation of Saints,* &c. By which we ſee the *Juſtice* of the *Cauſe* of *Reformation* doth not depend on any ſuch *Ceremonies*, as ours are, nor on the *want* of *Diſcipline*, nor on the bare *Diſſatisfaction* of *Conſcience*, but on ſuch great and important Reaſons, as obtruding *new Articles of Faith*, and *Idolatrous Worſhip* on the *partakers* of the *Communion* of the *Roman Church*.

Cap. 18.

De ſeceſſ. ab Eccleſ. Rom. &c. p. 233.

Amyraldus goes ſo far, as to ſay, *That if there had been no other faults in the Roman Church beſides their unprofitable Ceremonies in Baptiſm, and other things, beyond the meaſure and genius of Chriſtian Religion, they had ſtill continued in its communion; For,* ſaith he, *a Phyſician is to be born with that loads his Patient with ſome unuſeful Preſcriptions, if he be otherwiſe faithful and ſkilful. But if he mixes Poiſon with his Medicines, and beſides adds abundance of Preſcriptions, both needleſs and chargeable, then the Patient hath great reaſon to look out for better help, and to take care of his own ſafety and freedom.* By which he plainly declares, that bare *Ceremonies*, although many more than ours, are no ſufficient *Ground* for *Separation*.

Prejuges legitimes contre les Calviniſtes.

Of late years, a *Perſon* of Reputation in *France* ſet forth a *Book* againſt the *Reformation*, charging it with *Schiſm*, becauſe of the *Separation* from the *Roman Church*; which hath been Anſwered three ſeveral ways by three learned Divines, M. *Claude*, M. *Pajon*, and Mr. *Turretin*.

But, Do any of theſe inſiſt upon matters of *mere Ceremony* where the *Doctrine is ſound*, the *conſtant uſe of Liturgy*, *bare neglect of Diſcipline*, &c. No, they were Men of better underſtanding, than to inſiſt on ſuch things as theſe, which they knew could never bear that weight, as to juſtifie *Separation* from a *Church*; and that they ſhould have expoſed themſelves and their *Cauſe*, to the contempt of all conſidering Men, if they could have alledged no more Subſtantial Reaſons than theſe.

Claude ſa Defence de la Reformation. 8. *part.* *Pajon Examen du livre*, &c. 3. *partie.* *Turretini diſput.* 1. *de neceſſariâ ſeceſſione ab Eccleſiâ. Rom. Sect.* 11. *Le Blanc. Theſes de Reunione.*

But they all agree in ſuch common reaſons, which they thought ſufficient to make a *Separation* juſtifiable, *viz.* *Great corruption in Doctrine*, *idolatrous Worſhip*, *and inſupportable Tyranny over the Conſciences of Men.* *Turretin* expreſly ſaith, *No ſlight Errors*, *no tolerable Superſtitious Rites that do not infect the Conſcience* (as they cannot where they are not forced upon it by unſound Doctrine) *not any corruption of Manners*, *nor defect in Government or Diſcipline*, *are ſufficient grounds for Separation. In one word*, ſaith he, *the Patient is not to be forſaken*, *unleſs his Diſeaſe be deadly and infectious*, *nor then neither but with great difficulty.*

Le Blanc ſhewing the *impoſſibility* of *Re-union* with the *Papiſts*, goes upon theſe Three Grounds.

1. *That it cannot be obtained without ſubſcribing to the Decrees and Canons of the Council of* Trent, *and without anathematizing all thoſe who have oppoſed them. For the condition of Communion with that Church is no leſs, than receiving all its Errors for neceſſary Articles of Faith.*

2. *That the Publick Worſhip practiſed and allowed in that Church is idolatrous, he inſtanceth in Adoration of the Hoſt, the Worſhip of Saints and Images.*

3. *That they cannot return to that Church without ſubjecting their Conſciences to the tyrannical Uſurpations of the Pope.*

Let our *Brethren* now conſider, what Triumphs the *Church* of *Rome* would make over us, if we had nothing to juſtifie our *Separation* from them, but only that we could not have *our Children Baptized without an aerial Sign of the Croſs*, *nor receive the Communion without Kneeling*; *that we do not obſerve Holy-days*, *and uſe a Liturgy*; *and that they are not ſo good as they ſhould be*, *nor Doctrines ſo exact as were to be wiſhed*; How ſhould we be hiſſed and laughed at all over the *Chriſtian World*; if we had nothing to alledge for our *Separation* from the *Roman Church*, but ſuch things as theſe? And when the *Papiſts* ſee the weakneſs of theſe Allegations, they are harden'd in their own ways; and cry out preſently there is no End of *Schiſms* and *Separations* on ſuch Pretences as theſe, by which unſpeakable Miſchief hath been done to the *Cauſe* of the *Reformation.*

Sect. 24. (2.) *This Pretence of Separation would make Union among the Proteſtant Churches impoſſible*, *ſuppoſing them to remain as they are.* For the *Lutheran Churches* have the ſame, and more *Ceremonies*, and *Unſcriptural Impoſitions*, (as they are called) than *our Church* hath. They uſe the *Croſs in Baptiſm*, *Kneeling at the Communion*; and the *Obſervation of Holy-days and Times of Faſting*, *and Set-Forms of Prayer*, &c. yet theſe *Churches* have been thought fit to be *united* with the *moſt Reformed Churches*, by the beſt and wiſeſt *Proteſtants*, both abroad and at home. I do not mean only to have *Communion with them in Faith and Love*, as Dr. O. ſpeaks, but to join together ſo as to make the ſame

Bodies of Churches. A *Synod* of the *Reformed Churches* in *France*, at *Charenton. A.D.* 1631. declared, *that there was no Idolatry or Superſtition in the Lutheran Churches, and therefore the Members of their Churches might be received into Communion with them, without renouncing their own Opinions or Practices*; which ſhews that they did not look on them as ſufficient grounds of *Separation*; for then they would not have admitted them as *Members* of the *Lutheran Churches*, but have told told them, they ought to forſake their Communion, and embrace that of the *Reformed Churches*. Look over all thoſe *learned* and *peaceable Divines*, who have projected or perſwaded an *Union* with the *Lutheran Churches* and others; and ſee if any of them make the Particulars mention'd, any cauſe of *Separation* from them. The *Helvetian Churches* declare, *That no Separation ought to be made for different Rites and Ceremonies, where there is an Agreement in Doctrine: And the true concord of Churches lies in the Doctrine of* Chriſt, *and the Sacraments deliver'd by him*. And this *Confeſſion* was firſt drawn up by *Bullinger*, *Myconius* and *Grynæus*, and ſubſcribed afterwards by *all* their *Miniſters*; and by thoſe of *Geneva* and other Places. And they take notice of the different *Cuſtoms* in other *Churches* about the *Lord's Supper* and other things, yet, ſay they, *becauſe of our conſent in Doctrine, theſe things cauſe no Breach in our Churches*. And they make no ſcruple about the *indifferency* of any of the *Ceremonies* uſed in the *Lutheran Churches*, except thoſe of the *Maſs* and *Images in Churches*. At *Sendomir in Poland, A. D.* 1570. Thoſe who followed the *Helvetian*, *Auſpurg*, *Bohemian Confeſſions*, came to a full Agreement, ſo as to make up one Body, notwithſtanding the different *Rites* and *Ceremonies* among them; *which*, they ſay, *ought not to break the Communion of Churches, as long as they agree in the ſame purity of Doctrine, and the ſame foundation of Faith and Salvation*; and for this they appeal to the *Auſpurg* and *Saxon Confeſſions*. The *Auſpurg Confeſſion* declares, *That agreement in Doctrine and Sacraments is ſufficient for the Churches Unity*; then Separation cannot be lawful merely on the account of *Ceremonies* and *Human Traditions*. And the *Confeſſion of Straſbug* ſaith, *That they look on no Human Traditions as condemned in Scripture, but ſuch as are repugnant to the Law of God; and bind the Conſciences of Men; otherwiſe if they agree with Scripture, and be appointed for good Ends, although they be not expreſly mention'd in Scripture, they are rather to be looked on as Divine than Human; and the contempt of them is the contempt of God himſelf. Nay*, they ſay, *tho' the Laws ſeem very hard and unjuſt, a true Chriſtian will not ſtick at obeying them, if they command nothing that is wicked*.

Præfat. ad Confeſſ. Helvet. & art. 17, 27.

Conſenſ. Polon. p. 220.

Confeſſ. Auguſt. art. 7.

Confeſſ. Argent. c. 14.

Joh. Crocius diſtinguiſheth of Three ſorts of *Ceremonies*.

The Firſt *commanded*,
The Second *forbidden*,
The Third *neither commanded nor forbidden*.

Croc. de Eccleſ. Unit. & Schiſm. c. 6. *n.* 4.

The Unity of the Church ſuppoſeth the Obſervation of the Firſt, and yet for every Omiſſion the Communion of the Church is not to be broken. The Second breaks the Churches Unity; yet its communion not to be forſaken for One or Two of theſe, if there be no Tyranny over the Conſciences of Men; but for the Third, Men ought not to break the Unity of the Church. And in another place he gives particular Inſtances in the *Ceremonies* obſerved in the *Lutheran Churches*, *the Exorciſm in Baptiſm, the Linen Garments and Wax-Candles, the Holy-days and Confeſſion*, &c. and declares, *That we ought not to break off communion with Churches, or make a Schiſm for theſe things*. Zanchy *accounts it a great Sin to di-*

Comment. de Aug. confeſſ. 9. *c.* 4. *p.* 33. *c.* 29. *Pag.* 435. *Zanch.* 1. *de Red. p.* 765.

ſturb the Peace of Churches for the ſake of indifferent Ceremonies; *and contrary to that Charity we ought to have to our Brethren and to Churches.* *Amyraldus* ſpeaking of the *Ceremonies* in the *Lutheran Churches*, ſaith, *that thoſe which came in uſe after the Apoſtolick times, have no other Obligation on us, than that for the ſake of indifferent things, tho' at firſt appointed out of no Neceſſity, nay tho' there be Inconveniency in them, yet the Churches Peace ought not to be diſturbed.*

Amyrald. de Seceſſ. ab Eccl. Rom. Deque pace cum Evangel. conſtit. p. 231.

And he very well obſerves, *that the Nature of Ceremonies is to be taken from the Doctrine which goes along with them*; *if the Doctrine be good the Rites are ſo, or at leaſt are tolerable*; *if it be falſe, then they are troubleſome, and not to be born*; *if it be impure, and lead to Idolatry, then the Ceremonies are tainted with the Poyſon of it.* *But*, ſaith he, *the Lutheran Churces have no falſe or wicked Doctrine concerning their Rites*; *and therefore he adviſeth Porſons to communicate with the Lutheran Churches, as their Occaſions ſerve*; and ſo do others. And *Ludovicus Prince Elector Palatine*, not only congratulated the *mutual Communion* of the ſeveral *Churches in Poland*, but pray'd for the ſame in *Germany* too, as *Biſhop Davenant* tells us; who proves at large, that there is no ſufficient *Reaſon* to hinder it; which he makes to lie only in Three things.

Hornbeek de Conſociat. Evang. Sect. 1. n. 3.

Sentent. D. Daven. p. 5.

I. *Tyranny over Mens Faith and Conſciences.*
II. *The Practice of Idolatry.*
III. *The Denial of ſome Fundamental Article of Faith.*

And none of theſe things being chargeable on the *Lutheran Churches*, the *lawfulneſs* of the *Terms* of *Communion* with them doth fully appear.

And now I deſire our Brethren, who juſtifie their *Separation* upon pretence *that our Terms of Communion are unlawful*, to reflect upon theſe things. Will they condemn ſo many *Proteſtant Churches* abroad, which have harder *Terms* of *Communion* than we? What would they think of the *Exorciſm* of *Infants*, of *Auricular Confeſſion*, of *Images in Churches*, and ſome other things, beſides what are obſerved among us? Do we *want Diſcipline?* Do they not in other *Churches* abroad?

The *Tranſylvanian Divines* in their *Diſcourſe* of the *Union* of *Proteſtant Churches* declared, *That little or none was obſerv'd among them.* Will they then *ſeparate from all Proteſtant Churches?* Will they confine the *Communion* of *Chriſtians* to their Narrow Scantlings? Will they ſhut out all the *Lutheran Churches* from any poſſibility of *Union* with them? For what *Union* can be juſtifiable with thoſe whoſe *Terms of Communion are unlawful?* They may pity them, and pray for them, and wiſh for their *Reformation*, but an *Union* doth ſuppoſe ſuch a *Communion of Churches*, that the *Members* of one may *communicate* in another. Do they allow this to the *Lutheran Churches?* If not, then they render *Union* among the *Proteſtant Churches* impoſſible, becauſe *unlawful.* If they do, will they be ſo unjuſt, as not to allow the ſame Favour and Kindneſs to our own *Church?* Can they think *Separation* neceſſary from our *Church* on thoſe Grounds, which are common to us with other *Proteſtant Churches*; and yet think *Union deſirable* and *poſſible* with them notwithſtanding? Do they think that the *Members* of the *Reformed Churches* could *lawfully communicate* with the *Lutheran Churches*, altho' they have the *Croſs in Baptiſm*, *Kneeling at the Communion*; the *Surplice*, and other *Ceremonies* which we have not? and yet, Is it neceſſary to *ſeparate* from our *Churches Communion* on the account of ſuch things as theſe; where there is acknowledged to be a full *Agreement* in the *Subſtantials* of *Religion?*

Irenic tract. Pror. p. 55

ligion? Either therefore they muſt differ from the Judgment of the *Reformed Churches*, and the moſt eminent *Proteſtant Divines* abroad, or they muſt renounce this *Principle* of *Separation*.

Sect. 25. (3.) *This will juſtifie the ancient Schiſms which have been always condemn'd in the Chriſtian Church.* For ſetting aſide the *Ceremonies* (of which already) and *the uſe of the Liturgy and Holy-days* (which is common to our *Church* with all other *Chriſtian Churches*, for many Hundred years before the great Degeneracy of the *Roman Church*; and are continued by an *univerſal conſent* in all parts of the *Chriſtian World*) the other Reaſons for *Separation* are ſuch, which will juſtifie the greateſt *Schiſmaticks* that ever were in the *Chriſtian Church*, viz. *Want of Evangelical Church-Diſcipline, and due Means of Edification, and depriving the People of their Liberty of chuſing their own Paſtors, whereby they are deprived alſo of all uſe of their light and knowledge of the Goſpel, in providing for their own Edification.* For, What gave occaſion to the *Novatian Schiſm*, which began ſo ſoon, and ſpread ſo far, and continued ſo long, but the Pretence of *the want of Evangelical Church-Diſcipline, and better Means of Edification, and humouring the People in the choice of their own Paſtors?*

Vindication of Non-conformiſts, p. 13. 36.

There were Two things the *Novatians* chiefly inſiſted on, as to *Evangelical-diſcipline*.

1. The *Power of the Keys*.
2. The *Purity of the Church*.

1. As to *the Power of the Keys*, they ſaid, *That* Chriſt *had never given it abſolutely to his Church, but under certain Reſtrictions, which if Men exceeded, the Church had no Power to releaſe them*; and that was eſpecially *in the caſe of denial of* Chriſt *before Men, when Men fell in time of Perſecution.*

2. *The Church's Purity ought to be preſerved, by keeping ſuch who had thus fallen from ever being receiv'd into communion again.* They did not deny *that God might pardon ſuch upon Repentance, but,* they ſaid, *the Church could not.* And this they pleaded would tend very much to *the Edification of Chriſtians*, and would make them *more watchful* over themſelves, when they ſaw no hopes of recovering the *Church's communion*, if they once fell from it. Add to this, that *Novatus*, or *Novatianus* (for the *Greeks* confounded their Names) in his *Epiſtle* to *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria*, ſaith, *That he was forced to do what he did, by the importunity of the Brethren, who out of their zeal for the Purity of the Eccleſiaſtical-Diſcipline*, would not comply with the looſer part, which joined with *Cornelius*, and therefore choſe him to be their *Biſhop*. And ſo much appears by *Pacianus*, that *Novatus* coming from *Carthage* to *Rome*, makes a Party there for *Novatianus* in oppoſition to *Cornelius*, which conſiſted chiefly of *thoſe who had ſtood firmeſt in the Perſecution*; in their Name he Writes to *Novatianus*, declaring, That he was *choſen* by the *zealous Party* at *Rome*, *whereas Cornelius had admitted the lapſed to communion*, and conſequently *corrupted* the *Diſcipline* of the *Chriſtian Church*.

Cyprian. ad Anton. Ep. 52. n. 13.

Euſeb. l. 6. c. 45.

Pacian. Epiſt. 3. *ad Sempron.*

Here we have a concurrence of Dr. O's Pleas, *Zeal for Reformation of Diſcipline, the greater Edification of the People, and the aſſerting their right in chuſing ſuch a Paſtor as was not likely to promote their Edification.* But notwithſtanding theſe fair Pretences, the making a *Separation* in the *Church*, was every where condemned as a *great Sin*; as appears by St. *Cyprian*, *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria*, *Theodoret*, *Epiphanius*, and others.

Cyprian. Epiſt. 51, 52. *De unit. Eccl. de lapſis. Euſeb. l.* 6. c. 45. *Theod. hæret. fab. l.* 3. 5. *Epiph. hær.* 59.

others. *Dionyſius* tells the Author of the *Schiſm, that he had better have ſuffer'd any thing, than thus to have made a Rent in the Church: and it was as glorious a Martyrdom to die to prevent a Schiſm, as to avoid Idolatry, and he thinks it a much greater thing; the one being a Martyrdom for the Church, the other only for ones own Soul.* St. *Cyprian* charges thoſe who were guilty of this *Schiſm* with *Pride and Arrogance, and doing unſpeakable miſchief to the Church, by breaking the Peace of it: and will hardly allow thoſe to be Chriſtians who lived in ſuch a Schiſm:* when as
Cyprian. de Unit. Eccl. n.11.12,&c. *Epiphanius* obſerves, *they ſtill pleaded they had the ſame Faith with the Catholick Church*; and yet St. *Cyprian* will not allow that to be *true Faith which hath not charity*; and ſaith, *That there can be no true charity, where Men do thus break in pieces the Unity of the Church.*

Epiph. hær. 68. The *Meletians* in *Ægypt* agreed with the *Catholick Chriſtians* in the *Subſtantials of Religion, holding the ſame Faith with them*, as *Epiphanius* relates the Story; and their *Schiſm* began too *about preſerving the Diſcipline of the Church, and the beſt means for the Edification of the People.* They allowed a *Reſtitution* for the *lapſed* to the *Communion* of the *Church*, but after a *very ſevere Diſcipline*, and an utter *incapacity* of thoſe in *Orders* as to any parts of their *Functions.* But *Peter Biſhop* of *Alexandria* thought the milder way the better; whereupon a *Separation* followed: and the *Meletians* had *diſtinct Churches*; which they called, *The Churches of the Martyrs.* This *Schiſm* grew to that height, *that they would not pray together in Priſon, nor in the Quarries whither they were ſent. Meletius being*
Theod. l.1.c. 9. a *Biſhop* was *depoſed* by *Peter* of *Alexandria*, but he went on ſtill to promote the *courſe of Separation* in *Thebais*, and other parts of *Egypt*, upon which the *Council* of *Nice*, in their *Synodical Epiſtle*, deprived him of all *Epiſcopal Power*, and the *People* that adhered to him, of the *Power of chooſing their own Paſtors* (or rather of *propoſing the names of thoſe who were to be ordained.*) And ſo, according to Dr. O. *they had juſt cauſe to continue their Separation ſtill*; although it were condemned by the *Council* of *Nice.*

Audæus began his *Schiſm* out of a *mighty zeal* for the *Diſcipline* of the
Epiph. hær. 70. *Church*, and a great freedom which he uſed in reproving the *faults* of the *Biſhops* and *Clergy*; but meeting with ill uſage, he withdrew from the *Churches Communion*, with his *Diſciples*, although he ſtill retained *the ſame Faith, and agreed in the Subſtantials of Religion with the beſt Chri-*
Sect. 15. *ſtians*; but forbore *all Communion* with them; which *Epiphanius* accounts δεινότερον πάντων ϗ φοβερώτερον, *the moſt dreadful thing in the World:* and yet upon Dr. O's *Principles* of *Separation*, they did a very commendable thing as long as their deſign was to reſtore *the Churches Diſcipline, and to conſult their own greater Edification.*

The followers of *Euſtathius Sebaſtenus* are on this account likewiſe excuſed, who withdrew from the *publick Congregations* on a pretence of greater *ſanctity and purity in Paphlagonia*, and ſtand condemned in ſeveral *Canons* of the *Council* at *Gangræ*; ſo are thoſe mention'd and condemn'd in the *Councils* of *Conſtantinople* and *Carthage*; and the *Separation* of *Feliciſſimus* and his *Brethren* from St. *Cyprian*; all which are ſet down together in my *Sermon*, but are gently paſſed over by Dr. O. and Mr. *B.* and the reſt of their Adverſaries.

Rector of Sutton, &c. p.42. Only one ſaith, *That the Errors of the followers of* Euſtathius Sebaſtenus, *both in Opinion and Practice, were very groſs, which the Council takes notice of and condemns.* Yet, *as groſs as they were*, there was a *pretence* of *greater Sanctity and Purity* in them. For *their abſtaining from*

Marriage, *and peculiarity of Habits*, and *Separate Meetings*, were all carried on with the ſame *Pretence*.

To proceed then. On the ſame accounts the *Donatiſts* will be vindicated in the *main grounds* of their *Schiſm*, although they were miſtaken in the *matter* of *fact* concerning *Cæcilian*; for their *great pretence* was to preſerve *the purity* of the *Church's Diſcipline*, as may at large be ſeen in *Optatus*, and St. *Auguſtin*; and yet they frequently, and deliberately call it, *a moſt Damnable and Sacrilegious Schiſm*.

The *Luciferians* pretended ſuch a *zeal* for the *true Faith*, and the *Diſcipline of the Church*, that the only *pretence* for their *Schiſm* was, that they could not *communicate* with thoſe who had ſubſcribed to *Arianiſm*, or received *Ordination* from *Arian Biſhops*; as may be ſeen at large in the *Book* of *Marcellinus* and *Fauſtinus*. And they joyned with the party of *Urſinus* at *Rome* againſt that of *Damaſus*, and complained, *they were deprived of the liberty of chooſing their own Paſtors*.

So that upon theſe grounds, there hath ſcarce been any conſiderable *Schiſm* in the *Chriſtian Church*, but may be juſtified upon Dr. *Owen's* Reaſons *for Separation from our Church*.

Sect. 26. (4.) Another Argument againſt this *courſe* of *Separation*, is, *That theſe grounds will make Separation endleſs*. Which is, to ſuppoſe all the Exhortations of *Scripture* to *Peace* and *Unity* among *Chriſtians*, to ſignifie nothing. For nothing being more contrary to *Unity* than *Diviſion* and *Separation*; if there be no bounds ſet, but what the fancies of Men dictate to them be ſufficient Grounds to juſtifie *Diviſion* and *Separation*, any People may break *Communion* with a *Church*, and ſet up a *new* one, when they think fit; which will leave the *Chriſtian Church* in a remedileſs condition againſt thoſe who break its *Peace* and *Communion*. It being a true ſaying of Mr. *Cotton's* of *New-England*, *That they that ſeparate from their Brethren farther than they have juſt Cauſe, ſhall at length find cauſe (or at leaſt think they have found cauſe) juſt enough to ſeparate one from another. I never heard*, ſaith he, *of any inſtance to the contrary, either in* England, *or* Holland. The ſubſtance of this I had objected before in the *Preface* to my *Sermon*; To which Mr. *A.* Replies after this manner; *That though ſome petty and inconſiderable inconveniencies, ſome little trouble may ariſe to a Church from the levity and volubility of Mens Minds; yet this is no Reaſon why they ſhould enſlave their Judgments or Conſciences to others.* And is this all the *Antidote* againſt the *Miſchief* of *Separation*? Is it a Sin, to *break* the *Church's Communion*, or, Is it not? If it be a *Sin* in ſome caſes, but not in others; Why do you not ſhew us what thoſe *caſes* are; and that it is a *ſinful Separation* in other *caſes*, but not in them? But to talk of *ſmall inconveniencies by the levity of Peoples minds*, is Childiſh trifling, and not anſwering. Is *Schiſm* indeed become ſuch an *inconſiderable and petty inconvenience*? Is this an Anſwer becoming a *Chriſtian*, to ſwell every *ſmall Impoſition* into a huge inſupportable Mountain, and to make themſelves lie groaning under the weight of a *Ceremony or two*, as though their very heart-ſtrings were cracking, and as if *Nero* had begun a freſh Perſecution; and at the ſame time to leſſen the guilt of *Diviſion* and *Separation*, as though it were nothing but a little *wantonneſs* in the *Lambs* of their *Flocks*, friſking up and down from one *Paſture* to another; *ſome ſmall and inconſiderable inconveniencies* may happen by it, but not worth ſpeaking of; and it is pity they ſhould be deprived of their pleaſure for it. What a rare Advocate had this Man been for the *Novatians*, *Donatiſts*, *Luciferians*, or what

Cotton's *Anſwer to* R. Williams *p.* 121.

Miſchief of Impoſit. in the Preface.

Schiſmaticks ſoever rent the *Church* in pieces in former times? And ſup-
poſing St. *Cyprian*, and St. *Auguſtine*, and other great oppoſers of the an-
cient *Schiſms*, to be met together, we may gather from theſe words, and
the *Principles* of *Separation*, which he lays down, after what manner he
would accoſt them. “ Alas (ſaith he) What do you mean, *Cyprian*,
“ and *Auſtin*, and other *Reverend Fathers*, to talk with ſo much ſeverity
“ and ſharpneſs againſt *ſeparation* from the *communion* of the *Church*, as
“ though it were ſuch a *damnable ſin*, ſuch a *ſacrilegious impiety*, ſuch a
“ *horrid Wickedneſs?* Will you make no allowance to the *levity and*
“ *volubility of Mens Minds?* What! you would have Men *enſlave*
“ *their Judgments and conſciences to others*, would you? You would
“ have us be *mere Brutes to be managed by your Bit and Bridle?* If
“ the *Novatians* do think your *Diſcipline* too looſe, Why ſhould not
“ they join together for ſtricter? If *Feliciſſimus* and his Brethren
“ diſlike ſome things in the *Church* of *Carthage*, Why may not they
“ go to the *Mountains* for *ſeparate Meetings?* If the good People were
“ impoſed upon againſt their *Wills* in the Choice of *Cornelius*, Why
“ may not they chooſe *Novatian* for their *Paſtor?* What a ſtir do you
“ *Cyprian* make in your *Epiſtles* about keeping the *Peace* of the *Church*,
“ and ſubmitting to your *Rules* of *Diſcipline?* As though there were
“ not more *miſchief* in your *impoſing*, than in the *Peoples ſeparating*. And
“ as for you *Auguſtin*, Who can with patience read your long and fierce
“ Declarations, againſt the ſober *Donatiſts?* For, there were mad hare-
“ brained *Fanaticks*, called *Circumcellians*, who were troubled with more
“ than ordinary *levity* and *volubility*, running *from place to place*, and ta-
“ ing away other Mens lives, and their own too, out of *pure zeal*;
“ Theſe I grant have an extraordinary *Worm*, which ought to be picked
“ out in time; but for the reſt of the *Brethren*, that only *ſeparate* on
“ the account of *impurity* which they apprehend in your *Church*, Why
“ ſhould you be ſo ſevere againſt them? Why do you ſo often cry out
“ of the *ſacrilegiouſneſs* of this *Schiſm?* We know no other *ſacrilege*,
“ but the *ſacrilegious deſertion* of our *Miniſtry*, in obedience to the Laws;
“ this is a *Sacrilege* we often talk of, and tell the People, *it is far worſe*
“ *than robbing Church-Plate*, conſidering what precious Gifts we have.
Aug. c. Ep. “ But for the *Sacrilege* of *Schiſm*, that we can never underſtand; al-
Parmen. l. 1. “ though I perceive you have it over and over; beſides many other hard
c. 7. *l.* 2. *c.* 1, “ words, wherein you would ſeem to make it *the greateſt of all Wicked-*
3, 11. *l.* 3. “ *neſs*; and you ſay, *That God puniſhed it more ſeverely than Idolatry*;
c. 1. “ *ſince thoſe who were guilty of the latter, were to be deſtroyed by the*
De bapt. c. “ *Sword, but Schiſmaticks were ſwallowed up of the Earth; as* Corah,
Donat. l. 2. “ *and his* Company. Whereas we that have greater light, look upon
c. Creſcon. “ *Separation* but as an effect of the *levity and volubility of Mens Minds*,
l. 2. *c.* 14. “ and though ſome *little trouble may come to the Church by it*, yet it is
Aug. Ep. 43. “ far better than ſubmiſſion to others impoſitions. And is not this an
& 51. “ intolerable impoſition, for you to force theſe honeſt *Donatiſts* to com-
“ municate in a *corrupt* and *impure Church*, as they do believe yours to
“ be? When the *Cauſe* was ſtrictly examined at *Carthage*, What was
Collat. 3. “ it their *Party* pleaded for, but *Purity* of *Diſcipline*, and that the *Church*
Carthag. “ was defiled for *want* of it? And therefore they were forced to *Sepa-*
n. 258. “ *rate*, for *greater Purity* of *Ordinances*. And, Is this the *Damnable*,
“ *Deviliſh, Sacrilegious Schiſm* you talk of? Methinks you ſhould con-
“ ſider better the *Miſchief* of your *Impoſitions*, when you require *Com-*
“ *munion* ſo ſtrictly with you, or elſe they muſt preſently be *Separatiſts*

"and *Schiſmaticks.* I pray Sirs have a little patience with me; if I do not fetch off my good friends the *Donatiſts* in this matter, we will all be content to be called *Schiſmaticks*, as well as they. For if our *Principles* do clear our ſelves, I am ſure they will do as good a turn for them. Now, the main *Principles* of our preſent *Separation* are theſe.

"(1.) *That every particular Church, upon a due balance of all circumſtances, has an inherent right to chooſe its own Paſtor, and every particular Chriſtian the ſame Power to chooſe his own Church. I ſay not to miſchooſe*, do you mark me, *but, a power to chooſe; not to chooſe any, but one that may beſt advance their own Edification; at leaſt that no Paſtor be forced upon a Church, no Church obtruded on a ſingle Chriſtian without their own conſent.* Now I pray conſider, Why might not *Lucilla*, and *Donatus*, and *Botrus*, and *Celeuſius*, with their Party among the *People at Carthage*, chooſe *Majorinus* for their *Paſtor*; although the reſt had choſen *Cæcilian*? For they were not well ſatisfied with *Menſurius* his Predeceſſor, whom they ſuſpected for a *Traditor*; but when they had *their liberty to chooſe*, Why ſhould they be debarred of their *inherent right of chooſing their own Paſtor?* Why ſhould *Cæcilian* be obtruded upon them? Why ſhould not they chooſe one, who would beſt *advance their Edification?* For *Cæcilian* was at leaſt under ſuſpicion of *compliance* in time of *Perſecution*, and therefore for my part, upon our Principles, I think the *Donatiſts* very free from the *charge* of *Schiſm.*

Miſchief of Impoſitions in the Preface.

"(2.) *That it is the duty of every Chriſtian to worſhip, not only in purity of heart, but according to the purity of Goſpel-Adminiſtrations.* Now obſerve, that there was nothing the *Donatiſts* pleaded ſo much, and ſo vehemently for, as the *purity of Goſpel-Adminiſtrations.* This was that which *Parmenian*, *Petilian*, and the reſt ſtill contended for, as appears by the *Plea* they put in for themſelves in the laſt *Conference* at *Carthage.* *We are they* (ſay they) *that have ſuffer'd perſecution for maintaining the Purity of the Church, this hundred years, becauſe we would not comply with their corruptions, we have been turned out of our Churches, and been ſent to Priſon, and had our Goods taken from us, and ſome of our Brethren have been killed, and others hardly uſed for ſo good a Cauſe*; And, Can ſuch Men as you condemn them for a horrible *Schiſm?* I tell you, they are as Innocent as our ſelves, for they went upon the ſame grounds.

Collat. 3. Carthag. n. 258.

"(3.) *That every Chriſtian is obliged to live in the uſe of all God's Ordinances and Commandments.* Now, Is not *Diſcipline* one of *God's Ordinances?* And, Do we not make *want of Diſcipline*, one of the *Reaſons* of our *Separation?* And therefore the *Donatiſts* were very honeſt Men, for they were juſt of our mind. And theſe being the chief grounds we go upon, we cannot but in *Brotherly kindneſs* ſpeak this in *vindication* of them, againſt your unreaſonable ſeverity. I know you tell them often, *There will be no end of Separation upon theſe terms; for why might not* Maximianus *do the ſame by* Primianus, *that* Majorinus *did by* Cæcilian? And ſo make *fruſtum de fruſto*, by which they did *minutatim concidere, cut the Church into ſo many little pieces*, that could never be joyned together again: But, let me tell you, that the force of your Argument comes to this, *That Men may chooſe one Paſtor to day, and another to morrow, and a third the next; and ſo turn round till they are giddy, and run themſelves out of breath in a Wild-gooſe*

Aug. enarr. 2 in Pſ. 36. C. Parmen. l. 1. c. 5. l. 2. c. 18.

“ *chaſe, till they ſit down and reſt in Irreligion and Atheiſm. And is*
“ *this all?* (theſe are his own words.) *The Apoſtle commands us to*
“ *prove all things* (What! by running from one Communion to another?
“ *Muſt we needs therefore never hold faſt that which is good? unſetled*
“ *heads, and unſetled hearts will be wandring; let them go, 'tis a good*
“ *riddance of them if they be obſtinate; but where this humour has deſtroyed*
“ *one Church, this rigorous forcing of Paſtors on the People* (as
“ *Cæcilian* on the People of *Carthage*) *has divided and deſtroyed*
“ *hundreds.*

Thus far the *Advocate-General* for *Schiſmaticks*.

Judge now, *Reader*, whether the *cauſes* of the preſent *Separation*, as they are laid down by my Adverſary, do not equally defend the *Donatiſts* in their *Schiſm*; and his making ſo light a matter of *Schiſms* doth not give Encouragement to Men to make more.

Sect. 27. But I ſhall not ſend him ſo far back as St. *Cyprian*, and St. *Auguſtin*, for better Inſtruction in this matter; but I ſhall refer him to one whoſe Writings I perceive he is better acquainted with, even Mr. *Baxter*. Who hath very well, in ſeveral *Books*, ſet forth *the great Miſchief of Diviſions and Separations.* He doth not look upon them *as petty and inconſiderable Inconveniencies, little Troubles to the Church, the effects of levity, and volubility of Mens Minds*; but he quotes above Forty Places of *Scriptures* againſt them, and ſaith, *That the World, the Fleſh, and the Devil are the cauſes from whence they come; that they are as much the Works of the Fleſh, as Adulteries, Fornications,* &c. *that contentious Dividers are carnal Men, and have not the Spirit; that Dividers are the Wounding, nay the Killing of the Church, as much as lieth in the Dividers; and that to reform the Church, by dividing it, is no wiſer than to cut out the Liver, or Spleen, or Gall, to cleanſe them from the filth that both obſtruct them, and hinder them in their Office; that Diviſions are the deformities of the Church, the lamentation of Friends, and the ſcorn of Enemies; the diſhonour of* Chriſt *and the Goſpel; the great hinderance of the Converſion and Salvation of the World, and of the Edification of the Members of the Church; That they fill the Church with Sins of a moſt odious Nature; they cheriſh Pride and Malice, and Belying others (the Three great Sins of the Devil) as naturally as dead fleſh breedeth Worms. In a word, the Scripture telleth us, that where envying and ſtrife is, there is confuſion and every evil work,* (*And, is not this a lamentable way of Reformation of ſome imaginary, or leſſer evils*) *Yet farther*, he ſaith, *They are uneaſie to the perſons themſelves, and rob them of the ſweeteſt part of Religion; they lead directly to Apoſtacy from the Faith, and ſhake States and Kingdoms, having a lamentable Influence on the Civil Peace.* Is all this nothing but the natural effect of *the levity or volubility of Peoples Minds*? This learned *Author* begins his *Book* with a very ſtarched Relation of his admirable Reading, *That in his time he hath read an Elegant Oration in praiſe of a Quartan Ague; another upon the Gout, a third upon Folly; but there wants one yet in the praiſe of Schiſm*; and I never met with one that doth offer fairer toward it, than he doth. For he not only excuſes it, from the *natural cauſe* of it, and *the ſmall trouble that attends it*; but he implies it to be the *conſequence of Men's uſing their Reaſon, and not being made Brutes to be managed with a ſtrong Bit and Bridle.* But Mr. *Baxter* will teach him another Leſſon; for, he ſaith, *that Schiſm is a Sin againſt ſo many, and clear, and vehement words of the*

Cure of Diviſions, Direct. 7. Defence of the Cure, p. 3.

Chriſtian Directory, p. 739, &c.

Miſchief of Impoſ. Sect. p.

Chriſtian Directory, p. 741.

the Holy Ghoſt, that it is utterly without excuſe; Whoredoms, and Treaſon, and Perjury are not oftner forbidden in the Goſpel, than this: That it is contrary to the very deſign of Chriſt *in our Redemption, which was, to reconcile us all to* God, *and to unite and centre us all in him: That it is contrary to the deſign of the Spirit of Grace, and to the very nature of Chriſtianity it ſelf: That it is a Sin againſt the neareſt Bonds of our higheſt Relations to each other; that it is either a dividing* Chriſt, *or robbing him of a great part of his Inheritance: And neither of theſe is a little ſin: That it is accompanied with Self-ignorance, and Pride, and great Unthankfulneſs to God: That Church-dividers are the moſt ſucceſsful ſervants of the Devil, being enemies to* Chriſt *in his Family and Livery: And that they ſerve the Devil more effectually than open enemies: That Schiſm is a ſin which contradicteth all God's Ordinances and Means of Grace, which are purpoſely to procure and maintain the Unity of his Church. That it is a ſin againſt as great and lamentable Experiences, as almoſt any ſin can be: And this is a heinous aggravation of it; that it is commonly juſtified, and not repented of by thoſe that commit it; and it is yet the more heinous, that it is commonly father'd upon God: Laſtly, that it is moſt unlike the Heavenly State, and in ſome regard worſe than the Kingdom of the Devil, for he would not deſtroy it by dividing it againſt it ſelf. Remember now,* ſaith he, *that Schiſm, and making Parties and Diviſions in the Church, is not ſo ſmall a Sin as many take it for.* I conclude this, with his *Admonition* to *Bagſhaw*, upon his leſſening the *Sin* of *Separation. Alaſs, dear Brother, that after ſo many years Silencing and Affliction, after Flames and Plagues, and Dreadful Judgments, after Twenty years Practice of the Sin it ſelf, and when we are buried in the Ruins which it cauſed, we ſhould not yet know, that our own Uncharitable Diviſions, Alienations, and Separations are a Crying Sin! Yea, the Crying Sin; as well as the Uncharitableneſs and Hurtfulneſs of others. Alaſs! Will God leave us alſo, even us, to the Obdurateneſs of* Pharaoh? *Doth not Judgment begin with us? Is there not Crying Sin with us? What have we done to* Chriſt's *Kingdom, to this Kingdom, to our Friends (dead and alive) to our ſelves, and (alaſs) to our Enemies, by our Diviſions. And, Do we not feel it? Do we not know it? Is it to us, even to us, a Crime intolerable to call us to Repentance? Woe to us! Into what Hard-heartedneſs have we ſinned our ſelves? Yea, that we ſhould continue, and Paſſionately defend it? When will God give us Repentance unto Life?*

Defence of his Cure, 2 Except. p. 6.

Let Mr. *A.* read theſe Paſſages over Seriouſly, and then conſider, Whether he can go on to Excuſe, and Palliate the *SIN* of *SCHISM.*

But it may be ſaid, *That Mr.* A. *ſpeaks all this Comparatively, with enſlaving our Judgments and Conſciences to others, which he calls an Enormous and Monſtrous Principle*; and he ſaith, *This is a Medicine worſe than the Poyſon, even as 'tis much better to have a Rational Soul, tho' ſubject to Miſtakes, than the Soul of a Brute, which may be managed as you will, with a ſtrong Bit and Bridle.* To make it plain, that he makes little or nothing of the *Sin* of *Separation*, we muſt attend to the *Argument* he was to anſwer; which was, *That if it be lawful to ſeparate* on a *pretence* of *greater purity*, where there is an *Agreement in Doctrine*, and the *ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip*, as is agreed in our *Caſe*, then a bare difference of *Opinion*, as to ſome *circumſtances of Worſhip*, and the beſt *Conſtitution* of *Churches*, will be ſufficient *Ground* to break

Communion, and to ſet up *new Churches*; which conſidering the great variety of Men's fancies about theſe matters, is to make an *infinite Diviſibility* in *Churches*, without any poſſible ſtop to farther *Separation.* Where we ſee plainly the Inconvenience urged is *endleſs Separation:* Doth he ſet any kind of bounds to it? No; but only talks of *inconſiderable and petty Inconveniences, and ſome little trouble that may ariſe to a Church from the levity and volubility of Men's Minds*, i. e. let Men *ſeparate* as long as they will, this is the worſt of it; and he muſt grant, that though *Separation* be *endleſs*, there is no harm in it. But he that could find out a *medium* between *Circumſtances of Worſhip, and Subſtantials*; can find out none between *endleſs Separation*, and the *enſlaving Men's Judgments and Conſciences*; for he ſuppoſes, one of the two muſt of neceſſity be: Which is plain giving up the *Cauſe* to the *Papiſts*. For this is their Argument, *Either we muſt give up our Judgments and Conſciences to the Conduct of our Guides, or there will be endleſs Separation.* He grants the *conſequence*, and cries, What then? It is nothing but *the levity and volubility of Men's Minds*, and *this is much rather to be choſen than the other.* But any ſound *Proteſtant* that underſtands the *State* of the *Controverſie* between us and them (as this *Author* apparently doth not) will preſently deny the *Conſequence:* Becauſe a *prudent and due ſubmiſſion* in *lawful things* lies between *Tyranny over Men's Conſciences, and endleſs Separation.* But he knows no *Medium* between being tied Neck and Heels together, and leaping over Hedge and Ditch, being kept within no Bounds. And what ignorance or malice is it to ſuppoſe, *that our Church brings in that enormous and monſtrous Principle, of enſlaving Men's Judgments and Conſciences, forcing them to ſurrender their Reaſons to naked Will and Pleaſure?* and if he doth not ſuppoſe it, his Diſcourſe is frivolous and impertinent. For, a *due ſubmiſſion* to the *Rules* of our *eſtabliſhed Church*, without any force on the *Conſciences* of Men, as to the *Infallibility* of *Guides*, or *neceſſity* of the *things* themſelves; will put a ſufficient ſtop to *Separation*; which muſt be *endleſs* on my Adverſaries ſuppoſitions.

Sect. 28. (5.) Laſtly, I Argue againſt this *Separation*, *from the Obligation which lies upon all Chriſtians, to preſerve the Peace and Unity of the Church.* And now I have brought the matter home to the *Conſciences* of Men, who it may be will little regard other *Inconveniences*, if the practice of *Separation* do not appear to be *unlawful* from the *Word* of *God.* Which I now undertake to prove, upon theſe Suppoſitions.

(1.) That all *Chriſtians* are under the *ſtricteſt Obligations* to preſerve the *Peace and Unity* of the *Church.* For it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe, that any *Duty* ſhould be bound upon the *Conſciences* of Men, with plainer Precepts, and ſtronger Arguments than this is. The places are ſo many, that it were *endleſs* to repeat them; and therefore needleſs, becauſe this is agreed on all hands. So that *violation* of the *Unity* of the *Church*, where there is no ſufficient reaſon to juſtifie it, is a *Sin*, as much as *Murder* is, and as plainly forbidden. But it happens here, as it doth in the other caſe, that as *Murder* is always a *ſin*; but there may be ſome *circumſtances*, which may make the taking away a Man's Life, not to be *Murder*; ſo it may happen, that though *Schiſm* be always a *ſin*, yet there may be ſuch *circumſtances* which may make a *Separation* not to be a *Schiſm*; but then they muſt be ſuch Reaſons, as are not fetched from our Fancies, no more than in the caſe of *Murder*; but ſuch as are allowed by *God* himſelf in his Law. For, he only that made the Law can except from it.

(2.) The *Unity* of the *Church* doth not lie in a *bare communion of Faith and Love*, but in a *Joynt-participation of the Ordinances appointed by* Chriſt *to be obſerved in his Church*. For although the former be a *Duty*, yet it doth not take in the whole *Duty* of a *Chriſtian*, which is to join together, as *Members of the ſame Body*. And therefore they are commanded *to Aſſemble together*; and upon the firſt *Inſtitution* of a *Chriſtian Church*, it is ſaid, *The Diſciples continued in the Apoſtles Doctrine and Fellowſhip, and in breaking of Bread, and in Prayers.* And the *Apoſtle* ſets forth *Chriſtians* as making *one Body*, by Communion in the Ordinances of *Chriſt*. *We being many are one Bread, and one Body; for we are all Partakers of that one Bread. And by one Spirit, we are all Baptized into one Body; whether we be Jews or Gentiles, bond or free, and have been all made to drink into one Spirit.* The *Unity* of the Chriſtian Church, St. *Paul* ſaith, is *to be preſerved by the Bond of Peace*; and that *Unity* ſuppoſeth *One Body* and *One Spirit*; and the *Members* of that *Body* as they are united to one *Head*, whom he calls *One Lord*, ſo they are joined together by *One Faith*, and *One Baptiſm*. Therefore as the *Unity* of the *Church* is founded upon ſome *External Bonds*, as well as *Internal*, that is, *One Faith*, and *One Baptiſm*, as well as *One Lord*, and *One Spirit*; ſo the manifeſtation of this *Unity* ought to be by *External Acts*; for, How can this *Unity* be diſcovered by *Acts* merely Internal and Spiritual; as inward *love* to the *Members* of the *Body*, being *preſent in Spirit*, &c? Therefore, the Obligation to preſerve the *Unity* of the *Church*, doth imply a *joining* together with the other *Members* of the *Church*, in common and Publick *Acts* of *Religion*.

Heb. 10. 25.
Act. 2. 42.
1 Cor. 10. 17.
1 Cor. 12. 13.
Epheſ. 4. 3, 4, 5.

(3.) Nothing can diſcharge a *Chriſtian* from this *Obligation* to *Communion* with his *Fellow-Members*, but what is allowed by *Chriſt* or his *Apoſtles*, as a *ſufficient Reaſon* for it. Becauſe this being a *new Society* of *Chriſt*'s own *Inſtitution*; and the *obligation* to *Communion* being ſo ſtrictly enjoined, we are to ſuppoſe it ſtill to hold, where ſome plain declaration of his Will to the contrary doth not appear. Although *God* hath, with great ſeverity, forbidden *Killing*: Yet when himſelf appointed particular *caſes*, wherein Men's Lives were to be taken away; we are thereby aſſur'd, that in theſe caſes it is not that *killing* which is *forbidden*; ſo in the preſent caſe, if it appear that although *Separation* from the *Communion* of *Chriſtians* be a thing condemned; yet if the ſame *Authority* do allow particular exemptions, we are certain in thoſe caſes ſuch *Separation* is no ſin. But then, as in the former caſe, no Man is exempted from the guilt of *ſhedding blood*, who upon his own fancy takes upon him to execute *Juſtice*; ſo here, no Man's *imagination* that he doth *ſeparate* for a good end, will juſtifie his *Separation*; for the guilt of the ſin remains as great in it ſelf. And there is ſcarce any other ſin more aggravated in the *New Teſtament* than this; it being ſo directly contrary to that *Unity* of his *Church*, which our *Saviour* prayed for, and his *Apoſtles* with ſo much earneſtneſs recommend to all Chriſtians; and uſe ſo many Arguments to perſuade Men to perſevere. From hence *Irenæus* ſaith, *That* Chriſt *will come to Judge thoſe who make Schiſms in the Church, and rather regard their own advantage, than the Churches Unity; who, for*

John 17. 21.
Iren. *l.* 4. c. 62.

ſlight cauſes, or for any, make nothing of cutting aſunder the great and glorious Body of Chriſt, *and do what in them lies to deſtroy it. They ſpeak for Peace,* ſaith he, *but they mean War; they ſtrain at a Gnat, and ſwallow Camels. The benefit they hope to bring to the Church, cannot make amends for the miſchief of their Schiſm. Nothing provokes God more,* Chryſoſt. in Eph. 4. p. 822. ſaith St. *Chryſoſtom, than to divide his Church: Nay,* ſaith he, *the Blood of Martyrdom will not waſh off the guilt of it. The miſchief the Church receives by it, is greater than it receives from open Enemies; for the one makes it more glorious, the other expoſes it to ſhame among its Enemies, when it is ſet upon by its own Children. This,* ſaith he, *I ſpeak to thoſe who make no great matter of Schiſm, and indifferently go to the Meetings of thoſe who divide the Church. If their Doctrine be contrary to ours, for that reaſon they ought to abſtain; if not,* πολλῷ μᾶλλον, *they ought to do it ſo much the rather. Do not you know what* Corah, Dathan, *and* Abiram *ſuffer'd? and not they only, but thoſe that were with them. But you ſay, they have the ſame Faith, and they are very Orthodox: Why then,* ſaith he, *do they ſeparate? One Lord, one Faith, one Baptiſm. If they do well, we do ill; if we do well they do ill. If they have the ſame Doctrines, the ſame Sacraments, for what cauſe do they ſet up another Church in oppoſition to ours? It is nothing but vain-glory, ambition, and deceit. Take away the People from them, and you cut off the diſeaſe.* And after much more to that purpoſe, *I ſpeak theſe things,* ſaith he, *that no Man might ſay, he did not know it to be ſuch a ſin: I tell you, and teſtifie this to you, that Separation from the Church, or dividing of it, is no leſs a ſin, than falling into Hereſie.* If the ſin then be ſo great and dangerous, Men ought to examine with great care, what caſes thoſe are wherein Separation may be made without ſin.

And I do earneſtly deſire our *Brethren*, as they love their own Souls, and would avoid the guilt of ſo great a Sin, impartially, and without prejudice to conſider this paſſage of *Irenæus*, and how parallel it is with their own Caſe who *ſeparate* from us, and ſet up other Churches in oppoſition to ours, which yet they acknowledge *to be very Orthodox*, and to agree with them *in the ſame Doctrine, and the ſame Sacraments.*

4. There are Three *Caſes* wherein the *Scripture* allows of *Separation.*

Firſt, In the *caſe* of *idolatrous Worſhip.* For the Precepts are as plain that *Chriſtians* ſhould *abſtain* from *Idolatry*, as that they ſhould preſerve 1 Cor. 10. 6. 14. the *unity* of the *Church. Neither be ye Idolaters. Flee from Idolatry.* 1 St. Joh. 5. *Keep your ſelves from Idols. Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God, and him* Mat. 4. 19. *only ſhalt thou ſerve.* And to the caſe of *Idolaters*, St. *Paul* applies the 2 Cor. 6. 17. words ſpoken of old to the *Babylonians, Come out from among them, and be ſeparate, and touch not the unclean thing.* Now in this caſe, where there is ſo plain a Command, there is no doubt of the *lawfulneſs* of *Separation*; if Men cannot join with a Church in their religious Worſhip, without doing that which *God* hath ſo ſtrictly forbidden.

Secondly, In caſe of *falſe Doctrine* being impoſed in ſtead of *true.* For Heb. 13. 7. 17. although in other things great *ſubmiſſion* is required to the *Guides* and 1 Theſſ. 5. 12, 13. *Governours* of the *Church*; yet if any *Teachers* offer to bring *another* Gal. 1. 6, 7, 8. *Goſpel*, or to corrupt the *true* one, St. *Paul* denounces an *Anathema* againſt them; and that implies that they ſhould have *no communion* with them, but look upon them as *Perſons cut off* from the *Body*, (like putrid Members) leſt they ſhould corrupt the reſt. St. *Paul* commands *Titus*, when Tit. 3. 10. there is no hopes of reclaiming ſuch, to exclude them from the *So-*

ciety of *Chriſtians*. St. *John* forbids all familiar converſation with ſuch.
The *Church* of *Epheſus* is commended for *hating the Nicolaitans*, and 2 John 10.
the *Church* of *Pergamus* reproved for *tolerating* their *Doctrine*. Rev. 2. 6. 15.

Thirdly, In caſe Men make *things indifferent neceſſary to Salvation*,
and *divide* the *Church* upon that account. And this was the caſe of
the *falſe Apoſtles*, who urged the *Ceremonies* of the *Law*, *as neceſſary to* Acts 15. 1.
Salvation; and to propagate this opinion of theirs, they went up and
down, and endeavour'd to draw away the *Apoſtles Diſciples*, and to ſet
up *ſeparate Churches* among the *Chriſtians*; and to allow none to partake
with them, that did not own the *Neceſſity* of the *Jewiſh Ceremonies*
to *Salvation*. Now although St. *Paul* himſelf complied ſometimes with
the practice of them; and the *Jewiſh Chriſtians* eſpecially in *Judæa*,
generally obſerved them; yet when theſe falſe *Apoſtles* came to enforce
the *obſervation* of them, *as neceſſary to Salvation*, then he bid the *Chriſtians*
at *Philippi* to beware of them, *i. e.* to fly their *communion*, and Phil. 3. 3.
have nothing to do with them. Theſe are all the *Caſes* I can find in
the *New Teſtament*, wherein *Separation* from *publick Communion* is allowed;
but there are two others, wherein St. *Paul* gives particular Directions,
but ſuch as do not amount to *Separation*.

1. The *different Opinions* they had about *Meats* and *Drinks*; ſome
were for a *Pythagorean Abſtinence*, from *all Fleſh*; ſome for a *Jewiſh* Rom. 14. 2.
Abſtinence, from ſome certain ſorts; others for a full *Chriſtian Liberty*.
Now this being a matter of *Diet*, and relating to their own *Families*, the
Apoſtle adviſes them not to cenſure or judge one another; but notwithſtanding
this difference, to join together as *Chriſtians* in the *Duties common*
to them all. For the *Kingdom of God doth not lie in Meats and* —17.
Drinks; *i. e.* Let every one order his Family as he thinks fit; but that
requires *innocency*, and a care not to give diſturbance to the *Peace* of the
Church for theſe matters; which he calls *peace and joy in the Holy Ghoſt*,
which is provoked and grieved by the diſſentions of *Chriſtians*. *And he*,
ſaith he, *that in theſe things ſerveth Chriſt, is acceptable to God, and ap-* —18.
proved of men. Let us therefore follow after the things that make for —19.
peace, and things wherewith we may edifie one another. In ſuch *Caſes*
then, the Apoſtle allows no *Separation* from the *publick communion of*
Chriſtians. It was the ſame caſe as to the *obſervation* of *Days* then;
for ſome *Chriſtians* went then on *Jewiſh Holidays* to the *Synagogues*;
others did not; but for ſuch things they ought not to divide from each
others *communion* in the common *Acts of Chriſtian Worſhip*. And the
deſign of the *Apoſtle* is not to lay down a *ſtanding Rule* of *mutual forbearance*
as to *different Communions*; but to ſhew that ſuch *differences*
ought not to be an occaſion of *breaking Communion* among *Chriſtians*,
and ſo the *Apoſtle*'s diſcourſe, *Rom.* 14. holds ſtrongly againſt *Separation*,
on theſe and the like accounts.

2. The *corrupt Lives* of many who were not under the *Church*'s Cenſure.
When St. *Paul* taxes ſo many *Corruptions* in the *Church* of *Corinth*, no
wonder if ſome of them, put the caſe to them, what they ſhould do,
in caſe they knew ſome *Members* of the *Church* to be Men of bad Lives;
although the offences were not *ſcandalous*, by being *publickly known*; muſt
they *abſtain* from the *communion* of the *Church* for theſe? To this St. *Paul* 1 Cor. 5. 11.
anſwers, That every private Chriſtian ought to forbear all *familiar Converſation*
with ſuch: *If any one that is a brother, be a fornicator*, &c.
with ſuch a one, no not to eat. Which is all the *Apoſtle* requires of
private Chriſtians; but if the *Scandal* be publick, as that of the *ince-*

ſtuous perſon, the *Church* had power to vindicate its own honour, by
Ver. 12, 13. *caſting ſuch out*; not as though the *Church-Communion* were *defiled*, if they continued in; but the reputation and honour of the *Church* ſuffered by it; the preſervation whereof, is the *true cauſe* of the *Church*'s *Diſcipline*. But the *Apoſtle* gives not the leaſt *countenance* to private Mens withdrawing from the *Church*'s *Communion*, though ſuch perſons ſtill continued in it. For there may be many *reaſons* to break off *private familiarity*, which will not hold as to *publick Communion*. For our *Communion* in publick is a thing which chiefly reſpects *God*, and a neceſſary duty of his own appointing, the benefit whereof depends upon his *Promiſes*, and all the *communion* they have with other Men, is only joining together for the performance of a *common religious Duty*: but *private familiarity* is a thing which wholly reſpects the *Perſon*'s converſe with, and a thing of *mere choice*, and hardly to be imagined without *approbation* at leaſt, if not *imitation* of their *wickedneſs*. And therefore to argue from one to the other is very *unreaſonable*.

The matter of *Separation* being thus ſtated, according to the *Scripture*, there can be no way left to juſtifie the *Separation* from our Church, but to prove, either that our *Worſhip is idolatrous*; or that *our Doctrine is falſe*, or that *our Ceremonies are made neceſſary to Salvation*; which are all ſo remote from any colour of *Truth*, that none of my *Adverſaries* have yet had the hardineſs to undertake it. But however, what *Pleas* they do bring to juſtifie this *Separation*, muſt in the next place be examined.

The

The Unreaſonableneſs of Separation.

PART. III.

The Pleas *for* Separation *examined.*

§. 1. *The Plea for Separation from the Conſtitution of the* Parochial Churches *conſidered.* §. 2. *Juſtice* Hobart*'s Teſtimony for Congregational Churches anſwered.* §. 3. *No Evidence in Antiquity for Independent Congregations.* §. 4. *The Church of* Carthage *governed by Epiſcopal Power, and not Democratical in St.* Cyprian*'s time.* §. 5, 6. *No evidence in Scripture of more Churches than one in a City, though there be of more Congregations.* §. 7. *No rule in Scripture to limit Church-power to a ſingle Congregation; but the general Rules extend it farther.* §. 8. Of Dioceſan Epiſcopacy; *the Queſtion about it ſtated. But one Biſhop in a City in the beſt Churches, though many Aſſemblies.* §. 9. *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy clearly proved in the* African *Churches. The extent of* St. Auſtin*'s Dioceſe.* §. 10. *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy of* Alexandria. *The largeneſs of* Theodoret*'s Dioceſe; the Teſtimony of his Epiſtle cleared from all Mr.* B.*'s late Objections.* §. 11. *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy not repugnant to any inſtitution of Chriſt, proved from Mr.* B. *himſelf.* §. 12. *The Power of* Preſbyters *in our Church.* §. 13. *The Epiſcopal Power ſucceeds the Apoſtolical, proved from many Teſtimonies.* §. 14. *What Power of Diſcipline is left to Parochial Churches, as to Admiſſion.* §. 15. *Whether the Power of Suſpenſion be no part of Church Diſcipline.* §. 16, 17. *Of the defect of Diſcipline; and whether it overthrows the being of our Parochial Churches.* §. 18. *Of* National Churches, *and the grounds on which they are built.* §. 19. *The advantages of National Churches above Independent Congregations.* §. 20. *Mr.* B.*'s* Quæries *about National Churches anſwered. The* Notion *of the* Church of England *explained.* §. 21. *What neceſſity of one Conſtitutive Regent part of a National Church.* §. 22. *What Conſent is neceſſary to the Union of a National Church.* §. 23. *Other Objections anſwered.* §. 24. *Of the* Peoples Power of chuſing their own Paſtors. *Not founded in Scripture.* §. 25. *The Teſtimony of Antiquity concerning it fully enquired into. The great diſturbance of popular Elections; the Canons againſt them. The* Chriſtian Princes *interpoſing. The ancient Rights of Nomination and Preſentation. The practice of foreign Proteſtant Churches. No reaſon to take away the Rights of Patronage to put the choice into the peoples hands. Objections anſwered.* §. 26. *No unlawfulneſs in the* Terms of our Communion. *Of ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip. The things agreed on both ſides.* §. 27. *The way of finding the difference between mere Ceremonies and parts of Divine Worſhip cleared.* §. 28. *The difference of the Popiſh Doctrine from ours as to Ceremonies.* §. 29. *The Sign of the Croſs a Rite of Admiſſion into our Church, and no part of Divine Worſhip.* §. 30. *No new Sacrament. Mr.* B.*'s Objections anſwered.* §. 31. *His great miſtakes about the Papiſts Do-*

ctrine concerning the Moral Cauſalty of Sacraments. §. 32. *Of the Cuſtoms obſerved in our Church, though not ſtrictly required.* §. 33. *Of the Cenſures of the Church againſt Oppoſers of Ceremonies, and the force of Excommunication* ipſo facto. §. 34. *Of the Plea of an erroneous Conſcience, in the caſe of Separation.* §. 35. *Of Scruples of Conſcience ſtill remaining.* §. 36. *Of the uſe of Godfathers and Godmothers in Baptiſm.* §. 37. *No ground of Separation becauſe more Ceremonies may be introduced.* §. 38. *No parity of Reaſon as to the Diſſenters Pleas for ſeparating from our Church, and our ſeparation from the Church of* Rome.

An Appendix containing ſeveral Letters of eminent Proteſtant Divines abroad, ſhewing the unreaſonableneſs of the preſent Separation from the Church *of* England.

Letter of Monſieur Le Moyn.

—— *Of Monſieur* Le Angle.

—— *Of Monſieur* Claude.

Sect. 1. ALL the conſiderable *Pleas* at this time made uſe of for *Separation*, may be reduced to theſe *Heads*. 1. Such as relate to the *Conſtitution of our Church*. 2. To the *Terms* of *Communion* with it. 3. To the *Conſciences* of *Diſſenters*. 4. To the *Parity* of *Reaſon* as to our *Separation* from *Rome*.

I. Such as relate to the *Conſtitution* of *our Church:* Which are theſe,

1. That our *Parochial Churches* are not of *Chriſt's Inſtitution*.
2. That our *Dioceſan Churches* are *unlawful*.
3. That our *National Church* hath no foundation.
4. That the *People* are deprived of their *Right* in the *choice* of their *Paſtors*.

1. I begin with our *Parochial Churches*; becauſe it is Separation from theſe, with which we principally charge our Adverſaries; for herein they moſt diſcover their *Principles* of *Separation*, ſince in former times, the *Nonconformiſts* thought it their duty to keep up *Communion* with them. But ſince the *Congregational-way* hath prevailed in *England*, the preſent *Diſſenters* are generally fallen into the *practice* of it, whatever their *Principles* are, at leaſt ſo far as concerns forſaking *Communion* with *our Parochial Churches*, and joining together in *ſeparate Congregations* for *Divine Worſhip*. This Principle is therefore the firſt thing to be examined. And the main foundation of that way, I ſaid, was, that *Communion* in *Ordinances* muſt be only in ſuch *Churches* as *Chriſt* himſelf inſtituted by *unalterable Rules*, which were only *particular* and *Congregational Churches*. Concerning which I laid down two things. (1.) That ſuppoſing *Congregational Churches* to be of *Chriſt's Inſtitution*, this was no reaſon for *ſeparation* from our *Parochial Churches*, which have all the *eſſentials* of ſuch *true Churches* in them. (2.) That there is no reaſon to believe that the *Inſtitution* of *Churches* was limited to *particular Congregations*.

In anſwer to this, Dr. O. ſaith theſe things, (1.) *That they do not deny, at leaſt ſome of our Parochial Churches to be true Churches:* But why then do they deny Communion with them? But, he ſaith, *he hopes it will not be made a Rule, that Communion may* not *be with-held*, (ſo the ſenſe muſt be although *not* be left out) *or withdrawn from any Church in any thing, ſo long as it continues as unto the eſſence of it to be ſo.*

This is ſomewhat odly and faintly expreſſed. But as long as he *Ibid.* grants, that our *Parochial Churches are not guilty of ſuch heinous Errors in Doctrine, or idolatrous Practice in Worſhip as to deprive them of the Being and Nature of Churches*, I do aſſert it to be a *Sin* to *ſeparate* from them. Not but that I think, there may be a *ſeparation* without ſin, from a *Society* retaining the *eſſentials* of a *Church*; but then I ſay, the reaſon of ſuch *ſeparation* is, *ſome heinous Error in Doctrine, or ſome idolatrous Practice in Worſhip, or ſome tyranny over the Conſciences of men*; which may not be ſuch, as to deſtroy *true Baptiſm*, and therefore conſiſtent with the *eſſentials* of a *Church*. And this is all that I know the *Proteſtant Writers* do aſſert in this matter.

(2.) He anſwers, *That they do not ſay, that becauſe Communion in Ordinances muſt be only in ſuch Churches as Chriſt hath inſtituted, that therefore it is lawful and neceſſary to ſeparate from Parochial Churches, but if it be on other grounds neceſſary ſo to ſeparate or withold Communion from them, it is the duty of them who do ſo, to join themſelves in or unto ſome other particular Congregation.*

To which I reply, that this is either not to the buſineſs, or it is a plain giving up the *Cauſe* of *Independency*. For, wherefore did the *diſſenting Brethren* ſo much inſiſt upon their *ſeparate Congregations*, when not one of the things, now particularly alleged againſt our *Church*, was required of them? But if he inſiſts on thoſe things common to our *Church* with other *reformed Churches*, then they are ſuch things, as he ſuppoſes contrary to the *firſt Inſtitution of Churches*; And then I intreat him to tell me, what difference there is, between *ſeparating from our* Churches *becauſe Communion in Ordinances is only to be enjoy'd in ſuch Churches as Chriſt hath inſtituted; and ſeparating from them becauſe they have things repugnant to the firſt Inſtitution of Churches?* Is not this the *primary reaſon* of *Separation*, becauſe *Chriſt hath appointed unalterable Rules for the Government of his Church*; which we are bound to obſerve, and which are not obſerved in *Parochial Churches?* Indeed, the moſt *immediate reaſon* of *ſeparation* from *ſuch* a *Church* is not obſerving *Chriſt's Inſtitution*; but the *primary ground* is, *that Chriſt hath ſettled ſuch Rules for Churches which muſt be unalterably obſerved.* Let us then (1.) ſuppoſe, that *Chriſt* hath by *unalterable Rules* appointed *that a Church ſhall conſiſt only of ſuch a number of men as may meet in one Congregation, ſo qualified; and that theſe by entring into Covenant with each other become a Church, and chooſe their Officers, who are to Teach, and Admoniſh and Adminiſter Sacraments, and to exerciſe Diſcipline by the conſent of the Congregation*; And let us (2.) ſuppoſe ſuch a *Church not yet gathered*, but there lies *fit matter* for it diſperſed up and down in ſeveral *Pariſhes*. (3.) Let us ſuppoſe Dr. O. about to *gather ſuch a Church*. (4.) Let us ſuppoſe not one thing *peculiar* to our *Church* required of theſe *members*; *neither the aereal ſign of the Croſs, nor kneeling at the Communion, &c.* I deſire then to know, whether Dr. O. be not bound by theſe *unalterable Rules* to draw theſe *members* from *Communion* with their *Parochial Churches*, on purpoſe that they might form a *Congregational Church*, according to *Chriſt's Inſtitution?* Either then he muſt quit theſe *unalterable Rules*, and the *Inſtitution* of *Chriſt*; or he muſt acknowledge that *ſetting* up a *Congregational Church* is the *primary ground* of their *Separation* from our *Parochial Churches*. If they do ſuppoſe but *one* of thoſe *Ordinances* wanting which they believe *Chriſt* hath *inſtituted* in *particular Churches*, do they not believe this a ſufficient ground for *ſeparation?* It is not therefore any *Reaſon* peculiar to our *Church*, which is the true *Cauſe* of their *ſeparation*; but ſuch *Reaſons* as are common to all *Churches*, that are not formed juſt after their own model. If there be then *unalterable Rules for Congregational Churches*, thoſe muſt be obſerved, and *ſeparation* made in order to it; and therefore *ſeparation* is neceſſary upon Dr. O's grounds, not from the particular *Conditions* of *Communion* with us, but becauſe our *Parochial Churches*, are not formed after the *Congregational way*. But this was a neceſſary piece of art at this time, to keep fair with the *Presbyterian Party*, and to make them believe (if they can be ſo forgetful) that they do not own *ſeparation* from their Churches, but only from *ours*, the contrary whereof is ſo apparent from the debates with the *diſſenting Brethren*, and the ſetting up *Congregational Churches* in thoſe days, that they muſt be forgetful indeed, who do not remember it. Have thoſe of the *Congregational way* ſince alter'd their judgments? Hath Dr. O. yielded, that in caſe ſome *terms* of *Communion* in our *Church* were not inſiſted upon, they would give over *ſeparation*? Were not their *Churches* firſt gathered out of *Presbyterian Congregations*? And if *Presbytery* had been ſetled upon the *Kings Reſtauration*, would they not have continued their *Separation*? Why then muſt our *Church* now be accuſed for giving the *Occaſion* to the *Independant ſeparation*, when it is notoriouſly otherwiſe; and they did *ſeparate* and *form their Churches*, upon reaſons common to our *Church* with all other *Reformed Churches*? This is more artificial than ingenuous.

Vindic. 3. *p.* 37. *Sect.* 2. As to the Second, Dr. O. anſwers, *that it is ſo clear and evident in matter of fact, and ſo neceſſary from the nature of the thing, that the Churches planted by the Apoſtles were limited to Congregations, that many wiſe Men, wholly unconcerned in our Controverſies, do take it for a thing to be granted by all without diſpute.* And for this two Teſtimonies are alleged, of *Juſtice Hobart*, and *Father Paul*; but neither of them ſpeaks to the point. All that *Chief Juſtice Hobart* ſaith is, *That the Primitive Church in its greateſt Purity, was but voluntary Congregations of Believers ſubmitting themſelves to the Apoſtles, and after to the Paſtors.* Methinks Dr. O. ſhould have left this *Teſtimony* to his Friend *L. du Moulin*, it ſignifies ſo very little to the purpoſe; or rather, quite overthrows his *Hypotheſis*; as appears by theſe two Arguments. (1.) Thoſe *voluntary Congregations over which the Apoſtles were ſet*, were no *limited Congregations* of any one *particular Church*; but thoſe *Congregations over whom the Apoſtles were ſet*, are thoſe of which *Juſtice Hobart* ſpeaks. And therefore it is plain he ſpake of *all the Churches* which were under the *care* of the *Apoſtles*, which he calls *voluntatary Congregations*. (2.) Thoſe *voluntary Congregations over whom the Apoſtles appointed Paſtors after their deceaſe*, were no *particular Congregations* in one City; but thoſe of whom *Juſtice Hobart* ſpeaks, were ſuch; for he ſaith, *they firſt ſubmitted to the Apoſtles, and after to other Paſtors.* But *Juſtice Hobart* could not be ſuch a ſtranger to Antiquity to believe that the *Chriſtians* in the *Age* after the *Apoſtles* amounted but to *one Congregation in a City*. And therefore, if he conſults *Juſtice Hobart*'s honour or his own, I adviſe him to let it alone for the future. As to the Teſtimony of Father *Paul*, it only concerns the *Democratical Government of the Church*, and I wonder how it came into this place; I ſhall therefore conſider it in its due ſeaſon.

Sect. 3. I come therefore to conſider now, the evidence *for the Inſtitution of Congregational Churches*; concerning which, theſe are my words.

“ It is poſſible at firſt, there might be no more Chriſtians in one City
“ than could meet in one Aſſembly for Worſhip; but where doth it ap-
“ pear, that when they multiplied into more Congregations, they did
“ make new and diſtinct Churches under new Officers with a ſeparate
“ Power of Government? Of this I am well aſſured, there is no mark
“ or footſtep in the New Teſtament, or the whole Hiſtory of the Primi-
“ tive Church. I do not think it will appear credible to any conſiderate
“ man, that the 5000 Chriſtians in the Church of *Jeruſalem* made one
“ ſtated and fixed Congregation for Divine Worſhip; not, if we make all
“ the allowances for ſtrangers which can be deſired: but if this were
“ granted, where are the unalterable Rules, that as ſoon as the compa-
“ ny became too great for one particular Aſſembly, they muſt become a
“ new Church under peculiar Officers and an independent Authority?
To this Dr. O. anſwers in four particulars.

1. *That an account may e'er long be given of the inſenſible deviation of the Firſt Churches after the deceaſe of the Apoſtles from the Rule of the firſt Inſtitution: which although at firſt it began in matters of ſmall moment; yet ſtill they increaſed until they iſſued in a fatal Apoſtaſie*; or as he after expreſſes it, *leaving their Infant ſtate, by degrees, they at laſt brought forth the Man of Sin.* But I do not underſtand how this at all anſwers the former *Paragraph* of my *Sermon* concerning the *firſt Inſtitution* of *Churches*; but being I ſuppoſe intended for a *Reaſon* why he doth not afterwards anſwer to the *evidence* out of *Antiquity*, I ſhall not only ſo far take notice of it, as to let him know, that when that is done, I do not queſtion, but the *Primitive Church* will find ſufficient *Advocates* in the *Church* of *England:* but I deſire that undertaker to conſider, what a blot and diſhonour it will be to *Chriſtian Religion*, if the *Primitive Churches* could not hold to their *firſt Inſtitution*, not for one *Age* after the *Apoſtles*. I know what abominable *Hereſies* there were ſoon after, if not in the *Apoſtles* days; but the queſtion is not concerning theſe, but the *pureſt and beſt Churches*; and about them, not whether ſome trifling Controverſies might not ariſe, and humane infirmities be diſcovered; but *whether they did deviate from the plain Inſtitutions of Chriſt, and the unalterable Rules of Government which he had fixed in his Church?* This ſeems utterly incredible to me upon this conſideration among many others: That Government is ſo nice and tender a thing, that every one is ſo much concerned for his ſhare in it, that men are not eaſily induced to part with it. Let us ſuppoſe the Government of the Church to have been *Democratical* at firſt, as Dr. O. ſeems to do; is it probable, that the *People* would have been wheadled out of the ſweetneſs of Government ſo ſoon and made no noiſe about it? Yea, Dr. O. tells us that in *Cyprian's time it continued at Carthage*; and others ſay, a great deal longer: there was then no ſuch change as to this *part* of the *Government* ſo ſoon after. And why ſhould we imagin it otherwiſe, as to extent of *Power* and *Juriſdiction?* Suppoſe *Chriſt* had limited the *Power* of a *Church* to *one Congregation*; the *Paſtor* of that *Church* could have no more pretence over any other Congregation, than Dr. O. by being *Paſtor* over one *Congregation* in *London*, could challenge a right to Govern all the *Independent Congregations* in *London* or *about it*; and appoint their ſeveral *Teachers*, and call them to an account for their proceedings. I appeal now to any man of conſideration, whether there be the leaſt probability that ſuch an alteration could be made without great noiſe and diſturbance? Would not Mr. G. Mr. *B.* Mr. C. and many more, think themſelves concerned to ſtand up for their own *Rights?* And if they could

Vindi. p. 41.

could be drawn into the deſign, would the *People* ſubmit? Let us put the caſe, as to *New-England.* Suppoſe the *Apoſtles* an Age or two ſince, had planted ſuch *Congregational Churches* there, as have been formed within theſe laſt 50 years at *Plimouth*, *Boſton*, *Hereford*, *New-haven*, &c. and had inveſted every *Congregation* with the *full Power* of the *Keys*, the execution whereof they had intruſted with the ſeveral *Elderſhips*, within their own Congregation; but ſo, as not to have any *Power* or *Authority*, over the *Elders* or *Members* of any other *Congregation*: Let us then ſuppoſe, that after the deceaſe of the *Apoſtles*, theſe *Churches* gradually declined ſo far, that in this Age Mr. *Cotton* at *Boſton* ſhould take upon him the whole *Power* of the *Keys*, and not only ſo, but appoint *Paſtors* over other *Congregations*, and keep a great *number* of *Elders* under him, and challenge the *Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction* over the whole *Colony* of *Maſſachuſets*, of which *Boſton* is the *chief Town*, and ſo three others do the ſame at the chief *Places* of the other *Colonies*; Would not this be a wonderful alteration of the Church Government? And is it poſſible to conceive, ſuch a change ſhould be brought about inſenſibly, without any complaint of the *ſubordinate Elders*, or the *members* of the *Congregations*, who were robbed of their *inherent Right* by an *Inſtitution* of *Chriſt*, and ſo late an eſtabliſhment by the *Apoſtles*? Doctrines may be inſenſibly changed by continuing the names and altering opinions, through the careleſneſs and unskilfulneſs of *People*: But in *matters* of *Government*, the meaneſt *People* are ſenſible, and look big with an opinion of it. If therefore it be not conceivable in this caſe, the *Government* ſhould be thus changed from the *Inſtitution* of *Chriſt* in ſo ſhort a time; let the ſame conſideration be applied to the *Ages* which really ſucceeded the *Apoſtles*.

Sect. 4. I ſhall, to prevent all cavils, chuſe that very *Church* which Dr. O. mentions, and I find Mr. *Cotton* and others make their *Appeals* to, and that is the *Church* of *Carthage* in Saint *Cyprian*'s time. Here Dr. O. finds the *Community of Members determining Church affairs*; but Mr. *Cotton* hath farther diſcovered the *judgment of the Elders*, the *Votes* of the *Congregation*, and the *Conſent of neighbour Miniſters*; in ſhort, he hath found there, *the expreſs and lively Lineaments of the very Body of Congregational Diſcipline*; *and the ſame for ſubſtance wherein they walk* (as he calls it) *at this day*. Hitherto then, there was *no deviation* from the *unalterable Rules of Chriſt*. Let us therefore impartially conſider, what the *Government* of the *Church* of *Carthage* then was: Concerning which theſe things may be obſerved. Cotton's *way of Congregational Churches cleared*, p. 98, 99.

1. That there was a *great number* of *Preſbyters* belonging to the *Church* of *Carthage*, and therefore not probable to be one *ſingle Congregation*. This appears from Saint *Cyprian*'s *Epiſtles* to them in his Retirement. In one he gives them advice how to viſit the *Confeſſors* in *Priſon*, which he would have them *to do by turns*, *every one taking a Deacon with him becauſe the change of Perſons would be leſs invidious*: And conſidering the *number* of *Confeſſours*, and the frequent attendance upon them, the number of *Preſbyters* and *Deacons* muſt be conſiderable. When he ſent *Numidicus* to be placed among the *Preſbyters* at *Carthage*, he gives this reaſon of it, *that he might adorn the plenty of his Preſbyters with ſuch worthy Men, it being now impaired by the fall of ſome*, during the perſecution. In the caſe of *Philumanus*, *Fortunatus* and *Favorinus*, he declares he would give no judgment, *cùm multis adbuc*

Cyprian *l.* 5. *Ep.* 2. *in the late Edit. Ep.* 5.

L. 4. 10. *Ep.* 35.

L. 5. *Ep.*3.

adhuc de Clero abſentes ſint, when many of his Clergy were abſent. And in another *Epiſtle* he complains, *that a great number of his Clergy* Ep. 28. *were abſent, and the few that were remaining were hardly ſufficient for their work.* At one time *Feliciſſimus* and *five Preſbyters* more did L.3. Ep.22 break Communion with the *Church* at *Carthage*; and then he mentions Ep. 24. *Britius, Rogatianus* and *Numidicus*, as the chief *Preſbyters* remaining with them; beſides *Deacons* and *inferiour Miniſters.* About the ſame Ep. 40. time *Cornelius Biſhop* of *Rome* mentions 46 *Preſbyters* he had with him in that *City.* And in *Conſtantinople* of old, ſaith *Juſtinian* in his *Novels*, Euſeb. l. 6. were 60 *Preſbyters* (for in one he ſaith, *The cuſtom was to determin* c. 35. Phot. Nomo- *the number*, and in another, *that 60 was to be the number at Conſtantinople.*) Can. tit. 1. Let any one now conſider, whether theſe *Churches* c. 30. that had ſo many *Preſbyters* were *ſingle Congregations*; and at *Carthage*, we have this evidence of the great *numbers* of *Chriſtians*; that in the time of *Perſecution*, although very many ſtood firm, yet *the numbers* L. 3. Ep. 5. *of the lapſed was ſo great*, that Saint *Cyprian* ſaith, *Every day thouſands* Ep. 15. *of Tickets were granted by the Martyrs and Confeſſors in their behalf for reconciliation to the Church: And in one of thoſe Tickets ſometimes might be comprehended twenty or thirty perſons, the form being* L. 3. 15. *Communicet ille cum ſuis.* Is it then probable this *Church* at *Carthage* Ep. 11. ſhould conſiſt of one *ſingle Congregation?*

2. Theſe *Preſbyters* and the *whole Church* were under the particular care and *Government* of Saint *Cyprian* as their *Biſhop.* Some of the *Preſbyters* at *Carthage* took upon them to meddle in the affairs of *Diſcipline*, L.3. Ep.14. without conſulting their *Biſhop* then in his retirement. Saint Ep. 10. *Cyprian* tells them *they neither conſidered Chriſt's Command, nor their own Place, nor the future Judgment of God, nor the Biſhop who was ſet over them, and had done that which was never done in foregoing times, to challenge thoſe things to themſelves, with the contempt and reproach of their Biſhop*, which was to receive *Penitents* to *Communion* without impoſition of hands by the *Biſhop* and his *Clergy.* Wherein, L.3. Ep.15 he vindicates the *Martyrs and Confeſſors* in his following *Epiſtle*, ſaying, Ep. 11. *that ſuch an affront to their Biſhop was againſt their will: For they ſent their Petitions to the Biſhop, that their Cauſes might be heard when the Perſecution was over.* In another *Epiſtle* to the *People* of *Carthage* L.3. Ep.10. on the ſame occaſion, he complains of theſe *Preſbyters*, that they did Ep. 12. not *Epiſcopo honorem Sacerdotii ſui & Cathedræ reſervare, reſerve to the Biſhop the honour which belonged to his Place:* And therefore charges, *that nothing farther be done in this matter till his return, when he might* Ep. 21. *conſult with his fellow-Biſhops.* *Celerinus* ſends to *Lucian* a *Confeſſor*, to beg him for a *Letter of Grace* for their Siſters *Numeria* and *Candida* who had fallen. *Lucian* returns him anſwer, *that* Paulus *before his* Ep. 22. *Martyrdom had given him Authority to grant ſuch in his Name, and that all the Martyrs had agreed to ſuch kindneſs to be ſhewed to the lapſed; but with this condition that the Cauſe was to be heard before the Biſhop, and upon ſuch Diſcipline as he ſhould impoſe, they were to be received to Communion.* So that though *Lucian* was extreamly blamed Ep. 25. for *relaxing* the *Diſcipline* of the *Church*; yet neither he nor the other *Martyrs* would pretend to do any thing without the *Biſhop.* *Cyprian* gives an account of all that had paſſed in this matter to *Moſes* and *Maximus* two Roman *Preſbyters* and *Confeſſors*; they return him anſwer, *that they were very glad he had not been wanting to his* Ep. 26. *Office, eſpecially in his ſevere reproving thoſe who had obtained from*

Preſbyters the Communion of the Church in his abſence. In his *Epiſtle*
Ep. 28. to the *Clergy* of *Carthage* he mightily blames thoſe *who communicated*
with thoſe perſons who were reconciled to the Church merely by Preſbyters
without him; and threatens excommunication to any Preſbyters or Deacons
who ſhould preſume to do it. The *Roman Clergy* in the vacancy of
Ep. 30. the *See*, take notice of the *diſcretion of the Martyrs in remitting the*
lapſed to the Biſhop, as an argument of their great modeſty, and that
they did not think the Diſcipline of the Church belonged to them: And
Ep. 31. they declared their reſolution, *to do nothing in this matter, till they had*
a new Biſhop. By which we ſee the *Power* of *Diſcipline* was not then
ſuppoſed to be in the *Congregation*, or that they were the *firſt ſubject of*
the Power of the Keys; but that it was in the *Biſhop* as *ſuperiour* to the
Preſbyters. And that they were then far from thinking it in the *Power*
Ep. 33. of the *People, to appoint and ordain their own Officers.* Saint *Cyprian*
ſends word to the *Church* of *Carthage, that he had taken one* Aurelius
into the Clergy; although his general cuſtom was in Ordinations to conſult
them before, and to weigh together the manners and deſerts of every
Ep. 34. *one:* Which is quite another thing from an *inherent Right* to *appoint*
and *conſtitute* their own *Church-Officers:* The ſame he doth ſoon after,
Ep. 35. concerning *Celerinus* and *Numidicus.* When he could not go among
them himſelf, by reaſon of the Perſecution, he appoints *Caldonius*
Ep. 38. and *Fortunatus* two *Biſhops*, and *Rogatianus* and *Numidicus* two
Preſbyters, to viſit in his name; and to take care of the poor, and of the
perſons fit to be promoted to the Clergy. Who give an account in the
Ep. 39. next *Epiſtle, that they had excommunicated* Feliciſſimus *and his Brethren*
for their ſeparation.

3. That Saint *Cyprian* did believe that this *Authority* which he had
for *governing* the *Church* was not from the *Power* of the *People*, but
from the *Inſtitution* of *Chriſt.* So upon the *occaſion* of the *Martyrs* invading
Ep. 27. the *Diſcipline* of the *Church*, he produceth that ſaying of *Chriſt*
to Saint *Peter, Thou art Peter*, &c. And *whatſoever you ſhall bind*, &c.
From whence, ſaith he, *by a conſtant ſucceſſion of times, ſuch a courſe*
hath been always obſerved in the Church, that the Church hath been ſtill
governed by Biſhops, and every Act of the Church hath been under their
care and conduct. Since this, ſaith he, *is a Divine Inſtitution, I wonder*
at the boldneſs of thoſe who have written at that rate to me (concerning
the lapſed) *ſince the Church conſiſts in the Biſhop, the Clergy and the*
Ep. 52. *ſtanding People.* In his *Epiſtle* to *Antonianus*, he ſpeaks of the *Agreement*
Ep. 55. *of the Biſhops throughout the whole World:* And in *that* to
Cornelius, that every Biſhop hath a part of the flock committed to him,
which he is to govern and to give an account thereof to God: And
Ep. 65. *that a Biſhop in the Church is in the place of Chriſt; and that diſobedience*
to him is the cauſe of Schiſms and Diſorders. To the ſame
Ep. 69. purpoſe he ſpeaks in his *Epiſtle* to *Rogatianus*, and to *Papianus*; where
he declares *a Church to be a People united to a Biſhop*; and to *Stephanus*,
Ep. 75. *that they have ſucceeded the Apoſtles in a conſtant courſe.*

Let the Reader now judge, whether theſe be the *ſtrokes and lineaments*
of the *Congregational way*; and whether Dr. O. had any reaſon
to appeal to Saint *Cyprian* for the *Democratical Government of the*
Church. But we have this advantage from this appeal, that they do
not ſuppoſe *any deviation* then *from the Primitive Inſtitution*, and what
that was in Saint *Cyprian*'s judgment any one may ſee, when he ſpeaks
of nothing peculiar to his own *Church*, but what was generally ob-

ſerved over the *Chriſtian world.* And now let Dr. *O.* give an account, how a change ſo great, ſo ſudden, ſo univerſal, ſhould happen in the *Chriſtian world*, in the *Government* of the *Church*; that when *Chriſt* had placed *the Power in the People*, the *Biſhops* in ſo ſhort a time ſhould be every where ſettled, and allowed to have the chief management in *Church-affairs*, without any *control* from the *People*: which to me is as ſtrong an argument as a matter of this nature will bear, that the *Power* was at firſt lodged in *them*, and not in the *People*. For, as Mr. *Noys* of *New-England* well argues, *It is not imaginable that Biſhops ſhould come by ſuch Power, as is recorded in Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, and that over all the world; and in a way of ambition, in ſuch humbling times, without all manner of oppoſition for three hundred years together, and immediately after the Apoſtles, had it been uſurpation or innovation. When and where is innovation without oppoſition? Would not Elders, ſo many ſeeing and knowing men, at leaſt ſome of them, have contended for Truth, wherein their own Liberties and Rights were ſo much intereſſed?* Aërius *his oppoſing of Biſhops, ſo long after their riſe and ſtanding, is inconſiderable.* The force of which reaſoning, will ſway more with an impartial and ingenuous mind, than all the difficulties I ever yet ſaw on the other ſide. So much for the account Dr. *O.* promiſes of the *deviations* of the *Churches* after the *Apoſtles deceaſe*.

Moſes and Aaron, p. 62.

Sect. 5. (2.) Dr. O. anſwers as to the *matter of fact* concerning *the Inſtitution of Congregational Churches*, that *it ſeems to him evidently exemplified in the Scripture.* The *matter* of *fact* is, that when *Churches* grew too big for one *ſingle Congregation* in a *City*, then a *new Congregational Church* was ſet up under *new Officers*, with a *ſeparate Power of Government*. Let us now ſee Dr. *O.*'s proof of it. *For although it may be there is not expreſs mention made that theſe or thoſe particular Churches did divide themſelves into more Congregations with new Officers*, i. e. although the *matter of fact* be not *evident* in *Scripture*, *yet*, ſaith he, *there are Inſtances of the erection of new particular Congregations in the ſame Province.* But what is this to the proof of the *Congregational way?* The thing I deſired was, that when the *Chriſtians* in *one City* multiplied into *more Congregations*, they would prove, that they did make *new and diſtinct Churches*; and to exemplifie this, he mentions *new Congregations in the ſame Province*. Who ever denied or diſputed that? On the contrary, the proof of this, is a great advantage to our *Cauſe*; for ſince where the *Scripture* ſpeaks of *the Churches of a Province*, it ſpeaks of them as of *different Churches*; but when it mentions *the Chriſtians of one City*, it calls them *the Church of that City*, (as the *Church of Jeruſalem*, the *Church of Epheſus*; but *the Churches of Judea, Galilee* and *Samaria*) what can be more evident, than that the *Chriſtians* of *one City*, though never ſo numerous, made but *one Church?* If one obſerve the language of the *New Teſtament*, one may find this obſervation not once to fail; that where *Churches* are ſpoken of in the *plural number*, they are the *Churches of a Province*, as the *Churches* of *Judæa, the Churches of Aſia*; *the Churches of Syria and Cilicia*; *the Churches of Galatia*; *the Churches of Macedonia*; but where all the *Chriſtians* of *one City* are ſpoken of, it is ſtill called the *Church of that City*; as *the Church at Antioch*; *the Church at Corinth*; and when the ſeven *Churches* are ſpoken of together, they are the ſeven *Churches*; but when ſpoken to ſingle, it is *the Church of Epheſus, the Church of Smyrna*, &c. Which being ſpoken without any diſcrimination, as to the difference of theſe

Vindic. p. 39.

Acts 9. 31.

1 *Theſſ.* 2. 14.
1 *Cor.* 16. 19.
Acts 15. 41.
1 *Cor.* 16. 1.
Gal. 1. 2.
2 *Cor.* 8. 1.

places, in greatneſs and capacity, or the number of Believers in them, doth evidently diſcover that what *number* ſoever they were, they were all but the *Church* of that *City*. For it is not to be ſuppoſed that the *number* of *Chriſtians* was no greater in *Epheſus*, *Sardis*, *Pergamus* and *Laodicea*, which were great and populous Cities, than in *Thyatira* and *Philadelphia*, which were much leſs; eſpecially, conſidering the time
Acts 20. 19. —— 31. 1 Cor. 16. 9. Saint *Paul* ſtaid at *Epheſus*, and the *mighty ſucceſs* which he had in preaching there, which will amount to no great matter, if in three years time, he converted no more, than made up one *ſingle Congregation*. And thus men to ſerve an *Hypotheſis*, take off from the mighty *power* and prevalency of the *Goſpel*. I cannot but wonder, what Dr. O. means when after he hath produced the evidence of diſtinct *Churches* in the
Vindic. p. 40. *ſame Province*, as *Galatia*, and *Macedonia*, he calls this *plain Scripture evidence and practice for the erecting particular diſtinct Congregations*; who denies that? but I ſee nothing like a proof of *diſtinct Churches in the ſame City*, which was the thing to be proved, but becauſe it could not be proved, was prudently let alone: whereas we have *plain Scripture evidence*, that all the *Chriſtians* of *a City*, though never ſo great, made but *one Church*; and uncontrolable evidence from *Antiquity*, that the neighbouring *Chriſtians* were laid to the *Church* of the *City*. All
p. 41. that he ſaith farther to this matter, is, *that ſuch Churches had power to rule and govern themſelves, becauſe in every one of them Elders were ordained*, Acts 14. 22. which is again an argument on our ſide; for if we compare *Acts* 14. 22. with *Titus* 1. 5. we ſhall find *that ordaining Elders*, κατ' Ἐκκλησίαν hath the ſame importance with *ordaining them* κατὰ πόλιν; ſo that by the *Church* is underſtood the *Body of Chriſtians inhabiting in one City*, as the Ἐκκλησία at *Athens* was the whole *Corporation* there; and particular *Congregations* are but like the ſeveral *Companies*, all which together make up but *one City*.

Sect. 6. (3.) Dr. O. ſaith, *that the Chriſtians of one City might not exceed the bounds of a particular Church or Congregation, although they had a multiplication of Biſhops or Elders in them, and occaſional diſtinct Aſſemblies for ſome Acts of Divine Worſhip*. Then, ſay I, the notion of a *Church* is not limited in *Scripture* to a ſingle *Congregation*: For if *occaſional Aſſemblies* be allowed for ſome *Acts of Worſhip*, why not for others? if the *number* of *Elders* be unlimited, then every one of theſe may attend the *occaſional diſtinct Aſſemblies* for *Worſhip*, and yet altogether make up the *Body* of *one Church*; to which, if he had but allowed a *ſingle Biſhop* over theſe, he had made up that *repreſentation* of a *Church*, which we have from the beſt and pureſt *Antiquity*. And ſo
Orig. c. Celſ. l. 3. *Origen* compares the *Churches* of *Athens*, *Corinth*, and *Alexandria* with the *Corporations* in thoſe *Cities*; the *number* of *Preſbyters* with the *Senates* of the *Cities*; and at laſt the *Biſhop* with the *Magiſtrate*. But Dr. O. adds, *that when they did begin to exceed in number, beyond a juſt proportion for edification, they did immediately erect other Churches among them, or near them*. Name any one *new Church* erected in the *ſame City*, and I yield. And what need a new Church, when himſelf allows *occaſional diſtinct Aſſemblies* for *greater edification*? But he names *the Church at Cenchrea, which was a Port to the City of Corinth; becauſe of the mighty increaſe of Believers at Corinth*, Acts 18. 10. *with* Rom. 16. 1. I anſwer, (1.) It ſeems then there was ſuch an increaſe at *Corinth*, as made them plant a *diſtinct Church*; and yet at *Epheſus*, where Saint *Paul* uſed extraordinary diligence, and had great ſucceſs, there was no need

need of any *new* and *diſtinct Church*. And at *Corinth* he ſtaid but a *year and ſix months*, but at *Epheſus three years*, as the time is ſet down in the *Acts*. *Acts* 18.11. *Acts* 20.31. Doth not this look very improbably? (2.) *Stephanus Byzant.* reckons *Cenchrea* as a *City* diſtinct from *Corinth*, and ſo doth *Strabo*, who placeth it in the way from *Tegea* to *Argos*, through the *Parthenian Mountain*; Str. *l.* 8. and it is ſeveral times mentioned by *Thucydides* as diſtinct from *Corinth*; Thucyd. *l.* 4. & *l.* 8. and ſo it is moſt likely was a *Church* originally planted there, and not *formed* from the too great fulneſs of the *Church* of *Corinth*.

As to the *Church* of *Jeruſalem*, he ſaith, *that the five thouſand Converts were ſo diſpoſed of or ſo diſperſed, that ſome years after, there was ſuch a Church there, as did meet together in one place, as occaſion did require, even the whole multitude of the Brethren; nor was their number greater when they went unto* Pella. p. 41. To which I anſwer, (1.) The force of the Argument lies in the five thouſand being ſaid *to be added to the Church*, *Acts* 4. 4. before any *diſperſion* or *perſecution*. In which time we muſt ſuppoſe a *true Church* to be *formed*, and the *Chriſtians* at that time performing the *Acts of Church-communion:* the *Queſtion* then is, whether it be in the leaſt probable, that five thouſand perſons ſhould at that time, make one *ſtated and fixed Congregation* for *Divine Worſhip*, and all the *Acts* of *Church-communion?* What place was there large enough to receive them, when they met for *Prayer* and *Sacraments?* Dr. O. was ſenſible of this inconvenience, and therefore only ſpeaks of the *Church* of *Jeruſalem* when theſe were *diſperſed*; but my queſtion was about them while they *were together*. Were they not a *Church* then? *Did they not continue in the Apoſtles Doctrine and Fellowſhip, and breaking of Bread and Prayers?* But how could five thouſand then do all this together? Therefore a *Church* according to its firſt *Inſtitution*, is not limited to a *ſingle Congregation*. (2.) A *Church* conſiſting of many *Congregations*, may, upon extraordinary *occaſions*, aſſemble together, as the ſeveral *Companies* in a *common Hall*, for matters of general concernment, which yet manage their particular Intereſts apart: ſo for *Acts* of *Worſhip* and *Chriſtian Communion*, *particular Congregations* may meet by themſelves; but when any thing happens of great concernment, they may *occaſionally aſſemble together*; as in the two debates mentioned *Acts* 15. 4. and 21. 22. ſo the ſeveral *Tribes* in *Athens* did, at their general *Aſſemblies*, which *Strabo* and *Euſtathius* ſay were 174. Str. *l.* 9. Euſtat. *ad Il.* β. (3.) There is no number mentioned of the *Chriſtians* that went to *Pella*; neither by *Euſebius* nor *Epiphanius*, who relate the ſtory, ſo that nothing can thence be concluded; Euſeb. *l.* 3. *c.* 5. Epiph. *hær.* 29. but if the force lies in his calling *Pella* a *Village*, I am ſure *Euſebius* calls it a *City of Peræa, beyond Jordan*; and *Epiphanius* adds, *that they ſpread themſelves from thence to Cœleſyria, and Decapolis, and Baſanitis.* So that all this put together makes no proof at all, that the *Chriſtian Churches*, by their *firſt Inſtitution*, were limited to *ſingle Congregations*.

Sect. 7. (4.) He anſwers, *that he cannot diſcern the leaſt neceſſity of any poſitive Rule or Direction in this matter, ſince the nature of the thing, and the duty of men doth indiſpenſably require it.* p. 42. But is it not Dr. O. that ſaith, *that the Inſtitution of Churches, and the Rules for their diſpoſal and government throughout the world, are the ſame, ſtable and unalterable?* Evangel. Love, p. 59. Are all theſe *Rules* now come to nothing but what follows from the *nature of the thing?* Is it not Dr. O. that ſaith, *that no religious Union or Order among Chriſtians is of ſpiritual uſe and advantage to them,* p. 65.

but what is appointed and deſigned for them by Jeſus Chriſt? Doth not this overthrow any other *Order* or *Union* among *Chriſtians* but what *Chriſt hath inſtituted and appointed for them?* The Queſtion is not about ſuch a *Conſtitution* of *Churches* as is neceſſary for performing the *duties* of *religious Worſhip*; for all Parties are agreed therein; but whether *Church-power* be limited to theſe excluſively to all other *Unions* of *Chriſtians?* whether every *ſingle Congregation* hath *all Church-power* wholly in it ſelf, and unaccountably, as to ſubordination to any other? How doth this appear from the *nature of the thing*, and the *neceſſary duties of Chriſtians?* I grant the *Inſtitution* of *Churches* was *for Edification:* And I think a great deal of that *Edification* lies in the *orderly diſpoſal* of things. Whatever tends to *Peace* and *Unity* among *Chriſtians*, in my judgment tends to *Edification.* Now I cannot apprehend how a *ſole Power* of *Government* in every *Congregation* tends to the preſerving this *Peace* and *Unity* among *Chriſtians:* much leſs how it follows ſo clearly from *the nature of the thing* as to take away the need of any *poſitive Rule or Direction* in this matter. And here the main Controverſie lies, between us and the *Congregational Churches.* Is there no *poſitive Rule* or *Direction* in this matter? then it follows as much from the *nature of the thing*, that ſince *Peace* and *Order* is to be kept up among *Churches* as well as *Perſons*, every *ſingle Congregation* ought not to engroſs *Church-power* to it ſelf, but to ſtand accountable for the management of it to thoſe who are intruſted with the immediate care of the *Churches Peace.* And I cannot yet ſee, by all that hath been ſaid, how thoſe that break the eſtabliſhed *Order* in a *Church wherein all the ſubſtantials of Religion are acknowledged to be ſound*, and ſet up particular *Independent Churches* in oppoſition to it, can acquit themſelves from the Guilt of Schiſm, how *great and intolerable* ſoever it be thought. p. 43.

As to what concerns *the Churches in the Houſes of Priſcilla and Aquila, and Nymphas and Philemon*, I ſay, that this is to be underſtood, not of a *Church meeting in their Houſes*, but of their own *Families* was pleaded by the *diſſenting Brethren*, who ſay, *moſt of our Divines are of that Opinion:* and therefore the Argument holds againſt them. And from Dr. O's Diſcourſe I leſs underſtand than I did before, what *obligation* of *Conſcience* can be upon any, when they may ſerve *God* in their *Families*, in oppoſition to *Laws*, to keep up ſuch *publick Congregations* as are forbidden by them. For (1.) he grants that a *Church* may be in a *Family*; altho' a *Family* as ſuch be not a *Church.* Then the *members* of a *Family* ſubmitting to the *Government* of the *Maſter* as their *Paſtor* are a *true Church:* for a *Church*, he ſaith, *may conſiſt only of the Perſons that belong to a Family.* Then there is no neceſſity of going out of a *Family* for the *Acts* of *Church-communion*; eſpecially, when the addition of four more, may provide ſufficiently for all the *Officers* they believe neceſſary to the making up of a *Church.* (2.) All that he ſaith, is, *that there is no ſuch example given of Churches in private Families in Scriptures, as ſhould reſtrain the extent of Churches from Congregations of many Families.* And what then? the *Queſtion* is not now whether they be *lawful*, but whether they be *neceſſary*; for nothing leſs than a *Divine Command* can juſtifie the *breach* of a plain *Law*; but where is that *Command?* Doth not Dr. O. appeal to the *nature* of the *thing*, and the *indiſpenſible duties* of men with reſpect to the end of *Churches*, as his great *Rule* in theſe caſes? But which of all theſe neceſſary *duties* may not be performed within the *terms* of the *Law?* ſo that no *obligation* can ariſe from thence to have *Congregations* of many *Families.* All that he ſaith farther, as to

p. 44.
Reaſons againſt the Inſtances, &c. p. 83.

this

p. 46.

this matter is, *that if through non-compliance any diſturbance happen, the blame will be found lying upon thoſe who would force others to forego their Primitive Conſtitution.* Then it ſeems at laſt the *Primitive Conſtitution* is come to be the ground of *non-compliance*; which in this caſe amounts to *ſeparation.* But this *primitive Conſtitution* had need be far better proved, before it can be thought a *good ground* for breaking the *Peace* of the *Church* and the *Laws* of the *Land:* and much more before it can carry off the blame from the perſons who break *Orders* and *Laws* to the *Makers* of them. All men no doubt that ever broke Laws, if this Plea would be admitted, would transfer the blame upon thoſe that made them. And ſo much for the *Plea* of the *Congregational* Party.

p. 24.

True and only way of Concord. p. 111.

Premonition to the true way of Concord.

Sect. 8. 2. I now come to conſider the *Plea* of thoſe, who hold *our Dioceſan Epiſcopacy* to be unlawful. In my *Sermon*, as it is printed, I ſet down this ſaying of Mr. *Baxter, That to deviſe new ſpecies of Churches (beyond Parochial or Congregational) without God's Authority, and to impoſe them on the world (yea in his name) and to call all Diſſenters Schiſmaticks, is a far worſe uſurpation, than to make or impoſe new Ceremonies or Liturgies.* Which I ſaid doth ſuppoſe *Congregational Churches* to be ſo much the *Inſtitution of Chriſt*; that any other *Conſtitution* above theſe is both *unlawful* and *inſupportable:* which is more than the *Independent Brethren* themſelves do aſſert. Now for our better underſtanding Mr. *B*'s meaning, we muſt conſider his deſign in that place from whence thoſe words are quoted. 1. He ſaith, *Chriſt hath inſtituted only Congregational or Parochial Churches.* 2. That *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy is a new ſpecies of Churches deviſed by men without God's Authority, and impoſed in ſuch a manner, that thoſe are called Schiſmaticks who diſſent from it.* 3. *That ſuch an impoſition is worſe than that of Ceremonies and Liturgies*; *and conſequently affords a better plea for Separation.* But to prevent any miſunderſtanding of his meaning, I will ſet down his own Cautions. 1. *That the Queſtion is not whether every particular Church ſhould have a Biſhop with his Presbyters and Deacons:* i. e. *whether every Rector of a Pariſh be not a Biſhop, if he hath Curates under him.* This he calls *Parochial Epiſcopacy.* 2. *Nor, whether theſe ſhould have Archbiſhops over them, as Succeſſors to the Apoſtolical and general Overſeers of the firſt Age, in the ordinary continued parts of their Office.* 3. *Nor, whether Patriarchs, Dioceſans and Lay-chancellours be lawful, as Officers of the King, exerciſing under him ſuch Government of the Church as belongeth to Kings, to which in ſuch exerciſe all Subjects muſt for conſcience ſake ſubmit.* 4. *Nor, if Dioceſans become the ſole Biſhops over many hundred Pariſhes, all the Parochial Biſhops and Pariſh Churches being put down and turned into Curates and Chapels, whether a Miniſter ought yet to live quietly and peaceably under them.* You will ask then, where lies this horrible *impoſition,* and intolerable *uſurpation?* It is in requiring the owning the *lawfulneſs* of this *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy*; and joyning with *Parochial Churches* as *parts* of it. But wherein lies the unſufferable malignity of that? 1. *It is making a new ſpecies of Churches without God's Authority.* 2. *It is overthrowing the ſpecies of God's making:* which, according to Mr. *B.* requires two things. 1. *Local and preſential Communion,* as he calls it, *i. e.* That it conſiſts only of ſo many, as can well meet together for *Church Society.* 2. *The full exerciſe of Diſcipline within it ſelf by the Paſtors*; which being taken away, they are only *Curates*, and their *Meetings Oratories* and no *Churches.* This I think is a true and fair repreſentation of Mr. *B*'s opinion in this matter. Which tending ſo apparently to overthrow our preſent *Conſtitution* as *inſupportable*, and to juſtifie *ſeparation* from our

Parochial Churches as *members* of a *Dioceſan Church*; therefore to vindicate the *Conſtitution* of *our Church*, I ſhall undertake theſe three things.

1. To ſhew that our *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy* is the ſame for *ſubſtance* which was in the *Primitive Church*.
2. That it is not *repugnant to any Inſtitution of Chriſt*, nor *deviſing a new ſpecies of Churches* without *God's Authority*.
3. That the accidental *alterations* in *Diſcipline* do not overthrow the *being* of our *Parochial Churches*.

Plea for peace, p. 66. Church-Hiſtory, p. 37. p. 73. Church-Hiſtory, p. 57.

1. *That our Dioceſan Epiſcopacy is the ſame for ſubſtance which was in the Primitive Church.* This I begin with, becauſe Mr. *B.* ſo very often makes his *Appeal* to *Antiquity* in this matter. And my firſt inquiry ſhall be into the *Epiſcopacy* practiſed in the *African Churches*; becauſe Mr. *B.* expreſſeth an eſteem of them above others; for in St. *Cyprian*'s time he ſaith *they were the beſt ordered Churches in the world; and that the Biſhops there were the moſt godly, faithful, peaceable company of Biſhops ſince the Apoſtles times.* And of the following times he thus ſpeaks, *Moſt of the African Councils*, ſaith he, *were the beſt in all the world. Many good Canons for Church order were made by this and moſt of the African Councils, no Biſhops being faithfuller than they.* Therefore concerning the *Epiſcopacy* there practiſed, I ſhall lay down theſe two Obſervations.

Anſw. to Sermon, p. 74.

Obſ. 1. That it was an *inviolable Rule* among them, *That there was to be but one Biſhop in a City*, though the *City* were never ſo *large*, or the *Chriſtians* never ſo *many*. This one Obſervation made good, quite overthrows Mr. *B*'s *Hypotheſis*. For upon his *principles*, where ever the *Congregation* of *Chriſtians* became ſo great, *that they could not conveniently aſſemble at one place ſo as to have perſonal Communion in preſence*, as he ſpeaks; there either they muſt alter the *inſtituted ſpecies* of *Government*, or they muſt have more *Biſhops* than *one* in a *City*. For, he ſaith, *the Church muſt be no bigger, than that the ſame Biſhop may perform the Paſtoral Office to them in preſent Communion*, and for this he quotes 1 *Theſſ.* 5. 12, 13. *Heb.* 13. 7, 17. *i. e.* their *Biſhops* muſt be ſuch as they muſt *hear preach, and have Converſation with.* But that this was not ſo underſtood in the *African Churches*, appears by their ſtrict obſervance of this Rule; of having but *one Biſhop* in a *City*, how large ſoever it was. And how punctually they thought themſelves bound to obſerve it, will appear by this one Inſtance, That one of the greateſt and moſt pernicious *Schiſms* that ever happened, might have been prevented if they had yielded to more *Biſhops* than *one* in a *City*; and that was the *Schiſm* of the *Donatiſts*, upon the competition between *Majorinus* and *Cæcilian*; as the *Novatian Schiſm* began at *Rome* upon a like occaſion between *Cornelius* and *Novatian*. Now was there not all the *Reaſon* imaginable upon ſo important an occaſion to have made more *Biſhops* in the *ſame City*, unleſs they had thought ſome *Divine Rule* prohibited them? When there were 46 *Presbyters* at *Rome*, had it not been fair to have divided them? or upon Mr. *B*'s principles *made ſo many Biſhops* that every one might have had three or four for his ſhare? But inſtead of this, how doth St. *Cyprian*, even the holy and meek St. *Cyprian*, as St. *Auguſtin* calls him, aggravate the *Schiſm* of *Novatian* for being choſen a *Biſhop* in the *ſame City*, where there was one choſen before? His words are ſo conſiderable to our purpoſe, that I ſhall ſet them down. *Et cum poſt primum ſecundus eſſe non poſſit, quiſquis poſt unum qui ſolus eſſe debeat, factus eſt, non jam ſecundus ille ſed nullus eſt. Since there cannot be a ſecond after the firſt, whoſoever is made Biſhop when one is made already, who ought to be alone, he is not*

Aug. de Bapt. l. 2. c. 4.

Cyp. Ep. 52. n. 4.

another Biſhop, but none at all. Let Mr. *B.* reconcile theſe words to his *Hypotheſis* if he can. What! in ſuch a *City* of *Chriſtians*, as *Rome* then was, where were 46 *Presbyters*, to pronounce it a mere *nullity* to have a *ſecond Biſhop* choſen? Mr. *B.* would rather have thought there had been need of 46 *Biſhops*; but St. *Cyprian* who lived ſomewhat nearer the *Apoſtles* times, and I am apt to think, knew as well the *Conſtitution* of *Churches* then, thought it overthrew that *Conſtitution* to have *more Biſhops than one in a City.* At *Carthage* it ſeems ſome turbulent *Presbyters* that were not ſatisfied with St. *Cyprian*'s Government, or it may be looking on the charge as too big for one, choſe one *Fortunatus* to be *Biſhop* there: with this St. *Cyprian* acquaints *Cornelius*; and there tells him, how far they had proceeded, and what miſchief this would be to the *Church*, *ſince the having one Biſhop was the beſt means to prevent Schiſms.* After the election of *Cornelius*, ſome of the *Confeſſors* who had ſided with *Novatian* deſerted his Party, and were received back again at a *ſolemn Aſſembly*, where they confeſſed their fault, and declared, *That they were not ignorant, that as there was but one God, and one Chriſt, and one Holy Ghoſt, ſo there ought to be but one Biſhop in the Catholick Church.* Not according to the ſenſeleſs interpretation of *Pamelius*, who would have it underſtood of *one Pope*; but that according to the ancient and regular *Diſcipline* and *Order* of the *Church*, there ought to be but *one Biſhop* in a *City*. After the *Martyrdom* of *Cornelius* at *Rome*, St. *Cyprian* ſends to *Rome* to know *who that one Biſhop was, that was choſen in his place.* And the neceſſity of this *Unity*, he inſiſts on elſewhere; and ſaith, *Our Saviour ſo appointed it, unam Cathedram conſtituit, & unitatis ejuſdem originem, ab uno incipientem ſua auctoritate diſpoſuit.* Which the *Papiſts* fooliſhly interpret of St. *Peter*'s *Chair*; for in his following words he utterly overthrows the *ſupremacy*, ſaying, *all the Apoſtles were equal*; and a little after, *Epiſcopatus unus eſt, cujus à ſingulis in ſolidum pars tenetur.* But this is ſufficient to my purpoſe, to ſhew that theſe *holy men*, theſe *Martyrs* and *Confeſſors*, men that were indeed *dying daily*, and that for *Chriſt* too, were all agreed that a *Biſhop* there muſt be, and that but *one in a City*, though never ſo large and full of *Chriſtians.* St. *Auguſtin* in his *excellent Epiſtle* to the *Donatiſts*, gives an account of the proceedings about *Cæcilian* after the *election* of *Majorinus*, and that *Melchiades* managing that matter with admirable temper, offer'd for the *healing* of the *Schiſm* to receive thoſe who had been ordained by *Majorinus*, with this Proviſo, *that where by reaſon of the Schiſm there had been two Biſhops in a City, he that was firſt conſecrated was to remain Biſhop, and the other to have another People provided for him.* For which St. *Auguſtin* commends him, *as an excellent man, a true Son of Peace, and Father of Chriſtian People.* By which we ſee the beſt, the wiſeſt, the moſt moderate Perſons of that time, never once thought that there could be *more Biſhops than one in a City.* In the famous *Conference* at *Carthage* between the *Catholick* and *Donatiſt Biſhops*, the *Rule* on both ſides was, *but one Biſhop to be allowed of either ſide of a City and Dioceſe*; and if there had been any new made, to increaſe their number, as it was objected on both ſides; if it were proved, they were not to be allowed: for generally then, every *Dioceſe* had *two Biſhops* of the *different Parties*; but in ſome places they had but *one*, where the *People* were of *one mind*; and nothing but this notorious *Schiſm* gave occaſion to ſuch a multiplication of *Biſhops* in *Africa*; both Parties ſtriving to increaſe their *Numbers.*

Cyp. *Ep.* 55. *n.* 6, 9.

Ep. 46. *n.* 3.

Ep. 58. *n.* 2. *De Unit. Eccl. n.* 3, 4.

S. Auguſt. *Ep.* 162. *N.E. Ep.* 43.

Collat. Carthage 1.

Sect. 9. *Obſ.* 2. In *Cities* and *Dioceſes* which were under the *care* of one *Biſhop*, there were *ſeveral Congregations* and *Altars*, and *diſtant places*. *Carthage* was a very *large City*, and had great *numbers* of *Chriſtians* even in S. *Cyprian*'s time, as I have already ſhewed. And there beſides the *Cathedral* called *Baſilica Major & Reſtituta* [a] in which the *Biſhops always ſate*, as *Victor Vitenſis* ſaith; there were ſeveral other conſiderable *Churches*, in which S. *Auguſtine* often preached when he went to *Carthage*, as the [b] *Baſilica Fauſti*; the [c] *Baſilica Leontiana*; the [d] *Baſilica Celerinæ* mentioned by * *Victor* likewiſe, who ſaid it was otherwiſe called *Scillitanorum*. The [f] *Baſilica Novarum*. The [g] *Baſilica Petri*. The [h] *Baſilica Pauli*. And I do not queſtion there were many others, which I have not obſerved; for *Victor* ſaith, *that when Geiſericus enter'd* Carthage *he found there* Quodvultdeus *the Biſhop, & maximam turbam Clericorum, a very great multitude of Clergy, all which he immediatly baniſhed*. And without the *City* there were *two great Churches*, faith *Victor*; one where S. *Cyprian ſuffered Martyrdom*, and the other *where his body was buried*, at a place called *Mappalia*. In all he reckons about 500 of the *Clergy* belonging to the *Church* of *Carthage*, taking in thoſe who were trained up to it; And doth Mr. *B.* imagine all theſe were intended to ſerve *one Congregation?* or that all the *Chriſtians* then in *Carthage* could have *local and preſential Communion*, as he calls it, in *one Church*; and at *one Altar?* Sometimes an *Altar* is taken with a particular *reſpect* to a *Biſhop*; and ſo ſetting up *one Altar* againſt *another*, was ſetting up *one Biſhop* againſt *another*, as that *Phraſe* is commonly uſed in Saint *Cyprian* and Saint *Auguſtin*; ſometimes for the *place* at which the *Chriſtians* did communicate, and ſo there were as many *Altars* as *Churches*. So *Fortunatus* a *Catholick Biſhop* objected to *Petilian* the *Donatiſt*, *that in the City where he was Biſhop, the Hereticks had broken down all the Altars*: which is the thing *Optatus* objects ſo much againſt them. And that there were *Altars* in all their *Churches* appears from hence, that not only the *Oblations* were *made* there, and the *Communion* received, but all the *Prayers* of the *Church* were made at them; as not only appears from the *African Code* and Saint *Auguſtin* (which I have mentioned elſewhere) but from *Optatus*, who upbraiding the *Donatiſts* for breaking down the *Altars* of *Churches*, he tells them *that hereby they did what they could to hinder the Churches Prayers*, for ſaith he, *illac ad aures Dei aſcendere ſolebat populi oratio. The Peoples Prayers went up to Heaven that way.* And that *diſtant places from the City* were in the *Biſhop's Dioceſe* and under his care I thus prove. In the *African Code*, there is a *Canon* that *no Biſhop ſhould leave his Cathedral Church, and go to any other Church in his Dioceſe there to reſide*; which evidently proves, that there were not only *more places*, but *more Churches* in a *Biſhop's Dioceſe*. And where the *Donatiſts* had erected *new Biſhopricks*, as they often did, the *African Council* decrees, *that after the deceaſe of ſuch a Biſhop, if the People had no mind to have another in his room, they might be in the Dioceſe of another Biſhop*. Which ſhews, that they thought the *Dioceſes* might be ſo *large*, at to hold the *People* that were under *two Biſhops*. And there were many *Canons* made about the *People* of the *Donatiſt Biſhops*. In one it was determined, *that they ſhould belong to the Biſhop that converted them, without limitation of diſtance*; after that, *that they ſhould belong to the ſame Dioceſe they were in before: But if the Donatiſt Biſhop were converted, then the Dioceſe was to be divided between them.*

Aug. *Ep.* 43.

Victor Vitenſis *l.* 1.

[a] Aug. *Serm.* 4. 14. 102. *de diverſis.*

[b] *Serm.* 12. 122. *de diverſis.*

[c] *De diverſ.* 11.

[d] 96. *de Temp.*

* Vict. *l.* 1.

[f] 110. *de Temp.*

[g] 251. *de Temp.*

[h] 24. *de diverſ.*

Victor Vit. *l.* 5.

Collat. 1. Carthage *n.* 139.

Optat. *l.* 6.

Cod. *Eccl.* Afric. *c.* 71.

c. 98, 99.

c. 117.

c. 118.

If any Biſhop neglected the converting the People of the places belonging to his Dioceſe, he that did take the pains in it, was to have thoſe places laid to his Dioceſe; unleſs ſufficient cauſe were ſhewed by the Biſhop, that he was not to blame. Let Mr. *Baxter* now judge, whether their *Biſhopricks* were like *our Pariſhes*; as he confidently affirms. Saint *Auſtin* mentions the *Municipium Tullenſe* not far from *Hippo*, where there was *Preſbyter* and *Clerks* under his *care* and *government:* And he tells this particular Story of it; *that a certain poor Man who lived there fell into a Trance, in which he fancied he ſaw the Clergy thereabout, and among the reſt the Preſbyter of that place who bad him go to* Hippo *to be baptized of* Auguſtin *who was Biſhop there; the Man did accordingly, and the next Eaſter put in his name among the Competentes and was baptized, and after told Saint* Auguſtin *the foregoing paſſages.* It ſeems the *Donatiſts* were very troubleſome in ſome of the remoter parts of the *Dioceſe* of *Hippo*, whereupon Saint *Auguſtin* ſent one of his *Preſbyters* to *Cæcilian* the *Roman Preſident*, to complain of their inſolence, and to crave his aſſiſtance, which, he ſaith he did, *leſt he ſhould be blamed for his negligence, who was the Biſhop of that Dioceſe.* And can we think all theſe perſons had *præſential and local Communion* with Saint *Auſtin* in his *Church* at *Hippo?* While he was yet but a *Preſbyter* at *Hippo*, in the abſence of the *Biſhop* he writes to *Maximinus* a *Donatiſt Biſhop* a ſharp Letter, for offering to *rebaptize* a *Deacon* of their *Church* who was placed at *Mutagena*, and he ſaith, *he went from* Hippo *to the place himſelf to be ſatisfied of the truth of it.* At the ſame place lived one *Donatus* a *Preſbyter* of the *Donatiſts* whom Saint *Auguſtin* would have had brought to him againſt his Will, to be better inſtructed, *as being under his care*, but the obſtinate Man rather endeavour'd to make away himſelf, upon which he writes a *long Epiſtle* to him. In another *Epiſtle* he gives an account, that there was a place called *Fuſſala*, *which with the Country about it, belonged to the Dioceſe of* Hippo; *where there was abundance of People, but almoſt all* Donatiſts; *but by his great care in ſending Preſbyters among them, thoſe places were all reduced; but becauſe* Fuſſala *was* 40 *miles diſtant from* Hippo, *he took care to have a Biſhop placed among them*; but as appears by the event he had better have kept it under his own Care. For upon the complaints made againſt their *new Biſhop*, he was fain to *reſume it*; as appears by a *Preſbyter* of *Fuſſala*, which he mentions afterwards. However it appears, that a place 40 *miles diſtance* was then under the *care* of ſo *great* a *Saint*, and ſo *excellent* a *Biſhop* as Saint *Auguſtin* was. And could Mr. *B.* have found it in his heart to have told him *that he did not underſtand the right conſtitution of Churches?* How many *Quæres* would Mr. *B.* have made about the *numbers* of *Souls* at *Fuſſala*, and how he could take upon him the *care* of a *place* ſo far *diſtant* from him? And it is no hard matter to gueſs what anſwer Saint *Auguſtin* would have given him.

c. 121.
Church Hiſtory, p. 73.
De curâ pro Mortuis c. 12.
Aug. *Ep.* 60.
Aug. *Ep.* 203.
Ep. 204.
Ep. 262.
Ep. ad Quodvultdeum *ante lib. de hæreſ.*

But beſides this plain evidence of the extent of *Dioceſes*, we have as clear proof of *Metropolitan Provinces* in the *African Churches*. *Quidam de Epiſcopis in Provinciâ noſtrâ*, ſaith Saint *Cyprian*; and yet he ſpeaks of his *Predeceſſors* times, which ſhews the very *ancient extent* of that *Province*, *In provinciâ noſtrâ per aliquot Civitates*, ſaith he again; which ſhews that *more Cities than Carthage* were under his care. *Quoniam latius fuſa eſt provincia noſtra*, in his *Epiſtle* to *Cornelius*. In the *African Code* it appears the *Biſhop* of *Carthage* had the *Primacy* by his

*S.*Cyprian. *Ep.* 52. *n.* 13.
Ep. 23. *n.* 2.
Ep. 45. *n.* 2.

his *place*; in the other *Provinces* by *Seniority of Conſecration.* *Victor* Victor Vit. *l.* 1. mentions one *Creſcens*, who had 120 *Biſhops* under him as *Metropolitan.* And I hope at leaſt for the ſake of the *African Biſhops*, Mr. *B.* will entertain the better opinion of the *Engliſh Epiſcopacy.*

Sect. 10. But that he may not think this ſort of *Epiſcopacy* was only in theſe *parts* of *Africa*, let us enquire into the *Epiſcopacy* of the *Church* of *Alexandria.* And we may ſuppoſe *Athanaſius* did not ſpend all his zeal upon *doctrinal points*, but had ſome for the *right Conſtitution* of *Churches*; and yet it is moſt certain the *Churches* under his care could not have *perſonal Communion* with him. It is obſerved by Epiph. *hær.* 68. *n.* 6. Athanaſ. *Ap. p.* 781. 802. *Epiphanius, that* Athanaſius *did frequently viſit the neighbour Churches, eſpecially thoſe in* Maræotis; of which *Athanaſius* himſelf gives the beſt account. *Maræotis*, ſaith he, *is a Region belonging to* Alexandria, *which never had either Biſhop or Suffragan in it; but all the Churches there are immediately ſubject to the Biſhop of* Alexandria; *but every Preſbyter is fixed in his particular Village; and here they had Churches erected in which theſe Preſbyters did officiate.* All this we have expreſly from *Athanaſius* himſelf, whence we obſerve, (1.) That here were *true Parochial Churches*; for ſo *Athanaſius* calls them *Churches*, and not *bare Oratories.* (2.) That theſe had *Preſbyters fixed among them*, who performed *divine Offices* there. (3.) That theſe were under the *immediate inſpection* of the *Biſhop* of *Alexandria*, ſo that the *whole Government* belonged to him. (4.) That theſe were at *that diſtance*, that they could not have *local Communion* with their *Biſhop* in his *Church* at *Alexandria.* Which is directly contrary to Mr. *Baxter*'s *Epiſcopacy.* *Hæreſ.* 68. *n* 4. 69. *n.* 1. So in *Alexandria* it ſelf, there were many *diſtant Churches* with fixed *Preſbyters* in them, as *Epiphanius* ſeveral times obſerves: And it would be a very ſtrange thing indeed, if ſo many *Preſbyters* ſhould have *fixed Churches* in *Alexandria*, and yet the *whole Church* of *Alexandria* be no *Abridgment of Church. hiſt. p.* 9. *bigger* than to make *one Congregation for perſonal Communion with the Biſhop.* But Mr. *Baxter*'s great argument is, *from the meeting of the whole multitude with* Athanaſius *in the great Church at* Alexandria *to keep the Eaſter Solemnity*; whence he concludes, *that the Chriſtians in* Alexandria *were no more than that the main body of them could meet and hear in one Aſſembly.* Whereas all that *Athanaſius* ſaith, amounts Athanaſ. *Ap. p.* 682. to no more than this, *that the multitude was too great to meet in one of the leſſer Churches, and therefore a great clamour was raiſed among them that they might go into the New Church;* Athanaſius *preſſed them to bear with the inconveniency and diſperſe themſelves into the leſſer Churches; the People grew impatient, and ſo at laſt he yielded to them.* But what is there in all this to prove that *all the Chriſtians* in the *whole City* were then *preſent*, and that this *Church* would hold them all? If a great Aſſembly ſhould meet at one of the leſſer *Churches* in *London* upon ſome *Solemn Occaſion*, and finding themſelves too big for that place ſhould preſs the *Biſhop* to open St. *Paul*'s for that day before it were quite *finiſhed*, becauſe of the greater *capacity* of the *Church* for receiving ſuch a number, would this prove that Saint *Paul*'s held all the *Chriſtians* in *London*? *Athanaſius* ſaith not a word more, *than that it was Eaſter, and there appeared a great number of People, ſuch a one as Chriſtian Princes would wiſh in a Chriſtian City.* Doth he ſay, or intimate, that all the Chriſtians of the *City* were *preſent*? that none of them went to the *leſſer Churches*? or were abſent, though the Crou w as ſo great?

Doth he not ſay, *the multitudes were ſo great in the ſmaller Churches in the Lent Aſſemblies, that not a few were ſtifled and carried home for dead? And therefore it was neceſſary to conſider the multitude at ſuch a time.* In my mind Mr. *Baxter* might as well prove that the whole *Nation* of the *Jews* made but one *Congregation*; becauſe at the dedication of *Solomon*'s *Temple* there was ſo great *a multitude preſent*, that one of the leſſer *Synagogues* could not hold them. But the argument is of greater force in this reſpect, that *God* himſelf appointed but *one Temple* for the *whole Nation* of the *Jews:* And therefore he intended no more than a *ſingle Congregational Church.* But to ſerve this *Hypotheſis*, *Alexandria* it ſelf muſt be ſhrunk into a leſs compaſs; although *Dionyſius Alexandrinus*, who was *Biſhop* there, ſaith it was ἡ μεγίστη πόλις *a very great City*, and the *Geographer* publiſhed by *Gothofred* ſaith it was σφόδρα μεγίστη, *an exceeding great City*; *ſo great that it was* ἀσύλληπτος *paſs'd Men's comprehenſion:* And *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſaith it *was the top of all Cities.* And for the *number* of *Chriſtians* there long before the time of *Athanaſius*, *Dionyſius Alexandrinus* ſaith *in a time of great perſecution, when he was baniſhed, he kept up the Aſſemblies in the City; and at* Cephro *he had a large Church, partly of the Chriſtians of* Alexandria *which followed him, and partly from other places, and when he was removed thence to* Colluthion, *which was nearer the City, ſuch numbers of Chriſtians flocked out of the City to him, that they were forced to have diſtinct Congregations:* So the words κατὰ μέρος ſignifie, and ſo *Athanaſius* uſeth them, κατὰ μέρος καὶ διῃρημένως, for the *Chriſtians meeting in ſeveral Congregations.* If there were ſuch a number of *Chriſtians* at *Alexandria* ſo long before, under the *ſharpeſt perſecution*, is it poſſible to imagin, in ſo *great* a *City*, after *Chriſtianity* had ſo long been the *Religion* of the *Empire*, that the number of *Chriſtians* there ſhould be no greater than to make *one large Congregation?* There is no hopes of convincing Men, that can build *Theories* upon ſuch ſtrange Improbabilities. I ſhall only add one Inſtance more from *Antiquity*, which is plain enough of it ſelf to ſhew the great extent of *Dioceſan Power* then; and that is of *Theodoret*, a great and learned Biſhop; and although his *Biſhoprick* was none of the largeſt, yet in his *Epiſtle* to *Leo* he ſaith, *he had the Paſtoral charge of* 800 *Churches; for ſo many Pariſhes*, ſaith he, *are in my Dioceſs, which he had then enjoyed twenty ſix years.* Doth Mr. *B.* believe that all the *Chriſtians* in *theſe* 800 *Churches had perſonal Communion with* Theodoret? And yet theſe *Pariſhes* did not change their *ſpecies*, for he ſaith, *they were Churches ſtill.*

Euſeb. *l.* 7. c. 21.

Vetus Orbis deſcript. p. 18.

Amm. Marc. *l.* 22.

Euſeb. *l.* 7. c. 11.

Ath. *Apol. p.* 683.

Theodor. Ep. 113.

This Teſtimony of *Theodoret* is ſo full and peremptory, that Mr. *Baxter* hath no other way to avoid the force of it, but to call in queſtion the *Authority* of the *Epiſtle.* But without any conſiderable ground, unleſs it be that it contradicts his Hypotheſis. For, *what if* Theodoret*'s Epiſtles came out of the* Vatican *Copy?* Is that a ſufficient argument to reject them, unleſs ſome inconſiſtency be proved in thoſe Epiſtles, with the Hiſtory of thoſe times, or with his other Writings? Which are the *Rules*, *Rivet* gives for judging the ſincerity of them. *That Epiſtle which* Bellarmin *and others reject as ſpurious*, is contradicted by other Epiſtles of his ſtill extant; which ſhew a full reconciliation between *Cyril* of *Alexandria* and him before his death. And it is ſuppoſed, that *John* of *Antioch* was dead ſome conſiderable time before *Cyril*; which manifeſtly overthrows the Authority of it. But

Treatiſe of Epiſcopacy, p. 67.

Critic. Sacr. l. 4. *c.* 21.

what is there like that in this *Epiſtle* to *Leo*, when the matter of fact is proved by other *Epiſtles?* As to the unreaſonable proceedings of *Dioſcorus* againſt him, (which was the occaſion of writing it) his other Epiſtles are ſo full of it, that Mr. *B.* never read the reſt, if he calls this into queſtion upon that account. That *Hypatius*, *Abramius* and *Alypius* were ſent into the *Weſt* upon *Theodoret*'s account; appears by the Epiſtles to *Renatus* and *Florentius*, which follow that to *Leo*. *What if ſeveral Epiſtles of his are loſt, which* Nicephorus *ſaw*, doth that prove all that are remaining to be counterfeit? But he is much miſtaken, if he thinks *there was no other Copy but the* Vatican *tranſlated by* Metius; for *Sirmondus* tells us he met with another Copy at *Naples*, which he compared with the *Vatican*, and publiſhed the various Readings of the *Epiſtles* from it. *What if* Leontius *ſaith that Hereticks feigned Epiſtles in* Theodoret*'s name?* Doth that prove an *Epiſtle* wherein he vindicates himſelf from the *imputation* of *Hereſie*, to be ſpurious? What Mr. *B.* means *by the printing this Epiſtle alone after* Theodoret*'s Works*, I do not well underſtand, unleſs he never ſaw any other than the *Latin Edition* of *Theodoret*. But it is a very bold thing to pronounce concerning the *Authority* of a Man's Writings, without ſo much as looking into the lateſt and beſt Editions of them. But there are two things he objects which ſeem more material. (1.) *That it ſeems incredible that a Town within two days journey of* Antioch *ſhould have* 800 *Churches in it at that time.* (2.) *That he proves from other places in* Theodoret, *that it is very improbable that Dioceſes then had ſo many Churches.*

Theod. *Ep.* 116. *Ep.* 117.

Sirmond. *Præf. ad* Theod. *Opera.*

1. As to the firſt, certainly no man in his wits ever undertook to prove, *that one ſuch City* as *Cyrus* then was, *had* 800 *Churches in it.* But by *Cyrus*, *Theodoret* means the *Dioceſe* of *Cyrus*; as will afterwards appear. If *Cyrus* were taken for the *Regio Cyrrheſtica*, with the bounds given it by *Ptolemy*, *Strabo*, and *Pliny*, then there would not appear the leaſt improbability in it, ſince many conſiderable *Cities* were within it, as *Beræa*, (now *Aleppo*) and *Hierapolis*, and extended as far as *Euphrates*; *Zeugma* being comprehended under it. The Eccleſiaſtical Province was likewiſe very large, and by the ancient *Notitiæ* it is ſometimes called *Euphratenſis*, which in *Ammianus* his time took in *Comagena*, and extended to *Samoſata*, (but the *Regio Cyrrheſtica* before was diſtinct from *Comagena*, as appears by *Strabo*, and others) in that Province there was a Metropolitan, who was called the Metropolitan of *Hagiopolis*, which by the ſame *Notitiæ* appears to have been then one of the names of *Cyrus*, or *Cyrrhus*. But notwithſtanding, I do not think the words of *Theodoret* are to be underſtood of the *Province*, but of his own peculiar *Dioceſe*; for *Theodoret* mentions the *Metropolitan* he was under. By *Cyrus* therefore we underſtand the *Region* about the *City*, which was under *Theodoret*'s care; within which he was confined by the Emperour's Order, as he complains in ſeveral Epiſtles, and there it is called by him, ἡ Κυῤῥεστῶν χώρα, *Regio Cyrrheſtica*; and *Theodoret* himſelf ſets down the extent of it in his *Epiſtle* to *Conſtantius*, where he ſaith, *it was forty miles in length, and forty in breadth.* And he ſaith in another *Epiſtle*, *that Chriſtianity was ſo much ſpread among them, that not only the Cities, but the Villages, the Fields, and utmoſt bounds were filled with Divine Grace.* And that theſe Villages had *Churches* and *Prieſts* ſettled in them, under the care of the *Biſhop*, appears expreſly from a paſſage in the *Life* of *Symeon*, where he ſpeaks of *Baſſus viſiting* the *Parochial Churches*; Ὃς τηνικαῦτα πολλὰς περιώδευσε κώμας τοῖς κατὰ κώμην ἱερεῦσιν ἐπιστατῶν·

Ptolem. *l.* 5. *c.* 15. Strab. *l.* 16. Plin. *l.* 5. *c.* 24.

Amm. Marcel. *l.* 14.

Notitiæ *Antiq. Append. ad* Car. *à* S. Paulo, *p.* 59.

Theodor. *Ep.* 16.

Theodor. *Ep.* 79, 81.

Ep. 42.

Ep. 72.

Religioſ. Hiſt. Vit. Symeon. *p.* 879.

If there were then *Parochial Churches* ſetled with *Preſbyters* in them, and theſe under the care of the *Dioceſan Biſhop*, then Mr. *B.*'s *Hypotheſis* is utterly overthrown. In his Epiſtle to *Nomus*, he mentions *eight Villages in his Dioceſe that were over-run with the Hereſie of* Marcion, *another with the* Eunomian, *another with the* Arian *Hereſie, which were all converted by his care:* *Ep.* 81. and in another place he ſaith, *he had brought ten thouſand* Marcioniſts *to Baptiſm.* *Ep.* 145. In another he mentions the *ſpreading of* Marcion'*s Doctrine in his Dioceſe, and the great pains he took to root it out; and the ſucceſs he had therein.* *Vita* Jacobi *jun. p.* 860, 861, &c. 868, 869, 876, 877, 878, 879. And we find the names of many of the *Villages* in his *Lives*, as *Tillima*, *Targala*, *Nimuza*, *Teleda*, *Telaniſſus*, which are ſufficient to ſhew that *Theodoret* had properly a *Dioceſan Church*, and that his Epiſcopal Care and Authority did extend to many *Parochial Churches*; his *Dioceſe being forty miles in length, and as many in breadth.* So that Mr. *B.* muſt reject, not only that *Epiſtle* to *Leo*, but the reſt too, and his other Works, if he hopes to make good his *Parochial Epiſcopacy*; which is too hard a Task to be undertaken, without better evidence than he hath hitherto brought.

2. But he offers to produce *other Teſtimonies out of* Theodoret, *to ſhew the improbability that Dioceſes had ſo many Churches.* The queſtion is not about the bare *number* of *Churches* in *Dioceſes*, which all men know to have been very different; but about the *extent* of *Epiſcopal Power*, whether it were limited to *one Parochial Church*, or was extended over many, And what is there in *Theodoret* which contradicts this? I extremely failed of my expectation, as to the other places of *Theodoret*, which he promiſed to produce; for I find five or ſix places cited out of his *Hiſtory*, but not one that comes near any proof of this matter. *Treatiſe of Epiſcopacy, part* 2. *p.* 49, 50. The (1.) proves, *that in a time of Perſecution at* Alexandria, *nineteen Preſbyters and Deacons were baniſhed to* Heliopolis *in* Phœnicia, *where there were no Chriſtians.* Theod. *Hiſt. l.* 4. c. 19. Therefore in *Theodoret*'s time there was no *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy*. The (2.) ſhews, *that in a ſmall City of* Thebais, *whither* Eulogius *and* Protogenes *were baniſhed, and there were but a few Chriſtians, yet there was a Biſhop.* *l.* 4. *c.* 15. Who ever denied this, where there was a proſpect of converting more, as appears by the endeavours of *Eulogius* and *Protogenes* there? But he ought to have proved that as the *Chriſtians increaſed, new Biſhops* were made, which this is very far from. The (3.) proves *that* Lucius *of* Alexandria *was made Biſhop by force, without any Synod of Biſhops, or choice of the Clergy, or requeſt of the People.* *l.* 4. *c.* 19. I ſuppoſe by this time, Mr. *B.* had forgotten what he promiſed to prove from *Theodoret*. But I wonder how it came into his mind to ſay *the Church of* Alexandria *at that time was like a Preſbyterian Church:* which I am ſure he had not from *Theodoret*, nor from the *Epiſtle* of *Peter* of *Alexandria.* The (4.) is intended to prove, *that in the time of* Valens, *the Patriarchal Orthodox Church of* Alexandria *was but one Aſſembly, which met only in one place at once.* *l.* 4. *c.* 21. But it is very unhappy, that *Theodoret* ſhews juſt the contrary in that place, for he ſaith, *that* Valens *expelled the orthodox Chriſtians out of their Churches*, Τῶν ἱερῶν ἐξήλασεν οἴκων, are his very words: *to whom*, he ſaith, *Jovianus had likewiſe given the new built Church.* Which Mr. *B.* thus tranſlates, *Valens found the Orthodox, even in the great Patriarchal City of* Antioch *in poſſeſſion but of one Church, which good* Jovinian *the Emperour had given them, of which he diſpoſſeſſed them.* I deſire any one who relies on Mr. *B.*'s ſkill and fidelity in theſe matters, but to compare this *Tranſlation* with the *Text* in *Theodoret*, and I dare ſay he will ſee

cauſe to admire it. But if any one can imagine that the *Patriarchal Church* of *Antioch* in the time of *Valens* could conſiſt but of *one Congregation*, for my part, I muſt give him over, as one uncapable of being convinced of any thing by me. I do not ſpeak what the *Church* in a time of great perſecution might be driven to, but of what it was in *l. 4. c. 29.* its *ſetled ſtate*. The (5.) is, *from* Terentius *his begging one Church for the Orthodox, of* Valens; which ſaith Mr. *B. intimates their numbers.* I am aſhamed to read, much more to confute ſuch arguments as theſe. For if the *Papiſts* ſhould deſire the *liberty* but of *one Church* in *London*, doth that prove they are no more than can make *one Congregation?* *l. 5. c. 4.* The (6.) proves *that* Maris *was made Biſhop of* Dolicha, *a ſmall Town infected with* Arianiſm. It is true, *Theodoret* ſaith, *Doliche was a little City*, and ſo he tells us, *Cyrus was no great one*; but he doth not ſet down the *bounds* of the *Dioceſe*; which for any thing we ſee in *Theodoret*, might be as large, as, we have evidently proved from him, the *Dioceſe of Cyrrhus* was. Let the Reader now judge, whether *Theodoret* doth not plainly overthrow Mr. *B.*'s notion of *Parochial Epiſcopacy*.

But Mr. *B.* inſiſts *upon the Inſtitution of Chriſt; and if Chriſt hath appointed one ſort of Churches*, viz. *for perſonal communion, and men make another, is not this a violation of Chriſt's command, and ſetting up Man againſt God?* I ſee no evidence produced for any ſuch *Inſtitution of Chriſt*, which limits *Epiſcopal Power* to a *ſingle Congregation*; and therefore the extending it to more, can be no *violation* of *Chriſt*'s *command*, or *ſetting up a new ſpecies of Churches*, as will appear from Mr. *B.* himſelf under the next particular. Yet Mr. *B.* according to his wonted meekneſs towards his *Adverſaries*, charges me, for ſpeaking againſt this *Anſwer to Serm. p. 73.* principle of his, with pleading for *preſumption, profanation, uſurpation, uncharitableneſs, ſchiſm*, and what not? What is the reaſon of all this *rage* and *bitterneſs?* Why, I ſet down a ſaying of his, as going beyond the *Independents* in making *the deviſing new ſpecies of Churches beyond Parochial or Congregational without God's Authority, and to impoſe them on the world, yea in his name, and call all Diſſenters Schiſmaticks, a far worſe uſurpation than to make or impoſe new Ceremonies or Liturgies. But is not all this true ſuppoſing that ſuch new ſpecies of Churches be ſo deviſed and ſo impoſed?* That is not to the buſineſs; for that which I quoted it for, was to ſhew that Mr. *B.* looked upon all *Churches beyond Parochial, as Churches merely of mens deviſing*; and that *to charge men with Schiſm for oppoſing any ſuch Conſtitution is unreaſonable*; and that *the impoſing it as Divine, is an intolerable uſurpation*; and all this at the ſame time, when he pretends to write for *Peace* and *Concord*. My buſineſs is now to ſhew

Sect. 11. 2. *That ſuch an Epiſcopacy as is practiſed here, and was ſo in the Primitive Church is no deviſing a new ſpecies of Churches, nor hath any thing repugnant to any Inſtitution of Chriſt.* And to prove this, I need no more than one of Mr. *B.*'s own *Cautions* in his *Premonition*, viz. that *he doth not diſpute the lawfulneſs of Archbiſhops*, as he calls them, *over Parochial Biſhops, as Succeſſors to the Apoſtolical and other general Overſeers of the firſt Age, in the ordinary continued parts of their Office.* *p. 263.* And what he ſaith in his own name and others in his *Plea for Peace: There are ſome of us, that much incline to think that Archbiſhops, that is, Biſhops that have overſight of many Churches with their Paſtors, are lawful Succeſſors of the Apoſtles in the ordinary part of their Work.* But *Chriſtian Directory. Eccleſ. Caſes Q. 66. p. 831.* I cannot here omit Mr. *Baxter*'s Arguments to prove, that the *ordinary governing part of the Apoſtolical Office, was ſetled for all following Ages.*

1. Becauſe we read of the ſetling of that form, but we never read of any abolition, diſcharge, or ceſſation of the Inſtitution. 2. Becauſe if we affirm a ceſſation without proof, we ſeem to accuſe God of mutability, as ſetling one form of Government for one Age only, and no longer. 3. We leave room for audacious Wits accordingly to queſtion other Goſpel Inſtitutions, as Paſtors, Sacraments, &c. *and to ſay, they were but for an Age. 4. It was general Officers Chriſt promiſed to be with to the end of the world,* Mat. 28. 20. Which being joined with the *Conſent* of the *Chriſtian Church of the Ages ſucceeding the Apoſtles*, that the *Apoſtles* did leave *Succeſſours* in the *care* and *government* of *Churches*, have a great deal of weight in them, and over-ballance the *difficulties* on the other ſide. As upon this occaſion I think fit to declare. From whence I argue thus, That which is only a *continuance* of the *ſame kind of Churches* which were in being in the *Apoſtolical time*, is *no deviſing a new ſpecies of Churches*, nor hath any thing *repugnant to any Inſtitution of Chriſt*. But that is the caſe as to our *Epiſcopacy*. We intend no quarrel about names: If it be Mr. *B.*'s pleaſure to call our *Biſhops Archbiſhops*, let him enjoy his own fancy. It already appears from Saint *Cyprian*, and might much more be made plain from many others if it were needful, that the *Biſhops* of the *ſeveral Churches* were looked on as *Succeſſors* to the *Apoſtles* in the *care* and *government* of *Churches*. Now the *Office* of Mr. *B.*'s *Parochial Biſhops* was only to attend to *one particular Congregation*; but the *Apoſtolical Office* was above this, while the *Apoſtles* held it in their own hands; and did not make a *new ſpecies* of *Churches*, nor overthrow the *Conſtitution* of *Parochial Churches*. It ſeems then a ſtrange thing to me, that the continuance of the ſame kind of *Office* in the *Church*, ſhould be called the *deviſing a new ſpecies of Churches*.

But Mr. *B.* runs upon this perpetual miſtake, that our *Engliſh Epiſcopacy* is not a *ſucceſſion* to the *Ordinary part* of the *Apoſtolical Power* in *governing Churches*; but a *new ſort of Epiſcopacy*, not heard of in the *ancient Church*, which ſwallows up the *whole Power* of *Preſbyters*, and leaves them only a bare name of *Curates*, and deſtroys the *being* of *Parochial Churches*. But if I can make the contrary to appear from the *Frame* and *Conſtitution* of this *Church*, I hope Mr. *B.* will be reconciled to our *Epiſcopal Government*, and endeavour to remove the *prejudices* he hath cauſed in *Peoples* minds againſt it.

Sect. 12. Now to examine this, let us conſider two things. (1.) What *Power* is left to *Preſbyters* in our *Church*. (2.) What *Authority* the *Biſhops* of our *Church* have over them.

I. What *Power* is left to *Preſbyters* in our *Church*: and that may be conſidered two ways. 1. With reſpect to the *whole Body* of this *Church*. 2. With reſpect to their particular *Congregations* or *Cures*.

1. With reſpect to the *whole Body* of this *Church*: and ſo, (1.) There are no *Rules of Diſcpline*, no *Articles of Doctrine*, no *Form of Divine Service*, are to be allowed or received in this *Nation*; but, by the *Conſtitution* of this *Church*, the *Preſbyters* of it have their *Votes* in paſſing them, either in *Perſon*, or by *Proxy*. For, all things of that *Nature*, are to paſs both *Houſes* of *Convocation*; and the *lower Houſe* conſiſts wholly of *Preſbyters*, who repreſent the whole *Preſbytery* of the *Nation*, either appearing by their *own Right*, as many do, or as *being choſen by the reſt*, from whom *by Indentures* they either do, or ought to receive *Power* to tranſact things in their *names*. And the *cuſtom* of this *Church* hath ſometimes been, for the *Clergy* of the *Dioceſes* to give *limited*

Proxies in particular *Caſes* to their *Procurators*. Now I appeal to any man of underſtanding, whether the *Clergy* of this *Church* have their *whole Power* ſwallowed up by the *Biſhops*, when yet the *Biſhops* have no power to oblige them to any *Rules* or *Canons* but by their *own conſent*, and they do freely vote in all things of *common concernment* to the *Church*, and therefore the *Preſbyters* are not by the *Conſtitution* deprived of their *ſhare* in one of the greateſt *Rights* of *Government*, viz. in making *Rules* for the *whole Body*. And in this main part of *Government* the *Biſhops* do nothing without the *counſel* of their *Preſbyters*, and in this reſpect our *Church* falls behind none of the *ancient Churches*, which had their *Councils* of *Preſbyters* together with their *Biſhops*; only, there they were taken *ſingly* in *every City*, and here they are combined together in *Provincial Synods*; model'd according to the *Laws* of the *Nation*. And when the *whole Body* of *Doctrine*, *Diſcipline*, and *Worſhip* are thus agreed upon by a general conſent, there ſeems to be far leſs need of the particular *Councils* of *Preſbyters* to every *Biſhop*, ſince both *Biſhops* and *Preſbyters* are now under *fixed Rules*, and are accountable for the breach of them. (2.) *In giving Orders*; by the *Rules* of this *Church four Preſbyters* are *to aſſiſt the Biſhop*, and to *examine the Perſons to be ordained*, (or the *Biſhop* in their preſence) and afterwards *to join in the laying on of hands upon the Perſons ordained*. And is all this nothing but to be the *Biſhop's Curates*, and to officiate in ſome of his *Chapels*?

Can. 31, & 35.

2. As to their *particular charges*, one would think thoſe who make this objection, had never read over the *Office* of *Ordination*, for therein, (1.) For the *Epiſtle* is read the Charge given by Saint *Paul* to the *Elders* at *Miletus*, Acts 20. or the *third Chapter* of the *firſt Epiſtle* to *Timothy*; concerning the *Office* of a *Biſhop*. What a great impertinency had both theſe been, if the *Preſbyter*'s *Power* had been quite ſwallowed up by the *Biſhop*'s? But it hence appears, that our *Church* looked on the *Elders* at *Epheſus*, and the *Biſhop* in *Timothy* to be *Preſbyters*, as yet under the care and government of the *Apoſtles*, or ſuch as they deputed for that Office, ſuch as *Timothy* and *Titus* were. Which I ſuppoſe is the true meaning of Saint *Jerome*, and many other doubtful Paſſages of Antiquity, which relate to the *community* of the *names* of *Biſhop* and *Preſbyter*, while the *Apoſtles* governed the Church themſelves. And at this time *Timothy* being appointed to this part of the *Apoſtolical Office* of *Government*, the *Biſhops* mentioned in the *Epiſtle* to him, may well enough be the ſame with the *Preſbyters* in the *Epiſtle* to *Titus*, who was *appointed to ordain Elders in every City*, Titus 1. 5. (2.) In the *Biſhop*'s *Exhortation* to them that are to be ordained, he ſaith, *Now we exhort you in the name of the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, to have in remembrance into how high a dignity, and to how chargeable an Office ye be called, that is to ſay, the Meſſengers and Watchmen, the Paſtors and Stewards of the Lord, to teach, to premoniſh, to feed and provide for the Lord's Family*, &c. *have always therefore printed in your remembrance, how great a treaſure is committed to your charge; for they be the Sheep of Chriſt, which he bought with his death, and for whom he ſhed his Blood. The Church and Congregation whom you muſt ſerve is his Spouſe and Body. And if it ſhall chance the ſame Church, or any Member thereof, to take any hurt or hindrance, by reaſon of your negligence, you know the greatneſs of the fault, and of the horrible puniſhment which will enſue*, &c. Is this the language of a *Church* which deprives *Preſbyters* of the *due care of their flocks*, and makes *Parochial Congregations* to be *no Churches*? (3.) The perſon to be ordained doth

ſolemnly promiſe *to give faithful diligence to miniſter the Doctrine and Sacraments, and the Diſcipline of Chriſt, as the Lord hath commanded, and as this Realm hath received the ſame, according to the Commandments of God, ſo that he may teach the People committed to his Cure and Charge, with all diligence to keep and obſerve the ſame.* Here we ſee a *Cure* and *Charge* committed to the *Preſbyters*; *Preaching* and *Adminiſtration* of *Sacraments* required of them, and the *exerciſe of Diſcipline*, as far as belongs to them, (of which afterwards) but now in the *Conſecration* of a *Biſhop*, this part is left out, and inſtead of that it is ſaid, *That he is called to the Government of the Church; and he is required to correct and puniſh ſuch as be unquiet, diſobedient and criminous in his Dioceſe.* So that the more particular *charge* of *Souls* is committed to every *Paſtor* over his own Flock, and the general care of *Government* and *Diſcipline* is committed to the *Biſhop*, as that which eſpecially belongs to his *Office*, as diſtinct from the other.

p. 442.

Principal Government of Christ's Church. l. 3. 117. 224.

Sect. 13. II. Which is the next thing to be conſidered, *viz. What Authority the Biſhop hath, by virtue of his Conſecration, in this Church?* And that, I ſay, is what Mr. *B.* calls the *ordinary parts of the Apoſtolical Authority*; which lies in three things, *Government*, *Ordination* and *Cenſures*. And that our *Church* did believe our *Biſhops* to ſucceed the *Apoſtles* in thoſe parts of their *Office*, I ſhall make appear by theſe things. (1.) In the *Preface* before the *Book* of *Ordination*, it is ſaid, *That it is evident unto all men, diligently reading Holy Scripture, and ancient Authors, that from the Apoſtles time, there have been theſe Orders of Miniſters in Chriſt's Church, Biſhops, Prieſts and Deacons.* What is the reaſon that they expreſs it thus, *from the Apoſtles time*, rather than *in the Apoſtles times*, but that they believed, while the *Apoſtles* lived, they managed the affairs of Government themſelves; but as they withdrew, they did in ſome Churches ſooner, and in ſome later, as their own *continuance*, the *condition* of the *Churches*, and the *qualification* of *Perſons* were, commit the Care and Government of *Churches* to ſuch *Perſons* whom they appointed thereto? Of which, we have an uncontrolable evidence in the Inſtances of *Timothy* and *Titus*; for the care of *Government* was a diſtinct thing from the *Office* of an *Evangeliſt*, and all their removes do not invalidate this, becauſe while the *Apoſtles* lived, it is probable there were no fixed *Biſhops*, or but few. But as they went off, ſo they came to be ſettled in their ſeveral *Churches*. And as this is moſt agreeable to the ſenſe of our *Church*, ſo it is the faireſt *Hypotheſis* for reconciling the different *Teſtimonies* of *Antiquity*. For hereby the ſucceſſion of *Biſhops* is ſecured from the *Apoſtles* times, for which the Teſtimonies of *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, Saint *Cyprian*, and others, are ſo plain; hereby room is left to make good all that Saint *Jerome* hath ſaid; and what *Epiphanius* delivers concerning the differing *ſettlements* of *Churches* at firſt. So that we may allow for the *community* of names, between *Biſhop* and *Preſbyter*, for a while in the *Church*, i. e. while the *Apoſtles* governed the *Churches* themſelves; but afterwards, that which was then part of the *Apoſtolical Office*, became the *Epiſcopal*, which hath continued from that time to this, by a conſtant ſucceſſion in the *Church*.

ch. 13. p. 441.

(2.) *Archbiſhop Whitgift* ſeveral times declares, *that theſe parts of the Apoſtolical Office ſtill remained in the Biſhops of our Church. As for this part of the Apoſtles function*, ſaith he, *to viſit ſuch Churches as were before planted, and to provide that ſuch were placed in them, as were vertuous and godly Paſtors, I know it remaineth ſtill, and is one of the chief parts of the Biſhops function.* And again, *There is now no planting of Churches*,

Defence of the Anſwer to the Adm. p. 218.

p. 484.

Churches, nor going through the whole world, there is no writing of new Goſpels, no propheſying of things to come, but there is governing of Churches, viſiting of them, reforming of Paſtors, and directing of them, which is a portion of the Apoſtolical function. Again, *Although that this part of the Apoſtolical Office which did conſiſt in planting and founding of Churches through the whole world is ceaſed, yet the manner of Government by placing Biſhops in every City, by moderating and governing them, by viſiting the Churches, by cutting off Schiſms and contentions, by ordering Miniſters, remaineth ſtill, aud ſhall continue, and is in this Church in the Archbiſhops and Biſhops, as moſt meet men to execute the ſame. Biſhop Bilſon* fully agrees, as to theſe particulars. (1.) *That the Apoſtles did not at firſt commit the Churches to the government of Biſhops, but reſerved the chief power of Government in their own hands.* (2.) *That upon experience of the confuſion and diſorder which did ariſe through equality of Paſtors, did appoint at their departure certain approved men to be Biſhops.* (3.) *That theſe Biſhops did ſucceed the Apoſtles in the Care and Government of Churches,* as he proves at large, and therefore he calls *their function Apoſtolick.* Inſtead of many others, which it were eaſie to produce, I ſhall only add the *Teſtimony* of King *Charles* I. in his *Debates* about *Epiſcopacy*, who underſtood the *Conſtitution* of our *Church* as well as any *Biſhop* in it, and defended it with as clear and as ſtrong a Reaſon. In his *third Paper* to *Henderſon*, he hath theſe words, *Where you find a Biſhop and Preſbyter in Scripture to be one and the ſame, (which I deny to be always ſo) it is in the Apoſtles times; now I think to prove the Order of Biſhops ſucceeded that of the Apoſtles, and that the name was chiefly altered in reverence to thoſe who were immediately choſen by our Savionr.* In his *firſt Paper* at the *Treaty* at *Newport*, he thus ſtates the caſe about *Epiſcopal Government. I conceive that Epiſcopal Government is moſt conſonant to the word of God, and of an Apoſtolical Inſtitution, as it appears by the Scriptures to have been practiſed by the Apoſtles themſelves, and by them committed and derived to particular Perſons as their ſubſtitutes or ſucceſſors therein, (as for ordaining Preſbyters and Deacons, giving Rules concerning Chriſtian Diſcipline, and exerciſing Cenſures over Preſbyters and others) and hath ever ſince to theſe laſt times been exerciſed by Biſhops in all the Churches of Chriſt, and therefore I cannot in conſcience conſent to aboliſh the ſaid Government.* In his *Reply* to the *firſt Anſwer* of the *Divines*, he ſaith, *that mere Preſbyters are* Epiſcopi Gregis *only, they have the overſight of the Flock in the duties of Preaching, Adminiſtration of Sacraments, publick Prayer, Exhorting, Rebuking,* &c, *but Biſhops are* Epiſcopi Gregis & Paſtorum *too, having the overſight of Flock and Paſtors within their ſeveral Precincts in the Acts of external Government. And that, although the Apoſtles had no Succeſſors* in eundem gradum *as to thoſe things that were extraordinary in them, as namely the meaſure of their Gifts, the extent of their charge, the infallibility of their Doctrine, and the having ſeen Chriſt in the fleſh; but in thoſe things that were not extraordinary, (and ſuch thoſe things are to be judged which are neceſſary for the ſervice of the Church in all times, as the Office of Teaching and the Power of governing are) they were to have and had Succeſſors; and therefore the learned and godly Fathers and Councils of old times, did uſually ſtile Biſhops the Succeſſors of the Apoſtles without ever ſcrupling thereat.* Many other Paſſages might be produced out of thoſe *excellent Papers* to the ſame purpoſe, but theſe are ſufficient to diſcover that our *Biſhops* are looked on as *Succeſſors* to the *Apoſtles*, and therefore Mr. *Baxter*

p. 427.

Perpetual Government of Chriſt's Church, ch. 12. *p.* 224

ch. 13. *p.* 244.

hath no reaſon to call our *Epiſcopacy a new deviſed ſpecies of Churches*, and ſuch as deſtroys the *being of Parochial Churches.*

Sect. 14. 3. It now remains, that we conſider whether the *reſtraint* of *Diſcipline* in our *Parochial Churches* doth overthrow their *Conſtitution?* To make this clear, we muſt underſtand that the *Diſcipline* of the *Church* either reſpects the *admiſſion* of *Church-members* to the *Holy Communion*; or the *caſting of them out* for *Scandal* afterwards.

1. As to that part of *Diſcipline* which reſpects the *admiſſion* of *Church-members.* The *Rubrick* after *Confirmation* ſaith, *That none ſhall be admitted to the holy Communion, until ſuch time as he be confirmed, or be ready and deſirous to be confirmed.* Now to capacitate a perſon for *Confirmation*, it is neceſſary that he be able to give an account of the neceſſary points of the *Chriſtian Faith* and *Practice*, as they are contained in the *Creed*, the *Lord's-Prayer*, the *Ten Commandments* and the *Church Catechiſm*; and of his ſufficiency herein the *Parochial Miniſter* is the *Judge.* For he is *either to bring or ſend in writing, with his hand ſubſcribed thereunto, the names of all ſuch perſons within his Pariſh, as he ſhall think fit to be preſented to the Biſhop to be confirmed.* Now, if this were ſtrictly obſerved (and the *Church* is not reſponſible for mens neglect) were it not ſufficient for the ſatisfaction of men as to the *admiſſion* of *Church-members* to the *Lord's Supper?* And I do not ſee, but the *Objections* made againſt the *Diſcipline* of this *Church* might be removed, if the things allowed and required by the *Rules* of it, were duly practiſed; and might attain to as great *purity*, as is ever pretended to by the *Separate Congregations*, who now find ſo much fault for our *want* of *Diſcipline.* For, even the *Churches* of *New-England* do grant, *that the Infant ſeed of Confederate viſible Believers are members of the ſame Church with their Parents, and when grown up are perſonally under the Watch, Diſcipline and Government of that Church. And, that Infants baptized have a right to farther privileges, if they appear qualified for them.* And the main of theſe *qualifications* are, *underſtanding the Doctrine of Faith, and publickly profeſſing their aſſent thereto, not ſcandalous in life, and ſolemnly owning the Covenant before the Church.* Taking this for the *Baptiſmal Covenant*, and not *their Church Covenant*, our *Church* owns the ſame thing, only it is to be done *before the Biſhop* inſtead of their *Congregation.* But the *Miniſter* is to be *judge* of the *qualifications*, which Mr. *Baxter* himſelf allows in this caſe. Who grants *the Profeſſion of Faith to be a Condition of Right before the Church*; and then adds, *that ſuch profeſſion is to be tried, judged and approved by the Paſtors of the Church to whoſe Office it belongs; becauſe to Miniſters as ſuch the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven are committed; and they are Stewards of God's Houſe*, &c. which he there proves at large by many Arguments. But *he complains of the old careleſs practice of this excellent duty of Confirmation.* This is a thing indeed to be lamented, that it is too haſtily and curſorily performed: but let the fault then be laid, where it ought to be laid; not upon the *Church*, whoſe *Rules* are very good, but upon thoſe *perſons* in it who ſlubber over ſo important a *Duty.* But is it not more becoming *Chriſtians* in a peaceable and orderly manner to endeavour to retrieve ſo excellent a means for the *Reformation* of our *Parochial Churches*; than peeviſhly to complain of the *want* of *Diſcipline*, and to reject *Communion* with our *Church* on that account? And I ſhall deſire Mr. *Baxter* to conſider his own words, *That the practice of ſo much Diſcipline, as we are agreed in, is a likelier way to bring us to agreement in the reſt, than all our diſputings will do without it.*

Synod of New-England *concerning the Subject of Baptiſm*, &c 1662.

Baxter *of Confirmation*, p. 20. p. 49, 52.

p. 155.

p. 172.

Yea, Mr. *Baxter* grants, *That the Preſbyters of our Church have by the Rubrick the Trial and Approbation of thoſe, that are ſent to the Biſhop for Confirmation; and that the Doctrine and Practice of the Church of* England, *is for the Power of Preſbyters herein as far as they could deſire.* This is a very fair confeſſion, and ſufficient to make it appear that our *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy* doth not overthrow the *Power* of *Preſbyters,* as to this part of *Diſcipline* which concerns *admiſſion* of *Church-members* to the *Communion.*

p. 262.

Sect. 15. 2. As to that part of *Church Diſcipline* which reſpects the rejecting thoſe for *Scandal,* who have been Church-members. In caſe of *open* and *publick Scandal,* our Church doth allow if not require *the Parochial Miniſter to call and advertiſe ſuch a one that is guilty of it in any wiſe not to come to the Lord's Table, until he hath openly declared himſelf to have truly repented and amended his former naughty life, that the Congregation may thereby be ſatisfied, which before was offended. And in caſe the offender continue obſtinate, he may repel him from the Communion; but ſo, that after ſuch repelling, he give an account to the Ordinary within* 14 *days; and the Ordinary is then to proceed according to the Canon.* Here is plainly a *Power* granted to put back any *Scandalous Offender* from the *Sacrament,* whoſe faults are ſo notorious as to give *offence* to the *Congregation;* but it is not an *abſolute* and *unaccountable Power,* but the *Miniſter* is obliged to give account thereof within a limited time to the *Ordinary.* Now wherein is it that our *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy* deſtroys the *being* of *Parochial Churches* for want of the *Power* of *Diſcipline?* Is it that they have not *Power* to exclude men, whether their faults be *Scandalous* to the *Congregation* or not? Or is it, that they are bound to juſtifie what they do, and to proſecute the Perſon for thoſe faults for which they put him back from the *Communion?* Or is it, that they have not *Power* to proceed to the *greater Excommunication,* that being reſerved to the *Biſhop,* upon full hearing of all parties concerned? But as long as by the *Conſtitution* of our *Church* every Miniſter in his Pariſh hath power to keep back *notorious Offenders,* it will be impoſſible to prove from other circumſtances that the being of our *Churches* is deſtroyed by our *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy.* Mr. *B.* ſaith, *that if it could be proved, that the leſſer excommunication out of our particular Congregations were allowed to the Pariſh Miniſters, it would half reconcile him to the Engliſh ſort of Prelacy; but if it be ſo, he hath been in a ſleep theſe* 50 *years, that could never hear or read of any ſuch thing.* It is ſtrange, in all this time, he ſhould never read or conſider the 26 Canon, which ſaith, *that no Miniſter ſhall in any wiſe admit any one of his Flock, or under his care to the Communion of the Lord's Supper, who is notoriouſly known to live impenitently in any ſcandalous Sin.* This is not in the *Reformatio Legum Eccleſiaſticarum,* which he mentions *as an abortive thing, publiſhed by John Fox,* (which laſt any one that hath ſeen them, knows to be a miſtake) not *in* Dr. *Mocket's Book which was burnt;* yet not ſo deſtroyed, but with ſome diligence he might have ſeen it (but it was *for nothing of this kind,* that *Book* underwent ſo ſevere a cenſure; as Mr. *B.* inſinuates; but for ſeeming to incroach too much on the *King's Prerogative.*) But I appeal to what Mr. *B.* calls *the Authorized Church Canons;* which I think are plain in this caſe. But Mr. *B.* ſaith, *this is not the leſſer excommunication, but a temporary ſuſpenſion of the Miniſter's own Act in delivering the Sacrament to ſuch perſons.* Let Mr. *B.* call it by what name he pleaſeth; this is certain, the *Miniſter* is impowered, is required to do this; the

Rubrick before Communion.

Defence of the Plea. p. 58.

queſtion then is, whether this be not ſuch a *Cenſure* of the *Church*, as to ſuſpend *notorious Offenders* from the *Sacrament*; and that within the *Power* of the *Parochial Miniſter*? I grant, this is not *the leſſer excommunication*, according to the *Uſe* of this *Church*, for that ſuppoſeth the *ſentence* paſſed; and is ſo called by way of diſtinction from the *greater* pronounced by the *Biſhop* in Perſon, upon extraordinary occaſions. But yet it is a *Church-cenſure* upon *Offenders*, and was accounted a ſort of *excommunication* by the *Ancient Church*; for thoſe who were in the *ſtate* of *Penitents* were then ſaid to be under a kind of *excommunication*; as appears by ſeveral paſſages in St. *Auguſtin*, produced by *Spalatenſis* to this purpoſe, *viz.* to prove that there was a *penitential excommunication*. But Mr. *B.* quotes *Albaſpinæus* to ſhew *that the old Excommunication did ſhut perſons out from all other Church-communion as well as the Sacrament.* Which is very true of the *greater Excommunication*; but beſides this there were other *Cenſures* of the *Church* upon *Offenders*, whereby they were *ſuſpended* from *full Communion*; but not debarred the *hopes* of it upon *ſatisfaction* given. Theſe were ſaid to be in the *ſtate* of *Penitents*. It was a favour to the *excommunicated* to be brought into this *ſtate*; and others were never allowed to *hope* to be *reſtored* to *Communion*; others only on their *death-beds*; others according to the *nature* and *degrees* of their *Repentance*; of which thoſe were left to be *Judges*, who were particularly intruſted with the *care* of the *Penitents*. *Albaſpinæus* grants that as long as men remained *Penitents they were actually deprived of the Privileges of Church-communion*; but he ſaith, *the Penitents were in a middle ſtate between the excommunicated and the faithful, being ſtill Candidates*, as he calls them; ſo that all that were *Penitents* were *ſuſpended* from *Communion*; but not *wholly caſt out of the Church*; becauſe the *Chriſtians* might as freely converſe with theſe, as with any, but they were not allowed to participate in the *Sacred Myſteries*. But there was no queſtion, whereever there was a *Power* to *ſuſpend* any *Perſons* from *Communion*, there was a *Power* of *Diſcipline*; becauſe the *Church's Diſcipline* did not conſiſt merely in the *power of Excommunication*; no more than a *Judge's* power lies only in condemning men to be hanged; but in ſo governing the *Members* of the *Church*, that *Scandalous perſons* may be kept from the greateſt *Acts* of *Communion*, and by *Admonition* and *Counſel* be brought to a due *preparation* for it. Since then our *Church* doth give *power* to *Parochial Miniſters* to *ſuſpend notorious Offenders* from the *Communion*, it is thereby evident, that it doth not deprive them of all the neceſſary and eſſential parts of *Church-diſcipline*. But ſaith Mr. *B. If a Miniſter doth publickly admoniſh another by name, not cenſured by the Ordinary, the Lawyers tell him he may have his action againſt him.* I anſwer, 1. What need this *publick Admonition by name*? Doth the *nature of Church-diſcipline* lie in that? Suppoſe a man be privately and effectually dealt with to withdraw himſelf, is not this ſufficient? I am ſure St. *Auguſtine* took this courſe with his *People* at *Hippo*, *he perſuaded them to examine their own Conſciences, and if they found themſelves guilty of ſuch Crimes as rendred them unfit for the holy Communion, he adviſed them to withdraw themſelves from it, till by Prayers and Faſting and Alms they had cleanſed their Conſciences, and then they might come to it.* Here is no *publick Admonition* by *name*; and in many caſes St. *Auguſtin* declares the *Church* may juſtly forbear the *exerciſe* of *Diſcipline* towards *Offenders*, and yet the *Church* be *a true Church*, and *Chriſtians* obliged to *communicate* with it; as appears by all his *diſputes* with the *Donatiſts*. 2. If a reſtraint be laid on *Miniſters by*

Epiſt. 108. *Poſt collat.* c. Donat. c. 20.

Spalat. *l.* 5. c. 9.

Albaſpin. *l.* 2. c. 4.

Defence of the Plea p. 65, 72.

De Tempore Serm. 252.

Law: The queſtion then comes to this, whether the obligation to admoniſh publickly an Offender, or to deny him the Sacrament, if he will come to it, be ſo great as to bear him out in the violation of a Law; made by publick Authority, with a deſign to preſerve our *Religion?* But my deſign is only to ſpeak to this caſe, ſo far as the *Church* is concerned in it.

Sect. 16. If it be ſaid, *that notwithſtanding this, the neglect and abuſe of Diſcipline among us are too great to be juſtified, and too notorious to be concealed*; I anſwer.

1. That is not our queſtion, but whether our *Parochial Churches* have loſt their being for want of the *Power* of *Diſcipline?* and whether the *Species* of our *Churches* be changed by *Dioceſan Epiſcopacy?* which we have ſhewed ſufficient Reaſon to deny. And what other *abuſes* have crept in, ought in an orderly way to be reformed, and no good Man will deny his aſſiſtance in it.

Of Confirmation, p. 174, &c.

2. It is far eaſier to *ſeparate*, or complain for *want of Diſcipline*, than to find out a *due way* to reſtore it. No Man hath more ſet out the almoſt inſuperable difficulties which attend it, than Mr. *Baxter* hath done; eſpecially in that, it will provoke and exaſperate thoſe moſt who ſtand in need of it; and be moſt likely to do good on thoſe who need it leaſt.

His Majeſty's final Anſwer to the Divines at Newport, *n.* 4.

3. The caſe of our *Churches* now, is very different from that of the *Churches* in the *Primitive times.* For, the great *Reaſon* of *Diſcipline* is not, that for want of it the *Conſciences* of *Fellow-communicants* would be *defiled* (for to aſſert that, were *Donatiſm*) but that the *honour* of a *Chriſtian Society* may be maintained. If then the *Chriſtian Magiſtrates* do take care to vindicate the *Church's honour* by *due puniſhment* of *Scandalous Offenders*, there will appear ſo much leſs neceſſity of reſtoring the *ſecurity* of the *ancient Diſcipline.* To which purpoſe theſe words of the *Royal Martyr* King *Charles* I. are very conſiderable. "But his *Majeſty* ſeeth no neceſſity that the *Biſhops* challenge to the *Power* of *Juriſdiction* ſhould be at all times as large as the *exerciſe* thereof at ſome times appeareth to have been; the *exerciſe* thereof being variable according to the various conditions of the *Church* in different times. And therefore his *Majeſty* doth not believe that the *Biſhops* under *Chriſtian Princes* do challenge ſuch an *amplitude* of *Juriſdiction* to belong unto them in reſpect of their *Epiſcopal Office* preciſely, as was exerciſed in the *Primitive times*, by *Biſhops* before the days of *Conſtantine.* The reaſon of the difference being evident, that in thoſe former times under *Pagan Princes*, the *Church* was a *diſtinct body* of it ſelf, divided from the *Commonwealth*, and ſo was to be governed by its own *Rules* and *Rulers*; the *Biſhops* therefore of thoſe times, though they had no outward coercive power over Mens Perſons or Eſtates, yet in as much as every Chriſtian Man when he became a Member of the Church, did *ipſo facto*, and by that his own voluntry Act put himſelf under their Government, they exerciſed a very large Power of Juriſdiction *in ſpiritualibus*, in making *Eccleſiaſtical Canons*, receiving accuſations, converting the accuſed, examining Witneſſes, judging of Crimes, excluding ſuch as they found guilty of *Scandalous offences* from the *Lord's Supper*, enjoyning Penances upon them, caſting them out of the Church, receiving them again upon their Repentance, *&c.* And all this they exerciſed as well over *Preſbyters* as others. But after that the *Church* under

“ *Chriſtian Princes* began to be incorporated into the *Commonwealth*,
“ whereupon there muſt of neceſſity follow a *complication* of the *Civil*
“ and *Eccleſiaſtical Power*, the *Juriſdiction* of *Biſhops* (in the outward
“ exerciſe of it) was ſubordinate unto, and limitable by the Supreme
“ Civil Power, and hath been, and is at this day, ſo acknowledged by
“ the Biſhops of this Realm.

4. The due exerciſe of *Diſcipline* is a work of ſo much *prudence* and *difficulty*, that the greateſt *Zealots* for it, have not thought it fit to be truſted in the hands of every *Parochial Miniſter* and his *particular Congregation*. *Calvin* declares, *that he never thought it convenient that every Miniſter ſhould have the power of Excommunication: Not only becauſe of the invidiouſneſs of the thing, and the danger of the example; but becauſe of the great Abuſes and Tyranny it may ſoon fall into, and becauſe it was contrary to the Apoſtolical Practice.* Calvin. Ep. 135. And to the ſame purpoſe, *Beza* delivers his judgment, who likewiſe gives this account of the *Diſcipline* of *Geneva*, *that the Parochial Miniſters and Elders proceed no farther than Admonition; but in caſe of Contumacy they certify the Preſbytery of the City which ſits at certain times and hears all Cauſes relating to Diſcipline, and as they judge fit either give admonition, or proceed to ſuſpenſion from the Lord's Supper; or, which is a rare caſe, and when no other remedy can prevail, they go on to publick Excommunication.* Bez. Ep. 20. Where we ſee, every *Parochial Church* is no more truſted with the *Power* of *Diſcipline* than among us; nay, the *Miniſter* here hath no power *to repel*, but all that he can do there is *to admoniſh*; and how come then their *Parochial Churches* to be *true*, and not ours? Beſides, why may not our *Miniſters* be obliged to *certify* the *Biſhop*, as well as theirs to *certify* the *Preſbytery?* ſince in the *African Churches* the matter of *Diſcipline* was ſo much reſerved to the *Biſhop*, that a *Preſbyter had no power to receive a Penitent into the Communion of the Church without the advice and direction of the Biſhop*; Codex Eccleſ. Afric. c. 6, 7, 9, 43. and Saint *Auguſtin* propoſed it, *that whoſoever received one that declined the judgment of his own Biſhop, ſhould undergo the ſame cenſure which that perſon deſerved; and it was allowed by the Council. Alipius*, Saint *Auguſtin*'s great Friend and Legat of the *Province* of *Numidia*, c. 10. *propoſed the caſe of a Preſbyter under the cenſure of his Biſhop, who out of pride and vain-glory ſets up a ſeparate Congregation in oppoſition to the Order of the Church; and he deſired to know the judgment of the Council* c. 11. *about it; and they unanimouſly determined that he was guilty of Schiſm, and ought to be anathematized, and to loſe his place.* And this was the *Judgment* even of the *African Biſhops*, for whom Mr. *Baxter* profeſſeth greater reverence than for any others; and ſaith, *their Councils were the beſt in the world*; and commends *their Canons for very good about Diſcipline*. But he pretends *that a Biſhop's Dioceſe there*, *was but like one of our Pariſhes*, which I have already refuted at large, by ſhewing that there were places at a conſiderable diſtance under the care of the *Biſhops*. So that the bringing the *full power* of *Diſcipline* into *every Parochial Church*, is contrary to the practice of *Antiquity*, as well as of the *Reformed Churches* abroad, which plead moſt for *Diſcipline*; and would unavoidably be the occaſion of great and ſcandalous diſorders, by the ill management of the *Power* of *Excommunication*; as was moſt evident by the *Separatiſts* when they took this *Sword* into their hands, and by their fooliſh and paſſionate, and indiſcreet uſe of it, brought more *diſhonour* upon their *Churches*, than if they had never

meddled with it at all. And in ſuch a matter, where the *honour* of the *Chriſtian Society* is the chief thing concerned, it becomes wiſe Men to conſider what tends moſt to the promoting of that; and whether the good, Men promiſe themſelves by *Diſcipline*, will countervail the *Schiſms* and *Contentions*, the heart-burnings, and animoſities which would follow the *Parochial exerciſe* of it. The diſſenting Brethen in their Apologetical Narration do ſay, p. 5. *That they had the fatal Miſcarriages and Shipwrecks of the Separation, as Land-marks to forewarn them of the Rocks and Shelves they ran upon*; and therefore they ſay p. 9. *they never exerciſed the Power of Excommunication.* For they ſaw plainly, they could never hold their *People* together if they did; ſince the *excommunicated Party* would be ſure to make Friends enough, at leaſt to make *breaches* among them; and they holding together by *mutual conſent*, ſuch *Ruptures* would ſoon break their *Churches* to pieces. Beſides, this would be thought no leſs than ſetting up an *Arbitrary Court of Judicature* in *every Pariſh*; becauſe there are no *certain Rules* to proceed by; no ſtanding determination what thoſe ſins and faults are, which ſhould deſerve *excommunication*; no method of trials agreed upon; no ſecurity againſt falſe Witneſſes; no limitation of Cauſes; no liberty of Appeals, (if *Parochial Churches* be the only *inſtituted Churches*, as Mr. *Baxter* affirms:) beſides multitudes of other inconveniencies, which may be eaſily foreſeen; ſo that I do not queſtion, but if Mr. *Baxter* had the management of this *Parochial Diſcipline* in any one *Pariſh* in *London*, and proceeded by his own *Rules*, his Court of *Diſcipline* would be cried out upon in a ſhort time, as more *arbitrary* and *tyrannical*, than any *Biſhop's Court* this day in *England:* Let any one therefore judge, how reaſonable it is for him to overthrow the *being* of our *Parochial Churches*, for *want* of that, which being ſet up according to his own *Principles*, would deſtroy the *Peace* and *Unity*, if not the very being, of any *Parochial Church* whatſoever.

5. That *want* of *Diſcipline*, which is in *Parochial Churches*, was never thought by the moſt zealous *Non-conformiſts* of old, deſtructive to the *Being* of them. Of which I have already produced the *Teſtimonies* of *Cartwright*, *Hilderſham*, *Giffard* and many others.

Sect. 17. And ſuppoſing all perſons left to the *judgment* of their *own Conſciences*, as to their own *fitneſs* for the *Holy Communion*, we may obſerve theſe things; which may ſerve towards the *vindication* of our *Parochial Churches*.

(1.) That the *greateſt Offenders* do generally *excommunicate* themſelves; not daring to venture upon ſo hazardous a thing, as they account the *Holy Communion* to be, for fear of the *damnation* following *unworthy receiving*. So that, the moſt conſtant *Communicants*, are the moſt *pious* and *ſober* and *devout Chriſtians*.

(2.) That if any ſuch do voluntarily come, it is upon ſome great *awakenings of Conſcience*; ſome *freſh Reſolutions* they made of amendment of life; after ſome dangerous ſickneſs, or under ſome great affliction; when they are beſt inclined, and have ſtrong convictions, and hope for greater *ſtrength* of *Grace* againſt the *power* of *Temptations*. So that whether this *Sacrament* be a *converting Ordinance* or not, by *God's Inſtitution*, yet the *preparation* and diſpoſition of Men's Minds before it, puts them into the fitteſt capacity for *Divine Grace*; if they be not looked on as the *effects* of it.

(3.) That it is no prejudice to the benefit of this *Holy Sacrament* to thoſe who are well prepared, if thoſe who are not, do come to it; any more than in joining in *Prayer* or *Thankſgiving* with them. And if the preſence of ſuch perſons who deſerve *excommunication* and are *not excommunicated*, do overthrow the *being* of a *Church*; then *Chriſt* and his *Diſciples* did not make a *Church*, when *Judas* was preſent with them; as in probability he was, at his laſt *Supper*. At leaſt, if this kind of *Diſcipline* had been ſo neceſſary, it would never have been left ſo doubtful, as it is by the *Evangeliſts*; ſince it had been neceſſary for the *information* of the *Chriſtian Church*, to have ſet it down expreſly; not only that he was not preſent, but that he *ought not to be*; and therefore was *caſt out* before.

(4.) That ſeveral *Preſbyterian Churches* for many years had no *Diſcipline* at all among them; nor ſo much as the *Lord's Supper* adminiſtred. And were theſe *true Churches* all that while, and are not ours ſo now? Nay Mr. *Baxter* ſaith, *That ſome Non-conformiſts have theſe ſeventeen or eighteen years forborn to baptize, or adminiſter the Lord's Supper, or to be Paſtors of any Churches.* *Plea for Peace, p. 243. Anſw. to Serm.* Now I would fain know, what *Churches* theſe Men are of? Some or other they muſt own, if they be *Chriſtians*; *New Churches they have not*, they ſay; either then they muſt own *our Churches* to be *true*, notwithſtanding the *defect* of *Diſcipline*, or they muſt be of *no Church* at all.

(5.) That our Church is but in the ſame condition, the *Church* of *Conſtantinople* and other *Churches* were in, when *Nectarius* changed the *Diſcipline* of it, or rather took it quite away. For, the *Pœnitentiary*, whom he removed for the ſcandal given, was the Perſon whoſe buſineſs it was to look after the *Diſcipline* of the *Church*, and to ſee that all known *Offenders* performed the *Penance* enjoined them, for ſatisfaction of the *Church*. And, the conſequence of it *Socrates* ſaith was, *That every one was left to the judgment of his own Conſcience, as to the participation of the Holy Myſteries.* And this *Socrates* ſaith, he had *Socr. l. 3. c. 19.* from *Eudæmon* himſelf, who gave the Counſel to *Nectarius to take that Office away*; which was accordingly done; and *no more reſtored*, ſaith *Sozomen*: The conſequence whereof was, ſaith he, *that every one* *Soz. l. 7. c. 16.* *went to the Lord's Table*, ὡς ἂν ἑαυτῷ συνειδείη καὶ θαῤῥεῖν δύναιτο, *as his Conſcience gave him leave, and as he was aſſured in his own mind.* And this example of *Nectarius* was ſoon followed *in other Churches*, ſaith *Sozomen*; and ſo the *Diſcipline* of the *Church* decayed. But I hope all thoſe *Churches* did not loſe their *being*, by the loſs of *Diſcipline*. And ſo much in vindication of our *Dioceſan Church Government*.

Sect. 18. I now come to the *National Conſtitution* of *our Church*. By the *Church of England*, I ſaid, "We meant that *Society* of *Chriſtian* *Serm. p. 19.* "*People* which in this Nation are united under the ſame *Profeſſion* of "*Faith*, the ſame *Laws* of *Government*, and *Rules* of *Divine Worſhip*. "And that this was a very conſiſtent and true notion of our *National* "*Church*, I proved from the firſt notion of a *Church*, which is a *Society* of Men united together for their *Order* and *Government* according to the *Rules* of *Chriſtian Religion*. And ſince, the loweſt kind of "that Society, *viz.* *Congregations* for *Worſhip*, are called *Churches*; "ſince the largeſt *Society* of all *Chriſtians* is accounted a *true Catholick* "*Church*; and both from their *union* and *conſent* in ſome common "thing; I ſaid I did not underſtand why a *National Society* agreeing "together in the *ſame Faith*, and under the *ſame Government* and *Diſ-*

“ *cipline*, might not be as truly and properly *a Church*, as any *particu-*
“ *lar Congregations?* Becauſe the narrowneſs or largeneſs of extent doth
“ not alter the *nature* of the thing: The *Kingdom* of *France* being as
“ truly a *Kingdom*, as the ſmall *Kingdom* of *Ivetot:* And as ſeveral
“ *Families* make one *Kingdom*, ſo ſeveral *leſſer Churches* make *one Na-*
“ *tional.* And that this notion was not diſagreeing with the impor-
“ tance of the word Ἐκκλησία, I ſhewed, that at *Athens*, from whence
“ the word was taken, it did comprehend in it all the *ſeveral Tribes*
“ when met together, although every one of thoſe *Tribes* in its *parti-*
“ *cular Aſſembly* might be an Ἐκκλησία too; and from thence in the
“ *firſt Ages* of the *Chriſtian Church*, the name of a *Church* compre-
“ hended in it the *Eccleſiaſtical Governours* and *People* of *whole Cities*,
“ and therefore might by parity of Reaſon be extended to many Cities
“ united together under one civil Government and the ſame Rules of
“ Religion. This is the ſubſtance of what I delivered upon this ſubject; againſt which all my Adverſaries have ſomething to ſay, though not with equal ſtrength, clearneſs, or temper. Dr. *Owen* ſaith, *Vindicat. of Non-conform. p. 16.* (1.) *That ſince I make National Churches to begin with the diſſolution of the Roman Empire, it fell out a great while after the firſt Inſtitution of Churches, and therefore they are not concerned in it: becauſe he ſuppoſeth Congregational Churches to be entire Churches of Chriſt's Inſtitution, and therefore to have a juſt right to govern and reform themſelves, independently as to any National Conſtitution.* To which I anſwer, that if the *Churches* of *Chriſt's Inſtitution* be not limited to *particular Congregations*, as I have already proved, then the gradual increaſe of *Churches*, till they came to be *National*, doth not alter any *Inſtitution of Chriſt*; and conſequently the *Power* of thoſe *Churches* muſt limit and determin that of *particular Congregations*; or elſe nothing but diſorder and confuſion will follow, if every *Congregation* may have a *ſeveral Rule* of *Worſhip* and *Doctrine* of *Faith*, without being liable to an account to any ſuperior *Church Authority*. Which is all one, as to ſuppoſe that every Family may govern it ſelf, becauſe a *Kingdom* is made up of *Families*, without any reſpect to the *Laws* and *Conſtitution* of a *Kingdom*. *p. 17.* No, ſaith Dr. O. *the caſe is not the ſame. For God never appointed that there ſhould be no other Government but that of Families.* And where hath he appointed that there ſhould be no other *Churches* but particular *Congregations?* *But God by the Light and Law of Nature, by the ends and uſe of the Creation of Man, by expreſs Revelation in his Word, hath by his own Authority, appointed and approved other ſorts of Civil Government.* So ſay I, that *God* by the *Light* and *Law* of *Reaſon*, by the *ends* and *uſe* of a *Chriſtian Society*, by *expreſs Inſtitution* of the *Apoſtolical Function* in the *care* and *Government* of *many Churches* did declare, that he did appoint and approve other *ſorts* of *Church Government* beſides that of *particular Congregations*. For, if *God* upon the *diſperſion* of the *Nations* after the *Flood*, had appointed *twelve Princes* to have ruled the People in their ſeveral diſperſions, it had been a plain demonſtration he did not intend the *ſeveral Families* to have a *diſtinct* and *independent Power* within themſelves; but that they ought to be governed according to their appointment; ſo in the caſe of *Churches*; ſince *Chriſt* did appoint *twelve Apoſtles* to plant, ſettle and govern *Churches*, and ſet up *Rulers* in them, but ſtill under their *Authority*, Can any thing be plainer, than that theſe particular *Churches* were not ſettled with an *entire power of governing themſelves?* But as in the former

former caſe, if we ſuppoſe thoſe *twelve Princes* to have led out their ſeveral *Diviſions*, and to have placed them in convenient *Seats*, and given them general *Rules* for governing themſelves in *Peace* and *Order* under ſuch as they ſhould appoint, and as they found themſelves decaying, ſhould nominate ſo many *Succeſſors* as they thought fit for the ruling the *ſeveral Colonies*, were they not then obliged to ſubmit to ſuch *Governors?* Without breaking in pieces into ſo many *Families*, every Maſter governing his family by himſelf; which would certainly ruin and deſtroy them all; becauſe they could not have ſtrength and union to defend themſelves. So it is again in the *caſe* of *Churches*, the *Apoſtles* planted them, and ſetled ſuch *Officers* in them as were then fit to teach and govern them, ſtill reſerving the main care of *Government* to themſelves; but giving excellent *Rules* of *Charity*, *Peace*, *Obedience* and *Submiſſion* to *Governours*; and as they withdrew from particular *Churches* (within ſuch a *precinct*, as *Crete* was) they appointed ſome, whom they thought fit to take care of all thoſe *Churches*, and to conſtitute inferior Officers to teach and rule them; and therefore in this caſe, here is no more *independency* in *particular Congregations*, than in the other, as to *private Families*; which is as contrary to the general deſign of the *Peace* and *Unity* of *Chriſtians*, and their mutual preſervation and defence, as in the former caſe. In which, we believe the *civil Government* to be from *God*, although no *Monarch* can now derive his *Title* from ſuch *Princes* at the firſt diſperſion; and would it not then ſeem unreaſonable to queſtion the *ſucceſſion* of *Biſhops* from the *Apoſtles*, when the matter of fact is atteſted by the moſt early, knowing, honeſt and impartial *Witneſſes?* Laſtly, as in the former caſe, ſeveral of thoſe *leſſer Princes* might unite themſelves together by joint-conſent for their common intereſt and ſecurity, and become one *Kingdom:* ſo in the latter caſe; *ſeveral Biſhops* with the *Churches* under them, might for promoting the common ends of *Chriſtianity*, and the *Peace* and *eſtabliſhment* of their *Churches*, join together under the ſame common bonds and become one *National Church:* which being intended for the good of the whole ſo united, and no ways repugnant to the deſign of the Inſtitution, and not uſurping upon the *Rights* of others, nor aſſuming more than can be managed, as an *univerſal Paſtor* muſt do; will appear to be no ways repugnant to any particular command or general *Rules* of the *Goſpel*, as the *Pope*'s challenge of *univerſal Dominion* over the *Church* is. Which I therefore mention that any one may ſee, that the force of this Reaſoning will never juſtifie the *Papal Uſurpations.*

But ſaith Dr. O. *National Provincial Churches muſt firſt be proved of* p. 17. *Chriſt's Inſtitution, before they can be allowed to have their power given them by Jeſus Chriſt.* And yet in the caſe of Congregational Churches, he ſaith *there is no need of any poſitive Rule or direction; for the Nature* p. 42. *of the thing it ſelf, and the duty of men with reſpect to the end of ſuch Churches, is ſufficient for it.* And this is as much as we plead in behalf of *National Churches*, viz. What the nature of a *Chriſtian Society*, and the *duty of men with reſpect to the end of it* doth require. For, whatever tends to the *ſupport* of *Religion*, to the *preſerving Peace* and *Unity* among *Chriſtians*, to the preventing *dangerous Errors* and *endleſs confuſions*, from the *very nature* of the *thing*, and the end of a *Chriſtian Society* becomes a *Duty*. For the general *Rules* of *Government* lay an obligation upon men to uſe the beſt means for advancing the ends of it. It being then taken for granted among all *Chriſtians*, 1. That *Chriſt* is the *Author* or founder of this *Society* which we call the *Church*; 2. That he deſigns the *continuance* and *preſervation* of it; 3. That the beſt way of its *preſervation* is by an *Union* of the *members* of it; provided the *Union* be ſuch as doth not overthrow the ends of it: We may reaſonably infer, that whatever tends to promote this *Union*, and to prevent any notable inconveniences or miſchiefs which may happen to it, is within the deſign of the *firſt Inſtitution*; although it be not contained in expreſs words.

Sect. 19. We are now therefore to conſider, whether *ſingle Congregations* diſperſed and diſunited over a *Nation*; or a *combination* of them together under ſome *common bonds* as to *Faith*, *Government* and *Worſhip*, be the more likely way to promote *Religion*, to ſecure the *Peace* and *Tranquillity* of a *Church*.

Let us then compare theſe two *Hypotheſes* together in point of *Reaſon*, as to theſe ends.

In the *Congregational way*, there may be as many *Religions* as *Churches*. I do not ſay there *are*, but we are arguing now upon what may be, from the nature of the *thing*. Suppoſing then every *Congregation* to have an entire and unaccountable Power within it ſelf; what hinders but of *ten Congregations* one may be of *Socinians*, another of *Papiſts*, another of *Arians*, another of *Quakers*, another of *Anabaptiſts*, &c. and it may be no two of them of the ſame mind. But if they be, it is mere *chance* and *good hap*; there being no *obligation* upon them to have any more than *mutual forbearance* towards each other. Let now any rational man judge, whether it appear probable, that ſo looſe and ſhatter'd a *Government* as this is, ſhould anſwer the *obligation* among *Chriſtians*, to uſe the beſt and moſt effectual means to preſerve *the Faith once delivered to the Saints*, and to uphold *Peace* and *Unity* among *Chriſtians*? But ſuppoſing all theſe ſeveral *Congregations* united together under ſuch common bonds, that the *Preacher* is accountable to *ſuperiors*; that none be admitted but ſuch as own the *true Faith*, and promiſe *obedience*; that publick *legal Cenſures* take hold upon the *diſturbers* of the *Church's Peace*: here we have a far more effectual means according to *Reaſon* for upholding *true Religion* among us. And that this is no mere *Theory*, appears by the ſad experience of this *Nation*, when upon the breaking of the bonds of our *National Church-Government*, there came ſuch an overpowring inundation of *Errors* and *Schiſms* among us, that this Age is like to ſmart under the ſad effects of it. And in *New-England*, two or three men, as *Williams*, *Gorton* and *Clark* diſcovered the apparent weakneſs of the *Independant Government*: which being very material to this buſineſs, I ſhall give a brief account of it as to one of them. Mr. *Roger Williams* was the *Teacher* of a *Congregational Church* at *Salem*, and a man in very good eſteem as appears by Mr. *Cotton*'s Letter to him: he was a great admirer of the *purity* of the *New-England Churches*; but being a thinking man, he purſued the *principles* of that way farther than they thought fit, for he thought it *unlawful* to join with *unregenerate men in prayer, or taking an Oath*; *and that there ought to be an unlimited toleration of Opinions*, &c. Theſe Doctrines, and ſome others of his not taking, he proceeded to *Separation* from them, and gathered a *New Church* in oppoſition to theirs; this gave ſuch a diſturbance to them, that the *Magiſtrates* ſent for him, and the *Miniſters* reaſoned the caſe with him. He told them, *he went upon their own grounds, and therefore they had no reaſon to blame him.* Mr. *Cotton* told him *they deſerved to be puniſhed who made Separation among them*; Mr. *Williams* replied, *this would return upon themſelves; for had not they done the ſame as to the Churches of* Old-England? In ſhort,

Williams *his Anſwer to* Cotton's *Letter*, p. 1.

ſhort, after their debates, and Mr. *Williams* continuing in his *principles* of *Separation* from their *Churches* a *ſentence* of *baniſhment* is decreed againſt him by the *Magiſtrates*, and this *ſentence* approved and juſtified by their *Churches*. For theſe are Mr. *Cotton*'s words, *That the increaſe of concourſe of People to him on the Lord's days in private, to a neglect or deſerting of publick Ordinances, and to the ſpreading of the leaven of his corrupt imaginations, provoked the Magiſtrates, rather than to breed a Winter's ſpiritual plague in the Country, to put upon him a Winter's journey out of the Country.* This Mr. *Williams* told them, was falling into *the National Church way*, which they diſowned; or elſe, ſaith he, *why muſt he that is baniſhed from the one, be baniſhed from the other alſo?* And he charges them *that they have ſuppreſſed Churches ſet up after the Parochial way; and although the Perſons were otherwiſe allowed to be godly, to live in the ſame air with them, if they ſet up any other Church or Worſhip than what themſelves practiſed.* Which appears by the *Laws* of *New-England* mentioned before: and Mr. *Cobbet* one of the *Teachers* of their *Churches*, confeſſeth *that by the Laws of the Country, none are to be free men, but ſuch as are members of Churches.* I now appeal to any man, whether theſe *proceedings* and theſe *Laws* do not manifeſtly diſcover the apparent weakneſs and inſufficiency of the *Congregational way* for preventing thoſe *diſorders*, which they apprehend to be *deſtructive* to their *Churches*? why had not Mr. *Williams* his liberty of *Separation* as well as they? why are no *Anabaptiſts* or *Quakers* permitted among them? *Becauſe theſe ways would diſturb their Peace, and diſtract their People, and in time overthrow their Churches.* Very well: but where is the *entireneſs* of the *power* of *every ſingle Congregation*, the mean while? Why might not the *People* at *Salem* have the ſame liberty as thoſe at *Boſton* or *Plymouth*? The plain truth is, they found by experience, this *Congregational way* would not do alone, without civil Sanctions, and the interpoſing of the *Paſtors* of other *Churches*. For when *Williams*, and *Gorton*, and *Clark* had begun to make ſome impreſſions on their *People*, they beſtirred themſelves as much as poſſible to have their mouths ſtopt, and their perſons baniſhed. This I do only mention, to ſhew, that where this way hath prevailed moſt, they have found it very inſufficient to carry on thoſe ends which themſelves judged neceſſary for the preſervation of their *Religion*, and of *Peace* and *Unity* among themſelves. And in their *Synod* at *Boſton*, 1662. the *New-England Churches* are come to apprehend the neceſſity of *Conſociation* of *Churches*, *in* caſe of *diviſions* and *contentions*; and *for the rectifying of male-adminiſtrations, and healing of errors and ſcandals, that are unhealed among themſelves: For, Chriſt's care*, ſay they, *is for whole Churches as well as for particular perſons.* Of which *Conſociation* they tell us, that Mr. *Cotton drew a platform before his death.* Is ſuch a *Conſociation* of *Churches* a *Duty* or not, in ſuch caſes? If not, why do they do any thing relating to *Church Government*, for which they have no Command in *Scripture*? If there be a *Command* in *Scripture*, then there is an *Inſtitution* of a *Power* above *Congregational Churches*. It is but a ſlender evaſion, which they uſe, when they call theſe only *voluntary Combinations*, for what are all *Churches* elſe? Only, the antecedent obligation on men to join for the Worſhip of God makes entring into other *Churches* a *Duty*; and ſo the obligation lying upon *Church Officers* to uſe the beſt means to prevent or heal diviſions, will make ſuch *Conſociations* a Duty too. And therefore in ſuch caſes *the Nature* of the *thing* requires an *union* and con-

Cotton's *Anſwer to* R. Williams, *p.* 57.

Anſwer to Cotton, p. 46.

Cobbet's *Anſwer to* Clark's *Narrative*, p. 40. 47.

Synod of New-England, *p.* 30. *Defence of the Synod* p. 102.

conjunction ſuperiour to that of *Congregational Churches*; which is then moſt agreeable to *Scripture* and *Antiquity*, when the *Biſhops* and *Preſbyters* join together. Who agreeing together upon *Articles* of *Doctrine*, and *Rules* of *Worſhip* and *Diſcipline*, are the *National Church repreſentative*; and theſe being owned and eſtabliſhed by the civil Power, and received by the *Body* of the *Nation*, and all perſons obliged to obſerve the ſame in the ſeveral *Congregations* for *Worſhip*; theſe *Congregations* ſo united in theſe common bonds of Religion, make up the *complete National Church*.

Sect 20. And now I hope I may have leave to conſider Mr. *Baxter*'s ſubtilties about this matter; which being ſpread abroad in abundance of words to the ſame purpoſe, I ſhall reduce to theſe following heads, wherein the main difficulties lie.

1. Concerning the *difference* between a *National Church*, and a *Chriſtian Kingdom*. 2. Concerning the *Governing Power* of this *National Church*, which he calls the *Conſtitutive Regent part*. 3. Concerning the *common Ties*, or *Rules* which make this *National Church*.

1. Concerning the difference between a *Chriſtian Kingdom*, and a *National Church*. A *Chriſtian Kingdom*, he ſaith, *they all own, but this is only equivocally called a Church, but*, he ſaith, *the Chriſtian Biſhops for* 1300 *years, were far from believing that a Prince, or Civil Power, was eſſential to a Chriſtian Church, or that the Church in the comon ſenſe was not conſtituted of another ſort of regent part that had the Power of the Keys*. If there be any ſuch *Chriſtians* in the world, that hold a *Prince* an *eſſential part* of a *Chriſtian Church*, let Mr. *Baxter* confute them; but I am none of them, for I do believe there were *Chriſtian Churches* before *Chriſtian Princes*, that there are *Chriſtian Churches* under *Chriſtian Princes*, and will be ſuch, if there were none left. I do believe the *Power* of the *Keys* to be a diſtinct thing, from the *Office* of the *Civil Magiſtrate*; and if he had a mind to write againſt ſuch an opinion, he ſhould rather have ſent it to his *learned, ſincere*, and *worthy Friend Lewis du Moulin*, if he had been ſtill living. *But if I only mean a Chriſtian Kingdom, who denies it?* ſaith he, *If all this confuſed ſtir be about a Chriſtian Kingdom, be it known to you, that we take ſuch to be of divine Command*. Nay farther, *if we mean all the Churches of a Kingdom aſſociated for concord as equals, we deny it not*. What is it then, that is ſo denied and diſputed againſt, and ſuch a flood of words is poured out about? It ſeems at laſt it is this, *that the Nation muſt be one Church as united in one Sacerdotal head, perſonal or collective, Monarchical or Ariſtocratical*. Before I anſwer this Queſtion, I hope I may aſk another; whence comes this zeal now againſt a *National Church?* For, when the *Preſbyterians* were in power, they were then for *National Churches*, and thought they proved them out of *Scriptures*; and none of theſe *Subtilties* about the *Conſtitutive Regent part* did ever perplex or trouble them. Thus the *Preſbyterian London Miniſters*, 1654, made no difficulty of owning *National Churches*; and particularly the *Church of England*, in theſe words. *And if all the Churches in the world are called one Church; let no man be offended if all the Congregations in England, be called the Church of England*. But this you will ſay is by *aſſociation* of *equal Churches*. No, they ſay, *it is when the particular Congregations of one Nation living under one Civil Government, agreeing in Doctrine and Worſhip, are governed by their greater and leſſer Aſſemblies, and in this ſenſe*, ſay they, *we aſſert a National Church*. Two things, ſaith Mr. *Hudſon*, are

Anſw. p. 31, 32.

Difference between the Power of the Magiſtrates and Church Paſtors, 1671.

p. 37, 40.

p. 37.

Jus divinum Miniſt. Evangelici 2d *part*, p. 12, 13, 14.

Hudſon *of the Church*, p. 15.

are required to make a *National Church*, 1. *National agreement in the ſame Faith and Worſhip.* 2. *National union in one Eccleſiaſtical body, in the ſame Community of Eccleſiaſtical Government.* The old *Non-conformiſts* had no ſcruple about owning the *Church of England*, and thought they underſtood what was meant by it. Whence come all theſe difficulties now to be raiſed about this matter? Is the thing grown ſo much darker than formerly? But ſome mens Underſtandings are confounded with nice diſtinctions, and their Conſciences enſnared by needleſs Scruples.

To give therefore a plain anſwer to the Queſtion, *What we mean by the National Church of England.* By that is underſtood either, (1.) The *Church of England diffuſive.* Or, (2.) The *Church of England repreſentative.*

1. The *National Church of England diffuſive*, is, the whole *Body* of *Chriſtians* in this Nation, conſiſting of *Paſtors* and *People*, agreeing in that *Faith*, *Government* and *Worſhip*, which are eſtabliſhed by the *Laws* of this *Realm*. And by this deſcription any one may ſee, how eaſily the *Church* of *England* is diſtinguiſhed from the *Papiſts* on one ſide, and the *Diſſenters* on the other. Which makes me continue my wonder at thoſe who ſo confidently ſay, *they cannot tell what we mean by the Church of England.* For was there not a *Church* here ſetled upon the *Reformation* in the time of *Edward* 6. and *Queen Elizabeth?* Hath not the *ſame Doctrine*, the *ſame Government*, the *ſame manner of Worſhip*, continued in this *Church?* (bating only the interruption given by its Enemies.) How comes it then ſo hard for men to underſtand ſo eaſie, ſo plain, ſo intelligible a thing? If all the Queſtion be, how all the *Congregations* in *England* make up this *one Church?* I ſay, by *unity of conſent*; as all *particular Churches* make *one Catholick Church*. If they aſk, *how it comes to be one National Church?* I ſay, becauſe it was received by the *common conſent* of the *whole Nation* in *Parliament*, as other *Laws* of the *Nation* are; and is univerſally received by all that obey thoſe *Laws*. And this I think is ſufficient to ſcatter thoſe Miſts which ſome pretend to have before their eyes, that they cannot clearly ſee *what we mean by the Church of England.*

2. The *repreſentative Church of England*, is the *Biſhops and Presbyters of this Church*, meeting together according to the *Laws* of this *Realm*, to conſult and adviſe about *matters of Religion*. And this is determin'd by the allowed *Canons* of this *Church*. We do not ſay, that the *Convocation* at *Weſtminſter* is *the repreſentative Church of England*, as the *Church of England* is a *National Church*; for that is only *repreſentative* of this *Province*, there being another *Convocation* in the other *Province*; but the *Conſent* of both *Convocations*, is the *repreſentative National Church of England*. *Can.* 139.

Sect. 21. And now to anſwer Mr. *Baxter*'s grand difficulty, concerning *the Conſtitutive Regent part of this National Church.* I ſay, 1. It proceeds upon a *falſe ſuppoſition*. 2. It is capable of a *plain reſolution.*

1. That it proceeds upon a *falſe ſuppoſition*; which is, that where-ever there is the *true Notion* of a *Church*, there muſt be a *Conſtitutive Regent part*, i. e. there muſt be a *ſtanding governing Power*, which is an *eſſential part* of it. Which I ſhall prove to be *falſe* from Mr. *Baxter* himſelf. He aſſerts, that there is *one Catholick viſible Church*; and *that all particular Churches, which are headed by their particular Biſhops, or Paſtors, are parts of this univerſal Church, as a Troop is of an Army, or a City of a* Kingdom.

Chriſtian Directory, Eccl. Caſes, Q. 56. *p.* 830.
Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 77.

Kingdom. If this Doctrine be true, and withal it be neceſſary *that every Church muſt have a Conſtitutive Regent part as eſſential to it,* then it unavoidably follows that there muſt be a *Catholick viſible Head,* to *a Catholick viſible Church.* And ſo Mr. *Baxter*'s *Conſtitutive Regent part* of a *Church,* hath done the *Pope* a wonderful kindneſs, and made a very plauſible *Plea* for his *Univerſal Paſtorſhip.* But there are ſome Men in the World, who do not attend to the advantages they give to *Popery*; ſo they may vent their ſpleen againſt the *Church* of *England.* But doth not Mr. *Baxter* ſay, *that the univerſal Church is headed by* Chriſt *himſelf?* I grant he doth; but this doth not remove the difficulty; for the *Queſtion* is about *that viſible Church* whereof *particular Churches are parts*; and they being *viſible parts* do require a *viſible Conſtitutive Regent part as eſſential* to them; therefore *the whole viſible Church* muſt have likewiſe *a viſible Conſtitutive Regent part,* i. e. *a viſible Head* of the *Church*; as if a *Troop* hath an inferiour *Officer*, an *Army* muſt have a *General*; if a *City* hath a *Mayor*, a *Kingdom* muſt have a *King*, that is *equally preſent* and *viſible* as the other is. This is indeed to make a *Key* for *Catholicks*, by the help of which they may enter and take poſſeſſion.

2. The *plain reſolution* is, that we deny any neceſſity of any ſuch *Conſtitutive Regent part*, or *one formal Eccleſiaſtical Head* as *eſſential to a National Church.* For a *National Conſent* is as ſufficient to make *a National Church*; as an *Univerſal Conſent* to make a *Catholick Church.* But if the Queſtion be, by what way this *National Conſent* is to be declared? then we anſwer farther; that by the *Conſtitution* of this *Church*, the *Arch-biſhops*, *Biſhops*, and *Preſbyters* being ſummoned by the *King's Writ* are to *adviſe* and *declare* their *Judgments* in *matters* of *Religion*; which being received, allowed and enacted by the *King* and *three Eſtates* of the *Kingdom*; there is as great a *National Conſent* as is required to any *Law.* And all *Biſhops*, *Miniſters*, and *People*, taken together, who profeſs the *Faith* ſo *eſtabliſhed*, and *worſhip God* according to the *Rules* ſo appointed, make up this *National Church* of *England:* which notion of a *National Church* being thus explained, I ſee no manner of difficulty remaining in all Mr. *Baxter*'s *Quaries* and *Objections* about this matter.

Sect. 22. 3. That which looks moſt like a difficulty is (3.) concerning *the common ties or Rules which make this National Church.* For Mr. *B.* would know, *whether by the common Rules I mean a Divine Rule or a mere human Rule. If it be a Divine Rule, they are of the National Church as well as we; if it be a humane Rule, how comes conſent in this to make a National Church? how come they not to be of it for not conſenting? how can ſuch a conſent appear, when there are differencs among our ſelves?* This is the ſubſtance of what he objects. To which I anſwer, (1.) Our *Church* is founded upon a *Divine Rule*, viz. the *Holy Scriptures*, which we own as the *Baſis* and *Foundation* of our *Faith*; and according to which, all other *Rules* of *Order* and *Worſhip* are to be agreeable. (2.) Our *Church* requires a *Conformity* to thoſe *Rules* which are appointed by it, as *agreeable* to the *word* of *God.* And ſo the *Churches* of *New-England* do, to the *orders* of *Church Government* among themſelves by all that are members of their *Churches*; and annex *civil Privileges* to them; and their *Magiſtrates* impoſe *civil Puniſhments* on the breakers and diſturbers of them. And although they profeſs agreement in other things, yet becauſe they do not ſubmit to the

Anſw. p. 34.

the *Orders* of their *Churches*, they do not own them as *members* of their *Churches*. Why ſhould it then be thought unreaſonable with us, not to account thoſe *members* of the *Church* of *England*, who contemn and diſobey the *Orders* of it? (3.) There is no difference among our ſelves concerning the *lawfulneſs* of the *Orders* of our *Church*, or the *duty* of *ſubmiſſion* to them. If there be any other differences, they are not *material*, as to this buſineſs: And I believe are no other than in the *manner of explaining* ſome things, which may happen in the beſt *Society* in the world, without breaking the *Peace* of it. As about the *difference* of *Orders*; the ſenſe of ſome *paſſages* in the *Athanaſian Creed*; the *true explication* of *one* or *two Articles*; which are the things he mentions. A multitude of ſuch differences will never overthrow ſuch a *Conſent* among us, as to make us not to be *members* of the ſame *National Churches*.

p. 39.

Sect. 23. Having thus cleared the *main difficulties* which are objected by my more weighty Adverſaries, the weaker aſſaults of the reſt in what they differ from theſe, will admit of a quicker diſpatch. Mr. *A.* objects, (1.) *That if National Churches have Power to reform themſelves, then ſo have Congregational; and therefore I do amiſs to charge them with Separation.* I grant it, if he proves that no *Congregational Church* hath any more *Power* over it, than a *National Church* hath: *i. e.* that there is as much evidence againſt both *Epiſcopal* and *Preſbyterial Government* as there is againſt the *Pope's Uſurpations*. When he doth prove that, he may have a farther anſwer. (2.) *That National Churches deſtroy the being of other Churches under them*; this I utterly deny, and there wants nothing but Proof; as *Eraſmus* ſaid one *Andrelinus* was a good *Poet*, only his *Verſes* wanted one *Syllable* and that was Nūs. (3.) *By my deſcription the Parliament may be a National Church, for they are a Society of Men united together for their Order and Government, according to the Rules of the Chriſtian Religion.* But did I not immediately before ſay, that *National Churches are National Societies of Chriſtians, under the ſame Laws of Government and Rules of Worſhip?* from whence it is plain that in the next words, when I went about to prove *National Churches* to be *true Churches*, I uſed ſuch a general deſcription as was common to any kind of *Church* and not proper to a *National Church*. (4.) *He gives this reaſon why conſent ſhould not make National Churches as well as Congregational; becauſe it muſt be ſuch an agreement as the Goſpel warrants; and that is only for Worſhip, and not to deſtroy their own being.* This is the reaſoning of a Horſe in a Mill; ſtill round about the ſame thing. And therefore the ſame anſwer may ſerve. (5.) Out come Mr. *B's* Objections, *againſt a viſible Head of this National Church; and the manner of union, and the differences among our ſelves*; as though Mr. *B.* could not manage his own Arguments, and therefore he takes them and ſtrips them of their heavy and ruſty Armour; and makes them appear again in the field, in another dreſs, and if they could not ſtand the field in the former habit, they can much leſs do it in this.

Miſchief of Impoſ. p. 27.

ibid.

p. 29.

p. 30.

p. 31.

The Author of the Letter ſaith, *I only prove a National Church a poſſible thing*. He clearly miſtakes my deſign; which was to ſhew that if there be ſuch a thing as a *National Church*, then no *ſingle Congregations* have ſuch a power in themſelves to ſeparate from others in matters of *order* and *decency* where there is a *conſent* in the *ſame Faith*. To prove that there was ſuch a thing, I ſhewed that if the *true Notion* of a *Church* doth agree to it, then upon the ſame reaſon that we own

Letter out of the Country, p. 24.

particular Churches, and the *Catholick Church*, we are to own a *National Church*; ſo that the deſign of that diſcourſe was not barely to prove the *poſſibility* of the thing; but the *truth and reality* of it. But, p. 25. ſaith he, *Can it be proved that Chriſt hath inveſted the Guides of this Church, not choſen by the People, with a Power to make Laws and Decrees, preſcribing not only things neceſſary for common order and decency; but new fœderal rites, and teaching ſigns and ſymbols, ſuperadded to the whole Chriſtian Inſtitution?* &c. I anſwer, that ſuch a *Church* hath *Power* to appoint *Rules* of *Order* and *Decency* not repugnant to the *word* of *God*, which on that account others are bound to ſubmit to; and to take ſuch care of its *preſervation*, as to admit none to its *privileges* but ſuch as do ſubmit to them; and if any diſturb the *Peace* of this *Church*, the *Civil Magiſtrate* may juſtly inflict *civil Penalties* upon them for it. All which is no more than any ſettled *Church* in the world aſſerts, as well as ours. And I wonder this ſhould be ſo continually objected againſt our *Church*, which all *Societies* in the world think juſt and neceſſary for their own *preſervation*. *As to the Guides of the Church not being choſen by the People*, I ſhall ſpeak to that afterwards. One objection more he makes, which the others did not, *viz.* I had ſaid *that by whole or National Churches, I underſtood the Churches of ſuch Nations which upon decay of the Roman Empire reſumed their juſt right of Governing themſelves, and upon their owning Chriſtianity incorporated into one Chriſtian Society, under the ſame common ties and rules of Order and Government. Such Churches, I ſay, have a juſt right of Reforming themſelves, and therefore are not liable to the imputation of Schiſm from the Roman Church.* Would one think what unlucky Inferences he draws from hence? p. 26. (1.) *Then all that remain within the Empire, were bound to continue in the Communion of the Roman Church.* What, if I ſhould deny the continuance of the *Roman Empire?* then all would be ſafe. But do I any where ſay, *that being in the Empire*, they were bound to *ſubmit* to the *Roman Church?* No; but as the *Nation* reſumed its *juſt civil Rights*, the *Church* might as rightfully recover it ſelf from *Papal Uſurpations*; not laying the force of one upon the other, but paralleling them together: And the advantage of the argument is on the *Churches* ſide. (2.) *Then where Princes have not reſumed their juſt rights as to Reformation, they are Schiſmaticks that ſeparate from Rome.* Part 2. That doth not follow: for in the caſes before mentioned *ſeparation* is *lawful*; but no *Reformation* is ſo unexceptionable, as when there is a *Concurrence* of the *Civil Power*.

Rector of Sutton, &c. p. 27. My laſt Adverſary doth not deny a *National Church* from *conſent* in the *ſame Articles of Religion, and Rules of Government and Order of Worſhip*; but then he ſaith, *ſuch ought to be agreeable to the eſtabliſhed Rule of Holy Scriptures.* And therein we are all agreed. So that after much tugging, this point is thought fit to be given up.

Sect. 24. The next thing to be conſidered, is, *the intereſt and Power of the People as to the choice of their Paſtors*; for want of which great complaints are made by my *Adverſaries*, as a thing *injurious* to *them*, and *prejudicial* to the *Church*, and that we therein go *contrary* to all Vindication, &c. p. 36. *Antiquity*. Dr. O. puts *the depriving the People of their liberty of chuſing their Paſtors among the Cauſes of Separation.* Mr. *Baxter* is very *Tragical* upon this argument; and keeps not within tolerable bounds of *diſcretion*, in pleading the *Peoples Cauſe, againſt Magiſtrates and* Anſw. p. 15, 16. *Patrons and Laws:* And he tells me, *I go againſt all the ancient Fa-*

thers and Churches for many hundred years, and am ſo far a Separatiſt from more than one Pariſh Prieſt; and therefore my charge of them is ſchiſmatical and unjuſt, and recoileth on my ſelf; who inſtead of God's Rule, accuſe them that walk not by our novel crooked Rules; which may make as many modiſh Religions as there are Princes. When I firſt read ſuch paſſages as theſe, I wonder'd what I had ſaid, that might give occaſion to ſo much *undecent Paſſion*, as every where almoſt diſcovers it ſelf in his Anſwer: And the more I conſider'd the more I wonder'd; but at laſt I reſolved as Mr. *A.* doth about the Aſſembly, that Mr. *B.* is *but a Man*, as other Men are; and for all that I ſee, of *equal paſſions*, and that upon little or no provocation. For I had not ſaid one word upon this Argument. What then? Would Mr. *B.* ſeek a *Cauſe* to expreſs his *anger* againſt me? as *if I had allowed Princes to ſet up what Religions they pleaſe.* Surely, he thought himſelf writing againſt *Hobbs* and *Spinoſa* then. No: but thus he artificially draws me into this ſnare. I ſpake much againſt *Separation*. How then? *They would never have ſeparated, if they had not been ſilenced; and therefore my being againſt their ſeparation, ſhews I am for their ſilencing.* As though theſe neceſſarily followed each other. What is this *to Princes impoſing what Religion they pleaſe?* Thus. Then *Magiſtrates* by their *Laws* may put out *Nonconformiſts* and put in *Conformiſts*. But have we not the ſame *Religion* ſtill? But, ſaith Mr. *Baxter*, *theſe muſt be my ſuppoſed grounds; that Magiſtrates may appoint what Religion they pleaſe, and thoſe are Separatiſts who do not obey them.* Is not this admirable ingenuity, to rail upon a Man, for *ſuppoſitions* of his own making? However Mr. *Baxter* will have it ſo, let me ſay what I will. The *People's* part he will take, and let me take that of the *Magiſtrates* and *Laws*, if I think good; and ſince they are fallen to my lot, I will defend them as well as I can, as to this matter. Mr. *B.* appearing very warm in this buſineſs, what doth Mr. *A.* coming after him, but make it the very *firſt* and *fundamental Ground* of their *Separation?* viz. *That every particular Church upon a due balance of all circumſtances, has an inherent right to chuſe its own Paſtor, and every particular Chriſtian the ſame Power to chuſe his own Church.* Nay then, I thought, we were in a very fair way of ſettlement; when the *Anabaptiſts* in *Germany* never broached a *looſer principle* than this; nor more contrary to the very poſſibility of having an *eſtabliſh'd Church*: for it leads to all manner of *Schiſms* and *Factions* in ſpight of all *Laws* and *Authority* in *Church* or *State*. The *Author* of the *Letter* goes upon the ſame principle too, and ſaith, *The Guides of the Church are to be choſen by the People, according to Scripture and Primitive practice.* This I perceive is a *popular argument*, and a fine device to draw in the *common People* to the *diſſenting Party*; whatever becomes of *Laws*, and Mens *juſt* and *legal Rights of Patronage*, all muſt yield to the *antecedent Right of the People*. But to bring this matter to a ſtrict debate, we muſt conſider theſe three things. 1. What *Original*, or *inherent Right* and *Power* the *People* had. 2. How they came to be *deveſted* of it. 3. Whether there be ſufficient *ground* to *reſume* it. And from thence we ſhall underſtand, whether ſome of the *People's* conſenting to hear the *Nonconformiſts preach*, notwithſtanding the *Laws*, can excuſe them from *Separation?* for this lies at the bottom of all.

Miſchief of Impoſitions Preface.

Letter out of the Country, p. 25.

1. As to the *Original, inherent Right* and *Power* of the *People*. Dr. *O.* ſuppoſeth all *Church-Power to be originally in the People*; for to mani-

feſt how favourable *wiſe Men have been to the Congregational way*, he
Vindicat. p. 37. quotes a ſaying of *F. Paul*; out of a *Book* of his, lately tranſlated into
*Engliſh, That in the beginning, the Government of the Church had altogether
a Democratical Form*; which is an opinion ſo abſurd and unreaſonable,
that I could not eaſily believe ſuch a ſaying to have come from
ſo *learned* and *judicious* a *Perſon*. For was there not a *Church* to be
formed *in the beginning?* Did not *Chriſt* appoint *Apoſtles* and give them
Commiſſion and *Authority* for that end? Where was the *Church-power*
then lodged? Was it not in the *Apoſtles?* Did not they in all places, as
they planted *Churches*, appoint *Officers* to teach and govern them? And
did they not give them *Authority* to do what they had appointed? Were
not then the ſeveral *Paſtors* and *Teachers* inveſted with a *Power ſuperior*
to that of the *People* and *independent* upon them? And if they had ſuch
Power and *Authority* over the *People*, how came their *Power* to be derived
from them, as it muſt be, if the *Church Government* then were
Democratical? Beſides, Is it reaſonable to ſuppoſe the *People* ſhould
aſſemble to chuſe their *Officers*, and convey the *Power* of the *Keys* to
them; which never *were* in their hands? And how could they make
choice of Men for their *fitneſs* and *abilities*, when their *abilities* depended
ſo much on the *Apoſtles laying on of their hands?* For *then the
Holy Ghoſt was given unto them.* But in all the *Churches* planted by
the *Apoſtles*, in all the directions given about the choice of *Biſhops* and
Deacons, no more is required, as to the *People*, than barely their *Teſtimony*;
therefore it is ſaid *they muſt be blameleſs and Men of good report.*
1 Tim. 3. 2, But, where is it ſaid or intimated that the *Congregation* being the *firſt*
7, 10. *ſubject of the Power of the Keys*, muſt meet together, and chuſe their
Paſtor, and then convey the *Miniſterial Power* over themſelves, to
them? If it were true *that the Church Government at firſt was Democratical*,
the *Apoſtles* have done the People a mighty injury; for they
have ſaid no more of their *Power* in the *Church*, than they have done
of the *Pope*'s. It is true the *Brethren* were preſent at the *nomination* of
Act. 1. 14. a *new Apoſtle:* But were not the *Women* ſo too? And is the *Power* of
the *Keys* in their hands too? Suppoſe not, Doth this prove that the
Church's Power was then *Democratical?* then the *People* made an *Apoſtle*
and gave him his *Power*; which I do not think any Man would ſay,
much leſs *F. Paul.* As *to the election of Deacons*; it was no properly
Church Power which they had; but they were *Stewards* of the *common
Stock*; and was there not then, all the reaſon in the world, the *Community*
Act. 6. 3, 5. ſhould be ſatisfied in the choice of the Men? *When Saint* Peter
received Cornelius *to the Faith, he gave an account of it to all the
Church.* And what then? Muſt he therefore derive his *power* from it?
Do not *Princes* and Governours give an account of their proceedings
for the ſatisfaction of their *Subjects* Minds? But here is not *all the*
11. 3. *Church* mentioned; only *thoſe of the Circumciſion at Jeruſalem* had a
mind to underſtand the *reaſon* of his receiving a *Gentile Convert.* And
what is this to the *power* of the *Church?* *But in the Council of*
Jeruſalem *the People did intervene, and the Letters were written in the
names of all the three Orders, Apoſtles, Prieſts and faithful Brethren.* I
grant it; but is it not expreſly ſaid, that the *Queſtion* was ſent up from
15. 2. the *Churches, to the Apoſtles and Preſbyters?* Is it not ſaid, *that the
Apoſtles and Preſbyters met to debate it*; and that *the multitude was*
6. 12. *ſilent?* Is it not ſaid, *that the Decrees were paſſed by the Apoſtles and*
16. 4. *Preſbyters*, without any mention of the *People?* And here was the
proper

proper occaſion to have declared their *Power*; but in the other place, it ſignifies no more than their *general conſent* to the *Decrees* that were then made. *In ſucceſs of time*, it is added, *when the Church increaſed in number, the faithful retiring themſelves to the affairs of their Families*, and having *left thoſe of the Congregation, the Government was retained only in the Miniſters, and ſo became Ariſtocratical, ſaving the election which was Popular*. Which account is neither agreeable to *Reaſon*, nor to *Antiquity*. For, was not the Government of the Church *Ariſtocratical* in the *Apoſtles* times? How came it to be changed, from that to a *Democratical Form?* Did not the Apoſtles appoint *Rulers* in the ſeveral Churches, and charged the *People* to *obey them?* And was this an argument the *Power* was then in the *People?* It was not then *the Peoples withdrawing* (of which there can be no evidence, if there be ſo much evidence ſtill left for the *Peoples Power*, in *Antiquity*) but the *Conſtitution* of the *Church* was *Ariſtocratical* by the appointment of the *Apoſtles*.

Sect. 25. We therefore come now to conſider the *Popular Elections*, as to which there is ſo fair a pretence from *Antiquity*; but yet not ſuch, as to fix any *inherent*, or *unalterable Right* in the *People*. As I ſhall make appear, by theſe following Obſervations.

1. That the main ground of the *Peoples Intereſt* was founded upon the *Apoſtles* Canon, *That a Biſhop muſt be blameleſs* and of *good report*. 1 *Tim.* 3. 2, 7.

2. That the *People* upon this *aſſuming* the *Power* of *Elections*, cauſed great *diſturbances* and *diſorders* in the *Church*.

3. That to prevent theſe, many *Biſhops* were appointed without their *choice*, and *Canons* made for the better regulating of them.

4. That when there were Chriſtian *Magiſtrates*, they did interpoſe as they thought fit, notwithſtanding the popular claim; in a matter of ſo great conſequence to the *Peace* of *Church* and *State*.

5. That upon the alteration of the *Government* of *Chriſtendom* the *Intereſt* of the People was ſecured by their conſent in *Parliaments*, and that by ſuch conſent the *Nomination* of *Biſhops* was reſerved to *Princes*, and the *Patronage* of *Livings* to *particular Perſons*.

6. That things being thus ſettled by eſtabliſhed *Laws*, there is no reaſonable *Ground* for the *Peoples* reſuming the *Power* of *electing* their own *Biſhops* and *Miniſters* in oppoſition to theſe *Laws*.

If I can make good theſe *Obſervations*, I ſhall give a full anſwer to all the *Queſtions* propounded, concerning the *Right* and *Power* of the *People*, which my Adverſaries build ſo much upon.

(1.) *That the main ground of the Peoples intereſt was founded upon the Apoſtles Canon, that a Biſhop muſt be blameleſs, and of good report*. For ſo the *Greek Scholiaſt* argues from that place in *Timothy*, *If a Biſhop ought to have a good report of them that are without*, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, *How much rather of the Brethren*, πολλῷ μᾶλλον τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων, ſaith *Theophylact*. And both have it from Saint *Chryſoſtom*. So it is ſaid concerning *Timothy* himſelf, Ὃς ἐμαρτυρεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Λύστροις καὶ Ἰκονίῳ ἀδελφῶν, *Who had a good Teſtimony from the Brethren in Lyſtra and Iconium*. *Act.* 16. 2. And this is mentioned before Saint *Paul*'s taking him into the Office of an *Evangeliſt*. So in the choice of the *Deacons*, the *Apoſtles* bid them find out, ἄνδρας ἐξ ὑμῶν *Act.* 6. 3.

Clement. *Epiſt.* p. 54, 55, 56, 57.

μαρτυρουμένους, *Men of good reputation among them.* And there is a very conſiderable *Teſtimony* in the *Epiſtle* of *Clemens* to this purpoſe; where he gives an account, how *the Apoſtles preaching through Cities and Countries, did appoint their Firſt-fruits, having made a ſpiritual trial of them, to be Biſhops and Deacons of thoſe who were to believe.* Here it is plain, that they were of the *Apoſtles appointment*, and not of the *Peoples choice*; and that their *Authority* could not be from them, whom they were appointed *firſt to convert* and then to *govern*; and although their number was but ſmall at firſt, yet as they increaſed, though into many *Congregations*, they were ſtill to be under the *Government* of thoſe, whom the *Apoſtles* appointed over them. And then he ſhews *how thoſe who had received this Power from God came to appoint others:* And he brings the *Inſtance* of *Moſes*, *when there was an emulation among the Tribes, what method he took for putting an end to it, by the bloſſoming of Aaron's Rod*; which, ſaith he, *Moſes did on purpoſe to prevent confuſion in Iſrael, and thereby to bring Glory to God*; now, ſaith he, *the Apoſtles foreſaw the Contentions that would be about the name of Epiſcopacy* (ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς Ἐπισκοπῆς) *i. e.* about the choice of Men into that *Office* of *Ruling* the *Church*; which the ſenſe ſhews to be his meaning: *Therefore foreſeeing theſe things perfectly, they appointed the perſons before mentioned, and left the diſtribution of their Offices, with this inſtruction, that as ſome died, other approved Men ſhould be choſen into their Office. Thoſe therefore who were appointed by them, or other eminent Men, the whole Church being therewith well-pleaſed, diſcharging their Office with humility, quietneſs, readineſs, and unblameableneſs, being Men of a long time of good report, we think ſuch Men cannot juſtly be caſt out of their Office.* It ſeems, ſome of the *Church* of *Corinth* were at that time *factious* againſt ſome *Officers* in their *Church*, and endeavoured to throw them out for the ſake of one or two more, and made ſuch a diſturbance thereby as had brought a *great ſcandal*, not only on themſelves, but the *Chriſtian Church*; which made *Clemens* write this *Epiſtle* to them; wherein he adviſeth thoſe buſie Men *rather to leave the Church themſelves, than to continue making ſuch a diſturbance in it; and if they were good Chriſtians they would do ſo; and bring more glory to God by it, than by all their heat and contentions.* Now by this diſcourſe of *Clemens* it is plain, (1.) That theſe *Officers* of the *Church* were not *choſen* by the *People*, but appointed by the *Apoſtles*, or other *great Men*, according to their Order? (2.) That they took this courſe on purpoſe to prevent the *contentions* that might happen in the *Church*, about thoſe who ſhould bear *Office* in it. (3.) That all that the *People* had to do, was to *give Teſtimony*, or to expreſs their *approbation* of thoſe, who were ſo appointed. For he could not allow their *power of chuſing*, ſince he ſaith, *the Apoſtles appointed Officers on purpoſe to prevent the contentions that might happen about it.* And it ſeems very probable to me, that this was one great reaſon of the *faction* among them, *viz.* that thoſe few *Popular* Men in that *Church*, who cauſed all the diſturbance, repreſented this, as a great grievance to them; that their *Paſtors* and *Officers* were *appointed* by others, and not *choſen* by themſelves. For they had no *objection* againſt the *Preſbyters themſelves*, being allowed to be Men of *unblameable lives*; yet a *contention* there was, and that about *caſting them out*; and ſuch a contention, as the *Apoſtles deſigned to prevent by appointing a ſucceſſion from ſuch whom themſelves ordained*; and therefore it is very likely, they challenged this *power* to themſelves to *caſt out* thoſe whom they had *not choſen.* But it ſeems, the *Apoſtles* knowing what *contentions* would follow in the *Church*, took care to prevent them, leaving to the *People* their *Teſtimony* concerning thoſe whom they ordained. And this is plain, even from Saint *Cyprian* where he diſcourſeth of this matter, in that very *Epiſtle* concerning *Baſilides* and *Martialis*, to which Mr. *Baxter* refers me. For, the force of what Saint *Cyprian* ſaith comes at laſt only to this *giving Teſtimony*; *therefore*, ſaith he, *God appointed the Prieſt to be appointed before all the People, thereby ſhewing that Ordinations in the Chriſtian Church ought to be ſub Populi Aſſiſtentis Conſcientiâ, in the Preſence of the People:* For what reaſon? That they might give them *Power?* No; that was never done under the *Law*; nor then imagined, when S. *Cyprian* wrote; but he gives the account of it himſelf; *that by their preſence, either their faults might be publiſhed, or their good acts commended; that ſo it may appear to be a juſt and lawful Ordination, which hath been examined by the ſuffrages and judgment of all.* The *People* here had a ſhare in the *Election*, but it was in matter of *Teſtimony* concerning the good or ill behaviour of the Perſon. And, *therefore*, he ſaith, *it was almoſt a general Cuſtom among them, and he thinks came down from Divine Tradition and Apoſtolical Practice, that when any People wanted a Biſhop, the neighbour Biſhops met together in that place, and the new Biſhop was choſen, plebe præſente, the People being preſent,* (not by the *Votes* of the *People*) *quæ ſingulorum vitam pleniſſimè novit, which beſt underſtands every Man's Converſation:* And *this*, he ſaith, *was obſerved in the Conſecration of their Fellow-biſhop* Sabinus, *who was put into the place of* Baſilides. Where he doth expreſs the *Conſent* of the *People*, but he requires the *Judgment* of the *Biſhops*; which being thus performed, he incourages the People to withdraw from *Baſilides* and to adhere to *Sabinus*. For, *Baſilides* having fallen foully into *Idolatry*, and joined *blaſphemy* with it, had of his *own accord* laid down his *Biſhoprick*, and deſired only to be received to *Lay-Communion*, upon this *Sabinus* was *conſecrated Biſhop* in his room; after which *Baſilides* goes to *Rome* and there engages the *Biſhop* to interpoſe in his behalf, that he might be reſtored; *Sabinus* finding this, makes his *application* to Saint *Cyprian* and the *African Biſhops*, who write this *Epiſtle* to the *People* to withdraw from *Baſilides*, ſaying *that it belonged chiefly to them to chuſe the good and to refuſe the bad.* Which is the ſtrongeſt Teſtimony in *Antiquity* for the *People's Power*; and yet here we are to conſider, (1.) It was in a caſe where a *Biſhop* had *voluntarily reſigned.* (2.) Another *Biſhop* was put into his room, not by the *Power* of the *People*, but by the *Judgment* and *Ordination* of the *neighbour Biſhops.* (3.) They had the judgment of a whole *Council* of *African Biſhops* for their deſerting him. (4.) For a notorious matter of fact, *viz. Idolatry* and *Blaſphemy* by his *own confeſſion.* (5.) All the proof which Saint *Cyprian* brings for this, doth amount to no more, than that the *People* were moſt concerned to give *Teſtimony*, as to the *good* or *bad lives* of their *Biſhops.* This farther appears by the words in *Lampridius* concerning *Alexander Severus*, who propoſed the *names* of his *civil Officers* to the *People*, *to hear what they had to object againſt them, and ſaid it was a hard caſe, when the Chriſtians and Jews did ſo about their Prieſts, the ſame ſhould not be done about Governours of Provinces, who had Mens lives and fortunes in their hands.* But no Man could ever from hence imagin, that the *People*

Anſw. p. 27.

Cypr. *Epiſt.* 68.

had the *Power* to *make* or *unmake the Governors* of *Roman Provinces.* *Origen* ſaith, *The Peoples preſence was neceſſary at the Conſecration of a Biſhop, that they might all know the worth of him who was made their Biſhop*; it muſt be *aſtante Populo, the People ſtanding by*; and this is that Saint *Paul* meant, when he ſaid, *A Biſhop ought to have a good Teſtimony from thoſe that are without.*

(2.) That the *People* upon this *aſſuming* the *Power* of *Elections* cauſed great *diſturbances* and *diſorders* in the *Church.* *Euſebius* repreſents the *diſorders* of *Antioch* to have been ſo *great* in the City upon the *choice* of a *new Biſhop,* by the *Diviſions* of the *People, that they were like to have ſhaken the Emperor's Kindneſs to the Chriſtians. For, ſuch a flame was kindled by it,* that he ſaith, *it was near deſtroying both the Church and the City: and they had certainly drawn Swords, if the Providence of God, and fear of the Emperour had not reſtrained them. Who was forced to ſend Officers and Meſſages to keep them quiet: and after much trouble to the Emperour and many meetings of Biſhops, at laſt* Euſtathius *was choſen.* *Greg. Nazianzen* ſets forth the mighty *unrulineſs* of the *People* of *Cæſarea* in the *choice* of their *Biſhop,* ſaying *it came to a dangerous ſedition, and not eaſy to be ſuppreſſed:* and he ſaith, *the City was very prone to it, on ſuch occaſions.* And although there was one *Perſon* of *incomparable worth* above the reſt, yet through the *Parties* and *Factions* that were made, *it was a hard matter to carry it for him.* He complains ſo much of the *inconveniencies* of *popular Elections, that he wiſhes them alter'd*; and the *Elections brought to the Clergy*; and he thinks *no Common wealth ſo diſorderly as this method of Election was.* *Evagrius* ſaith, *the ſedition at* Alexandria *was intolerable, upon the diviſion of the People between* Dioſcorus *and* Proterius; the *People riſing againſt the Magiſtrates and Soldiers who endeavoured to keep them in order: and at laſt they murthered* Proterius. Such *dangerous Seditions* are deſcribed at *Conſtantinople,* upon the *Election* of *Paulus* and *Macedonius,* by *Sozomen*; and in the ſame place after the death of *Eudoxius,* and after the death of *Atticus* by *Socrates*; and after the deprivation of *Neſtorius.* And again at *Antioch* upon the *removal* of *Eudoxius*; and about the Election of *Flavianus*; at *Epheſus* by Saint *Chryſoſtom,* at *Verſelles* by Saint *Ambroſe*; at *Milan* by *Socrates,* and many other places. I ſhall only add a remarkable one at *Rome* on the choice of *Damaſus:* which came *to bloodſhed* for *ſeveral days*; and is particularly related by *Ammianus Marcellinus*; and the *Preface* to *Fauſtinus* his *Libellus Precum.* Mr. *Baxter* grants *there are inconveniencies in the Peoples conſenting Power, and ſo there are in all humane affairs.* But are theſe *tolerable inconveniencies?* Is this Power ſtill to be pleaded for, in *oppoſition* to *Laws,* as though *Religion* lay at ſtake; and only *Magiſtrates* were *bad men,* and the *People* always *good* and *wiſe* and *vertuous?* A man muſt have great ſpite againſt *Men* in *Power,* and unreaſonable fondneſs of the *Common People* that can repreſent *great Men as wicked, debauched, and enemies to Piety,* and at the ſame time diſſemble, and take no notice of the *Vices* of the *Common People*; beſides their *Ignorance* and *incapacity* of *judging* in ſuch matters, and their great proneneſs to fall into *ſidings* and *parties* and *unreaſonable contentions* on ſuch occaſions. But Saint *Chryſoſtom* complains much of the *unfitneſs of the People to judge in ſuch caſes.* Saint *Hierom* ſaith, *they are apt to chooſe men like themſelves:* and ſaith elſewhere, *they are much to be feared whom the People chooſe.* *Origen* ſaith, *the People are often moved either for favour or reward.*

Orig. *hom.* 6. *in Levit.*

Euſeb. *de Vit.* Conſt. *l.* 3. *c.* 59.

Greg. Naz. *Orat.* 19.

Evagr. *l.* 2. *c.* 5.

Socr. *l.* 4. *c.* 14.

Soz. *l.* 3. *c.* 5.

Socr. *l.* 7. *c.* 26, 35.

Ambroſ. *Ep.* 82.

Socr. *l.* 4. *c.* 30.

Soz. *l.* 4. *c.* 28.

Socr. *l.* 5. *c.* 9. *l.* 6. *c.* 11.

Amm. Marc *l.* 27.

Anſw. p. 15.

De Sacerd. l. 3.

Hieron. *adverſus Jovin. in Ezek. c.* 33.

Orig. *in Num. hom.* 22.

(3.) That to prevent theſe *Inconveniencies* many *Biſhops* were appointed without the *choice* of the *People*, and *Canons* were made for the *regulation* of *Elections*. In the *Church* of *Alexandria* the *Election* of the *Biſhop* belonged to the 12 *Preſbyters*, as Saint *Jerome* and others ſhew. For by the *Conſtitution* of that *Church*, before the *alteration* made by *Alexander*, the *Biſhop* of *Alexandria* was not only to be *choſen* out of the *twelve Preſbyters*, but *by them*. So *Severus*, in the Life of the *Alexandrian Patriarchs*, ſaith, *that after the death of their Patriarch. the Preſbyters met together and prayed, and proceeded to election; and the firſt Preſbyter declared it belonged to them to chuſe their Biſhop, and to the other Biſhops to conſecrate him. To which the Biſhops aſſented, only ſaying, if he were worthy they would conſecrate whom they choſe, but not otherwiſe. Elmacinus* makes this a *Conſtitution* of Saint *Mark* in the firſt *foundation* of that *Church*; and ſaith, *it continued to the time of the* Nicene *Council*; and then, as *Hilarius* the *Deacon* ſaith, *the cuſtom was alter'd, by a Council among themſelves, which determin'd that they might chuſe the moſt deſerving perſon, whether of that Body or not.* And there could be no room for *popular Elections*, where-ever that *Cuſtom* obtained, which the counterfeit *Ambroſe* ſpeaks of, *ut recedente uno ſequens ei ſuccederet*; ſpeaking of the *Biſhop dying, and the next in courſe ſucceeding*. But if this be only a particular *conceit* of that *Author*, yet we find the *Biſhops* conſecrating others in ſeveral *Churches*, without any mention of *choice* made by the *People*. So, when *Narciſſus* retired from *Jeruſalem*, *Euſebius* ſaith, *the neighbour Biſhops aſſembled, and conſecrated one* Dius *in his room, and after him followed* Germanio, *and then* Gordius, *in whoſe time* Narciſſus *returned; but being grown very old,* Alexander *was brought in to aſſiſt him, by Revelation, and a Voice from Heaven to ſome of the Brethren. Severus*, Biſhop of *Melevis*, *in his life-time appointed his Succeſſor, and acquainted the Clergy with it, but not the People*; great diſturbance was feared hereupon; the *Clergy* ſent to Saint *Auguſtin* to come among them, and to *ſettle* their *new Biſhop*, who went, *and the People received the Biſhop ſo appointed very quietly*. St. *Auguſtin* himſelf declares, *the ſad effects he had often ſeen of the Church's election of Biſhops*, through the *ambition* of ſome, and the *contention* of *others*, and *therefore he deſired to prevent any ſuch diſturbance in his City, when he was dead*. And for that reaſon, he acquainted the *People* that he deſigned *Eradius*, or as ſome Copies have it, *Eraclius* for his *Succeſſor*. So *Paulus* the *Novatian Biſhop* at *Conſtantinople*, appointed his *Succeſſor Marcianus* to *prevent the contentions that might happen after his death; and got his Preſbyters to conſent to it*.

Hieron. *Ep. ad* Evagr.

Ecchellenſ. *de* Orig. *Eccl.* Alex. c. 6.

Ambroſe *Comment.* in 4 *Eph.*

Euſeb. *l.* 6. c. 10.

c. 11.

Aug. *Ep.* 110.

Socr. *l.* 8. c. 46.

The *Greek Canoniſts* are of opinion, that the *Council of* Nice *took away all power of election of Biſhops from the People, and gave it to the Biſhop of the Province*. And it is apparent from the *Council* of *Antioch*, *that Biſhops were ſometimes conſecrated in the Eaſt, without the conſent of the People*; for it doth ſuppoſe a *Biſhop* after *conſecration may not be received by his People*, which were a vain *ſuppoſition*, if their *election* neceſſarily went before it. And withal, it puts the *caſe* of a *Biſhop* that *refuſed to go to his People after Conſecration*; which ſhews, that the *conſecration* was not then performed in his own *Church*. *Gregory* ſubſcribed at *Antioch*, as *Biſhop* of *Alexandria*, before ever he went thither. So Saint *Baſil* mentions his *conſecration* of *Euphronius* to be *Biſhop* of *Nicopolis*, without any *conſent* of the *People* before; it being then performed by the *Metropolitan* in his own See; but *he perſuades the Senate and People*

to

Concil. Nicen. c. 4.

Concil. Antioch. c. 18.

c. 17.

Socr. *l.* 2. c. 10.

Baſil. *Ep.* 194.

to accept of him. If the *People did* agree upon a *Perſon* to be *Biſhop*, their way then was, to petition the *Metropolitan and his Synod*, who had the *full Power* either to allow or to refuſe him. And it is evident from the twelfth *Canon* of the *Council* of *Laodicea*, that although all the *People* choſe a *Biſhop*, if he intruded himſelf into the *poſſeſſion* of his *See*, without the *conſent* of a *Provincial Synod*, *he was to be turned out or rejected by them.* Which ſhews how much the *buſineſs* of *Elections* was brought into the *Biſhop's Power* in the *Eaſtern parts*. And by virtue of this *Canon*, *Baſſianus* and *Stephanus* were *rejected* in the *Council* of *Chalcedon.* By the Law of *Juſtinian*, the *common People* were excluded from *Elections* of *Biſhops*; and the *Clergy*, and *better ſort of Citizens*, were to *nominate* three to the *Metropolitan*, out of which he was to chuſe one. By the *Canon* of *Laodicea*, *the common People were excluded the power of chuſing any into the Clergy:* For they were wont to raiſe tumults upon ſuch occaſions; ſuch as St. *Auguſtine* deſcribes in the caſe of *Pinianus*; but ſome of the *Greek* and *Latin Canoniſts* enlarge the ſenſe of the *Laodicean Canon* to the *election* of *Biſhops* too. The *ſecond Council* of *Nice* reſtrained the *election only to Biſhops*, which was confirmed by following *Councils* in the *Greek Church*, as Can. 28. *Concil. Conſtantinopol.* againſt *Photius*; and the *People* are there excluded with an *Anathema.* So far were *popular Elections* grown out of requeſt in the *Eaſtern Church.*

Conc. Chalced. *Act.* 11.
Novel. Juſtin. 123, 137.
C. de Epiſc. lex. 42.
Can. Laod. c. 13.
Aug. *Ep.* 225.
Conc. Nic. 2. c. 3.
Concil. 8. c. 28.

(4.) That when there were *Chriſtian Magiſtrates*, they did interpoſe in this *matter* as they judged expedient. So *Conſtantine* did in the *Church* of *Antioch*, when there was great diſſention there, upon the depoſition of *Euſtathius*, he recommended to the Synod *Euphronius* of *Cappadocia*, and *Georgius* of *Arethuſa*, or whom they ſhould judge fit, without taking any notice of the *intereſt* of the *People:* and they accordingly conſecrated *Euphronius*. After the death of *Alexander*, *Biſhop* of *Conſtantinople*, the *People* fell into *Parties*, ſome were for *Paulus*, and others for *Macedonius*; the *Emperour Conſtantius* coming thither puts them both by, and appoints *Euſebius* of *Nicomedia* to be *Biſhop* there. *Euſebius* being dead, the *Orthodox Party* again chuſe *Paulus*; *Conſtantius* ſends *Hermogenes* to drive him out by force, and was very angry with *Macedonius* for being made *Biſhop* without his leave, although afterwards he placed him in his throne. When *Athanaſius* was reſtored, *Conſtantius* declared, *it was by the decree of the Synod, and by his conſent.* And he by his *Authority* reſtored likewiſe *Paulus* and *Marcellus*, *Aſclepas* and *Lucius* to their ſeveral *Sees.* When *Gregory Nazianzen* reſigned the *Biſhoprick* of *Conſtantinople*, *Theodoſius* commended to the *Biſhops* the care of *finding out a Perſon*, who recommending *many* to him, the *Emperor* himſelf pitched upon *Nectarius*, and would have him made *Biſhop*, tho' many of the *Biſhops* oppoſed it. When *Chryſoſtom* was choſen at *Conſtantinople*, the *Royal Aſſent* was given by *Arcadius*, *the election being made*, ſaith *Sozomen*, *by the People and Clergy*; but *Palladius* gives a more particular account of it, *viz. That upon the death of* Nectarius *many Competitors appeared, ſome making their application to the Court, and others to the People, in ſo much that the People began to be tumultuous,* (κλονεῖται, ſaith *Palladius*) *upon which they importuned the Emperor to provide a fit man for them.* Eutropius *being then chief Miniſter of State, recommended* Chryſoſtom *to the Emperor, and immediately an Expreſs was ſent to the* Comes Orientis, *that he ſhould with all privacy*, for fear of a tumult at *Antioch*, *ſend him away to* Conſtantinople: *whither being brought, he was ſoon after conſecrated Biſhop.* So that here was no antecedent

Soz. *l.* 2. c. 19.
Socr. *l.* 2. c. 6, 7.
c. 13.
c. 16.
c. 23.
Soz. *l.* 7. c. 7.
l. 8. c. 2.
Socr. *l.* 7. c. 29.
Pallad. *Vit.* Chryſ. p. 42.

election of the *People*, as *Sozomen* ſaith, but whatever there was, was ſubſequent to the *Emperor*'s determination. After the death of *Siſinnius*, the Emperor declared, *That to prevent diſturbance, they would have none of the Clergy of* Conſtantinople *choſen Biſhop there*; and ſo *Neſtorius* was brought from *Antioch*. *Maximianus* being dead, he gave order that *Proclus* ſhould be made *Biſhop*, before the other's body was buried. Theſe Inſtances are ſufficient to ſhew, that *Chriſtian Princes* did from the firſt think fit, when *juſt occaſion* was given, to make uſe of their *Authority* in this matter.

Socr. *l.* 7. c. 40.

(5.) Upon the alteration of the *Government* of *Chriſtendom* there was greater reaſon for the *Magiſtrate*'s interpoſing than before. For upon the *endowment* of *Churches* by the great *liberality* of the *Northern Princes*, it was thought at firſt very reaſonable, that the *Royal Aſſent* ſhould be obtained, though a *Biſhop* was *choſen* by the *Clergy* and *People*: which at firſt depended only on *tacit conſent*; but after the ſolemn Aſſemblies of the *People* came to be much uſed, theſe *Privileges* of *Princes* came not only to be *confirmed* by the *Conſent* of the *People*, but to be enlarged. For, the *Princes* obtained by degrees not only the *Confirmation* of the *elected*, but the *liberty* of *nomination*; with a *ſhadow* of *election* by the *Clergy*, and others of the *Court*, as appears by the *Formulæ* of *Marculphus*. This way was not always obſerved in *France*, where frequently, according to the *Edict* of *Clotharius*, the *Clergy* and *People choſe*, the *Metropolitan conſecrated*, and the *Prince* gave his *Royal Aſſent*: but in doubtful or difficult caſes, he made uſe of his *Prerogative*, and *nominated* the Perſon, and appointed the *Conſecration*. Afterwards, there aroſe great conteſts between the *Papal* and *Royal Power*, which continued for ſeveral Ages, and at laſt among us, the *Royal Power* overthrowing the other, reſerved the *Power* of *Nomination* of *Biſhops*, as part of the *Prerogative*; which being allowed in *frequent Parliaments*, the *Conſent* of the *People* is ſwallowed up therein; ſince their *Acts* do oblige the whole Nation. For not only the *Statute* of 1 *Ed.* 6. declares, *The Right of appointing Biſhops to be in the King*; but 25 *Ed.* 3. it is likewiſe declared, *That the Right of diſpoſing Biſhopricks was in the King by Right of Patronage, derived from his Anceſtors before the freedom of elections was granted*. Which ſhews not only the *great Antiquity* of this *Right*, but the *Conſent* of the *whole Nation* to it. And the ſame is fully related in the *Epiſtle* of *Ed.* 3. to *Clement* 5. where it is ſaid, *That the King did diſpoſe of them*, jure ſuo Regio, *by his Royal Prerogative, as his Anceſtors had done from the firſt founding of a Chriſtian Church here*. This is likewiſe owned in the famous *Statute* of *Carliſle*, 25 *Ed.* 1. ſo that there is no *Kingdom* where this *Right* hath been more fully acknowledged by the *general conſent of the People*, than here in *England*; and that from the *original planting* of a *Chriſtian Church* here. As to the inferior *Right of Patronage*, it is juſtly thought to bear equal date with the *firſt ſettlements* of *Chriſtianity* in peace and quietneſs. For when it began to ſpread into *remoter Villages* and places diſtant from the *Cathedral Churches*, where the *Biſhop* reſided with his *Preſbyters*, as in a *College* together; a neceſſity was ſoon apprehended of having *Preſbyters fixed* among them. For the *Council* of *Neocæſarea* mentions the ἐπιχώριοι πρεσβύτεροι, *the Country Preſbyters*, *c.* 13. whom the *Greek Canoniſts* interpret to be ſuch as then were *fixed* in *Country-Cures*, and this *Council* was held ten years before the *Council* of *Nice*. In the time of the *firſt Council* of *Orange*, *A.D.* 441. expreſs mention is made of

Concil. Aurelian. *A.D.* 549.

V. Concil. Tarracon. *A. D.* 599. *Can.* 3.

Concil. Tolet. 12. *c.* 6. *& ibi* Loaiſam.

Grati. *Diſt.* 63.

Concil. Vernenſe, *Can.* 2.

Sirmond. *Append. ad* To. 2. *Con.* Gall.

Lup. Ferrarienſ. *Ep.* 81, 98, 99.

V. Grotii *Pict. p.* 91.

Walſingh. *in* Edw. 3. *p.* 161.

the *Right of Patronage* reſerved to the *firſt Founders* of *Churches*, *c.* 10. *viz. If a Biſhop built a Church on his own Land, in another Biſhop's Dioceſe, yet the Right of preſenting the Clerk was reſerved to him.* And this was confirmed by the *ſecond Council* of *Arles*, *c.* 36. *A. D.* 452. By the *Conſtitution* of the *Emperour Zeno*, *A. D.* 479. the *Rights of Patronage* are *eſtabliſhed*, upon the *agreements* at firſt made in the *endowments* of *Churches*. This *Conſtitution* was confirmed by *Juſtinian*, *A. D.* 541. and he allows the *nomination* and *preſentation* of a fit *Clerk*: And the ſame were ſetled in the *Weſtern Church*, as appears by the *ninth Council* of *Toledo*, about *A. D.* 650. and many *Canons* were made in ſeveral *Councils* about *regulating* the *Rights* of *Patronage*, and the *Endowments* of *Churches*, till at laſt it obtained by *general Conſent*, that the *Patron* might tranſmit the *Right* of *Preſentation* to his *Heirs*, and the *Biſhops* were to approve of the *Perſons* preſented, and to give *Inſtitution* to the *Benefice*. The *Barons* of *England*, in the *Epiſtle* to *Gregory* IX. plead, *That their Anceſtors had the Right of Patronage, from the firſt planting of Chriſtianity here.* For thoſe upon whoſe Lands the *Churches* were built, and at whoſe coſt and charges they were erected, and by whom the *Parochial Churches* were endowed, thought they had great *Reaſon* to reſerve the *Nomination* of the *Clerks* to themſelves. And this *Joh. Sariſburienſis* ſaith, *was received by a general cuſtom of this whole Kingdom.* So that the *Right* of *Patronage* was at firſt built upon a *very reaſonable conſideration*; and hath been ever ſince received by as *univerſal a Conſent* as any *Law* or *Cuſtom* among us. And the only *Queſtions* now remaining are, whether ſuch a *Conſent* can be made void by the *Diſſent* of ſome *few Perſons*, who plead it to be their *inherent Right to chuſe their own Paſtors?* and ſuppoſing, that it might be done, whether it be *reaſonable* ſo to do? And I conclude, that,

C. ſi quis 15. *Cod. de Sacroſ. Eccl. Nov.* 57.

Nov. 123. *c.* 18.

Mat. Paris, *ad A.*1235.

Joh. Sariſb. *Ep.* 6. & 119.

6. Things being thus ſetled by *general Conſent, and eſtabliſh'd Laws*, there is no ground for the *People* to *reſume* the *liberty* of *Elections*: (1.) Becauſe it was *no unalterable Right*, but might be paſſed away; and hath been by *Conſent* of the *People*, upon good conſiderations: And, (2.) Becauſe no ſuch inconveniencies can be alleged againſt the ſetled way of diſpoſal of *Livings*, but may be remedied by *Laws*; far eaſier, than thoſe which will follow upon the *Peoples taking this Power to themſelves*, which cannot be done in a *divided Nation*, without throwing all into *remedileſs confuſion*. (3.) Becauſe *other reformed Churches* have thought this an *unreaſonable pretence*. *Beza* declaims againſt it, *as a thing without any ground in Scripture, or any right in Antiquity, and ſubject to infinite diſorders.* In *Sweden* the *Archbiſhop* and *Biſhops* are appointed by the *King*; and ſo are the *Biſhops* in *Denmark*: In other *Lutheran* Churches, the *Superintendents* are appointed by the ſeveral *Princes* and *Magiſtrates*; and in theſe the *Patrons* preſent before *Ordination*. The *Synod* of *Dort* hath a *Salvo* for the *Right* of *Patronage*, *Can. Eccleſ.* 5. In *France* the *Miniſters* are choſen by *Miniſters*; at *Geneva* by the *Council* of *State*, which hath *Power* to *depoſe them*. And it would be very ſtrange, if this *inherent* and *unalterable Right* of the *People* ſhould only be diſcovered here, where it is as unfit to be practiſed, as in any part of the Chriſtian world.

Epiſt. 83.

Ritterſhuſ. *ad* Novell. *p.* 1. *c.* 7. *n.* 36, 37.

But Mr. *B.* is unſatisfied with any *Laws* that are made in this matter; for when the objection is put by him, *That the People chuſe the Parliament who make the Laws which give the Patrons Power, and therefore they now conſent*; he ſaith, *this ſeemeth a Jeſt*; *for*, he ſaith,

*Treatiſe of Epiſcop p.*2. *p.* 123.

1. It cannot be proved that all the Churches or People gave the Patrons that Power. 2. They never conſented that Parliaments ſhould do what they liſt, and diſpoſe of their Souls, or what is neceſſary to the ſaving of their Souls. 3. They may as well ſay, that they conſent to be baptized, and to receive the Sacraments, becauſe the Parliament conſented to it. 4. Their Forefathers had no power to repreſent them by ſuch conſenting. 5. The obligation on the People was Perſonal, and they have not God's *conſent for the tranſmutation.*

So that one would think by Mr. *B.*'s Doctrine, all *Laws* about *Patronage* are void in themſelves; and all *Rights* of *Advowſon* in the *King*, or *Noblemen* and *Gentlemen*, or *Univerſities*, are mere *Uſurpations*, and things utterly unlawful among *Chriſtians*, ſince he makes ſuch a *perſonal obligation to chuſe their own Paſtors* to lie on the *People*, that they cannot transfer it by their own *Act*. But upon ſecond Thoughts, I ſuppoſe, he will not deny, that the *freedom* of *publick Churches*, and the *Endowments* of them, do lie within the *Magiſtrate*'s *Power*, and ſo binding Laws may be made about them; unleſs he can prove that the *Magiſtrate*'s *Power* doth not extend to thoſe things which the *Magiſtrate gives*. And if theſe may be juſtly ſetled by *Laws*, then the *Rights* of *Patronage* are as *juſt* and *legal Rights* as Men have to their Eſtates, and conſequently every Miniſter duly preſented, hath a *legal* Title to *the Temple and Tythes*, as Mr. *B.* calls them. *But this doth not*, ſaith he, *make a Miniſter for their Souls, and the Parliament cannot diſpoſe of their Souls.* The meaning of all which is, if the People be humourſome and factious, they may run after whom they pleaſe, and ſet up what *Miniſter* they pleaſe, in oppoſition to Laws. And ſo for inſtance, ſuppoſe a Pariſh be divided in their Opinions about Religion, (as we know too many are at this day) all theſe ſeveral parties, *viz. Anabaptiſts*, *Quakers*, yea and *Papiſts* too, as well as others, will put in for an equal ſhare in what concerns *the care of their Souls*, and conſequently, may chuſe a ſeveral Paſtor to themſelves, and leave the *Incumbent* the bare poſſeſſion of *the Temple and Tythes*. But if there be no other objection, this may be thought ſufficient, *that he was none of their chuſing*, being impoſed upon them by others, who could not *diſpoſe of their Souls*. By which means, this pretence of *taking care for their Souls*, will be ſoon made uſe of to juſtifie the greateſt diſorder and confuſion, which can happen in a Church. For, let the Perſon be never ſo worthy in himſelf, the *People* are ſtill to have their *liberty* of *chuſing* for themſelves. And who are theſe *People?* Muſt all have equal Votes? then according to Mr. *B.*'s opinion of our *Churches*, the worſt will be ſooneſt choſen; for why ſhould we not think the *worſt People will chuſe their like*, as well as the *worſt Patrons*, and the *worſt Biſhops?* But if the *profane* muſt be excluded, *by what Law?* Is it becauſe they have *no right to the Ordinances?* But have they *no right to their own Souls, and to the care of them?* therefore they are equally concerned with others. Yea let us ſuppoſe all theſe excluded, as *no competent Judges*; ſhall all the reſt be excluded too, who are *incompetent Judges?* then I am afraid there will not be many left. And, whatever they pretend, the *People* where they do chuſe, do truſt other mens Judgments, as well as where the *Patrons preſent*; and to prevent popular tumults, ſuch Elections are generally brought by a kind of *devolution* to a few Perſons who are entruſted to chuſe for the reſt. But if all the People were left *to chuſe their own Paſtors*, it is not to be imagined, what Parties and Factions; what mutual

tual Hatreds, and perpetual Animoſities, they would naturally fall into on ſuch occaſions. Do we not daily ſee ſuch things to be the fruits of popular Elections, where men are concerned for the ſtrength and reputation of their Party? What envying and ſtrife, what evil-ſpeaking and backbiting; what tumults and diſorders; what unchriſtian behaviour in general, of men to each other, do commonly accomany ſuch *Elections?* Which being the natural effects of mens paſſions, ſtirred up by ſuch occaſions, and there being ſo much experience of it in all Ages of the Chriſtian Church, where ſuch things have been; I am as certain, that *Chriſt* never gave *the People ſuch an unalterable Right of chuſing their own Miniſters*, as I am that he deſigned to have the *peace* and *unity* of the *Church* preſerved. And of all Perſons, I do the moſt wonder at him, who pretends to diſcover *the Only way of unity and concord among Chriſtians*, that he ſhould ſo much, ſo frequently, ſo earneſtly inſiſt upon this; which if it be not *the only*, is one of the moſt *effectual ways* to perpetuate *diſorder* and *confuſion* in a broken and divided Church. And ſo much for the *Plea* for *Separation*, taken from the *Peoples Right to chuſe their own Miniſters.*

Sect. 26. Having thus diſpatched all the *Pleas* for *Separation*, which *relate* to the *Conſtitution* of our *Church*, I come to thoſe which concern the *Terms* of *Communion* with us, *which are ſaid to be unlawful.*

Miſchief of Impoſitions, p. 41.

Vindic. of Non conf. p. 13.

Dr. Falkner's *Vindication of Liturgies*, 1680.

One of the chief *Pleas* alleged for *Separation*, by Dr. *O.* and Mr. *A.* is, *that many things in the conſtant total Communion of Parochial Churches are impoſed on the Conſciences and Practices of men, which are not according to the mind of* Chriſt. Theſe are very general words; but Dr. *O.* reckons up the particulars, which (ſetting aſide thoſe already conſidered) are, *the uſe of the Aëreal ſign of the Croſs, kneeling at the Communion, the religious obſervation of Holy-days, and the conſtant uſe of the Liturgy in all the publick Offices of the Church.* As to this laſt I ſhall ſay nothing, it being lately ſo very well defended by a *learned Divine* of our *Church*. To the other, Mr. *B.* adds, *the uſe of Godfathers* and *Godmothers*; and now I am to examine what weight there is in theſe things, to make men ſeriouſly think *Communion* with our *Church unlawful.*

When I found our *Church* thus charged with *preſcribing unlawful Terms of Communion*, I expected a particular and diſtinct proof of ſuch a charge, becauſe the main weight of the *Cauſe* depended upon it. And this is the method we uſe in dealing with the *Church* of *Rome*. We do not run upon general charges of *unſcriptural Impoſitions*, and *things impoſed on mens Conſciences, againſt the mind of* Chriſt; but we cloſe with them upon the particulars of the charge, as *Worſhip of Images, Invocation of Saints, Adoration of the Hoſt*, and we offer to prove by plain *Scripture*, that theſe are *forbidden*, and therefore *unlawful*. But I find no ſuch method taken or purſued by our *Brethren*, only we are told, over and over, that *they judge, they think, they eſteem them unlawful; and they cannot be ſatisfied about them*; but for particular arguments to prove them *unlawful*, I find none; which makes the whole charge look very ſuſpiciouſly. For men do not uſe to remain in *generals*, when they have any aſſurance of the *goodneſs* of their *Cauſe*. Yet, to let the Reader ſee that I decline nothing that looks like argument in this matter, I ſhall pick up every thing I can find, which ſeems to prove theſe *Terms* of our *Communion* to be *unlawful*, or to juſtifie their *Separation*.

In the *Epiſtle* before my *Sermon*, I had uſed this Argument againſt the *preſent Separation*, “ that if it be lawful to ſeparate on a pretence of “ *greater purity*, where there is an *agreement* in *Doctrine* and the *ſub-*“ *ſtantial parts of Worſhip*, as is acknowledged in our Caſe, then a bare “ difference of opinion, as to ſome *circumſtantials of Worſhip*, and the “ *beſt Conſtitution* of *Churches*, will be ſufficient ground to break *Com-*“ *munion*, and to ſet up *new Churches*; which, conſidering the great “ variety of mens fancies about theſe matters, is to make an infinite “ Diviſibility in Churches, without any poſſible ſtop to farther Separa-“ tion.

This Argument others were willing to paſs over, but Mr. *A.* in his *Preface*, undertakes to anſwer it in all the parts of it; which being ſo material to our buſineſs, I ſhall now diſtinctly conſider; and like an able Diſputant, he allows nothing at all in this Argument; for he denies the *Suppoſition*, viz. *that there is any ſuch agreement in Doctrine, and the ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip*; he denies *the firſt conſequence*; and, as though that were not ſufficient, he denies the *remoter conſequence* too. And what Argument can ſtand before a Man of ſuch proweſs in diſputing?

1. He denies *an agreement in Doctrine*, which I have already ſhewed, was allowed by *all Diſſenters* before him, from the days of *R. Brown*, to Mr. *A.* But we muſt not miſtake him, for as fierce as he ſeems to be at firſt, yet let him but have ſcope to ſhew ſome tricks of Wit, and trials of his ſkill in fencing, and he is as tame and yielding as you would wiſh him; for at laſt he confeſſes *they generally agree with the Doctrine contained in the Thirty nine Articles*; and but for mere ſhame he would have ſaid *all*; for I never heard of one before him made any ſcruple of it. And this is the *Doctrine* eſtabliſhed in this *Church*, and if there be an *agreement in this*, then this *Suppoſition* is granted.

2. As to *ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip*, he denies an *agreement in this too*, although Dr. O. ſaith, *we are agreed in the ſubſtantial parts of Religion*, and I hope the *parts* of *Worſhip* are allowed to be ſome of them. *Vindication, p. 22.* But he pretends *not to know what we mean by the difference between the parts of Worſhip, making ſome ſubſtantial, and others circumſtantial*; and then he offers to prove, *that our Church appoints new ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip*, and therefore he muſt know one from the other; and after he hath ſpent ſome leaves in the proof of that, at laſt he fairly concludes, *that there is a difference at leaſt in a circumſtantial part of Worſhip*.

But becauſe this is a weighty charge againſt our *Church*, I ſhall take the more pains to conſider it, becauſe the main objection againſt our *Ceremonies* lies under it, and that which moſt ſticks with the more ſober *Non-conformiſts*.

Mr. *A.*'s charge about *a ſubſtantial part of Worſhip* being appointed by our *Church*, is thus drawn up. *An outward viſible ſign of an inward inviſible grace, whereby a perſon is dedicated to the profeſſion of, and ſubjection to the Redeemer, is a ſubſtantial part of Worſhip.* Now this he chargeth our *Church* with, but gives no inſtance; but the *ſign* of the *Croſs* after *Baptiſm*, is that which he means, which Mr. *B.* calls *the tranſient dedicating Image of the Croſs*. *Anſw. p. 49* For the clearing of this, it will be neceſſary to ſhew, 1. What we mean by *a ſubſtantial part of Worſhip*. 2. How it appears that the *ſign of the Croſs* is made no *ſubſtantial part of Worſhip* by our *Church*.

1. What we mean by a *ſubſtantial part of divine Worſhip.* For I have obſerved, that the want of a clear and diſtinct notion of this, hath been one of the greateſt occaſions of the *Scruples* of the moſt conſcientious *Non-conformiſts.* For being afraid of diſpleaſing God, by uſing any other *parts of Worſhip*, than himſelf hath appointed; and looking on our Ceremonies, as *real parts of divine Worſhip*, upon this reaſon they have thought themſelves obliged in conſcience, at leaſt, to forbear the uſe of them. The great principle they went upon was this, *that whatever was any ways intended or deſigned for the Worſhip of God, was a real and ſubſtantial part of his Worſhip*; and when their Adverſaries told them that *Divine Inſtitution* was neceſſary to make *a part of Worſhip*, their anſwer was, that *Divine Inſtitution* did not make that a *part of Worſhip* which was *none*, but that to be *a part of true Worſhip*, which otherwiſe would be *a part of falſe Worſhip.* In the mean time, they did not deny the *lawfulneſs* of the *application* of *common Circumſtances* to *Acts* of *Religious Worſhip*, as *Time* and *Place*, &c. but the annexing any other *Rites*, or *Ceremonies* to proper *Acts* of *Religious Worſhip*, (as the *ſign of the Croſs* to *Baptiſm*) they ſuppoſed to be the making *new ſubſtantial parts of Divine Worſhip*; and therefore forbidden by all thoſe places of *Scripture*, which imply the *Scripture it ſelf* to be a perfect *Rule of Worſhip.* This, as far as I can gather, is the ſtrongeſt *Plea* of the *Non-conformiſts ſide*, which I have repreſented with its full advantage, becauſe my deſign is, if poſſible, not ſo much to confute, as to convince our *Diſſenting Brethren.*

Let us then ſeriouſly conſider this matter, and if we can find out a plain diſcernable difference between *ſubſtantial parts of Divine Worſhip*, and mere *accidental Appendices*, this diſcovery may tend more to diſentangle ſcrupulous minds, than the multiplying of Arguments to *prove* the *lawfulneſs* of our *Ceremonies.* And that we may better underſtand where the difficulty lies, theſe following things are agreed on both ſides.

1. That beſides *proper Acts* of *Worſhip*, there are ſome *Circumſtances* which may be differently uſed, without ſetting up *new parts* of *Worſhip.* As for inſtance, *Adoration* is a *ſubſtantial* and *proper Act* of *Divine Worſhip*; but whether that *Adoration* be performed by *proſtration*, or by *bowing*, or by *kneeling*, is in it ſelf *indifferent*; and no man will ſay, that he that makes his *adoration kneeling*, makes another *new part* of *Worſhip*, from what he doth who performs it *ſtanding*, or *falling on his face.* And ſo, if the ancient *Eaſtern Church* did at certain times forbid *kneeling* in *Acts* of *adoration*, this doth not prove that they differ'd in point of *Adoration* from the *Weſtern Church*, which requires *kneeling* in the ſame *Offices* of *Divine Worſhip*, becauſe they agreed in the *Act* of *Adoration*, but only differ'd in the manner of expreſſing it.

2. That *Divine Inſtitution* makes thoſe to be *neceſſary parts* of *Worſhip*, which of themſelves are not ſo. As is plain in the *Sacraments* of the *New Teſtament*, which of themſelves are no *neceſſary ſubſtantial parts of the Worſhip of God*, but only become ſo, by being appointed by *Chriſt.* So under the Law, many things merely *ritual* and *ceremonial* in themſelves, yet by vertue of *Divine appointment*, became *ſubſtantial parts* of *Divine Worſhip.*

3. That for men to make *new Parts* of *Divine Worſhip* is *unlawful.* For that is to ſuppoſe the *Scripture* an *imperfect Rule* of *Worſhip*, and

that *Superſtition* is no fault, and conſequently, that our Saviour, without cauſe, found fault with the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* for their *Traditions*.

4. That there are many things which may be done in the *Worſhip* of *God*, which are not forbidden to be done, unleſs they be *Parts* of *Divine Worſhip*. For, if the ſuppoſed reaſon of their *prohibition*, be their being made *Parts* of *Divine Worſhip*, if it be made appear, that they are not ſo, then it follows they are not forbidden.

5. That what is neither *forbidden directly*, nor by *conſequence*, is *lawful*, and may be practiſed in the *Worſhip* of *God*. For although Mr. *A.* quarrels with me, for ſaying, they require *expreſs Commands* to make things *lawful* in the *Worſhip of God*; yet he allows, that what is not required either *directly*, or by *conſequence* is unlawful, and by parity of Reaſon, what is not forbidden in the ſame manner muſt be lawful. *Miſchief of Impoſ. p.*29.

Sect. 27. It remains now to find out thoſe certain *Notes* and *Marks* of *diſtinction* in this matter, as may give ſatisfaction to the conſciences of men, in the difference between *innocent Ceremonies*, and *ſuperſtitious Parts* of *Divine Worſhip*. For the difference here doth not lie in ſuppoſing ſome things of *Divine Inſtitution* which are not, but in making thoſe to be *parts* of *Divine Worſhip* which are not. And that may be done theſe ways.

1. By ſuppoſing them to be ſo *neceſſary*, that the *doing* them would be a thing *pleaſing* to God, and the *omitting* of them would be a thing *diſpleaſing* to God, although there were no *humane Law* which required the doing of them. For, where there is no obligation by vertue of any humane Law, and yet men ſuppoſe they ſhould *pleaſe God* by doing, or *diſpleaſe God* by not obſerving ſome particular *Ceremonies*, it is a ſign they eſteem thoſe to be *Parts* of *Divine Worſhip*. And this was the caſe of the *Scribes* and *Phariſees*, whom our *Saviour* reproved, not ſo much for their *frequent waſhings*, as for ſuppoſing that a man's *Conſcience* was *defil'd*, if he did not obſerve them. For they had taken up an opinion among them, (as *H. Grotius* obſerves) that any thing that was touched by a Perſon unclean by the Law, did communicate an uncleanneſs firſt to their Bodies, and then to their Souls; but that this ceremonial waſhing did purifie both Body and Soul: upon which ſuppoſition, they concluded this *waſhing* ſo neceſſary a *part* of *God's Worſhip*, that the doing of it was a thing very pleaſing to God, and the omiſſion of it muſt be diſpleaſing to him, becauſe it left an inward defilement upon their Conſciences, which might have been removed by the uſe of it. But it is lately pleaded by Mr. *A.* *that this waſhing of hands among the Jews condemned by our Saviour, was juſt of the nature of our Ceremonies, being only obſerved as a command of their Superiors, not repugnant to the Law of God, but rather more agreeable to it than our Ceremonies are*: from whence he infers, *That all Traditions, Canons, Injunctions, concerning unneceſſary things are contrary to the Law of God, and conſequently invalid, and not obligatory.* But I ſay, the reaſon of our Saviour's oppoſing the *Phariſees* about this matter, was not becauſe a thing in it ſelf unneceſſary, was determined by their *Superiors*, but becauſe of the *ſuperſtitious opinion* which the *Phariſees* had concerning this *waſhing*, with reſpect to the *Conſciences* of men. And that I ſhall prove, 1. From the force of our *Saviour*'s reaſoning. 2. From the general ſenſe of the *Jews* concerning it.

*Mat.*15.11, 19, 20.

Exercit. on Mat. 15. 1, 9.

p. 23, 25.

p. 28.

1. From the force of our *Saviour*'s reaſoning, which will appear, by obſerving what he proves, *viz.* that they ſet up their *Tradition above the Law.* Ver. 3. *Why do you alſo tranſgreſs the Commandment of God by your Tradition?* and v. 6. *Thus ye have made the Commandment of God of none effect by your Tradition:* v. 9. *Full well ye reject the Commandment of God, that ye may keep your own Tradition.* Our *Saviour* here proves by a plain and undeniable Inſtance about the *Vow Corban*, that they did believe their *Traditions* to have a force *ſuperior* to the *Law*; elſe it were impoſſible they ſhould ſuppoſe ſuch an *arbitrary Vow* ſhould ſuperſede the obligation of the *Law*, as to the duty which *Children* owe to their Parents; but from hence it appeared that they believed the keeping of this *Vow* to be a thing more pleaſing to *God*, than relieving their Parents, and ſo they eſteemed it a *more neceſſary* and *ſubſtantial part* of *Divine Worſhip*. The force of his Argument then extends to all things which they looked on as things pleaſing to God, on the account of the *Tradition* of their *Elders*; for he argued againſt the main ſuppoſition, the truth of which he proves by a clear inſtance, where the *Tradition* did contradict the *Law*. And ſince by this, it appeared, that they thought their *Tradition* to over-rule the *Law*, it was no wonder they ſet up others equal to it, and thought mens Conſciences ſtrictly obliged to obſerve them. *But how doth the argument reach to the preſent caſe*, viz. *Becauſe that when their Traditions contradicted the Law, they were not to be obſerved; therefore, not, when agreeable, unleſs he rejected all kind of Traditions?* I anſwer, the *Phariſees* did think a man's *Conſcience* defiled if he did not obſerve that *Tradition*, as appears by what follows, when he taught the People upon this occaſion, *v.* 11. *That which entreth into the mouth defileth not a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth defileth a man.* This was the *Doctrine Chriſt* taught the *People* with reſpect to this diſpute with the *Phariſees*; which ſignified nothing, unleſs the opinion among them was, that eating of bread with unwaſhen hands, did really defile a man's *Conſcience* towards *God*. At which the *Phariſees* were much offended, as the *Diſciples* told him, *v.* 12. and they were not ſo very well ſatisfied, but they deſire a farther explication of this matter from himſelf; which he gives them, *v.* 17, 18, 19. where he ſhews that no *defilement* could come to mens *Conſciences* merely *by what they did eat*; but that mens *inward luſts* were the things which *defiled them*, for theſe were the ſourſe of thoſe *wicked actions*, which were moſt diſpleaſing to God. And ſo he concludes his Diſcourſe, *v.* 20. *Theſe are the things which defile a man, but to eat with unwaſhen hands defileth not a man.* From whence it follows, that the main thing in diſpute was, whether this *Ceremony* of *waſhing hands* could be omitted, without *defiling the Conſcience?* or elſe our *Saviour*'s concluſion doth not reach the Queſtion. But if the *concluſion* was contrary to the *Phariſees Doctrine*, then they muſt look upon this *Ceremony* of *waſhing of hands*, as *a part* of *Worſhip* equal to the *Law of God*, and which men pleaſed *God* by doing, and diſpleaſed him by omitting it; not merely with reſpect to the *command* of *Superiors*, but as they ſuppoſed ſome leſſer guilt upon the *Conſcience* might be *expiated* by it, which would remain, if they did not uſe it.

2. From the *general ſenſe* of the *Jews*. Even Mr. *A.* himſelf, in the very ſame diſcourſe, where he would make *this waſhing of hands like our Ceremonies*, quotes ſeveral paſſages of the *Talmudiſts*, to prove *that they equalled their Traditions with the Laws of God, and ſometimes* p. 17.

ſet them above them; and particularly of this *Tradition* he ſaith, *It is a ſaying of the Talmud, that he that eats bread with unwaſhen hands, ſins as grievouſly as if he lay with a Whore.* Which is a ſaying of R. *Aſe* in *Sota*; and abundantly proves, that this was not looked on as an *indifferent Ceremony*, but as a thing whoſe omiſſion brought a guilt on the Conſcience. And I wonder Mr. *A.* did not diſcern, that by this one ſaying, he overthrew all the reſt of his diſcourſe: But this opinion is not built on the ſaying of any *Rabbi*, but on a conſtant *Tradition* among them, which they derive from the *days* of *Solomon, who*, they ſay, *appointed it firſt, when they did eat of Sacrifices*; afterwards, *the wiſe men applied it to the Terumah*, and at laſt *Hillel* and *Schammai decreed it ought to be obſerved for their greater purification, before the eating their common Meals.* And the *Phariſees* placing the greateſt part of their *Religion* in the nice obſervance of ſuch *Traditions*, thought themſelves ſo much more holy than others, as they did more carefully avoid the defilements of common Converſation; and for that reaſon they obſerved *this waſhing*, eſpecially when they had been in promiſcuous company. For they thought themſelves *defiled* by any *touch from the ordinary ſort of People*; and this, *Maimonides* ſaith, *they looked on as a peculiar part of Sanctity*; and the more ſtrict and punctual they were in this, the more holy they were accounted. Therefore in the *Talmud*, one *John*, the Son of *Gudged*, is particularly admired for his *Sanctity*, *becauſe he exceeded others in the niceneſs of waſhing his hands.* And they have a ſaying in the *Miſna* to this purpoſe, *The Garments of the common People, are a pollution to the Phariſees, and the Garments of the Phariſees to thoſe that eat the Terumah, and theirs to thoſe that eat of the Sacrifices, and theirs to thoſe that touched the water of cleanſing.* So that they had different *degrees* of *Sanctity* about this *matter* of *waſhing*, none of which was impoſed for the ſake of *cleanlineſs*, but from the *ſuppoſition* of ſome *inward purification* they obtained by it, from the *common filthineſs* of the world. And upon this principle, even the *veſſels* of the *Temple* were to be *waſhed* all over, *if they were but touched by the common People.* In the *waſhing their hands*, they put a difference between that before, and that after meat; the latter they accounted a matter of liberty, or at leaſt only *for health* to waſh off the dangerous *ſaline particles* which they ſuppoſed to remain; but the former was required for *inward purification*; which they require ſo ſtrictly, *that if water may be had within four miles, a Jew is bound not to eat till he hath waſhed, no not with a fork*; *and in caſe none can be had, then he is to cover his hands, and ſo eat*; *nor can he take meat from another in his mouth, until his mouth be firſt waſhed. If there be no more water than will ſerve for his drink, he muſt part with enough of it to waſh his hands*; and therefore R. *Akiba* in priſon ſaid, *He would rather periſh with thirſt, than want water to waſh his hands.* And they ſay, *Whoſoever diſeſteems this Cuſtom, deſerves not only excommunication, but death too.* Since all this is evident from the moſt *authentick Writers* among the *Jews*, I cannot but admire at Mr. *A.*'s deſign, who would make the world believe, that this was no more than an *indifferent Ceremony* among the *Jews*, that was only required for *Order* and *Decency*, as *our Ceremonies* are, when thoſe very *Citations* he brings from *Buxtorf*, and Dr. *Lightfoot*, do manifeſtly prove the contrary. This I thought neceſſary to be cleared, becauſe this is the chief place in the *New Teſtament*, which they bring to prove the *unlawfulneſs* of our *Ceremonies.*

Excerpta Gemar. c. 1. §. 6.

Mark 7.

Chagiga, c. 2. §. ult.

Erub. in f. 21.

From hence it now appears that the reaſon of *Chriſt*'s condemning that *Ceremony* of *waſhing of hands*, was not upon the account of *Decency*, but a *ſuperſtitious Opinion* they had concerning it, that it did *expiate* a leſſer kind of *guilt* and *ſpiritual filthineſs* which they contracted by the *impure touches* of Men leſs holy than themſelves. And this the *Phariſees* more wondred at in *Chriſt's Diſciples*, becauſe it was a *Rule* among them, *that the Diſciples of the Wiſe ought to be more ſtrict in theſe caſes than others*, becauſe theſe things tended to advance the *Reputation* of their *Holineſs*, among the *People*. And where ſuch an Opinion prevails, there ſuch *Ceremonies* are made *parts* of *Divine Worſhip*.

Bellarm. *de effectu Sacra. l.* 2. *c.* 31. *Sect. tertia.*

Bell. *de cultu Sanct. l.* 3. *c.* 7. § *Nota. Benedict. Salis ad aquam luſtral. Paſtoral. de Sacr. Bap.* Azor. *Inſtit. Moral. l.* 4. *c.* 11.

Greg. *de Valent. To.* 4. *diſp.* 7. *q.* 4. *puncto* 1. Marſil. Columnæ *Hydragiologia.*

Bell. *de Imag. l.* 2. *c.* 30.

Thyræ. *de locis infeſt. p.* 3. *c.* 68.

Theſaur. *Cathol. To.* 1. *l.* 2. *art.* 9.

Freſh Suit againſt Cerem. p. 70. *p.* 427.

Caſſand. *Conſult. art.* 7. & 9.

To. 4. *diſp.* 3. *q.* 1. *p.* 4.

Sect. 28. And thus it is in many of the *Ceremonies* of the *Roman Church*, which their *Divines* aſſert to have *a purifying and cleanſing faculty as to the Souls of Men*; *not for juſtification of Men from mortal ſins, but for other ſpiritual effects, and taking away the guilt of venial ſins.* For ſay they, *no doubt they are effectual for the ends to which the Church appointed them, and of this, there is no diſpute among Catholicks.* And withal, they add, *That it is probable that the Church hath power to appoint Ceremonies in ſuch a manner, that they may produce theſe effects,* ex opere operato, *as the Sacraments do juſtification, becauſe Chriſt hath left it in the power of the Church to apply his merits for leſſer effects; having appointed the Sacraments himſelf for the greater.* But *Bellarmin* thinks this latter part diſputable concerning the *opus operatum of Ceremonies*; but as to the former, *viz. by way of impetration*, he ſaith, *it is paſt all doubt among Catholicks.* So, as to *the ſprinkling of Holy Water*, *Bellarmin* ſaith, *it is no mere ſignificant Ceremony*; *but it is effectual for the blotting out of venial ſins*; and he quotes Saint *Thomas*, and *Dom. à Soto*, and *Gratian* for it; who produceth the *Canon of Alex.* 1. whereby it appears it was firſt inſtituted *ut eâ cuncti aſperſi ſanctificentur & purificentur*; that all that were ſprinkled might be ſanctified and purified by it. In the prayer of *Conſecration* for the *Salt* to *make holy Water*, one expreſſion is, *that it might be wholſome both to Body and Soul*; and the *Water* is conſecrated *to drive away the power of the Devil. Azorius* ſaith, *that holy Water cleanſeth venial ſins,* ex opere operato, *and drives away Devils. Greg. de Valentia* agrees in the thing, but is not ſo peremptory in the manner. But *Marſilius Columna* hath written a whole *Book* of the *admirable effects of this Ceremony.* And ſo for *the ſign of the Croſs*, *Bellarmin* attributes *wonderful effects* to it, *for driving away Devils and Diſeaſes, and ſanctifying the things it is applied to:* And he ſaith, it hath power againſt the Devil *ex opere operato. Pet. Thyræus* the *Jeſuit*, attributes a *proper efficiency to the ſign of the Croſs againſt the power of the Devil. Coccius* ſaith, *It is a terror to the Devils, and very beneficial to Mankind.* Which makes me wonder at Dr. *Ames* his diſigenuity, when he would go about to make the Doctrine of our *Church* about *Ceremonies* not to differ from that of the *Church* of *Rome*. It is true, *Caſſander* and ſome few others, talk at another rate; and *Caſſander* himſelf ſaith, *the beſt Men on both ſides were agreed about theſe matters.* But we are not to take their general ſenſe from ſuch as *Caſſander*; eſpecially when their *publick Offices* ſpeak the ſenſe of their *Church* better than *Caſſander. Greg. de Valentiâ* indeed, ſaith, *It is a lie that they attribute as much to Ceremonies as to Sacraments:* And in truth they do it not; for they attribute *Juſtification* to the *Sacraments*, and the *expiation* of the remainder of *venial ſins* to the uſe of *Ceremonies*. However, ſince they attribute ſo *ſpiritual effects* to them; it is an argument they look upon them as *real parts* of *Divine Worſhip*, as much as they do on *Prayer*, with which they compare them in point of *efficacy*. But with what face can this be objected againſt our *Church*; which utterly rejects any ſuch *ſpiritual efficacy*, as to the *Ceremonies* that are retained among us; and declares that they are no otherwiſe received in our *Church*, than as they are purged from *Popiſh Superſtition* and *Error*? And therefore all opinion of *merit* and *ſpiritual efficacy* is taken from them; which do make them to be *parts* of *Divine Worſhip*; which being removed, they remain only naked *Ceremonies*, *i. e.* as *Caſſander* well expreſſes it, *Words made viſible*, or *teaching Actions*; whoſe deſign and intention being towards us, and not towards *God*, they cannot be thought to be made *parts* of *Divine Worſhip*, although they be uſed in the performance of them. As if the *Chriſtians* in the Eaſt did wear the badge of a *Croſs* upon their *Arms*, at ſome ſolemn days, as on *good Friday* at their *devotions*, to diſtinguiſh them from *Turks* and *Jews*; would any one ſay, that they made this *badge* a *part* of *Divine Worſhip*? But when they ſee the *Papiſts* on that day uſing the moſt ſolemn *poſtures* of *adoration* to the *Crucifix*, they might well charge them with making this a *part* of *Divine Worſhip*. So that the *diſtinction* between theſe two, is not ſo hard to find, if Men apply their Minds to the conſideration of it.

Preface to the Common-Prayer, Can. 30.

2. Men may make *Ceremonies* to become *parts* of *Divine Worſhip* if they ſuppoſe them *unalterable*, and *obligatory* to the *Conſciences* of all *Chriſtians*: for this ſuppoſes an *equal neceſſity* with that of *Divine Inſtitution*. If Men do aſſert ſo great a *Power* in the *Church*, as to appoint things for *ſpiritual effects*, and to *oblige* the *Conſciences* of all *Chriſtians* to obſerve them; it is all one as to ſay, the *Church* may make *new parts* of *Worſhip*. But this can with no colour be objected againſt a *Church* which declares as expreſly as it is poſſible, *that it looks on the Rites and Ceremonies uſed therein, as things in their own nature indifferent and alterable; and that changes and alterations may be made, as ſeems neceſſary or expedient to thoſe in Authority: And that every Country is at liberty to uſe their own Ceremonies; and that they neither condemn others nor preſcribe to them.* What can more expreſs the not making *Ceremonies* any *parts* of *Divine Worſhip* than theſe things do? And thus I have at once ſhewed, what we mean by *ſubſtantial parts* of *Divine Worſhip*, and that our *Church* doth not make any human *Ceremonies* to be ſo.

Preface to Common Prayer.

Second Preface.

Sect. 29. I now come particularly to examin the charge againſt our *Church*. For Mr. *A.* ſaith, *An outward viſible ſign of an inward inviſible grace, whereby a perſon is dedicated to the profeſſion of and ſubjection to the Redeemer, is a ſubſtantial part of Worſhip.* I anſwer,

1. An *outward viſible ſign* between Men repreſenting the *duty* or *engagement* of another, is *no part* of *Divine Worſhip* at all, much leſs a *ſubſtantial part* of it. There are ſome *viſible ſigns* from *God to Men*, repreſenting the *effects* of his *Grace* to us, and thoſe we call *Sacraments*; there are other *ſigns from Men to God*, to teſtifie their *ſubjection* and *dependence*, and theſe are *acts* of *Worſhip*; and there are *ſigns from Men to Men* to repreſent ſome other thing beſides the bare action; and theſe are *ſignificant Ceremonies*, ſuch as the *Croſs* in *Baptiſm* is. For, after the *Child is baptized* and received into the *Church*, the ſign of the

Croſs is uſed *in token that hereafter he ſhall not be aſhamed to confeſs the faith of Chriſt crucified.* &c. To whom is this token made? Is it to *God?* No certainly. If it were a permanent ſign of the *Croſs*, would it be for a *Teſtimony* to *God*, or to *Men?* When the *Primitive Chriſtians* uſed the *ſign of the Croſs* in token they were not aſhamed of *Chriſt crucified*, was this a *dedicating ſign to God*, or a *declarative ſign to Men?* And what if it repreſents *ſubjection to Chriſt* as the *Redeemer?* Muſt it therefore be ſuch an *outward viſible Sign* of *inward inviſible Grace*, as the *Sacraments* are? It repreſents the *Duty* and not the *Grace*; the *Duty* is *ours*, and may be repreſented by us; but the *Grace* is *God's*, and therefore he muſt appoint the *ſigns* to *repreſent* and convey that, becauſe he alone is the *Giver* of it.

2. The *Croſs* in *Baptiſm* is not intended by our *Church* for a *ſign* of *immediate dedication* to *God*, but of *obligation* on the perſon. It is true, that in the 30 *Canon* it is ſaid, *that this Church retains the ſign of the Croſs, following the example of the Primitive and Apoſtolical Churches; and accounteth it a lawful outward Ceremony and honourable badge, whereby the Infant is dedicated to the ſervice of him who died upon the Croſs.* But for the right underſtanding thereof, we muſt conſider, That *Baptiſm* is declared to be *compleat* before; ſo that the *ſign* of the *Croſs* adds nothing to the *perfection* or *vertue* of it, nor being omitted, takes nothing from it; as it is there expreſſed as the *ſenſe* of this *Church*. This therefore, is no part of the *Baptiſmal Dedication*. And the *Miniſter* acts in a *double capacity*, when he doth *baptize*, and when he *ſigns* with the *ſign* of the *Croſs:* When *he baptizeth*, he acts by vertue of *Authority* derived *from Chriſt*, *I baptize thee in the Name of the Father*, &c. Which being done, and the *Child* thereby ſolemnly *dedicated to God in Baptiſm*; he then ſpeaks in the *name* of the *Church*, varying the number; *We receive this Child into the Congregation of* Chriſt's *Flock, and do ſign him with the ſign of the Croſs*, &c. *i. e. We Chriſtians*, that are already *members* of *Chriſt's Flock*, *do receive him into our number*; and in token of his being *obliged* to perform the *duty* belonging to ſuch a one, do make uſe of this *ſign of the Croſs*, as the *Rite of Admiſſion* into the *Church*, and of his *obligation* to behave himſelf, as becomes a *Chriſtian*. And if we conſider the *ſign of the Croſs* in this ſenſe, as no doubt it was ſo intended, all the difficulties about a *Dedicating*, *Covenanting*, *Symbolical*, *Sacramental Sign*, concerning which ſome have made ſo great a ſtir, will ſoon appear to be of no force. For why may not the *Church* appoint ſuch a *Rite* of *Admiſſion* of one of her *Members* declaring it to be *no part* of *Baptiſm?* Let us ſuppoſe an adult perſon to be *baptized*, and immediately after *Baptiſm* to be admitted a *Member* of an *Independent Church*; and the *Ceremony* of this *admiſſion* to be *holding up of his hand*, in token of his owning the *Church-Government*, i. e. of promiſing to live as a *Church-member* ought to do among them; the *Paſtor* of the *Church* then baptizes him, and immediately after, upon *the holding up of his hand, in token of his owning the Church-Covenant*, he ſaith in the name of the Church, *we receive thee into this Congregation, and accept of thy holding up of thy hand as a token that thou wilt hereafter behave thy ſelf as a Church-member ought to do among us.* What harm is there in all this? And yet is not this a *Profeſſing*, *Dedicating*, *Covenanting*, *Symbolical*, *Sacramental Sign*, as much as the *Sign of the Croſs* is among us? Doth not *holding up the hand* ſignify and repreſent? Is it
not

Plea for Peace, p. 178, 179. *Defence of the Plea*, p. 42.

not therefore a *ſignificant* and *ſymbolical Ceremony?* Doth it not import an *obligation* lying on the perſon? Is it not therefore *dedicating, covenanting, and ſacramental*, as much as the *ſign of the Croſs?* Why then ſhould this be ſcrupled more than the other?

And by this Mr. *B*'s great miſtake appears about this matter; who ſuppoſeth that the *Miniſter* ſpeaketh *in the name of* Chriſt when he *ſigns* with the *ſign of the Croſs*; and *as God's Officer from him*, and *ſo dedicates him by this ſign to the ſervice of him that died upon the Croſs*; whereas the *Miniſter* in that *Act* ſpeaks in the *name* of the *Church*, as evidently appears by thoſe words, *We receive him into the Congregation of* Chriſt's *Flock*; and then follows, as the ſolemn rite of Admiſſion, *And do ſign him with the ſign of the Croſs*, &c. All publick and ſolemn *Admiſſions* into *Societies*, having ſome peculiar *Ceremony* belonging to them. And ſo as *Baptiſm* beſides its *ſacramental Efficacy* is a *Rite* of *Admiſſion* into *Chriſt's Catholick Church*; ſo the *ſign of the Croſs* is into our *Church* of *England*: in which this *Ceremony* is uſed, without any *preſcription* to other *Churches*.

Plea for Peace, p. 180.

Sect. 30. But ſaith Mr. *B. though the ſign of the Croſs may be lawful, as a tranſient, arbitrary, profeſſing ſign; yet not as a dedicating ſign, and as the common profeſſing ſymbol of baptized Perſons.* If it be *lawful* in the former ſenſe, I cannot underſtand how it ſhould be *unlawful* in the latter. *Yes*, ſaith he, *the inſtituting of the latter belongs to God only.* How doth that appear? *Becauſe he hath made two Sacraments already for that end.* True, but not only for that end; but to be the *means* and *inſtruments* of *conveying his Grace* to men; which none but *God* himſelf can do, and therefore none but he ought to appoint the *means* for that end. And we account it an unſufferable inſolency in the *Roman Churches*, for them to take upon them to make *application of the Merits of* Chriſt *to Rites of their own Inſtitution*; which is the only poſſible way for a *Church* to make *new Sacraments*; but if every *ſignificant cuſtom* in a *Church* muſt paſs for a *new Sacrament*, then *ſitting* at the *Sacrament* is a *new Sacrament*, becauſe we are told *it betokens reſt and Communion with* Chriſt; then putting off the *Hat* in *Prayer* is a *new Sacrament*, becauſe it is a *profeſſing ſign of Reverence*; then laying *on the hand, and kiſſing the Book in ſwearing* are *new Sacraments*, becauſe they are *publick ſymbolical Rites*. But ſaith Mr. *B. it belongeth only to the King to make the common badge or ſymbol of his own Subjects.* Yet I hope, every Nobleman or Gentleman may give a *diſtinct Livery* without *Treaſon*. And therefore why may not every *Church* appoint its own *Rite* of *admiſſion* of *Members* into its *Body? But the obligation here is to the common duties of Chriſtians.* And is not every *Church-member* bound to perform theſe? That which is peculiar, is the *manner* of *admiſſion* by the *ſign* of the *Croſs*; and his *Rite* our *Church* impoſes on no others but its own *Members*, *i. e.* makes it neceſſary to none elſe; and to ſhew it to be only a ſolemn *Rite* of *Admiſſion*, it allows it to be forborn in *private Baptiſm*. But ſaith Mr. *B. Chriſt's Sacraments or Symbols are ſufficient, we need not deviſe more, and accuſe his Inſtitution of inſufficiency.* If it be lawful, the *Church* is to judge of the *expediency*; and not every private perſon. And to appoint other *Rites* that do not encroach upon the *Inſtitutions* of *Chriſt*, by challenging any *effect* peculiar to them, is no charging them with inſufficiency. Well, ſaith Mr. *B. but it is unlawful on another account*, viz. *as it is an Image uſed as a medium in God's Worſhip, and ſo forbidden in the Second Commandment.* He may as well make it unlawful to uſe *Words*

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in *God's Worſhip*; for are not they *Images* and repreſent things to our *minds*, as well as a *tranſient ſign of the Croſs?* Nay, doth not Mr. *B.* in the ſame place make it *lawful to make an Image an Object or Medium of our conſideration exciting our minds to Worſhip God? as he inſtanceth in a Crucifix or hiſtorical Image of Chriſt, or ſome holy man.* If any *Divine* of the *Church* of *England* had ſaid any thing to this purpoſe, what out-cries of *Popery* had been made againſt us? How many *Advances* had we preſently made for letting in the *groſſeſt Idolatry?* How many *Divines* of the *Church* of *Rome* had been quoted, to ſhew, that they went no farther and deſired no more than this? Yet the *tranſient ſign of the Croſs*, without any reſpect to *Worſhip*, is condemned among us, *as forbidden by the Second Commandment*; and that by the *ſame perſon* and in the *ſame page. But it is uſed as a medium in God's Worſhip.* Is our *Worſhip* directed to it? or, do we *kneel* before it, as Mr. *B.* allows men may do before a *Crucifix?* Do we declare that we are *excited* by it to worſhip God? No; all theſe are rejected by our Church. How then *is it a medium in God's Worſhip?* Why forſooth, *it is not a mere circumſtance but an outward act of Worſhip.* What, as much as *kneeling before a Crucifix?* and yet that is lawful according to him, *ſuppoſing the mind be only excited by it.* Suppoſe then we only uſe *the ſign of the Croſs* to *excite* mens conſideration in the *act* of *Worſhip*; what harm were in it upon Mr. *B*'s grounds? But our *Church* allows not ſo much, only taking it for a *lawful outward Ceremony*, which hath nothing of *Worſhip* belonging to it; how comes it then to be a *medium in God's Worſhip.* For Mr. *B.* ſaith, in the ſame place, *there is a twofold medium in God's Worſhip.* 1. Medium excitans, *that raiſes our minds to Worſhip God, as a Crucifix, &c.* 2. Medium terminans; or as he calls it *terminus, in genere cauſæ finalis,* a worſhipped *medium or the terminus, or the thing which we worſhip mediately, an pretence of repreſenting God, and that we worſhip him in it ultimately. And this he takes to be the thing forbidden directly in the ſecond Commandmeut,* viz. *to worſhip a Creature (with mind or body) in the Act of Divine Worſhip, as repreſenting God, or as the mediate term of our Worſhip, by which we ſend it unto God, as if it were more acceptable to him. So that it is lawful,* ſaith he, *by the ſight of a Crucifix to be provoked to worſhip God, but it's unlawful to offer him that Worſhip, by offering it to the Crucifix firſt, as the ſign, way, or means of ſending it to God.* Obſerve here a ſtrange piece of partiality. 1. It is allowed to be *lawful to pray before a Crucifix*, as a *medium excitans*, as *an object that ſtirs up in us a worſhipping affection*; and ſo all thoſe *Papiſts* are excuſed from *Idolatry* who profeſs they uſe a *Crucifix* for *no other end*, although they perform all *Acts* of *adoration* before it; and it will become a very hard queſtion whether the mind in its conſideration, uniting the *Image* with the *Object*, may not give the ſame *Acts of Worſhip* to one as to the other, but in different reſpects. For the *Image* being allowed to *excite the mind to conſideration of the object to be worſhipped*, the *object* is *conſidered* in the *mind* as *repreſented by the Image*, and conſequently is ſo worſhipped; and why then may not *the worſhip* be as well directed to the *Image as repreſenting*, as to the *Object repreſented by the Image*; provided, that the *Act* of the mind be ſtill fixed upon the *Object* as *repreſented* by the *Image?* And thus even *Latria* may be performed to a *Crucifix*. Is not this a very fair conceſſion to the *Papiſts?* But on the other ſide, 2. The *ſign of the Croſs*, even the *aëreal ſign*, as Dr. O. calls it, muſt be made a *medium* in *God's Worſhip*, though it be utterly denied by our *Church*; and there be no colour for it from his own grounds. For it is neither *medium excitans*, being not intended by our *Church* for that purpoſe, a *Crucifix* being much fitter for that purpoſe; and our *Church* calls it only *a lawful ceremony and honourable badge*; much leſs can it be thought to be any *mediate object* of *our Worſhip*, there being nothing like *Worſhip* performed towards it. But if all his meaning be, that whatever is uſed in the time of *Worſhip*, that is not a *mere circumſtance*, muſt be a *medium* of *Worſhip*, that is ſo weak a pretence, that I ſhall conſider it no farther.

Sect. 31. But ſuppoſe it be no *medium* of *Worſhip*, yet it cannot out of Mr. *B*'s Head, but that it muſt be a *new Sacrament*; *For*, ſaith he, *If Chriſt had inſtituted the Croſs as our Church doth; would you not have called this a Sacrament? And if it want but Divine Inſtitution and Benediction, it wanteth indeed a due efficient, but it is ſtill a Human Sacrament though not a Divine, and therefore an unlawful Sacrament.* If *Chriſt* had inſtituted it with ſuch *promiſes*, as he hath his other *Sacraments*, no doubt it had been one; but then the uſe of it had been quite changed, from what it is now. For then its *ſignification* had been from *God to us*; and the *Miniſter* had *ſigned in Chriſt's Name* and not in the *Church's*; and then it had been *in token that Chriſt will not fail of his Promiſe, if we perform our Conditions.* But here it is quite contrary, as hath already appeared.

Defence of the Plea, p. 41.

There is one thing yet remaining in Mr. *B.* about this matter to be conſidered, *viz, That according to the Rule of our Church, the Croſs in Baptiſm hath a Sacramental efficacy attributed to it*; for, ſaith he, *As the Water of Baptiſm worketh morally, by ſignifying the waſhing of Chriſt's Body; ſo the Croſs is to operate morally, by ſignifying Chriſt's Crucifixion, the benefits of his Croſs and our Duty.* And then he adds, *That it is the common Doctrine of Proteſtants that the Sacraments are not inſtituted to give Grace phyſically, but only morally; and that even the wiſeſt Papiſts themſelves do maintain only ſuch moral Cauſality in Sacraments.* And ſo by this means he would make *the ſign of the Croſs* to have the *nature* of a *Sacrament* with us. But that he hath miſprereſented or miſapplied both the *Popiſh* and *Proteſtant Doctrine* about the *efficacy* of *Sacraments* to ſerve his purpoſe, I ſhall now make appear,

Defence of the Plea, p. 49.

1. Concerning the *Popiſh Doctrine*; that which overthrows the ſtrength of all that Mr. *B.* ſaith is, that it is unanimouſly agreed among them as a *matter of faith, that the Sacraments do confer grace,* ex opere operato, *where there is no actual impediment; and that it is no leſs than hereſie to aſſert, that they are bare outward profeſſing ſigns, i. e.* That they are *mere Ceremonies.* This not one of them, whom I ever ſaw, either denies, or diſputes; and it is expreſly determined in the *Councils* of *Florence* and of *Trent.* But then they have a very nice and ſubtle queſtion among them about the *manner* how the *Sacraments* do confer Grace, whether *phyſically* or *morally.* By *phyſically*, they mean, *when a thing by its own immediate action hath influence on producing the effect*; by *morally*, they mean *that which doth effectually concur to the producing the effect, but after another manner, as by perſuaſions, by intreaty,* &c. As he that *runs the ſword* into *another's bowels*, kills him *phyſically*; he that *perſuades and incourages him* effectually to do it, is as *really* the *cauſe* of his *death* as the other; but then they ſay, he is but a *moral* and not a *phyſical cauſe* of the *murther.* They all agree, that the *Sacraments* do *effectually* convey *Grace*, where there is *no obſtacle put*; but the only queſtion is, about the *manner* of producing it. And as to this they agree, that the *Sacraments* do work as *moral Cauſes*,

Concil. Florent. Decret. Union. Concil. Trident. Seſſ. 7. *Can.* 6.

not *principal* but *inſtrumental*; the *principal* they ſay is *the Merit of Chriſt*, the *Inſtrumental* the *Sacraments* as deriving their *efficacy* from the former; as the *Writing* from the *Seal*, and the *Seal* from the *Authority* of the *Perſon*; or as *Money* from the *Stamp*, and the *Stamp* from the *King*; but beſides this, they queſtion whether there be not a *proper efficiency by Divine Power in the Sacraments*, to produce at leaſt the *character* from whence *Divine Grace* immediately follows. And about this indeed they are divided. Some ſay, there is *no neceſſity* of aſſerting more than a bare *moral Cauſality*; becauſe this is ſufficient *for the infallible efficacy of the Sacraments*, ſublato obice, as *Gamachæus* a late *Profeſſor in the Sorbon* delivers their Doctrine: and of this opinion, he reckons *Bonaventure*, *Altiſſidore*, *Scotus*, *Durandus*, *Canus*, *Ledeſma*, *and many others*: and with this he cloſes, *becauſe this is ſufficient*, *and the other is to make Miracles without cauſe*; *as long as the effect follows*, *certò infallibiliter & ex opere operato*, as he there ſpeaks. And for the ſame reaſon *Card. de Lugo* yields to it, although he there ſaith, that a Sacrament is *ſignum practicum infallibile Gratiæ*. So that thoſe who do aſſert only this *moral Cauſality* of *Sacraments*, do not ſuppoſe *any uncertainty in the effect*, any more than the others do, but only differ about the *way* of producing it. Yet *Yſambertus*, another late Profeſſor of the *Sorbon*, proves the Doctrine of a *Phyſical efficiency* to be much more agreeable to the *ſenſe* of their *Church*; and that the argument is of no force againſt it, *becauſe it is ſo hard to be underſtood*, for then they muſt quit many other Doctrines beſides this. *Joh. Baptiſta Gonet*, a late learned *Thomiſt* not only contends earneſtly for this opinion, but ſaith, *The greater part of their Divines aſſert it*, *and thoſe of the greateſt reputation*, as *Ruardus Tapper*, *Vega*, *Sayrus*, *Yſambertus*, *Suarez*, *Valentia*, *Bellarmin*, *Reginaldus*, *Mœratius*, *Ripalda* and many more. And *Coquetius*, he ſaith, *reckons up Fifty three eminent Divines who hold the phyſical Cauſality of the Sacrament*. So that Mr. *B.* is both very much miſtaken in the *common Doctrine* of the *Roman Schools*, and in *applying* the *moral Cauſality* of the *Sacraments*, as it is aſſerted by their *Divines*, to the *ſignificancy* of our *Ceremonies*.

Gamachæ. *Sum. Theol. To.* 2. *qu.* 2. c. 5.

Lugo *de Sacram. diſp.* 4. *Sect.* 4. *n.* 32.

Yſambert. *de Sacram. ad. Qu.* 62. *diſp.* 4. *art.* 3.

Clypeus *Theolog. Thomiſt. To.* 5. *diſp.* 3. *art.* 2. §. 1.

2. As to the *Proteſtant Doctrines*, he repreſents that in very ambiguous terms; for, he ſaith, *That Proteſtants commonly maintain that the Sacraments are not inſtituted to give Grace phyſically, but only morally.* If it be their *Doctrine*, that the *Sacraments* are inſtituted for the *conveying of Grace* at all, which he ſeems to yield; (and if he did not, might be fully proved from the *Teſtimonies* of the moſt eminent *Reformers* abroad, as well as at home) This is ſufficient to ſhew that the *ſign* of the *Croſs* can never be advanced to the *dignity* of a *Sacrament* among us; ſince in no ſenſe it is held to be an *Inſtrument* appointed for the *conveying* of *Grace*.

And ſo this *Phraſe* of a *New Sacrament* is a thing only invented to amuſe and perplex tender and injudicious Perſons. There being not the leaſt ground for it, that I can diſcern; and yet ſuch pretences as theſe have ſerved to darken People's minds, and have filled them with ſtrange fears and ſcruples; yea, ſome who have conquer'd their prejudices as to other things, have not been able to get over this mighty *ſtumbling-block*; which I have therefore taken the more pains to remove out of their way.

And yet after all, Mr. *B.* declares, *That if it be a ſin, it is the Miniſter's, and not the Perſon's who offers the Child to be baptized; and another man's ſinful mode will not juſtifie the neglect of our duty.* And therefore

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fore ſuppoſing *the ſign of the Croſs* to be as bad as ſome make it, yet it can be no pretence for *Separation.*

Miſchief of Impoſit. Preface.

Sect. 32. But Mr. *A.* hath a farther blow at our *Church*, for allowing *worſhiping towards the Altar, the Eaſt, and at the ſound of the word Jeſus*; *which*, he ſaith, *are made the Motive of Worſhip, if not ſomething elſe.* The lawfulneſs of theſe things, ſo far as they are required by our *Church*, I had formerly defended againſt the *Papiſts*, and now Mr. *A.* borrows their *Weapons* from them; although he doth not manage them with that ſkill and dexterity which *T. G.* uſed. I had ſaid, that bowing at the *name of Jeſus* was no more than *going to Church at the Toll of a Bell*, the *Worſhip* being not given to the *Name*, but to *Chriſt* at the ſound of his Name. *Why may not*, ſaith he, *an Image give warning to the Eye, when to worſhip God, as well as a Bell to the Ear?* I will tell him, ſince he needs it, becauſe an *Image* is a *mighty diſparagement* to an *infinite* and *inviſible Being*; it is directly contrary to his *Law* to *worſhip* him by an *Image*; it is againſt the *ſenſe* of the *Chriſtian Church* in its *beſt and pureſt Ages*; this one would have thought I had proved ſo much againſt the *Papiſts*, that I had little reaſon to expect ſuch a queſtion from a *Proteſtant.* But ſuch men do too much diſcover, whoſe part they are willing to take againſt the *Church* of *England.* *He grants the Papiſts go too far in preferring an Image higher than to be* Motivum Cultûs; *but the Queſtion is, whether they do not ſin in applying it to this lower uſe, to make it an ordinary ſtated Motive to Worſhip.* When I read this, I began to pity the man, being in ſome fear leſt ſomething had a little diſordered his fancy. For where do we ever allow ſuch an *uſe of Images* in our *Church?* If he had written againſt Mr. *B.* who allows a *Crucifix* to be *Medium excitans*, he had ſome reaſon to have anſwered him, but I have none. But he brings it home to us; *for*, ſaith he, *If men do ſin who make an Image an ordinary ſtated motive of Worſhip, then how ſhall we excuſe our own adorations?* What doth the man mean? I am yet afraid, all things are not right ſomewhere. We acknowledge *no adorations*, but what are due to the *Divine Majeſty*; and do theſe need to be excuſed? And what conſequence is there from the unlawfulneſs of the *Worſhip* of *Images*, againſt our *worſhipping* of *God?* Let him firſt prove, that we give *adoration* to any beſides the *Divine Majeſty*, before we ſhall go about to *excuſe* our *adorations.* *But if men do not ſin in making an Image a ſtated Motive of Worſhip* (who ever ſaid they did not? I am ſure, not our Church. But let this paſs, what follows?) *then*, ſaith he, *why do we not introduce Images into our Churches?* Aſk Mr. *B.* that *Queſtion*, and not us of the *Church* of *England.* If we allowed the *Worſhip* of *Images* to be *lawful*, this were a pertinent Queſtion; but ſince we deny it, what makes all this againſt us? *which if our Church-men ſhall venture upon*; I pray ſtay till they do, before you charge us with it. Are not theſe men hugely to ſeek for Arguments againſt our *Church* that talk at this rate? But, he ſaith, *they may do it with equal reaſon.* Here is ſomething now fit to be proved. We utterly deny that we may *worſhip Images* on the ſame *Reaſon*, that we perform *external adoration* to *God* by *bowing the body*; or to *Jeſus* at the mention of his *name.* Hold now to this, and prove it. Inſtead of that, he ſhews the difference between going to Church at the *ſound* of a *Bell*, and *bowing* at the *name* of *Jeſus*; viz. *That the Bell tolls out of Worſhip to bring them to it; but the ſound of the word Jeſus is in the middle of Worſhip, when mens minds ſhould be intent on devotion, and not ſit liſtening and* *watching, as* Whittington's *Cat watcht the Mouſe, (there 'tis for you,* viz. what he hath laboured for all this while) *for the caſual ſtarting of a word, and the dropping of two ſyllables.* But the Queſtion is not about the *ſeaſonableneſs* of doing this when we are in other *Acts of Devotion* and *immediate application to God,* which no body contends for, that I know of, but about the *lawfulneſs* of doing it in the *time* of *Divine Service,* when we hear the name of *Jeſus* repeated in the *Leſſons,* or the *Creed*; and the *Canon* which requires it refers to the former *Cuſtom,* and in the *Injunctions* of Queen *Elizabeth,* the *Leſſons* and *Sermons* are mentioned particularly; and although it be ſaid, *or otherwiſe in the Church pronounced,* yet by the manner of ſhewing this Reverence, *viz. with lowneſs of courteſie and uncovering of heads of mankind*; it ſuppoſeth them at that time not to be imployed in any other *Act of Devotion.* And ſo it gives no interruption to the *intention* of it; nor *obliges* men to lie at the *catch for the coming of the word,* as though all our *Worſhip* conſiſted in it; but ſince our *Church* approves it as a *laudable Ceremony,* we ought not to refuſe it at *ſeaſonable times*; unleſs it can be proved *unlawful* in it ſelf. Which I ſay, can never be done, as long as the *Worſhip* is directed to a *true object, viz.* the *Perſon of Chriſt*; and the mention of his name, only expreſſes *the time,* as the tolling the *Bell* doth of going to *Church.* Neither doth it ſignifie any thing to this purpoſe, *whether Perſons be in the Church or out of it, when the Bell rings*; for in the ſame page he mentions the *Maſs-bell*; which ſounds to the *People* in the Church as well as out of it; and if the *Object* of their *Worſhip* were true, as it is falſe, that would make him better underſtand the parallel.

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ſtantials will be ſufficient ground to break Communion and to ſet up new Churches. To underſtand the conſequence we muſt ſuppoſe, 1. An *agreement* in the *ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip.* 2. *A Separation,* for *greater purity of Worſhip.* And what then can juſtifie this *Separation,* but a difference of *Opinion* as to ſome *circumſtantials* in Worſhip? *Hold,* ſaith he, *the conſequence is not good, for there are certain middle things, between ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip and bare circumſtances, about which it will be lawful to divide, though otherwiſe we agree in doctrine, and the ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip.* So that here a *Separation* is juſtified (1.) on the account of ſuch things, which are confeſſed to be neither *ſubſtantial* nor *circumſtantial parts of Worſhip,* (2.) *Although there be an agreement in the ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip*; and conſequently, although theſe *middle kind of things* be not made *ſubſtantial parts of worſhip.* For that he charged us with in the *Antecedent*; and now allowing the *Antecedent* and denying the *Conſequence,* he muſt grant, that it is lawful to *ſeparate* on the account of *Ceremonies,* although they be made no *parts* of *worſhip* at all. For if they be neither *ſubſtantial* nor *circumſtantial parts* of *Worſhip,* they can be none at all; and yet he ſaith, it is lawful to divide about them. And which is more pleaſant, when he goes about to prove the *lawfulneſs* of *ſeparating* for the ſake of theſe things, he doth it by undertaking to ſhew, *that they are made ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip.* For thus he argues, *The Church of* England *hath exalted theſe things,* i. e. *Ceremonies, to a high preferment in worſhip, to ſignifie the ſame things with the Sacramental Elements, to make them neceſſary to ſalvation as far as Man can make them*; *and therefore they conclude them ſinful.* If their preferment in Worſhip makes them ſinful, then they muſt be either *ſubſtantial,* or *circumſtantial parts of Worſhip,* and their *ſeparation* is not upon the account of their being *Ceremonies,* but thoſe *Ceremonies* are ſuppoſed to be made *Parts* of *Worſhip,* which I have anſwer'd already.

§. 33. But after all our arguings about theſe matters, Mr. *A.* ſaith, *the Controverſie ſtands ſtill, where it did theſe hundred years and more:* I utterly deny that, for the *Nonconformiſts* have advanced more towards *Separation* theſe laſt ten years, than they did in a hundred years before; as appears by the foregoing diſcourſe. However, *they are ſtill unſatisfied in Conſcience about theſe matters, and ſo long they cannot join with us, and our Church excommunicates thoſe who condemn our ceremonies*; *ſo that there appears from hence a neceſſity of ſeparation*; *and if it be neceſſary it cannot be denied to be lawful.* This is the faireſt remaining *Plea* for *Separation,* which I ſhall conſider both ways. (1.) As it reſpects *the Church's cenſures.* (2.) As it reſpects *the judgment of Conſcience.*

1. Anſwer to Serm. p. 47, 48. Plea for Peace, p. 232. 233.

1. As it reſpects the *Church's cenſures.* *This* Mr. *B.* often inſiſts upon. *The Canons,* ſaith he, *excommunicate* ipſo facto, *all that ſay the impoſed Conformity is unlawful. If this be unjuſt, is it ſeparation to be ſo excommunicated? And who is the Schiſmatick here? Would you have excommunicate Men communicate with you? And if Men be wrongfully excommunicate, are they thereby abſolved from all publick Worſhipping of God? or do they loſe their Right to all Church-communion?* To this I anſwer, That the *Excommunication* denounced, is not againſt ſuch as modeſtly ſcruple the *lawfulneſs* of *things impoſed,* but againſt thoſe who *obſtinately affirm it?* The words of the *Canon* are not, as Mr. *B.* quotes

them, *If any one do but affirm any thing in the Liturgy, Ceremonies*, &c. *to be unlawful are excommunicate*, ipſo facto; but *whoſoever ſhall Affirm the Ceremonies of the Church of* England, *eſtabliſhed by Law, to be impious, Anti-Chriſtian, or Superſtitious, let him be Excommunicate* ipſo facto. Mr. *B.*'s words bear quite another ſenſe from thoſe of the *Canon*; for to ſay, *if any Man do but affirm*, &c. it implies that a *bare ſingle affirmation* incurrs *excommunication* ipſo facto; but when the *Canon* ſaith, *if any ſhall affirm*, &c. it implies, theſe circumſtances which according to the common ſenſe of Mankind do deſerve *excommunication*, viz. that it be done *publickly* and *obſtinately*: (Both which the word *Affirm* will bear.) For, as S. *Auguſtin* very well ſaith, *every Man's error is born with, until he either finds an accuſer, or he obſtinately defends his opinion. Tam diu ſuſtinetur peccatum aut error cujuſlibet, donec aut accuſatorem inveniat, aut pravam opinionem pertinaci animoſitate defendat.* All *excommunication* doth ſuppoſe *precedent admonition*, according to the *Rule*, *If he will not hear the Church, let him be as an Heathen, or a Publican.* Therefore *general excommunications* although they be *latæ ſententiæ*, as the *Canoniſts* ſpeak, do not affect particular perſons, until the *evidence* be *notorious*, not only of the *bare fact* but of the *contumacy joined* with it. Beſides, ſuch *excommunications* which are *de jure & latæ ſententiæ*, are rather to be looked on as *Comminations*, than as *formal excommunications*. For *Gerſon* putting the queſtion, *what the effect of ſuch excommunications is?* he anſwers, *that it is no more than this, that there needs no new judicial proceſs, but upon proof or confeſſion the Judge may pronounce the ſentence. Which,* he ſaith, *he learnt from his Maſter*, who was *Pet. de Alliaco* the famous *Cardinal of Cambray*. And if it requires a *new ſentence*, then it doth not *actually excommunicate*. But of this the learned *Arch-biſhop of Spalato* hath diſcourſed at large; to whom I refer the Reader. As to the practice of *Canon* Law in *England*, *Lyndwood* ſaith, that a declaratory ſentence of the Judge is neceſſary, notwithſtanding the Excommunication *ipſo facto*. And it is a *Rule* in our *Church*, *that Perſons excommunicate are to be publickly denounced excommunicate in a Cathedral or Parochial Church every ſix Months, that others may have notice of them*; and until the *ſentence* be thus declared, I do not know how far particular perſons can think themſelves obliged to *forbear Communion* on the account of a *general ſentence* of *excommunication*, though it be ſaid to be *ipſo facto*. For although the ſentence ſeem peremptory, yet, *ipſo facto*, doth ſuppoſe *a fact*, and ſuch as deſerves *excommunication* in the ſenſe of the *Church*; of which there muſt be evident proof brought, before the *ſentence* can take hold of the *Perſon*. And to make the *ſentence valid* as to the *perſon*, there muſt be *due execution* of it; and the queſtion in this caſe then is, whether any perſon, knowing himſelf to be under ſuch qualifications which incur a *ſentence* of *excommunication*, be bound to *execute* this *ſentence* upon himſelf? which he muſt do, if he thinks himſelf bound to *ſeparate* from our *Church* on the account of this *general excommunication*. And ſo Mr. *B.* himſelf ſeems to reſolve this point; *Although*, ſaith he, *we are excommunicated* ipſo facto, *yet we are not bound our ſelves to execute their ſentence; but may ſtay in Communion till they prove the fact, and do the execution on us themſelves by refuſing us.* And ſo he hath fully anſwered his own objection. *But can thoſe be called Schiſmaticks for not communicating*

Can. 6.

Aug. de vera Relig. c. 6.

De vitâ ſpir. lect. 4. concl. 14. prop. 2.

De reb. Eccl. l. 5. c. 9. n. 22, 23, 24, 25.

De Conſtit. c. quia incontinent. ipſo facto.

Can. 65.

Plea for Peace, p. 233.

ſtantials will be ſufficient ground to break Communion and to ſet up new Churches. To underſtand the conſequence we muſt ſuppoſe, 1. An *agreement in the ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip.* 2. *A Separation, for greater purity of Worſhip.* And what then can juſtifie this *Separation*, but a difference of *Opinion* as to ſome *circumſtantials* in Worſhip? *Hold,* ſaith he, *the conſequence is not good, for there are certain middle things, between ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip and bare circumſtances, about which it will be lawful to divide, though otherwiſe we agree in doctrine, and the ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip.* So that here a *Separation* is juſtified (1.) on the account of ſuch things, which are confeſſed to be neither *ſubſtantial* nor *circumſtantial parts of Worſhip,* (2.) *Although there be an agreement in the ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip*; and conſequently, although theſe *middle kind of things* be not made *ſubſtantial parts of worſhip.* For that he charged us with in the *Antecedent*; and now allowing the *Antecedent* and denying the *Conſequence*, he muſt grant, that it is lawful to *ſeparate* on the account of *Ceremonies*, although they be made no *parts* of *worſhip* at all. For if they be neither *ſubſtantial* nor *circumſtantial parts* of *Worſhip*, they can be none at all; and yet he ſaith, it is lawful to divide about them. And which is more pleaſant, when he goes about to prove the *lawfulneſs* of *ſeparating* for the ſake of theſe things, he doth it by undertaking to ſhew, *that they are made ſubſtantial parts of Worſhip.* For thus he argues, *The Church of* England *hath exalted theſe things,* i. e. *Ceremonies, to a high preferment in worſhip, to ſanctifie the ſame things with the Sacramental Elements, to make them neceſſary to ſalvation as far as Man can make them*; *and therefore they conclude them ſinful.* If their preferment in Worſhip makes them ſinful, then they muſt be either *ſubſtantial*, or *circumſtantial parts of Worſhip,* and their *ſeparation* is not upon the account of their being *Ceremonies,* but thoſe *Ceremonies* are ſuppoſed to be made *Parts* of *Worſhip,* which I have anſwer'd already.

§. 33. But after all our arguings about theſe matters, Mr. *A.* ſaith, *the Controverſie ſtands ſtill, where it did theſe hundred years and more*: I utterly deny that, for the *Nonconformiſts* have advanced more towards *Separation* theſe laſt ten years, than they did in a hundred years before; as appears by the foregoing diſcourſe. However, *they are ſtill unſatisfied in Conſcience about theſe matters, and ſo long they cannot join with us, and our Church excommunicates thoſe who condemn our ceremonies; ſo that there appears from hence a neceſſity of ſeparation; and if it be neceſſary it cannot be denied to be lawful.* This is the faireſt remaining *Plea* for *Separation,* which I ſhall conſider both ways. (1.) As it reſpects *the Church's cenſures.* (2.) As it reſpects *the judgment of Conſcience.*

1. 1. As it reſpects the *Church's cenſures.* *This* Mr. *B.* often inſiſts upon. *The Canons,* ſaith he, *excommunicate* ipſo facto, *all that ſay the impoſed Conformity is unlawful. If this be unjuſt, is it ſeparation to be ſo excommunicated? And who is the Schiſmatick here? Would you have excommunicate Men communicate with you? And if Men be wrongfully excommunicate, are they thereby abſolved from all publick Worſhipping of God? or do they loſe their Right to all Church-communion?* To this I anſwer, That the *Excommunication* denounced, is not againſt ſuch as modeſtly ſcruple the *lawfulneſs* of *things impoſed*, but againſt thoſe who *obſtinately affirm it?* The words of the *Canon* are not, as Mr. *B.* quotes them,

Anſwer to Serm. p. 47, 48.
Plea for Peace, p. 232. 233.

them, *If any one do but affirm any thing in the Liturgy, Ceremonies,* &c. *to be unlawful are excommunicate,* ipſo facto; but *whoſoever ſhall Affirm the Ceremonies of the Church of* England, *eſtabliſhed by Law, to be impious, Anti-Chriſtian, or Superſtitious, let him be Excommunicate* ipſo facto. Mr. *B.*'s words bear quite another ſenſe from thoſe of the *Canon*; for to ſay, *if any Man do but affirm,* &c. it implies that a *bare ſingle affirmation* incurrs *excommunication* ipſo facto; but when the *Canon* ſaith, *if any ſhall affirm,* &c. it implies, theſe circumſtances which according to the common ſenſe of Mankind do deſerve *excommunication,* viz. that it be done *publickly* and *obſtinately:* (Both which the word *Affirm* will bear.) For, as S. *Auguſtin* very well ſaith, *every Man's error is born with, until he either finds an accuſer, or he obſtinately defends his opinion. Tam diu ſuſtinetur peccatum aut error cujuſlibet, donec aut accuſatorem inveniat, aut pravam opinionem pertinaci animoſitate defendat.* All *excommunication* doth ſuppoſe *precedent admonition,* according to the *Rule, If he will not hear the Church, let him be as an Heathen, or a Publican.* Therefore *general excommunications* although they be *latæ ſententiæ,* as the *Canoniſts* ſpeak, do not affect particular perſons, until the *evidence* be *notorious,* not only of the *bare fact* but of the *contumacy joined* with it. Beſides, ſuch *excommunications* which are *de jure & latæ ſententiæ,* are rather to be looked on as *Comminations,* than as *formal excommunications.* For *Gerſon* putting the queſtion, *what the effect of ſuch excommunications is?* he anſwers, *that it is no more than this, that there needs no new judicial proceſs, but upon proof or confeſſion the Judge may pronounce the ſentence. Which,* he ſaith, *he learnt from his Maſter,* who was *Pet. de Alliaco* the famous *Cardinal of Cambray.* And if it requires a *new ſentence,* then it doth not *actually excommunicate.* But of this the learned *Arch-biſhop of Spalato* hath diſcourſed at large; to whom I refer the Reader. As to the practice of *Canon* Law in *England, Lyndwood* ſaith, that a declaratory ſentence of the Judge is neceſſary, notwithſtanding the Excommunication *ipſo facto.* And it is a *Rule* in our *Church, that Perſons excommunicate are to be publickly denounced excommunicate in a Cathedral or Parochial Church every ſix Months, that others may have notice of them*; and until the *ſentence* be thus declared, I do not know how far particular perſons can think themſelves obliged to *forbear Communion* on the account of a *general ſentence* of *excommunication,* though it be ſaid to be *ipſo facto.* For although the ſentence ſeem peremptory, yet, *ipſo facto,* doth ſuppoſe *a fact,* and ſuch as deſerves *excommunication* in the ſenſe of the *Church*; of which there muſt be evident proof brought, before the *ſentence* can take hold of the *Perſon.* And to make the *ſentence valid* as to the *perſon,* there muſt be *due execution* of it; and the queſtion in this caſe then is, whether any perſon, knowing himſelf to be under ſuch qualifications which incur a *ſentence* of *excommunication,* be bound to *execute* this *ſentence* upon himſelf? which he muſt do, if he thinks himſelf bound to *ſeparate* from our *Church* on the account of this *general excommunication.* And ſo Mr. *B.* himſelf ſeems to reſolve this point; *Although,* ſaith he, *we are excommunicated* ipſo facto, *yet we are not bound our ſelves to execute their ſentence; but may ſtay in Communion till they prove the fact, and do the execution on us themſelves by refuſing us.* And ſo he hath fully anſwered his own objection. *But can thoſe be called Schiſmaticks for not communicating*

Can. 6.

Aug. de vera Relig. c. 6.

De vitâ ſpir. lect. 4. *concl.* 14. *prop.* 2.

De reb. Eccl. l. 5. *c.* 9. *n.* 22, 23, 24, 25.

De Conſtit. c. quia incontinent. ipſo facto.

Can. 65.

Plea for Peace, *p.* 233.

with a Church, who are firſt excommunicated by that Church? Yes, in theſe caſes they may (1.) when there is a juſt and ſufficient *Cauſe* for that ſentence. For, otherwiſe, *no Church* could condemn any *excommunicated Perſons* for *Schiſm*; if it declared before hand, that all thoſe who held ſuch *Doctrines*, or condemned ſuch *Practices*, ſhould be *excommunicated.* To make this plain by Inſtances: Suppoſe the *Churches* of *New England* declared the ſentence of excommunication *ipſo facto* againſt all that oppoſe *Infant-baptiſm*; *R. Williams* and his *Company* oppoſe it; they upon this are *actually excommunicated*; may the *Churches* of *New England* call theſe Men *Schiſmaticks* or not? If they are *Schiſmaticks* notwithſtanding the *ſentence* of *excommunication*; then the denouncing this *ſentence* before hand doth not excuſe them from the *guilt of Schiſm.* By the *Conſtitution* of the *Churches* of *France*, *every Miniſter that refuſes to ſubſcribe to the Orders among them is to be declared a Schiſmatick*; Would this make ſuch a one not to be a *Schiſmatick*, becauſe this amounts to an *excommunication ipſo facto?* So in *Scotland*, 1641. *Subſcription to the Preſbyterian diſcipline was required under pain of excommunication*; if any had been *excommunicated* on this account, would this excuſe them from the charge of *Schiſm*, in the judgment of the *Covenanters?* By the *Conſtitutions* of *Geneva*, *any one that oppoſes, or contemns the Authority of that Church for a year together, is liable to the ſentence of baniſhment for a whole year*; as *Calvin* himſelf relates it. Suppoſe this were merely *excommunication* for ſo long; would not *Calvin* have thought them *Schiſmaticks* for all that? For he fully declares his mind in this caſe, on occaſion of a certain *Non-conformiſt* in an *Epiſtle* to *Farell*; where he adviſes *that he ſhould be firſt ſummoned before the Magiſtrate; if that did not prevail, they ſhould proceed to excommunication of a perſon who by his obſtinacy diſturbed the order of the Church*; which, ſaith he, *is agreable to ancient Councils and the mind of God in Scripture; therefore let him that will not ſubmit to the Orders of a Society be caſt out of it.* Here we ſee *excommunication* juſtified againſt ſuch as refuſe to obey the *Orders* of a *Church*; and much more certainly, if they publickly affirm them to be *Impious*, *Antichriſtian* or *Superſtitious*, as 8. *Canon* expreſſeth: And no *Church* in the world, but will think *excommunication* reaſonable upon the like grounds; and therefore if there be ſuch a thing as *Schiſm*, they may be guilty of it ſtill, although *excommunication* be denounced againſt them on ſuch accounts. (2.) If they proceed to form *new Churches*; as will appear evident to any one that reflects on the former inſtances; and let him judge, whether all perſons ſo *excommunicated*, would not have been condemned much more for *Schiſmaticks*, if they had ſet up *new Churches* in oppoſition to theirs. S. *Auguſtin* puts the caſe of *good Men unjuſtly excommunicated*; and he ſaith, *they are to bear it with patience, for the peace of the Church, and ſuch will ſtill maintain the true faith*, ſine ullâ Conventiculorum ſegregatione, *without running into ſeparate Meetings; although they do believe themſelves unjuſtly excommunicated. Such as theſe*, ſaith he, *the Father which ſeeth in ſecret, will reward and crown in ſecret. This kind ſeems very rare, but there want not inſtances, yea, there are more than can be believed.*

Diſcipl. de France, Des Miniſt. art. 5.

Calvin Ep. Olevian. p. 311. p. 132.

De verâ Rel. c. 6.

2. As

§. 34.

Letter out of the Country, p. 5, 6, &c.

2. As *to the judgment of Conſcience*. The *Author of the Letter out of the Country* lays the *Foundation* of the *Separation* upon the force of *Scruples*, mighty *Scruples*, *Scruples* of a *long ſtanding*, and of a *large extent*; *Scruples that there is no hopes to remove, without ſome very over-poweriug impreſſion on mens minds.* I am ſo much of another mind, that I think a little *impartiality*, and *due conſideration* would do the buſineſs; but as long as men read and hear and judge only of one ſide, and think it a temptation to examine things as they ought to do, and cry out *they are ſatisfied already*, there is not much hopes of doing good upon ſuch, but I think they can have no great comfort in ſuch *Scruples*. Men that really ſcruple things out of *tenderneſs of Conſcience*, are ſincerely willing to be better informed, and glad of any light that brings them ſatisfaction, and do not fly out into rage, and violent paſſion againſt thoſe who offer to remove their *Scruples*. Hath this been the temper of our *ſcrupulous Brethren* of late? Let their *Scruples* be touched never ſo tenderly, they cannot bear it, and take it extremely ill of thoſe who would better inform them. Mr. *B.* freely tells me, *that he that thinks his own, or others reaſonings will ever change all the truly honeſt Chriſtians in the Land*, (as to the *unlawfulneſs* of the things impoſed) *knoweth ſo little of matters, or of men, or of Conſcience, as that he is unmeet to be a Biſhop or a Prieſt.* What is the reaſon of ſuch a ſevere ſaying? Where lies the *ſtrength* and *evidence* of theſe *Scruples?* Why may not honeſt men be cured of their errors and miſtakes, as I am perſuaded theſe are ſuch which they call *Scruples?* Is there no hopes to bring the *People* to a *better temper*, and *more judgment?* For I know nothing more is neceſſary for the cure of them. Here is no depth of learning, no ſubtilty of reaſoning, no endleſs quotation of *Fathers* neceſſary about theſe matters. The diſpute lies in a narrow compaſs, and men may ſee light if they will. *But what if they will not?* Then we are to conſider, how far a *wilful miſtake*, or *error of Conſcience, will juſtifie men?* I ſay it doth not, cannot juſtifie them *in doing evil*; and that I am ſure *breaking the Peace of the Church* for the ſake of ſuch *Scruples* is. And this I had ſaid in my Sermon, which I take to be very material for our *ſcrupulous Perſons* to conſider. For ſuppoſe they ſhould be miſtaken, doth this *error of Conſcience* juſtifie their *Separation*, or not? If not, they may be in an ill condition, for all their *Scruples*, or their confidence. And ſo Mr. *Baxter* hath long ſince declared, *that if we do, through weakneſs, or perverſeneſs, take lawful things to be unlawful, that will not excuſe us in our diſobedience. Our error is, our ſin, and one ſin will not excuſe another ſin.* But Mr. *A.* ſaith, (1.) *That I do ill to put together wilful Error and miſtake of Conſcience, when I ſay they do not excuſe from ſin, ſince there is ſo great a difference between a wilful Error, and a miſtake of ſimple ignorance.* What ſtrange cavilling is this? when any one may ſee that I join *wilful* both to *Error* and *Miſtake*. And is not a *Miſtake*, or *Error* of *Conſcience* all one? If I had ſaid *a Miſtake of ſimple Ignorance doth not excuſe from ſin*, I had contradicted the whole deſign of that diſcourſe, which is to ſhew that there muſt be *wilfulneſs* in the *Error* or *Miſtake*, which doth not *excuſe*. For I ſay expreſly, if the Error be wholly involuntary, it doth excuſe. This is but a bad beginning in a Diſcourſe about *Conſcience*.

Anſw. p. 81.

5. Diſputations of Church Gov. p. 483.

Miſchief of Impoſ. p. 72.

2. *If no error will excuſe from ſin, why is the queſtion afterwards put by me, What error will excuſe?* I anſwer, (1.) It is an exerciſe of patience, to be troubled with a cavilling Adverſary. (2.) Do not I ſay,

as plainly as words can expreſs it, that a wilful error doth not excuſe from ſin? And the queſtion afterwards put, concerns the ſame thing; and the Anſwer I give to it is, if the error be wholly involuntary, it doth excuſe, but if it be wilful it doth not. Is this man's Conſcience full of *Scruples* that writes at this rate, with ſo little regard to the plain meaning and words of him whom he pretends to confute?

P.73. 3. He ſaith, *I put one of the wildeſt Caſes that ever was put*, viz. *If a man think himſelf bound to divide the Church by ſinful Separation, that ſeparation is never the leſs a ſin for his thinking himſelf bound to do it.* For (1.) *It may be juſtly queſtioned, whether it be poſſible for a man in his wits, to think himſelf bound to divide the Church by ſinful Separation.* What *Sophiſters* Arguments are theſe? As though we did not commonly ſpeak of the thing *as it is*, and not as the *Perſon apprehends it*. S. *Paul* did think himſelf bound to a *ſinful perſecution*, although he did not think it ſo when he did it. The *Jews* thought themſelves bound *to kill the Apoſtles*, which was *wilful murder*, and yet they were men in their wits. The *falſe Apoſtles* thought themſelves bound to divide the Church by a *ſinful ſeparation*. How then comes this to be thought ſo impoſſible a caſe as to the thing it ſelf? for I was not ſo fooliſh to put the caſe concerning men, who thought themſelves bound to commit a ſin, knowing it to be a ſin. (2.) *He much queſtions, whether ever any did think himſelf bound to divide a Church, he may poſſibly think himſelf bound to avoid it.* If he may think himſelf bound to do that which makes *diviſions* in a *Church*, it is ſufficient to my purpoſe. And did not the *falſe Apoſtles* do ſo, and have not others followed their examples? And thus, after other trifling Cavils to the ſame purpoſe, after his manner, he yields all that I ſay, and ſaith, *It is freely granted by all the world, that wilful* P.77. *Error doth not excuſe from ſin.* And after many words about the caſe of an *erroneous Conſcience*, he concludes, that *I deliver nothing but the common Doctrine of all Caſuiſts*; *only he thinks it not pertinent to the matter in hand.* Why ſo? was not the matter in hand about the *duty* of *complying* with an *eſtabliſhed Rule?* And was it not very pertinent to this, to ſhew how far an *erroneous Conſcience* may, or may not excuſe from ſin? But Mr. *A.* ſaith, *it ſhould have been about the Power of Conſcience, concerning an eſtabliſhed Rule of man's making*; *and ſuch for which they have neither general nor particular warrant from God ſo to make.* Is not this indeed to the purpoſe? Firſt to ſuppoſe an *unlawful Rule* impoſed, and then to enquire what *Conſcience* is to do about it. My buſineſs was to ſhew, that men were not in doubtful caſes to ſatisfie themſelves with this, *that they followed their Conſciences*; becauſe their *Conſciences* might *err*, and if that *Error* happened to be *wilful*, being contracted for want of due care what they did, might not only be *ſinful in it ſelf*, but imputed to them as *ſins*. Which all men who pretended any regard *to Conſcience*, ought to have an eye to: For why do they pretend *Conſcience*, but to avoid ſin? And if under a *wilful error of Conſcience*, they may ſtill be guilty of great *ſins*, as the *Jews*, and St. *Paul* were, then men ought not to ſatisfie themſelves barely with this pretence, that they do as their *Conſciences* direct them. This was the plain deſign of that part of *my Sermon*; and I leave any one to judge, whether it were not *pertinent*.

P.78. But he ſaith, *the Errors of the Diſſenters, if they be ſuch, are wholly involuntary, and cauſed by invincible Ignorance.* If they prove ſo, it will be the better for them. I hope they have better Arguments in their own breaſts for it than what appears in ſeme of their late Books; for neither a peeviſh, angry, ſcornful, provoking way of writing about theſe matters; nor a light, ſcurrilous, cavilling ſophiſtical Anſwer to a ſerious diſcourſe, are any great ſigns of ſuch an impartial endeavour after *ſatisfaction*, as Mr. *A.* boaſts of. I cannot tell how much *they have read the Scriptures, and ſtudied this Controverſie*; *nor how earneſtly they have prayed for direction*, but I have ſeen enough of their *unfriendly debates*, which give me no great ſatisfaction in this matter. But I leave this to *God* and their own *Conſciences* to judge, being very willing to hope and believe the beſt.

§. 35.

To return to the *Author of the Letter*. The main force of what he ſaith, lies in this, *that thoſe who cannot conquer their Scruples as to communion with our Church, muſt either return to the ſtate of Paganiſm, or ſet up new Churches, by joining with the ejected Miniſters.* This is new *Doctrine*, and never heard of in the days of the *old Puritans*, for they ſuppoſed men obliged to continue in the *Communion of this Church*, although there were ſome things they *ſcrupled*, and could not *conquer thoſe Scruples*. And this they ſuppoſed to be far enough from a *State of Paganiſm*.

P. 4.

But they ſcruple the uſe of the Sacraments with us; *and much more living under ſome of our Miniſters*. I never heard this laſt alleged for a ground of ſeparation till very lately, and it hath been conſidered already. And it is a very hard caſe with a *Church*, if *People* muſt fly into *Separation*, becauſe all their *Mineſters* are not ſuch as they ought to be. But if they do ſcruple *joining in communion with our Church*, I would fain know, whether as often as men do *ſcruple joining with others*, their *Separation* be *lawful*? If it be, it is a vain thing to talk of any *ſetled Conſtitution of a Church*, whether *Epiſcopal*, *Presbyterian*, or *Independent*; for this *Principle* overthrows them all. I will inſtance particularly in the laſt, as moſt favourable to ſuch kind of *Liberty*. And I need not ſuppoſe a caſe, ſince ſuch hath already happened ſeveral times in *New-England*. *R. Williams* is one remarkable inſtance, who *ſcrupled many things in their Churches*, and therefore *could join no longer with them*; and thought himſelf bound to ſet up a *ſeparate Congregation* among them; and the *People who ſcrupled as well as he, choſe him for their Paſtor*. What is there in this caſe, but is every whit as juſtifiable, as the *preſent ſeparation*? But did the *Churches* of *New-England* allow this for a *juſt Cauſe*? ſo far from it, that *R. Williams* publiſhed grievous complaints to the world, of the *perſecution* he underwent for it. Mr. *Baxter* mentions another inſtance ſince this, from the mouth of Mr. *Norton*, an *eminent Miniſter* of *New-England*, viz. *of a Church that ſeparated from a Church, on the account of their Preachers having human learning*; *and upon all the applications and endeavours that could be uſed towards them, their anſwer was, That is your Judgment, and this is ours*, i. e. *they could not conquer their Scruples*, and therefore muſt perſiſt in *ſeparation*, or return to *Paganiſm*. Mr. *Cobbet* of *New-England* mentions a third inſtance; one *Obadiah Holmes* being unſatisfied with the proceedings of the *Church of Rehoboth*, withdraws from their *Communion*, and ſets up another *Aſſembly* in the *Town*, and upon his obſtinate continuance therein, was ſolemnly *excommunicated* by them. And what the late differences among them concerning the *Subject of Baptiſm and Conſociation of Churches* may come to, time will diſcover. I would only know, whether if Mr. *Davenport* and the *diſſenting party*

P. 8.

Anſwer to Cotton's Letter. Bloody Tenent.

Defence of the Cure of Diviſ. p. 124.

Cobbet's Append. to Magiſtrates Power, p. 51.

as plainly as words can expreſs it, that a wilful error doth not excuſe from ſin? And the queſtion afterwards put, concerns the ſame thing; and the Anſwer I give to it is, if the error be wholly involuntary, it doth excuſe, but if it be wilful it doth not. Is this man's Conſcience full of *Scruples* that writes at this rate, with ſo little regard to the plain meaning and words of him whom he pretends to confute?

P. 73. 3. He ſaith, *I put one of the wildeſt Caſes that ever was put*, viz. *If a man think himſelf bound to divide the Church by ſinful Separation, that ſeparation is never the leſs a ſin for his thinking himſelf bound to do it. For* (1.) *It may be juſtly queſtioned, whether it be poſſible for a man in his wits, to think himſelf bound to divide the Church by ſinful Separation.* What *Sophiſters* Arguments are theſe? As though we did not commonly ſpeak of the thing *as it is*, and not as the *Perſon apprehends it*. S. *Paul* did think himſelf bound to a *ſinful perſecution*, although he did not think it ſo when he did it. The *Jews* thought themſelves bound *to kill the Apoſtles*, which was *wilful murder*, and yet they were men in their wits. The *falſe Apoſtles* thought themſelves bound to divide the Church by a *ſinful ſeparation*. How then comes this to be thought ſo impoſſible a caſe as to the thing it ſelf? for I was not ſo fooliſh to put the caſe concerning men, who thought themſelves bound to commit a ſin, knowing it to be a ſin. (2.) *He much queſtions, whether ever any did think himſelf bound to divide a Church, he may poſſibly think himſelf bound to avoid it.* If he may think himſelf bound to do that which makes *diviſions* in a *Church*, it is ſufficient to my purpoſe. And did not the *falſe Apoſtles* do ſo, and have not others followed their examples? And thus, after other trifling Cavils to the ſame purpoſe, after his manner, he yields all that I ſay, and ſaith, *It is freely granted by all the world, that wilful* P. 77. *Error doth not excuſe from ſin.* And after many words about the caſe of an *erroneous Conſcience*, he concludes, that *I deliver nothing but the common Doctrine of all Caſuiſts*; *only he thinks it not pertinent to the matter in hand.* Why ſo? was not the matter in hand about the *duty* of *complying* with an *eſtabliſhed Rule?* And was it not very pertinent to this, to ſhew how far an *erroneous Conſcience* may, or may not excuſe from ſin? But Mr. *A.* ſaith, *it ſhould have been about the Power of Conſcience, concerning an eſtabliſhed Rule of man's making*; *and ſuch for which they have neither general nor particular warrant from God ſo to make.* Is not this indeed to the purpoſe? Firſt to ſuppoſe an *unlawful Rule* impoſed, and then to enquire what *Conſcience* is to do about it. My buſineſs was to ſhew, that men were not in doubtful caſes to ſatisfie themſelves with this, *that they followed their Conſciences*; becauſe their *Conſciences* might *err*, and if that *Error* happened to be *wilful*, being contracted for want of due care what they did, might not only be *ſinful in it ſelf*, but imputed to them as *ſins*. Which all men who pretended any regard *to Conſcience*, ought to have an eye to: For why do they pretend *Conſcience*, but to avoid ſin? And if under a *wilful error of Conſcience*, they may ſtill be guilty of great *ſins*, as the *Jews*, and St. *Paul* were, then men ought not to ſatisfie themſelves barely with this pretence, that they do as their *Conſciences* direct them. This was the plain deſign of that part of *my Sermon*; and I leave any one to judge, whether it were not *pertinent*.

P. 78. But he ſaith, *the Errors of the Diſſenters, if they be ſuch, are wholly involuntary, and cauſed by invincible Ignorance.* If they prove ſo, it will be the better for them. I hope they have better Arguments in their own breaſts for it than what appears in ſome of their late Books; for neither a peeviſh, angry, ſcornful, provoking way of writing about theſe matters; nor a light, ſcurrilous, cavilling ſophiſtical Anſwer to a ſerious diſcourſe, are any great ſigns of ſuch an impartial endeavour after *ſatisfaction*, as Mr. *A.* boaſts of. I cannot tell how much *they have read the Scriptures, and ſtudied this Controverſie; nor how earneſtly they have prayed for direction*, but I have ſeen enough of their *unfriendly debates*, which give me no great ſatisfaction in this matter. But I leave this to *God* and their own *Conſciences* to judge, being very willing to hope and believe the beſt.

§. 35. To return to the *Author of the Letter.* The main force of what he ſaith, lies in this, *that thoſe who cannot conquer their Scruples as to communion with our Church, muſt either return to the ſtate of Paganiſm, or ſet up new Churches, by joining with the ejected Miniſters.* This is *new Doctrine*, and never heard of in the days of the *old Puritans*, for they ſuppoſed men obliged to continue in the *Communion of this Church*, although there were ſome things they *ſcrupled*, and could not *conquer thoſe Scruples.* And this they ſuppoſed to be far enough from a *State of Paganiſm.* P. 4.

But they ſcruple the uſe of the Sacraments with us; and much more living under ſome of our Miniſters. I never heard this laſt alleged for a ground of ſeparation till very lately, and it hath been conſidered already. And it is a very hard caſe with a *Church*, if *People* muſt fly into *Separation*, becauſe all their *Mineſters* are not ſuch as they ought to be. But if they do ſcruple *joining in communion with our Church*, I would fain know, whether as often as men do *ſcruple joining with others*, their *Separation* be *lawful?* If it be, it is a vain thing to talk of any *ſetled Conſtitution of a Church*, whether *Epiſcopal, Preſbyterian*, or *Independent*; for this *Principle* overthrows them all. I will inſtance particularly in the laſt, as moſt favourable to ſuch kind of *Liberty.* And I need not ſuppoſe a caſe, ſince ſuch hath already happened ſeveral times in *New-England.* R. *Williams* is one remarkable inſtance, who *ſcrupled many things in their Churches*, and therefore *could join no longer with them*; and thought himſelf bound to ſet up a *ſeparate Congregation* among them; and the *People who ſcrupled as well as he, choſe him for their Paſtor.* What is there in this caſe, but is every whit as juſtifiable, as the *preſent ſeparation?* But did the *Churches* of *New-England* allow this for a *juſt Cauſe?* ſo far from it, that *R. Williams* publiſhed grievous complaints to the world, of the *perſecution* he underwent for it. Mr. *Baxter* mentions another inſtance ſince this, from the mouth of Mr. *Norton*, an *eminent Miniſter* of *New-England*, viz. *of a Church that ſeparated from a Church, on the account of their Preachers having human learning; and upon all the applications and endeavours that could be uſed towards them, their anſwer was, That is your Judgment, and this is ours*, i. e. *they could not conquer their Scruples*, and therefore muſt perſiſt in *ſeparation*, or return to *Paganiſm.* Mr. *Cobbet* of *New-England* mentions a third inſtance; one *Obadiah Holmes* being unſatisfied with the proceedings of the *Church of Rehoboth*, withdraws from their *Communion*, and ſets up another *Aſſembly* in the *Town*; and upon his obſtinate continuance therein, was ſolemnly *excommunicated* by them. And what the late differences among them concerning the *Subject of Baptiſm and Conſociation of Churches* may come to, time will diſcover. I would only know, whether if Mr. *Davenport* and the *diſſenting party*

P. 8.

Anſwer to *Cotton*'s Letter. Bloody Tenent.

Defence of the Cure of Diviſ. p. 124.

Cobbet's Append. to Magiſtrates Power, p. 51.

Firſt Principles of *New-England* by *J. Mather*, 1675.

party there, from the determination of their *Synod*, ſhould proceed to *Separation*, this *Separation* be *juſtifiable* or not? This is certain, that the *Diſſenters* there do charge their *Brethren* with *Innovation* and *Apoſtaſie from their firſt principles*; and ſay, *their conſciences cannot comply with their Decrees:* and if they proceed, thoſe *Churches* may be broken in pieces, by theſe *principles* of *Separation.* As the *Separate Congregations* in the *Low Countries*, moſt of them were by *new Scruples*, which the People could not conquer; for the *Anabaptiſts* commonly raiſed *Scruples* among their *members*, and carried away many of them. And ſo they had done in *New-England*, and diſſolved thoſe Churches before this time, if this principle had been allowed there, *viz. that where People cannot conquer their ſcruples, they may proceed to Separation.* No, they tell them, they muſt preſerve the *Peace of their Churches*, and if they cannot be quiet among them, the world is wide enough for them. So they ſent *R. Williams* and others out of their *Colonies*; notwithſtanding the far greater danger of *Paganiſm* among the *Indians*. This I only mention, to ſhew that no *ſettled Church* doth allow this *liberty* of *Separation, becauſe men cannot conquer their Scruples.* And upon the ſame ground, not only *Anabaptiſts* and *Quakers*, but the *Papiſts* themſelves muſt be allowed the *liberty of ſetting up ſeparate Congregations.* For, I ſuppoſe this Gentleman will not deny, but they may have *Scruples* too, *many Scruples, and of long ſtanding, and among great numbers, and they have Prieſts enough at liberty to attend them.* And by that time all theſe have ſet up among us, ſhall we not be in a very hopeful way to preſerve the *Proteſtant Religion?*

Theſe conſequences do flow ſo naturally from ſuch principles, that I wonder that none of thoſe who have undertaken to defend the *Cauſe* of *Separation*, have taken any care to put any ſtop to it, or to let us know, where we may fix and ſee an end of it; what *ſcruples* are to be allowed, and what not: and whether it be lawful to *ſeparate* as long as men can go on in *ſcrupling*, and ſay *they cannot conquer their Scruples.* Are there no *Scruples* among us, but only againſt *the ſign of the Croſs*, and *God-fathers and God-mothers in Baptiſm*, and *kneeling at the Lord's Supper?* Are there none that *ſcruple the lawfulneſs* of *Infant-baptiſm* among us? Are there none that ſcruple *the very uſe of Baptiſm and the Lord's Supper*, ſaying they are not to be literally underſtood? Are there none that ſcruple giving *common reſpect* to others as a *ſort of Idolatry?* Are there none that *ſcruple* the *validity of our Ordinations*, and ſay, we can have *no true Churches*, becauſe we renounce *Communion* with the *Pope?* What is to be done with all theſe, and many more *Scruplers*, who profeſs *they cannot conquer their Scruples* no more than others can do theirs about *our ceremonies*, and ſuch weighty things as the uſe of *God-fathers* and *God-mothers*.

p. 6.

p. 8.

T. C.'s firſt Anſwer to Whitg. p. 157.

§ 36. This I mention, becauſe this *Gentleman* ſeems to look on it, as a more dreadful thing than *the ſign of the Croſs*. For, having ſpoken of that, he adds, *Nor is it in it ſelf of leſs weight (perhaps 'tis of much greater) that in Baptiſm the Parents are not ſuffered to be Sponſors for their Children, but others muſt appear and undertake for them:* which he repeats ſoon after. And yet *T. C.* who ſaw as much into theſe matters, as any that have come after him, in the *Admonitions* declared, *that this was a thing arbitrary, and left to the diſcretion of the Church.* And in his firſt *Anſwer* he ſaith, *For the thing it ſelf, conſidering that it is ſo generally received of all the Churches, they do not miſlike of it.* So that, on the ſame ground it ſeems, all other *Proteſtant Churches* may be ſcrupled at, as well as ours; and yet not only this *Gentleman*, but Mr. *B.* ſeveral times mentions this, as one of the *grounds* of the *unlawfulneſs* of the *Peoples joyning in Communion with us:* nay, he calls this, *his greateſt objection*; and yet he confeſſeth, *that if the Sponſors do but repreſent the Parents, our Baptiſm is valid and lawful.* Now where is it, that our Church excludes ſuch a *repreſentation?* Indeed by *Canon* 29. *the Parents are not to be compelled to be preſent, nor ſuffered to anſwer, as Suſceptors for their Children*; but the *Parents* are to *provide* ſuch as are fit to undertake that *Office.* In the *Bohemian Churches*, there ſeems to be an *expreſs compact* between the *Parents* and the *Sponſors*; but there is no *declaration* of our *Church* againſt ſuch an *implicit* one, as may be reaſonably inferred from the conſent of the parties. For the *Parents* deſire of the *Sponſors* undertaking ſuch an *Office* for his *Child* is in effect transferring his own *Right* to them; and ſo they may be ſaid to repreſent the *Parents.* If our *Church* had appointed the *Sponſors* without or againſt the conſent of the Parents; then none could in reaſon ſuppoſe, that there was any *implicit compact* between them. But ſince they are of the *Parents chooſing*, what they do in that *office*, is ſuppoſed to be with their *full conſent.* If *Baptiſm* were ſolemnly celebrated as of old, at ſome certain ſeaſons only, and indiſpenſable occaſions required the *Parents abſence*, might not they appoint others to be *Sponſors* for their *Children* upon *mutual conſent* and *agreement* among themſelves? Our *Churches* not permitting the *Parents* themſelves to be *Sponſors* is but like ſuch an occaſion of abſence; and the intention of our *Church* is not to ſuperſede the *obligation* of *Parents*, but to ſuperinduce a farther obligation upon other Perſons for greater ſecurity of performance. If men be negligent in doing their duty, muſt the *Church* bear the blame, and this be pleaded for a ground of *Separation* from her *Communion?*

Anſw.p.49. Plea for Peace, p. 143, 167. Defence of his Plea. p.26. Plea for Peace, p. 149.

Ratio Diſcip. Fratr. c. 3. *Sect.*2.

But there is ſomething beyond this, which lies at the bottom of this ſcruple; viz. *that the Child's Right to Baptiſm depends on the Right of the Parents, and therefore if the Parents be excluded, and only Sponſors admitted, the Children ſo baptized have no right to Baptiſm.* For Mr. *B*'s firſt *Queſtion* is, *which way the Child cometh to have right to Baptiſm, any more than all the Infidels Children in the world? And his next is, whether the Church of* England *require any ground of title in the Infant, beſides the Sponſion of the fore-deſcribed God-fathers, and God's general promiſe?*

Defect. of the Plea. p. 26.

I anſwer, (1.) The *Church* by requiring *Sponſors* doth not exclude any *Title* to *Baptiſm*, which the *Child* hath by the *Right* of the *Parents.* For the *Sponſors* may be ſuppoſed to appear in a threefold *Capacity.* 1. As *repreſenting the Parents in offering up the Child to Baptiſm*; and ſo whatever *right* the Parents have, that is challenged, when the *Child* is brought to be *baptized.* 2. As *repreſenting the Child in the Anſwers that are made in Baptiſm*; which is a very ancient and univerſal practice of the Chriſtian Church; for it was not only obſerved in the Latin *Churches* in S. *Auguſtin*'s time, and in the *Greek Churches* in S. *Chryſoſtom*'s, and hath ſo continued ever ſince, but the *Æthiopick* and *Armenian Churches* do ſtill obſerve it. 3. *In their own capacity*; when they *promiſe to take care of the good education of the Child in the principles of the Chriſtian faith*, in the charge given to them *after Baptiſm.* So that ſince one of theſe *capacities* doth not deſtroy another, they all ſucceeding each other, there

Aug. ep. 23. *Chryſoſt. in Pſal.* 14.

there is no reaſon to ſay that the *Church* doth exclude the right which comes by the Parents.

(2.) If the *Parents* be ſuppoſed to have *no right*, yet upon the *Sponſion* of *God-fathers*, the *Church* may have *right* to adminiſter *Baptiſm* to *Children*. Not as though their *Sponſion* gave the *right*, but was only intended to make them *parties* to the *Covenant* in the *Child's name* and *Sureties* for performance. To make this clear, we muſt conſider, that *adminiſtration* of *Baptiſm*, is one conſiderable part of *the Power of the Keys*, which *Chriſt* firſt gave to the *Apoſtles*, and is ever ſince continued in the *Officers* of the *Church*. By vertue of this *Power*, they have *Authority* to give admiſſion into the *Church* to capable *Subjects*. The *Church* of *Chriſt*, as far as we can trace any records of *Antiquity*, hath always allowed *Children* to be *capable Subjects of Admiſſion into the Chriſtian Church*; but leſt the *Church* ſhould fail of its end, and theſe *Children* not be afterwards well inſtructed in their Duty, it required *Sponſors* for them, who were not only to take care of them for the future, but to ſtand as their *ſureties* to ratifie their part of the *Covenant* which *Baptiſm* implies. And the *ancient Church* went no farther as to the *right of Baptiſm* than this, for ſince the *Power of the Keys* was in the *Church* to give *admiſſion* to *capable Subjects*; ſince the *Catholick Church* did always judge *Infants capable*, there ſeemed to be no more neceſſary for their *admiſſion* than the undertaking of *Sponſors* in their name. All this appears from S. *Auguſtine*'s *Epiſtle ad Bonifacium*; where he ſaith (1.) That the *Child's* benefit by *Baptiſm* doth not depend upon the *intention* of thoſe that offer him. For *Boniface* put the queſtion to S. *Auguſtin* about ſome *who offered Children to Baptiſm, not for any ſpiritual benefit, but for corporal health*; notwithſtanding this, ſaith S. *Auguſtine, if the due form of Baptiſm be obſerved, the ſpiritual effect of it is obtained.* (2.) That the *Church's* right is chiefly concerned in the *baptiſm* of *Infants*. *For*, ſaith he, *the Children are offered to Baptiſm and the Spiritual Grace to be received thereby, not ſo much by thoſe in whoſe arms they are carried* (for ſo the *Sponſors* uſed to carry them in their *right arms*) *as by the whole Society of the Faithful. Tota ergo mater Eccleſia quæ in ſanctis eſt facit, quia tota omnes, tota ſingulos parit:* ſo that it is by the *Church's right*, that he ſuppoſeth them to receive *baptiſm* and the *benefits* by it. (3.) That there is no neceſſity, *that the Parents themſelves offer their Children*. For he calls *it a miſtake to think that Children receive the benefit in Baptiſm, as to the remiſſion of Original Guilt, on the account of their Parents offering them. For many are offered to Baptiſm by ſtrangers, and ſlaves ſometimes by their Maſters. And when Parents are dead, Children are offered by ſuch as take pity upon them; and ſometimes Children expoſed by Parents, and ſometimes as they are taken up by holy Virgins, which neither have Children, nor intend to have any.* (4.) *That the Anſwers made by the Sponſors in Baptiſm in the name of the Child, are a part of the ſolemnity of Baptiſm. Not as though the Child did really believe, yet it is ſaid to believe on the account of the Sacrament which ſuppoſeth faith. For the Sacraments becauſe of the reſemblance between them and the things repreſented by them, do carry the name of the things repreſented*; as, ſaith he, *the Sacrament of Chriſt's body after a certain manner is called his Body; and the Sacrament of his blood is called his blood, ſo the Sacrament of faith is called faith, i. e.* the Baptiſmal *Covenant* ſuppoſing believing on one part, the *Church* ſupplies that part by the *Sponſors*, which cannot be performed by the *Children*. Thence he ſaith,

Tertul. in Baptiſmo. c. 18.

ipſa reſponſio ad celebrationem pertinet Sacramenti, ſo that then the *Church* looked upon the *Sponſors anſwering*, as a neceſſary part of the *ſolemnity* of *Baptiſm*. Thence S. *Auguſtine* elſewhere ſaith, that the *fide juſſores* or *Sureties did in the name of the Children renounce the Devil and all his Pomp and Works*; and in another place he declares, *that he would not baptize a Child without the Sponſors anſwering for the Child, that he would renounce the Devil, and turn to God, and that they believed he was baptized for the remiſſion of ſins.*

Serm. 116. *de Tempore.*

De peccat. meritis & remiſſ. l. 1. *c.* 34.

(3.) Thoſe who think themſelves bound to *baptize Children* only by vertue of *the Parents right*, muſt run into many *perplexing Scruples* about *baptizing Children*, and be forced to exclude the far greater number of thoſe that are offered. For, (1.) They are not well agreed, what it is which gives *Parents a right* to have their *Children baptized*; whether a *dogmatical Faith be ſufficient*, or a *juſtifying Faith* be neceſſary? If *ſaving Faith* be neceſſary, whether the *outward profeſſion* of it be *ſufficient*? Whether that ought to be taken for a *true profeſſion* which is only *pretended* to be *a true ſign of the mind*, or that only which is *really ſo*? Whether *profeſſion* be required for it ſelf, or as a *diſcovery* of *ſomething farther*? Whether *ſeeming ſeriouſneſs in profeſſion* be *ſufficient*, or *real ſeriouſneſs* be required? What we muſt judge *real ſeriouſneſs in profeſſion*, as diſtinct from *inward ſincerity*? What *contradiction* may be allowed to make a *profeſſion not ſerious*? Whether beſides a *ſerious profeſſion* it be not neceſſary to be a *practical profeſſion*? and what is neceſſary for the judging a *profeſſion* to be *practical*? Whether beſides mere *practical profeſſion* the *poſitive ſigns* of *inward Grace* be not neceſſary? And whether beſides all theſe, *actual confederation* and joyning in *Church Covenant* be not neceſſary? And if it be, whether the *Children of confederated Parents not being confederated themſelves, can convey a right to their Children?* About theſe, and other ſuch like Queſtions, thoſe who go upon *the Parents Right* are in *perpetual diſputes*, and can neither give others, nor hardly themſelves *ſatisfaction* about them. (2.) The conſequence of this is, that *they muſt baptize many with a doubting mind*; and muſt exclude many more, than they can baptize. For Mr. *B.* ſaith, *if he took a dogmatical faith it ſelf, or any ſhort of juſtifying for the Title and neceſſary qualifications of them I muſt admit, I would baptize none, becauſe I cannot know who hath that dogmatical faith, and who not.* The like others are as ready to ſay, of his *ſerious, voluntary, not prevalently contradicted, practical profeſſion*; or at leaſt, that no man can baptize with a *good Conſcience*, till he hath upon good evidence throughly weighed the *lives* of the *Parents*, and is able to pronounce that the actions of their lives do not *prevalently contradict their profeſſion.* Others muſt reject all thoſe in whoſe *Parents* they do not ſee *poſitive ſigns of Grace*; or are not *actually confederated* with them. And upon all theſe ſeveral bars to the *Parents Right*, how few *Children* will be left, that a man can *baptize* with a *ſafe Conſcience*? Is not this now a more likely way to reduce the far greateſt part of *Chriſtianity* to *Paganiſm* than denying the *lawfulneſs* of *Separation*? Thus I have conſidered this main Scruple againſt *the Uſe of entitling and Covenanting Godfathers*, as Mr. *B.* calls them; and have ſhewed how little reaſon there is to make uſe of this as ſo *great an objection* againſt our *Church's Communion.*

Preface to Right to Sacraments

Conferences First Part. As to *kneeling* at the *Communion*, I find nothing particularly objected againſt that deſerving conſideration, which I have not anſwered in another place.

Miſchief of Impoſ. p. 85, 86, 87. *Sect.* 37. Mr. *A.* hath one thing yet more to ſay againſt the *terms* of our *Church's Communion, viz. that upon the ſame Reaſon theſe are impoſed, the Church may impoſe ſome uſe of Images, Circumciſion, and the Paſchal Lamb.* To which I anſwer,

(1.) That our Queſtion is about *Separation* from the *Communion* of our *Church* on the account of the *terms that are impoſed*; and is this a reaſonable pretence for men not to do what is required, becauſe they do not know what may be required on the ſame grounds? A Father charges his Son *to ſtand with his Hat off before him, or elſe he ſhall not ſtay in his Houſe*; at firſt the Son demurs upon *putting off his Hat* to his *Father*, becauſe he hath ſome *ſcruples*, whether *putting off the Hat* be a *lawful Ceremony* or not; not merely on the account of its *ſignificancy*, but becauſe it ſeems to him to be *giving worſhip to a Creature*. This he thinks ſo *weighty a ſcruple*, that he charges his *Father* with *Tyranny over his Conſcience* for *impoſing* ſuch a *condition*, on his continuing in his houſe, and thinks himſelf ſufficiently *juſtified* by it in his *diſobedience* and *forſaking his Father's Houſe*, and drawing away as many of his *ſervants* from him, as he can infuſe this *ſcruple* into. But let us ſuppoſe him brought to underſtand the difference between *Civil* and *Religious Worſhip*, yet he may upon Mr. *A*'s grounds ſtill juſtifie his *diſobedience*. For ſaith he to his *Father*, “Why do you require me to *put off my Hat in your Preſence*, and to make this the *condition* of my ſtaying in your *Houſe?* Is it not enough that I own my ſelf to be your *Son*, and aſk you *bleſſing* Morning and Evening, and am very willing *to ſit at your Table*, and depend upon you for my *ſubſiſtence?* Are not theſe ſufficient *Teſtimonies* that I am your *Son*, but you muſt expect my *obedience* in ſuch a *trifling Ceremony* as *putting off my Hat?* You ſay, *it is a token of reſpect*; I ſay for that reaſon I ought not to do it. For, how do I know when you will have done with your *tokens of reſpect?* It is true, you require no more now, but I conſider what *you may do*, and for all that I know, the next thing you may require me will be to *put off my Shoes before you*, for that is a *token of reſpect* in ſome Countries; next you may require me *to kiſs your Toe*, for that is a *token of reſpect* uſed ſome where; and who knows what you may come to at laſt; and therefore I am reſolved to ſtop at firſt, and will rather leave your *Houſe*, than be bound to *put off my Hat in your Preſence.* Let any one judge whether this be a reaſonable ground for ſuch an *obſtinate diſobedience* to the *Command* of his *Father*. Or ſuppoſe a *Law* were made to diſtinguiſh the *ſeveral Companies* in *London* from each other, that they ſhould have ſome *Badge* upon their *Livery Gowns*, that may repreſent the *Trade* and *Company* they are of; would this be thought a juſt excuſe for any man's refuſing it, to ſay, “What do I know how far this *impoſing Power* may go at laſt? it is true, the matter is ſmall at preſent, but I conſider it as a *Badge*, it is a *moral ſignificant Ceremony*, a dangerous teeming thing, no man knows what it may *bring forth* at laſt; for how can I or any man living tell, but at laſt I may be required to wear a *Fool's Coat.* Would ſuch an unreaſonable jealouſie as this juſtifie ſuch a man's *refractorineſs*, in rather chooſing to loſe the *privilege* of his *Company*, than *ſubmitting* to wear the *Badge* of it? So that the *fears* of what may be required is no ground for *actual diſobedience* to what is required. (2.) There can be no *reaſonable ſuſpicion* that our *Church* ſhould impoſe *any other Ceremonies*, than what it hath already done, ſuppoſing that it might do it, on the ſame ground: Becauſe the *Church* hath rather *retrenched* than *increaſed Ceremonies*; as will appear to any one that compares the firſt and ſecond *Liturgies* of *Edw.* 6. And ſince that time no one new Ceremony hath been required, as a *condition of Communion.* But beſides, our *Church* gives a particular reaſon againſt the *multiplying* of *Ceremonies:* becauſe *the very number of them, ſuppoſing them lawful, is a burden; of which St.* Auguſtin *complained in his time, and others had much more cauſe ſince; and therefore for that cauſe many were taken away*, And withal, *it is declared that Chriſt's Goſpel was not to be a Ceremonial Law.* So that for theſe reaſons there can be no juſt fears that our *Church* ſhould contradict her *own doctrine*, which it muſt do, if it *increaſed our Ceremonies*, ſo as to make a *new argument* againſt them, from the *number* of them. (3.) There is not the *ſame Reaſon* for *introducing* the things mentioned by Mr. *A.* as for the *Ceremonies* in *Uſe* among us. For, (1.) *As to the Uſe of Images*, our *Church* hath fully declared againſt any *Religious Uſe* of them, in the *Homilies* about the *Peril of Idolatry*; and that from ſuch reaſon, as cannot extend to our *Ceremonies*: *viz.* from the *expreſs Law of God*, and the *general ſenſe* of the *Primitive Church*; which allowed and practiſed *the ſign of the Croſs*, at the ſame time when it diſputed moſt vehemently againſt *Images*. (2.) *For Circumciſion*, which he tells us, *may be uſed as ſignifying the circumciſion of the Heart.* He knows very well that our Church joins *ſignificancy* and *decency* together in the *matter* of *Ceremonies*; and no man can imagine that ſuch a kind of ſignificancy as that he mentions, ſhould be ſufficient to introduce ſuch a practice which is ſo repugnant to *Decency* among us. Beſides that St. *Paul* makes it ſo great a *badge* of the *obligation* to the *Law*, that he ſaith, *If ye be circumciſed Chriſt profiteth you nothing:* which was never ſaid of any of our *Ceremonies.* And whereas he ſaith, *it is obſerved in* Abaſſia *as a myſtical Ceremony*; he is much miſtaken, if their *Emperor Claudius* ſay true; for he ſaith, *it is only a National Cuſtom without any reſpect to Religion, like the cutting of the face in ſome parts of* Æthiopia *and* Nubia, *and boring the ear among the Indians.* And *Ludolphus* proves it to be no other, *becauſe it is done by a woman in private, without any witneſſes.* (3.) *As to his Paſchal Lamb in memory of Chriſt our Paſſover that is ſacrificed for us*; We owe greater *Reverence* to *God's own Inſtitutions* that were intended to *typifie Chriſt to come*, than to preſume to turn them quite another way to *repreſent what is paſt.* Eſpecially ſince *Chriſt* is become *the great Sacrifice for the ſins of mankind.* And he might as well have mentioned *the Scape-Goat and the Red Heifer as the Paſchal Lamb*; ſince they were all *Types* of the *great Sacrifice* of *Propitiation.* But why are things never uſed by the *Primitive Church* (*for as to his ſtory of Innocent* 2. be it true or falſe, it is nothing to us) brought to parallel our *Ceremonies*, when the great *Reaſon* of our *Churches* retaining any *Ceremonies* was declared from the beginning of the *Reformation* to be out of *Reverence* to the *Ancient Church*, which obſerved the ſame kind of *Ceremonies*?

Preface to the Common-Prayer.

Confeſſio Fidei Claudii Regis Æthiopiæ.

The only remaining pretence for the *preſent Separation*, is, *that there is a parity of reaſon, as to their Separating from us, and our Separating from the Church of* Rome. For ſo Mr. *A.* urgeth the argument, *we Se-*

parate

Miſchief of Impoſ. *Preface.*

parate from them becauſe they impoſe doubtful things for certain, falſe for true, new for old, abſurd for reaſonable; then this will hold for themſelves becauſe they think ſo; and that was all I oppoſed to T. G. But is it poſſible for any man that pretends to be a *Proteſtant Divine* to think the caſe alike? When (1.) *They confeſs our Doctrine in the* 39 *Articles to be true,* we reject all their *additional Articles,* in *Pius* 4. *his Creed,* not only *as falſe,* but ſome of them as *abſurd* and *unreaſonable,* as men can invent, *viz.* that of *Tranſubſtantiation*; which is made by them the great trying and burning point. But what is there, which the moſt inveterate enemies of our *Church* can charge in her doctrine, as *new,* as *falſe,* as *abſurd?* nay, they all yield to the *Antiquity,* to the *Truth,* to the *Reaſonableneſs* of our *Doctrine*; and yet is not Mr. *A.* aſhamed to make the *caſe* ſeem parallel. But what new and ſtrong Reaſon doth he bring for it? You may be ſure it is ſome mighty thing; for he ſaith, preſently after it, *that my Importunity hath drawn them out of their reſervedneſs, and they have hitherto been modeſt to their prejudice.* Alas for him, that his modeſty ſhould ever hurt him! But what is this dangerous *Secret,* that they have hitherto kept in, out of mere *veneration to the Church of* England? Let us prepare our ſelves for this unuſual, this killing charge. Why, ſaith Mr. *A. In the Catechiſm of the Church, this Doctrine is contained* (It is *matter* of *Doctrine* then, I ſee; although we are confeſſed *to be agreed in the* 39 *Articles, as far as they concern Doctrine.* But what is this *notorious Doctrine?*) *It is,* ſaith he, *that Infants perform Faith and Repentance by their Sureties.* Did I not fear it was ſome *dreadful thing*; ſome *notorious hereſie,* condemned by one or two at leaſt of the four *General Councils?* But is it ſaid ſo, in plain words? or is it wire-drawn by far-fetched Conſequences? No, it is plain enough; for the Queſtion is, *What is required of Perſons to be baptized.* Anſw. *Repentance whereby they forſake ſin; and faith, whereby they ſtedfaſtly believe the promiſes of God made to them in that Sacrament.* Queſt. *Why then are Infants baptized, when by reaſon of their tender age, they cannot perform them?* Anſw. *Becauſe they promiſe them both by their Sureties; which promiſe when they come to age themſelves are bound to perform.* But I pray doth it hence follow, that *Infants do perform Faith and Repentance, by their Sureties?* Are not the words expreſs, *that they promiſe both by their Sureties?* And is *promiſing* and *performance* all one? I do not find it ſo by this *Inſtance.* For here was a greater matter *promiſed,* and nothing *performed.* It is true the *Catechiſm* ſaith, *Faith and Repentance are required of them that are to be baptized:* which ſuppoſeth the perſons to be baptized *capable* of performing theſe things themſelves. And then comes a *Queſtion,* by way of *objection*; *why then are Infants baptized,* &c. to which the ſenſe of the *Anſwer* is, that although by *reaſon* of their Age they are *uncapable* of *performing* the *Acts* of *Repentance* and *Believing*; yet the *Church* doth allow *Sureties* to enter into *Covenant* for them; which doth imply a *Promiſe* on their parts for the *Children,* and an *obligation* lying on them to *perform* what was then *promiſed.* And now let the Reader judge, ſince this *horrible Secret* is come out, whether this ought to be ranked in an equal degree as to the juſtifying *Separation* with the *monſtrous, abſurd* and *unreaſonable doctrines* of the *Roman Church.* And I know nothing can do them greater Service, than ſuch *Parallels* as theſe.

(2.) We charge them with thoſe *Reaſons* for *Separation*, which the *Scripture* allows; ſuch as *Idolatry*, *perverting the Goſpel* and *Inſtitutions* of *Chriſt*, and *Tyranny* over the *Conſciences* of men, in making thoſe things *neceſſary to ſalvation*, which *Chriſt* never made ſo: But none of theſe, can with any appearance of *Reaſon* be charged on the *Church* of *England*, ſince we profeſs to give *Religious Worſhip* only *to God*; *we worſhip no Images*; *we invocate no Saints*; *we adore no Hoſt*; *we creep to no Crucifix*; *we kiſs no Relicks.* We equal no *traditions* with the *Goſpel*; we lock it not up from the *People* in an *unknown language*; we preach no other *terms* of *ſalvation* than *Chriſt* and his *Apoſtles* did; we ſet up *no Monarchy* in the *Church* to *undermine Chriſt's*, and to diſpence with his *Laws* and *Inſtitutions.* We *mangle* no *Sacraments*, nor pretend to know what makes more for the *honour* of his *Blood* than he did himſelf. We pretend to no ſkill in *expiating mens ſins when they are dead*; nor in turning the bottomleſs pit into the Pains of *Purgatory* by a *charm of words* and a quick motion of the hand. We do not cheat mens ſouls with *falſe bills of exchange*, called *Indulgences*; nor give out that we have the *Treaſure* of the *Church* in our keeping, which we can apply as we ſee occaſion. We uſe no *pious frauds* to delude the *People*, nor pretend to be infallible, as they do when they have a mind to deceive. Theſe are things which the *Divines* of our *Church* have with great clearneſs and ſtrength of Reaſon made good againſt the *Church* of *Rome*; and ſince they cannot be *objected* againſt our *Church*, with what face can men ſuppoſe the *caſes* of thoſe who *ſeparate* from each of them to be *parallel?*

(3.) As to the *Ceremonies* in the *Roman Church* and ours, there are theſe conſiderable differences,

(1.) They have a *mighty number*, as appears by their *Rituals* and *Ceremonials*, and the great *volums*, written in *explication* of them; we, *very few*, and thoſe ſo very eaſie and plain, that it requires as great ſkill not to underſtand ours, as it doth to underſtand theirs. (2.) They place *great holineſs* in theirs, as appears by the *Forms* of *conſecration* of their *Water*, *Oyle*, *Salt*, *Wax*, *Veſtments*, &c. but we allow *none* of theſe, but only the *uſe* of *certain ceremonies*, without any preceding *Act* of the *Church* importing any *peculiar holineſs* attributed to them. (3.) They ſuppoſe *great vertue* and *efficacy* to be in them, for the purging away *ſome ſorts of ſins*; we utterly deny any ſuch thing to belong to our *ceremonies*, but declare, that they are appointed only for *Order* and *Decency.* (4.) They make their *ceremonies* being appointed by the *Church* to become *neceſſary parts of Divine Worſhip*; as I have already proved; but our *Church* looks upon them, even when determined *as things in their own nature indifferent*, but only required by vertue of that *general obedience* which we owe to *lawful Authority.* So that as to *ceremonies* themſelves there is a *vaſt diſparity* between the *Roman Church* and ours; and no man can pretend otherwiſe, that is not either *groſly ignorant*, or doth not *wilfully miſunderſtand* the *ſtate* of the *Controverſie* between them and us.

Thus I have gone through all the *Pleas* for the *preſent Separation* I could meet with, in the *Books* of my *Anſwerers:* and I have not concealed the *force* or *ſtrength* I ſaw in any of them. And however Mr. *A.* reproaches me with *having a notable talent of miſrepreſenting my Adverſaries*, (a thing which I have always abhorred, and never did it *wilfully* in my life, it appearing to me an act of *injuſtice* as well as *diſingenuity*) yet I do aſſure him, I have endeavoured to underſtand them truly, and *Miſchief of Impoſ. p.* 51.

to repreſent them fairly, and to judge impartially. And although I make *no ſuch appeals to the day of Judgment* as others do; yet I cannot but declare to the world, *as one that believes* a day of Judgment to come, that upon the moſt *diligent ſearch*, and *careful inquiry* I could make into this matter, I cannot find any *Plea ſufficient* to juſtifie in point of *conſcience*, the *preſent Separation* from the *Church* of *England*.

Monſeigneur,

DEux voyages que j'ay été obligé de faire, m'ont empéché de répondre auſſi toſt que je l'aurois ſouhaité a la Lettre dont Vôtre Grandeur m'a fait la grace de m'honorer. Comme j'étois ſur le point de vous en faire des excuſes, Monſieur de L'Angle eſt arrivé en ceſte Ville, qui me les a fait encore differer, dans l'eſperance, qu'il voudroit bien ſe charger de ma reponſe, & qu'elle pourroit par ce moien vous étre plus fidellement rendue. Il eſt vray, Monſieur, que ſi j'en croyois mon déplaiſir, je la remettrois encore a une autre fois; car je ne peux vous ecrire ſans un extreme douleur, quand je ſonge à la matiere ſur laquelle vous me commandés de vous dire mon ſentiment. Je croy que vous les ſçavés deja bien, & que vous ne me faites pas l'honneur de me le demander comme en ayant quelque ſorte de doute; vous me faites plus de juſtice que cela; & vous ne me comprenez pas au nombre de ceux, qui ont touchant l'Egliſe d'Angleterre une ſi mechante opinion. Pour moy, je n'en avois pas une ſi mechante d'aucun veritable Anglois, & je ne pouvois pas me perſuader qu'il y en eut un ſeul, qui crût qu'on ne peut éſtre dans ſa communion ſans haſarder ſon propre ſalut. Pour ceux qui ſont engagés dans le parti de l'Egliſe Romaine, j'en jugeois tout autrement. Ils ont des maximes particuliers, & agiſſent par d'autres intereſts. Mais pour ceux qui n'ont aucune liaiſon avec Rome, c'eſt une choſe bien ſinguliere de les voir paſſer juſqu' a cette extremité que de croir que dans l'Egliſe Anglicane on ne peut faire ſon ſalut. C'eſt n'avoir gueres de conoiſſance de la Confeſſion de foy, que tout le monde Proteſtant a ſi hautement approuvée, & qui merite en effect les loüanges de tout ce qu'il y a de bons Chreſtiens. Car on ne pouvoit rien faire de plus ſage que cette Confeſſion, & jamais les articles de foy n'ont été recueillis avec un diſcernment plus juſte, & plus raiſonable que dans cette excellente piece. On a raiſon de la garder avec tant de veneration dans la Bibliothequé d'Oxford, & le grand Juellus pour l'avoir ſi dignement defendüe, eſt digne d'une loüange immortelle. C'eſt d'elle dont Dieu ſe ſervit dans le commencement de la Reformation d'Angleterre, & ſi elle n'avoit pas étè comme ſon ouvrage, il ne l'auroit pas benit d'une façon ſi avantageuſe. Le ſucces qu'elle out, devroit fermer la bouche a ceux qui ſont les plus animés, & l'avoir veue trionpher de tant d'Obſtacles devroit faire reconnoitre a tout le monde, que Dieu s'eſt declaré en ſa faveur, qu'il eſt viſiblement mêlé de ſon établiſſement, & qu'elle a la verité & la fermeté de ſa parole, a qui elle doibt en effect ſa naiſſance, & ſon origine. Elle eſt aujourdhuy ce qu'elle étoit quand elle étoit formée, & on ne peut pas reprocher a Meſſieurs les Evêques qu'ils y ayent depuis cette terme lá, apporté quelque changement. Et comment donc s'imaginer qu'elle ayt changé d'uſage? & peut on rien voir de plus inique, que de dire, qu'un

Inſtrument que Dieu employa autrefois pour l'inſtruction de tant de gens de bien, pour le ſalut de tant de peuples, pour la conſolation tant de fidelles ſoit aujourdhuy devenüe quelque choſe de funeſte, & pernicieuſe. Si vôtre Confeſſion de foy eſt pure, & innocente, vôtre ſervice divin l'eſt auſſi. Car on n'y voit rien de tout qui tend a l'idolatrie; vous n'adorès que Deu ſeul; dans vôtre culte il n'y a rien qui ſe termine a la creature, & ſi l'on y trouve quelques ceremonies qui ne ſe rencontrent pas ailleurs, c'eſt faire profeſſion d'un terrible Theologie, avoir depouillé toute charité, ne ſçavoir guere ce que valent les ames, ne connoitre point la nature de choſes indifferentes, que decroire qu'elles ſont capables de perdre eternellement ceux qui s'y veulent aſſujettir. C'eſt avoir une même dureté que de croire que vôtre diſcipline eccleſiaſtique eſt capable de damner les hommes. Car ou a t'on jamais vû que pour des articles de diſcipline le ſalut des hommes ſe trouve intereſſê, & de choſes qui ne regardent que le dehors, & l'ordre de l'egliſe, & qui ne ſont que comme l'ecorce, & les envelopes de la verité, peuvent elles cauſer la mort, & gliſſer du poiſon dans une ame? Certes on ne les comprend jamais au nombre de verités eſſentielles, & comme il n'y a que celles cy qui ſauvent, il n'y a qu'elles auſſi qui peuvent exclurre du ſalut. Pour le gouvernement Epiſcopal, qu'a t'il qui ſoit dangereux, & qui puiſſe raiſonnablement alarmer des conſciences? & s'il eſt capable de priver de la gloire eternelle, & de boucher les avenües du ciel, qui eſt ce qui y eſt entré l'eſpace de plus de quinze cents ans? Puiſque pendant tout ce temps la, toutes les Egliſes du monde n'ont point eu d'autre governement. S'il étoit contraire a la verité & a l'aquiſition du bonheur eternel, eſt il croyable que Dieu l'eut ſi hautement approuvé, & qu'il eut permis que pendant tant de ſiecles ſon Egliſe en euſt été tyranniſé? Car qui eſt ce qui l'a gouverné, qui eſt ce qui a compoſé ſes conciles tant generaux que particuliers, qui eſt ce qui a combatu les Hereſies dont elle a eſté de tout temps attaqué? ont ce pas été les Evéques, & n'eſt ce pas a leur ſage conduite, que la parole de Dieu eſt redevable, apres Dieu, de ſes victoires & de ſes triomphes. Et ſans remonter juſqu'au berceau, & la naiſſance de l'Egliſe, qui eſt ce qui dans le ſiecle precedent delivra l'Angleterre, de l'Erreur dont elle étoit envelopée? Qui eſt ce qui y fit reſveiller ſi miraculuſement la verité? fut ce pas le zele, & la fermeté des evêques, & leur miniſtere? degagea t'il pas les Anglois de l'oppreſſion ſous laquelle ils gemiſſoient de puis ſi long temps; & leur exemple aida't y pas puiſſamment a la Reformation de toute l'Europe? En verité je croy qui'ls en pouvroient uſer comme fiſt autrefois Gregoire de Nazianze au milieu de Conſtantinople. Quand il y arriva, il trouva que l'Arianiſme y avoit fait de fort grand progres, cependant, ſon courage, ſon zele, ſon ſçavoir affoblioent ſi forte le parti des Heretiques, qu'en peu de temps la verité y apparut plus belle que jamais, & il volut que le Temple ou il l'avoit ſi fortement appuiée portoit le nom d'Anaſtaſie, parce qu'il l'y avoit comme deterrée, & degagée de deſſous l'erreur, & par ſes ſoins continuels, il y avoit comme fait ſortir du tombeau, & glorieuſement reſuſcitée, c'eſt ce qu'ont fait auſſi les Eveſques d'Angleterre. Ils voyoient non une verité ſeulement, mais quaſi toutes les verités fondamentales enſevelies ſous un nombre eſpouvantables d'Erreurs. Ils voyoient le joug de Rome plus peſant au milieu d'eux qu'il n'étoit nulle part ailleurs. La difficulté qu'il y avoit a reüſſir dans la Reformation étoit capable de décourager des perſonnes d'une capacité, & d'une zele mediocre, & neantmoins rien ne les detourne d'un ſi gene-

to repreſent them fairly, and to judge impartially. And although I make *no ſuch appeals to the day of Judgment* as others do; yet I cannot but declare to the world, *as one that believes* a day of Judgment to come, that upon the moſt *diligent ſearch*, and *careful inquiry* I could make into this matter, I cannot find any *Plea ſufficient* to juſtifie in point of *conſcience*, the *preſent Separation* from the *Church* of *England*.

Monſeigneur,

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reux deſſein. Les ennemis de dehors, ceux de dedans, tous terribles qu'ils paruſſent, ne les intimident point; ils entreprenent ce grand ouvrage, & ne l'abandonnent point qu'ils n'en ſoient venus au bout, & qu'ils n'ayent remis ſur le throne la verité reſuſcitée. En ſorte qu'ils pouvoient laiſſer par tout des monuments de ce miracle & nommer juſtement toutes leur Egliſes du nom d'Anaſtaſie & de reſurrection. Mais ſi ce Tiltre manque a leur Temples, la choſe en ſoy leur convient, & l'on n'entend reſſonner au milieu d'eux que les Leſſons, & les Loüanges de la pure Verité. Ce que doit obliger tous les gens de bien à ne s'en ecarter pas, & a regarder l'Egliſe Anglicane comme une Egliſe tres Orthodox. C'eſt ce qui font les Proteſtants de France, ceux de Geneva: ceux de Suiſſe, & d'Allemagne, & ceux d'Hollande auſſi. Car ils ſe firent un fort grand honneur, d'avoir dans leur Concile de Dordrecht des Theologiens d'Angleterre, & monſtrerent bien qu'ils avoient pour l'Egliſe Anglicane une profonde veneration. Et d'ou vient donc, que des Anglois mêmes en ont aujourdhuy ſi mechante opinion, & rompre ſi temerairement comme ils font, avec Elle? eſt ce pas rompre avec toute l'Egliſe Ancienne, avec toutes les Egliſes Oriéntales, avec toutes les Egliſes Proteſtantes qui ont toujours fort conſideré la pureté de celle d'Angleterre? eſt ce pas une horrible dureté que de l'excommunier ſans miſericorde, & s'en faire etrangement a croire que de s'imaginer qu'ils ſoient le ſeuls en Angleterre & même au milieu de tout le monde chriſtien, qui ſoient deſtinés au bonheur eternel & a ſouſtenir, comme il faut, le verites neceſſaires au ſalut. Certes on pourroit faire un parallele fort odieux entre ces Docteurs, & le Pape Victor, qui volut excommunier les Egliſes d'Aſie par ce qu'elles ne celebroient le feſte de Paſque au même jour que Rome le faiſoit; entre eux & les Audiens, qui rompoient avec les Chriſtiens, & ne vouloient point ſuffrir d'Evêques riches. Entre eux & le Donatiſtes, qui ne vouloient point de communion avec ceux qui avoient eſté ordines par des Evêques laches, & qui s'imaginoient que leur ſocieté étoit la veritable Egliſe, & lépouſe bien aimée qui paiſſoit ſon troupeau vers le midi. Entre eux & ceux de la communion Romaine, qui ont ſi bonne opinion de leur Egliſe, que hors d'elle ils ne s'imaginent pas qu'un puiſſe jamais acquirer le Salut. Pour moy quelque enclin que je ſois a la tolerance, je ne pourois pourtant me perſuader qu'il en faille avoir pour ceux qui en ont ſi peu pour les autres, & que s'ils étoient les maitres feroient aſſurement un mauvais quartiér a ceux qui dependroient d'eux. Je regarde ces gens là, comme de perturbateurs de l'Eſtat, & de l'Egliſe, & qui ſont infalliblement animès d'un eſprit de ſedition. J'ay même de la paine a croire qu'ils ſoient juſtement ce qu'ils diſent eſtre, & je craindrois bien que ſous ces Docteurs il n'y euſt des ennemis tres dangereux qui fuſſent cachés. Des Societés compoſées de telles perſonnes ſeroient extremement perilleuſes, & on ne les pourroit ſoufrir ſans ouvrir la porte au diſordre, & travailler a ſa propre ruine. Il y en a de compoſêes de perſonnes plus raiſonnables. Mais j'y voudrois qu'elles le fuſſent aſſez, pour ne ſe point ſeparer de celles qui compoſent l'Egliſe Anglicane; particulierement au terme ou nous ſommes elles devroient tout faire pour une bonne Reconciliation; & dans le conjuncture des affaires preſentes ils devroient bien s'aperçevoir qu'il n'y a qu'une bonne reunion qui puiſſe prevenir les maux dont l'Angleterre eſt menacée. Car pour dire la verité, je ne voi pas que leur Meetings *ſoient de fort grand utilité, & qu'on puiſſe s'y conſoler davantage, que dans les Egliſes Epiſcopales. Quand j'eſtois a Londres, il y a bien toſt cinq ans, je me trouvay en pluſieurs aſſemblées particulieres pour voir comme on l'y pre-*

noit pour l'inſtruction du peuple, & la predication de la parole de Dieu. Mais j'avoüe que je n'en receus aucune edification. J'entendis un de plus fameux Non-conformiſtes. Il prechoit en un lieu ou il y avoit trois hommes, & ſoiſſante, ou quatre vingt femmes. Il avoit choiſi un texte touchant le reſtabliſſement des ruines de Jeruſalem, & pour l'expliquer, il cita cent fois Plinie *&* Vitruve, *& n'oublia pas de dire en Italien ce proverbe,* duro con duro non fa muro. *Tout cela me parut hors de propos, fort peu a propos pour des femmelettes, & tres éloigné d'un eſprit qui ne cherche que la conſolation & l'edification de ſes auditeurs. Se Cantoner & faire un ſchiſme pour avoir la liberté de debiter de telles vanités eſt une fort mauvaiſe conduite; & les peuples paroiſſent bien foibles de quitter leur mutuelles aſſemblées pour de choſes qui meritent ſi peu leur eſtime, & leur preference. Je n'eſtime pas, qu'on ſoit en obligation de ſouffrir ce dereglement. Il eſt vray qu'autrefois on ſouffroit les Aſſemblées de Novatiens à Rome & à Conſtantinople, & que le Donatiſtes a voient en la premiere place quelque ſorte de liberté. Mais c'eſtoit les Eſtrangers, & cela même ne dura pas long temps & comme il y en avoit peu, cela ne tiroit pas en conſequence. Mais c'eſt un autre fait en Angleterre, & comme le bien de l'Eſtat, & de l'Egliſe depend abſolument de l'union du peuple ſur le poinct de la Religion, on n'y pourroit trop preſſer une union univerſelle. Mais il la faut procurer par les bonnes voyes, & comme Meſſieurs les Evêques ſont de perſonnes d'une grande experience, d'un ſçavoir extraordinaire, d'un zele, & d'une bonté, envers leur peuples veritablement paternelle, jeſpere qu'ils s'employeront a ce grand Ouvrage avec toute la prudence & la charité qui ſont neceſſaires pour faire reüſſir une ſi louable entrepriſe. Vous particulierement, Monſeigneur, dont la moderation & la capacité ſont reconnües de tout le monde, il ſemble que ce ſoit un deſſein reſervé pour vôtre grande Sageſſe, & ſi vous n'y reuſciſtes pas, apparemment que tous les autres y travailleront inutilement. Pour moy, je ne puis contribuer d'icy que de voeus, & que de prieres; auſſi vous puis bien proteſter que j'en fais tous les jours de fort ſinceres pour la proſperité de l'Egliſe Anglicane, & pour qu'il plaiſe a Dieu faire en ſorte, que tous les Proteſtants d'Angleterre ne ſoyent a l'avenir qu'un cœur, & qu'une ame. Je prie Voſtre Grandeur d'en eſtre bien perſuadé, & de croire qu'il n'eſt pas poſſible d'eſtre avec plus de reſpect que je le ſuis,*

Monſeigneur,

Vôtre tres humble, & tres
Obeiſſant Serviteur,

A Leyden, 3 Septemb. 1680.

LE MOYNE.

Firſt Letter.

A Letter from Monſieur le Moyne, *Profeſſor of Divinity at* Leyden, *to my Lord Biſhop of* London, *concerning the nature of our preſent Differences, and the unlawfulneſs of Separation from the Church of* England.

MY LORD,

TWO Journeys that I have been obliged to take, have hindred me from anſwering the Letter, with which your Lordſhip did me the favour to honour me, ſo ſoon as I could have wiſhed. Juſt as I was about to excuſe my ſelf to you for it, Monſieur *de l'Angle* came to this Town, which made me defer it longer yet, in hopes that he would charge himſelf with my anſwer, and that by that means it might be brought unto you more ſafely. It is true, my Lord, that if I ſhould hearken to my own unwillingneſs, I ſhould put it off ſtill to another time; for I cannot write unto you without being extreamly grieved, when I think upon the matter, of which you command me to tell you my opinion. I believe that you know it already, and that you do not do me the honour to ask it of me, as if you had any kind of doubt of it. You do me more right than ſo; and you do not account me of the number of thoſe that have ſo ill an opinion of the Church of *England*. For my part I had not ſo bad a one of any true *Engliſh-man*, and I could not have perſwaded my ſelf that there had been ſo much as one, which had believed that a man could not be of her Communion, without hazarding his own Salvation. For thoſe that are engaged in the party of the Church of *Rome*, I judged quite otherwiſe of them; they have particular Maxims, and act by other intereſts. But for thoſe that have no tye to *Rome*, it is a very ſtrange thing to ſee them come to that extream, as to believe that a man cannot be ſaved in the Church of *England*. This is not to have much knowledge of that Confeſſion of Faith, which all the Proteſtant World has ſo highly approved, and which does really deſerve the praiſes of all good Chriſtians that are, For there cannot be any thing made more wiſe than that Confeſſion, and the Articles of Faith were never collected with a more juſt and reaſonable diſcretion than in that excellent piece. There is great reaſon to keep it with ſo much veneration in the Library of *Oxford*; and the great *Jewell* deſerves immortal praiſe for having ſo worthily defended it. It was this that God made uſe of in the beginning of the Reformation of *England*. And if it had not been as it were his work, he had never bleſſed it in ſo advantagious a manner. The ſucceſs that it has had, ought to ſtop the mouth of thoſe that are the moſt paſſionate, and its having triumphed over ſo many obſtacles, ſhould make all the World acknowledge that God has declared himſelf in favour of it, and that he has been viſibly concerned in its eſtabliſhment; and that it has the truth and confirmation of his word, to which in effect it owes its birth and original. It is the ſame at preſent as it was when it was made, and no one can reproach the Biſhops for having made any change in it ſince that time. And how then can it be imagined, that it has changed its uſe? And can there be any thing more unjuſt, than to ſay, that an inſtrument which God has heretofore employed for the inſtruction of ſo many people, for the conſolation of ſo many good men, for the ſalvation of ſo many Believers, is now become a deſtructive and pernicious thing? if your Confeſſion of Faith be pure and innocent, your Divine Service is ſo too: for no one can diſcover any thing at all in it that tends to Idolatry: You adore nothing but God alone; in your Worſhip there is nothing that is terminated on the Creature: And if there be ſome Ceremonies there, which one ſhall not meet with in ſome other places; this were to make profeſſion of a terrible kind of Divinity, to put off all Charity, not to know much what ſouls are worth; not to underſtand the nature of things indifferent, to believe that they are able to deſtroy thoſe eternally, that are willing to ſubmit themſelves unto them. It is to have the ſame hardneſs to believe that your Eccleſiaſtical Diſcipline can damn any. For where has it been ever ſeen, that the ſalvation of men was concerned for Articles of Diſcipline, and things that regard but the out-ſide, and order of the Church, and are but as it were the bark and covering of the truth? Can theſe things cauſe death, and diſtil poyſon into a Soul? Truly theſe are never accounted in the number of eſſential truths; and as there is nothing but theſe that can ſave, ſo there is nothing but theſe that can exclude men from Salvation. For the Epiſcopal Government, what is there in it that is dangerous, and may reaſonably alarm mens conſciences? And if this be capable of depriving us of eternal Glory, and ſhutting the Gates of Heaven, who was there that entred there for the ſpace of fifteen hundred years, ſince that for all that time all the Churches of the World had no other kind of Government? If it were contrary to the truth, and the attainment of eternal happineſs, is it credible that God had ſo highly approved it, and permitted his Church to be tyrannized over by it for ſo many Ages? For who was it that did govern it? Who was it that did make up its Councils, as well general, as particular? Who was it that combated the Hereſies with which it has been at all times aſſaulted? Was it not the Biſhops? And is it not to their wiſe conduct, to which next under God, his Word is beholden for its Victories and Triumphs? And not to go back ſo far as the birth and infancy of the Church; who was it that in the laſt Age delivered *England* from the error in which ſhe was inveloped? Who was it that made the truth to riſe ſo miraculouſly there again? Was it not the zeal and conſtancy of the Biſhops, and their Miniſtry, that diſengaged the *Engliſh* from that oppreſſion under which they had groaned ſo long? And did not their Example powerfully help forward the Reformation of all *Europe?* In truth I think they might make the ſame uſe of this, as *Gregory Nazianzen* did heretofore at *Conſtantinople*. When he arrived there, he found that Arianiſm had made a very great progreſs in that place; but then his courage, his zeal, his learning did ſo mightily weaken the party of the Hereticks, that in a little time the truth appeared there again more beautiful than ever; and the Church where he had ſo ſtoutly upheld it, he would have to bear the name of *Anaſtaſia*; becauſe he had brought the truth as it were out of the earth and cleared it from the error that lay upon it; and by his continual cares had cauſed it, as it were, to come out of the Grave to a glorious Reſurrection. It is this too that the Biſhops of *England* have done; they ſaw not only one truth, but almoſt all the fundamental truths buried under a formidable number of errors; they ſaw the yoke of *Rome* heavier among them, than it was any where elſe: The difficulty that there was of ſucceeding in the Reformation, was enough to diſcourage Perſons of an ordinary capacity and zeal. Nevertheleſs nothing turns them from ſo generous a deſign; the enemies without, and thoſe within as terrible as they ſeem, do not fright them; they undertake this great work, and do not leave it till they had brought it about, and raiſed up the truth, and placed it again upon the Throne; in ſuch a manner that they might every where have monuments of this Miracle, and juſtly have called all their Churches by the name of *Anaſtaſia*, or Reſurrection. But if their Churches have not that title, the thing it ſelf belongs unto them; and you ſhall hear nothing diſcourſed of in theſe, but lectures and praiſes of the pure truth. Which ought to oblige all good men not to ſeparate from it; but to look upon the Church of *England*, as a very Orthodox Church. Thus all the Proteſtants of *France* do, thoſe of *Geneva*, thoſe of *Switzerland* and *Germany*, and thoſe of *Holland* too; for they did themſelves a very great honour in having ſome Divines of *England* in their Synod of *Dort*, and ſhewed plainly that they had a profound veneration for the Church of *England*. And from whence does it then come, that ſome *Engliſhmen* themſelves have ſo ill an opinion of her at preſent, and divide raſhly from her, as they do? Is not this to divide from all the ancient Churches, from all the Churches of the Eaſt, from all the Proteſtant Churches, which have always had a very great reſpect for the purity of that of *England*? Is it not horrible impudence to excommunicate her without mercy, and to make themſelves believe ſtrangely of her, for them to imagine that they are the only men in *England*, nay, in the Chriſtian World, that are predeſtinated to eternal Happineſs, and to hold the truths neceſſary to ſalvation, as they ought to be held? Indeed one might make a very odious Parallel betwixt theſe Teachers and Pope *Victor*, that would needs excommunicate the Churches of *Aſia*, becauſe they did not celebrate the Feaſt of *Eaſter* the ſame day that they did at *Rome*. Betwixt them and the *Audeans* that divided from the Chriſtians, and would not endure rich Biſhops. Betwixt them and the *Donatiſts*, that would have no communion with them that had been ordained by lapſed Biſhops, and imagined that their Society was the true Church, and the well-beloved Spouſe, that fed her flock in the South. Betwixt them and thoſe of the *Roman* Communion, who have ſo good an opinion of their own Church, that out of her they do not imagine that any one can ever be ſaved. For my part, as much inclined to Toleration as I am, I cannot for all this perſwade my ſelf, that it ought to be allowed to thoſe that have ſo little of it for other men: and who, if they were Maſters, would certainly give but bad quarter to thoſe that depended upon them. I look upon theſe Men as diſturbers of the State and Church, and who are doubtleſly animated by a Spirit of Sedition. Nay, I can ſcarce believe, that they are juſt ſuch as they ſay they are; and I ſhould be ſomething afraid, that very dangerous enemies might be hid under colour of theſe Teachers. Societies compoſed of ſuch perſons, would be extreme dangerous; and they could not be ſuffered without opening the Gate to diſorder, and advancing towards ones own ruine. There are ſome of theſe that are compoſed of more reaſonable Men, but I could wiſh they were reaſonable enough not to ſeparate from thoſe of which the Church of *England* is compoſed. Eſpecially in the caſe we are in, they ſhould do all for a good agreement; and in the preſent conjuncture of affairs, they ſhould underſtand that there is nothing but a good reunion, that can prevent the evils with which *England* is threatned. For to ſpeak the truth, I do not ſee that their Meetings are of any great uſe, or that one may be more comforted there, than in the Epiſcopal Churches. When I was at *London* almoſt Five years ago, I went to ſeveral of their private aſſemblies, to ſee what way they took for the inſtruction of the People, and the preaching of the Word of God. But I profeſs I was not at all edified by it. I heard one of the moſt famous *Non-Conformiſts*, he preached in a place where there were three Men and three or fourſcore Women? he had choſen a Text about the building up the Ruins of *Jeruſalem*, and for the explication of it, he cited *Pliny* and *Vitruvius* a hundred times, and did not forget to mention a Proverb in *Italian*, *Duro con duro non fa muro.* All this ſeem'd to me nothing to the purpoſe, and very improper for the poor Women, and very far from a Spirit that ſought nothing but the comfort and edification of his hearers. To cantonize themſelves, and make a Schiſm, to have the liberty to vent ſuch vanities, is very ill conduct, and the People ſeem very weak to quit their mutual Aſſemblies for things that ſo little deſerve their eſteem and preference. I do not think that any one is obliged to ſuffer this irregularity. It is true, that the Aſſemblies of the *Novatians* were ſometimes ſuffered at *Rome* and *Conſtantinople*, and that even the *Donatiſts* had ſome kind of liberty in the firſt of theſe places. But they were only ſtrangers; and that neither did not indure any long time; and as there were but few of them, that is not to be drawn into example. But it is another caſe in *England*; and ſeeing the good of the State and Church depends abſolutely upon the union of the People in the point of Religion, one cannot there preſs an univerſal union too much. But it ought to be procured by good means; and ſince the Biſhops are perſons of great experience, of an extraordinary knowledge, of a true fatherly zeal and goodneſs towards their people, I hope that they will employ themſelves in this great work with all the prudence and charity that are neceſſary to the ſucceeding of ſuch a commendable undertaking. You particularly, My Lord, whoſe moderation and capacity are acknowledged by all the World; it looks as if it were a deſign reſerved for your great Wiſdom; and if you do not ſucceed, it is clear, that all others will labour in it but in vain. For my part, I can contribute nothing to it where I am, but Vows and Prayers; and of theſe I can proteſt that I make very ſincere ones every day for the proſperity of the *Engliſh* Church; and that it would pleaſe God to order things in ſuch manner, that all the Proteſtants of *England* for the future, might be of one heart and of one ſoul. I beg your Lordſhip to be well aſſured of this and to believe that it is impoſſible to be with more reſpect than I am,

My Lord,

Your moſt Humble and
moſt Obedient ſervant,

Leyden Sept. 3.
1680.

Le Moyne.

A Paris l' 32. d'Octob.

Monſeigneur,

Rien ne vous a due paroiſtre ſi eſtrange ny ſi incivil que mon ſilence ſur la lettre que vous me fiſtes l'honneur de m'eſcrire il y a environ trois mois; Il eſt pourtant vray que je n'ay rien a me reprocher ſur cela, & a fin que vous le croyiez comme moy, vous voulez bien me permettre de vous dire comment la choſe s'eſt paſſée. Quand on m'apporta voſtre lettre, j'eſtois retombé dans une grande & violente fiebure dont Dieu m'a effligé durant quatre ou cinq mois, & qui m'a mené juſqu' a deux doits de la mort. Je priay un de mes amis, qui eſtoit alors dans ma chambre, de l'ouvrir & de me dire le nom de celuy qui me l'eſcrivoit, mais il ſe trouva que vous aviez oublié de la ſigner, ſur quoy je me l'a fis apporter, pour voir ſi je n'en connoiſtrois point le caractére; Et ce fut encore inutilement, par ce que juſqu'alors je n' avois rien veu de voſtre main: Cela me fit croire qu'elle avoit eſté eſcrite par celuy lá meſme qui l'avoit apportée, pour m'attrapper dix ou douze ſous de port; car ce petit ſtratageme eſt aſſez commun en cette ville: & aprez cela, je ne me mis pas fort en peine de ce qu'elle deviendroit. Elle ſe conſerva pourtant dans mon cabinet par le plus grand hazard du monde, & m'eſtant heureuſement tombée ſous la main, il y a deux ou trois jours, je la relus; & l'aiant trouvêe trop ſage & trop grave pour avoir eſté eſcrite par un homme tel que je me l'eſtois imaginé, je la monſtray à Monſieur Claude qui y reconnut d' abord voſtre eſcriture, & qui me dit que vous en eſtiez l'Auteur. Je penſe Monſeigneur que cela ſuffit pour me juſtifier auprez de vous d'un ſilence, qui bien que je n'en ſois aucunement coupable, ne laiſſe pas de me donner quelque eſpece de confuſion. Mais pour venir au contenu de voſtre lettre, je ne vous puis exprimer avec quelle douleur j'apprens que vos diviſions continuent, en un temps auquel il y a des raiſons ſi preſſantes de ce réünir; Ce que vous me dites ſur tout des eſcrits que l'on publie a cette heure, pour faire croire que la communion avec l'Egliſe Anglicane eſt illégitime, & que les Miniſtres ne la peuvent permettre aux particuliers ſans crime, me paroiſt une choſe ſi deraiſonnable en elle meſme, & ſi fort à contre-temps, que j'aurois peine a la croire ſi elle ne m'eſtoit atteſtée par une perſonne de voſtre mérite & de voſtre poids. Vous ſavez bien Monſeigneur quels ſont & quels ont toujours eſté mes ſentimens ſur cela, & la maniére dont j'en uzay il y a deux ans dans mon voiage d'Angleterre, en fréquentant vos aſſemblées, & en preſchant meſme dans un troupeau qui eſt ſous la Juriſdiction de l'Egliſe Anglicane, monſtre aſſez que je ſuis bien éloigné de croire que ſa communion ſoit illégitime; Et cela meſme prouve d'une maniére bien évidente, que mon ſentiment a cet égard eſt celuy de nos Egliſes, parce qu'il n'eſt pas imaginable que j'euſſe voulu faire, ſans néceſſité, une choſe qui m'euſt attiré l'indignation de mes fréres, & qui, a mon retour, m'euſt expoſe à leures reproches ou a leurs cenſures. Pleuſt a Dieu, Monſeigneur, que tout ce qu'il y a de Chreſtiens êgarez dans le monde vouluſſent recevoir voſtre Reformation, que je répandrois de bon cœur tout ce que j'ay de ſang pour leur procurer un ſi grand bien. Et que je ſuis aſſeuré de la *joye extreſme avec laquelle nos Egliſes entreroient dans leur Communion, Si en eſtant dans la pureté de vos ſentimens pour les dogmes, ils ne differoient plus d'avec nous que par des Surplis, par des Cérémonies innocentes, & per quelque diverſité d'Ordres dans le gouvernement de l'Egliſe. Et cela, Monſeigneur, vous fait aſſez comprendre, ce que j'ay a reſpondre a voſtre ſeconde queſtion. Car puis que l'Egliſe Anglicane eſt une véritable Egliſe de noſtre Seigneur, Puis que ſon Culte & ſes Dogmes ſont purs, & n'ont rien de contraire a la parole de Dieu, Et puis que quand la Reformation y a eſté receüe, elle y a eſté receüe, avec l'Epiſcopat. Et en y eſtabliſſant la Liturgie & les Cérémonies qui y ſont aujourdhuy en uzage, il eſt ſans doute du devoir de tous les Réformez de Voſtre Royaume de ſe tenir inſéparablement unis a Cette Egliſe; Et ceux qui ne le font pas, ſous ombre qu'ils deſireroient, plus de ſimplicité dans les Cérémonies, & moins d'inegálité entre les Miniſtres commettent aſſeurément un tres grand péché. Car le ſchiſme eſt le plus redoutable mal qui puiſſe arriver á l'Egliſe; Et pour l'éviter la charité Chreſtienne oblige tous les gens de bien a ſupporter en leurs fréres des choſes bien moins ſupportables que ne le doivent paroiſtre celles dont il s'agit, aux yeux de ceux lá meſmes qui les ont le plus en averſion: Et c'eſtoit lá ſi bien le ſentiment de noſtre Grand & Excellent Calvin, que dans ſon traitté de la neceſſité de la Réformation, il ne fait point de difficulté de dire: Que s'il ſe trouvoit des gens aſsez deraiſonnables pour refuſer la Communion d'une Egliſe pure dans ſon culte & dans ſes Dogmes, & pour ne pas ſe ſoumettré avec reſpect a ſon Gouvernement, ſous ombre qu'elle auroit retenu l'Epiſcopat conditionné comme le voſtre, il n'y auroit point de cenſure ny de rigueur de diſcipline qu'on ne deuſt exercer contre eux.* * Talem nobis Hierarchiam ſi exhibeant, in qua ſic emineant Epiſcopi ut Chriſto ſubeſſe non recuſent, ut ab illo tanquam ab unico capite pendeant & ad ipſum referantur, in qua ſic inter ſe fraternam ſocietatem colant ut non alio modo quam ejus veritate ſint colligati, tum vero nullo non anathemate dignos fatear, ſi qui erunt qui non eam revereantur, ſummaque obedientia obſervent. *Et Beze meſme, qui n'approuvoit pas en général le gouvernement Epiſcopal, fait une telle diſtinction du voſtre, et eſt ſi éloigne de croire que l'on puiſſe, ou que l'on doive en prendre ſujet de ſe ſéparer de voſtre Egliſe, qu'il prie Dieu ardenment qu'elle puiſſe toujours de meurer dans l'heureux eſtat ou elle avoit eſte miſe et conſervée, par le ſang, par la pureté de lay foy, et par la ſage conduite de ſes Excellens Eveſques.* * Quod ſi nunc Anglicana Eccleſia inſtaurata ſuorum Epiſcoporum & Archiepiſcoporum authoritate perſiſtat, quemadmodum hoc noſtra memoria contigit, ut ejus ordinis homines non tantum inſignes Dei Martyres, ſed etiam præſtantiſſimos Paſtores & Doctores habuerit, fruatur ſane iſta ſingulari Dei beneficentia, quæ utinam illi ſit perpetua. *Mais, Monſeigneur, quoy que les premiers Auteurs de la ſéparation qui vout trouble ſoient extraordinairement coupables, et que ceux qui la continuent et qui la fortifient par leurs eſcrits dé raiſonnables et emportez le ſoient auſſy extrémement, il eſt neanmoins certain que dans la multitude qui les ſuit, il y a une infinité de bonnes gens dont la foy eſt pure et la pieté ſincére; et qui ne demeurent eloignez de vous que parce que leur ſimplicité eſt ſurpriſe, et qu'on les a effrayez par ces grands mots de Tyrannie, d'Oppreſſion, de ſuppoſts de l'Antechriſt dont on leur bat perpetuellement les oreilles: Je les mets au rang de ces foibles qui diſoient qu'ils n'eſtoient point du corps et dont St. Paul dit qu'ils eſtoient du corps pourtant; Et il me ſemble que les bons et charitables Eveſques comme vous, en doivent dire, quoy qu'en un ſens un peu différent, ce qu'Optat de Miléve diſoit des Donatiſtes de ſon temps,* Si collegium

* Calv. Edit. Amſtel. tom. 8. p. 60.

* Bez. contra Sarrav. ad cap. 8. art. 3. pag. 270. Edit. Francof. ann. 1601.

gitim Epiſcopale nolunt nobiſcum habere, tamen fratre
de Dieu donc, Monſeigneur, faites tout ce qui vous ſera po
mener a leur devoir par la douceur et par la Charité qui
d'opérer de grandes choſes en ces occaſions. Car les hommes
de l'orgueil, ſe ſoulevent ordinairement contre tout ce
n'agir que par la ſeule Authorité, mais ils ne manquent p
ſe rendre au ſupport et à la condeſcendance, Manſuetus h
medicus. *Je ne pretens pas Monſeigneur m'ingérer de vo*
ſus aucun conſeil particulier ; Vous qui voiez les choſes
avez le cœur tout pénetré de la charité Chreſtienne jugez
ſonne des remedes qui ſont les plus propres a un ſi grand
aſſeuré, que s'il ne falloit pour le guérir que s'abſtenir de
ſions, que quitter quelques cérémonies, et que changer la
ques habits, vous vous y reſoudriez avec grand plaiſir, et
de pluz difficile. Il me ſemble meſme avoir leu en quelque
dicit *de Monſieur le Doien de Winſor que ce furent là les ſe*
bles que fit paroiſtre l' Egliſe Anglicane par la bouche de troi
Eveſques dans une Conférence qui ſe fit ſur les moiens de réun
année du reſtabliſſement de ſa Majeſté Britannique, et qu'il
ques Miniſtres de ceux qu'on appelle Preſbyteriens que la ch
avant. Quoy qu'il en ſoit je prie Dieu de tout mon cœur qu
des uns pour leur faire connoiſtre la foibleſſe des raiſons ſur
dent une ſéparation ſi affligeante, Et qu'il conſerve & qu'il
en plus dans les autres, la piété, le zéle et la charité dont i
travailler heureuſement a une réünion qui rejouira les hom
et qui attirera mille bénédictions de la terre et du Ciel ſur
le plus contribüé : Et je vous avouë, Monſeigneur, que je
ſolable ſi je voiois qu'on ne fiſt pas au moins quelque no
reüſſir dans un ouvrage ſi ſaint et ſi important dans un t
roiſt ſi propre. Car outre que les intereſts de Voſtre E
Egliſe le demandent extraordinairement, J'apprens que pa
benédiction du Ciel, toutes vos Chaires Epiſcopales ſont ma
par d' Excellens Serviteurs de Dieu, qui aiment Jeſus Chr
et qui ont tous les qualitez de la teſte et du cœur qui ſont
pouvoir et pour vouloir contribuer a cette bonne œuvre.
vous Monſeigneur, et par Monſeigneur l' Archeveſque d
Monſeigneur l'Eveſque d' Oxford que j'ay eu l'honneur de
ſejour en Angleterre, je n'ay pas de peine a me le perſu
peur de vous avoir ennuyé par cette longue lettre, je vous
humblement pardon, Et je vous ſupplie d' eſtre bien perſua
toujours une extreſme reconnoiſſance de l' amitie dont vous
je ſuis avec tout le reſpect que je vous dois

Voſtre tres h
obeyſa

Monſeigneur,

Monſieur Claude mon Excellent Collegue a qui j'ay mo
m'a prie de vous dire, en vous aſſeurant de ſon tres humbl
ſouſcriroit de bon cœur et quil eſt abſolument dans mes ſent

Paris, *Octob.* 31. 1680.

Second Letter.

From Monſieur de L'Angle *one of the preſent Preachers of the Reformed Church, meeting at* Charenton *near* Paris, *upon the ſame Subject.*

My Lord,

NOthing may ſeem ſo ſtrange and ſo uncivil to you, as my ſilence upon your *Letter* you did me the honour to write me about three months ago. But yet it is true that in this caſe I have nothing to blame my ſelf for; and that you may believe it as well as I, you will give me leave to tell you how the matter happen'd. When your Letter was brought me, I was relapſed into a great and violent Fever, with which God has afflicted me for the ſpace of four or five months, and which has brought me very near the grave; I prayed one of my friends, which was then in my Chamber, to open the Letter, and to tell me the name of him that wrote it; but it chanced that you had forgotten to ſubſcribe it, upon which I made it be brought to me, to ſee if I did not know the Character; but it was to no purpoſe, becauſe till then I had not ſeen any thing of your hand. This made me believe that it had been written by the ſame man that brought it, to get ten or twelve *Sous* for the carriage; for that little ſtratagem is common enough in this Town. After this, I did not much trouble my ſelf what became of it; but yet it was preſerved in my Cabinet by the greateſt chance in the world; and being happily fallen into my hands two or three days ſince, I read it over again; and having found it too prudent and grave to have been written by ſuch a one as I had imagined, I ſhewed it to *Monſieur Claude*, who preſently knew your hand, and told me that you were the Author of it. I think, my Lord, this is enough to excuſe me to you, for a ſilence, for which though I am not any way faulty, yet I cannot chooſe but be ſomething aſhamed.

But to come to the contents of your Letter; I cannot expreſs to you with how much grief I underſtand that your diviſions continue, at a time in which there are ſuch preſſing reaſons for being Re-united. Above all, that which you tell me of writings that are at this time publiſhed, to make men believe that Communion with the Church of *England* is unlawful, and that the Miniſters cannot permit it to private perſons without ſinning, ſeems to me a thing ſo unreaſonable in it ſelf, and ſo very unſeaſonable now, that I ſhould ſcarce believe it, if it were not atteſted by a perſon of your merit and conſideration. My Lord, you know well what my ſentiments are, and always have been in this matter: and the way which I uſed two years ago, when I was in *England*, in frequenting your aſſemblies, and preaching too in a Congregation that is under the juriſdiction of the Church of *England*, ſufficiently ſhews that I am very far from believing that her Communion is unlawful. And this alſo proves very evidently that my opinion in this matter is the ſame that is holden by our Churches; becauſe it is not imaginable that I would without any neceſſity, have done a thing which would have drawn the diſpleaſure of my Brethren upon me, and which at my return would have expoſed my ſelf to be blamed, if not to be cenſured by them. My Lord, I would to God that all the miſtaken Chriſtians that are in the world would receive your Reformation; I would with all my heart ſpend all the blood I have to procure them ſo great a good. And I am ſure with what an exceeding Joy our Churches would enter into their Communion, if being pure in their Opinions for Doctrine, they differed no more from us, than by Surplices, and innocent Ceremonies; and ſome diverſity of Orders in the Government of the Church.

And by this, my Lord, you may perceive what I have to anſwer to your ſecond queſtion. For ſince the Church of *England* is a true Church of our Lord; ſince her Worſhip and Doctrines are pure, and have nothing in them contrary to the word of God; and ſince that when the Reformation was there received, it was received together with Epiſcopacy, and with the eſtabliſhment of the Liturgy, and Ceremonies, which are there in uſe at this day; it is without doubt the duty of all the Reformed in your Realm, to keep themſelves inſeparably united to the Church. And thoſe that do not do this, upon pretence that they ſhould deſire more ſimplicity in the Ceremonies, and leſs of inequality among the Miniſters, do certainly commit a very great ſin. For Schiſm is the moſt formidable evil that can befal the Church: and for the avoiding of this, Chriſtian charity obliges all good men to bear with their Brethren in ſome things much leſs tolerable than thoſe, of which the diſpute is, ought to ſeem, even in the eyes of thoſe that have the moſt averſion for them. And this was ſo much the opinion of our great and excellent *Calvin*, that in his Treatiſe of the neceſſity of the Reformation, he makes no difficulty to ſay; That if there ſhould be any ſo unreaſonable as to refuſe the Communion of a Church that was pure in its Worſhip and Doctrine, and not to ſubmit himſelf with reſpect to its Government, under pretence that it had retained an Epiſcopacy qualified as yours is; there would be no Cenſure nor rigour of Diſcipline that ought not to be exerciſed upon them. *Talem nobis Hierarchiam ſi exhibeant, in qua ſic emineant Epiſcopi ut Chriſto ſubeſſe non recuſent, ut ab illo tanquam ab unico Capite pendeant, & ad ipſum referantur; in qua ſic inter ſe fraternam ſocietatem colant, ut non alio modo quam ejus veritate ſint colligati; tum vero nullo non Anathemate dignos fatear, ſi qui erunt qui non eum revereantur, ſummaq; obedientiâ obſervent.* And *Beza* himſelf, who did not in the general approve of the Epiſcopal Government, makes ſuch a diſtinction of yours, and is ſo far from believing, that one may, or that one ought to take occaſion from thence to ſeparate from your Church, that he prays earneſtly to God that ſhe may always remain in that happy eſtate in which ſhe had been put and preſerved, by the blood, by the purity of the Faith, and by the wiſe conduct of her excellent Biſhops. *Quod ſi nunc Anglicana Eccleſia inſtaurata ſuorum Epiſcoporum & Archiepiſcoporum authoritate perſiſtat, quemadmodum hoc noſtrâ memoriâ contigit, ut ejus ordinis homines, non tantum inſignos Dei Martyres, ſed etiam præſtantiſſimos Paſtores & Doctores habuerit, fruatur ſane iſtâ ſingulari Dei beneficentiâ, quæ utinam illi ſit perpetua.*

Calvin opera Edit. Amſtel. Tom. 8. p. 60.

Beza contra Sarrav. ad cap. 8. art. 3. pag. 270. Edit. Francof. anno 1601.

But, my Lord, although the firſt Authors of the Separation, which troubles you, be extraordinarily to blame, and though thoſe that continue it, and ſtrengthen it, by their unreaſonable and paſſionate Writings,

tings, be extreamly ſo too; it is certain yet that among the multitude that follows them, there is a very great number of good men, whoſe faith is pure and whoſe piety is ſincere, and who remain ſeparate from you only becauſe their ſimplicity is ſurprized, and becauſe they have been frighted with the bugbear words of *Tyranny*, *Oppreſſion*, *Limbs of Antichriſt* which are continually beaten into their ears. I rank theſe with thoſe weak ones who ſaid they were not of the Body; and of whom St. *Paul* ſaid they were of the Body for all that. And it ſeems to me that the good and charitable Biſhops, ſuch as you, ought to ſay of them, though in ſomething a different ſenſe, as *Optatus Milevitanus* ſaid of the *Donatiſts* of his time, *Si Collegium Epiſcopale nolunt nobiſcum habere, tamen Fratres ſunt.* In the name of God then, my Lord, do all that poſſibly you can to bring them back to their duty by ſweetneſs and charity, which is only able to do great things on theſe occaſions. For men, who have always ſomething of Pride, do commonly oppoſe every thing that ſeems to them to act by bare Authority only: but they ſcarce ever fail to yield themſelves up to forbearance and condeſcenſion. *Manſuetus homo, cordis eſt medicus.*

I do not pretend, my Lord, to thruſt my ſelf in to give you any particular advice in this caſe; you that ſee things near at hand, and that have a heart deeply affected with Chriſtian Charity, will judge better than any man, what remedies are the moſt proper for ſo great an evil; and I am ſure that if there were nothing wanting to cure it, but the abſtaining from ſome expreſſions, the quitting ſome Ceremonies, and the changing the colour of ſome habits, you would reſolve to do that, and ſomething more difficult than that, with great pleaſure. And I think I have read in ſome part of the *Vindiciæ* of Mr. Dean of *Windſor*, that theſe were the charitable ſentiments which the Church of *England* declared by the mouth of three or four of her Biſhops, in a Conference that was held concerning the means of re-union, the firſt year that his Majeſty was reſtored; and that nothing hindred the matter from going farther, but ſome of thoſe Miniſters they call Preſbyterians. However it be, I pray God with all my heart, that he would open the eyes of the one to make them ſee the weakneſs of the reaſons upon which they ground ſuch an afflicting Separation; and that he would preſerve, and increaſe more and more in the other, that piety, that zeal, and that charity which they have need of for the happy proceeding to a re-union, which will rejoice men and Angels, and bring down a thouſand bleſſings of Heaven and Earth upon thoſe that ſhall contribute the moſt unto it. And I aſſure you, My Lord, I ſhould be paſt all Comfort if I ſhould ſee that ſome new attempt at leaſt were not made for the ſucceſs of a work ſo holy, and of ſuch conſequence, in a time that ſeems to me ſo proper for it. For beſides that the intereſt of your State, and Church do require it in ſuch an extraordinary manner; I hear that by a wonderful bleſſing of Heaven, all your Epiſcopal Sees are filled at this time with excellent ſervants of God, who love *Jeſus Chriſt* and his Church, and who have all the qualities of the head and the heart, which are neceſſary to make them able, and willing to contribute to this good work. And to judge of it by you, My Lord, and My Lord Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, and My Lord Biſhop of *Oxford*, whom I had the honour to ſee during my ſtay in *England*, I am eaſily perſuaded of it.

But I am afraid I have tired you with this long Letter; I humbly beg your pardon for it; and I beſeech you to be very well aſſured that I always preſerve a very grateful acknowledgement of the Friendſhip with which you honour me, and that I am with all the reſpect that I owe

Your moſt Humble and
moſt Obedient Ser-
vant,

De L'Angle.

Monſ. *Claude* my excellent Collegue, to whom I have ſhewed this Letter, has prayed me to tell you, with aſſurance of his moſt humble ſervice, that he would ſubſcribe this with all his heart, and that he is abſolutely of my Opinion.

The Third Letter, from Monſieur *Claude*, on the ſame Subject.

A Paris 29 Novemb. *Stilo Novo.*

Monſeigneur,

*Monſieur de l'*Angle *m'ayant rendu la Lettre qu'il vous a plû m'écrire, j'ay eſté ſurpris d'y voir que vous m'aviez fait l'honneur de m'en écrire une autre que je n'ay point receüe, & à laquelle je n'euſſe pas manquè de faire réponſe. Vous me faites beaucop d'honneur de vouloir bien que je vous diſe ma penſée ſur le different qui vous trouble depuis longtems, entre ceux qu'on appelle Epiſcopaux, & ceux qu'on nomme Preſbyteriens. Quoy que je m'en ſois deja diverſes fois expliquè & par des Lettres que j'ay faites ſur ce ſujet à pluſieurs perſonnes, & dans mon livre meſme de la Defenſe de la Reformation, où parlant de la diſtinction de l'Eveſque & du Preſtre, j'ay dit formellement* que je ne blame pas ceux qui l'obſervent comme une choſe fort ancienne, & que je ne voudrois pas qu'on s'en fiſt un ſujet de querelle dans les lieux où elle ſe trouve établie, *pag. 366. & quoy que d'ailleurs je me connoiſſe aſſez pour ne pas croire que mon ſentiment doive eſtre fort conſiderè, je ne laiſſeray pas de vous temoigner dans cette occaſion, comme je feray toujours en toute autre, mon eſtime Chretienne, mon reſpect, & mon obeiſſance. C'eſt ce que je feray d'autant plus que je ne vous diray pas ſimplement ma penſée particuliere, mais le ſentiment du general de nos Egliſes.*

Premierement donc, Monſeigneur, nous ſommes ſi fort éloignez de croire qu'on ne puiſſe en bonne conſcience vivre ſous voſtre diſcipline, & ſous voſtre Gouvernement Epiſcopal, que dans noſtre pratique ordinaire nous ne

faiſons nulle difficultè, ni de donner nos chaires, ni de commettre le ſoin de nos troupeaux à des Miniſtres receus & ordinez par Meſſieurs vos Eveſques, comme il ſe pourroit juſtifier par un aſſez grand nombre d'exemples & anciens, & recens, & depuis peu Mr. Dupleſſis *ordinè par Monſieur l'Eveſque de* Lincoln *à eſté eſtabli, & appellè dans une Egliſe de cette Province, & Monſieur* Wicart, *que vous, Monſeigneur, avez receu au S. Miniſtere nous fit l'honneur il-n'y-a que quelques mois de Preſcher à* Charenton *à l'edification univerſelle de tout noſtre troupeau. Ainſi ceux qui nous imputent à cet égard des ſentimens éloignez de la paix & de la concorde Chretienne, nous font aſſurement injuſtice.*

Je dis la paix & la concorde Chretienne, car, Monſeigneur, nous croyons que l'obligation à conſerver cette paix & cette concorde fraternelle, qui fait l'unité exterieure de l'egliſe, eſt d'une neceſſitè ſi indiſpenſable que S. Paul *n'a pas fait difficultè de la joindre avec l'unite interieure d'une meſme foy, & d'une meſme regeneration, non ſeulement comme deux choſes qui ne doivent jamais eſtre ſeparées, mais auſſi comme deux choſes dependantes l'une de l'autre, parce que ſi l'unité exterieure eſt comme la fille de l'interieure, elle en eſt auſſi la conſervatrice.* Cheminez, *dit il* Epheſ. 4. comme il eſt convenable à la vocation dont vous eſtes appellez, avec toute humilité, & douceur, avec un eſprit patient, ſupportant l'un l'autre en charité. Eſtant ſoigneux de garder l'unitè de l'eſprit par la lien de la paix. *D'un cotè il fait dependre cette charitè fraternelle, qui nous joint les uns avec les autres, de noſtre commune vocation, & de l'autre il nous enſeigne qu'un des principaux moyens de conſerver en ſon entier cette commune vocation qu'il appelle l'unitè de l'eſprit, eſt de garder entre nous la paix. Selon la premiere de ces maximes nous ne pouvons avoir de paix, ni de Communion Eccleſiaſtique avec ceux qui ont tellement degenerè de la vocation Chretienne qu'on ne peut plus reconnoitre en eux une veritable & ſalutaire foy, principalement lors qu'à des erreurs mortelles ils ajoutent la tyrannie de l'ame, & qu'ils voulent contraindre la conſcience, en impoſant la neceſſitè de croire ce qu'ils croyent & de pratiquer ce qu'ils pratiquent. Car en ce cas le fondement & la veritable cauſe de la communion exterieure n'eſtant plus, la communion exterieure ceſſe auſſi de droit, & il-n'y-en peut plus avoir de legitime. Selon la ſeconde maxime nous ne croyons pas qu'une ſimple difference de governement, ou de diſcipline, ni meſme un difference de ceremonies innocentes de leur nature, ſoient un ſujet ſuffiſant pour rompre le ſacrè lien de la communion. C'eſt pourquoy nos Egliſes ont toûjours regardè & conſiderè la voſtre, non ſeulement comme une ſoeur, mais comme une ſoeur aiſnée pour qui nous devons avoir des tendreſſes accompagnées de reſpect & de veneration, & pour qui nous preſentons ſans ceſſe à Dieu des voeux treſardens. Nous n'entrons point dans la comparaiſon de voſtre ordre, avec celuy ſous lequel nous vivons. Nous ſavons qu'il-n'y-en a, ni n'y-en peut avoir aucun entre les hommes, qui par noſtre corruption naturelle, ne ſoit ſujet à des inconveniens, le noſtre à les ſiens comme le voſtre, & l'un & l'autre ſans doute ayant leurs avantages & leurs deſavantages à divers égards,* alternis vincunt & vincuntur. *Il nous ſuffit de ſavoir que la meſme Providence Divine qui par une neceſſitè indiſpenſable, & par la conjoncture des choſes, mit au commencement de la Reformation nos Egliſes ſous celuy du Preſbyterat, à mis la voſtre ſous celuy de l'Epiſcopat, & que comme nous ſommes aſſures que vous ne mepriſez point noſtre ſimplicitè, nous ne devons pas auſſi nous élever contre voſtre dignitè. Ainſi, Monſeigneur, nous deſapprouvons entierement, & voyons avec* *douleur, de certeines extremitez où ſe jettent quelques uns de une part & d'autre, les uns regardant l'Epiſcopat comme un ordre ſi abſolument neceſſaire que ſans luy il-n'y peut avoir ni de ſocietè Eccleſiaſtique, ni de legitime vocation ni d'eſperance de ſalut, & les autres le regardant avec indignation comme un reſte d'Antichriſtianiſme. Ce ſont également des chaleurs & des excés qui ne viennent point de celuy qui nous appelle, & qui pechent contre les loix de la ſageſſe & de la charité.*

Voylà, Monſeigneur, nos veritables & ſinceres ſentimens communs, pour ce qui vous regarde, & puiſque vous deſirez que je deſcende un peu plus particulierement à l'état où ſe trouve voſtre propre Egliſe, par les diviſions inteſtines qui la travaillent, Permettez moy que je ne vous diſe mes penſées qu'en vous expliquant mes ſouhaits, & les deſirs de mon coeur, ſur une choſe auſſi importante que l'eſt celle là. Je ſouhaiterois donc de toute mon ame que ceux qui ſont allez juſqu'à ce point que de ſonger à rompre les liens exterieurs, & la dependance mutuelle de vos troupeaux, pour donner à chaque Egliſe particuliere une eſpece de ſouveraigntè de gouvernement, conſideraſſent bien ſi ce qu'ils prétendent faire n'eſt pas directement contraire à l'eſprit du Chriſtianiſme qui eſt un eſprit d'union, & de ſocietè, & non de diviſion. Qu'ils conſideraſſent que ſous prétexte que le principe des Reformez eſt d'avoir en horreur la domination humaine ſur la foy, & ſur la conſcience, comme une choſe deſtructive de la Religion, il ne faut pourtant pas ni rejetter tout frein de diſcipline, ni ſecoüer tout joug de Gouvernement, ni ſe priver des ſecours que nous pouvons tirer de l'union generale pour nous affermir dans la vraye foy, & dans la vraye pietè. Qu'ils conſideraſſent enfin que la meſme raiſon qui leur fait deſirer l'Independence des troupeaux, peut eſtre auſſi employée pour établir l'Independance des perſonnes dans chaque troupeau. Car un troupeau n'a pas plus de droit de vouloir eſtre Independant des autres troupeaux, qu'une perſonne en auroit de vouloir eſtre Independante des autres perſonnes. Or ce ſeroit aneantir toute diſcipline, jetter l'Egliſe entant qu'en nous ſeroit dans une horrible confuſion; & expoſer l'heritage du Seigneur à l'opprobre de ſes adverſaires.

Pour ce qui regarde ceux qu'on appelle parmy vous Preſbyteriens, comme je ſuis perſuadè qu'ils ont de la lumiere, de la ſageſſe, & du Zele, je ſouhaiterois auſſi de tout mon coeur qu'ils gardaſſent plus de meſure dans le ſcandale qu'ils croyent avoir autrefois receu de l'ordre Epiſcopal, & qu'ils diſtinguaſſent les perſonnes d'avec le Miniſtere. Les perſonnes qui occupent les charges non ſeulement ont leurs defauts, mais il peut meſme quelquefois arriver que les plus ſaintes, & les plus eminentes charges ſoient poſſedées par des méchans, & en ce cas la raiſon & la pieté voulent également qu'on ne confonde pas le Miniſtere avec le Miniſtre. A preſent que Dieu par ſa grace a ote ce ſcandale de devant leurs yeux, & qu'il leur a fait voir dans les perſonnes de Meſſieurs les Eveſques de la Piete, du Zele, & de la Fermete, pour la conſervation de la Religion, j'eſpere que cela meſme ne contribuera pas peu à l'adouciſſement des eſprits. D'ailleurs je ſouhaiterois qu'il leur pluſt de conſiderer que ſi dans le Gouvernment Epiſcopal il-y-a des inconveniens facheux, comme je ne doute pas qu'il-n'y-en-ayt, il-y-en-à auſſi & de tres-facheuz dans le Presbyterien, comme je l'ay deja dit. Nul ordre dont l'exercice eſt entre les mains des hommes n'en eſt exempt, l'egalite a ſes vices, & ſes exces à craindre, de meſme que la ſuperiorite. Le plus ſur & le plus ſage n'eſt donc pas de voltiger de l'une à l'autre, ni de riſquer de faire un ébranlement general, ſur l'eſperance d'eſtre mieux, quand meſme on ſeroit en autoritè & en pouvoir de le faire.

faire. Le prudence, la juſtice, & la charité Chretienne ne permettent pas d'en venir à ces éclattantes & dangereuſes extremitez, pour une ſimple difference de Gouvernment. Le plus ſur, & le plus ſage eſt de tacher d'apporter quelque temperament pour éviter, ou pour diminuer autant qu'il ſe peut les inconveniens qu'on apprehende, & non de recourir à des remedes violens.

Je ne craindray pas d'appeller de ce nom celuy de faire des aſſemblées à part, de ſe ſeparer des aſſemblées communes, & de ſe ſouſtraire de voſtre gouvernement. Il-n'y-a perſonne qui ne voye que ce ſeroit un veritable ſchiſme, qui en luy-meſme & de ſa nature ne peut jamais eſtre qu'odieux à Dieu, & aux hommes, & dont les auteurs, & les protecteurs ne ſauroient eviter quils ne rendent conte devant le Tribunal de noſtre commun Maitre. Quand S. Paul *nous a defendu* de delaiſſer noſtre commune aſſemblée, *il a non ſeulement condamnè ceux qui ne s'y trouvent point en demeurant dans leur particulier, mais ceux auſſi ſans doute qui en font d'autres oppoſées aux communes, car c'eſt rompre le lien de la charitè Chretienne qui ne nous joint pas ſeulement avec quelques uns de nos freres, mais avec tous nos freres, pour recevoir d'eux de l'edification, & pour leur en donner de noſtre part, en vivant enſemble dans une meſme ſocietè. Et il ne ſerviroit de rien de pretextur que la conſcience reſiſt à ſe trouver dans des aſſemblées qui ſe font ſous un Gouvernement qu'on n'approuve pas, & que ce ſeroit approuver exterieurement, ce que l'on condamne interieurement. Car outre qu'il faudroit bien examiner la queſtion ſi ces reſiſtances ne viennent pas d'une conſcience trompée, par un jugement precipitè, puiſque les plus gens de bien ſont ſouvent ſujets à ſe former de tels ſcrupules qui au fond ne ſont pas tout à fait legitimes. Outre cela, il faut diſtinguer trois ſortes de choſes, les unes que la conſcience approuve, & recoit, & auſquelles elle acquieſce pleinement, les autres qu'elle regarde comme inſupportables, & comme deſtructives de la gloire de Dieu, de la vraye foy, ou de la vraye Pieté, & de l'eſperance du ſalut, & les autres enfin qui tiennent le milieu, c'eſt-adire qu'on n'approuve pas à la veritè pleinement, mais qu'on ne croit pourtant pas mortelles à la vraye piete, & au ſalut, en un mot qu'on regarde comme des taches & des infirmetez ſupportables. J'avoüe que quand on trouve dans des aſſemblées des choſes de ce ſecond ordre, ou que la conſcience les juge telles, on ne peut y aſſiſter, & toute la queſtion ce reduit à ſavoir, ſi l'on ne ſe trompe pas, ſur quoy il fait bien prendre garde de ne pas faire de jugemens temeraires. Mas de s'imaginer qu'on ne puiſſe en bonne conſcience aſſiſter à des aſſemblées, que lors qu'on y approve plenement & generalement toutes choſes, c'eſt aſſurement ne pas connoitre ni l'uſage de la charitè, ni les loix de la ſocietè Chretienne. Ce principe renverſeroit toutes les Egliſes, car je ne ſay s'il-y-en a aucune dont le Gouvernement, la Diſcipline, la forme exterieure, les uſages, & les pratiques ſoient dans une telle perfection, qu'il-n'y-ayt abſolument rien à redire, & quoy q'uil en ſoit comme les jugemens des hommes ſont fort differens, ce ſeroit ouvrir la porte à des ſeparations continuelles, & abolir les aſſemblées. Il eſt donc conſtant que la conſcience n'oblige point à ſe ſouſtraire des aſſemblées, mais qu'au contraire elle nous oblige de nous y choquent ſont ſupportables, & qu'elles n'empechent pas l'efficace ſalutaire de la parole, du culte divin, & des Sacremens. Et c'eſt à la faveur de ce ſupport de la charitè qu'eſt couverte l' aſſiſtance que nous donnons à des choſes que nous n'approuvons pas entierement. Voyez ce que* S. Paul *dit à ſes* Philippiens, *chap.* 3. Si vous ſentez quelque choſe autrement, Dieu vous le revelera auſſi. Toutefois cheminons en ce à quoy nous ſommes pervenus d'une même regle, & ſentons une même choſe. *Cela eſt bien éloigné de dire, des que vous aurez le moindre ſentiment contraire ſeparez vous, la conſcience ne vous permet pas de demeurer enſemble.* Conſilia ſeparationis, *dit St.* Auguſtin *contre* Parmenian, Inania ſunt & pernicioſa, & plus perturbant infirmos bonos quàm corrigant animoſos malos. *Quels funeſtes effets ne produiroit pas une telle ſeparation ſi elle s'établiſſoit au milieu de vous? De la maniere que les eſprits des hommes ſont faits, on verroit bientôt naitre de là la difference des interets, celle des partys, celle des Sentimens à l'égard même de la ſocieté civile, la hayne mutuelle, & toutes les autres triſtes ſuites que la diviſion, qui n'eſt plus temperée par la charité, produit naturellement. Je laiſſe à part le ſcandale qu'en reçevroient toutes les Egliſes reformées de l'Europe, la joye qu'en auroient leurs adverſaires, & les avantages qu'ils en retireroient, qui ſelon toutes les apparences ne ſeroient pas petits. J'ay trop bonne opinion de ces Meſſieurs qui croyent que la Gouvernement Preſbyterien eſt preferable à l'Epiſcopal, pour n'eſtre pas perſuadé qu'ils ſont de ſages & de ſerieuſes reflexions ſur toutes ces choſes, & ſur tant d'autres que leurs lumieres leur fourniſſent, & que la conſcience, & l'amour de la Religion Proteſtante les empechera toujours de rien faire, qui puiſſe eſtre blamé devant Dieu, & devant les hommes. Car enfin je ne ſaurois croire qu'il-y-en-ayt aucun parmy eux, qui regarde ni voſtre Epiſcopat, ni voſtre Diſcipline, ni quelques Ceremonies que vous obſervez, comme des taches & des erreurs capitales, qui empechent qu'on ne puiſſe faire ſon ſalut, & même avec facilité dans vos Aſſemblées & ſous voſtre Gouvernement. Il ne s'agit icy ni de l'*eſſe*, ni du* bene eſſe*, mais ſeulement du* melius eſſe*, qu'ils diſputent avec vous, & cela eſtant ainſi la juſtice, la charité, l'amour de la paix, la prudence, & le zele pour le general de la Religion ne conſentiront jamais qu'ils ſe détachent de vous.*

Mais, Monſigneur, puiſque vous m'avez mis la plume à la main ſur ce ſujet, Pardonnez je vous ſupplie à ma liberté ſi elle và juſqu'à vous dire ce que je croy que vous auſſi devez faire de voſtre part. J'eſpere donc que dans ces occaſions que Dieu vous preſente vous ferez voir à toute la terre, & en convaincrez les plus incredulez que vous aves de la pieté, du zele, & de la crainte de Dieu, & que vous eſtez de dignes ouvriers, & de dignes ſerviteurs de Jeſus Chriſt. C'eſt deja le temoignage que vous rendent les gens de bien, & que nul quelque mal intentionné qu'il ſoit, n'oſe contredire, & je ne doute pas que vous ne pouſſiez voſtre vocation juſqu'au bout. Mais outre cela, Monſeigneur, j'eſpere que vous ne defaudrez point aux devoirs de la charité, & de l'eſprit de paix, & que quand il ne s'agira que de quelques temperamens, ou de quelques Ceremonies qui ſervent d'achoppement, & qui en elles mêmes ne ſont rien en comperaiſon d'une entiere reünion de voſtre Egliſe ſous voſtre ſaint Miniſtere, vous ferez voir que vous aimez l'Epouſe de voſtre Maître plus que vous mêmes, & que ce n'eſt pas tant de voſtre grandeur, & de voſtre dignité Eccleſiaſtique que vous deſirez tirer voſtre gloire & voſtre joye, que de vos vertus Paſtorales, & des ſoins ardens que vous avez de vous troupeaux. J'eſpere auſſi que ceux que vous avez choiſis, & appellez au S. Miniſtere, & ceux que deſormais vous y appellerez avec un prudent diſcernement, reglez non ſeulement par la douceur, mais auſſi par la ſeverité de la Diſcipline, quand la ſeverité ſera neceſſaire, marcheront ſur vos traces, & ſuiront heureuſement l'exemple que vous leur donnerez, pour eſtre eux-mêmes en exemple, & en edification aux Egliſes qui leur ſont commiſes. Je finis, Monſeigneur, par des prieres tres-ardentes que je préſent à Dieu de tout mon cœur, afin qu'il luy plaiſe de vous conſerver à jamais le flambeau de ſon Evangile, de re-

pandre ſur tout le corps de voſtre Miniſtere, une abondante meſure de ſon onction & de ſa benediction celeſte, dont celle de l'ancien Aaron *n'eſtoit que l'ombre, afin qu'elle ſoit non l'emblême & l'image de la concorde fraternelle comme cette ancienne, mais qu'elle en ſoit la cauſe & le lien. Je le prie qu'il veuille de plus en plus ramener le cœur des enfans aux peres, & des peres aux enfans, afin que voſtre Egliſe ſoit heureuſe, & agreable comme un Eden de Dieu. Je le prie enfin qu'il vous conſerve, vous Monſeigneur, en parfait & longue ſanté pour ſa gloire, & pour le bien & l'avantage de cette grande & conſiderable partie de ſon champ qu'il vous a donné cultiver, & que vous cultivez ſi heureuſement. Je vous demande auſſi le ſecours de vos ſaintes prieres, & la continuation de l'honneur de voſtre affection, en vous Proteſtant que je ſeray toute ma vie avec tout le reſpect que je vous dois,*

MONSEIGNEUR,

Voſtre tres-humble,

& tres-obeiſſant Serviteur,

& Fils en Jeſus Chriſt,

CLAUDE.

Paris Novemb. 29. Stilo Novo.

MY LORD,

Monſieur de L'*Angle* having given me the Letter which you have been pleaſed to write to me, I was ſurprized to ſee by that, that you had done me the honour to write me another, which I have not received, and to which I had not failed to make an anſwer. You do me a great deal of honour to deſire that I ſhould tell you my thoughts of the difference that has troubled you ſo long, betwixt thoſe they call *Epiſcopal*, and thoſe they name *Preſbyterians.* Although I have already explained my ſelf about this divers times, both by Letters which I have written upon this Subject to ſeveral perſons, and in my Book too of the Defence of the Reformation, where ſpeaking of the diſtinction betwixt the Biſhop and the Prieſt, I have ſaid expreſly, That I do not blame thoſe that obſerve it as a thing very ancient, and that I would not that any one ſhould make it an occaſion of quarrel in thoſe places where it is eſtabliſhed, *pag.* 366. And though I otherways know my ſelf ſufficiently not to believe that my opinion ſhould be much conſidered, I will not forbear to aſſure you upon this occaſion, as I ſhall always do upon any other, of my Chriſtian eſteem, my reſpect, and my obedience. This I ſhall do the rather, becauſe I ſhall not ſimply tell you my private Thoughts, but the opinion of the generality of our Churches.

Firſt then, my Lord, we are ſo very far from believing that a man cannot live with a good Conſcience under your Diſcipline and under your Epiſcopal Government, that in our ordinary practice we make no difficulty, neither to beſtow our Chairs, nor to commit the care of our Flocks to Miniſters received, and ordained by my Lords the Biſhops; as might be juſtified by a great number enough of Examples both old and new: And a little while ſince Mr. *Dupleſſis* that was ordained by my Lord Biſhop of *Lincoln*, has been eſtabliſhed and called in a Church of this Province. And Monſieur *Wicart*, whom you, my Lord, received to the Holy Miniſtery, did us the honour, but ſome months ago, to preach at *Charenton*, to the general edification of our Flock. So that they who in this reſpect do impute unto us any opinions diſtant from peace, and Chriſtian concord, do certainly do us wrong.

I ſay Peace and Chriſtian concord; for, my Lord, we believe that the obligation to preſerve this Peace, and this Brotherly concord, which make up the external unity of the Church, is of a neceſſity ſo indiſpenſable, that St. *Paul* has made no difficulty to join it with the internal unity of the ſame Faith, and the ſame Regeneration; not only as two things which ought never to be ſeparated, but likewiſe as two things depending the one upon the other; becauſe if the external unity be as it were the Daughter of the internal, ſhe is likewiſe the preſerver of it. *Walk*, ſays he, Epheſ. 4. *worthy of the calling wherewith ye are called, with all lowlineſs and meekneſs, with long-ſuffering, forbearing one another in love: Endeavouring to keep the unity of the ſpirit in the bond of peace.* On the one ſide he makes this brotherly love, which joins us one with another, to depend upon our common vocation; and on the other ſide he teaches us that one of the principal means to preſerve our common vocation entire, which he calls the unity of the ſpirit, is to keep peace among our ſelves. According to the firſt of theſe maxims we cannot have peace, or Eccleſiaſtical communion with thoſe that have ſo degenerated from the Chriſtian vocation, that one cannot perceive in them a true and ſaving Faith; eſpecially when with mortal errors they join tyranny over the Soul, and that they will force the Conſcience, by impoſing a neceſſity to believe that which they believe, and to practiſe that which they practiſe. For in this caſe the foundation and true cauſe of external communion being no more, the external communion too its ſelf ceaſes of right, and there is not any that is lawful to be had any more with ſuch. According to the ſecond maxim, we do not believe that a ſingle difference of Government or Diſcipline, nor even a difference of Ceremonies innocent in their own nature is a ſufficient occaſion to break the ſacred bond of Communion. Wherefore our Churches have always looked upon and conſidered yours, not only as a Siſter, but as an Elder Siſter, for which we ought to have a kindneſs accompanied with reſpect and veneration, and for which we do preſent moſt ardent prayers unto God without ceaſing. We do not enter into the compariſon of your Order, with that under which we live. We know that there is not, neither can there be any amongſt men, which by reaſon of our natural corruption is not ſubject to inconveniencies, ours has hers, as well as yours; and the one and the other without doubt have their advantages, and diſadvantages in divers reſpects: *alternis vincunt, & vincuntur.* It is enough for us to know that the ſame Divine Providence which by an indiſpenſable neceſſity, and by the conjuncture of affairs, did at the beginning of the Reformation put our Churches under that of the Preſbytery, has put yours under that of the Epiſcopacy; and as we are aſſured that you do not deſpiſe our ſimplicity, ſo neither ought we to oppoſe our ſelves againſt your preeminence. So that, my Lord, we utterly diſapprove, and ſee with grief, certain extremes whereinto ſome of the one ſide, and the other do caſt themſelves. The one looking upon Epiſcopacy as an Order ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that without it there can be no Eccleſiaſtical ſociety, nor lawful vocation, nor hope of Salvation, and the other looking upon it with indignation, as a Relique of Antichriſtianiſm. Theſe are equally heats and exceſſes which do not come from him that calls us, and which do offend againſt the Laws of wiſdom and charity.

Theſe, my Lord, are our true and ſincere common Opinions. For what concerns you, ſince you deſire that I would deſcend a little more particularly into the ſtate that your own Church is in, by reaſon of the inteſtine diviſions that trouble it; give me leave not to tell you my thoughts, without declaring my wiſhes, and the deſires of my heart, upon a matter ſo important as this is. I could wiſh then with all my ſoul that thoſe that are gone ſo far as this point, to think to break the external bonds, and the mutual dependence of your Flocks, to give every particular Church a kind of ſovereignty of Government, would conſider well, whether that they pretend to do be not directly contrary to the ſpirit of Chriſtianity, which is a ſpirit of union, and ſociety, and not of diviſion. That they would conſider, that under the pretence that the principle of the Reformed was to abhor mens domineering over Faith, and Conſcience, as a thing deſtructive of Religion, we ought not for all that to reject the bridle of Diſcipline, nor to ſhake off the whole yoke of Government, nor deprive our ſelves of the ſuccours we might draw out of a general Union, for to ſtrengthen us in the true Faith, and in true Piety. That they would conſider, in fine, that the ſame reaſon which makes them deſire the Independency of the Flocks, may be likewiſe employed to eſtabliſh the Independency of the perſons in every Flock. For a Flock has no more right to deſire to be Independent upon other Flocks, than a perſon might have to deſire to be Independent upon other perſons. But this would be to bring all Diſcipline to nothing, to throw the Church, as much as in us lies, into a horrible confuſion, and to expoſe the heritage of the Lord to the reproach of its Adverſaries.

For what concerns thoſe which amongſt you they call Preſbyterians, as I am perſwaded that they have light, and wiſdom, and zeal, ſo I could wiſh with all my heart, that they would obſerve more moderation in the ſcandal they believe they have heretofore received from the Epiſcopal Order, and that they would diſtinguiſh the Perſons from the Miniſtry. The perſons that poſſeſs the places have not only their faults, but it may happen too ſometimes that the moſt holy, and moſt eminent places may be poſſeſſed by wicked men; and in that caſe reaſon and piety do equally require that we ſhould not confound the Miniſtry with the Miniſter. At preſent that God by his grace has taken away this ſcandal from before their eyes, and made them ſee piety, zeal, and conſtancy for the preſervation of Religion in the perſons of the Biſhops, I hope that this will not a little contribute to the ſweetning of their ſpirits. Beſides, I could wiſh that they would be pleaſed to conſider that if there be ſome unpleaſant inconveniencies in the Epiſcopal Government, as I do not doubt but there are, there are too ſome very unpleaſant ones in the

Presbyterian, as I have ſaid already. No order whoſe execution is in the hands of men, is exempt from them; an equality has its faults and exceſſes to be feared, as well as a ſuperiority. Therefore it is not the moſt ſafe and wiſe way to leap from the one to the other, nor to hazard the making a general concuſſion, upon the hopes of being better, though one ſhould be in authority and power to do it. Chriſtian prudence, juſtice and charity do not permit us to proceed to ſuch daring and dangerous extremes, for a ſingle difference of Government. It is moſt ſafe and wiſe to endeavour to provide ſome kind of temper to avoid, or to leſſen as much as may be, the inconveniencies that are feared, and not have recourſe to violent remedies.

I ſhall not be afraid to give that name to the holding of aſſemblies apart, and ſeparating from the publick aſſemblies, and withdrawing themſelves from under your government. There is no man that does not ſee that this would be real ſchiſm, which in it ſelf and of its own nature cannot chooſe but be always odious to God and men, and of which the Authors and Patrons cannot avoid the rendring an account before the Tribunal of our common Maſter. When Saint *Paul* forbad us to forſake the aſſembling of our ſelves together, he did not only condemn thoſe that did not come thither, but ſtayed at home; but thoſe too without doubt that held other aſſemblies in oppoſition to the publick ones. For this is to break the bond of Chriſtian charity, which does not only join us with ſome of our brethren, but with all our brethren, to receive from them, and to give them edification by living together in the ſame communion. And it would be to no purpoſe to pretend that our conſcience did oppoſe our being preſent at thoſe aſſemblies that are held under a Government that we do not approve; and that that would be to approve outwardly, what we inwardly condemn. For beſides that it would be neceſſary to examin well the queſtion, whether theſe oppoſitions do not proceed from a conſcience miſtaken by a precipitate judgment; ſince that the beſt men are often ſubject to frame themſelves ſuch ſcruples, as are not altogether lawful at the bottom. Farther then it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh three kinds of things; the one thoſe which the conſcience approves, and admits of, and in which it does fully acquieſce; the other which ſhe looks upon as intolerable, and deſtructive to the glory of God, and the true faith, or true piety, and the hopes of ſalvation; and others laſtly which are between theſe, that is to ſay ſuch as we do not fully approve as to the truth, but yet we do not believe them mortal enemies to true piety and ſalvation; in a word ſuch as we look upon as ſtains, and tolerable infirmities. I affirm that when we find things of this ſecond rank in any Aſſemblies, or thoſe which the Conſcience judges ſuch, we cannot be preſent there; and the whole queſtion will be reduced to this, to know, whether we be not miſtaken, where we ought to take good heed that we do not make a raſh judgment. But to imagin that we cannot with a good Conſcience be preſent at Aſſemblies, but only when we do fully and generally approve of all things in them, it is certainly not to know neither the uſe of charity, nor the laws of Chriſtian ſociety. This principle would overturn all Churches, for I cannot tell whether there be any, whoſe government, diſcipline, outward form, uſages, and practices be of ſuch perfection, that there is nothing at all in them to blame; and however it be, as the judgments of men are very different, this would be to open the gate to continual ſeparations, and to aboliſh all Aſſemblies. It is therefore certain that Conſcience does not oblige us to withdraw from the Aſſemblies, but on the contrary it obliges us to join with them, when the things that offend us are tolerable, and do not hinder the ſalutary efficacy of the Word, of the Divine Worſhip, and of the Sacraments. 'Tis the favour of this charitable patience that juſtifies our being preſent at thoſe things which we do not perfectly approve. See what St. *Paul* ſays to the *Philippians*, chap. 3. *If in any thing ye be otherways minded, God ſhall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheleſs, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the ſame rule, let us mind the ſame thing.* This is very far from ſaying, as ſoon as ye have the leaſt contrary ſentiment ſeparate your ſelves, Conſcience will not allow you to remain together. *Conſilia ſeparationis*, ſays St. *Auguſtin* againſt *Parmenian*, *inania ſunt & pernicioſa, & plus perturbant infirmos bonos, quam corrigant animoſos malos.* What deadly effects would not ſuch a ſeparation produce if it were eſtabliſhed amongſt you? As the diſpoſitions of men are, one ſhould quickly ſee to ſpring from hence a difference of intereſts, of parties, of opinions, even in reſpect of the civil ſociety, mutual hatred, and all the other ſad conſequences which a diviſion not tempered with charity does naturally produce. I let alone the ſcandal which all the Reformed Churches of *Europe* would receive by it, the joy which their Adverſaries would have, and the advantages which they would draw from it, which in all appearance would not be ſmall. I have too good an opinion of thoſe Gentlemen who believe that the Presbyterian Government is to be preferred before the Epiſcopal, not to be perſuaded that they make wiſe and ſerious reflections upon all theſe things, and many more which their own knowledge furniſhes them with; and that conſcience, and the love of the Proteſtant Religion will always hinder them from doing any thing, that may be blamed before God and men. For in fine I cannot believe that there is any one amongſt them that looks upon your Epiſcopacy, or your Diſcipline, or certain Ceremonies which you obſerve, as blots, and capital errors, which hinder a man from obtaining ſalvation, even with facility in your Aſſemblies, and under your Government. The queſtion here is not about the *Eſſe*, or the *bene Eſſe*, but only about the *melius Eſſe*, that they diſpute with you; and this being ſo, juſtice, charity, the love of peace, prudence, and zeal for Religion in the general will never allow that they ſhould divide themſelves from you.

But, my Lord, ſince you have put the pen into my hand upon this ſubject, I beſeech you pardon my freedom if it go ſo far as to tell you what I think you alſo ought to do on your part. I hope then that on theſe opportunities that God preſents unto you, you will make all the world ſee, and convince the moſt incredulous, that you have piety, zeal, and the fear of God, and that you are worthy labourers, and worthy ſervants of Jeſus Chriſt. This is the teſtimony which all good Men do already give you, and none how ſpightful ſoever he be dares to contradict it, and I do not doubt but that you will carry on your calling to the end. But beſides this, my Lord, I hope you will not be wanting in the duties of charity, and the ſpirit of peace, and that when the diſpute ſhall be only of ſome temperaments, or of ſome Ceremonies that are a ſtumbling-block, and which in themſelves are nothing in compariſon of an intire re-union of your Church under your holy Miniſtry, you will make it ſeen that you love the Spouſe of your Maſter more than your ſelves; and that it is not ſo much from your

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greatneſs, and your Eccleſiaſtical dignity that you deſire to receive your glory, and your joy, as from your paſtoral vertues, and the ardent care you take of your Flocks. I hope too that thoſe you have choſen and called to the holy Miniſtry, and thoſe which hereafter you ſhall with a prudent diſcretion call unto it, being governed not only by ſweetneſs, but likewiſe by ſeverity of diſcipline, when ſeverity ſhall be neceſſary, will tread in your ſteps, and happily follow the example which you ſhall give them, that they may be themſelves for an example, and edification to the Churches that are committed to them.

I conclude, my Lord, with very earneſt prayers which I preſent to God with all my heart, that it would pleaſe him always to preſerve unto you the light of his Goſpel, and to pour out upon the whole body of your Miniſtry, an abundant meaſure of his unction and heavenly benediction, of which that of the old *Aaron* was but a ſhadow; that it may be not the emblem, and image of brotherly concord, like the unction of old, but the cauſe and bond of it. I pray him that he would more and more bring back the heart of the Children to the Fathers, and of the Fathers to the Children, that your Church may be happy and pleaſant as the Paradiſe of God.

Laſtly I pray that he would preſerve you, my Lord, in perfect and long health, for his glory, and the good and advantage of that great and conſiderable part of his field which he has given you to cultivate, and which you do cultivate ſo happily. I deſire too the help of your holy prayers, and the continuance of the honour of your affection, proteſting to you that I will be all my life with all the reſpect that I owe you,

G.R. III.

My Lord,

Your moſt humble

and moſt obedient Servant

and Son in Jeſus Chriſt,

CLAUDE.

FINIS.